political science and political theory
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Political science and political theoryAynsley J. Kellow aa Temporary Lecturer, Centre for Environmental Studies , University of TasmaniaPublished online: 21 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Aynsley J. Kellow (1981) Political science and political theory, Politics, 16:1, 33-45
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Politics, XVI (1), May, 1981, pp 33-45 33
Political Science and Political TheoryAynsley J. Kellow
THEODORE J LOWI (1964; 1970; 1972)has developed a theory which states thatthere exist different types of policy, andthat each type of policy evokes a distinctpattern of political interaction (or 'arenaof power'); in short, he holds that policydetermines politics.
While assigning independent variablestatus to 'policy' offends the conventionalwisdom of political science, Lowi's provoc-ative analysis constitutes a promising butfrustrating contribution to the armouryavailable to political scientists studyingpublic policy. The frustration arises be-cause, while it promises much by way ofunderstanding, Lowi's analysis somehowfails to fulfil that promise and this gapbetween promise and delivery has servedas a stimulus for numerous attempts toincrease the pay-off. The result has beenconfusion rather than clarification as others(for example, Kjellberg 1977; Smith 1975;Salisbury 1968; Hayes 1978) have chimedin with new policy categories and revisionsto Lowi's original scheme. In writing thispaper I am in danger of simply addinganother item to what is coming to look likea stall at a policy theory jumble sale, but Icontend that through Lowi's work, andthat of his followers, runs a strand which ifmade explicit will overcome some of thedifficulties'associated with this approach.
The case I want to make out is thatLowi's theory would be improved if cast inthe language of E E Schattschneider—that
*I have benefited considerably from criticismsof earlier versions of this paper from Joe Atkinson(University of Auckland), Jim Flynn and TonyWood (University of Otago), Stanley Kochanek(Pennsylvania State University), and two anonym-ous referees.
Lowi's categories of policy type refer to theeffects of policy proposals on the scope ofthe conflict, which Schattschneider arguedwas determined by the visibility, intensityand direction of the conflict. That is to say,policies differ in terms of the visibility, in-tensity and direction of the issues they seekto solve. What follows then is a proposalof marriage to Lowi on Schattschneider'sbehalf. No great originality can be claimedfor this proposal because, as I shall demon-strate, I am simply responding formally toa number of flirtations from Lowi andothers.
Lowi's Policy Categories
Lowi (1964) has argued that distinct typesof policy evoke distinct patterns of politicsbecause legislative and organised group be-haviour vary according to the policy underconsideration. He develops his argumentthus:(1) Interpersonal relationships are deter-
mined by people's expectations of theresult of that interaction;
(2) In politics, expectations are determinedby policies;
(3) "Therefore a political relationship isdetermined by the type of policy atstake, so that for every type of policythere is likely to be a distinctive type ofpolitical relationship' (1964: 688).
This analysis rests on the assumption thatdistinct types of policy can be discerned,and Lowi argued (1964: 688-9) thatpolicies could be categorised according totheir types: Distributive, Regulatory, andRedistribute. Lowi was later (1970) toadd a fourth category—'constituent policy'—to this list, but he fails to provide goodreasons for its inclusion and initially
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explicitly stated that this was not a policycategory (Lowi 1967: 239). I shall omitthis confusing category from considerationbecause I suspect Lowi was yielding to whathe called 'the easy infinitude of four-celltables' (1967: 238) in including it.
Distributive policies are those by whicha benefit is given to a recipient, seeminglywithout anybody being deprived. Lowinotes that the term was first used to referto nineteenth century land distributionpolicies in the United States, but wasreadily extended to include subsidies, 'porkbarrel' programs, the traditional tariff, anddefence procurement. Their distinguishingcharacteristics are that the benefits dis-tributed can easily be disaggregated andparcelled out in isolated pieces and that(since no costs are apparent) 'the indulgedand the deprived, the loser and the recipientneed never come into direct confrontation'(Lowi 1964: 690). Note that Lowi doesnot deny that there are losers. Indeed, hebegins his description of the policy cate-gories with a statement which is crucial tothe thesis of this paper: 'In the long run, allgovernmental policies may be consideredredistributiye, because in the long run somepeople pay in taxes more than they receivein services' (Lowi 1964: 690). However,with distributive policies 'the deprivedcannot as a class be identified' because, hemaintains, the more influential groups willbe accommodated by further disaggregationof the benefits—that is, by the processknown as 'logrolling'. The crucial questionhere—a question I consider Schattschneidercan answer—is why the deprived do notcontest the policy, because it is their non-participation which gives rise to the politicalpattern Lowi associates with this type.
Regulatory policies are (like distributive)specific and individual in their impactbut (unlike distributive) are incapable ofbeing disaggregated by an 'almost infiniteamount'. They are stated in general termsbut their impact is one of 'directly raisingcosts and/or reducing or expanding thealternatives of private individuals' (Lowi1964: 690). They are implemented on acase-by-case basis but they cannot be
disaggregated to that level because theyinvolve the application of a general rule toa case and the general rule must apply toat least a sector of society—where a sectoris 'any set of common or substitutablecommodities or services' (Lowi 1964:691n). Regulatory policies are thereforesaid to be disaggregable only down to thesector level. Importantly, they also differfrom distributive policies in that theyinvolve a direct choice as to who will beindulged and who will lose.
Finally, redistributive policies also in-volve explicit choice between the indulgedand the deprived but their impact is onmuch larger groups—on those 'approachingsocial classes', the haves and have-nots(Lowi 1964: 691).
Lowi then proceeds to describe the'arenas of power' associated with therespective policy categories. While he doesthis with particular regard to which branchof American government usually dominatesthe settlement of each type of policy I wishto omit such morphological features fromthis analysis because I am interested inextending the applicability of the theory toother political systems (which might be lessfragmented and have more responsibleparty government, but which neverthelessallow an important role for interest groupactivity). I therefore propose to state simplythat each type of policy evokes a differentpattern of political activity, leaving asidewhich structure in a particular politicalsystem might dominate the resolution ofthe issue. The essence of Lowi's theorycan be retained because in non-Americansystems many issues evoke more pluralistpatterns of interaction and are not settledaccording to the ideologies of the politicalparties; Lowi predicts that such issues willbe regulatory, whereas those on which theparties will be active will be redistributive.
Note that Lowi uses 'issue' and 'policy'interchangeably in his 1964 article. I take itthat by 'policy' he means policy proposal(rather than policy output or outcome), andis not trying to say that a policy outputdetermines the political interaction whichproduces it. The confusion arises because as
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Lowi suggests, past policies are importantin defining issues, but while classificationof policies according to Lowi's types mightstill be difficult in practice his schema is notinherently post-dictive as Greenberg et al(1977: 1538) have suggested.1
Returning to the 'arenas of power' asso-ciated with policy types, Lowi contends(1964: 693) that on distributive issues eachitem can be dealt with separately with aresultant multiplication of interests andreduction of conflict. Relations betweenvarious interests are those of 'reciprocal non-interference' which Schattschneider (1935:135-6) described in his classic study of thetariff: each seeks benefits but does notoppose the granting of benefits sought byothers. Conflict is thus 'individualised', andLowi (1964: 695n) acknowledges that inThe Semisovereign People Schattschneider'offers some fascinating propositions aboutthe "scope of the conflict" which can easilybe subsumed within the scheme offeredhere'. Significantly, Schattschneider (1965)briefly explained the differences betweenthe passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act 1930and the Trade Expansion Act 19622 in termsof an expansion of the scope of the conflict,and it is my contention that a union ofLowi's theory with Schattschneider's analy-sis will overcome some of the difficultieswhich have been associated with it.
Lowi (1964: 695) argues that regulatorypolicies are decided by the political processdescribed by the pluralists. Because theyexplicitly both indulge and deprive they areconflictual, and because they are disaggreg-able only down to the sector level, groupsrepresenting those sectors contest both sidesof the issue—in contrast to the politicalpattern found with distributive policieswhere individual firms or corporations areactive on one side only. However, becausecoalitions form around shared, related inter-ests on regulatory issues, changes in interests(or the emergence of fresh conflicts ofinterests) make the typical power structureless stable than that for distributive policies(Lowi 1964: 697).
'Issues that involve redistribution cutcloser than any others along class lines and
activate interests in what are roughly classterms' (Lowi 1964: 707). Consequently,peak associations find the cohesion amongtheir sectors necessary to contest theseissues, just as individual firms are bondedinto sector groupings by regulatory issues.Lowi (1964: 709) provides a hypotheticalexample which nicely illustrates thisprogression:
Let us say, in brief, that on Monday night thebig associations meet in agreement and consider-able cohesion on the 'problem of government',the income tax, the Welfare State. On Tuesday,facing regulatory issues, the big associationsbreak up into their constituent trade or otherspecialised groups, each prepared to deal withspecial problems in its own special ways, usuallyalong subject matter lines. On Wednesday nightstill another fission takes place as the pork barreland other forms of subsidy and patronage comeunder consideration. The parent groups and'catalytic groups' still exist, but by Wednesdaynight they have little identity.
Reversing the order stated by Lowiabove, as we move from distributivethrough regulatory to redistributive wemove from issues upon which a few cor-porate individuals are active, through thoseupon which groups (or 'sectors') are activeto those on which peak associations findenough agreement to serve as the basis foraction. By then the shared interests areusually so stable, clear and consistent thatthey provide the basis for ideologies, notcorresponding directly to bourgeoisie andproletariat, Lowi (1964: 711) claims, butto the 'money-providing' and 'service-demanding' groups in society. At this levelpolitical parties become relevant to theresolution of the issue.
Now this progression to me amounts towhat Schattschneider called the socialisationof conflict, and I consider that his analysisprovides the answer to the question posedearlier: if all issues are redistributive, whydo those deprived by distributive policiesnot contest them?
Schattschneider and Problems ofClassification
The most frequent criticism raised against
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Lowi's theory concerns the problemsencountered in attempting to place anyexample of policy into one of the cate-gories. Francesco Kjellberg (1977: 556-7),James Q Wilson (1973: 328-9), and BruceOppenheimer (1974: 5), for example, haveargued that the categories are not mutuallyexclusive: any one policy example can befitted into any or all categories. Further,even if initial classification can be agreedupon, the policy often changes categoriesduring the policy process (Hayes 1978:156;Mann 1975). This difficulty of classificationappears to damn Lowi's theory (for ifclassification is not possible the theory isvapid) and highlights what Hugh Heclo(1972:105) considers to be the main sourceof unreality in such analytic categorisations—they are static, whereas 'behaviour andparticularly behaviour connected withpolicy is dynamic; the phenomena at issueare moving events, routines, strategies andadaptations' (Heclo 1972:106).
While this is a serious weakness of Lowi'stheory I consider it can be salvaged by revis-ing it in the light of Schattschneider's analy-sis which not only accounts for this problemof classification and issue movement butascribes to such phenomena a crucial rolein politics. I remain in basic agreement withWilson (1973: 330), therefore, in consider-ing that 'Lowi's fundamental insight—thatthe substance of a policy influences therole of organisations in its adoption—seemscorrect.. . '
Schattschneider's (1975) argument is thatthe outcome of any conflict is determined 3
by its scope which in turn is governed by thevisibility, intensity and direction of the con-flict. The outcome of any conflict dependsupon who participates in it; whether theaudience joins the fray on one side or theother or remains passive has importantconsequences for the result because itsparticipation on one side or the other cantip the balance of power in favour of eithercontestant. Although the whole of societycould participate in all conflicts (a situationwhich would be chaotic, to say the least) itrefrains from doing so, and whether anymember of the audience participates in any
conflict depends upon his being able to (a)see what the conflict is all about, (b) deter-mine that the outcome will affect him in animportant rather than a trivial manner, andupon (c) his attachment to other conflicts.If he is already involved in one or more con-flicts of greater visibility and/or intensity hewill be constrained from entering anotherfor he would have to abandon the morevisible and/or more intense conflict (at leastpartially) to participate in the new conflictbecause the cleavages of the conflictsintersect and are themselves in conflict.
I shall return to this 'conflict of conflicts'presently, but note in passing that if thecleavages of conflict coincide rather thanintersect—if the battle lines are drawn thesame on two or more issues—the issues aregeneralisable and can begin to serve as thebasis for political parties.
Schattschneider (1975: 4) maintains thatwith small conflicts the relative strengths ofthe participants are likely to be known inadvance and the weaker is likely to backdown. (I am unlikely to enter the boxingring with Muhammad Ali, for example). Ifthe weaker contestant succeeds in involvingthe audience in the conflict, however, thebalance of forces might be changed in hisfavour and he might engage in the conflict inanticipation of this socialisation of conflict.(I might enter the ring with Muhammad Aliif I knew that the audience of several thou-sand racists would spring to my aid before Iwas beaten beyond recognition—althoughthe rules of the game usually prevent thispossibility). The joining or quitting thecontest by any potential participant thuschanges the ratio of forces, and thatratio is never fixed until all are involved(Schattschneider 1975: 3-4).
Because small conflicts favour the strong(the weak can readily see that they will loseand will back down) it is usually the weakwho seek to socialise the conflict, to expandits scope by calling in outside help. Powerfulinterests therefore want private settlementswhereas the weak, the losers in privateconflicts 'go to the government', involvethe wider public—and only with suchoutside involvement do conflicts become
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political (Schattschneider 1975: 39). Thusfor Schattschneider politics is 'the social-isation of conflict' (1975: 38), and publicauthority functions to 'modify privatepower relations by enlarging the scope ofconflict' (1975: 40).- A danger lies herein,however, because one temptation open togovernments seeking to manage conflict isto try to privatise it and so while democratslike Schattschneider see the purpose ofgovernment being to provide an alternativepower system to counterbalance economicpower, there are tendencies for politics tomirror economics because a privatisationof conflict will favour those who possesseconomic power (see Schattschneider 1975:119). I will say more on this later.
In a complex society only a small numberof the multitude of potential conflicts everbecome significant. This reduction in thenumber of conflicts is a crucial part ofpolitics (Schattschneider 1975: 64) andvisibility, intensity and direction are im-portant in this respect. I regard as truismsthe propositions that an individual must (a)see a conflict and (b) feel strongly aboutthe outcome before he will participate in it,although I concede that some individualsmight relish a fight regardless of the spoils.However, visibility entails the acquisitionof information and, as Anthony Downs(1956: 238-56) has shown, the costs ofacquiring information are sufficiently pro-hibitive to lead to an individual acquiringlittle information on many issues relatingto consumption in order to maximise thebenefits accruing to him by concentratinghis investment in information (and hencehis political activity) in the one sphere:production (since he consumes in manyareas but produces in only one).
Down's point is essentially the same asSchattschneider's concerning the directionof conflict. People must choose among con-flicts; what they want more is the enemy ofwhat they want less (Schattschneider 1975:63). Their priorities determine which con-flict they participate in, thus ensuring boththat many conflicts remain privatised (to theadvantage of the economically powerful)and that conflict is more predictable—to the
advantage of politicians (see Schattschneider1975: 63-9). According to the 'doctrine ofthe chosen battlefield', the substitution ofone conflict for another is a vital politicalstrategy because both conflicts compete forthe loyalty and attention of the public, withthe more intense and visible dominating or(if both are equal on these dimensions) sup-port being dissipated. The manipulation ofissues by political leaders is vital accordingto Schattschneider because 'the definitionof the alternatives is the supreme instrumentof power . . . the definition of alternativesis the choice of conflicts, and the choice ofconflicts allocates power' (1975:68 roriginalemphasis).
A great hazard for any issue is thus a flankattack by those pressing inconsistent issuesthat compete for the attention and loyaltyof the public. Earlier Schattschneider (1952:19) gave as examples of this phenomenonthe subordination of national and localconflicts to international conflicts and thesubordination of other conflicts to racialconflict in the American South. I take it thatracial conflict long allowed real questions ofdistributive justice to go unasked, let alonebe answered, in the South because poorwhites were able to extend racist argumentsto account for their poverty. Similarly,David Adamany (1975: xxv) cites theexample of Nixon's landslide in 1972,where he won over working-class Democratsby associating McGovern with 'amnesty,abortion and acid' rather than with thetraditional Democratic concerns for socialwelfare. A similar explanation might begiven for the National Party victory in NewZealand in the 1975 election, because thatparty produced a more attractive proposalfor superannuation while at the same timeappealing to working-class conservativesby opposing compulsory trade unionismand government interference in sportingcontacts with South Africa.
This is nothing more than the skeleton ofSchattschneider's analysis and is includednot as a substitute for a reading of his workbut as a reminder of its line of argument.It is sufficiently complete, however, for meto return to Lowi's theory and argue that
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while all policies are essentially redistri-butive some appear to be distributive orregulatory because they are framed as suchin order to restrict the scope of conflict.
Lowi Re-examinedRecall that distributive issues are those inwhich a recipient is given a benefit, ap-parently without anyone bearing the cost.We know that the cost is borne by all tax-payers and that others lose relative to thebeneficiary by not being granted benefits,but the policy does not identify the losers.The cost is thus obscure (visibility) and ex-tremely small (intensity) for any individualtaxpayer and the information costs neededto be incurred to increase the visibilitycould well be greater than the cost to theindividual citizen in providing the benefit.Even in the absence of commitments toother issues, therefore, there is no incentivefor citizens to oppose the granting of suchbenefits and the conflict remains privatised.Those who lose relative to the beneficiary(by not being given part of the benefit) willboth see their loss more clearly and feelit more intensely. This statement mighttrouble the reader, because it might seemthat the relative losers do not suffer anygreater loss than all other revenue providers;however, the relative losers will be thosewho identify themselves as being similar tothe beneficiary (business corporations inthe same sector of the economy—defencecontractors, for example) and they will cer-tainly consider they have lost by not beinggranted a benefit. In Schattschneider'swords, 'Changes in the relative position ofthings are painful' (1975: 125; originalemphasis).
While such losing firms will not opposethe granting of the benefit, they will alsowant a piece of it and must be bought offby the logrolling process until the porkbarrel has been divided sufficiently toensure that the conflict is contained. Thispoint will be reached when those notaccommodated are less influential thanthose who have been; the losers then knowthat to oppose the granting of the benefitwould be futile because they would lose
unless they called in outside help. But tosocialise the conflict would spoil the mini-mal visibility business enjoys and whichwill perhaps allow them to be granted abenefit next time. The bargaining power ofthe relative losers therefore both stems fromand is limited by the necessity to maintainlow visibility and intensity—if the log wasrolled too far and the size of the porkbarrel increased endlessly to accommodatetheir demands, the deceit could not bemaintained. As Lowi (1972a: 31-2) hasnoted, successful logrolling usually occursout of public view.
A troubling feature of the distributivecategory is that it is difficult to see suchpolicies as policies at all because eachbenefit is apparently granted withoutreference to a general rule, whereas accep-ted definitions of 'policy' (Kerr 1976, forexample) stipulate that policies are generalrules specifying actions to be taken undercertain circumstances in order to achievecertain goals. Distributive policies amountto actions alone for which the general rulecan only be determined after the event byaggregating the smaller policy decisions.Distributive policies such as farm subsidiesor tariff protection still entail general rules,therefore, but their non-declaration isimportant in containing conflict by dimini-shing visibility. Indeed, should the glare ofpublicity fall upon it, such patronage ishard to defend without recourse to ageneral rule which can be shown to beserving a goal justifiable to a significantsector of the public (helping the balanceof payments, or stimulating industrialdevelopment to ensure employment).
A regulatory policy on the other handinvolves the explicit application of a generalrule to a sector of society on a case-by-casebasis. The allocation of costs and benefitsis at the sector level, so the scope of theconflict evoked by such issues is inevitablywider than the 'non-conflict' surroundingdistribution. In addition, the losers areclearly identified and can readily see thattheir interests will be adversely affected;whereas distributive policies offer carrotsas inducements, regulatory policies usually
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use sticks to alter behaviour. The conflictgenerated by such policies, being both morevisible and more intense, is wider in scope.
Adding Schattschneider to Lowi explainshow the different types of policy can beidentified and not only accounts for themovement of issues but assigns causal signi-ficance to such movement. Individuals andgroups forego opposition to distributiveissues because they have attachments tomore visible and more intense conflictswhich conflict with distributive issues;however, should such conflicts cease tobe dominant (because they are resolved,because of the issue-manipulations ofleadership, or because the costs of provid-ing the distributive benefit escalate), thendistributive issues can be transformed intoregulatory or even redistributive issues (ifthey align with conflict between haves andhave-nots).
If we assume that individuals and groupsgive priority to holding on to what theyalready have over gaining additional benefits—an assumption confirmed by studies of thebudgetary process (Wildavsky 1964; Hartle1976)—we can see that they will be morestrongly motivated to contest a regulatorypolicy which affects them than to attemptto obtain additional benefits by becomingactive on distributive issues. If they expectto receive distributive benefits the code ofmutual non-interference will dictate thatthey should not oppose the granting of suchbenefits to others; if they do not expectdistributive benefits the low visibility andintensity of the costs of providing such abenefit plus their commitment to dominantconflicts (which promise a higher returnfor invested effort) ensure the absence ofopposition on a large number of smalldistributive issues.
The costs of financing distributive bene-fits are imposed upon the public throughhigher prices or general government revenueswhich are usually collected by means whichensure low visibility and intensity—incomeis taxed at its source in small, regularamounts so the payer is much less aware ofhis contribution. This relatively painless im-position of costs and their pooling before
distribution is thus crucial for the allocationof resources in society with minimal conflict(Hartle, 1976). As comparison of (lumpsum) local government taxes and 'pay asyou earn' income taxes readily suggests,and as Schattschneider (1957: 939) haspointed out, if individual taxpayers had tomake one large, annual contribution theirsubsequent revolt would make distributivepolicies politically impossible.
Despite the fact that taxation is used toprovide distributive benefits, Lowi (1964:706-7) classifies taxation policies as re-distributive, reinforcing my point that allpolicies redistribute benefits but differ inthe way they are framed so as to limit thescope of conflict. Redistributive issues arethe big battles, victory in which will yielda greater return for invested commitmentthan would result if 'service-demanding'interests successfully opposed dozens ofdistributive policies. Should the generalsummed pattern of distributive policies-(as favouring the 'haves') become clear thenthey will reinforce (rather than conflictwith) the dominant, redistributive cleavageand be contested on ideological grounds.Usually, however, losers in the economicgame seek to maximise their welfare bypolitical means on a few big redistributiveissues and a number of regulatory issuesand so abandon the distributive battlefieldto their opponents who can seek to offsetany losses they have been unable to avoidin conflicts of wider scope.
What I propose, therefore, is that weregard 'distributive', 'regulatory' and 'redis-tributive' not as the fixed categories whichLowi's critics find unrealistic, but ratheras graduations on a continuum of issuedefinition which indicate the scope ofconflict a policy proposal is likely to evoke.This requires revision of Lowi's 'policiesdetermine politics' by admitting that this isonly part of the picture. The revision wouldunambiguously restore policy to ultimatedependent variable status and in its shortestform would read 'politics determines policyoutputs'. Note that this is not the reverse ofLowi's dictum but that it incorporates it. Iam not disputing Lowi's insight—that the
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way an issue is defined and hence a policyproposal is framed has a causal influence onthe ensuing pattern of politics. I am addingto that, however, the notion adopted fromSchattschneider that politics influences thedefinition of issues and another notion—which if not correct means the study ofpublic policy by political scientists is futile—that political interaction over policyproposals has a causal influence on policyoutputs.
This formulation, I maintain, representsan advance over Lowi's because, firstly,it not only accounts for the problems ofclassification but ascribes causal signi-ficance to the ability of issues to fit anycategory and be moved at any time accord-ing to the perceptions of those affected.Secondly, by stating Lowi in the parlanceof Schattschneider we can be clear that weare talking about policy proposals, so thetheory need not be post-dictive (regardlessof how difficult measuring the perceptionsof participants might prove in practice) andpolicy can be restored to dependent variablestatus (which is what political scientists havelong believed it to have). Finally, I havestripped Lowi's theory of all references tothe American political system so that byadding different assumptions about thegroup system, the party system, politicalculture, and so on, it should be able to bemore readily applied to other politicalsystems.
Revisions of Lowi
I now want to briefly discuss my refor-mulation of Lowi in relation to revisionsto Lowi's theory and my starting pointhere is to draw attention to a significantchange which occurs along the distributive-regulatory-redistributive continuum: as thescope of the conflict widens the size ofactive organisations increases.
Thus far I have referred to individuals'perceptions of issues, preferences, andintensity of feeling as determining the like-lihood of their contesting them. Although Iwould argue that these three variables alsoinfluence decisions to participate takenby groups (as 'corporate individuals'), the
fact that, voting aside, most individualsparticipate in politics collectively shouldnot be glossed over. In addition to notingthe factors which influence whether anindividual or group will participate in anyconflict, we should therefore also considerthose which influence the formation ofthe groups themselves; here I draw uponthe works of Mancur Olson (1965) andAnthony Downs (1957).
Both Downs and Olson discuss theparticipation of individuals in groupsaccording to the precepts of rationalityand, although they take different tacks,both show how some interests will berelatively under-represented in group poli-tics. Olson's argument centres on the 'freerider' problem associated with public or in-divisible goods. This is that if no member ofa community of interest can be preventedfrom partaking of the benefits providedby collective action, the price of groupmembership cannot be extracted from himin voluntary exchange for the benefit; hethus receives the benefit whether he payshis dues or not and since his not joiningmakes only a marginal difference to thestrength of the group (and hence the levelof the benefit which accrues to him) it isrational not to join since his welfare is thusmaximised. Interests in public goods willtherefore be understated in politics unlessthe group uses coercion to ensure member-ship or provides an additional exclusivebenefit which it can use to induce paymentof membership costs.
Downs's analysis, as we have seen, issimilar to Schattschneider's point that in-dividuals must choose between conflicts. Itruns as follows: an individual will only makethe investment of the price of membershipwhen he is likely to receive a return greaterthan the outlay; since he consumes in manyareas but produces in only one he willconcentrate his political activity in theproductive sphere. The two arguments arecomplementary: interests in indivisiblebenefits (including consumer interests) willbe inadequately organised into politics(Olson) while productive interests will bewell organised (Downs). Schattschneider
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(1975: 22-35) makes essentially the samepoint in distinguishing public from privateinterests and organised from unorganisedinterests while arguing that 'organisation isthe mobilisation of bias', but fails to makeexplicit the relationship Downs and Olsonshow between the degree of organisationand the type of benefit in question.
The point has been well made by James QWilson (1973: 332), however, who proposesthat policies should be classified accordingto the scope of the costs and benefits theyinvolve rather than on Lowi's scheme.According to Wilson's analysis distributivepolicies would be those with narrow bene-fits and wide costs, regulatory those withnarrow costs and narrow benefits or widebenefits (since regulation is often performedin the public interest), and redistributivethose with wide benefits and wide costs.While this points in the same direction asthe approach I have proposed it fails tomake explicit the importance of visibility,intensity and direction in determiningpolitical patterns likely to result from thesetypes of policy and, lacking these importantdynamic factors, we are still left with fixedcategories which tell us little about the re-definition of issues which can be importantin determining outcomes.
In reviewing Olson's work Lowi (1970)also applies this distinction, but discusses itin terms of coercion; he correctly sees theimposition of costs as involving greatercoercion than the provision of benefits inattempts to alter behaviour. For example,because distributive policies
work entirely on the benefits side, and coercionis displaced on to the general revenue system orto all who have no access to the program inquestion, it is possible to disaggregate theavailable resources and to treat each decisionin isolation from other decisions (Lowi 1970'.320).
Now the general revenue system is fundedby taxation policies which Lowi classesas redistributive; what I contend requireexplanation are the factors which deter-mine who shall have 'no access to theprogram in question'—factors I considerSchattschneider provides.
In this later paper Lowi (1970: 321)distinguishes distributive policies fromregulatory or redistributive on the basis ofthe likelihood of coercion, with the likeli-hood being immediate for these last twocategories where the losers are clearly iden-tified. In the phraseology I have adoptedfrom Schattschneider I propose that thedistinction should be made in terms ofvisibility and intensity: more visible costsprovide a greater incentive to contest apolicy; and policies imposing costs willbe felt more intensely (and hence involvegreater coercion if adopted) than those ofequivalent visibility which provide benefits.Visibility can be 'bought' by expendingorganisational resources to obtain moreinformation; the availability of suchresources will depend on the nature of thecosts and benefits, and decisions aboutwhether to expend them on one issuerather than another will depend upon thepriority assigned by the group to the issuein question (the direction of the conflict).
The distinction on the basis of thecollective or private nature of the costs andbenefits involved (proposed by Wilson) alsoindicates that two policy types have beenlumped together by Lowi: both imposenarrow costs but the benefits might bewide (regulation in the 'public interest') ornarrow (regulation of competing narrowinterests). The phenomenon of symbolicquiescence described by Murray Edelman(1964) in his analysis of anti-trust policycan therefore be seen as being regulation inthe public interest (narrow costs and widebenefits). The pattern Edelman describesis one where the adoption of a policy out-put assuages the constituencies of publicinterest groups while private interestssuccessfully obstruct implementation ofthe policy on a case-by-case basis. Policymakers can thus avoid choosing betweenconflicting interests by manipulating visibil-ity in order to privatise conflict duringimplementation. If there is to be a fourthcell in a matrix of policy types it is betterfilled by this variant of regulation than byLowi's confusing 'constituent' type.
Elsewhere Lowi (1969: 125-56) has
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condemned this practice as 'policy-without-law' and, although he has not dealt withthe redefinition of issues in his more widelyread work has explicitly stated that 'Whenthis happens, what started out to be regula-tory policy turns out to be distributive . . . '(1972a: 41).1 Note that this is only onepossible reaction to situations where 'adynamic interest-group system is too stale-mated to arrive at any appropriate policydecisions at all' (Lowi 1972a: 40). Otherpossibilities are repression by governingelites or 'the emergence of a social move-ment and an eventual redefinition of thepolicy as a demand for a broad redistribu-tion of power' (1972a: 40). In agreementwith my argument here, Lowi (1972a: 41)notes that 'Schattschneider refers to thispolitical transformation as the expansionand socialisation of conflict'.
It is my contention that the confu-sion stemming from the abundance ofpolicy typologies can be overcome byreformulating Lowi's theory in the light ofSchattschneider.41 have done no more herethan attempt a tentative cross-fertilisationof the two and it remains to be seenwhether this attempt will be any morefruitful in empirical applications thanLowi's theory or its successors. After all,cross-fertilisations can produce hybridsincapable of bearing fruit, but let me closeby discussing a couple of points whichindicate the cross might be worthwhile.
Firstly, the hybrid theory I have proposedis suggestive of a number of propositionsabout the policy-making process. It isimmediately apparent that those seekingbenefits will do better to frame theirdemands in such a way that they will notarouse opposition (distributive) and thoseopposing the granting of benefits (or oppos-ing an existing situation which is to theirdisadvantage) will do better if they cansocialise the conflict by portraying the issuein redistributive or, at the least, regulatoryterms. While an ideal strategy for the latterwould be to involve all possible opponentswithout drawing in all possible beneficiaries,this will be very difficult to achieve for itwill require the issue to be generalised and
those identifying with the winners will seewhat is at stake just as clearly as the losers.All this is only to repeat Schattschneider'spoint that the strong seek to privatiseconflict and the weak to socialise it. WhatI find significant is that there are strongincentives for policy makers which lie inthe same direction as those for the winnersin private conflicts, because their chancesof re-election will be enhanced if they canmake benefits as visible as possible whiledisguising costs. That is, policy makers willhave greater success in managing conflict ifthey can keep conflicts predictable, whichis most easily achieved when issues aredisaggregated and the weak refrain fromparticipating in a multitude of distributiveissues—any one of which affects them verylittle and on which they are likely to loseanyway.
This amounts to a repetition of therationale behind Charles E Lindblom's(1959) prescriptive and descriptive modelof incremental policy-making. Leaving asidethe question of whether policy shouldadvance only by the cumulation of a seriesof small steps (because of incomplete know-ledge), Lindblom is correct in pointing outthat political rationality usually dictatesthat it will be, if it is to advance at all.Lowi has made essentially the same point,both descriptively and in offering a prescrip-tion which runs counter to Lindblom's.Lowi (1972: 308) has argued that we shouldbe able to choose between policy optionswhich promise an equal (if uncertain) like-lihood that we will achieve our goals usinghis typology as a criterion—that is, on thegrounds that one will have a more desirableimpact on the political system. I wouldargue that policy makers already exercisesuch judgments in practice, a point Lowi(1972a: 34) seems to appreciate in statingthat distributive policies 'are the ones mostlikely to be adopted earliest and in largestnumber'.
While the force of Lowi's descriptivepoint lies in the same direction as Lind-blom's (towards a privatisation of conflict)he differs sharply from Lindblom overprescription. While Lindblom has strong
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Popperian grounds for recommending incre-mentalism (a variant of Popper's 'piecemealsocial engineering'), Lowi argues that,despite political rationality, democratsshould eschew the deception of distributivepolicies 'because nothing open and demo-cratic can come of them'(Lowi 1972: 308).Distributive policies, or regulatory policieswhich degenerate into the distributive typebecause they are 'policy-without-law', thushave bad implications for responsiblegovernment because 'we should expect thatcontrol would come to rest a considerabledistance from politically responsible levelsand would tend to resist being recentralisedif and when a change is desired' (1972a:34-5).
Finally, policies which are distributive inappearance will be more readily permittedunder certain prevailing economic condi-tions; these are indicated by the origin ofthe term 'distributive'—the parcelling outof land. The ability of policy makers todeal with problems by distributive meansappears to be dependent upon an economicsurplus (or an expanding national 'frontier').Robert Dahl (1970: 66-73), for example,shows how an economic surplus 'can bedrawn on to facilitate peaceful adjustmentof conflicts . . . [since it] makes it easierfor the parties to a conflict to be "boughtoff"' (Dahl 1970: 72). With an expandingfrontier—as the United States had in thenineteenth century (Potter 1954: 114-21)—or a growing economy, distribution offersa politically easy way to avoid conflict.However, should growth stop or the frontierreach its limits further benefits can only beprovided at the expense of others: as thegame theorists would say, the situationbecomes zero-sum. Because conflict mustthen become redistributive (or regulatory,if its scope can be partially confined) greaterossification into class-based ideologies and
political parties might then be expected, andthe stronger and more long-standing organis-ation of such parties around redistributiveissues in 'old world' Europe (as comparedwith countries with colonial origins) can beexplained.5
The theory also provides some insightinto why inflation is difficult to solve inliberal democracies: in addition to theeconomic surplus provided by growth, or asa substitute for it, inflation provides a veryuseful impediment to visibility by makingreal wins and losses much more difficult tocalculate. Indeed, Hayes (1978: 147) goesso far as to argue that the use of distributivepolicies for reasons of political conveniencecauses inflation because
co-operation is accomplished by passing on thecosts of- tariff protection to consumers in theform of higher prices, or, in the case of subsidiesor rivers and harbours legislation, by raisingtaxes or inflating the currency.6
ConclusionThe above two examples do not amount toa justification of the union between Lowiand Schattschneider I have attempted here—that can only come by harnessing therevision to the task of the empirical study ofpublic policy. The examples do indicate thatwe might expect more from the theory thanit has so far delivered in either its originalform or its many reformulations-manyof which flirt with Schattschneider butstop short of attempting cross-fertilisation.Should the hybrid theory I have proposedprove unfruitful then at least we can discarda possible solution not previously explored.
There is every reason to be optimistic,however. Mules can be very useful—if oftendifficult to get to work; once harnessed tothe empirical task and prodded into actionthis one promises to be worthwhile.
ENDNOTES1. To be quite clear on this point, Lowi is
treating policy as an independent variable but hisdependent variable is the pattern of politics.Lowi's theory therefore concerns only part of thepolicy-making process and the additions I make
here seek to specify the factors both preceding theproduction of policy proposals and the productionof policy outputs. Any attempt to utilise Lowi'scontribution alone, as a theory of the policy pro-cess is therefore bound to run into difficulties.
2. It was in order to explain the differencesbetween tariff politics in these two eras that Lowi
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dropped and problems associated with the latterovercome (see Debnam, 1975). Schattschneidercoined the phrase 'mobilisation of bias', but thefull statement (usually overlooked by non-decisiontheorists) is 'organisation is itself a mobilisation ofbias' (Schattschneider 1975: 30, original emphasis).My synthesis provides for such problems of organ-isation, the manipulation of issues by elites, andother attempts to restrict the scope of conflict(such as 'self-regulation').
5. In a recent paper Robert Goodin and JohnDryzek (1980) have made a similar point. Althoughthey confine their discussion to the effects of landsettlement on democratic participation, I am sug-gesting here a more general relationship betweeneconomic structure and politics. Note, however,that the more fully developed class-based partieswhich exist in Australia and New Zealand (as com-pared with the United States) can be attributed tothe colonisation of these centres by the Wakefieldsettlement scheme, which perpetrated to someextent the inequalities of Europe.
6. The idea that politicians deliberately pursueinflationary policies, rather than act in ignoranceof economic theory, has recently been explored byWhitehead (1979). At the time of revising thispaper (November 1980) fiscal drag has increasedincome tax receipts in New Zealand by over30 per cent during a period when the stated aimof the government has been to move from directto indirect taxation. As a result, New Zealandershave been paying more direct taxation (despite tax'cuts') as well as indirect taxes which have beenadded—with few cries of complaint.
REFERENCESAdamany, David (1975), 'Introduction', in Schatt-
schneider (1975).Dahl, Robert A (1970), Modern Political Analysis,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.Debnam, Geoffrey (1975), 'Nondecisions and
Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz',American Political Science Review, 69: 889-907.
Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory ofDemocracy, Harper and Row, New York.
Edelman, Murray (1964), The Symbolic Uses ofPolitics, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
Froman, Lewis A (1967), 'An Analysis of PublicPolicies in Cities', Journal of Politics, 29:94-108.
Goodin, Robert and Dryzek, John (1980), 'RationalParticipation: The Politics of Relative Power',British Journal of Political Science, 10: 273-92.
Greenberg, George D, Miller, Jeffrey A, Mohr,Lawrence B, Vladeck. Bruce C (1977), 'Devel-oping Public Policy Theory: Perspectives FromEmpirical Research', American Political ScienceReview, 71: 1532-43.
Hartle, D G (1976), A Theory of the ExpenditureBudgetary Process, Ontario Economic Council,Toronto.
Hayes, Michael T (1978), 'The Semi-SovereignPressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theoryand an Alternative Typology', Journal ofPolitics, 40: 134-61.
Heclo, H Hugh (1972), 'Review Article: PolicyAnalysis', British Journal of Political Science,
2: 83-108.Kerr, Donna H (1976), "The Logic of "Policy" and
Successful Policies , Policy Sciences, 7: 351-63.Kjellberg, Francesco (1977), 'Do Policies (Really)
Determine Politics? And Eventually How?',Policy Studies Journal, 5: 554-70.
Lindblom, Charles E (1959), 'The Science of"Muddling Through" ', Public AdministrationReview, 19: 79-88.
Lowi, Theodore J (1964), 'American Business, Pub-lic Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory',World Politics, 16: 677-715.
Lowi, Theodore J (1967), 'Party, Policy andConstitution in America', in Chambers, W Nand Burnham, W D (eds), The American PartySystems: Stages of Development, Oxford Uni-versity Press, New York.
Lowi, Theodore J (1969), The End of Liberalism,Norton, New York.
Lowi, Theodore J (1970), 'Decision Making vsPolicy Making: Toward an Antidote for Tech-nocracy', Public Administration Review, 30:314-25.
Lowi, Theodore J (1972), 'Four Systems of Policy.Politics and Choice', Public AdministrationReview, 33: 298-310.
Lowi, Theodore J (1972a), 'Population Policiesand the American Political System', in Clinton,Richard L, Flash, William S, Godwin, R Kenneth(eds), Political Science in Population Studies,Lexington Books, Lexington.
originally put forward his typology.3. Both Lowi and Schattschneider use 'deter-
mine'. I regard this as a little strong and wouldprefer 'influence', as other factors are also likelyto be important, but have retained their usage forthe sake of clarity.
4. Revisions of Lowi or similar categorisationshave been attempted by Smith (1975), Froman(1967), Rose (1970: 196-200), Oppenheimer(1974), Hayes (1978), Salisbury (1968) andSalisbury and Heinz (1970), and many have flirtedwith the synthesis I have attempted here: Hayes(1978: 154-61) uses Schattschneider in order tospecify the inter-relatedness of his underlyingdimensions and to allow for the movement ofissues, but simply tacks Schattschneider on toLowi without seeing the similarity; Smith merelynotes the similarity; Kjellberg (1977: 556) doeslittle more than repeat Lowi's remark in 1964 thata synthesis might be possible; Salisbury takes ashis dimensions the type of demand pattern andthe structure of the decisional system and later,with Heinz, focuses on the costs and benefits ofdecision makers; Froman similarly distinguishes'areal' and 'segmental policies.
In a paper which has appeared since thispiece was submitted Pennock (1979) has proposeda similar theory based upon the distribution ofcosts and benefits, intensity and visibility, andconsiderations of rationality without makingSchattschneider explicit, however. By actuallydoing this I consider we are left with a neaterscheme. For example, Hayes's categories of'non-interference' and 'non-decision' can be
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Mann, Dean E (1975), Political Incentives in USWater Policy: Relationships Between Distribut-ive and Regulatory Politics', in Holden, Matthewand Dresang, Dennis L (eds), What GovernmentDoes, Sage (Sage Yearbooks in Politics andPublic Policy, Vol 1), Beverley Hills.
Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of CollectiveAction, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Massachusetts.
Oppenheimer, Bruce Ian (1974), Oil and the Con-gressional Process, Lexington Books, Lexington.
Pennock, J Roland (1979), 'Another LegislativeTypology', Journal of Politics, 41: 1206-13.
Potter, David M (1954), People of Plenty, ChicagoUniversity Press, Chicago.
Rose, Richard (1970), People in Politics, Faberand Faber, London.
Salisbury, Robert (1968), 'The Analysis of PublicPolicy' in Ranney, Austin (ed), Political Scienceand Public Policy, Markham, Chicago.
Salisbury, Robert and Heinz, John (1970), 'ATheory of Policy Analysis and Some Prelim-inary Applications', in Sharkansky, Ira (ed),
Policy Analysis in Political Science, Markham,Chicago.
Schattschneider EE (1935), Politics, Pressures,and the Tariff, Atherton, New York.
Schattschneider, E E (1952), 'Political Parties andthe Public Interest', The Annals, 280: 18-26.
Schattschneider, E E (1957), 'Intensity, Visibility,Direction and Scope', American Political ScienceReview, 51: 933-42.
Schattschneider, EE (1965), Review of Bauer,Pool and Dexter, American Business and PublicPolicy, Public Opinion Quarterly, 29: 343-4.
Schattschneider, E E (1975), The SemisovereignPeople, The Dryden Press, Hinsdale.
Smith, T Alexander (1975), The ComparativePolicy Process, Clio Books, Santa Barbara.
Whitehead, Laurence (1979), 'The Political Causesof Inflation', Political Studies, 27: 564-77.
Wildavsky Aaron (1964), The Politics of the Bud-getary Process, Little, Brown, Boston.
Wilson, James Q (1973), Political Organisations,Basic Books, New York.
New ZealandNew Zealand writings are rarely included in either the Australiana or 'other' sections ofPolitics since they are adequately covered in POLS: New Zealand Political Studies Associ-ation Newsletter. See 5 (2), December 1980. This issue has also a full list of NZ PoliticalStudies Conference (1980) and APSA (1979,1980) papers.
Membership of NZPSA, which includes POLS, is: Professional $5.00; Institutional$10.00; Students $2.00; from A D McRobie, Treasurer, NZPSA, Christchurch TeachersCollege, PO Box 31-065, Christchurch. The NZ journal is Political Science with manyissues (July 1980, 'Political Psychology') of general interest. Yours for $7.50 pa, $10.50(institutions) and $6.00 (students) from
Political Science (Business)Information SectionVictoria University of WellingtonPrivate BagWellingtonNew Zealand.
All prices in $NZ. For years many NZ colleagues have supported APSA at conferencesand by subscriptions. Let colleagues in Australia do their best to reciprocate—at leastcheck your library and order both journals. They are very good value and not expensive.
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