SOCIAL JUSTICE

1. Astudillo vs. Board of Directors, PHHC

GR NO. L-28066 SEPT. 22,1976

DOCTRINE:

The State is committed to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing (Secs. 6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution). But the State's solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean that it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private. "In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of the lawful and unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution" (Bernardo vs. Bernards, 96 Phil. 202, 206).

FACTS:

On December 28, 1957 applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piñahan, Quezon City.

His application was approved. He made a downpayment of P840, an amount equivalent to ten percent of the price of the lot. On September 9, 1961 the PHHC and Mitra executed a contract of conditional sale. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more than P9,000, a final deed of sale was executed in his favor on February 18, 1965. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to him on March 1, 1965.

The lot in question is actually in the possession of Peregrina Astudillo. She constructed thereon a residential house (a shanty, according to Mitra). She admits that she has been squatting on the said lot "uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the present”. She filed with the administrative investigating committee of the PHHC a request dated February 24, 1963, praying for the cancellation of the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra and asking the committee to recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No action was taken on that request. She questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She asked that Lot 16 be sold to her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC board to award that lot to her.

HELD:

NO. We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the award to Mitra and to require that she be allowed to purchase the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16. In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could have been impaired by that award (Bañez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 22).

The record does not show, and Peregrina does not claim, that she is a member of the Piñahan Homeowners Association some of whose members are "deserving squatters" (Kempis vs. Gonzales, L-31701, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 439).

In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because, in the first place, she has no right to the lot. Not being principally or subsidiarily bound in the contract of sale between Mitra and the PHHC, she is not entitled to ask for its annulment (Art. 1397, Civil Code).

Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter (erroneously referred to as section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 648) which provides that the PHHC should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent housing for those who may be unable otherwise to provide themselves therewith" and that it should acquire large estates for their resale to bona fide occupants.

Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do not justify her act of squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that the lot be sold her because she does not yet own a residential lot and house. She is not a bona fide occupant of Lot 16.

SSSEA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

DOCTRINE:

While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180; In lieu of strikes, government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.

FACTS:

SSS Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against SSSEA for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while SSSEA filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. SSSEA contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the SSSEA are covered by the Civil Service laws, thus they have no right to strike and that they are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE, so the court may enjoin the SSSEA from striking.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SSSEA’s members, being government employees, have the right to strike?

RULING:

NO. The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law". On the other hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress”, referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180, the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees” and that the SSS isone such government-controlled corporations with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, so its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. Government employees may, however, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule

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III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

The Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.

PEOPLE VS LEACHON

G.R. No. 108725-26. September 25, 1998

DOCTRINE: Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.

However, what is meant by “in accordance with law” and “just and humane manner” is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.

FACTS:

Pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate informations for violation of P. D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge Hon. Emilio Leachon Jr.

The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judgeissued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of “lack of jurisdiction.”

From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the CA for proper disposition.

On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the CA came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases, and disposing, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.” Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and

humane manner.

Every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, enjoys this presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, Anti-Squatting Law, was still effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically on urban land reform and housing.

Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated."

Presidential Decree No. 772, on the other hand, states: “Sec. 1. Any person, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine not less than one thousand or more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. If the offender is a corporation or association, the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the president, director, manager or managing partners thereof.”

In dismissing subject criminal cases for anti-squatting, respondent Judge ratiocinated that “if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered evicted, it will run counter to the said specific constitutional provisions because the conviction and eviction will not be in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and rural dwellers (referring to all accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government consulted all the accused as to where they should be relocated.” The import of the Order of dismissal under scrutiny is that- should the eviction be in a just and humane manner, the same shall be valid and upheld.

However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by “in accordance with law” and “just and humane manner” is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.

Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged “squatters” the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners.

In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu proprio, after the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the three accused an opportunity to present their evidence. What is more, there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of P. D. 772 was ever posed by the accused. Consequently, such an issue cannot be given due course for the simple reason that it was not raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity.

NB: But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act

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No. 8368, entitled “An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts’” was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that “all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.” PETITION DISMISSED.

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997

DOCTRINE: An employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law.

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUES:

Whether De Guzman’s concealment of her marriage a valid ground to terminate her

HELD:

NO. Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social

institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

EPZA VS. CHR

G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992

DOCTRINE: CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ.

FACTS:

P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia. Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoñez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint.They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"

The CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A). Two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders. On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?

HELD:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the "preventive measures

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and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

PEOPLE VS DULAY

G.R. NO. 193854. SEPTEMBER 24, 2012

DOCTRINE: The purpose of the R.A. 7610 is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

FACTS:

Prosecution’s facts (from the testimony of AAA and Dr. Tan) -Dulay convinced complainant AAA, 12 years of age, to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they looked for Dulay’s boyfriend in several places. When they went to Bulungan Fish Port to ask for some fish, they saw Dulay's boyfriend. AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dulay suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police station. The Parañaque City Police Office asked the assistance of the Child Protection Unit of the PGH, upon which the latter assigned the case to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a social worker of the DSWD, Dr. Tan conducted the requisite interview and physical examination on AAA. An information was filed, charging Dulay with the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.

Defense’s Facts (from the testimony of Dulay) -Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by her cousin Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of appellant was AAA's neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005, appellant averred that she was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She also saw AAA who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She asked AAA what she was doing there and the latter said that it was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA, appellant left the house and went home to General Trias, Cavite.

The trial court found Dulay guilty of the crime of rape by indispensable cooperation. The Court of Appeals affirmed such decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in finding Dulay guilty of rape as co- principal by indispensable cooperation.

HELD:

Yes, but she is held guilty for the violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610. Under the RPC, to be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate

in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed raped by considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence. In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt. These realities compel [this Court] to approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of a victim on whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends. In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit. The act of appellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. It is noted that the sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF PAO

A.M. No. 11-10-03-O

DOCTRINE: Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged and the marginalized.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the Feb.7, 2011 letter of Atty. Persida V. Rueda- Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of the Public Atty.’s Office (PAO), to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter, Atty. Acosta sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO’s clients from the payment of sheriff’s expenses, alleging that PAO’s clients in its Regional Office in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses in the amount of P1,000 upon the filing of a civil action in court. She claimed that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since Sec. 6 of RA No. 9406 specifically exempts them from the payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies.

In reply, OCA clarified that PAO’s clients, notwithstanding the exemption under SEc.6 of R.A. No. 9406 are not exempted from paying sheriff’s expenses. The OCA explained that sheriff’s expenses, strictly speaking, are not considered as “legal fees” under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since they

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are not payable to the government; they are payable to the sheriff/ process server to defray his travel expenses in serving court processes in relation to the litigant’s case.

Considering that the matter involves an interpretation of RA No. 9406, Atty. Acosta requested that the same be referred to the Court en banc for resolution. The Court en banc however issued its resolution adopting OCA’s recommendation.

Atty. Acosta filed a MFR but the Court en banc denied the same. Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second MFR. Still, the Court found the same to be devoid of merit.

ISSUE:WON PAO’s clients are exempted from the payment of sheriff’s fees HELD:

RULING:

The term “fees” is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain privileges or services. Viewed from this context, the phrase “docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action” refers to the totality of the legal fees imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees. These are the fees that are exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection with the action instituted before it.

Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they are the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. It is not the same as sheriff’s fees under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which refers to those imposed by the court for services rendered to a party incident to the proceedings before it.

The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO’s clients. In exempting PAO’s clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and the less privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to pay sheriff’s expenses, despite their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees, would effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the laudable intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.

Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus, Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “[f]reeaccess to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.” The Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts. Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision.

Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged and the marginalized. Having the foregoing principles in mind, the Court, heeding the constitutional mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance to the marginalized and less privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and employees of PAO to serve summons, subpoena and other court processes pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given herein by the Court to the officials and employees of PAO shall be limited only to cases involving their client.

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