poli digest - fundamental powers of the state

7/27/2019 POLI DIGEST - Fundamental Powers of the State

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW Part V (Fundamental Powers of the State)Case Digests Page 1 of 34

V. Fundamental Powers of the State

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO,TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, October25, 2006

DOCTRINE:

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all thecitizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of theclearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossedand turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitutionoutside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its ownset of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for therule of law in this country.

FACTS:

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to changethe 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite thatwill ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative andReferendum Act.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled"Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELECshould submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGINGTHE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THEORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in

the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least

twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified thesignatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

RESPONDENTs CONTENTION:

The draft of the proposed constitutional amendment " should be " ready and shown " to the people " beforethey sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that " before they sign there is already a draft shown to them ." Theframers also " envisioned " that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must " preparethat proposal and pass it around for signature ."

*antonio|arrellano|calvan|cayaban|federio|quinto|quintos|salendab|santos|sta.ana|tecson|valencia|villanueva|zulueta*


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ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendmentsto the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting inessential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

RULING:

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting apeople's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago , as the present petition warrants dismissal based aloneon the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court'sruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiativeto propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon apetition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must berepresented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x

The essence of amendments " directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition " is that theentire proposal on its face is a petition by the people . This means two essential elements must be present. First, thepeople must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as aninitiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to thepeople who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directlyproposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains thefull text of the proposed amendments .

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to itsrevision.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is NOT Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVIIof the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisitthis Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" tocover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the

outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to theConstitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court canbe resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts willnot pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.

3. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative



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In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's rulingin Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC . For following thisCourt's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petitionwarrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA :

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the publicrespondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with thedispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolutionof June 10, 1997.

HAIG V. AGEE453 U.S. 280 (1981)

Facts:Respondent, an American citizen and a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign "toexpose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they areoperating." He then engaged in activities abroad that have resulted in identifications of alleged undercover CIA agents andintelligence sources in foreign countries. Because of these activities the Secretary of State revoked respondent'spassport, explaining that the revocation was based on a regulation authorizing revocation of a passport where theSecretary determines that an American citizen's activities abroad "are causing or are likely to cause serious damage tothe national security or the foreign policy of the United States." The notice also advised respondent of his right to anadministrative hearing. Respondent filed suit against the Secretary in Federal District Court, seeking declaratory andinjunctive relief and alleging that the regulation invoked by the Secretary has not been authorized by Congress and isimpermissibly overbroad; that the passport revocation violated respondent's freedom to travel and his First Amendmentright to criticize Government policies; and that the failure to accord him a pre-revocation hearing violated his Fifth

Amendment right to procedural due process. The district court found the Secretary lacked the power to revoke thepassport and the court of appeals affirmed.

Issue:Whether the Secretary of State has the authority to revoke respondents passport.

Held: YES. The Supreme Court held that, given the broad discretion accorded the executive branch in matters of

national security and foreign policy, the Passport act of 1926 should be interpreted as granting the power to revoke apassport when necessary for national security. The 1926 Act authorizes the revocation of respondent's passport pursuantto the policy announced by the challenged regulation, such policy being "sufficiently substantial and consistent" to compelthe conclusion that Congress has approved it; and the regulation is constitutional as applied. The Court concluded that thehistory of passport controls since the earliest days of the Republic showed congressional recognition of Executiveauthority to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and foreign policy. Regarding

Agee's Constitutional attacks, the Court held that they, too, were without merit. The revocation of his passport did notimpermissibly burdens his freedom to travel because the freedom to travel abroad with a "letter of introduction" in the formof a passport issued by the sovereign is subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations; as such, it issubject to reasonable governmental regulation. The action was not intended to penalize his exercise of free speech anddeter his criticism of Government policies and practices because assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protectionsreach beyond our national boundaries, revocation of Agee's passport rested in part on the content of his speech. To theextent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, "it is an inhibition of action," rather than of speech. And that

failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing did not violate his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process becausewhen there is a substantial likelihood of "serious damage" to national security or foreign policy as a result of a passportholder's activities in foreign countries, the Government may take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit thesponsorship of his travels by the United States.

The Court found that the right to hold a passport is subordinate to national security and foreign policyconsiderations, and is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. Denial of Agee's passport was not protected under the First Amendment because unlike Kent v. Dulles and Aptheker v. Secretary of State involving denials of passportssolely on the basis of political beliefs entitled to First Amendment protection, Agee's actions amounted to more thanspeech and that the national security interests here, like Zemel v. Rusk , was sufficiently important to justify revocation.Finally, the Court held that the Government was not required to hold a pre-revocation hearing, since where there was a

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kent_v._Dulleshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aptheker_v._Secretary_of_Statehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zemel_v._Ruskhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zemel_v._Ruskhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kent_v._Dulleshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aptheker_v._Secretary_of_Statehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zemel_v._Rusk


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substantial likelihood of "serious damage" to national security or foreign policy as the result of a passport holder'sactivities abroad, the Government may take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit the United States'sponsorship of his travels. Further, a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a prompt post-revocation hearing weresufficient to satisfy the Constitution's due process guarantees.

NY TIMES V US CALVAN

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSG.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995

Feliciano, J.

DOCTRINE: Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to theindividual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of the country, to takeprivate property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitutea valid exercise of the police power of the State.FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of ResolutionNo. 2772 issued by respondent Comelec and its corresponding Comelec directive. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.

On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:

Sec. 2. Comelec Space . The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page inat least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6,1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of saidnewspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city.

Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space . " Comelec Space " shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable thecandidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.

"Comelec Space " shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information .

Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space . (a) "Comelec Space" shall also be available to all candidates during theperiods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal and impartial among all candidates for the sameoffice . All candidates concerned shall be furnished a copy of the allocation of "Comelec Space" for their information, guidance and compliance.

Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identicalletters to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World , the Philippine Star , the Malaya and the PhilippineTimes Journal , all members of PPI.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: PPI asks the SC to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violatesthe prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI arguesthat the Comelec Resolution is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

The SC issued a TRO enjoining Comelec from enforcing and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well asthe Comelec directives addressed to various print media enterprises. The Court also required the respondent to file aComment on the Petition.



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RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec ResolutionNo. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as itdoes not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to theSolicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with theprocurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and theconditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the

Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewedas mandatory , the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during theelection period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Respondent Comelec through its Chairman, Hon. Bernardo Pardo stated that the Resolution were not intended to compelthose members to supply Comelec with free print space. The letter-directives were merely designed to solicit from thepublishers the same free print space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election periodrelating to the May 1992 elections.

ISSUE: Whether Comlelec Resolution No. 2772 is a valid exercise of police power.HELD: NO, the Resolution, particularly Section 2, is a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No.2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2failed to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory "donation." The extent of the taking or deprivation is notinsubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. Themonetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of privatepersonal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to beexamined here: one is the necessity for the taking ; another is the legal authority to effect the taking . The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPIare unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alonedemonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative

authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws byComelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section 3,the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent Commission would be used not only for informing the public about theidentities, qualifications and programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vitalelection information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seemsto the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simplypurchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forthneed officially to be brought to the attention of the general public.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "justcompensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" isprecisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as

an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as anexhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in ResolutionNo. 2772. Section 2 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in thekind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute avalid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate""Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however,made too casually to require prolonged consideration on our part . Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently noinclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a power of legislation has been



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constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission . Secondly , while private property may indeed be validly taken in thelegitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with therequisites of a lawful taking under the police power.

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES vs.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987

Melencio-Herrera, J.:

FACTS: This petition assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the VideogramRegulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to asthe BOARD).

Thereafter, PD No. 1994 amended the NIRC providing, inter alia :

SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

The Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of thePhilippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors,were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that interventionwas necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by theunregulated proliferation of film piracy."

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:PD 1987 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds:1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local governmentis a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade inviolation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred uponhim by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: PD 1987 is constitutional since the State has the power to tax. It was also mentioned that while the underlying

objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of theviewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic filmsand films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, notto mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permitand municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

ISSUE:Whether the tax imposed is unconstitutional because it is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade.

HELD: NO. A tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters theactivities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courtsscarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of theauthority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficientsecurity against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization thatearnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby



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depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for everyvideogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movieindustry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket,thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogramoperators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the videoindustry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the

proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry,the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to imposethe tax was to favor one industry over another.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has beenrepeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state'spolice power.

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

ORTIGAS V CA QUINTO

G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000Quisumbing, J:

Doctrine: A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could begiven retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable notonly to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses willhave to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace,education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.

FACTS:

On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land located in GreenhillsSubdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila,. The contract of sale provided that the lot:

.(1) be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes only, and not more than one single-family residential

building will be constructed thereon,

x x x

6. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor advertising purposes

x x x

11. No single-family residential building shall be erecteduntil the building plans, specificationhavebeen approved by the SELLER

x x x

14....restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until December 31, 2025when they shall cease and terminate

In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority) enacted MMCOrdinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The ordinancereclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of GreenhillsSubdivision where the lot is located.

On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso RealtyCorp.. The lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private respondent constructed a singlestory commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso. The complaint sought the demolition of



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the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.

Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated on the titleit issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions wereagreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.

CA ruled in favor of Mathay

PETITIONERS CONTENTION BEFORE THE SC:Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in

*limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance.*a contractual right is not automatically discarded once a claim is made that it conflicts with police power.*the restrictive clauses in the questioned contract is not in conflict with the zoning ordinance.*the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 did not prohibit the construction of residential buildings.*even with the zoning ordinance, the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can voluntarily agree to an exclusiveresidential use thereof.

Hence, petitioner concludes that the CA erred in holding that the condition imposing exclusive residential use waseffectively nullified by the zoning ordinance

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:Private respondent argues

*appellate court correctly ruled refusing to subject the contract to the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.*appellate court properly held the police power superior to the non-impairment of contract clause in the Constitution.

He concludes that the appellate court did not err in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trialcourt in excess of its jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the MMC Ordinance should be applied in order to limit the contract of sale

Ruling:

Yes. In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, nonrespicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in

any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be givenretroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonablyimpair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to thosealready in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimateexercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and generalwelfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract

CHAVEZ v. ROMULOG.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004

Sandoval-Gutierez, J.

FACTS: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNPstressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the thenPNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).Under this directive, civilian owners may no longer bring their firearms outside their residences. Those who want to usetheir guns for target practice will be given special and temporary permits from time to time only for that purpose.

Acting on this directive, respondent Ebdane made a guideline for the implementation of the ban. This guideline is the onebeing assailed in this case.



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Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his requestwas denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G.Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.

ISSUE # 1: Whether Respondent Ebdane as PNP Chief is authorize to issue the assailed guidelines.

HELD: YES. In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations, petitioner argues thatthe Chief of the PNP is not the same as the Chief of the Constabulary, the PC being a mere unit or component of thenewly established PNP. He contends further that Republic Act No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authorityto issue rules and regulations regarding firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not theChief of the Constabulary. THIS IS NOT TRUE.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensingauthority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law . This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to issue detailedimplementing policies and instructions on such matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions,powers and duties of the PNP.

Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No.8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules andregulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations datedSeptember 15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 dealonly with the automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of therecords of convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No.8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community. Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.

ISSUE # 2: Whether or not the citizens right to bear arms is constitutional.

HELD: NO. Possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule . The right tobear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What then are the lawsthat grant such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commissionon October 12, 1907. It was passed to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms.Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.

ISSUE #3: Whether the revocation of the right to carry firearm is a violation of a persons right to property.

HELD: the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of theImplementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious

cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms tocarry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does notconstitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does notconfer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as maythereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit toimpose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure . Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights . The US Supreme Court, in



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Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co , held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessaryconsequence of the main power . A mere license by the State is always revocable .

ISSUE #4: Whether the issuance of the guideline is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: The test to determine the validity of police measure are: (1) The interests of the public generally, asdistinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and (2) The means employedare reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society.Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturbthe peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, themotivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do notentirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a newPTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crimeincidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their

homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of thepolice power. In State vs. Reams , it was held that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR asthe means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of policepower.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITYvs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

Doctrine : Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of

individuals not possessing legislative power.13

The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to thePresident and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.14 Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the nationallawmaking body. Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991 . The MMDA is NOT a local government unit and does NOT possess police power. Its functions are merelyadministrative in nature.

Facts:

MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc (BAVA) is a corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision inMakati City. It is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22,1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,

respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would bedemolished. BAVA then asked for a TRO from the RTC which issued the same. However, the RTC denied issuance of apreliminary injunction but which denial was overturned by the CA. Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not MMDA has authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic since it is an agent of the stateendowed with police power.

Held:

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No. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by theConstitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes andordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good andwelfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by anygroup or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power

to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governmentunits. 14 Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the nationallawmaking body. Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991 . This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies .

With the passage of Republic Act (R . A. ) No . 7924 in 1995 , Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region " and the Administration of "metro-wide " basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority " referred to as the MMDA . The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation andmonitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements,the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. There is no syllable in R . A. No7924 that grants the MMDA police power , let alone legislative power . The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various

national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for theefficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative innature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.

Contrary to petitioner's claim , the two Sangalang (Sanggalang v IAC) cases do not apply to the case at bar Firstly , both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, thebasis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice which does not cite any ordinance or law,either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as theMMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on thepresent MMDA. The MMC was the "central government " of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administeringprograms providing services common to the area. It possessed legislative powers . All ordinances, resolutions andmeasures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC's approval.

The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powersgranted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a privatesubdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of therule of law.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC) vs. ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN et.alG.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004

Tinga, J.:

Doctrine: A license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. It is not a right which canenforced through the writ of mandamus.

Facts: Respondents, who are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine in Valenzuela City Metro Manila, passedthe Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board).

Petitioner (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortlythereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine (79) successful examinees from Fatima College in thetwo most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high.

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Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatimagot marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%.

The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was arecord-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.

The Board then withheld the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. TheBoard also charged respondents with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chemand Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified.

Respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Board.

The RTC of Manila granted the writ of mandamus and allowed the respondents to take their physicians oath and toregister as duly licensed physicians. In sustaining the trial courts decision, the CA ratiocinated that the respondentscomplied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examination

Issue: Are respondents entitled to a writ of mandamus?

Held: No. The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If nolegal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedyfor a legal right. A license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.

It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subjectto a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed bythe Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.

Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may berequired to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

Courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license tocarry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for theguidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.

In the present case, guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), as amended, whichprescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the boardexaminations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license,or revoking a license that has been issued.

Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in thePhilippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn, provides that theoath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The operative word here is"satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance." 31 Thelicensing authority (Board) apparently did not find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations.

Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications

and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions andrequirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less thansatisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may bedemanded if denied.

Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courtsmay not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

Decision of the CA reversed and the writ of Mandamus is nullified.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. V. CA



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260 SCRA 319

FACTS:Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total banagainst the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescindedafter leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinksin the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequentlyissued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked withissuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. Pursuant to theEIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures andrequirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of theformer. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist'sRecord Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA. Petitionersassail the validity of the Department Orders on the ground that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) wasdiscriminatory and illegal. The government countered that the same was a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:Is the issuance of the Department Orders a valid exercise of police power?

HELD:YES. The police power of the State," one court has said... is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is notinaptly termed "the law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the statewhich enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of thelaw do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with theright of the individual. Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere withpersonal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailedDepartment Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that thesaid order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of DepartmentOrder No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, ameasure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the

method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limitsdeployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artistsabroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals andagencies.

DE LA CRUZ VS PARASG.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Fernando, C.J.:

Doctrine: Police Power. A local government council cannot prohibit the establishment of nightclubs and cabarets; itmay only regulate their operations.

Facts:Bocaue, Bulacan passed Ordinance No. 84 known as the prohibition and closure ordinance which tackles the prohibitionand revocation of licenses of nightclubs. The pertinent provisions of such ordinance: Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses, Permits . Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on this community as explained above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shallhenceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall beissued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementionedestablishments. The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishmentsshall include prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4. Revocation of Permits and Licenses . The licenses andpermits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation including permits issued toprofessional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-dayperiod given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the



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jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. And due to the effect of said ordinance, the owners and operators of thesenightclubs questioned the validity of passing such ordinance for being violative of due process and Bocaue having nopower to pass such kind of ordinance.

Petitioners contention:

1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the licensepreviously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189,as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses includingnight clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism."

Respondents contention:

1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance andoperation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. TheOrdinance No. 84 is not violative of petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, since propertyrights are subordinate to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive MunicipalCouncils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs."

The lower court dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening paragraph thus: " Those who lust cannot last . This in essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and cognizant of the

categorical imperatives of the current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validityand constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan.

Issue:Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of alawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses.

Held:NO. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations . - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, notrepugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by lawand such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the

morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for theprotection of property therein." It is practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinanceenacted by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States v.

Abendan "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the PhilippineLegislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of suchlegislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or itwill be pronounced invalid."

Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statutebeing invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a widegap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve themorals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs, to quotefrom Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutionalinfirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibitthe operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is toapply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legallyopen, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continuedexistence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations.



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The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining policepower legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant tolend the weight of its support to measures that can be characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESv. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANYG.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969

Reyes, J.B.L.,J.

Facts : The Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, theBureau of Telecommunication (BOT). PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install, operate andmaintain a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its ownappropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the governmentt offices to callprivately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service wherebyBOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violationof the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but alsoto serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court that judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract withthe plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such

conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT toenter into such agreement. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the PLDT can be compelled by the Republic to enter into an interconnecting agreement.

Ruling: YES. The court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate acontract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephonecompany to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of thegovernment service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominallyof course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, theexpropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only aburden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that realproperty may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and

services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case privateproperty is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the Statemay, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there isno reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided justcompensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of bothtelephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC.,vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG,METRO MANILA,

G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005Callejo, Sr., J.:

FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the PasigPublic Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho which isabutting E. R. Santos Street.

On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiateexpropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. On July 21, 1993, themunicipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of theproperty under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the City of Pasigs exercise of eminent domain was onlyfor a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to beexpropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. JILCSFI also averred that it has been



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denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest.

The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance with thedefinite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the mostconvenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.

Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA on the following assignment of errors:

ISSUES: THE LOWER COURT SERIOUS[LY] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEESUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE LAW WHEN IT EXPROPRIATED JILS PROPERTY TO BE USED AS ARIGHT OF WAY.

HELD: YES. T he right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power toappropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose .When the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against theagency asserting the power. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to theexpress terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.

Corollarily, the City of Pasig, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show theright of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirementsprovided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a localgovernment unit must be complied with:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of thelocal government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over aparticular private property.2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor andthe landless.3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, butsaid offer was not accepted Valid and Definite Offer

Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides:

The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements andvoluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action.

There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioners TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. Neither is the declaration in one of thewhereas clauses of the ordinance that "the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent topurchase the same for public use as a municipal road," a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid anddefinite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.

As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of thispower, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever maybe beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.

The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to complywith the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in theabsence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location androute of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious . Expropriation is

justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may notcapriciously choose what private property should be taken.



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DEVORAH E. BARDILLONvs. BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNAG.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003

Panganiban, J.:

DOCTRINE: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of Regional TrialCourts, regardless of the value of the subject property.

BRIEF FACTS:Two complaints for eminent domain were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating a ONE HUNDREDFORTY FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land, otherwise known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay Masili, Calamba,Laguna and owned by herein petitioner . The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providingBarangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents.

The first Complaint for eminent domain was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna ('MTC'). The MTCissued an order dismissing the Expropriation case 'for lack of interest' for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel toappear at the pre-trial.

The second Complaint for eminent domain was filed before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna('RTC') on October 18, 1999 . This]complaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D for the erection of a

multi-purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]complaint by allegingin the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that [respondent's] cause of action is barred by prior judgment,pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata . Th Judge issued an order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss , holding that theMTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding.On appeal by petitioner to the CA, the latter held that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, the second Complaintfor eminent domain not barred by res judicata . The reason is that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which dismissed thefirst Complaint for eminent domain had no jurisdiction over the action.

PETITONERS CONTENTION:Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner claims that the MTC's dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain was with prejudice, since there wasno indication to the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second Complaint before the

RTC should therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata .

Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC's Writ of Possession over her property, issued despite thepending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint. Petitioner also claims that respondent is guiltyof forum shopping, because it scouted for another forum after obtaining an unfavorable Decision from the MTC.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960. 1 Thus, the MTC did nothave jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictionalamount cognizable by MTCs. Having no jurisdication, res judicata likewise cannot set in.

ISSUE:1. Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the expropriation case?- NO.2. Does the dismissal of that case before the MTC constitute res judicata?-NO3. Did the CA err when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises- NO4, Is the respondent is guilty of forum shopping? NO.

RULING:I.

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by thegovernment of its authority and right to take property for public use. 1 As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation andshould be filed with the regional trial courts. 12This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor :13"It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the governmentor any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts



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determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process.In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapableof pecuniary estimation.

IIRes judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. 15 It provides that afinal judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties andtheir privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.

The following are the requisites of res judicata : (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the firstand the second actions an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds noapplication even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.

IIIThe requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governedby Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 18On the part of local government units, expropriation is alsogoverned by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. 19 Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form andsubstance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be

expropriated based on its current tax declaration.

In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites.Note: The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of theexpropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her

Answer to the Complaint. 21 The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminentdomain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

IVThe test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present in two or more pending cases, such that a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.

Be it noted that the earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been dismissed when the Complaint was filed beforethe RTC. Even granting arguendo that both cases were still pending, a final judgment in the MTC case will not constituteres judicata in the RTC, since the former had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVIG.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

DOCTRINE:"Just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

FACTS:Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against

defendants-appellees Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun over parcels of land situated in the

barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned

lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that thecourt authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the ProvincialTreasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the justcompensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of the lands at P259,669.10.



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After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trialcourt ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.

On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands. On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized theProvincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the landunder her administration, and ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the

supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.

The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for thecourt; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the plaintiff;and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark Air Base, for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified themselves, proceeded to the performance of their duties.

On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after havingdetermined that the lands sought to be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that thelowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that anadditional P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on thecompensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and thatno consequential damages be awarded. The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the case by

defenda

poli digest - fundamental powers of the state

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