polarization and transformation in zimbabwe social movements, strategy dilemmas and change

8/3/2019 POLARIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas and Change

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POLARIZATION AND

TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE

Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas

and Change

Erin McCandless, Ph. D.

LEXINGTONBOOKS

Erin McCandless


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v

CONTENTS

Tables and figures vii

Abbreviations ix

Acknowledgments xiii

PART I: MAPPING THIS STUDY 1

Chapter 1: Mapping Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe 3

Chapter 2: Historical Context for Social Action in Zimbabwe 25

Part II: THE MOVEMENTS 45

Chapter 3: The NCA: Grievances,

Structure and Identity, Driving Interests 47

Chapter 4: The ZNLWVA: Grievances,

Structure and Identity, Driving Interests 77

Chapter 5: NCA and ZNLWVA: Strategy Dilemmas and Actions 105

Part III: TRANSFORMATIVE MOVEMENTS AND CHANGE 147

Chapter 6: Assessing Outcomes and Implications

for Transformative Change and Peace 149

Chapter 7: Transforming and PreventingPolarization: Lessons from Zimbabwe 191

Reference List 219

Appendix: Exchange Rates in Zimbabwe

between 1980 and 2009 243

Index 245


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3MAPPING POLARIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE

The Catalyst

In February 2000 a national referendum took place on the governments proposednew constitution for Zimbabwe. It was rejected. Mobilization for a No vote to the

governments draft had been led by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), an

alliance of civil society actors that had become increasingly concerned with what it

saw as government abuses of power. It viewed constitutional change as the primary

way to prevent them. The No vote was the first widespread rejection of government

policy in Zimbabwes post-Independence period, when the Zimbabwe African National

Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government had for the better part of two decades

experienced widespread consensual support for its rule.

The referendum results were quickly dismissed as a white, urban vote by thegovernment, which proclaimed that the NCAs motives for constitutional change

were merely political and not rooted in genuine or legitimate grievances. In

fact, the government was deeply concerned about the NCAs alliances in particular

an emergent opposition political party that the NCA, along with the Zimbabwe

Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), had given birth to a year earlier. The Movement

for Democratic Change (MDC) was quickly illustrating its ability to mobilize

Zimbabweans desiring change. ZANU-PF, however, had no intention of leaving.

In the days following the referendum war veterans who had fought for

Zimbabwes Independence from 1972-1979 and had supported the draft constitution

launched a nation-wide movement of land occupations, primarily on large-scale white-owned farms. The war veterans, organized principally through a welfare organization

called the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), were

deeply frustrated with the lack of progress on land redistribution. The countrys racially

skewed land tenure system had, with the drive for self-rule, led Zimbabweans to war

in the first place. In 2000, however, the land issue remained a festering wound and

many war veterans believed that their sacrifices had gone largely unrewarded.

Moreover, ZANU-PF nationalists, their comrades in the struggle for Independence

and at the helm of their political party of choice, were perceived to be increasingly

aligning themselves with white capital over the years, effectively selling out and

MAPPING POLARIZATION AND

TRANSFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE

CHAPTER 1

3


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4 CHAPTER 1

abandoning the liberation agenda. Indeed, many ZANU-PF leaders were accumulating

great wealth while being seemingly dismissive of the plight of war veterans, most of

whom were living in poverty.

Beset with growing internal and external challenges to its grip on power, the

government quickly sought to co-opt the land movement, which many rural peasants

had joined. A fast-track approach to land reform was institutionalized and policies

were promulgated to support it. Taking back the land would serve to fulfill the

unfinished liberation war aims. It would also, government assured, be the key to

Zimbabwes economic recovery. This was a public space easily captured; despite the

NCAs victory, the majority of Zimbabweans were poor, hungry, and still acutely aware

of the structural inequalities rooted in colonial era policies that divided and

disempowered them. Meanwhile, the ZANU-PF government grew increasingly adept

at exploiting the notion that the growing opposition MDC and its civil society allieswere finding difficult to shake: that their concerns were urban and politically driven,

and that they would not and could not solve Zimbabwes ills.

Over the following years the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) was

implemented country-wide, displacing the majority of Zimbabwes white farmers

and effectively revolutionizing Zimbabwes land tenure system. The process served

to deepen the rift between ZANU-PF and its supporters, who were mainly rural

and included war veterans, on the one hand and a broad coalition of primarily

urban-based civil society organizations and the MDC, supported by many Western

governments and donors on the other.

Following the governments loan defaults, in 2000 the international financial

institutions withdrew from Zimbabwe. The particularly violent elections of 2002

were met with smart sanctions by the United States government. These included

a travel ban on government officials and a freezing of their assets. Similar measures

were taken by the European Union, while the Commonwealth suspended

Zimbabwe. As efforts increased to marginalize the troubled country from

international affairs, President Robert Mugabe skillfully used Pan-Africanist and

nationalist discourses to frame the situation as one of ongoing colonial injustice

a crisis resulting from international interference, including sanctions, the imposition

of poorly designed economic reform policies, and the failure of the United Kingdomto support needed land reform. For ZANU-PF supporters domestically and abroad,

this logic has effectively legitimized his now three-decade stay in office.

By 2008 the crisis had hit a breaking point with insurmountable economic

challenges and widely discredited Presidential elections. In the first round of voting

in March, the MDCs 48 percent win did not constitute a sufficient majority, and

the run-off that followed in July was widely discredited due to the atmosphere in

which it took place one of severe political violence, intimidation and

displacement. With continued efforts by the Southern African Development

Community and the African Union, a power-sharing agreement was reached in

September, resulting in a Government of National Unity (GNU), commonly referred

to as the Inclusive Government, which kept Mugabe as President and made Morgan


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Tsvangirai, leader of the predominant MDC faction, the Prime Minister. At the

time of writing the Inclusive Government is moving into its third year of operation.

While progress has been made in some important areas, Zimbabwes transition

remains obstructed on various fronts. The polarization that has divided society

and its leaders, and even many far beyond its borders, is still being fueled by

unresolved issues and challenges that need addressing for transformation to occur.

Overview of Study

This book investigates Zimbabwes story of polarization and prospects for

transformation through the perspective of two pivotal social movement

organizations the NCA and the ZNLWVA and the strategy dilemmas they haveconfronted in trying to mobilize change. As conceptualized in this study, there

are two primary strategy dilemmas confronting Zimbabwean civil society

organizations and social movements. The first is whether to prioritize political or

economic rights in efforts to foment nation-wide transformative change (rights

or redistribution). The second is whether and how to work with government and/

or donors given, in particular, with their political, economic, and social agendas

(participation or resistance). Through in-depth case description and analysis, the

lessons around the actions taken in the context of these dilemmas, the results

that have ensued, and the implications for wider social goals of transformativechange and peace are examined.

Polarization in Zimbabwe is not simply a process designed by and serving

elites. While this is undoubtedly part of the picture, as it often is in any conflict

setting, this book argues that polarization in Zimbabwe is rooted in genuine and

legitimate unmet historical grievances that have meaning for people globally, over

centuries: the desire for political and economic justice, and the desire to participate

genuinely in decision-making processes that affect society. Zimbabwe illustrates

how two sets of forces have coalesced around these grievances, with entrenched

positions shaping and deepening the processes of polarization. The strategic

actions of the NCA and ZNLWVA, particularly over the 1997-2007 decade, wereoften catalysts or drivers of these processes.

The cases suggest that these two powerful strategy dilemmas have not always

been well managed in Zimbabwe. While the NCA and ZNLWVA are amongst those

who have perhaps most used radical resistance-oriented measures, believing that

this will bring change, it is also evident that they, and the wider set of stakeholders

concerned with change in Zimbabwe, may not have sufficiently foreseen and

accounted for the ways in which their actions would interact with the actions of

others working for change in debilitating ways, thereby increasing polarization.

This book argues that, despite exhaustive efforts on the part of many civic actorsin Zimbabwe to address the ongoing crisis, the two strategy dilemmas have over

the years served more as obstacles than as entry points for transformative change.


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6 CHAPTER 1

The book draws on four years of sustained fieldwork (2001-2004) conducted

during the years when Zimbabwes crisis was pivotally unfolding and shorter visits

to the region in 2007 and 2010. While the book spans the period of 1997-2010,

particular attention is focused on a period of intense interaction between the

state, civil society, and donors (1997-2004). Outcomes and impacts of NCA and

ZNLWVA strategic actions from this period are examined in the years that follow,

and reflections are made on the current, Inclusive Government context (2009-

2010) for understanding the strategy dilemmas, polarization, and transformation.

While it is often assumed that Zimbabwe is a unique case and its relevance to

wider debates and international learning is marginal, nothing could be farther

from the truth. The issues that have divided Zimbabweans are of profound import

globally. Africa alone is awash with examples where political struggles, often led

by social movements, have achieved democracy and economic freedom in namebut not fact, and where leaders are in place (be they authoritarian or democratic)

who are not effectively serving their people. In many of these countries, deep

structural inequalities and identity divisions left by colonialism have been

compounded by poor post-colonial policies and practices, both domestic and

international. In such contexts, tough strategy dilemmas arise for civic actors

around priorities, the appropriate actors to partner with, and agendas to assume.

These dilemmas often obstruct or undermine effective action and foment or fuel

divisions. They are by no means Zimbabwean dilemmas, although in Zimbabwe

they have taken on particular forms that have resulted in extreme polarization

over the years, with highly destabilizing effects.

The Zimbabwe case brings out other related issues of global relevance, such

as the nature, role, and limits of leadership within government and civil society; the

ability of civil society to foment change in an authoritarian context; and the

appropriate roles for international donors operating within a host county where there

are strong political divisions and/or tense state-(civil) society relations. While

Zimbabwes story has played out in deeply divisive ways, understanding where, how,

and why these polarizing conceptions and strategy dilemmas can result in actions

and choices that tip too far in certain directions, resulting in destructive processes of

polarization, can facilitate our collective search for transformative change and peace.

Aims

As this book moves into production the world is captivated by non-violent

revolutions in North Africa that are ousting leaders who have been in power for

decades. While there is a fairly wide consensus in Zimbabwe and internationally

that President Mugabe should go, efforts to understand polarization and

transformation must start with the recognition that he is not the sole source of

Zimbabwes ills. As this study illustrates, the reality is far more complex.

Polarization and Transformation in Zimbabwe is guided by three interlockingaims that seek to deepen understanding about strategy dilemmas faced by civic


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organizations and social movements in Zimbabwe and beyond and how and why

particular choices may contribute to polarization on the one hand, and/or

transformative change and peace on the other. Together, these streams of inquiry

illustrate why efforts to bring meaningful change in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s

have been so profoundly difficult. The three aims are:

1. Depolarizing concepts

Underpinning conflicting beliefs about around the nature and suitable role of

civil society are two conflicting conceptions. The Anglo-American, liberal tradition

posits that civil society is an autonomous realm of associational life above the

individual (or family, some argue) and below the state (Seligman 1992; Patel 2002).

From this view, civil society demarcates social space against the state and themarket to uphold a sphere ofpoliticallife for citizens. It has aprecautionaryrole

against the state and an advocating role to protect individual rights and liberties

from incursions by the state and to promote and expand them (Keane 1998). The

Marxist tradition, on the other hand, identifies civil society as the site of economic

relations, upon which a legal and political superstructure is elevated (Bobbio 1989,

27), the socio-economic base of the state. The state and civil society for Marx

were the executive arms of the bourgeoisie, and thus the state could never be

neutral or serve societal interests as a whole.

Italian political philosopher Antonio Gramsci charted a middle ground,

which some, especially in the Zimbabwe context, usefully employ. Gramsci argued

that civil society is neither entirely captive of the state nor autonomous; rather, it

is a site for problem-solving where society might be defended from incursions of

both the state and market. However, he argued, it can also become a battleground

where the state, ruling elites and other powerful actors intervene with hegemonic

projects to influence and spread the agendas of organized groups (Hearn 2001).

In Zimbabwe the nature and role of civil society is deeply questioned.

Accusations about political and self-serving agendas and motives of different

actors, and their alliances and relationships with political parties, the government

and donors, are at the heart of the polarization. Unpacking these issues throughin-depth examination of the NCA and ZNLWVA, the study aims to contribute to

efforts that build upon Gramscian thinking to understand state-civil society

relations in a more integrated and contextualized manner, transcending liberal/

Marxist interpretations of civil society that contribute to polarization.

While conceptions of social movements, civil society, and NGOs are all highly

contested in international theory and practice, efforts are not made to defend any

one conception. The NCA and the ZNLWVA are considered both social movements

and social movement organizations (SMOs) manifesting different forms in different

periods and part civil society. A social movement can be defined as a collectivity,

acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional

channels for the purpose of promoting or resisting change (McAdam and Snow 1997,


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8 CHAPTER 1

xviii-xxi). SMOs are complex organizations whose goals coincide with the preferences

of a social movement and which try to realize those goals.1 Here emphasis is placed

on how organizations and movements self-conceptualize, how they understand their

relationships with the state, political parties, and donors, and the degrees and types

of autonomy they maintain, with a view to identifying concepts that transcend liberal,

Marxist and other mainly Western conceptions of civil society and social movements

from the Zimbabwean context.

2. Transcending strategy dilemmas

Secondly, the book aims to shed light on the nature and operational mechanisms

of strategy dilemmas and how processes of polarization are effected by and

entrench these dilemmas in an effort to highlight ways to transcend them. Thestrategy dilemmas in this study are defined as participation/resistance and rights/

redistribution. They form the basis of this studys conceptual framework, acting

as heuristic devices to gain deeper insight into the nature of the dilemmas

underlying Zimbabwes polarization.

Participation here refers to the strategy of partnering with, or working within,

processes set up by government or donors, and resistance to the strategy of fomenting

change by working outside the system, challenging and transforming existing

structures of authority or processes that visibly reinforce the status quo, or creating

entirely new, parallel structures and processes. While notions of engagement or

reform are often used in contrast with resistance, hereparticipation is used becauseit better reflects contemporary discourse and envisaged practices around the nature

of civil society relations with the state and donors. This usage also reflects the concept

of Gramscian hegemony2 whereby regimes reproduce their rule through coercive

measures andthrough the organization of consent a highly relevant concept in the

Zimbabwean context. Rarely defined, resistance is used in leftist, nationalist, and

social movement discourse and practice in manners that imply radical, often highly

confrontational strategies and anticipated radical outcomes, i.e., structural,

transformative change. Liberal and Marxist perspectives suggest opposite sets of

relationships between state and civil society on the one hand, and donors and civilsociety on the other, that reflect tensions in the participation/resistance dilemma.

Liberal conceptualizations suggest that civil society is autonomous from the state,

often in a watchdog role, with more collaborative, partner-oriented relationships

with international organizations and even donors. Marxists tend to argue conversely,

partnering civil society with a (presumably socialist-oriented) state against

international actors or capital. Examination of the public playing out of these debates

in Zimbabwe provides a unique context to re-examine the relevance and utility of

the concepts and theories underpinning them.

Rights discourse is often associated with liberal thinking, concerned in

particular with civil and political rights and individual liberties. Redistribution, asdiscussed above, is often associated with Marxist thinking, in particular, with the


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redistribution of wealth, and often land and other natural resources. While some

(i.e., those working on social and economic rights) may depict no natural conflict

between the two, in Zimbabwe and amongst many left-leaning and nationalist

sympathizing analysts, rights discourse is viewed as a Western, liberal, imposed

project that is in conflict with redistribution concerns. In Zimbabwe this view is

being strongly propagated by the government and ZNLWVA-affiliated war veterans

amongst others, with far-reaching implications: it has become part of the engine

fueling polarization at all levels even within civil society.

3. Contributing to transformative change and peace

Finally, the book aims to contribute to thinking and practice about how social

movements and wider civil society can work to ensure their actions contribute totransformation rather than polarization. As such, the results of key strategic actions

of the NCA and the ZNLWVA are examined: social process outcomes are identified

and their implications for wider social goals such transformative change, and

ultimately peace, are considered. As conceptualized in this study (in detail in

chapter 6), transformative change and peace are both rooted in practices of people-

centered democracy and development. Both value constructive changes of(rather

than in) the system and structure, and of the movement towards constructive

inter-group relationships. Both are process- and outcome-oriented.

Research Strategy and Structure of Book

Examining these cases in Zimbabwes politically charged climate involved considerable

risks3 that undoubtedly shaped the research process, ruling out certain traditional

research practices and necessitating creativity. Multiple strategies of inquiry were

employed, including case studies, ethnography, and evaluation. The study was guided

by a critical theory approach,4 encompassing a commitment to understand the

meaning of social action and to explain the social process outcomes, and a political

economy orientation.5 More than two hundred interviews were conducted with

stakeholders at all levels in civil society, government, political parties, and the

international community, primarily in Zimbabwe.6 Participant observation was

undertaken to gain insight into the NCA,7 and with the ZNLWVA, influential key

informants, well connected with the war veterans, allowed for deeper access than

researchers often have. Interviews with war veterans were conducted at their homes,

workplaces, and resettled farms. To assess change, a critical evaluative framework

was developed, described in detail in chapter 6, combining the NCAs and ZNLWVAs

self-assessments alongside normative criteria reflecting wider social goals within

Zimbabwean society and the global peace and social justice community. This approach

seeks to offer the dynamism needed to catalyze new thinking and practices that can

potentially contribute to facilitating a way out of polarized positions that divide civicorganizations and the wider society.


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10 CHAPTER 1

This book is divided into three parts. Chapters 1 and 2 in part I effectively

map the study methodologically, theoretically, and contextually. Chapter 2

examines Zimbabwes historical, political-economy context, focusing on the factors

that have given rise to, and facilitated, social action.

Part II turns to the case studies: the NCA and the ZNLWVA. Chapters 3 and 4

focus, respectively, on their structure and identity, and the grievances and interests

that drive them. These chapters generally seek to tell the story from their

perspectives, unpacking stereotypes often applied to them by other actors, and

endeavor to reveal the contradictions and complexities in their composition and

role, and the nuanced ways in which they evolve and operate in certain contexts.

In chapter 5 specific strategic actions are described the NCAs No vote and its

choice of mass action as its primary strategy, and the land occupations of the

ZNLWVA and the ways in which the strategy dilemmas inform them and playout are examined. This chapter illustrates how the SMOs built and drove social

movements around constitutional change and land redistribution, and how and

why the identified strategy dilemmas evolve and operate in Zimbabwe.

Part III, starting with chapter 6, examines the social process outcomes of the

strategic actions and their implications for transformative change and peace.

Chapter 7 identifies lessons from the study in the context of the three aims

discussed above and reflects upon the strategy dilemmas, polarization, and

transformation in the context of the 2008 GPA and the first two years of Zimbabwes

Inclusive Government working towards its implementation.

Zimbabwean Scholar and Activist Debates

Investigating polarization and transformation through the lens of social movement

organizations in Zimbabwe benefits from engagement with wider debates

embedded in North-South scholarship, practice, and activism. In Zimbabwe these

debates take on unique strains, as they both underlie and respond to the very

real dynamics that have polarized the environment.

The Nature of Civil Society

Scholars and activists over the last decade have reignited debates about the

structure, interests, and alliances of social movements and civil society as part of

a wider political economy critique of neo-liberalism and the nature, purpose,

and efficacy of international intervention. It is often asked whether these

associations are private or public, and whether they are principled, progressive,

and altruistically driven or represent simply another sphere of the neo-liberal

project. While not new, such debates reflect unresolved ideological tensions about


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the nature of civil society between liberal, Marxist, and Gramscian (Western

historical) traditions, and, increasingly, critical African and other Southern

perspectives. In Zimbabwe these debates are implicit and the assumptions that

inform them clearly underlie polarization.Despite ongoing contestation around the concept of civil society as

discussed in the previous section, the liberal perspective of civil society is widely

hegemonic in international practice, promoted by the humanitarian, development

and democratization communities. European and American donor consensus that

civil society is both the autonomous force that can hold governments accountable

and the base upon which a truly democratic culture can be built has since the

1980s led to a massive flow of funding to civil society. This consensus narrowly

interprets civil society as professionalized NGOs dedicated to advocacy or civic

education work on public interest issues directly relating to democratization, ratherthan older, established voluntary organizations and social movements (Carothers

and Ottaway 2000). This donor tendency has occurred in Zimbabwe, and underlies

debates about the nature and role of civil society.

Many critical scholars in Zimbabwe and internationally go further, arguing

that the civil societies developing in this liberal form reproduce material hierarchies

and class inequalities. The now highly prominent neo-liberal version of civil

society, it is argued, facilitates the operation of both state and market, benefitting

and marginalizing actors differentially and giving rise to new social groups and

forms of organization as prompted by changing economic incentives (Beckman

and Sjgren 2001). Civil society has served to cushion the shocks of structural

adjustment, and in the context of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and

donor-promoted poverty reduction development paradigm, civic organizations

are becoming a means for stabilizing rather than challenging the social and political

status quo (Hearn 2001; Cox 1999). In Zimbabwe these arguments are employed

by many within government as well as by some scholars critical of donor-supported

civil society (Moyo 2001; Rich Dorman 2002b).

In recent years, Zimbabwean scholars have begun arguing that civil society is

a much more complex and contextualized phenomenon. While liberal and Marxist

theorists were writing about the evolution of civil society in their own societies,colonialism interrupted the organic development of civil societies in Africa and

elsewhere (Masunungure 2008, 66). Civil societies that have developed in post-

colonial Africa are thus not shaped by, or responsive to, indigenous problems,

challenges, and opportunities inherent in their societies, but rather reflect hybrid

interests of both local and alien, compounded and exacerbated by the forces of

globalization. Zimbabwe scholars Moyo, Helliker and Murisa argue that civil society

is marked by significant internal diversity and contradiction, and that, like the

state, is a form of social domination in capitalist society and embedded within it

are contradictory relations (2008, 2, 27).


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12 CHAPTER 1

Its structure and driving influences

The structures and constituencies that make up civil society formations and the

interests and motives that drive them constitute a messy terrain that reflects

diversity and contradiction. Key questions driving Zimbabwean debates have

concerned whether an organization has a social base and organic linkages and

the nature and scope of their constituencies (Moyo 2001; Moyo, Makumbe, and

Raftopoulos 2000; Sachikonye 1995a). These are examined in chapters 3, 4, and

7. They link to and build upon Mamdanis influential Citizen and Subject(1996),

which considered the urban dominance of particular forms of civil society, the

ideals and motivations that drive urban versus rural civic formations, and the

strategies employed to achieve desired results.

Questions of value orientation, motives, and related tactics embedded withinthese debates are hotly contested in Zimbabwe. Progressive social movements

have been defined in the African context as inclusive movements that seek to

articulate the demands of the poor and politically disenfranchised through

interactive campaigns that address structural issues (Cheru and Gill 1997); as

democratic struggles that represent the poor of society and protect them against

corporatist strategies of the state (Mamdani 1991, Sachikonye 1995a); and as

peasant movements that specifically seek to defend rural livelihoods

(Mkandawire 2002; Moyo 2002a). Importantly, these conceptions link

democratically oriented approaches with ends oriented to economic justice.

In Zimbabwe progressiveness is fervently debated through the discourse of

civil and uncivil and raises the question of whether activists are actually

politicians, i.e., primarily motivated by politics. Where most civil society scholars

in Zimbabwe have focused on the violence of the land occupations, dismissing the

notion of war veterans as civic actors, Moyo and Yeros have sought to turn notions of

civility on their head. They argue that it is the uncivil agency of landless and

land-short (rural proletarians and peasants) that has been the basic source of

agrarian reform historically (Moyo and Yeros 2005, 53; Yeros 2002a). Neo-liberalism,

they argue, has shrunk civilized political space. More recently, Moyo and his co-

authors argue that while the uncivil was before associated with property-unfriendlyforces once the radical nationalist, socialist and land redistributing forces in this

era of neo-liberalism, the net is cast even wider, to the market-unfriendly forces.

They suggest that dualistic portrayals of the urban civil and the rural

communitarian fail to capture the varied forms of both civility and incivility that

exist in both urban and rural settings. They argue that this notion of uncivility pertains

to the sensibilities and logic of capital, and should not be conflated with violent

forms of political practice (Moyo, Helliker, and Murisa 2008, 10).

Political motivation is a deeply divisive issue in Zimbabwe and more widely in

Africa, and it is often considered antithetical to civic activism to have ambitions of

political office, or be working to foment regime change. Such issues do not concern

many Western movement theorists, who emphasize that social movements are a


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part of normal politics (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) and often part of the

environment that give rise to or influence parties, courts, legislatures and elections,

as illustrated in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia

(Goldstone 2003, 3; Kitschelt 1989; Rootes and Richardson 1995).

Some social movement theorists emphasize the challenges associated with

analyzing motivations, focusing on participation and how committed members

sustain the movement (McAdam and Snow 1997). Motivation often depends upon

the social context and the incentives or disincentives for participating (Opp and

Roehl 1997), although it is sometimes based on complicated ideological,

communicative, psychological, and structural factors (Walsh and Warland 1997,

229). Social movements are comprised of different people, forces and interests.

While some highlight the propensity for contemporary movements to consist of a

small group of professionals who mobilize a team of transitory constituents toparticipate in a particular activity (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977), De Waal argues

that in the African context successful social movements often consist of a coalition

between a primary mobilization of constituencies and secondary activism of

professionals (2002, 95).

As this study illustrates, questions about organizational form are deeply

interconnected with the choice of strategies and how strategy dilemmas manifest,

and with the nature of outcomes. It is arguably the dynamic interactions between

structures and strategies that are important to unpack when working to

understand change.

Strategies and Dilemmas of Civil Society

The choice of strategies that civil society organizations and social movements

employ has much to do with the context within which they are working. In

Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, critical factors in the choice of a strategy relate to their

cultural availability also referred to as repertoires of contention (Tarrow 1994,

Tilly 1977) 8 and the political opportunity structure: those features of the

political system which create the overall abilities and capacities for civil society

groups to organize (Uhlin 2001). At the same time, context and culture do noteliminate agency; movements are sources of innovation in protest behavior as

their actions expand the forms of contention available to succeeding generations

of activists (McAdam and Snow 1997). These issues become increasingly relevant

as the forthcoming case analysis unfolds.

In the last few years, the notion of dilemmas has emerged within the

context of state-building discussions, and dilemma analysis, a tool to facilitate

addressing them, has received some attention (Paris and Sisk 2007; McCandless

and Rose 2010). These concepts are explored in chapter 7. As discussed earlier, a

conceptual framework developed for this study encompasses two strategy

dilemmas facing social movements in Zimbabwe and farther afield: rights or

redistribution and participation or resistance.


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14 CHAPTER 1

Participation and resistance

As conceptualized here, the participation/resistance dilemma draws upon older

debates such as revolution or reform (Luxemburg 1986). In contemporary social

movement debates, proponents of reform view social movements as shaping social

relations at the level of the state, politicizing previously uncontested relations and

re-politicizing previously settled relations (Arrighi et al. 1996). Older social movements

tended to focus on capturing state power. The African left has considered this debate

with respect to the post-colonial state. Some see the growth of movements linked to

the disbursement of state resources and their incorporation as inevitable (Sachikonye

1995a), while others are concerned that changing the state from within amounts to

movements being captured; instead, they believe, the left should work to create

autonomous institutions (Shivji 1991). There can be problems, however, with thisapproach: where bureaucratic structures are set up, they can begin behaving like

state institutions, or clientelism can develop and spread (Cheru 1996). In addition to

different conceptualizations of the dilemma itself, there are varying interpretations

and usages of bothparticipation and resistance.

The meaning of participation has been hotly debated in the last decade in

particular, influenced by the requirements of IFI- or donor-promoted poverty reduction

strategy papers (PRSPs) for all countries receiving international loans, which are meant

to be participatorily developed and country owned. Despite the use of terms like

participation and partnership in the preparation of the PRSPs, the influence of

civic organizations is limited, agendas are often predetermined, and the scope for

participation is often confined to what can be better termed consultative status

(McCandless and Pajibo 2003). There is also widespread skepticism amongst

Zimbabwean and international activists concerning the genuineness of the

participation that donors are advocating and prepared to offer in their decision-making

structures. The pressure for civil society to be partners of both government and

donors it can be assumed undermines the ability of civil society to develop an

autonomous, critical voice of actors at both levels.

Critical questions surrounding the quality of participation arise where the

influence of political context, expectations of the process, and the method andorgan of participation must be factored into the analysis (Christian Aid 2002). In

the African context, the concept of empowerment is often tied to participation.9

Questions of participation as empowerment are deeply political in the spirit of

Paulo Freire (1970) and Mahatma Gandhi, for example where there is a desired

goal to facilitate change in favor of the dispossessed. African scholars have argued

that participation of the poor will be futile unless power structures that perpetuate

poverty are simultaneously addressed (Cheru 1996; Mkandawire 1999; Bond 2001).

The table below suggests a typology of participation, perhaps better termed

levels of involvement. In this study these terms are used as they are noted here,

while participation is used as described in the strategy dilemma conceptual

framework. The concept ofresistance is historically used in social movement and


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leftist discourse but seldom defined, though it often contains judgments about

both strategy and outcome; both in general are assumed to be radical, i.e., non-

institutional, protest-oriented strategies aiming to affect structural change.

Harrison argues that like the term struggle, resistance requires a normative

judgment; he equates these terms with mass politics, widening political

participation, and the promotion of socio-economic equality (2001, 388). Several

scholars point to the ways in which the victory of a political and economic model

at the end of the Cold War has led to the death of political struggle, with new

constitutions accompanying substantial structural continuity. As well, the ongoing

ways in which neo-liberal economic globalization weakens the state and society

and their organizational capacity to resist as social gains of the last century are

lost (Harrison 2001; Gills 2000; Kagoro 2001).

Chin and Mittelman usefully draw from three master theorists to evolve a

framework for resistance that highlights forms of resistance as multifaceted,

emerging in particular social and cultural contexts: Gramsci and his theory of

counterhegemony; Polanyi and countermovements; and Scott and infrapolitics

(2000) . Gramscis main target was the state, and the mode of resistance was wars

of movement (frontal assaults) and wars of position (non-violent resistance)

designed to impede the states functioning. A Gramscian reading of resistancewould have to explicate the development of a counter-hegemonic consciousness

that informs wars of movement and position. Polanyi, writing about the causes of

the crises of the 1930s, developed the concept of countermovements10 that

were arising, re-exerting social control over the market a double movement.

Whereas Gramsci and Polanyi focus on the collective level, Scotts infrapolitics

seeks to explain the changing meaning of politics and resistance in most forms of

day-to-day dominant-subordinate relations (1990).

While each of these has some relevance in Zimbabwe, Polanyis

countermovement speaks to Zimbabwes social context where there is resistance

(in this case a double movement or countermovement) against economic injustice

on the one hand and political authoritarianism on the other. As noted above,

Table 1.1: Forms of Participation

Source: McGee and Norton (2000), adapted by author.

Where participants initiate and assume control of theprocess; the most advanced form of participation

Where participants are allowed to debate and agree onthe content of the policy formulation process

When public views are solicited; government is not underany obligation to include such views in the final outcome

A minimum requirement for a participatory process; at this

point, stakeholders are briefed about the PRSP, its purpose isexplained, and the process is planned

Initiation and controlby stakeholders

Joint decision-

making

Consultation

Information-sharing


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16 CHAPTER 1

Gramsci is used by some Zimbabwe scholars to explain the situation and strategies

employed, although perhaps more in the context of how participation is used

here. Hammar and Raftopoulos focus on the states creation of hegemony around

the land issue and see Mugabes efforts to pose the crisis not on the level of a

class in crisis, but on a universal plane as a national and Pan-Africanist problem

(2003, 19). Rich Dorman writes that the context of political hegemony requires

that NGOs have good relations with the state (2001). NGOs feel compelled to be

accommodating in such a context. While the concept of hegemony is sometimes

associated with subaltern groups as victims of false consciousness who fail to

recognize their oppression, they may know themselves to be exploited, but fail to

act due to fear of reprisal (Scott 1990), which is perhaps the case in Zimbabwe.

Some associate resistance with violence, or, especially in the case of

Zimbabwe, uncivil behavior as discussed in the previous section. For movementscholars, violence is believed to grow out of confidence and impatience with change

or lack of resources (Gamson 1997; Della Porta and Diani 1999). Violent action

may polarize the conflict, transforming relations between challengers and

authorities from a confused, many-sided game into a bi-polar one (Tarrow 1994,

104). It often leads to an escalation of repression, and the conflict more generally

may alienate sympathizers and lead to greater responsiveness to the claims of

moderates (Haines 1988, 167; Gamson 1990).

Rights and redistribution

The rights/redistribution strategy dilemma has roots in historical political economy

debates between liberalism and Marxism that are complex and remain contested.

There are also parallels with debates on democracy and development surrounding

their relationship: Can they truly co-exist? Should one trail or lead the other? While

globalization processes appear to be entrenching positions further, donors increasingly

coordinate action based on the advancement of neo-liberal economic policies and

political conditionalities focused on good governance, democracy, the rule of law,

and human rights. This is partly what makes the Zimbabwe case interesting, where

this business as usual has not unfolded as it has elsewhere, but has rather beenhotly contested and formed the substantive core of Zimbabwes polarization.

Many African scholars and activists have argued vehemently against

Western-style democracy and development, declaring that ultimately the forms

proposed are anti-democratic and anti-developmental. Democracy has too often

been restricted to the political and public domain, while economic management

and growth models are based on the non-democratic principles of private

ownership and competition, and the interests of those engaged in export and

international trade. They often come at the expense of civil and political liberties

and self-government, creating profound social and economic inequality, social

crisis, and even conflict (Cheru and Gill 1997; Ake 1996; Cheru 1987, 1999;

Nyangoro 1999). These scholars have begun to recast traditional, narrow


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conceptions of democracy (i.e., election, constitutionalism, and the rule of law)

and development (i.e., economic growth), emphasizing instead the compatibility

ofhuman andpeople-centereddevelopment and real democratization.11

In Zimbabwe and across Africa, Mamdanis thesis about the nature and

contemporary repercussions of colonial rule lies at the heart ofrights/redistribution

debates and concerns. Mamdani argues that colonial rule sharply distinguished

racial groups between rights-bearing colons (civil society) and African ethnic

populations (the tribalized peasantry) who were governed through customary

laws (1996, 2001). Continued denial of justice for the native majority, he suggests

(1998, 1990), can lead to conditions where unaddressed social grievances can be

harvested by a demagogue. In such cases, talk of rights (over justice and

redistributive concerns) gives a legal umbrella under which minorities preserve

and reproduce their privilege. Critics disagree, many speaking indirectly or directlyto the Zimbabwe situation. De Waal shifts the blame for the rural (redistribution)

/urban (rights) divide back to African leaders (2002, 96). One common form of

political authority is personal or arbitrary rule: domination by a big man who

seeks to evoke traditional images as chief of the tribe or father of the nation

whose citizens are infantilized as subjects and should not insolently demand

rights. This sort of rule is especially effective in rural areas where adapted forms

of traditional authority prevail, and where challenges to government authority

will lead to their violent repression. As such:

Any civil society mobilization is antithetical to this neo-traditional rule . . . Thegovernment will tend to dismiss both civil society leaders and opposition

politicians as elitists who represent only narrow urban interests. This charge may

contain an element of truth: any form of social mobilization presupposes that

people envisage themselves as citizens and bearers of rights, not as subjects,

and if this kind of socio-political culture is confined to urban areas, this is where

civil society and social mobilization will occur (De Waal 2002, 98).

In Zimbabwe the rights/redistribution debates draw out these themes in a

specific context of nationalist history and the politics of land redistribution, the

urban/rural divide, and North-South justice and the history of colonialism. Twoleading Zimbabwean social theorists have presented different sides of this debate.

Raftopoulos argues that a violent program of land occupations sanctioned by the

state is at odds with an important part of the nationalist legacy civil and political

rights (2003b). The land issue has been mobilized by ZANU-PF as a political resource,

pushed by the war veterans; it has demonized human rights issues as a minority

concern driven by Western-backed opposition forces and in the process damaged

the potentially fruitful dialogue that should ensue between rights and

redistribution concerns, insisting on a facile association of the former with a roster

of others perceived as outside the authentic national community (2003b, 218).

This has driven a wedge between the civic movements and the official legacy of

the liberation struggle.


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18 CHAPTER 1

Raftopoulos argues that urban struggles can and do deal with bread and butter

issues, that this approach isthe basis for human development, and that a substantive

and lasting redistribution program cannot be achieved without a broad-based

democratization of existing post-colonial polities (2003b, 219). Sam Moyo on the

other hand argues that the liberal formula proposes the following: independence

(from the state rather than donors); multiparty democracy (when neo-liberal politics

holds hegemonic place); respect for the rule of law (defined by private property);

independent judiciary, meaning bourgeois; and free press, meaning private (2001).

Further, the enforcement of the liberal rights framework marginalizes the

redistribution agenda. Rural-based movements, such as war veteran-led land

occupations, have catalyzed major land redistribution efforts and are excluded from

the civil framework conforming to proper procedure and content of opposition

politics in accordance with the liberal model. He argues that their land occupationswere a deliberate effort to smash the liberal constitutional order.12

The role of constitutionalism in transformative change in Africa comprises an

important part of these debates. Shivjis work on the subject suggests that while

liberal constitutions focus excessively on the powers of the political elite, new

discourses and practices are focused on outlining a democraticprocess for developing

a political compact that defines not only the power relations between political

communities and constituencies, but also defines the rights, duties, and obligations

of citizens in any society (1991, 27; Ihonvbere 2000). The resulting constitution should

be a living document that all citizens actually understand, claim ownership of and

deploy in the defense of their rights. Also, to ensure against the abuse of power

eroding possibilities for good governance, human rights provisions must be included

(Sinjela 1998, 25, cited in Ihonvbere 2000). Others have argued that constitutionalism

is and should remain a critical element of peace and conflict prevention, primarily in

terms of providing representation, legality, and transparency in decision-making, and

mechanisms for managing change, including the peaceful transfer of power (De Waal

2002; Hart 2003). But whether and how the constitution and wider democratization

approaches associated with rights can support the aims of redistribution is

contested. Bartlett reflects a widespread critique that human rights are primarily

concerned with liberal notions of civil and political concerns of the individual (andhis and her property) rather than basic economic concerns, i.e., the rights to the

means of life, to health, and to education (2001, 83). In Zimbabwe the constitutional

movement (through the NCA in particular) has been widely critiqued in this manner;

even Raftopoulos has observed that it has failed to sufficiently engage with the

legacies of the liberation struggle (2003b, 235).

Social Movement Impacts, Polarization and Transformation

Identifying and understanding the impacts of civic or social movements, particularly

at the national level, is a complex task and a key reason for limited systematic

scholarship in this area (McAdam and Snow 1997, 461). Despite challenges, movement


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scholars have discussed the related questions ofwhat accounts for success of a

movement, and what have certain actions/tactics achieved. Zimbabwe scholars have

contributed more on the latter, especially in seeking to understand the outcomes of

the land occupations and the fast-track policy of government (discussed in detail in

chapter 6). This study overall is more concerned with the latter question as well,

while moving it into the area of impact considering the wider implications of

outcomes for transformative change and peace.

Briefly, on the issue of what accounts for success, conventional wisdom has

linked favorable political opportunities and the extent of movement mobilization

(Goldstone 2003, 20), and considered how outcomes are mediated by political

context, in particular conducive state or party circumstances.13 Some discount

the role of political context in determining outcomes, opting for explanations

based on resource mobilization or collective action (Gamson 1990). A range ofstudies attribute success to a variety of factors that concern, amongst other things,

the numbers and diversity of strategies, who is involved, and the length of time

such strategies are employed.14 The levels of success for a movement action are

also emphasized by some (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1997; Gamson 1990),

being: 1) recognition by opponents or the state (though without benefits this

may be co-optation); 2) gains in policies that aid the group; 3) the challenger

transforms itself into a member of the polity. Problems with ascertaining success

go beyond issues of causality, i.e., to the question of interpretation of the meaning

of success. This has led to a more differentiated analysis of what results a project

or program can produce.

As for what particular actions/strategies achieve, social movement literature

is at odds with the actual goals and achievements of many social movements:

while the latter often influence the way in which the political system as a whole

functions, the literature mostly refers to outcomes, focusing on such issues as

changes in public policy. Zimbabwe is no exception, where both the NCA and the

ZNLWVA have national-level goals that extend far beyond a programmatic output

or outcome. Few analysts have considered social movement impacts more broadly

given the inherent challenges in establishing causality (Della Porta and Diani 1999;

Roch 1999). Most agree, however, that translation of grievances into politicalimpact involves structural change (Beckman and Sjgren 2001) i.e., in the

condition of those mobilizing for change and cultural transformation: the

elaboration of new codes (Melucci 1982, 1984).15 Sociologists have theorized

about structuralchange where the emphasis is on changes ofrather than changes

in society (Sztompka 1993). Development and peace practitioners and social

change theorists have made useful inroads into the study of structural change

and transformative change, which this analysis draws on and discusses in detail in

chapter 6. Suffice to say that, according to eminent peace theorists, transformative

strategies for peace and change often require the use of confrontational strategies

to raise the profile of latent conflict and bring the existence of structural violence

into public awareness (Curle 1990; Galtung 1996).


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20 CHAPTER 1

It is logical then that social movements, particularly those using confrontational

strategies, can also contribute to polarization and conflict. Polarization is widely

considered to play a causal role in civil war and inter-communal conflict, while the

mechanisms that produce and drive it are not well understood (LeBas 2006, 421).

Much debate on polarization has been influenced by scholarship underpinning

theories of ethnic and identity conflict, with social-psychology driven explanations

focusing on the processes of group formation and differentiation that can be adversely

influenced by (mis)perceptions, stereotyping and dehumanization (Bloom 1990).

Peace scholar Johan Galtung emphasizes that polarization, defined as social, human

distance, may exist for ages between countries or classes of people without turning

violent. Particularly in structural conflicts, people may suffer in silence, perhaps until

their basic needs are violated, or until a wider culture of violence develops, paving

the way for physical violence (Galtung 2007).Some movement scholars describe polarization as a process, a widening of

political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the

gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward one, the other,

or both extremes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 322), and complex interactions

between mechanisms that drive polarization, such as boundary formation, the

strategic use of violence, and defensive radicalization.16 LeBas draws upon these

theories, arguing that political polarization in Zimbabwe has been craftedby elites

(2006). While not a necessary consequence of democratization, she suggests that

it was a result of short-run strategies of political elites in the interests of both

political parties to divide the electorate into two opposing camps. This served to

politicize constituencies, increase party mobilization capacities, and prevent

organizational fragmentation, which in turn set in motion broader political

processes beyond the control of political actors that intensified polarization and

fostered deadlock. LeBass deep empirical analysis reveals important insights into

the rapid development of political party competition and polarization in Zimbabwe.

She suggests that pressures from below against negotiation, for continued mass

action and confrontation have made it difficult for the MDC in particular to

adopt more moderate and possibly more effective strategies (2006, 435). The focus

of this study is targeted towards these wider processes of mobilization from belowand understanding how they contribute to polarization and transformation.

Studies considering social movement or civic organization action on peace

outcomes at the national level are exceedingly hard to come by. One useful study

considers impacts of movements on the peacemaking processes in four countries,

but without examining the wider issues central to sustaining peace, such as those

engaged in fostering of people-centered development and democracy (Gidron,

Katz, and Hasenfeld 2002). This book endeavors to make an important contribution

in this area, examining results of social movement action at the national level and

the implications for transformative change and peace.

* * *


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As illustrated in the preceding discussion, Zimbabwe scholars (who are often

simultaneously activists and/or policy-makers) are making critical contributions

to each of these areas of inquiry, around the nature of civil society organizations,

the strategies they undertake and dilemmas they face, and the outcomes that

result. In addition to in-depth studies of particular organizations and movements,17

two studies in particular have sought to engage debates that cut across these

three issue areas. Zimbabwes Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and

Nation in the Context of Crisis (Hammar, Raftopoulos, and Jensen 2003) and

Contested Terrain, a 2008 study edited by Moyo, Helliker, and Murisa, both offer

nuanced, empirically-based analyses that endeavor to provide a richer picture of

what lies beneath Zimbabwes polarities.

In spite of these efforts, heated debates about the nature of Zimbabwes

crisis continue that illustrate deep divisions in perspectives. In late 2008 the debatesamongst scholars were profoundly internationalized when Mahmood Mamdani

published an essay entitled Lessons of Zimbabwe in the London Review of Books

(2008).18 Mamdani argues that Mugabes land reform measures, however harsh,

were long overdue and effectively spawned a democratic revolution socially,

economically and even politically. Achieved with relatively minimal turmoil, the

measures have won him considerable popularity in Zimbabwe and throughout

southern Africa. He argues, moreover, that Mugabe has ruled not only by coercion

but also by consent. Unsurprisingly, a set of critiques were launched by scholars,

targeting a range of issues that included: Mamdanis dismissive position on state

violence and the closure of democratic spaces; his underestimation of the scale

of displacement during the period; his misreading of the history of the labor

movement and trivializing characterization of the MDC and civil society; his

assessment of the contribution of sanctions to the crisis; and his lack of

acknowledgement of ZANU-PFs enormous loss of legitimacy.19 At the heart of the

different positions informing this debate that continue to underlie polarization in

Zimbabwe lie questions about the nature, role, and legitimacy of actors vying for

change, their strategies, and the outcomes and impacts of major social actions.

This work endeavors to bring these important streams of thought together

into deeper dialogue, interweaving insights and lessons from wider scholarshipand practice, in search of transformative routes out of Zimbabwes polarization.

Endnotes

1. They include: inducing participants to offer their services; defining organizational aims;

managing and coordinating contributions; collecting resources from their environment;

and selecting, training and replacing members (Scott 1981, 9). SMOs possess the means

and mechanisms to mobilize resources for protest in order to further the movements

objectives (Rucht 1996), while working to neutralize opponents (McCarthy and Zald1977, 1987, 19).


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22 CHAPTER 1

2. Gramsci defined hegemony as the indissoluble union of political, intellectual, and moral

leadership, which goes beyond a simple class alliance (Mouffe 1979, 179). It is

elaborated and spread through civil society, including intellectuals and material and

institutional structures or hegemonic apparatuses, e.g. schools, churches, media,architecture. Hegemony is established when power and control over social life emerge

from and operate within society rather than forced by the state, or external sources

(Chin and Mittelman 2000, 167).

3. During this period international journalists and non-governmental organizations were

regularly denied entry or forced to leave the country if there was any suspicion about

their work. Interacting with war veterans, who were publicly propagating a worldview

hostile to foreigners and civil society generally, presented other problems, such as

simply trying to arrange legitimate interviews. Eventually I was caught doing research,

interrogated on multiple occasions by Central Intelligence Organization operatives,

and had my visa extension denied, despite having an offer for a full-time teachingposition at a Zimbabwe-based university.

4. A critical theory approach seeks to provide a historical account of the present order, a

critique of injustices and inequalities, and an assessment of immanent and

transformative possibilities for change, created through negotiation of analytic

frameworks with indigenous discourse (Cox 1981; Burchill et al. 2005; Young 1990). In

this tradition, critical ethnographic methods (Denzin 1989) and critical evaluation

methods were used (Greene 1994, 533).

5. Political economy perspectives seek to understand the balance of forces and power

relations involved in diverging social projects and competing political agendas within

civil society, as well as the contexts and forces that account for the emergence of

different segments in civil society (Gibbon 1995; Kasfir 1998; Sjgren 2001).

6. Between 2001 and 2004 approximately 150 interviews were systematically undertaken

in Harare, Manicaland, Matabeleland, and Masvingo three major geopolitical regions

of the country while more sporadic interviews were undertaken in many other parts

of the country, rural and urban. Approximately fifty interviews were conducted in

visits to the country in May 2007, May 2010 and November 2010, in Zimbabwe and

South Africa. Approximately half of the original 150 interviews with war veterans and

NCA activists were conducted in local languages by Zimbabwean researchers Gerald

Mazarire and Showers Mawowa. Focus groups were found to be counterproductive

given the climate of fear, with the exception of interviews with war veterans

themselves. Grassroots interviewees overwhelmingly chose to remain anonymousand thus their interviews (between 2003 and 2004) are sourced only in terms of their

association.

7. For two years I worked part-time with the NCA in the Information Department, mostly

assisting with the production of theAgenda quarterly publication. I attended meetings

when allowed, but not staff meetings. One senior NCA representative believed that I

was a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operative, reflecting the general culture of

extreme distrust and fear of infiltration. I never participated in protest activities.

8. Movement scholars also talk of toolkits of protest tactics available to activists at

any given historical moment (McAdam and Snow 1997, 326).

9. See, for instance, The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development,Arusha 1990. Empowerment means, among other things, creating the space and

institutional framework for consensus building as well as building the capacity of the


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people and equipping them with the requisite knowledge and skills to participate

effectively and meaningfully in national policy dialogue processes (Gumah 2003).

10. Countermovements aim to halt or neutralize goal attainment activities of the

movement in question (McAdam and Snow 1997, xxiii).11. See for example: Lipset 1959; Dahl 1989; Przeworski and Limongi 1997 on traditional

concepts, and for African scholars: Adedeji 1997; Adjibolosoo 1995; Cheru 1999, 2000;

Sachikonye 1995a; Amin 1994.

12. Interview with Sam Moyo, April 25, 2004.

13. An undemocratic political system is generally not conducive, while patronage-type

systems upheld by rewarding individuals may produce symbolic benefits rather than

structural measures (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1997, 497).

14. These include: the disruptive force of movement tactics (McAdam 1997; Gamson 1997),

particularly among the poor and lower classes (Piven and Cloward 1979); minimalist

strategies (Gamson 1990); the interweaving of organizational models and diversestrategies (Della Porta and Diani 1999); the relevance of a movements social basis

(Sachikonye 1995a); a coalition between the mass mobilization of people in pursuit of

their own rights and interests, and those of professionals (De Waal 2002); and a

sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the

jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that

populations worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (Tilly 1999, 257).

15. This could be through the importation of new issues into public debate or the degree

to which a movement has a sensitizing impact on a social or political actor in line

with its agenda (Kriesi et al. 1995, 211).

16. For a fuller discussion and review of this literature, see LeBas (2006).

17. Several researchers have worked on the NCA (e.g., Brian Kagoro 2001; Sara Rich Dorman

2001; Brian Raftoploulos and Gerald Mazarire 2000). Most research has focused on

the period only until or just after the No vote in 2000. While the war veterans, more

specifically the ZNLWVA, have attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention

since the land occupations launched in 2000, most research was conducted by analysis

of newspaper articles and some sporadic interviews, some written by white farmers

who lost farms (e.g., Cathy Buckle 2002). Norma Kriger (2003) has extensively

researched the war veterans (during the 1980-1987 period) with an approach rooted

in analysis of power and history. Sam Moyo (1995-present) bases his work on extensive

interviews with war veterans and focuses more closely on the issue of land than on

the war veterans as an organization. Wilbert Sadombas 2008 PhD thesis is the mostcomprehensive analysis of the war veterans to date. A war veteran himself, he analyses

the history of the liberation movement, their strategies and motives behind the land

occupations, from the inside.

18. The essay draws heavily on a 2005 study by Moyo and Yeros and seeks to explain the

origins and outcomes of the land reform program, including its casualties and the

associated domestic and international causes.

19. These were captured in Reflections on Mahmood Mamdanis Lessons of Zimbabwe

in an issue of Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin no. 82, Summer 2009. http://

concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/82/.

polarization and transformation in zimbabwe social movements, strategy dilemmas and change

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