AdoptionWho May Adopt or Be AdoptedIn Re: Adoption of Edwin Villa 1967

Petitioner-spouses Luis Santos, Jr., a lawyer and Edipola Villa, a nurse, having no child of their own, filed a petition praying that the minor Edwin Villa, a younger brother of Edipola, be declared their son by adoption. Due to the child’s sickness, he was entrusted to the petitioners since bir\th. The natural parents of the minor voluntarily gave their consent and written conformity to the adoption. The OSG opposed the petition on the ground that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one another because of the incongruous dual relationship that will result. TC dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.

1. W/N an elder sister may adopt her younger brother o HELD: Yes. There is no provision in the law prohibiting relatives by blood from adopting one another.

A335 NCC enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners aren’t among those prohibited from adopting. A339 NCC names those who can’t be adopted and the minor Edwin isn’t one of those excluded by law. A338 NCC on the other hand allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate kids by their father or mother, and a stepchild by the stepdad or stepmom.

o To say that adoption shouldn’t be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC is to preclude adoption among relatives no mater how removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which isn’t the policy of the law . Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate kids, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such kids by persons who can properly rear and educate them.

o The fact that adoption in this case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting sister, shouldn’t prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by adoption is limited to the adopting parents and doesn’t extend to their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Petition for adoption granted.

Republic v. CA [and Bobiles] 1992 Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition toadopt Jason Condat, then 6 y/o and who had been living

with her family since he was 4 months old. The court found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued and order setting the petition for hearing. The order was duly published and posted with copies seasonably served to interested parties. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. During the hearing, the testimonies of her husband Dioscoro Bobiles and DSWD worker Ma. Luz Salameno were taken and admitted. Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition which was affirmed by the CA.

During the pendency of her petition, the FC took effect, which makes mandatory the joint adoption of spouses. Petitioner OSG now contends that the petition for adoption should have been dismissed outright as it was filed

solely by private respondent without joining her husband Dioscoro Bobiles, in violation of Art 185 FC. It argues that FC must be applied retroactively to the petition of Mrs. Bobiles. And that even if the FC is not applied, the court still erred by granting adoption to both the spouses instead of Zenaida alone.

1. W/N the FC provision regarding joint adoption of spouses should apply o No. Art 256 FC provides for the retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof subject to

the qualification that such retroactive application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity, and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. It is the present fixed interest that should be protected against arbitrary State action. These include legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, as well as exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

o Zenaida had rightfully commenced the petition prior to the effectivity of the FC. Her right to that action is not subject to subsequent modification of the law, as her right to file the petition alone was already vested and cannot be impaired. Art 185 FC is remedial in nature. Technical rules should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings because it involves the future condition and paramount

welfare of the adoptee. Dioscoro also attached his affidavit of consent to the petition, and showed that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child, which is sufficient to make him a co-petitioner.

Republic v. Miller 1999 Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air Forceassigned at Clark Air Base, and his wife, Jumrus Miller, both

US citizens but residing in Angeles City, were childless and filed a verified petition to adopt minor Michael Magno Madayag. Poverty and deep concern for his future prompted Michael’s natural parents to give their irrevocable consent to the adoption.

RTC granted petition for adoption finding petitioners to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for adoption. Michael was freed from all obligations of obedience and support with respect to natural parents. He was then declared child of the Millers by adoption. His surname was to be changed from “Madayag” to “Miller”.

1. W/N the Court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under FC, effective on Aug 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was filed before FC, on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which allowed aliens to adopt

o Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the right of alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Adoption statues, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill the compassionate and noble objectives of the law.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim 2009 Monina and Primo Lim were a childless couple. Michelle and Michael were entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban in

1977 and 1983, when each were about 11 days old. They were so eager to have children so they made it appear that they were their real parents. They raised them as their own, sent the kids in exclusive schools, and were given the surname “Lim.”

Primo died in 1998 and Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen in 2000.In 2002, Monina filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael, who were 25 (already married) and 18 years old respectively, under the amnesty of RA 8552. Michelle, her husband, Michael, and Olario all gave their consent to the adoption.

DSWD issued a certification stating that Michelle and Michael were abandoned children whose natural parents’ whereabouts are unknown. However, RTC still denied the petition, as mere consent of her husband did not suffice.

1. W/N Monina can singly adopto No. Parental authority is only one of the effects of adoption. Husband and wife must adopt jointly

except for instances allowed by law. Petitioner is contending that she can file for adoption singly because parental authority is no longer required in this case since Michelle is already married and Michael has attained the age of majority.

o It is true that upon the age of emancipation, parental authority over the person and property of the child terminates. However, this is only one of the effects of adoption. The following are the other effects of adoption:

Sever ties between biological parents except when the spouses of adopter is the biological parent

Legitimate child of the adopter (surname, support and succession) Endow them reciprocal rights and obligations from the relationship of parent and child (not

limited to) Choose the name of the child Right to be the legal and compulsory heirs of each other Support and successional rights

o The law is clear. According to Sec. 7 Art. 3 of RA 8552, the husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in certain cases.Monina is not adopting the legitimate children of Olario. The children were not her illegitimate children. Nor were the spouses separated from each other. The use of the word “shall” means that the provision is mandatory and that the couple must jointly adopt.Furthermore, Olario, an American citizen, has additional requirements aside from his affidavit of consent. These cannot be waived by Sec. 7, because the children are not relatives within the fourth civil degree nor the legitimate child of the petitioner. He must show that:

His country has diplomatic relations with the Philippines He has been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of

petition for adoption He must maintain residency until the adoption decree is entered He has legal capacity in his country Adoptee is allowed to enter in his country as the latter’s adopted children

o Even if Olario has already filed for dissolution of marriage to petitioner in LA, the marriage still subsists, as this is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution. It is still mandatory to adopt jointly.

Adoption ProceedingsLazatin v. Campos 1979

Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate and was survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters Nora L. De Leon (married to Bernardo de Leon) and Irma Lazatin (married to Francisco Veloso).

A month after Mariano Lazatin’s death, Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding before the CFI of Pasay. To the said proceeding, Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne intervened since they claimed to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano with a woman named Helen Muñoz. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another illegitimate (not natural) child.

2 months after the intestate proceeding, Margarita de Asis died but left a holographic will (a will written entirely in the testator’s hand), which provided, among others, for:

o a legacy of cash, jewelry and stocks to Arlene De Leon, a granddaughter o a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister o a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara (petitioner’s son)

During Margarita de Asis’ lifetime, she kept a safety deposit box, which either she or Nora could open.Five days after Margarita’s death, Nora opened the said box and emptied its contents (shares of stock, adoption papers of hers and her sister’s, jewelry belonging to her and to her mother).

Her sole reason for opening the box was to get the stock certificates and other small items. A bank personnel informed her that she needed an authority from the court to open the box in view of her mother’s death, so she decided to remove everything from it. On June 3, 1974, the private respondents filed a petition to probate the will of Margarita. Days after learning that Nora opened the box, Ramon Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate court, claiming:

o that Margarita had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate o demanded its production o prayed for the opening of the boxOf course, when the court ordered its opening, the box was already

empty. Seven months after Margarita’s death, Renato Lazatin intervened for the first time as an admitted illegitimate

child. Then he also filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, this time as an adopted child on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, stating that Renato was an illegitimate child of Mariano who has later adopted by him. The affidavit was later modified to state that Renato was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita Renato’s motion to intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita was denied by the lower court on the ground that the evidence presented tend to prove that he was a recognized natural child of Mariano, but not a legally adopted child of Margarita. He never presented a decree of adoption in his favor.

Likewise, Renato’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the court unless he presented some documentary evidence to prove his adoptionRenato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in the probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child.

1. W/N Renato is an adopted childo Renato has not established his status as an adopted child. It is never presumed, and the absence of a

record has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. The petitioner’s evidence did not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption. Had it existed, he could have obtained a copy of the newspaper publication that is required by ROC.

o Living with a person and being treated kindly or charitably does not give rise to the presumption of adoption. Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the existence of the records are proven along with the contents of the records and its loss. Prior to its introduction, the former existence of the instrument must be established, which petitioner failed to do. The affidavit presented is not enough and does not replace the actual record of adoption. There was also no proof as to Nora possessing the document after emptying the safety deposit box. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out otherwise it is a nullity.

o Consequently, Renato cannot intervene in the settlement of Margarita’s estate due to lack of proof of an interest in said estate. As he failed to establish his status as an adopted child, he has to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the status of an admitted illegitimate child of the deceased.

Santos, et al. v. Aranzanso, et al. 1966 Paulina, 17 and Aurora, 8 were adopted by spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes. The two minors were in

the custody of the couple since infancy and the whereabouts of their biological parents have been unknown since the outbreak of the war (abandoned).

Crisanto de Mesa, the guardian ad litem gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina who was over 14 years old then also put in writing her assent to the proceeding. An adoption decree was eventually granted.

8 years later, Juliana died and Simplicio commenced the settlement of her estate declaring that he and the two adopted daughters, are her surviving heirs.

Gregoria Aranzanso, an alleged first cousin of Juliana opposed the settlement estate saying that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void ab initio for being bigamous. Likewise, the adoption is also null for want of written consent of their parents. Demetria Ventura, who claims to be another cousin of Juliana and mother of Paulina filed her opposition in the same tenor as Gregoria’s. Later on, so did two other cousins, Consuelo and Pacita Pasion, who asked to intervene and to be able to withdraw cash advances from the estate.

CFI held that the validity of the adoption could not be assailed collaterally, but CA reversed.

1. W/N the adoption decree is valido Yes. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have

abandoned their kids, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices. In adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties & relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural & legal obligations of care & support which parents owe to their kids.” Although the adoption court did not use the term “abandonment” the reasons propounded bear the essential elements of abandonment, and so the determination cannot be collaterally questioned.

o Granting arguendo that the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void, the adopted children are deemed to be adopted by Juliana as a single person. The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to promote welfare of the child, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.

DSWD v. Belen 1997 Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized US citizens, filed a petition to adopt their niece, the

minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Antonio Belen granted the petition based on the findings and recommendations of the DSWD that the adopting parents and the adoptee have developed emotional attachment, citing the Adoptive Home Study Report and Child Study Report from the department.

When travel clearance was being sought from DSWD so that the child may join her adopters in the States, it was discovered that DSWD was not informed about the commencement of the adoption proceedings nor was it given notice of the petition being granted.

The respondent judge is now charged with violations of Art 33 PD 603 and Circular No. 12, which require that the petition only be granted after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents, and the adoptive parents.

Respondent and Social Welfare Officer of the RTC Elma Vedaña is also implicated, as the judge claimed that he directed Vedaña to conduct the home and case study and to submit said reports, as these are her duties. He supposedly assumed that it was routine procedure for the SWO to coordinate with DSWD. Vedaña also allegedly asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting parents to expedite the DSWD proceedings. She denied this, and said she was only ordered to conduct the case study and submit her report one week before the hearing. She also denied asking for money.

1. W/N they should be administratively punishedo The Court established that DSWD has to be notified of the adoption proceedings. A Home and Child

Study Report is mandatory before adoption is to be finalized. The judge should have immediately notified DSWD at the commencement of the proceeding, so that the case study could have been conducted. The DSWD is undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. It was also his duty to exercise caution and see to it that the coordination was observed in the proceedings, together with other requirements.

o Vedaña arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, as she was only tasked to coordinate with the DSWD.

o However, the Court is convinced that the judge acted in good faith when he stated that the DSWD submitted the required reports, believing that it was standard procedure for the RTC’s Social Welfare Officer to coordinate with the department. There is also no evidence of Vedaña asking for money. The judge is censured, while the SWO is reprimanded.

Effects of AdoptionTamargo v. CA 1992

Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the 10 y/o minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was granted, Adelberto shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo using an air rifle. The parents of Tamargo sued Adelberto’s natural parents for damages. The child though was acquitted for acting without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the Rapisuras should be the proper parties in this suit since parental authority shifted to the adopting parent from the moment the petition for adoption was filed.

TC and CA dismissed the petition.

1. W/N the adoptive parents should be liable for damageso No. Adelberto’s natural parents are liable for the damages. The tortious act of the minor occurred prior

to the adoption, despite the adoption decree retroacting to the date of the filing of the petition. Adelberto was in his natural parents’ actual custody at the time of the accident, and the law presumes that parents with whom the minor is living exercise supervision and control. The adoptive parents cannot be held liable for a tortious act they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented, since they were in the US at the time. This would be unfair and unconscionable. In this case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the shooting, so in any case, actual custody was with the natural parents.

Sayson v. CA 1992 Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children. Their son Teodoro married Isabel, both deceased, and left their

properties to their children Delia, Edmundo and Doribel. Their father’s siblings (aunts and uncles) filed a complaint for partition and accounting ofthe intestate estate.The

children resisted the action and filed their own defense alleging that Delia and Edmundo were adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter. As such, they were entitled to inherit their father’s share of his estate by right of representation.

The aunts and uncles contend that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born when the decree of adoption was issued, thus making Teodoro and Isabel ineligible to adopt under Art 335 CC. However, they also contend that Doribel is not a legitimate daughter, but was in fact born to another woman who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.

1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adoptedo Yes. The position of the aunts and uncles is inconsistent because they question the legality of Delia’s and

Edmundo’s adoption on the ground that Doribel had already been born, but in the same breath they also question Doribel’s legitimacy.

o Also, the timeliness of the challenge to the decree of adoption is questionable. They should have brought this with the court even before the adoption was decreed.

o The validity of adoption cannot be challenged collaterally. It should be challenged in a direct proceeding. 2. WON Doribel is the legitimate daughter

o Yes. The birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Art. 265 CC and Art. 172 FC.Although it is only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence, no such evidence was presented in the case.

o Doribel’s legitimacy also could not be challenged collaterally. 3. WON Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are heirs of the intestate estate of their parents

o Yes. Doribel, Delia and Edmundo are therefore the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of their parents under Art 979 CC. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.The philosophy underlying this article is that a person’s love descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

4. WON they have a right of representation o Yes, but only Doribel, not Delia or Edmundo, has the right of representation. She has the right to

represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents, and is entitled to the share her father would have acquired had he survived.

o Delia and Edmundo do not have the right of representation because the grandparents are considered strangers to the adopted child. The relationship created by adoption exists only between the adopting parents and the adopted child. Thus, while the adopted children have the right to succeed their parents, they do not have the right of representation.

Johnston v. Republic 1963 Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2 y/o minor named Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion

Georgiana from Hospicio de San Jose, as she is in a childless marriage with Raymond Arthur Johnston. The petition was granted but the child was given Isabel’s maiden surname, Valdez. Isabel filed a motion to change the child’s surname to Valdez- Johnston, Isabel’s married name.

1. W/N the adopted child can use Johnstono Art. 341 CC provides that the adoption shall: 1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as

if he were a legitimate child of the adopter; 2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature; 3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter; and 4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname.

o Par. 4 refers to the adopter’s own surname, which is her maiden name, and not her married surname; She entered the adoption not as a married woman.

o Adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of the husband to the adoption did not have the effect of making him an adoptive father.

o To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter would mislead the public into believing that she had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case.

Republic v. CA [and Caranto] 1996 Midael had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years old. When Jaime married Zenaida, Midael stayed under

their care and custody.Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto then filed for the adoption of 15 y/o minor Midael C. Mazon. Aside from the decree of adoption, they also prayed for the change in the given name birth certificate entry from Midael to Michael.

OSG opposed the petition insofar as it also sought to change ‘Midael’ to ‘Michael’ in an adoption proceeding.

RTC dismissed OSG’s contention and rendered judgment granting Caranto spouses’ petition. CA affirmed.

1. W/N RTC acquired jurisdictiono Yes. Petitioner contends that since the name appearing in the requisite notice by publication did not

state the true name of the child. Court ruled that the case at bar was an obvious clerical error in the given name of the child, and does not confuse any identities (same rhyme and tone).

2. W/N RTC and CA erred in granting name changeo Yes. The change of given name is without force and effect. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not only

refer to errors concerning civil status, but even to names as well as enumerated in item (o) of § 2 of Rule 108, and thus applies to the case at bar. The local civil registrar must have been made party to the proceeding. The notice by publication also failed to include the matter on the change of name, depriving the local civil registrar of notice and opportunity to be heard.

Republic v. Hernandez 1996 Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an infant named Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran in his birth certificate.

When they had him baptized, they gave him the name Aaron Joseph, the name by which the child is known to the family, relatives and friends. The spouses then instituted a joinder of the petition for adoption and the petition for a change of name.

The petitioner OSG opposed the said action saying that there is no legal basis for the change of the adoptee’s given name.

RTC ruled in favor changing the name of the child ratiocinating that “as adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may feely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law.”

Further, the respondents submit that change of name may be given liberal construction since the object of strict implementation is to prevent fraudulent acts, while an infant has not exercised any of its rights.

1. W/N the joinder for adoption and petition for name change is allowedo No. In order for two petitions may be joined in one proceeding, the causes of action must: (a) not violate

the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and (b) arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

o There is no conceptual unity between petition for adoption and petition for change of name. The two actions are different and unrelated from each other, and therefore, two special proceedings which cannot be joined as having one cause of action. They must be instituted separately.

2. W/N there is lawful ground for name changeo No. The change of surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter

does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. The birth certificate, as it appears in the civil register, contains the official name. The baptismal name is unofficial and irrelevant if it is not the name entered in the civil register, as that is his name in the eyes of the law. A change of name is a privilege, not a right, and being given a different name upon baptism is not a sufficient reason to warrant a name change.

o If they really want to change the name, they institute another action under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, which governs substantial changes. This entails a petition signed and verified by the person desiring the name change, an order for the date and place of hearing, and satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations. This is an independent and special proceeding governed by its own set of rules.

In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia 2005 Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.

Stephanie's mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia and Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname.

When Honorato became a widower, he became qualified to become Stephanie's adopting parent.With the petition for adoption, he prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and her last name Garcia to Catindig.

RTC granted the adoption. Likewise, it ruled that the name would be Stephanie Nathy Catindig, without the middle name Garcia. RTC denied Honorato's motion for reconsideration, saying that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his/her biological mother as his/her middle name.

1. W/N Stephanie can use Garcia as her middle nameo Yes. The Court observed that there was no law, even in the FC that regulated the use of a middle name.

However, as correctly observed by the OSG, members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the FC recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child's mom as middle name.

o As adoption's underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child, laws or judgments must be construed in favor of the child.As one of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all rights provided by law to a legitimate child w/o discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her mother and father.

o Lastly, as stated by the OSG, it is necessary to maintain Stephanie's filiation w/ her natural mother. This is in connection with Art. 189 of the Family Code w/c states that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.

o Besides, she's living with her mother right now, obtaining support from Honorato. They are one happy family.