persons first 10 cases (full text)

8/3/2019 Persons First 10 Cases (Full Text)

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,

vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brothersolemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by thepetitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a partyin the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for thedeclaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother CresencianoAblaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification ofMarriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriagelicense, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for havingbeen solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had diedwithout any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby makinghim a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage betweenCresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.2

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000,3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition for thefollowing reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage(contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr.Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration onNovember 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to themarriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
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While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the lawnonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any ofthe parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse,who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as hestands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage willnot prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the

surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against thepetitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV.NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITHAPPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO.69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTINGJURISPRUDENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration ofnullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights,duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validityof a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature othe marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a

marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under theFamily Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between astepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void,considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which tookeffect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration ofabsolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line todistinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9

Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
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1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced afterMarch 15, 2003.10

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from thelimitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated

under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicablelaw was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on theexclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriageunder A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,12the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for thedeclaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of amarriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how andwhen each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of amarriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make themarriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order ofsociety as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained anddeclared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. Andtherefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriagemay be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after thedeath of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will bedisregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterallyattacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriagecannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must bea judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage

and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes eitherthe action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of eitherparty would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement ofestate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriageeven in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This iswithout prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullityis necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring suchprevious marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only forpurpose of remarriage.13

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving alicense to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v.Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails ofthe suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real partyin interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the meaningof the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, asdistinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no materialinterest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real partyin interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitionerwas as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
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affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws ofsuccession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 andArticle 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled toone half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relativesshall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludescollateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of thepetitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir.Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse their error,in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos surviving wife,19stood tobe benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not allmarriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shedlight on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have beena marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joinedherein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1 It isprecisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The absence of anindispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to theabsent parties but even as to those present.21

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano

Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determinewho between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 wasdecided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As adefendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila andLeila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable partywhose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however, considering thatSection 11,22Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissalof an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, suchamendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own initiativeat any stage of the action and on such terms as are just."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza andLeonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49,in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatorypleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasulas parties-defendants; then to determinewhether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the timeof his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled tosucceed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.
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No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD*

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to thewriter of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that theconclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of theopinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice


Manila


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SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,vs.DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon.Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Orderof the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriagebetween petitioner and respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage torespondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the followingdisposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS andrespondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychologicalincapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legalconsequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September

11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the requiredmotion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of VoidMarriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting theMotion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as

they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion toreconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decisionas final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential maritalobligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellatecourt stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCdid not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before theFamily Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the FamilyCode which took effect on August 3, 1988."
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Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion forReconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008].The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Ruleson Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewisedenied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

I S S U E S

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10,2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELIIS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THEISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURTIS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI ISPATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M.NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD"MARRIAGES."

C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATIONOF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLEMARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITYOF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITIONFOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.

D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH APRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT

PROPER IN HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIALCIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THEPETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCentitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable tothe case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the FamilyCode. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits,still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case.In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullitywas filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the
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marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filedand decided after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia wassolemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal fromthe decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citingthe mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations asrequired under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration ofAbsolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which theCourt promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment ofvoidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to thosemarriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets ademarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No.02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is noroom for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free fromambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as theplain-meaning rule orverba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention."Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be nodeparture."10

There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of theissue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court hasstressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mereexpediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for takingcertain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensableto prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptlydischarge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsiderationconsidering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in

Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made thisclear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered

thereto.1avvphil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration isjustified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-dayreglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attainedfinality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review

jurisdiction of this Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondentsappeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
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Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court.The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.14In the recent case of

Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a naturalright, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprivea party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and justdisposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appealconsidering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy isechoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance withlaw for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institutionwhose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriagesettlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous socialinstitution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is

vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of familiesweakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to thewriter of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that theconclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of theopinion of the Courts Division.
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RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice


Manila

THIRD DIVISION


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A.M. No. P-94-1054 March 11, 2003

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner,vs.EDDIE P. ARQUERO, respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint1 dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal

Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke's Point, Palawan for immorality.

Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke's Point, andrespondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke's Point, Palawan as aresult of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaintwas the girl's Baptismal Certificate2 reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached tothe letter-complaint was a copy of a marriage contract 3 showing that complainant and Dedje Irader contracted marriageon July 10, 1979.

By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the complaint.4

By his Answer5 of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality, claiming that it is "just a (sic)mere harassment and a product of complainant's hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife."6 Attached to the answerwere the September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance7 executed by complainant in favor of his wife with respect to anadministrative complaint he had much earlier filed against her, and complainant's sworn statement8 dated September 13,1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support his contentionthat the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise instituted a criminal complaint against himfor "adultery" which was, however, dismissed after preliminary investigation.

Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with another woman.

By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of theRegional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for investigation, report and recommendation.9 Judge Vergara having

retired during the pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who was,by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate andbaptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as to the information contained in the saidbaptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such other verifiable matters relevant to thecharge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation thereon.10

In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that the complaint be dismissed forfailure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the charge.11 The report focuses on the non-appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly:

xxx xxx xxx

Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per reliable information cannot be

notified for reason that subject persons are no longer residing in their given address and their whereabouts isunknown as shown by the return of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of thebaptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the respondent herein, and for thereason that the same had not been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of the entries containedtherein, this Court had not received adequate proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondentherein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him, hence, he should be absolved from any liability.

xxx xxx xxx12 (Quoted verbatim).

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation,report and recommendation.


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By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the recommendation of the Investigating Judge thatthe case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended fromoffice for a period of one (1) year without pay.13 Thus the OCA ratiocinates:

. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single man maintainedrelations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with "sexual union" (TSN dated23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having arelationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a "Kasunduan" oragreement entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them

to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a court employee respondent should have known thatsaid agreement was void despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separatedfrom her husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an immoralrelationship with a very much married woman and a co-court employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary tothe Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees which provides that publicemployees of which respondent is one, . . . "shall at all times (sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrainfrom doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and publicinterest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and "sling mud" at complainant for having executed anAffidavit dated September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It wouldseem that respondent would want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent wouldhave it appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an illegitimate child is precluded fromcomplaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another man.

Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein complainant. However, acursory reading of said document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein respondent.Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is 2 September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as evidencein his favor when the instant complaint was only filed sometime in 1994.

Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the baptism of the daughter of DedjeIrader Acebedo, his former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he answered, "I did not. I'm not sure the child ismine". From his answer, we could infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility that said childmight be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her paternity.

xxx xxx xxx14 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)

While the complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present case, the same does not ipso facto

warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction toinvestigate and ascertain the truth thereof.15 For it has an interest in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciaryand in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in the direction may not be derailed by thecomplainant's desistance from prosecuting the case he initiated.16

On the merits of the case, the entry of respondent's name as father in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquerocannot be used to prove for her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicitrelations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, inconformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity ofthe declarations and statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person baptized.17 It merelyattests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacramenton the date stated, but not the truth of the statement therein as to the percentage of the child baptized.18

By respondent's own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with complainant's wife:

Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the Court by your counsel, did theCourt get it correct that there has been a short lived relation between you and Dedgie Irader, am I correct in myimpression?

A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways already, I joking informed herthat she is now being separated, she is now single and is free to have some commitment. So, I courted her andshe accepted me, so we have a short lived relation and after that we parted ways.

Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago?


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A: May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.

Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9 months, you mean to tell the Court thatyou have (sic) a sexual union with this woman?

A: Yes ma'am.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant's wife with the spouses having priorly entered into asettlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in a "Kasunduan", the pertinent portions of which are

reproduced hereunder:

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino,at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Broke's (sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buhay kungaming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon namaghiwalay na bilang mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang makakasamasa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;

xxx xxx xxx20 (Italics supplied)

Respondent's justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduanhad absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the FamilyCode provides that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governedby law and not subject to stipulation." It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by lawwhich cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.21

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,enunciates the State's policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.22

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moralrighteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary.23 That is why this Court has firmly laid downexacting standards morality and decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary.24 Their conduct, not to mentionbehavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility,25 characterized by, among other things, propriety and

decorum so as to earn and keep the public's respect and confidence in the judicial service.26

It must be free from any whiffof impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behaviour outside the court asprivate individuals.27 There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their private morals.28

Respondent's act of having illicit relations with complainant's wife is, within the purview of Section 46(5) of Subtitle A, TitleI, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoralconduct.

Under Rule IV, Section 52A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoralconduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one(1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.

Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months

and one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Brooke'sPoint, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day withoutpay with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.

Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., concur.


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Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001


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LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitionervs.ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374,reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriagebetween petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of

respondent.

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-islandvessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young coupledid not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country onboard an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established theirresidence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It wasblissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together - when respondent was onvacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.

It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychologicalincapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husbandbecame apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the

afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent wouldbeat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presenceof the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister inQuezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent,and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected.Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in thepresence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the QuezonCity General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with thebarangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.

This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decidedto rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of theirmarriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed forsupportpendente lite .

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by thesheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial courtordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between theparties. 1wphi1.nt

On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, wasadmitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of theirchildren. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondentvehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.

On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriagebetween petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part ofrespondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, inholding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.


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The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner andrespondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:

"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity aswould cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the FamilyCode; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet hismarital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity hasbeen identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanentand incurable in nature.

"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favorof the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that thedoctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,2promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out inRepublic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,3promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application andon the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken tobe merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molinadicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely noevidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.

Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.

The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the FamilyCode, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:

"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberationsof the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentionedby some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,' quotingform the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; EdwardHudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construedindependently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to betruly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the partiesto the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to livetogether, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that theintendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases ofpersonality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tothe marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."

The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying orinterpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legisinterpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force oflaw.3 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law.

The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. Itis only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrinemay have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faithin accordance therewith5 under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and,until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santoswhen, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided proceduralguidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychologicalincapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
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At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a caseof psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as towarrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot beequated with psychological incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family6 that theState cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship withrespondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In thesecases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.


Manila

EN BANC


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A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,vs.JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause celebre is astar-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.

In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. deMijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and gravemisconduct. 1

After an answer2 and a reply 3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its Resolution datedFebruary 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals

for investigation, report and recommendation.

On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case No.142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, befound guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removalor suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same orany other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in hisaforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly

appreciated:

Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while respondentformer Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed byVice-President Joseph E. Estrada.

Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding No.90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after anabsence of sixteen (16) years.

Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before JudgeMyrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judgeof the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement.They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, MetroManila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became aclose family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their guests at aGerman restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8,Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered thephone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainantconfronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just acall at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to apoint when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae,yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it burned." Such unbearableutterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon.


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Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized,contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for whathappened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.

Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learnedfrom Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized themarriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by thedisheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6,1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").

On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the complainantexecuted against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").

Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered bycomplainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that therespondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This, therespondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainantlamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"); Orderdeclaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna LimVerano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994

was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the MarriageContract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed againsther by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized thatwhen his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea,his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet becomefinal and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the serviceof summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published.To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of theRegional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of JusticePurisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery ofmarriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and dignity. 4 He himself asserts that at the time of his

marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yetattained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez,in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had beenannulled.

Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify his actuations. Even ifthe said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, itdoes not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he isnot a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justiceof the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all thenecessary legal requisites. 5

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which we

quote with approval:

That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract withcomplainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofCarmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath byrespondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. Tobe sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e.,legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presenceof the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the casesprovided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of


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the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other ashusband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with.

The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham" marriage is tooincredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effortto save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention ofrespondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage werepresent. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize thecivil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.

Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case of Bigamyagainst herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not attained completefinality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone,only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant andrespondent void.

Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pena hadbeen annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriageand therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainantas his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled.

But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent can beadjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination inCriminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo thatwhat respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, theineluctible conclusion is that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member ofthe Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against hereincomplainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immoralitycharge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be rightedby another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares andtherefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent couldhave testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph GregorioNaval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.

In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and thefamily as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriagewith impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator andmankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7,1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his grossmisconduct, nay sacrilege.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continuedmembership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person ofgood moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continuedpossession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly

immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some episodesof the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and theundeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels thatdisbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended,would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of theCode of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) yearseffective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he committhe same or a similar offense hereafter.


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SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., J.J.,concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION


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G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance ofCebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled toinherit from them.

The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and GenovevaArzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,predeceasing their parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting againstpetitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they wereentitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single andwithout issue in their parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the propertiesof the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. Oncrossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies,Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino andCatalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipalcouncilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, 3a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private

respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina wassolemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and was infact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to thepoblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon,Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died inthe ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made thecoffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. 4She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a"receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she andGavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo diedafter an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common lawrelation with a man for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register ofMarriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of theTreasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must bepresumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there waslikewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war.(Exh. M)

On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified 5that Gavino died single at the familyresidence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know privaterespondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias tothe effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by


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Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino andCatalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. 6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriadoafter the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had childrenby a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of the children. On crossexamination,Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by acertain Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented8

to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs below),ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver toprivate respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not giving weight tothe certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino andCatalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, aswas their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias whichdid not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a

man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to belegitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 9Hence, thispetition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art.53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of thememorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they arequestioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents

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