Peacekeeping Operations andthe Durability of Peace: WhatWorks and What Does Not?

MAY 2013

Introduction

The modern incarnation of peacekeeping can be traced to United Nationsinterventions starting in 1948. Yet the underlying premise of peacekeeping andpeace support operations has a long pedigree extending back at least anotherninety-nine years. In 1849 Sweden and Norway—which then constituted aunion—deployed a neutral force of close to 4,000 troops in a territory disputedby Germany and Schleswig-Holstein on one side and Denmark on the other.The force was tasked to maintain law and order in the disputed territory untila peace agreement could be established, which was achieved in July 1850.1

Peacekeeping has gone through many changes since 1948, but arguably themost significant and far-reaching changes have occurred in the two decadesafter the end of the Cold War.

Over the past twenty years, peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have expandedin number and scope, with the latter comprising some 300 functions that fallunder more than twenty broad categories, including disarmament, demobi-lization, and reintegration (DDR); electoral assistance; peace process manage-ment; human rights monitoring; security sector reform (SSR); justice reform;and rule of law.2 This has resulted in complex operations with mandatesbordering on statebuilding and with an expectation that they will moreeffectively build the foundations of long-term peace and stability.3 Anothershift since the early 1990s is the growing contributions of regional arrange-ments. Regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as regional ad hoccoalitions of states, and even individual states, have in recent years assumed alarger peacekeeping role both within and occasionally outside their regions (aswith the case of the European Union). Meanwhile, the UN has promoted, andsought to coordinate and align such contributions alongside its own effortssince the early 1990s.4

The third International Experts Forum (IEF) considered whether, to what

This meeting note was drafted by

Robert Muggah, principal at the

SecDev Group and research director

at the Igarapé Institute, Birger Heldt,

director of research at the Folke

Bernadotte Academy, and Christian

Altpeter, research assistant at the

Folke Bernadotte Academy. It

reflects the rapporteurs' interpreta-

tion of the discussion and does not

necessarily reflect the view of all

participants.

The International Expert Forum was

originally launched at IPI in New

York on December 15, 2011. It is a

joint collaboration of the Folke

Bernadotte Academy, IPI, the

SecDev Group, and the Social

Science Research Council (SSRC).

The third International Expert

Forum was held at IPI on December

10, 2012.

1 Björn Gäfvert, “Swedish Troops in International Cooperation—North Africa, 1802 and Fyn-Schleswig,1848–1850,” in Solidarity and Defence: Sweden’s Armed Forces in International Peace-Keeping Operations During the19th and 20th Centuries. Stockholm: Swedish Military History Commission, edited by Lars Ericson (Stockholm:Swedish Military History Commission 1995), pp. 23–33.

2 Jack Sherman and Benjamin Tortolani, “Implications of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in United NationsMandates,” in Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force (New York: New York University Center for InternationalCooperation 2009), p. 15.

3 At least one indicator of more ambitious mandates is the dramatic increase in the average word count of UNSecurity Council Resolutions, with the 2009 average of 1,675 words per resolution more than double that of 2006(793).

4 See Hikaru Yamashita, “Peacekeeping Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations,”Review of International Studies 38, No. 1 (2010), 165–186; and Birger Heldt, “Trends from 1948-2005: How to Viewthe Relation Between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities,” in Prospects for Peace Operations: Institutional andNational Dimensions, edited by Don Daniel (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 2008), pp. 9–26.

2 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE

extent, and under what conditions PKOs contributeto the durability of negative and positive peace andhow it shapes organized violence.5 It broughttogether top-level researchers to discuss recentinsights with policymakers and practitioners. Animportant goal was to highlight challengesconfronting peacekeeping and ways in whichpeacekeeping has adapted to achieve short- andlong-term dividends. Another objective was tosynthesize lessons learned and policy implicationsfor enhancing peacekeeping efficacy. It featuredsessions on the past effectiveness of peacekeeping,the conditions for successful peacekeepingoperations, and on the importance of partnershipsand exit strategies.

The Track Record ofPeacekeeping Operations

Speakers in the first session discussed the empiricalevidence base for evaluating peacekeeping andpeace support operations. A key question waswhether peacekeeping can be successful inpreventing the resumption of civil war. A relatedquestion was what are the causal mechanisms thatconnect peacekeeping and the absence of violence.An overarching finding is that peacekeeping iseffective in promoting negative peace (absence ofviolence) since it extends the duration of post-civilwar peace. Both speakers—Virginia Page Fortnaand Nicholas Sambanis—stressed thatpeacekeeping is robustly correlated with areduction in the onset of war, and this finding haswithstood statistical replication attempts.Moreover, it seems that there is not a major differ-ence between enforcement or robust peacekeepinginterventions (Chapter VII) and consent-basedoperations (Chapter VI) in this regard. However,researchers noted that peacekeeping is not a silverbullet and exhibits many dysfunctions.

Fortna covered Chapter VI and VII missions andinterventions involving both UN and regionalorganizations. While excluding mediation missionsand humanitarian and peacebuilding activities, sheconsidered ninety-four cases in fifty-nine civil warsbetween 1989 and 2000. It is meanwhile importantto recognize that peacekeeping is not random—

indeed there are inherent biases since troops areassigned to the hard cases where there is no decisivevictory, rebel groups are strong, there are manyfactions, etc. Yet, Fortna’s study shows dramaticreductions in the re-onset and outbreak of violenceby 80 percent when PKOs are deployed.

Given that peacekeeping extends peace, a criticalquestion is why is this so. One reason, the speakerssuggested, is that peacekeeping makes peace morevaluable and war more costly. The prospects ofpolitical and economic gains for rebel and govern-ment leaders from the so-called “peacekept,”together with international aid and trust funds, areseen to change the calculus of prospective spoilers.The speakers also stressed that deterrence bypeacekeepers requires the capability and use offorce to be considered credible. Second, it wassuggested that peacekeeping alleviates mistrust andbuilds confidence by monitoring behavior andallowing parties to signal intentions. Third,peacekeeping allows for the control of sensitiveterritory and processes (e.g., disarmament) inaddition to providing critical security and trainingto buy time. In other words, peacekeeping takes“risks off the table.”

A number of policy implications arise fromFortna´s work. One key implication is thatpeacekeeping not only works, but it is also cost-effective. Another policy implication is thatChapter VII enforcement is not always necessary.Such enforcement is only effective when a deterrentis credible. This indirectly supports the notion thatChapter VI interventions are often just as effective,if less politically contentious. For policymakers, acritical issue is to identify political and economiclevers of influence in ceasefire settings—it may beworth “buying off ” the peacekept by making peacemore valuable and war more costly. Related policyimplications are connected to the (less) effectiveresults of peacekeepers in areas where there arecontraband sources of income (e.g., diamonds anddrugs).

One critical finding of Sambanis’s work is that theUN is effective in engendering not just negativepeace (as found by Fortna) but also positive peace,which extends beyond violence reduction. More tothe point, UN peacekeeping has significant effects

5 For a review of studies, see Page Fortna and Lise Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” Annual Review of Political Science 11, (January2008): 283–301.

on engendering participatory (i.e., democratic)peace, reducing low intensity violence, resolvingsovereignty disputes and the like. However,according to Sambanis, during the early post-warperiod many societies cannot “absorb” massivedemocratic transitions: achieving positive peace isdifficult—occurring in just 30 percent of all cases infirst five years after a war is brought to a close.Another finding is that externally-promoteddemocratization may sometimes have generatedviolence and backtracking in war-to-peace transi-tions.

Sambanis also finds that although multidimen-sional peacekeeping is especially successful, justlike Fortna, he sees value in observer missions. Oneof his critical findings is that peacekeeping reliesheavily on consent, and less on enforcement.Moreover, peacekeeping plays an important roleduring the critical, high-risk first 4–5 yearsfollowing a civil war. In addition, Sambanis hasdetected a positive net UN effect: countries withsome UN involvement simply do better than thosewithout. But again, the effects are short term, oftenwithin the first years of an intervention. Anotherinsight from the presentations is that non-UNoperations appear to be more effective at ensuringnegative peace—stopping violence—than in gene -rating net dividends beyond this. A possible reasonis that non-UN operations focus almost exclusivelyon traditional peacekeeping tasks and do not dealwith nation-building.

Both speakers stated that more research isrequired to assess the macro- and micro-leveloutcomes and causal effects of peacekeeping andpeace support operations on both negative andpositive peace. Differentiating between these levelsis important since mandates can be successfullyimplemented overall at the national level, but stillfail at the local level. At the macro-level, theevidence is supportive of PKOs in promotingnegative and positive peace. At the micro-level,however, there are still disagreements over whattypes of PKOs are most effective, how to managemicro-level power dynamics, and how to maintainthe legitimacy and credibility of peacekeepingmissions after the first few years. A betterunderstanding of micro-level outcomes and effectswill require more investment in generating data,including on when wars start and end, classifyingcases, managing endogenous variables and

explaining sub-national variation in policies andoutcomes. In this context both speakers highlighteda number of future horizons for research and howmandates can be designed to be successful not onlyat the macro-level, but also the micro-level.

First, they called for researchers to engage withdevelopment economics research on the effects offoreign aid. The results of these studies areimportant, despite some limitations in extrapo-lating to different contexts and aggregating resultsto develop policy guidelines. Second, there areopportunities to study implications of differentintervention strategies. Researchers shouldconsider the substitution and displacement effectsof discrete activities—from peacekeeping toelections, humanitarian assistance, and counter-insurgency. Third, there are insights emerging fromsocial psychology that may assist in explainingpeacekeeping success and failure. Indeed, it may becritical to gain a better understanding of group andindividual identity, the ways in which interventionsshape inter-group status, and questions of politicalaffiliation.

A key conclusion from comments by the discus-sants Sarah Cliffe and Sharon Wiharta is thatwhereas peacekeeping has created breathing spacefor economic and social recovery and transition, itis not a panacea. Its track record is mixed, especiallyin the area of rule of law reform, which has been afocus area during the past ten years. The reason is alack of clarity regarding what objectives—and lackof coherence regarding those objectives—PKOs aresupposed to achieve. For instance, do we place thebar for PKOs too low, and what do fragile statesreally need? In addition, during the last decadethere have been discussions on end states, but thereis a need for more discussions on objectives. Thereis also a need for a discussion on tool kits. Forinstance, do PKOs have any added value after fiveyears, and if not, should we then start to think ofother models of operations, and do we need otherforms of engagements? One commentatorsuggested that most PKOs do well in the beginning,and this begs the research questions of whathappens after the initial period. How can thosemissions be “unstuck”? What should PKOs do afterten years on the ground? A related issue is that thepeacekeeping community has not been good atmonitoring and evaluating PKOs. What is needed,it was suggested, is a “new deal” initiative in these

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4 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE

regards, but also in the areas of evaluating theimportance of spoilers and gender.

There is a need, both discussants contended, formore institutional investment over the long term tosupplement gains made during peacekeepinginterventions. Moreover, peacekeeping needs toengage with a wider range of violence types, not justpolitical violence, but also, for example, transna-tional organized crime as a form of postconflictviolence that is present when peacekeepers aredeployed. Problems arise when peacekeeping andcounter-insurgency roles are conflated, but at thesame time it is unclear whether a sequencingapproach in these regards is feasible since PKOsoften have to deal with several issues at the sametime. But perhaps the biggest challenge accordingto Cliffe is how to enhance civilian capacities,particularly national institutions in host states, toshore-up dividends of peacekeeping.6 This involvesat a minimum:1) working with national authorities to ensure an

inclusive political process for institutionalreform;

2) prioritizing institutions most linked to conflictrecurrence (e.g., core administrative functions,police, justice, and institutions of governance);and

3) promoting knowledge and exchange aboutrealistic paths—there is a need to recognizepolitical constraints to particular kinds ofreforms (this requires experienced actors).

Although the shift in peacekeeping from anarrow focus on military and police activities andother state institutions to wider political, social, andeconomic outcomes is important, this trend alsoraises new mandate-related questions. While thelast decade saw a consensus among the traditionalactors in peacekeeping on liberal peacebuilding, therole of emerging actors (e.g., the BRIC countries)might change the focus and put more emphasis onsocial and economic factors. Finally, there are still,as many acknowledged, challenges of integrationand sequencing, even if they are being graduallyaddressed within the UN.

One participant stressed that history suggeststhat transitions to stable peace take 15–25 years,and that this has to be kept in mind when assessingshort- and long-term effects of PKOs. There wasagreement that the economic growth-peaceconnection is not sufficient on its own to securepeace. Participants raised questions about whethereconomic distribution is more important thaneconomic growth, and they called for moreresearch on how and to what extent there areeconomic and political policy equivalents to theroles played by PKOs.

Conditions for SuccessfulPeacekeeping Operations

Whereas the first session dealt with whether PKOsare successful, the second session focused on underwhat conditions they are successful. Also while thefirst session focused on strategic level issuesthrough national-level data, the second sessionfocused on the tactical or operational level.Particular attention was given to challenges such asmandate implementation; the role of the hostcountry; issues of military, policy, and civiliancapabilities; and political factors.

DDR programs represent an importantcomponent of many ongoing peacekeepingoperations and the UN can look back at a rich trackrecord since the early 1990s when DDR became anintegral part of many missions.7 While DDR iswidely used and well-funded by donors, there islimited knowledge about its impact on peace -building. The first speaker Jonah Schulhofer-Wohlstressed the need for a clearer focus on assessingimpacts as a means of measuring effectiveness orsuccess and the contributions of DDR programs.Moreover, DDR programs would be well served byassessments concerning sequencing and potentialadverse effects such as status reversals in society,which could lead to new conflicts.

Over time, the term DDR has evolved to cover abroad range of complex programs. The consider-able variation among DDR programs and theheterogeneity within DDR programs both within

6 A question, then, is whether there are ways to either expand the PKOs further or identify equivalent “rapid economic missions” that could bolster positive peace.7 See Robert Muggah, ed., Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (London: Routledge 2009) and Jonah Schulhofer-

Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment," Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy Publications,2010.

countries and over time pose methodologicalchallenges when it comes to measuring outcomes,isolating effects, and generalizing.8 In order toassess DDR’s value for peace operations, it isnecessary to reframe successful DDR processes interms of peacebuilding outcomes or dimensions ofinterest. These outcomes of interest relate to theconflict-development nexus, violence and crimeprevention, civic and political participation, andhealing of wartime trauma. Focusing on theseoutcomes instead of studying the implementationand performance of individual program tasks willplace DDR programs as part of the larger picture.Such an approach requires a question-orientedapproach, explicit comparisons, and programsdesigned to allow systematic evaluation.

Offering a practitioner’s point of view, speakerArthur Boutellis stressed that the failures of peaceoperations are often due to mistakes at the politicaland strategic level. In particular, PKOs are often asubstitute for a political strategy rather than anenabler for political strategies. Such mistakes alsoexplain the fall of Goma, which is mostly a case of afailed political strategy instead of a military failure.In absence of a political strategy, operations quicklylose leverage and legitimacy vis-à-vis local actorsand the civilian population. Therefore, the consentof the host country, though a challenge to attain, ispivotal, but the consent needs to be managed overtime, and this requires that missions have politicalmandates. There is, it was suggested, a need torethink PKO mandates.

Moreover, the expansion of mandates combinedwith moral imperatives as laid out by, for example,the Brahimi Report has pushed UN PKOs to takeon broader and increasingly ambitious missions.9

Boutellis suggested there may be a need to rethinkthe design of mandates and to adopt more modestgoals and missions. This relates to the necessity toadapt and develop security and justice strategies,DDR, and stabilization.10 Instead of solely focusingon numbers, the question of capabilities maydeserve a stronger emphasis. There also remainswork to be done in the mission planning process to

better integrate civilian and military componentsand to include and prioritize political andeconomic tools and issues such as organized crime.Civilian capacities are of particular importance andmore relevant than bringing troop numbers up tolevel. In this regard, leaner and more rapid responseinterventions may be the way forward, and strongerengagement by regional organizations needs to beconsidered. There is also a need for defined exitstrategies, otherwise PKOs may lose their overalldirection without such plans in place.

Discussant Leanne Smith pointed to the progressthat has been made since the 1990s within the UNsystem in terms of collecting experiences and bestpractices from missions. The Brahimi Report andthe New Horizon process have been instrumentalin that regard.11 The challenges lying ahead concernknowledge regarding the long-term value ofpeacekeeping operations and how we can knowwhether peacekeeping is successful. It is compli-cated by the overall lack of consensus or agreementon what we even mean by “success.” In a sense, thiskey concept at the center of an entire research areahas no generally agreed upon meaning. This raiseschallenges for benchmarking and whetherbenchmarking should be focused on the localrather than the national level. The introduction ofbenchmarks, as applied by the UN Mission inSouth Sudan, contributes to understandingwhether peacekeeping is successful and to anassessment of its long-term impact. However, itremains unclear whether peacekeeping operationscan be effective not only for keeping the peace, butalso for early peacebuilding activities.

Peacekeeping partnerships and integratedmissions share important burdens and responsibil-ities. Major issues in this regard relate to assuringthe consent of the host state and nationalownership. While the former can become problem-atic in relation to human rights, the latter mightindeed involve more than just talking to thegovernment in power. In addition, the UN isstruggling to catch up with the challenges of UNreform and multidimensional missions. Here,

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8 See Robert Muggah, “No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Weapons Reduction During Post-ConflictContexts,” The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 94, No. 379 (2005): 239–252.

9 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN. Doc. A/55/502,October 20, 2000, available at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/55_502e.pdf .

10 See Robert Muggah, Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of Fragility (London: Routledge, 2013). 11 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping," New

York, DPKO, 2009, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf .

important lessons still have to be applied, and it istoo early to rethink those models that have not yetbeen put into practice to a full degree. The dynamiccontext in which PKOs operate remains the majorchallenge, politically as well as on the ground.

The second discussant Renata Dwan welcomeddebate within the UN on the definitions ofpeacekeeping and peacebuilding. These conceptsshould not be taken for granted. There is a risk thatthe approach to peacekeeping has become tootechnical an exercise with overly ambitious goals.The political nature of the undertaking is oftenglossed over. Currently, DDR and SSR issues havebecome too technical. There is a need, it wasclaimed, to not lose sight of the fundamentals ofthese missions. The real objectives of DDR arebasic: does it lead to more legitimate institutions,and does it facilitate SSR and state institutions?These micro-level priorities are particularlyimportant in countries with a history of strong andoppressive state institutions where the level ofpublic trust for the states’ security institutions isvery limited. How do we design DDR programsdesigned to reinforce weak institutions? In general,how do we adapt complex programs to shiftingrealities on the ground? Can there be a method-ology for this? According to Dwan, the researchcommunity could assist in addressing suchquestions by conducting relevant studies, e.g.,providing the UN with risk-analyses on the driversof conflict processes or how socio-economicconditions have changed during and due to theinternational presence.

Regarding the planning process of peacekeepingoperations, there is considerable confusion abouthow and why operations are created, which can bedetrimental for sustaining political support formissions. Also, insufficient attention is devoted tomaintaining support in the long run. Starting anoperation based on half-hearted consent will makeit difficult if not impossible to create a sustainablebasis for political support down the road. Inaddition to political actors, civil servants areimportant actors in the early stages and need to beonboard.

During the ensuing discussion, several partici-pants suggested a need to reframe DDR as aconcept since it is by many wrongly treated as a goalin itself and has turned into a catch phrase for

everything. Uprisings, such as in Libya or Syria,require a different approach than ones used withrebel groups or the scenario in Mali, where theinternational presence, once deployed, will facetraffickers, rebels, and terrorist groups. Learninghow to draw general lessons from case to case andhow to differentiate between intended andunintended outcomes are major challenges. Thecollection of best practices from missions is onepossible avenue to improve learning processes,which so far have not been carried out in a sophis-ticated way.

Moreover, insights from micro-level researchprojects can provide valuable insights. Whileseveral research studies have utilized micro-leveldata and efforts to randomize interventions (e.g., inSierra Leone, Liberia, and Aceh), more experi-mental work is needed. Although DDR is animportant tool, not all outcomes can reasonably beattributed to it. It is therefore important to examinenot only the effect of certain instruments, but alsothe constellation of instruments in a specificcontext. Finally, when discussing the impact ofcertain instruments and the success or failure ofpeacekeeping, political interests need to be broughtback in and the question of what is politicallyfeasible needs to be asked.

Partnerships and ExitStrategies

The final session addressed exit strategies andtransitions as well as the criteria for successful shiftsto other forms of international support such aspeacebuilding missions (PBMs). Also, the issue ofpartnerships and joint peace operations wasdiscussed.

The first speaker, Richard Caplan, highlighted thegeneral lack of attention and care given to theendgame strategy of international operations. It iscrucial to treat the transition as a process and not asan event. This is valid when operations changeshape, e.g., from a PKO to a PBM, and whenresponsibilities are handed over to nationalcounterparts at the end of an internationalpresence. In both cases, a prerequisite for asuccessful transition is a sustainable outcome. This,in turn, requires meaningful measures of progresstowards agreed upon goals based on benchmarks as

6 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE

opposed to a fixed timetable, since the latter mayserve as an invitation for spoilers. On the otherhand, a fixed timetable may also create buy-in andpredictability.

Caplan stressed that criteria for transition need tobe concrete and measurable. This means, forexample, clear distinctions between outcome andimpact, between measuring improvements andachievements, and a differentiation between what isnecessary and what is desirable. It is also importantto differentiate between core benchmarks thatmeasure progress towards the basic goals ofmissions, and contextual benchmarks that measurethe development of factors that may reignite theconflict. Above all, actors need to refrain frompoliticizing the evaluation process and results. Inreality, however, the timing and nature of exitstrategies and transitions are affected by politicalevents and pressures rather than an assessment ofactual developments on the ground. However, thereis little consistency across missions when it comesto benchmarking, there is little documentation ofsuch processes, and generally organization ofbenchmark processes is ad hoc.

The second speaker Huria Ogbamichaeladdressed the UN policy on transition, the primeobjective of which is to hand over power to nationalactors. Generally, there is a lack of guidance onmission drawdown and withdrawal, and this ismainly due to the interests of the member states.Based on experiences from previous missions, thereare many lessons identified by the UN. Thechallenge remains to transform these experiencesinto lessons learned that can better define the scopeof a policy of transition. In order to develop atransition policy, there is a need for key policies; aclear role of actors, rules, and procedures on how tomanage political processes and expectations;inclusion of stakeholders for national capacitydevelopment and mission support; and integratedassessment and planning.

Among the key principles that have been identi-fied for successful transition are early and flexibleplanning, the integration of the UN in the process,national ownership and communication, nationalcapacity development, and communication ofstrategies and practices to manage expectations.Meanwhile, there are major challenges. Forinstance, although these are commonsense princi-ples, how do we get the entire UN system to agree

on fundamentals when it does not work in anintegrated manner? Second, early planning is easiersaid than done because of short mandates that donot induce a mindset to think ahead, and becausebudget cycles are short. Third, a reactive—notproactive—organizational culture in the UNpresents a major problem. Fourth, there is a needfor regular reviews of mandates built on sharedanalysis, instead of isolated adjustments. We arepresently not seeing exits, but rather follow-upactivities or transitions to other missions. This hasfrustrated the international community's ability topredict the direction of transition processes. A casein point is the UN’s engagement in Burundi that haswitnessed several “exits” over time. Fifth, there is aneed to manage the political process. This is notjust a matter of will but also of capacity. A positivepolitical dialogue may not sufficiently look at therisk factors involved. In Timor-Leste, oftendescribed as a textbook example for withdrawal, thehandover to the national police was a politicaldecision. Because of the political dimension oftransition, national institutions need to be engagedin a political process to plan for the time followingthe presence of the PKO. Moreover, it is indispen-sable to ensure that peacebuilding priorities remainhigh on the agenda despite unpredictable changesin national priorities. Continuing financial andpolitical support is thus necessary. In these regards,the international community, the PeacebuildingCommission, and Groups of Friends haveimportant roles to play.

Discussant Haydewych Hazelzet discussedpartnerships and transitions primarily from an EUperspective. An initial question raised was whetherwe need sequencing and a division of labor amongactors based on who is best suited to certain tasks.Another question relates to the specific conditionsthat ensure that partnering is the best solution.According to Hazelzet, the main task of partners isto provide support and to fill in where the UN is notable to implement its mandate. Partnerships andthe distribution of tasks should be guided by theprinciple of added value, namely who is best atdoing what. Meanwhile, multiple memberships inregional and international organizations can causechallenges with regard to joint operations andpartnerships in relation to competition forresources. The handovers from the EU to the UN inthe Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003 and

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Chad in 2008/9, as well as the handover from theUN to the EU in Kosovo and in Georgia in 2008,are cases in point that provide lessons for the future.When it comes to partnering in these cases, it maybe more suitable to speak of a permanent reconfig-uration of involvement instead of clear-cuthandovers or transition. This is also true whenresponsibilities for missions change betweendifferent instruments within organizations.

When considering who does what best, it isimportant to return to the reasons why an organi-zation became involved in the first place. There isalso a need to map out who can do what, and actorsneed to pay more attention to what other parties aredoing already before getting involved. There isscope for complimentary approaches andpartnering with regional actors as the cooperationbetween the EU, the AU, and ECOWAS has shown.Joint planning and joint lessons-learned procedureswould offer major improvement for partnershipsand handovers, but are often prevented by politicaland institutional reasons and organizationalcultures.

With regard to ambitious mandates and timing ofexits, participants called for a more modestapproach. Outsiders eventually cannot stop theresumption of war if actors so prefer and it is thusdangerous to assume that external actors are in aposition to do more than influence—but notcontrol—the process. It was also noted that therehas been an escalation of goals in terms of PKOsmandates, while at the same time broad socialtransformation is very difficult to achieve. In short,the UN and international actors have taken on tasksthat they are unlikely to fulfill, and this overcommitment makes it difficult to deliver on eventhe most basic tasks. For instance, we have limitedknowledge of conditions for successful peace -building and even less knowledge of how topromote economic development. Nevertheless, itwas also pointed out that the UN has become morerealistic in terms of PKO goals compared to tenyears ago.

Practitioners often remarked there is a need totake into account that practitioners often followmore feasible goals despite the very ambitious goalsadopted by mandates. The question is whetherthere is a readiness to have open political discus-sions on what is achievable in peacebuilding, ratherthan on what would be ideal. Another question is

whether we are ready to accept failures, as long as itdoes not involve resumption of war. Even thoughbenchmarks will always be a subject to politicaldiscussions, benchmarking will probably neverbecome a science. Moreover, a major problem ofmission drawdown and transition is the lack offinancial support and interest. A UN policy ontransition needs to create a common understandingabout permanent reconfigurations of UN presencerather than exiting.

In terms of partnerships, it was suggested thatnew frameworks for improved coordination areneeded since the UN, however significant, is by nomeans the only actor. Other international andregional organizations, bilateral initiatives, andNGOs have to be taken into account and coordinatetheir activities. However, the right mechanisms topull together the diverse range of internationalactors has yet to be found, as the case of Somaliaamply shows. Regarding the partnership betweenthe UN and the EU, several models were suggested.For one, the EU can deploy missions in cases whenthe UN (or other actors) lack adequate capabilities.Second, EU operations can be deployed in responseto a specific demand, and instead of the UN, by forexample providing a regional response, as was thecase in Georgia. It is important to discover the typeof missions the EU is willing and able to undertake.The EU’s role is rarely peacekeeping in activeconflict environments, but rather it focuses ontraining, monitoring, and advising, i.e., capacity-building missions (CBMs) that lack an executivemandate. Such missions have a strong focus on ruleof law, SSR, and human rights. These chosen rolesshow that the EU has in general intervened in caseswhere the likelihood of success is favorable.

Concluding Reflections

The third IEF generated a provocative debate on therelationships between peacekeeping and peace. Ithighlighted new research, facilitated an exchangebetween researchers and practitioners, and identi-fied new pathways of research while cultivating agrowing network of senior professionals. Thediscussion began, however, with a reflection on theoverwhelming positive outcomes of peace supportoperations in preventing and reducing violence andpromoting transformative change and ended withproblematization and emerging challenges.

8 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE

The research presented at the third IEF foundthat peacekeeping works, but not always. It appearsto work particularly well in the context of a limitedwindow of opportunity—namely the first years. Italso seems to work in particular settings and in thecontext of more expansive and complex peacesupport mandates. The question of sequencing andcoordination is critical, particularly aspeacekeeping in and outside the UN increasinglydepends on a wide range of partnerships. Butdespite some angst and frustration amongpeacekeeping proponents, some conventionalwisdom holds: Chapter VI and VII mandates areeffective, political pacts and agreements are critical,fixed timetables are important, and confidencebuilding mechanisms can keep the peace.

The seminar revealed that there is growingconfidence in positive macro-level patterns ofpeacekeeping promotion (the what), but also that anew generation of scholars is trying to understandthe micro-dynamics of change (the why). Many ofthese researchers are moving away from gametheory to models that allow for a much widerconsideration of motivations and means of armedgroups. Many of these scholars are also exploringtemporal dynamics of peacekeeping, the ways inwhich such interventions lose steam after a fewyears. These are critical questions for practitionerswho are seeking ways of promoting effective transi-tions in situations of complex violence.

One additional insight is that while we knowsomething about whether and under whatconditions PKOs are successful, there is verylimited knowledge on whether and under whatconditions PBMs are effective. This is particularlyimportant since in many cases of transitions PKOsare handing over responsibilities to PBMs.

In closing, the third IEF raised some newquestions for the policy and research communitiesworking on peacekeeping: • How do policymakers and decision makers

manage complexity? How do you learn and applylessons? How are tricky processes of transitionmanaged? What kinds of guidance would help?

• Can we elaborate a more consistent nomencla-ture? There are a bewildering array of definitions

of peace, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, DDR,SSR, etc. It is critical that definitions be clear andfocused in both academic and policy circles inorder to test causation.

• In what ways can we measure success andeffectiveness? How narrow and how broadshould the criteria be? How much can we imputebeyond what is explicitly stated in thepeacekeeping mandate?

• What are the ways we can improve informationcollection, monitoring, and evaluation? How dowe start developing analytics for assessing newkinds of risk and volatility—before and duringpeace support operations? This information iscritical for pre-deployment of peacekeeping. Howcan we do experimental or quasi-experimentaldesign and randomized controls (in spite ofwarnings that they backfire)?

• How can the process and management of transi-tions be improved? This is a critical concern ofpractitioners, particularly given the absence ofguidance in situations where personnel areexpected to engage with new forms of violenceand corruption, negotiate complex politicalinterests, and manage practical issues of integra-tion, among other things.

• What is the next generation of tools—beyond orparallel with peace support operations—thatcan address wider issues of instability? There isa need to move beyond military considerationsand to account for social and economic factors,engage in more flexible ways with armed groups,and conduct new forms of joint analysis andpartnership. Structural challenges will remain butnew frontiers of possibility will need to be tested.The emergence of new threats, from organized

crime to contests over resources, are majorchallenges for future peacekeeping operations. Thespeed at which crises unfold and the multipledemands on peacekeepers are likely to accelerate.This suggests an ever greater imperative ondeveloping sophisticated analytics and long-termresearch agendas to anticipate and respond. TheInternational Expert Forum demonstratedunequivocally that peacekeepers cannot beexpected to keep the peace on their own.

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Agenda

Peacekeeping Operations and the Durability of Peace:What Works and What Does Not?

The International Expert Forum

Monday, December 10, 2012

09:00 – 09:20 Welcome and Introductory Remarks

Mr. Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research, International Peace InstituteDr. Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte AcademyDr. Robert Muggah, Principal, SecDev Group and Research Director, Igarapé Institute

09:20 – 10:50 Session 1: The Track Record of Peacekeeping Operations

This session presents data and analysis about peacekeeping operations. Particular considera-tion will be given to the question of whether—and to what extent—peacekeeping operationsare effective in securing peace (i.e., the absence of violence or “negative peace”), and inachieving other goals such as transition to stable and democratic institutions, or evenwhether peacekeeping promotes post-conflict economic recovery and development (i.e.,“positive peace”). Attention will also be given to the influence of peace operations in shapingtrajectories (onset, duration, and termination) of organized violence.

Chair Dr. Robert Muggah

PresentersDr. Page Fortna, Professor, Department of Political Science, Saltzman Institute of War andPeace Studies, Columbia University Dr. Nicholas Sambanis, Professor, Department of Political Science, Yale University

DiscussantsMs. Sarah F. Cliffe, Special Adviser and Assistant Secretary-General for United NationsCivilian CapacitiesMs. Sharon Wiharta, Head, Policy and Best Practices, Challenges Forum, Folke BernadotteAcademy

10:50 – 11:15 Coffee Break

11:15 – 12:45 Session 2: Conditions for Successful Peacekeeping Operations

This session features the insights of practitioners and scholars regarding the conditions forsuccessful peacekeeping operations. Particular attention is given to challenges such asmandate implementation; role of the host country; issues of military, policy, and civiliancapabilities; and political factors.

ChairDr. Birger Heldt

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11

Presenters Mr. Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, Assistant Professor, The Woodrow Wilson Department ofPolitics, University of Virginia Mr. Arthur Boutellis, Research Fellow, International Peace Institute

DiscussantsMs. Leanne Smith, Deputy Chief, United Nations Policy and Best Practices ServiceDr. Renata Dwan, Senior Project Officer, Civilian Capacities Project, United Nations

13:00 – 14:45 Working Lunch—Session 3: Partnerships and Exit Strategies

The session addresses the issue of partnerships—what works and what does not—in jointpeace operations, and of exit strategies and transitions, including what are the criteria forsuccessful exit and transition to other forms of support, including peacebuilding missions.

ChairMr. Francesco Mancini

Presenters Ms. Huria Ogbamichael, Policy and Best Practice Service, United Nations Department ofPeacekeeping OperationsDr. Richard Caplan, Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, OxfordUniversity

Discussant Dr. Hadewych Hazelzet, Head of CSDP Section—Crisis Management and PlanningDirectorate, European External Action Service

14:45 Closing Remarks

Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace InstituteDr. Birger HeldtDr. Robert Muggah

Alexis AquinoPermanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations

Christian AltpeterFolke Bernadotte Academy

Isali AxbergFolke Bernadotte Academy

Alexis AquinoPermanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations

Mónica Bolaños-PérezPermanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations

Kristen BoonSeton Hall University

Arthur BoutellisInternational Peace Institute

Henk-Jan BrinkmanUnited Nations Peacebuilding Support Office

Eve BurnettUnited Nations Department of Field Support,Field Personnel Division

Richard CaplanOxford University

Nicolas ChapdelainePermanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations

Sarah F. CliffeUnited Nations Civilian Capacities

Renata DwanUnited Nations Civilian Capacities Project

Jean-Pierre EsnaultUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Page FortnaColumbia University

Carlos Enrique Garcia GonzalezPermanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations

Panagiotis GeroglisPermanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations

Megan Gleason-RobertsCenter on International Cooperation

Hadewych HazelzetEuropean External Action Service

Birger HeldtFolke Bernadotte Academy

Adrian HillsUnited Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Andrew HyslopUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Ingjerd JensenPermanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations

Peggy KerryUnited States Mission to the United Nations

Mustafa İlker KılıçPermanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations

Paal Zandstra KrokeidePermanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations

Roy S. LeeColumbia Law School

Matti LehtonenUnited Nations Environmental Program

Adam LupelInternational Peace Institute

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Participants

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Youssef MahmoudInternational Peace Institute

Francesco ManciniInternational Peace Institute

Erin McCandlessGraduate Program in International Affairs

Yoshimitsu MorihiroPermanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Robert MuggahIgarapé Institute

Christopher O'DonnellUnited Nations Department of PeackeepingOperations

Madalene O'DonnellUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Huria OgbamichaelUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Shola J. OmoregieAfrica Peace Support

Tomislav PavicićPermanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations

Rafal RohozinskiThe SecDev Group

Nicholas SambanisYale University

Lisa SharlandPermanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations

Taimi StrehlowInternational Peace Institute

Oliver UlichUnited Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

Pol Vanden BerghePermanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations

Naomi WeinbergerColumbia University

Jonah Schulhofer-WohlThe Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics,University of Virginia

Leanne SmithUnited Nations Policy and Best Practices Service

Sharon WihartaFolke Bernadotte Academy

Trond Egil WithPermanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations

Vanessa WyethCenter on International Cooperation

Sergey P. YakushevPermanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

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