(pdf) yury chemerkin balccon_2013
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(IN-)EFFICIENCY OF SECURITY FEATURES ON MOBILE SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE
YURY CHEMERKIN
Balkan Computer Congress (BalCCON 2013)
EXPERIENCED IN :
REVERSE ENGINEERING & AV
SOFTWARE PROGRAMMING & DOCUMENTATION
MOBILE SECURITY AND MDM
CYBER SECURITY & CLOUD SECURITY
COMPLIANCE & TRANSPARENCY
FORENSICS AND SECURITY WRITING
HAKIN9 / PENTEST / EFORENSICS MAGAZINE, GROTECK BUSINESS MEDIA
PARTICIPATION AT CONFERENCES
INFOSECURITYRUSSIA, NULLCON, ATHCON, CONFIDENCE, PHDAYS,
DEFCONMOSCOW, HACTIVITY, HACKFEST
CYBERCRIME FORUM, CYBER INTELLIGENCE EUROPE/INTELLIGENCE-SEC, DEEPINTEL
ICITST, CTICON (CYBERTIMES), ITA, I-SOCIETY
[ YURY CHEMERKIN ]
www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin http://sto-strategy.com [email protected]
APPLE’S CENTRALIZED POINT OF DISTRIBUTION IS PROVIDING WITH CONFIDENCE THROUGH THE VALIDATION BY APPLE, EXCEPT
THE SUBMISSION OF SUSPICIOUS APP BY Ch. MILLER THAT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY APPROVED BY APPLE
INSTALLING CYDIA &THE REST APPS AFTER THAT
MICROSOFT (WINDOWS PHONE) HAS A CENTRALIZED MARKET WITH DEEPER TESTING AND VALIDATION LIKE APPLE
GOOGLE PROVIDES A CENTRALIZED MARKET TOO, HOWEVER PROVIDES ABILITY TO INSTALL APPS FROM 3RD-PARTY SOURCES SUCH AS AMAZON.
ANY OTHER ARE ORIGINATE FROM MALWARE HOTSPOTS
ANY ALTERNATIVE MARKETS FOR SO-CALLED “CRACKED” DISTRIBUTE FOR FREE REPACKAGES
BLACKBERRY IS THE SAFEST OS BECAUSE IT ISTHE MOST MANAGEABLE AND SECURE MAINLYAS IT IS ON AN ENTERPRISE WAY
[ OPINIONS ]
BLACKBERRY IS SAFER THAN WINDOWS THAT IS SAFER THAN iOS THAT IS SAFER THAN ANDROID IN TURN
[ Vulnerabilities of OS and apps ]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2004
2005
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
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2012
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2013
2013
2013
2013
Score - iOS Score - Android Score - BB
[ Vulnerabilities of OS and apps ]
iOS Average; 6,3
Android Average; 8,2
BB-Average; 6,3
iOS Min; 1,2Android Min; 1,9
BB Min; 2,1
Min & Average Score
MIN & AVERAGE SCORE
HOW MANY THE TOOLS ARE (approx): iOS – 10 ANDROID – 50 WINDOWS PHONE – 40 BLACKBERRY - 10
QUANTITY OF BUGS / SECURITY FLAWS AVERAGE – 50 MIN – 20 MAX – INFINITY
WARINING :: ADS VERACODE THE MOST USEFUL
BUGS TYPE (OBVIOUS | LIKELY) MISSED CONSTRUCTIONS LIKE
DOUBLE/TRIPLE FREE () DEBUG PATHS, KEY, AND ETC. PLAINTEXT & HARD-CODE PASSWORDS,
TOKENS, MASTER-KEYS, ETC.
NON-SECURE FLAWS, CONSTRUCTIONS, ETC.
CHECK IT OUT THE SQL-INJECTION IS POSSIBLE THERE IS NO HTTPS HERE
[ SOURCE & BINARY ANALYSIS TOOLS ]
HEY DUDE, WHY IS IT VULNERABLE AGAIN? SORRY, BIG BOSS, I’D JUST BEEN COMMITED A WRONG BRANCH
SECURE BOOTLOADER
SYSTEM SOFTWARE SECURITY (UPDATES)
APPLICATION CODE SIGNING
RUNTIME PROCESS SECURITY
SANDBOX
APIs
HARDWARE SECURITY FEATURES
FILE DATA PROTECTION
SSL, TLS, VPN
PASSCODE PROTECTION
SETTINGS
PERMISSIONS/ RESTRICTIONS
CONFIGURATIONS
REMOTE MAGAGEMENT
MDM
REMOTE WIPE
[ MOBILE SECURITY CAPABILITIES ]
THE SAME CAPABILITIES AMONG MOBILE OPERATION SYSTEMS
MDM SERVICES HELPS MANAGE AND PROTECT BLACKBERRY, IOS, WINDOWS, AND ANDROID DEVICES.
MDM SERVICES PROVIDE UNIFIED COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION SOFTWARE AND SERVICE (SaaS)
EACH OS IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT DATA IN TRANSIT, IN MEMORY AND STORAGE … AT ALL POINTS …
MDM SERVICES ENHANCED BY MANAGING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DEVICE
OS PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO PROTECT ANY APPLICATION DATA USING SANDBOXING
OS PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO MANAGE PERMISSIONS TO ACCESS ITS CAPABILITIES
OS EVALUATES ALL REQUEST MADE BY APP ... BUT LEADS AWAY FROM ANY DETAILS AND APIs
[ SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ]
EACH OS EVALUATES EVERY REQUEST THAT AN APPLICATION MAKES TO ACCESS TO…
ALL CONTROLLED OBJECTS ARE LIMITED BY
SANDBOX
PERMISSIONS
SECURITY FEATURES ON DEVICEs & MDMs
ADDITIONAL FEATURES AREN’T ACCESSIBLE ON DEVICE
USER-MODE MALWARE
SPYWARE, ROOTKITS
EXPLOTS & ATTACKS
REVERSING NETWORK LAYER
RECOVERING DATA VS. SANBOX&MEMORY
EXPLOITING TO GET SUPER PRIVILIGIES
MDM vs. COMPLIANCE
COMMON RECOMMENDATIONS
SET IS LESSER THAN SET OF MDM FEATURES
QUITE BETTER TO MANAGE MDM SOLUTIONS THAN DEVICE AT ALL
TOO FAR FROM DETAILS
YOUNG STANDARDS
FIRST REVISIONS, DRAFT REVISIONS
MOBILE SECURITY SOFWARE
READ-ONLY MODE / INFORMATION ONLY
APPLICATION FIREWALL (CALLS, MESSAGES…)
NETWORK FIREWALL REQUIRES ROOT
NO REAL SECURITY IF YOU BREAK A SANDBOX
[ KNOWN ISSUES ]
THREATS BOUNDS BECOME UNCLEAR… MDM& COMPLIANCE BRINGS COMMON RECOMMENDATIONS
BYPASS MDM SOLUTIONS
iOS, ANDROID
EXPLOITS, DUMP /MEM TO GET EMAILS
BLACKHAT EU’13 http://goo.gl/HN829p
BLACKBERRY PLAYBOOK
EXPLOITS, MITM, DUMP ‘.ALL’ FILES
SECTO’11R, INFILTRATE’12, SOURCE BOSTON’13 http://goo.gl/KaTtFG
GAIN ROOT ACCESS
ANDROID
APP SIGNATURE EXPLOITATION
APP MODIFICATION
BLACKHAT USA’13 http://goo.gl/p5FhWG
TIME-FRAME TO FIX
7+ MONTH or WAIT FOR A NEXT UPDATE
WAIT FOR A VENDOR’S INTEREST TO YOU ANALYSIS OF APP’S DATA IN THE REST
BLACKBERRY, iOS
DATA LEAKAGE
REVEAL PASSWORDS, MASTERKEYS, ETC.
BLACKHAT EU’12 http://goo.gl/STpSll
ANDROID
DATA LEAKAGE
WEAKNESS OF CRYPTO ENGINGE
PHDAY III ‘13 http://goo.gl/x1PPGK
[ KNOWN ISSUES. Examples ]
PLAYBOOK ARTIFACTS (see the previous slide)
BROWSERS HISTORY
NETWORKING IDs, FLAGS, MACs
VIDEO CALLS DETAILS
ACCESS TO INTERNAL NETWORK KERNEL
BLACKBERRY Z10
DUMP MICROKERNEL
EVEN DEVELOPERS’ CREDENTIALS (FACEBOOK, MOBILE, EMAILS) BLACKHAT DEFCON MOSCOW http://goo.gl/R74leX
GUI FAILS
BLACKBERRY OS
DATA LEAKAGE
REVEAL PASSWORDS, … ANYTHING
NO PERMISSIONS REQUESTED
BORROW PERMISSIONS OF ANOTHER APP
NullCon’13, CONFIDENCE’13
http://goo.gl/phMey2
[ KNOWN ISSUES. Examples ]
Account
country code, phone number
Device Hardware Key
login / tokens of Twitter & Facebook
Calls history
Name + internal ID
Duration + date and time Address book
Quantity of contacts / viber-contacts
Full name / Email / phone numbers Messages
Conversations
Quantity of messages & participants per conversations
Additional participant info (full name, phone)
Messages
Date & Time
content of message
ID
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Account
country code, phone number
login / tokens Facebook wasn’t revealed
‘Buy me for….$$$’
Avatars :: [email protected] (jfif) Address book
No records of address book were revealed…
Check log-file and find these records (!) Messages
Messages
Date & Time
content of message
ID :: [email protected]
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Account
Phone number
Password, secret code weren’t revealed
Trace app, find the methods use it
Repack app and have a fun
No masking of data typed Information
Amount
Full info in history section (incl. info about who receive money)
Connected cards
Encryption?
No
Bank cards
Masked card number only
Qiwi Bank cards
Full & masked number
Cvv/cvc
All other card info
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Account
ID , email, password Information
Loyalty (bonus) of your membership
all you ever type
Date of birth
Passport details Book/order history
Routes,
Date and time,
Bonus earning
Full info per each order
Connected cards
Encryption?
AES
256 bit
On password anywayanydayanywayanyday
Store in plaintext
Sizeof(anywayanydayanywayanyday) = 192 bit
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Account
ID ,bonus card number, password not revealed
Other id & tokens Information
Date of birth
Passport details
History (airlines, city, flight number only) Flights tickets, logins credentials
Repack app and grab it
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Account
ID , password
Loyalty (bonus) card number Information
Not revealed (tickets, history or else)
Repack app
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
Account
ID , email, password
Other id & tokens Information
Loyalty (bonus) of your membership
all you ever type
Date of birth
Passport details
All PASSPORT INFO (not only travel data)
Your work data (address, job, etc.) you have never typed! Flights tickets
Repack app and grab it
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
GOALS - MOBILE RESOURCES / AIM OF ATTACK
DEVICE RESOURCES
OUTSIDE-OF-DEVICE RESOURCES ATTACKS – SET OF ACTIOSN UNDER THE THREAT APIs - RESOURCES WIDELY AVAILABLE TO CODERS SECURITY FEATURES
KERNEL PROTECTION , NON-APP FEATURES
PERMISSIONS - EXPLICITLY CONFIGURED
3RD PARTY
AV, FIREWALL, VPN, MDM COMPLIANCE - RULES TO DESIGN A MOBILE SECURITY
IN ALIGNMENT WITH COMPLIANCE TO…
[ DEVICE MANAGEMENT ]
APPLICATION LEVEL ATTACK’S VECTOR
AV, MDM,
DLP, VPN
Goals
Attacks
APIs APIs
Permissions
Kernel
protection
Non-app
features
MDM features
𝚫 = 𝚨 ∪ 𝚩 ∪ 𝚪 ∪ 𝚼 , 𝚨 ⊂ 𝚩, 𝚼 ⊆ 𝚩, 𝚼 ⊂ 𝐀
𝛥 – set of OS permissions, 𝛢 – set of device permissions, 𝛣 – set
of MDM permissions, 𝛤 – set of missed permissions (lack of
controls), 𝜰 – set of rules are explicitly should be applied to gain
a compliance
𝚮 = 𝚬 + 𝚭 , 𝚬 ⊃ 𝚨 ∪ 𝚩
𝛨 – set of APIs , 𝛦 – set of APIs that interact with sensitive data,
𝛧 – set of APIs that do not interact with sensitive data
To get a mobile security designed with full granularity the set 𝛤
should be empty set to get 𝚬 ⊇ 𝚨 ∪ 𝚩 instead of 𝚬 ⊃ 𝚨 ∪ 𝚩, so
the matter how is it closer to empty. On another hand it should
find out whether assumptions 𝚼 ⊆ 𝚩, 𝚼 ⊂ 𝐀 are true and if it is
possible to get ⊆ 𝐀.
Set of permissions < Set of activities efficiency is
typical case < 100%,
ability to control each API = 100%
More than 1 permission per APIs >100%
lack of knowledge about possible attacks
improper granularity
[ DEVICE MANAGEMENT ]
Concurrency over native & additional security features The situation is very serious
MDM features
AV, MDM, DLP,
VPN Non-app features
Permissions
Kernel protection
[ BLACKBERRY. PERMISSIONS ]
BB 10 Cascades SDK BB 10 AIR SDK PB (NDK/AIR)Background processing + +BlackBerry Messenger - -
Calendar, Contacts + via invoke callsCamera + +
Device identifying information + +Email and PIN messages + via invoke calls
GPS location + +Internet + +Location + -
Microphone + +Narrow swipe up - +
Notebooks + -Notifications + +
Player - +Phone + -Push + -
Shared files + +Text messages + -
Volume - +
[ BLACKBERRY. Significant APIs ]
Feature Q. APIs Q. sign. APIs % (sign .APIs) Controlled ?
BlackBerry Messenger 77 70 90,91 +
Calendar 443 126 28,44 +
Camera 47 41 87,23 +
Contacts 316 150 47,47 +
Device identifying info 15 14 93,33 +
Email & PIN messages 347 211 60,81 +
Internet 161 145 90,06 +
Microphone 21 15 71,43 +
Notebooks 123 86 69,92 +
Notifications 32 24 75,00 +
Phone 27 22 81,48 +
Push 25 22 88,00 +
Shared files 78 70 89,74 +
Text messages 10 6 60,00 +
Account 66 21 31,82 -
MediaPlayer 66 63 95,45 -
NFC 24 11 45,83 -
Radio & SIM 68 51 75,00 -
Clipboard 6 4 66,67 -
[ BLACKBERRY. Common activities ]
6
21
5
34
7
18
63
17
3 42
4 4
8
3 42
14
14 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
41 2
5
10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission
[ BLACKBERRY. Derived activities ]
6
116
24
59
7
89
1623
47
311
3
19
46
9
24 25
2
27
1 4 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 18
1 2 5 10
20
40
60
80
100
120
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm
[ BLACKBERRY. Efficiency (%) ]
16,67 19,05
60,00
5,88 14,29 5,5616,67
66,67
11,76
66,67
25,0050,00
25,00 25,0050,00
33,3350,00
250,00
7,14
16,67
3,45
12,50
5,08
14,29
3,37 6,25
8,704,26
66,67
9,09
66,67
5,262,17
88,89
4,17
8,00
250,00
3,70
0,00
50,00
100,00
150,00
200,00
250,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm
[ iOS. Info.plist (app capabilities) ]
Key Descriptionauto-focus-camera handle autofocus capabilities in the device’s still camera in case of a macro photography or image processing.
bluetooth-le handle the presence of Bluetooth low-energy hardware on the device.camera-flash handle a camera flash for taking pictures or shooting video.front-facing-camera handle a forward-facing camera such as capturing video from the device’s camera.gamekit handle a Game Center.gps handle a GPS (or AGPS) hardware to track a locations in case of need the higher accuracy more than Cellular/Wi-Fi.
location-services retrieve the device’s current location using the Core Location framework though Cellular/Wi-Fi
microphone handle the built-in microphone and its accessoriespeer-peer handle peer-to-peer connectivity over a Bluetooth network.sms handle the presence of the Messages application such as opening URLs with the sms scheme.
still-camera handle the presence of a camera on the device such as capturing images from the device’s still camera.
telephony handle the presence of the Phone application such as opening URLs with the telephony scheme.
video-camera handle the presence of a camera with video capabilities on device such as capturing video from the device’s camera.
wifi access to the networking features of the device.
[ iOS. Settings ]Component Unit
Restrictions :: Native application
SafariCamera, FaceTime
iTunes Store, iBookstoreSiri
Manage applications*
Restrictions :: 3rd application
Manage applications*Explicit Language (Siri)
Privacy*, Accounts*Content Type Restrictions*
Unit subcomponents
Privacy :: LocationPer each 3rd party app
For system services
Privacy :: Private InfoContacts, Calendar, Reminders, Photos
Bluetooth SharingTwitter, Facebook
AccountsDisables changes to Mail, Contacts, Calendars, iCloud, and Twitter accounts
Find My FriendsVolume limit
Content Type Restrictions
Ratings per country and regionMusic and podcasts
Movies, Books, Apps, TV showsIn-app purchases
Require Passwords (in-app purchases)
Game CenterMultiplayer Games
Adding Friends (Game Center)
Manage applicationsInstalling AppsRemoving Apps
[ iOS. Common activities ]
5
12
3 3
8
13
2
10
2
6
10
3
17
10
0
2
0 0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
3
1
3
1 0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
2
4
02468
101214161820
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission Q. of m.+a. perm plus parental perm
[ iOS. Derived activities ]
9
20
13
139
18 12
10 2 10 10 6
25
82
0 2
0
0
0
1
0
0
1 10
0
1
3
1
3
1
00
1
0
0 1 10
1
2
4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm Q. of derived perm + plus parental perm
[ iOS. Efficiency (%) ]
0,00
16,67
0,00 0,00
0,007,69
0,000,00
50,0016,67 0,00
0,005,88
30,00
0,00
10,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
5,560,00
0,00
50,00 10,00
0,000,00
4,00
3,6620,00
25,00
33,33
0,00
0,00
7,69
0,00
0,00
50,00 16,67
0,0033,33
11,76
40,00
11,1115,00 7,69
0,000,00
5,56
0,00 0,00
50,00 10,00
0,00
16,67 8,00
4,88
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm Q. of m.+a. perm plus parental perm Q. of derived perm + plus parental perm
[ Windows. Permissions ]Permission Description
General use capabilities
musicLibrary provides access to the user's Music library, allowing the app to enumerate and access all files w/o user interaction.
picturesLibrary provides access to the user's Pictures library, allowing to enumerate and access all files w/o user interaction.
videosLibrary provides access to the user's Videos library, allowing the app to enumerate and access all w/o user interaction.
removableStorage provides access to files on removable storage, such as USB keys and external hard drives, filtered to the file type
microphone provides access to the microphone’s audio feed, which allows to record audio from connected microphones..
webcam provides access to the webcam’s video feed, which allows to capture snapshots, movies from a connected webcam.
location provides access to location functionality like a GPS sensor or derived from available network info.
proximityenables multiple devices in close proximity to communicate with one another via possible connection, incl.
Bluetooth, WiFi, and the internet.
internetClient, internetClientServer
provides outbound (inbound is for server only) access to the Internet, public networks via the firewall.
privateNetworkClientServerprovides inbound and outbound access to home and work networks through the firewall for games or for
applications that share data across local devices.Special use capabilities
enterpriseAuthenticationenable a user to log into remote resources using their credentials, and act as if a user provided their user name and
password.
sharedUserCertificates enables an access to software and hardware certificates like smart card.
documentsLibrary provides access to the user's Documents library, filtered to the file type associations
[ Windows. Significant APIs ]
Feature Q. APIs Q. sign. APIs % (sign. APIs) Controlled?General use capabilities
Notifications 68 4 5,88 +Music library 1300 138 10,62 +Pictures library 1157 133 11,50 +Videos library 1300 138 10,62 +Removable storage 1045 109 10,43 +Microphone 274 33 12,04 +Webcam 409 91 22,25 +Location 37 5 13,51 +Proximity 54 19 35,19 +Internet and public networks 488 134 27,46 +Home and work networks 488 134 27,46 +
Special use capabilitiesEnterprise authentication 8 4 50,00 +Shared User Certificates 20 5 25,00 +Documents library 1045 126 12,06 +
Non-controlled capabilitiesClipboard 132 20 15,15 -Phone 18 6 33,33 -SMS 122 25 20,49 -Contacts 97 31 31,96 -Device Info 221 30 13,57 -
[ Windows. Common Activities ]
1 1
3
1 1
3
5
3
6
14
43
4
23
8 8
12
1 1 1 1 1
3
6
1 12
5
12 2
0 0 0 0 00
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission
[ Windows. Derived Activities ]
1
810
8
5
11
14
3
7
21
16
6
12 12
8
15
11
8 8
1 2 2 2 13
6
1 1 2
5
1 2 20 0 0 0 00
5
10
15
20
25
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm
[ Windows. Efficiency (%) ]
100,00 100,00
33,33
100,00100,00
100,00
120,00
33,33
16,6714,29
125,00
33,33
50,00
100,00
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
100,00
25,00
20,00
25,0020,00
27,2742,8633,33
14,29
9,52
31,25
16,67 16,6716,670,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00
20,00
40,00
60,00
80,00
100,00
120,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm
ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES,ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION,
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMM
ANDS,ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION,ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE,
ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER,ACCESS_WIFI_STATE,ACCOUNT_
MANAGER,ADD_VOICEMAIL,AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS,BAT
TERY_STATS,BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE,BIND_APPWIDGET
,BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN,BIND_INPUT_METHOD,BIND_REMOTE
VIEWS,BIND_TEXT_SERVICE,BIND_VPN_SERVICE,BIND_WALL
PAPER,BLUETOOTH,BLUETOOTH_ADMIN,BRICK,BROADCAST_
PACKAGE_REMOVED,BROADCAST_SMS,BROADCAST_STICKY,
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH,CALL_PHONE,CALL_PRIVILEGED,CA
MERA,CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE,CHANGE_CO
NFIGURATION,CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE,CHANGE_WIFI_M
ULTICAST_STATE,CHANGE_WIFI_STATE,CLEAR_APP_CACHE,C
LEAR_APP_USER_DATA,CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES,DELE
TE_CACHE_FILES,DELETE_PACKAGES,DEVICE_POWER,DIAGN
OSTIC,DISABLE_KEYGUARD,DUMP,EXPAND_STATUS_BAR,FAC
TORY_TEST,FLASHLIGHT,FORCE_BACK,GET_ACCOUNTS,GET_
PACKAGE_SIZE,GET_TASKS,GLOBAL_SEARCH,HARDWARE_TE
ST,INJECT_EVENTS,INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER,INSTALL_P
ACKAGES,INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW,INTERNET,KILL_BACK
GROUND_PROCESSES,MANAGE_ACCOUNTS,MANAGE_APP_T
OKENS,MASTER_CLEAR,MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS,MODIFY_
PHONE_STATE,MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS,MOUNT_UN
MOUNT_FILESYSTEMS,NFC,PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY,PROCESS_
OUTGOING_CALLS,READ_CALENDAR,READ_CALL_LOG,READ_
CONTACTS,READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE,READ_FRAME_BUFFE
R,READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS,READ_INPUT_STATE,READ_L
OGS,READ_PHONE_STATE,READ_PROFILE,READ_SMS,READ_
SOCIAL_STREAM,READ_SYNC_SETTINGS,READ_SYNC_STATS,
READ_USER_DICTIONARY,REBOOT,RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLET
ED,RECEIVE_MMS,RECEIVE_SMS,RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH,RECO
RD_AUDIO,REORDER_TASKS,RESTART_PACKAGES,SEND_SMS
,SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER,SET_ALARM,SET_ALWAYS_FINISH,
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE,SET_DEBUG_APP,SET_ORIENTATION
,SET_POINTER_SPEED,SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS,SET_P
ROCESS_LIMIT,SET_TIME,SET_TIME_ZONE,SET_WALLPAPER,S
ET_WALLPAPER_HINTS,SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES,STA
TUS_BAR,SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ,SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_WR
ITE,SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW,UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS,USE_C
REDENTIALS,USE_SIP,VIBRATE,WAKE_LOCK,WRITE_APN_SET
TINGS,WRITE_CALENDAR,WRITE_CALL_LOG,WRITE_CONTAC
TS,WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE,WRITE_GSERVICES,WRITE_HI
STORY_BOOKMARKS,WRITE_PROFILE,WRITE_SECURE_SETTIN
GS,WRITE_SETTINGS,WRITE_SMS,WRITE_SOCIAL_STREAM,W
RITE_SYNC_SETTINGS,WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY,
[ A droid. Permissions ]
List contains ~150 permissions I have ever seen that on old BlackBerry devices
ACCOUNTS
AFFECTS_BATTERY
APP_INFO
AUDIO_SETTINGS
BLUETOOTH_NETWORK
BOOKMARKS
CALENDAR
CAMERA
COST_MONEY
DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS
DEVICE_ALARMS
DISPLAY
HARDWARE_CONTROLS
LOCATION
MESSAGES
MICROPHONE
NETWORK
PERSONAL_INFO
PHONE_CALLS
SCREENLOCK
SOCIAL_INFO
STATUS_BAR
STORAGE
SYNC_SETTINGS
SYSTEM_CLOCK
SYSTEM_TOOLS
USER_DICTIONARY
VOICEMAIL
WALLPAPER
WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY
[ A droid. Permission Groups ]
But there only 30 permissions groups I have ever seen that on old BlackBerry devices too
[ A droid. Efficiency (%) ]
20,00
15,38
28,57
9,52
33,33
25,00
2,00
20,00
8,33 7,144,00
10,00
5,88
20,00
15,38
0,00 0,00
10,71
0,00
2,91
0,00
4,557,14
3,130,00
3,13
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
30,00
35,00
40,00
45,00
50,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm
[ Average quantitative indicators ]
394,8667,48 9,23
32,48 2,01 2,1938,4
27,638,4
27,6
435,95
62,37 3,849,68
1,47 1,63 54 20,9758,06 22,76
119,31
60,38
7,43 17,070,64 0,69
9,06
5,9416,99
9,21
102,74
60,638,86 29,26 1,89 2,32 42,04
30,4848,06
32,79
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Q. APIs Q. sign APIs Q. of m.+a.activities
Q. of derivedactivities
Q. of m.+a.permissions
Q. of derivedpermissions
% m+a activitiesvs perm
%m+a derived vsperm
% m+a vs permenhanced by
MDM
% derived vsperm enhanced
by MDM
Android Windows iOS BlackBerry
CAMERA AND VIDEO
HIDE THE DEFAULT CAMERA APPLICATION PASSWORD
DEFINE PASSWORD PROPERTIES
REQUIRE LETTERS (incl. case)
REQUIRE NUMBERS
REQUIRE SPECIAL CHARACTERS
DELETE DATA AND APPLICATIONS FROM THE DEVICE AFTER
INCORRECT PASSWORD ATTEMPTS
DEVICE PASSWORD
ENABLE AUTO-LOCK
LIMIT PASSWORD AGE
LIMIT PASSWORD HISTORY
RESTRICT PASSWORD LENGTH
MINIMUM LENGTH FOR THE DEVICE PASSWORD THAT IS ALLOWED
ENCRYPTION
APPLY ENCRYPTION RULES
ENCRYPT INTERNAL DEVICE STORAGE TOUCHDOWN SUPPORT
MICROSOFT EXCHANGE SYNCHRONIZATION
EMAIL PROFILES
ACTIVESYNC
MDM . Extend your device security capabilities
Android CONTROLLED FOUR GROUPS ONLY
BROWSER
DEFAULT APP,
AUTOFILL, COOKIES, JAVASCRIPT, POPUPS
CAMERA, VIDEO, VIDEO CONF
OUTPUT, SCREEN CAPTURE, DEFAULT APP
CERTIFICATES (UNTRUSTED CERTs)
CLOUD SERVICES
BACKUP / DOCUMENT / PICTURE / SHARING
CONNECTIVITY
NETWORK, WIRELESS, ROAMING
DATA, VOICE WHEN ROAMING
CONTENT
CONTENT (incl. EXPLICIT)
RATING FOR APPS/ MOVIES / TV SHOWS / REGIONS
DIAGNOSTICS AND USAGE (SUBMISSION LOGS)
MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)
BACKUP / DOCUMENT PICTURE / SHARING
ONLINE STORE
ONLINE STORES , PURCHASES, PASSWORD
DEFAULT STORE / BOOK / MUSIC APP
MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)
PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, NEW BLACKBERRY DEVICES)
PHONE AND MESSAGING (VOICE DIALING)
PROFILE & CERTs (INTERACTIVE INSTALLATION)
SOCIAL (DEFAULT APP)
SOCIAL APPS / GAMING / ADDING FRIENDS / MULTI-PLAYER
DEFAULT SOCIAL-GAMING / SOCIAL-VIDEO APPS
STORAGE AND BACKUP
DEVICE BACKUP AND ENCRYPTION
VOICE ASSISTANT (DEFAULT APP)
MDM . Extend your device security capabilities
iOS CONTROLLED 16 GROUPS ONLY
GENERAL
MOBILE HOTSPOT AND TETHERING
PLANS APP, APPWORLD
PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, iOS)
BES MANAGEMENT (SMARTPHONES, TABLETS)
SOFTWARE
OPEN WORK EMAIL MESSAGES LINKS IN THE PERSONAL BROWSER
TRANSFER THOUGH WORK PERIMETER TO SAME/ANOTHER DEVICE
BBM VIDEO ACCESS TO WORK NETWORK
VIDEO CHAT APP USES ORGANIZATION’S WI-FI/VPN NETWORK
SECURITY
WIPE WORK SPACE WITHOUT NETWORK, RESTRICT DEV. MODE
VOICE CONTROL & DICTATION IN WORK & USER APPS
BACKUP AND RESTORE (WORK) & DESKTOP SOFTWARE
PC ACCESS TO WORK & PERSONAL SPACE (USB, BT)
PERSONAL SPACE DATA ENCRYPTION
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL FOR WORK APPS
PERSONAL APPS ACCESS TO WORK CONTACTS
SHARE WORK DATA DURING BBM VIDEO SCREEN SHARING
WORK DOMAINS, WORK NETWORK USAGE FOR PERSONAL APPS
EMAIL PROFILES
CERTIFICATES & CIPHERS & S/MIME
HASH & ENCRYPTION ALGS AND KEY PARAMS
TASK/MEMO/CALENDAR/CONTACT/DAYS SYNC
WI-FI PROFILES
ACCESS POINT, DEFAULT GATEWAY, DHCP, IPV6, SSID, IP ADDRESS
PROXY PASSWORD/PORT/SERVER/SUBNET MASK
VPN PROFILES
PROXY, SCEP, AUTH PROFILE PARAMS
TOKENS, IKE, IPSEC OTHER PARAMS
PROXY PORTS, USERNAME, OTHER PARAMS
MDM . Extend your device security capabilities
BlackBerry (new, 10, qnx) CONTROLLED 7 GROUPS ONLY
THERE 55 GROUPS CONTROLLED IN ALL EACH GROUP CONTAINS FROM 10 TO 30 UNITS
ARE CONTROLLED TOO EACH UNIT IS UNDER A LOT OF FLEXIBLE PARAMs
INSTEAD OF A WAY ‘DISABLE/ENABLED & HIDE/UNHIDE’
EACH EVENT IS
CONTROLLED BY CERTAIN PERMISSION
ALLOWED TO CONTROL BY SIMILAR PERMISSIONS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE
DESCRIBED 360 PAGES IN ALL THAT IN FOUR TIME MORE THAN OTHER DOCUMENTS
EACH UNIT CAN’T CONTROL ACTIVITY UNDER ITSELF
‘CREATE, READ, WRITE/SAVE, SEND, DELETE’ ACTIONS IN REGARDS TO MESSAGES LEAD TO SPOOFING BY REQUESTING A ‘MESSAGE’ PERMISSION ONLY
SOME PERMISSIONS AREN’T REQUIRED (TO DELETE ANY OTHER APP)
SOME PERMISSIONS ARE RELATED TO APP, WHICH 3RD PARTY PLUGIN WAS EMBEDDED IN, INSTEAD OF THAT PLUGIN
MDM . Extend your device security capabilities
Blackberry (old) Huge amount of permissions are MDM & device built-in
MERGING PERMISSIONS INTO GROUPS, e.g.
‘SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS’ SEPARATED (BlackBerry old)
‘SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS’ MERGED INTO ONE UNIT (BlackBerry new) SCREEN CAPTURE
IS ALLOWED VIA HARDWARE BUTTONS ONLY
NO EMULATION OF HARDWARE BUTTONS AS IT WAS IN OLD BLACKBERRY DEVICES
LOCKS WHEN WORK PERIMITER HAS BECOME TO PREVENT SCREEN-CAPTURE LOGGERS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED SANDBOX
MALWARE IS STILL A PERSONAL APPLICATION SUBTYPE IN TERMS OF (IN-)SECURITY
SANDBOX PROTECTS ONLY APP DATA, WHILE USER DATA STORED IN SHARED FOLDERS
INABILITY OF BACKUP MAKE DEVELOPERS TO STORE DATA IN SHARED FOLDERS
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE
SECURE & INSECURE APP IN THE SAME TIME
HAS ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION SESSIONS, AND MAY STORE CHAT COVERSATION WITHOUT ENCRYPTION
STORE SENSITIVE DATA IN PLAINTEXT (PASSW, PASSPORT DETAILS, CARD INFO) AND BELIEVE IN POWER OF SANDBOX
UPGRADE FEATURE AFFECT EVERYTHING
MAY UPDATE/REMOVE ANY OTHER APP - SURPRISE
REPACKAGES STILL HAVE AN ACCESS TO THE SAME DATA AS AN ORIGINAL APP
DEBUG/NOT ORIGINAL SIGNATURE PROBLEM – THAT’S NOT A PROBLEM
CLIPBOARD (SECURE CLIPBOARD HAS NEVER EXISTED ANYWHERE AND MIGHT HAVE EVER)
REVEAL THE DATA IN REAL TIME BY ONE API CALL
ACCESSIBLE BY APIs AS WELL AS FILE DATA (DEPENDS ON YOUR OS)
NATIVE WALLETS PROTECTS BY RETURNING NULL (ONLY OLD-BLACKBERRY)
WHILE THE ON TOP || JUST MINIMIZE OR CLOSE IT TO GET FULL ACCESS
EVERY USER MUST MINIMIZE APP TO PASTE A PASSWORD
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE
GUI EXPLOITATION HAPPENS (OLD BLACKBERRY, ANDROID REPACKAGES)
REDRAWING THE SCREENS (OLD BB ONLY), GRABBING THE TEXT FROM ANY FIELDs (INCL. PASSWORD FIELD)
ADDING, REMOVING THE FIELD DATA
ORIGINAL DATA IS INACCESSIBLE BUT NOT AFFECTED
KASPERSKY MOBILE SECURITY PROVIDES AN INSECURITY,
NO PROTECTION FROM REMOVING.CODs & UNDER SIMULATOR
EXAMING THE TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR
JUST SHOULD CHECK API “IS SIMULATOR” ONLY
SMS MANAGEMENT VIA “QUITE” SECRET SMS (NOT ENCRYPTED, HASH ONLY)…
THE SAME SECRET AMONG OPERATING SYSTEMS (BB, ANDROID, WINDOWS,…)
PASSWORD IS 4–16 DIGITS,AND MODIFIED IN REAL-TIME (OLD BLACKBERRY, OR ANDROID REPACKAGES)
SMS IS A HALF A HASH VALUE OF GOST R 34.11-94
HASH IMPLEMENTATION USES TEST CRYPTO VALUES AND NO SALT
TABLES (VALUEHASH) ARE EASY BUILT
OUTCOMING SMS CAN BE SPOOFED WITHOUT ANY NOTIFICATION, BECAUSE KMS DELETE THE SENT MESSAGES
OUTCOMING SMS COULD BLOCK/WIPE THE SAME/ANOTHER DEVICE
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE
Device diversityConfiguration managementSoftware DistributionDevice policy compliance & enforcementEnterprise ActivationLoggingSecurity SettingsSecurity Wipe, LockIAMMake you sure to start managing security under
uncertain terms without AI
Refers to NIST-800-53 and other
Sometimes missed requirements such as locking device, however it is in NIST-800-53
A bit details than CSANo statements on permission managementMake you sure to start managing security under
uncertain terms without AI
COMPLIANCE AND MDM
CSA Mobile Device Management: Key Components NIST-124
DENIAL OF SERVICE
REPLACING/REMOVING FILES
DOS’ing EVENTs, GUI INTERCEPT INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
CLIPBOARD, SCREEN CAPTURE
GUI INTERCEPT
SHARED FOLDERS
DUMPING .COD/.BAR/APK… FILES
MITM (INTERCEPTION / SPOOFING)
MESSAGES
GUI INTERCEPT, THIRD PARTY APPs
FAKE WINDOW/CLICKJACKING GENERAL PERMISSIONS
INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-PERMISSIONS
A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT LOGs FOR USER
BUILT PER APPLICATION INSTEAD OF APP SCREENs
CONCLUSION
PRIVILEGED GENERAL PERMISSIONS OWN APPs, NATIVE & 3RD PARTY APPs FEATURES
SIMPLIFICATION AND REDUCING SECURITY CONTROLS MANY GENERAL PERMISSIONS AND COMBINED INTO EACH OTHER NO LOGs ACTIVITY FOR SUB-PERMISSIONS TO PROVE THE TRANSPARENCY ANY SECURITY VULNERABILITY ARE ONLY FIXED BY ENTIRELY NEW AND DIFFERENT OS / KERNEL A FEW PERMISSIONs ARE CLOSED TO THE USER ACTIONS THE SANDBOX PROTECT ONLY APPLICATION DATA USERS HAVE TO STORE THEIR DATA INTO SHARED FOLDERS OR EXTERNAL STORAGE APPLICATIONS CONTINUE STORE DATA IN PUBLIC FOLDERs BECAUSE GOVERNED BY CHANCE OF AVAILABILITY MITM / INTERCEPTION ACTIONS ARE OFTEN SILENTLY THE NATIVE SPOOFING AND INTERCEPTION FEATURES COMPLIANCE DOES NOT EXTEND MDM CAPABILITIES – JUST REPEATS IT THE MOST GRANULAR SECURITY (PERMISSIONS) RULED BY AMAZON WEB SERVICES PERMISSIONS SHOULD RELY ON THE DIFFERENT USEFUL CASES SET INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC PERMISSION LIST
CONCLUSION
THE VENDOR SECURITY VISION HAS NOTHING WITH REALITY AGGRAVATED BY SIMPLICITY
Q & A