(pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

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VULNERABILITY ELIMINATION BY FORCE OF NEW MOBILE OS SECURITY RESEARCHER / PhD. YURY CHEMERKIN CONFidence‘2013

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Page 1: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

VULNERABILITY ELIMINATION BY FORCE OF NEW MOBILE OS

SECURITY RESEARCHER / PhD.

YURY CHEMERKIN

CONFidence‘2013

Page 2: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

Experienced in :

Reverse Engineering & AV

Software Programming & Documentation

Mobile Security and MDM

Cyber Security & Cloud Security

Compliance & Transparency

and Security Writing

Hakin9 Magazine, PenTest Magazine, eForensics Magazine,

Groteck Business Media

Participation at conferences

InfoSecurityRussia, NullCon, AthCon, PHDays

CYBERCRIME FORUM, Cyber Intelligence Europe/Intelligence-Sec

ICITST, CyberTimes, ITA, I-Society

[ Yury Chemerkin ]

www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin http://sto-strategy.com [email protected]

Page 3: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

BLACKBERRY ENTERPRISE SERVICE HELPS MANAGE AND PROTECT BLACKBERRY, IOS, AND ANDROID DEVICES.

UNIFIED COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION SOFTWARE

DESIGNED TO HELP PROTECT DATA THAT IS IN TRANSIT AT ALL POINTS AS WELL IS IN MEMORY AND STORAGE

ENHANCED BY A CONTROL OF THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DEVICE

PROTECTION OF APPLICATION DATA USING SANDBOXING

MANAGEMENT OF PERMISSIONS TO ACCESS CAPABILITIES

BB EVALUATES EVERY REQUEST THAT APP MAKES – BUT LEAD AWAY FROM ANY DETAILS AND APIs

BLACKBERRY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

BLACKBERRY EVALUATES EVERY REQUEST THAT AN APPLICATION MAKES TO ACCESS A CAPABILITY

Page 4: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

BLACKBERRY HANDLES SEVERAL TECHNOLOGIES

NATIVE

BLACKBERRY 10, BLACKBERY PLAYBOOK

OLD BLACKBERRY DEVICES

THIRD PARTY

ADOBE AIR FOR NEW BB DEVICES

ANDROID APPLICATIONS & DEVICES

IOS DEVICES

ALL CONTROLLED OBJECTS ARE LIMITED BY

SANDBOX

PERMISSIONS

SECURITY FEATURES ON DEVICEs & MDMs

USER-MODE MALWARE

SPYWARE

ROOTKITS

EXPLOTS & ATTACKS

REVERSING NETWORK LAYER

PARTIALLY RECOVERING DATA VS. SANBOX

MDM vs. COMPLIANCE

A FEW RECOMMENDATIONS

SET IS LESSER THAN SET OF MDM FEATURES

YOUNG STANDARDS

FIRST REVISIONS

DRAFT REVISIONS

KNOWN ISSUES

MALWARE BOUNDS BECOME UNCLEAR… COMPLIANCE BRINGS USELESS RECOMMENDATIONS

Page 5: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013
Page 6: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

CAMERA AND VIDEO

HIDE THE DEFAULT CAMERA APPLICATION PASSWORD

DEFINE PASSWORD PROPERTIES

REQUIRE LETTERS (incl. case)

REQUIRE NUMBERS

REQUIRE SPECIAL CHARACTERS

DELETE DATA AND APPLICATIONS FROM THE DEVICE AFTER

INCORRECT PASSWORD ATTEMPTS

DEVICE PASSWORD

ENABLE AUTO-LOCK

LIMIT PASSWORD AGE

LIMIT PASSWORD HISTORY

RESTRICT PASSWORD LENGTH

MINIMUM LENGTH FOR THE DEVICE PASSWORD THAT IS ALLOWED

ENCRYPTION

APPLY ENCRYPTION RULES

ENCRYPT INTERNAL DEVICE STORAGE TOUCHDOWN SUPPORT

MICROSOFT EXCHANGE SYNCHRONIZATION

EMAIL PROFILES

ACTIVESYNC

BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES - ANDROID

CONTROLLED FOUR GROUPS ONLY by BlackBerry CONTROLLED 74 OUT 200 APIs ONLY by Android

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BROWSER

DEFAULT APP,

AUTOFILL, COOKIES, JAVASCRIPT, POPUPS

CAMERA, VIDEO, VIDEO CONF

OUTPUT, SCREEN CAPTURE, DEFAULT APP

CERTIFICATES (UNTRUSTED CERTs)

CLOUD SERVICES

BACKUP / DOCUMENT / PICTURE / SHARING

CONNECTIVITY

NETWORK, WIRELESS, ROAMING

DATA, VOICE WHEN ROAMING

CONTENT

CONTENT (incl. EXPLICIT)

RATING FOR APPS/ MOVIES / TV SHOWS / REGIONS

DIAGNOSTICS AND USAGE (SUBMISSION LOGS)

MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)

BACKUP / DOCUMENT PICTURE / SHARING

ONLINE STORE

ONLINE STORES , PURCHASES, PASSWORD

DEFAULT STORE / BOOK / MUSIC APP

MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)

PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, NEW BLACKBERRY DEVICES)

PHONE AND MESSAGING (VOICE DIALING)

PROFILE & CERTs (INTERACTIVE INSTALLATION)

SOCIAL (DEFAULT APP)

SOCIAL APPS / GAMING / ADDING FRIENDS / MULTI-PLAYER

DEFAULT SOCIAL-GAMING / SOCIAL-VIDEO APPS

STORAGE AND BACKUP

DEVICE BACKUP AND ENCRYPTION

VOICE ASSISTANT (DEFAULT APP)

BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES - iOS

CONTROLLED 16 GROUPS ONLY by BlackBerry that‘s QUITE SIMLIAR to APPLE MDM SOLUTIONS

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GENERAL

MOBILE HOTSPOT AND TETHERING

PLANS APP, APPWORLD

PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, iOS)

BES MANAGEMENT (SMARTPHONES, TABLETS)

SOFTWARE

OPEN WORK EMAIL MESSAGES LINKS IN THE PERSONAL BROWSER

TRANSFER THOUGH WORK PERIMETER TO SAME/ANOTHER DEVICE

BBM VIDEO ACCESS TO WORK NETWORK

VIDEO CHAT APP USES ORGANIZATION’S WI-FI/VPN NETWORK

SECURITY

WIPE WORK SPACE WITHOUT NETWORK, RESTRICT DEV. MODE

VOICE CONTROL & DICTATION IN WORK & USER APPS

BACKUP AND RESTORE (WORK) & DESKTOP SOFTWARE

PC ACCESS TO WORK & PERSONAL SPACE (USB, BT)

PERSONAL SPACE DATA ENCRYPTION

NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL FOR WORK APPS

PERSONAL APPS ACCESS TO WORK CONTACTS

SHARE WORK DATA DURING BBM VIDEO SCREEN SHARING

WORK DOMAINS, WORK NETWORK USAGE FOR PERSONAL APPS

EMAIL PROFILES

CERTIFICATES & CIPHERS & S/MIME

HASH & ENCRYPTION ALGS AND KEY PARAMS

TASK/MEMO/CALENDAR/CONTACT/DAYS SYNC

WI-FI PROFILES

ACCESS POINT, DEFAULT GATEWAY, DHCP, IPV6, SSID, IP ADDRESS

PROXY PASSWORD/PORT/SERVER/SUBNET MASK

VPN PROFILES

PROXY, SCEP, AUTH PROFILE PARAMS

TOKENS, IKE, IPSEC OTHER PARAMS

PROXY PORTS, USERNAME, OTHER PARAMS

BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES –BLACKBERRY (QNX)

CONTROLLED 7 GROUPS ONLY by BlackBerry that‘s NOT ENOUGH TO MANAGE ALL APIs

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Page 12: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

THERE 55 GROUPS CONTROLLED IN ALL EACH GROUP CONTAINS FROM 10 TO 30 UNITS ARE CONTROLLED TOO EACH UNIT IS UNDER A LOT OF FLEXIBLE PARAMs INSTEAD OF A WAY ‘DISABLE/ENABLED & HIDE/UNHIDE’ EACH EVENT IS

CONTROLLED BY CERTAIN PERMISSION

ALLOWED TO CONTROL BY SIMILAR PERMISSIONS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE DESCRIBED 360 PAGES IN ALL THAT IN FOUR TIME MORE THAN OTHER DOCUMENTS EACH UNIT CAN’T CONTROL ACTIVITY UNDER ITSELF

‘CREATE, READ, WRITE/SAVE, SEND, DELETE’ ACTIONS IN REGARDS TO MESSAGES LEAD TO SPOOFING BY REQUESTING A ‘MESSAGE’ PERMISSION ONLY

SOME PERMISSIONS AREN’T REQUIRED (TO DELETE ANY OTHER APP)

SOME PERMISSIONS ARE RELATED TO APP, WHICH 3RD PARTY PLUGIN WAS EMBEDDED IN, INSTEAD OF THAT PLUGIN

BLACKBERRY CAPABILITES –BLACKBERRY (OLD)

INCREDIBLE AMOUNT OF GROUPS, UNITS AND PERMISSIONS ARE CONTROLELD BY MDM AND DEVICE

Page 13: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

BlackBerry Old iOS BlackBerry QNX Android

Quantity of Groups 55 16 7 4

Average perm per group 20 5 7 4

Efficiency 80,00 38,46 31,82 10,26

Totall permissions 1100 80 49 16

55

16

7 420

5 7 4

80,00

38,4631,82 10,26

1100

80

49

16

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

BlackBerry MDM

Quantity of Groups Average perm per group Efficiency Totall permissions

Page 14: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

OLD BB: MERGING PERMISSIONS INTO GROUPS

‘SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS’ SEPARATED (PREVIOUS BB)

‘SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS’ MERGED INTO ONE UNIT (LATEST BB) QNX-BB: SCREEN CAPTURE

IS ALLOWED VIA HARDWARE BUTTONS ONLY

NO EMULATION OF HARDWARE BUTTONS AS IT WAS IN OLD BLACKBERRY DEVICES

LOCKS WHEN WORK PERIMITER HAS BECOME TO PREVENT SCREEN-CAPTURE LOGGERS OLD BB: NO SANBOX HAS NEVER BEEN ANNOUNCED

ALL DATA ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT APP & SYSTEM DATA DUE TO GENERAL PERMISSION QNX-BB: OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED SANDBOX

MALWARE IS A PERSONAL APPLICATION SUBTYPE IN TERMS OF BLACKBERRY’s SECURITY

SANDBOX PROTECTS ONLY APP DATA, WHILE USER DATA STORED IN SHARED FOLDERS

ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS - I

USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE

Page 15: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

OLD BB: SECURE & INSECURE IM CHATS IN THE SAME TIME

HAS ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION SESSIONS

STORE CHAT COVERSATION IN PLAIN TEXT WITHOUT ENCRYPTION (EVEN BBM)

INACCESSIBLE FROM THE DEVICE BECAUSE OF UNKNOWN FILE TYPE (.CSV)

UPGRADE FEATURE AFFECT EVERYTHING

UPDATE APP THAT CALLS THIS API – USE GENERAL API

REMOVE APP THAT CALLS THIS APPS – USE GENERAL API

REMOVE ANY OTHER APP UNDER THE SAME API WITHOUT NOTIFICATION

HANDLE WITH PC TOOLS ON OLD BB DEVICES WITHOUT DEBUG / DEVELOPMENT MODE

OLD BB: CLIPBOARD (HAS NEVER EXISTED ANYWHERE AND MIGHT HAVE EVER)

REVEAL THE DATA IN REAL TIME BY ONE API CALL

NATIVE WALLETS PROTECTS BY RETURNING NJULL

WHILE THE ON TOP || JUST MINIMIZE OR CLOSE IT TO GET FULL ACCESS

EVERY USER CASE MUST MINIMIZE APP TO PASTE A PASSWORD

ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS - II

USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE

Page 16: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013
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INITIALLY BASED ON AUTHORIZED API COVERED

ALL PHYSICAL & NAVIGATION BUTTONS

TYPING TEXTUAL DATA, AFFECT ALL APPs

SECONDARY BASED ON ADDING THE MENU ITEMS

INTO THE GLOBAL / “SEND VIA” MENU

AFFECT ALL NATIVE APPLICATIONS

NATIVE APPs ARE DEVELOPED BY BLACKBERRY

WALLETS, SOCIAL, SETTINGS, IMs,…

GUI EXPLOITATION

REDRAWING THE SCREENS

GRABBING THE TEXT FROM ANY FIELDs (INCL. PASSWORD FIELD)

ADDING, REMOVING THE FIELD DATA

ORIGINAL DATA IS INACCESSIBLE BUT NOT AFFECTED

ADDING GUI OBJECTS BUT NOT SHUFFLING

KASPERSKY MOBILE SECURITY PROVIDES

FIREWALL, WIPE, BLOCK, INFO FEATURES

NO PROTECTION FROM REMOVING.CODs & UNDER SIMULATOR

EXAMING THE TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR

JUST SHOULD CHECK API “IS SIMULATOR” ONLY

SMS MANAGEMENT VIA “QUITE” SECRET SMS

PASSWORD IS 4–16 DIGITS,AND MODIFIED IN REAL-TIME

SMS IS A HALF A HASH VALUE OF GOST R 34.11-94

IMPLEMENTATION USES TEST CRYPTO VALUES AND NO SALT

TABLES (VALUEHASH) ARE EASY BUILT

OUTCOMING SMS CAN BE SPOOFED WITHOUT ANY

NOTIFICATION, BECAUSE KMS DELETE THE SENT MESSAGES

OUTCOMING SMS BLOCK/WIPE THE SAME/ANOTHERDEVICE

ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS – III

THE GUI EXPLOITATION (OLD BB) –NATIVE APPs 3RD PARTY SECURE SOLITUINS RUIN THE SECURITY

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DENIAL OF SERVICE

REPLACING/REMOVING EXEC FILES

DOS’ing EVENTs, NOISING FIELDS

GUI INTERCEPT

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

CLIPBOARD, SCREEN CAPTURE

GUI INTERCEPT

DUMPING .COD FILES, SHARED FILES

MITM (INTERCEPTION / SPOOFING)

MESSAGES

GUI INTERCEPT, THIRD PARTY APPs

FAKE WINDOW/CLICKJACKING

GENERAL PERMISSIONS

INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-PERMISSIONS

A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT LOGs FOR USER

BUILT PER APPLICATION INSTEAD OF APP SCREENs

CONCRETE PERMISSIONS

BUT COMBINED INTO GENERAL PERMISSION

A SCREENSHOT PERMISSION IS PART OF THE CAMERA

GENERAL PERMISSIONS

INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SUB-PERMISSIONS

A FEW NOTIFICATION/EVENT LOGs FOR USER

BUILT PER APPLICATION INSTEAD OF APP SCREENs

CONCLUSION - I

PRIVILEGED GENERAL PERMISSIONS OWN APPs, NATIVE & 3RD PARTY APPs FEATURES

Page 22: (Pdf) yury chemerkin _confidence_2013

SIMPLIFICATION AND REDUCING SECURITY CONTROLS MANY GENERAL PERMISSIONS AND COMBINED INTO EACH OTHER NO LOGs ACTIVITY FOR SUB-PERMISSIONS TO PROVE THE TRANSPARENCY ANY SECURITY VULNERABILITY ARE ONLY FIXED BY ENTIRELY NEW AND DIFFERENT OS / KERNEL A FEW PERMISSIONs ARE CLOSED TO THE USER ACTIONS THE SANDBOX PROTECT ONLY APPLICATION DATA USERS HAVE TO STORE THEIR DATA INTO SHARED FOLDERS OR EXTERNAL STORAGE APPLICATIONS CONTINUE STORE DATA IN PUBLIC FOLDERs BECAUSE GOVERNED BY CHANCE OF AVAILABILITY MITM / INTERCEPTION ACTIONS ARE OFTEN SILENTLY THE NATIVE SPOOFING AND INTERCEPTION FEATURES BLACKBERRY ENTERPRISE SOLUTION / BLACKBERRY MOBILE FUSION IS NOT EFFECTIVE MUCH THE BEST SECURITY (PERMISSIONS) RULED BY AMAZON WEB SERVICES PERMISSIONS SHOULD RELY ON THE DIFFERENT USEFUL CASES SET INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC PERMISSION LIST

CONCLUSION - II

THE VENDOR SECURITY VISION HAS NOTHING WITH REALITY AGGRAVATED BY SIMPLICITY