part 6: local conflicts€¦ · out the militants under operation zarb-e-azb, and partly through...

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THE NAP TRACKER 99 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016 PART 6: LOCAL CONFLICTS 6.1 Introducon The NAP also aempts to address local conflicts in the Federally Ad- ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) (#12), Karachi (#16), and Baloch- istan (#17). The FATA conflict is being addressed partly by driving out the militants under Operaon Zarb-e-Azb, and partly through much-needed potenal reforms in the region. The Ministry of Interior and Narcocs Control presented a report in the Naonal Assembly in January, 2016. According to this report, a commiee on FATA reforms has been constuted, surrender of and reconciliaon with Baloch insurgents is under way, an urban pacificaon operaon in Karachi has created a significant decline in murder and violence (parcularly target killings), and thousands of ter- rorists have been arrested or killed. 1 6.2 FATA Reforms 6.2.1 Historical Background of FATA FATA is geographically located along the Durand line, with KP on its eastern bor- der. The semi-autonomous region is comprised of seven agencies — Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. The Froner Crimes Regulaons (FCR), an archaic, draconian piece of legisla- on, serves as the manifestaon of government writ in the Federally Adminis- tered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, dang back to the Brish colonial period in pre-paron India. The “excluded areas” as they were called by secon 91 of the colonial constuonal law of Government of India Act are sll the excluded areas from the realm of development, investment, and modern civilizaon. FATA has no 1 Quesons and Oral Answers, 28th session of the Naonal Assembly. (2016, January 15). Retrieved March 15, 2016, from hp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques- ons/1452850149_459.pdf. LOCAL CONFLICTS NAP POINT 12: Administrave and devel- opment reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriaon of IDPs. NAP POINT 16: Ongoing operaon in Ka- rachi will be taken to its logical end. NAP POINT 17: Balochistan government to be fully empowered for polical rec- onciliaon with complete ownership by all stakeholders.

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PArT 6: locAl conFlIcTs6.1 Introduction

TheNAPalsoattempts toaddresslocal conflicts in the FederallyAd-ministered Tribal Areas (FATA)(#12), Karachi (#16), and Baloch-istan (#17). The FATA conflict isbeing addressed partly by drivingout themilitants underOperationZarb-e-Azb, and partly throughmuch-neededpotential reforms intheregion.

TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportintheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothisreport,acommitteeonFATAreformshasbeenconstituted,surrenderofandreconciliationwithBaloch insurgents isunderway,anurbanpacificationoperation inKarachihascreateda significantdeclineinmurderandviolence(particularlytargetkillings),andthousandsofter-roristshavebeenarrestedorkilled.1

6.2 FATA Reforms

6.2.1HistoricalBackgroundofFATA

FATAisgeographicallylocatedalongtheDurandline,withKPonitseasternbor-der. The semi-autonomous region is comprised of seven agencies — Bajaur,Mohmand,Khyber,Orakzai,Kurram,NorthWaziristanandSouthWaziristan.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), an archaic, draconian piece of legisla-tion, servesas themanifestationofgovernmentwrit in theFederallyAdminis-teredTribalAreas(FATA)ofPakistan,datingbacktotheBritishcolonialperiodinpre-partitionIndia.The“excludedareas”astheywerecalledbysection91ofthecolonialconstitutionallawofGovernmentofIndiaActarestilltheexcludedareasfromtherealmofdevelopment,investment,andmoderncivilization.FATAhasno

1 QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.

locAl conFlIcTsNAP POINT 12:Administrativeanddevel-opmentreformsinFATAwithimmediatefocusonrepatriationofIDPs.

NAP POINT 16:OngoingoperationinKa-rachiwillbetakentoitslogicalend.

NAP POINT 17:Balochistangovernmenttobe fully empowered for political rec-onciliationwith complete ownership byallstakeholders.

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networkofthestateinstitutionsinthemodernsense.Almostsevendecadesafterindependence,tribalPashtunsremainsubjecttotheapplicationofthisludicrous,inhumanesetofregulations.

Article247oftheconstitutionstates:“SubjecttotheConstitution,theexecutiveauthorityoftheFederationshallextendtotheFederallyAdministeredTribalAr-easandprovinceshallextendtotheProvinciallyAdministeredTribalAreas”.NW-FP’sprovincialgovernorexercisesexecutiveauthorityinFATAasthepresident’srepresentative.TheoveralladministrativeandpoliticalcontrolofFATAfallsundertheFederalMinistryofStatesandFrontierRegions(SAFRON).

6.2.2FCRversus1973Constitution

Pakistan’sconstitutionaffordsfundamentalhumanrights,includingequalcitizen-ry,toallPakistanisunderarticles8-28.However,underarticle247theseprovi-sionsarenullandvoidforFATA.Noactoftheparliamentextendstotheseareasunlessthepresidentdirectsso.Infact,evenlawmakerselectedfromtheregioncanlegislateforanypartofthecountry,exceptforFATA.TheFCRdiscriminatesboth incivilandcriminalmatters,classifiescitizens,doesnotrequireproof forconvictionora civil decree,andgivesno rightofdefensebya counselor,orarightofappeal. Inshort,theConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistanasawhole,forallpracticalpurposes,isaredundantandtautologicaldocumentasfarasitsapplicationinFATAisconcerned.Consequently,thepeopleofFATAhaveneitherany‘humanrights’norcantheyclaimanyotherstatus,privilege,positionconferreduponothercitizensofPakistanbytheconstitution.

PleaseseeSection6.6foradetailedargumentonFATAreforms.

6.2.3CurrentStatus:FATAReforms

FATAReformsCommittee,thelatestinalineofmany,wasformedinMay2014,priortotheenactmentofNAP,toframestrategicobjectivesforthevolatiletribalareas.Thiscommitteereleaseditsreportafterthoroughdeliberation.2Butunfor-tunatelythereportdidn’tcomeupwithanysuggestionsonFATAreforms.

AnothercommitteewasformedbythePrimeMinister,almostayearaftertheAPSattack,inNovember,2015.3Themovewasseenbymanyasameanstoappease

2Ali,Z.(2014,March20).AnothercommissionformedonFatareforms.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1107498.3Manan,A.(2015,November09).Govtformshigh-poweredpanelonFATAreforms-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/987775/notification-is-

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FATA lawmakers forwithdrawalof their candidateagainstSardarAyazSadiq,amerefivedaysbeforetheelectionoftheNationalAssemblyspeaker.ThereportpresentedtotheNationalAssemblydetailsnoprogressonFATAreforms,exceptthatthecommitteehasbeenformed,SpecialAdvisortothePrimeMinisterSartajAzizhasbeenappointedasthehead,andconsultationsareunderway.1Thecom-mitteewasmeanttodeliberateoverthreecoreissues:

1. extendingthejurisdictionofthesuperiorcourtstoFATA;

2. shiftingthelegislativepowersforthetribalareasfromthehandsofthepresidentandgovernorKPtotheparliament,andtotheBalochistan/KPAssemblies;and

3. decidingifFATAshouldbemadepartofmainstreamKPoroftheProvin-ciallyAdministeredTribalAreas(PATA)inKPorifitshouldbegiventhestatusofaprovinceofPakistan.

Thusfar,thecommitteehasofferednothingsubstantial.

AFATATribunalwasre-formedbythegovernmentinMay2015,totakeupcasesdispensedbyadministrators.TheprevioustribunalhadexpiredinJanuary,2015.4 Thisisanad-hocmeasurethatdoeslittletohelpthepeopleofFATA,andhasverylimitedpowerstoaffectchange.

6.3 FATA: Operation Zarb-e-Azb

OperationZarb-e-Azb is a jointmilitary offensive beingconductedbythe Paki-stanArmedForces againstvarious militantgroups,includingthe Tehreek-i-TalibanPakistan (TTP), the IslamicMovementofUzbekistan (IMU), the EastTurkestanIslamicMovement(ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ), al-Qaeda(AQ), Jundallah and the HaqqaniNetwork.Theoperationwas launchedon June14,2014 in NorthWaziristan,buthas sinceexpanded to includeurbanpacificationoperations intheportcityofKarachiinSindhprovince.Theoperationhas30,000soldiersonthefrontlines,andwaslaunchedfollowingthebreakdownofnegotiationswithextremistelementsandabrazenattackonKarachiairport.5

sued-govt-forms-high-powered-panel-on-fata-reforms/.4BureauReport.(2015,March28).‘Muchawaited’FataTribunalformed.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1184671.5Salahuddin,Z.(2014,April24).CounteringInsurgency.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/08/29/pakistan-countering-insurgency.

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6.3.1Progress

OnJune13,2015,thePakistanimilitaryreportedprogressovertheoperationinthecourseofayear.DirectorGeneraloftheInterServicesPublicRelations(ISPR)AsimSaleemBajwareportedthat2,763militantshadbeenkilledsofar,includ-ing218terroristcommandersin9,000intelligencebasedoperations(IBOs).6Theupdatealsolisted837hideoutsdestroyed,253tonsofexplosivesrecovered,and18,087weaponsseized.347officersandsoldiershadalsosacrificedtheirlivedintheoperation.Thisaccountsforthefirstyearoftheoperation.Thereportpre-sented intheNationalAssembly inJanuary,2016claims2,159terroristskilled,andanother1,724arrestedoverthecourseofthefirstyearoftheNAP.1

Graph 6.1 Progress against Militancy and Armed Combatants

ThisgoesontoshowthatthelawenforcementagenciesinPakistanareparticu-larlyadeptatkillingtheextremistthreat.However,thisasymmetricalwarfareisnotsustainableasitdoesnothingtoeliminatetheradicalideologythatformstherootofthisconflict.Pakistanneedssignificantpolicychangesandlawreformsto

6ISPR.(2015,June13).ISPRPressRelease-NoPR170/2015-ISPR.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttps://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/6/13.

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ensuretherelativepeaceacquiredismaintainedinthelongrun.

PleaseseeSection6.7foradetaileddiscussiononthefutureofNAPinFATAandKP.

6.3.2InternallyDisplacedPersons

PleaseseeSection8.3.3:IDPs–RehabilitationPlans.

6.4: Karachi Operation

6.4.1ViolenceinKarachi

DatacollectedbytheCenterforResearchandSecurityStudies(CRSS)showsthatdespitetheviolenceinFATA,Karachiremainedthemostviolentandvolatiledis-trictinPakistanthelastseveralyearsrunning.Karachilost5,063personstovio-lenceinthelastthreeyears.However,thelevelofviolencehasreducedbynearly78%inSindh,whileKarachiwitnesseda48%dropinthefatalitiesfromdifferentformsofviolenceintheyear2015.7

7Nafees,M.,Gul,I.,&Salahuddin,Z.(2016,February26).CRSSAnnualSecurityReport-2015.RetrievedFebruary26,2016,fromhttp://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Se-curity-Report-2015.pdf.

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Graph 6.2 Violence in Karachi – 2013 – 2015

6.4.2Ranger’sDeploymentinKarachi

RangersareaparamilitaryforceundercontroloftheMinistryofInterior,andtheirprimarytaskistoguard,defendandsecurebordersinpeacetimeaswellaswartime,provideandmaintainsecurityinwarzonesandareasofconflict,andmain-tainlawandorderwhichincludesprovidingassistancetothe police.

TheRangersKarachioperationwasinauguratedbyPrimeMinisterNawazSharifonSeptember5,2013,toridthecityofcrime,politicalmilitancyandviolence.8 Twoyearslater,theRangersannouncedthecompletionofphaseone,withthesecondphasetocommencefromAugust14,2015.9

TheRangersoperationinKarachicontinuesatthetimeofwritingthisreport.

6.4.3ShiftinFocussinceNAP

Anewsenseofurgencywasobserved in January,2015,whenthePMcalleda

8Tunio,H.(2013,September04).Karachilawandorder:Rangerstolaunchoperationintwodays-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/600064/kara-chi-law-and-order-rangers-to-launch-operation-in-two-days/.9Khan,F.(2015,August10).FirststageofKarachisecurityoperationcomplete:Rangers-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/935314/fist-stage-of-karachi-security-operation-complete-rangers/.

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highlevelmeetingonthelawandordersituationinKarachi.10Therewasaclearshift inmandate,as justoveramonth later,politicalmilitancy,a long-standingsourceofextremeviolence in thecitywas targeted inKarachi.Rangers raidedtheheadquartersofMuttahidaQaumiMovement(MQM),arrestingabscondersandrecoveringbanned,unlicensedweaponry.11ThusbothsourcesofviolenceinKarachi,religiousmilitancyandpoliticalmilitancy,weretargeted.

6.4.4OutcomesofKarachiOperation

IntheJanuary,2016reporttotheNationalAssembly,itwassharedthatasignif-icantdeclineinviolence,militancyandcrimewasobservedinKarachi.1 Accord-ingtothereport,targetkillingwasdownby53%,robberiesdownby30%,andextortiondownby56%.69,179criminalshadbeenarrested,whichinclude890terrorists,676proclaimedoffenders,10,426absconders,124kidnappers,545ex-tortionists,and1,834murderers.Thereportalsoclaimedthat16,304weaponshadbeenrecovered.

10Khan,F.(2015,August10).PMsummonshigh-levelmeetingonlawandordersituationinKarachitomorrow-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/829573/pm-summons-high-level-meeting-on-law-and-order-situation-in-karachi-tomorrow/11Salahuddin,Z.(2015,April15).ANewTurnforPakistan’sFightAgainstMilitancy.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/15/a-new-turn-for-pakistans-fight-against-militancy/.

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Graph 6.4 Karachi Operation Outcomes - Milestones

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Graph 6.3 Karachi Operation Outcomes - Arrested

Thisdata isbackedbyfindings from theCenter forResearchandSecurityStudies,althoughthefiguresdiffersomewhat.7

PleaseseeSection6.8foradetaileddiscussiononKarachi.

6.5: Baluchistan Insurgency

6.5.1BaluchistanNationalistMovement

Balochnationalisminitscontemporaryformbegannearlyacenturyagointhe1920s in theformof theAnjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan(AIB -OrganizationforUnityoftheBaloch).ThemovementclaimsthattheBalochpeopleareanation,andemphasizesethnicloyaltyoverreligiousloyalty;anideathatiscontrarytotheideologybehindPakistan’s creation.Theirdemandshave ranged fromcultural,

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economicandpoliticalreforms,topoliticalautonomy,tooutrightsecessionfromPa-kistan.ThemovementissecularandheavilyinfluencedbyleftistMarxistideology.12

6.5.2BalochInsurgentGroups

Theongoing insurgency isnot thefirstof its kind. In fact, thecurrent conflict,startedin2003,isthefifthofitskind.13TheinsurgentsinPakistanarefragmentedintoseveralgroups,mainlytheBalochLiberationArmy(BLA),theBalochRepubli-canArmy(BRA),theBalochLiberationFront(BLF)andtheLashkar-e-Balochistan(LeB-Baluchistan’sarmy).Whilethisfragmentationisreflectiveofthetribalna-tureofBalochnationalists,theirdemandsaredeeplyrootedinBalochnationalistideology.

6.5.3MissingPersons

Missingpersons isagenerictermusedinPakistantorefertotheostensiblyhun-dredsofpersonsin Pakistan whohavedisappeared inconflictzones.

Thenumberofmissingpersons isacontested issue,withahugegulfbetweentheclaimsbyBalochactivists,humanrightsbodiesandthestatisticsofthegov-ernment.MamaQadeer’sVoiceforBalochMissingPersons(VBMP)hasalwaysclaimed the highest toll at 21,000+14. This is abnormally different fromofficialnumbers, as theCommissionof InquiryonEnforcedDisappearances (CIED) in-formedtheSupremeCourtthat982missingpersonshadbeentracedinthelastfouryears.15AccordingtoCIED’sreport,1,273casesofenforceddisappearancesarestillunresolved,withonly122ofthembelongingtoBalochistan.Meanwhile,DefenceofHumanRights,anNGOthattracesmissingpeople,putsthenumberat5,149fromalloverPakistan.16

Missingpersonsremainathornyissueforauthoritiestonavigate.Withoutaprop-erresolutionoftheproblem,reconciliationeffortswillbehamperedinBalochistan.

12Breseeg,T.M.(2004).Balochnationalism:Itsoriginanddevelopment.Karachi:RoyalBookCompany.13BBC.(2014,February22).Balochistan:TheuntoldstoryofPakistan’sotherwar-BBCNews.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26272897.14Correspondent.(2015,April17).Raisinghisvoice:21,000missinginBalochistan,saysMamaQa-deer-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/871142/raising-his-voice-21000-missing-in-balochistan-says-mama-qadeer/.15Malik,H.(2015,February22).Enforceddisappearances:Upto982missingpersonstracedinthepastfouryears-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/842656/enforced-disappearances-up-to-982-missing-persons-traced-in-the-past-four-years/.16Iqbal,N.(2015,January14).SCseeksreportonnumberofmissingpersons.RetrievedMarch2,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156658.

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PleasealsoseeSection4.3:CPECSecurity.

6.5.4ReconciliationEfforts

ThegovernmentcurrentlybelievesthatreconciliationandaddressinggrievancesisthebestwaytoappeasetheBalochnationalistsandtoendtheconflictintheprovince.ThereportpresentedtothelawmakersintheNationalAssemblybytheInteriorMinisterChaudharyNisarisfairlyvague.Verbatim,itstatesthat“surren-derandreconciliation/rehabilitationofabsconders/outlawsinprogress”.1 Theex-actfigureforinsurgentswhohavesurrenderedvariesfromsourcetosource,butitwasreportedthat625insurgentslaiddowntheirarmsinthelastsixmonths.17

According to another report, some 1,025 militants, belonging to various pro-scribedoutfits,have surrenderedbefore theprovincial governmentduring thepastyear.18

InApril2015,BalochistanChiefMinisterDr.AbdulMalikalsosaidthatarecon-ciliationstrategyhadbeendevisedtohelpmainstreamBalochnationalists.19ThePrimeMinisteralsovisitedBalochistaninAugustandlauncheda“PeacefulBaloch-istanPlan”tobringangryBalochsbackintothefold.20AfterameetinginOctoberbetweentheCMandthePM,theCMannouncedthathewouldholdatribalcoun-cil tomeetexiled leadersandpersuadethemto jointhepoliticalmainstream.21 BalochistanMinisterNawabSanaullahZehrihadalsomettheKhanofKalat22 inLondonearlierinAugust,2015aspartofthereconciliationpolicy.23

PleaseseeSection6.9foradetaileddiscussiononBalochistan.

17Correspondent.(2016,February08).Balochistanreconciliation:625insurgentssurrenderedinsixmonths-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/sto-ry/1042338/balochistan-reconciliation-625-insurgents-surrendered-in-six-months/.18(2016,April26).1,025militantssurrenderedinBalochistanduringpastyear.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1254551.19Khan,A.(2015,April26).ReconciliationplandrawnupforestrangedBalochleaders:CM-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/876111/reconcilia-tion-plan-drawn-up-for-estranged-baloch-leaders-cm/.20Shahid,S.(2015,August07).Planfor‘peacefulBalochistan’approved.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1198912.21Ali,S.(2015,October08).SharifintensifieseffortstoreconcilewithexiledBalochleaders.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/08-Oct-2015/sharif-intensifies-ef-forts-to-reconcile-with-exiled-baloch-leaders.22CurrentKhan-e-Kalat,MirAghaSulimanDaud,wentintoself-exileintheUnitedKingdomaftertheassassinationofNawabAkbarBugtiin2006anddecidedtofromagovernmentinexileofBalochistan.23Shah,S.A.(2015,August15).ZehrimeetsKhanofKalatinLondon.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1200640.

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6.6 ARTICLE: FATA Reforms: the Political Economy by Imtiaz Gul24

DowntheRabbitHole

InDecember 2006, at the height ofGeneral (retd) PervezMusharraf’s contro-versialcareeras thePresidentofPakistan,a largemeetingwasconvened.Theattendees includedofficials from FATA, FATA Secretariat (including the PoliticalAgents),SAFRON,andthethenNWFPGoverner,aswellasanumberofFATAelitessuchasministersandclerics,andacontingentofthemilitaryestablishment.ThePresident’s intentwastoputalltheFATAstakeholdersinoneroom,anddeter-minethefutureofFATA.Fornearlythreedays,fieryspeeches,ambitiousplansandreformproposalsbouncedbackandforthbetweenthepoliticalandmilitaryelite,theonlycommonthreadbeinguniversalpraiseforMusharraffortakingtheinitiative.

However,theenthusiasmgavewaytocautiononthethirdday,whenparticipantsuniversallyadmonishedMusharraftonottinkerwiththeexistingsystem,lesthewas prepared to face catastrophic consequences. Despite days of deliberationanddiscussion,thegrouprose,undecided,perhapstomeetanotherday.OneofthePoliticalAgents(PAs)recountedtheseproceedingstomeattheParliamentar-ian’sLodgesinIslamabad.HewasnotparticularlythrilledaboutfuturemovementonthestatusofFATAeither,andperhapsunderstandablyso.Militaryofficials,hesaid,disfavoredanychangesintheviewoftheongoing“religiousinsurgency”.

Themilitary’sstakeinFATAalsocametolightin2009,whena27-memberCom-mittee on Constitutional Reforms deliberated extensively and climaxed withamendments to 105 articles of the federal constitution. However, not one oftheseappliedtoPartXII:Miscellaneous–ChapterIII:TribalAreas.Specifically,Ar-ticle246-whichgeographicallydefines“TribalAreas”,“ProvinciallyAdministeredTribalAreas”and“FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas”-andarticle247-whichgives the President sweeping powers, and excludes these areas fromany par-liamentarylegislation,orlegaljurisdictionfromtheSupremeCourtoranyHighCourt-weresimplymissingfromthesuggestedlist.

RepresentativesfromtheAwamiNationalParty(ANP)andPakistanPeople’sPar-ty(PPP)toldmeinbackgroundinterviewsthatthemilitaryopposedanydiscus-siononFATA.Jameat-e-Ulema-e-IslamFazl-ur-Rehman(JUI-F)membersremainedvaguewhenaskedaboutFATA.Nearlyeveryoneagreedontheneedforreforms,butnonehadanysolutions,andmostblamedtheGHQ.Militaryofficials,includ-ingGeneralTariqKhan,thethenInspectorGeneraloftheFrontierCorps,toldmetheparliamentarians“askedusforouropinionandwetoldthemthatthetiming

24Articlere-printedwithauthor’spermission.

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wasnotright”.But,heunderscored,themilitaryleftittothewilloftheparlia-mentarianstodowhatevertheywantedwithFATA.

Thenetresultwasthattherewasnotevenan“expressionofintentwithregardstochangesinFATA”inthe18thAmendment,passedonApril10,2010.However,tosolelyblamethemilitary’smanipulationoftheFATAreformagendawouldbefeigningobliviousnesstothepoliticaleconomyoftheregion.Thisrabbitholegoesthedeeperthemoreyoutraverseit.

AMatterofRegulations

Inordertounderstandthepoliticaleconomyoftheregion,itisimportanttofirsttakealookatthehistoryandnatureofFATA’scurrentstatus,aswellastheFron-tierCrimesRegulation(FCR).

Historically,FATAhasalwayspresentedacomplexsetofjudicialandadministra-tiveproblems.TheFCR,formedin1901,wasanevolutionoftheMurderousOut-ragesRegulationof1867,whichgaveBritishrulers,historicallyunabletoestab-lish theirwrit in the tribal region,powers toprosecute individuals forheinouscrimes,suchasmurder.In1947,PakistannotonlyadoptedtheFCR,butaddedtheclausethatwouldallowforanindividual’sarrestwithoutevenspecifyingthecrime.Sincethen,theFCRisalmostuniversallyseenasasystemofoppression,outdated,ill-advised,anddraconic.Overtime,theregulationhasbeenamendedseveraltimes,butnevertothebenefitofthepeopleofFATA.

TheFCRcontains64sections,mostofthemill-intended,butthemostdetrimentalonesaresections21-30,32,34and40.Sections21-30,alsoknownastheCol-lectiveResponsibilityclause,allowatribetobepunishedfortheactionsofonemember.Section34allowsforhomesandpropertyofthetribesmentobede-molished,if,forinstance,thestatewishestoacquirethatland.Section32allowsforentiresettlementstobeburnedtotheground.Section40,perhapsthemostabusedofall,allowstheadministrationtodetainaperson,potentiallyforyears,onmeresuspicion,andwithoutproof.ThisalsoimpliesthatthereisnoprovisionfortheaccusedtoappealandprovehisinnocenceundertheFCR.

TheFCRisalsocreditedwiththeriseofmilitancyinPakistan.ProfessorIjazKhanofPeshawarUniversitybelievesthatasatooltoimposeruleoflawandimproveservicedeliveryinthejusticesector,theFCRonlybecameweakerthanitalreadywasafter9/11.WhentheTalibanfledAfghanistan,theycametoFATAbecausetherewasalreadyasecurityvacuumduetopoorgovernance, lackofdevelop-ment,withno judicialoradministrative systemworking for thewelfareof thepeople,illiteracy,andanti-stateangst,allofwhichhelpedthemilitantsmakethisregiontheirsafehaven.

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TheFCRisalsocompletelysilentonwomen,andaffordsthemnorights.

Understandably,thecontinuationoftheFCRandthelackofprogressonthesta-tusofFATAonlywidenedthegulfbetweenthecitizensofFATAandthefederation.

FATA is theonly region inPakistanwhere theparliament cannot legislate, andtheapexcourtscannotadjudicate.TheareaisadministeredbytheGovernor(asarepresentativeof thepresident)of theKhyberPukhtunkhwaprovince,underthesupervisionofSAFRONinIslamabad.Oddly,the12membersintheNationalAssemblyand8intheSenatefromFATAcanvoteandlegislateonbillsinanypartof thecountry,but theconstituents they represent.Theyhaveno technicalorpoliticalpowerunderarticle247oftheconstitution.TherealpowerbelongswiththePoliticalAgents.

PoliticallyEconomical

JohnDalberg-Acton,theEnglishCatholichistorian,writerandpoliticianoncesaid,“Powertendstocorrupt,andabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely.” InPakistan,nowhereisthismoreevidentthantheroleofthePAs.PoliticalAgentsarea)thesymbolofthestate’sauthority,b)thetribalpeople’sadvocate,andc)theliaisonbetweenthepeopleandthegovernment.ThePAservesinthreeofficialcapaci-ties,a)thetitularoffice,b)districtmagistrate,andc)sessionsjudge.Hecanevenimposecurfew,rejectbail,andholdsomeoneinconfinementindefinitely.

Nearuniversally, thePA role is viewedascorruptofficialsenjoyingunchecked,boundlesspower.Facilitatedandpoweredbytheroughly35,000orsoMaliks(ti-tle-holders/representativesoftribes),theFCRisoftenusedasafulcrumtoexactpoliticalvengeance.TheeliteandrichcaneasilyleveragetheFCRasamechanismtoescapepunishment(avoteofconfidencefromfourMalikscanpreventdeten-tion),andasatooltoeliminatecompetition,punishenemies,orcleartheplayingfield.Itiseasytoseehowthisoppressiveandunjustsystemcanbeexploitedbythosewithresourcesandpower,andabhorredbyyouthandthelowestrungsofthesocio-economicstrata.

TheanecdoteatthetopsuggeststhatthemilitaryestablishmentisadamantlyandhistoricallyopposedtochangesinthestatusofFATA.TheypresentaformidableblockadeagainstprogressonFCRreforms.The35,000orsoMaliksinFATA,andtheelite,includingtheministers,thebusinessmenandotheraffluentinfluentialsthatenjoyalifeofluxuryandprivilegewithoutconsequence,alsoopposereformsin theregion.Finally, theFATASecretariatandSAFRONareakeystakeholders.TheSecretariatunderthegovernor,includingthesevenPoliticalAgents,andtheirrespectivestaffs(essentiallyasmatteringofsuper-empoweredbureaucratsinIs-lamabadandPeshawar),haveahugemonetarystakeinthestatusquo.ThemostpowerfulandvocalofthesehailfromKhyberandBajaurAgencies,Bannu(North

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Waziristan)andD.I.Khan(SouthWaziristan).

CurrentProgress

TheattemptatFATAreforms isnotnew.ThemeetingwithMusharraf in2006,andtheconstitutional reforms in2009,are just twoexamples. In2010,elevenreformsintheFCRwereproposedbythePoliticalPartiesJointCommitteeonFATAReforms.Thesewerechidedforbeinginvariablychainedtogovernmentinterests.InAugust2011,thethenPresidentAsifAliZardaripassedaPresidentialOrdertoamendtheFCR.Althoughminimalinitsscope,it isstillrecognizedasthemostpracticalandsignificantchangeintheregulationsinceitsinception.

Years later, inMay2014,weatCRSShadanotheropportunity todiscussFATA,thistimethrougha20-episodeseriesofTVshowsand60radioshows-involv-ing about 50notables such as FATAMPs, businessmen, civil societymembers,andrepresentativesfrommainstreampoliticalparties.Ironically,allthesediscus-sions yieldeda fragmentedpicture;mostof theyouth - students, civil society,andyoungerparliamentariansvociferouslyadvocatedfortheabolitionofFATA’scurrentstatus.Mostoftheparliamentariansandbusinessmen,however,pleadedforaphased,incrementalchangetothestatusofFATAthroughextensionofthewritofthePeshawarHighCourtandthelocalgovernmentelections.EvensomeoftheofficialswespoketoalsoarguedthattouchingFATAinexistingcircumstanc-eswasadangerousproposition.Thismirrorsthepoliticaleconomydichotomyintheprevioussections.

Mostrecently,inSeptember2015,nearlythreemonthsaftertheFATAReformsCommission’sreport,sourcesindicatethata“step-by-stepprocedureformerg-ingtribalareasintosettleddistricts”isunderway.Toprecipitatethis,BajaurandMohmandAgenciesfromFATAwillbemergedintoPATA.Theestimatedtimeforthistransitionis8-10months,anditwillserveasasteppingstoneforotherareastobebroughtintothenationalfold.Onthe9th,the22ndConstitutionalAmend-mentBillwaspresentedintheNationalAssemblybyFATAlawmakers,proposingamendmentstoArticles246/247tograntfullcitizenshiprightstothetribesmen,extendthereachofapexcourtstotheregion,andthemergerofFATAintoKP.

TheWayForward

Moong Qabail,theseriesofmediaprogramsCRSSconductedonFATAreforms,broughtfortharangeofsuggestedsolutionsandideasonhowtomanagethiscentury-oldproblem.Theseriespublicallyandempiricallyconfirmedthesenti-mentthatthepeopleofFATAholdFCRresponsiblefortheillsbeingsuffered,andthat itwastime itwasrepealed, reformed,orabolishedaltogether.Thestatusquosimplycannotcontinue.ThepeopleinFATAmayholdthegreenpassport,buttheConstitution’sArticle247andtheFCRdeprivesthemoffundamentalhuman

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rightsandcivilliberties,eventhoughtheyareaffordedtocitizensinallotherpartsofthecountry.TheseFederally“Alienated”TribalAreasaredeniedtheirrighttolife,security,justiceandexpression.

TheabolishmentoftheFCRpresentsthreeoptionsforthestatusofFATA.FATAcouldbemergedintoKP,becomeitsownprovince,orFATAcouldrunwithitsownGovernorwithCentralCouncil,aswellasagencyandtehsilcouncils.The22ndCon-stitutionalAmendmentproposesthefirstofthese.Failingthis,aplethoraofis-suesneedtobemanaged.Theseincludetheinfluenceofthepoliticalagents,theseparationofadministrationand judiciary, theFATAcouncil,holding localbodyelections,representationofwomen,development,educationandhealthfacilitiesandtheinfluenceofthegovernmentwithintheambitofthejudiciary.

As it stands, two things seemtobehappening simultaneously: thegingerfirststepofmergingtwoagenciesintoPATA,anddoingawaywithFCRaltogether,andmergingFATAintotheKP.Botharegoodnewsforapeoplesubjugatedbyoveracenturyofbadgovernance,archaicpolicies,anddatedregulations,butitmustbesaidthatneitherisofficialorexpectedsoon.MostoftheolderFATAMPsbelievein a gradual shift from the current status tomainstreamingof FATA.However,thepulloftheforcesofstatusquoissimplymuchstrongerthanthosewhofavorcomprehensive reform,wherebythe lawof the landcouldbeextendedto theFATAanditcouldbethusmainstreamed.Toturnthetide,aseriesofmechanismswillneedtobedeployedtohelpmitigatethepowerfulpoliticaleconomythatsovehementlyresistsanyattemptatchange.

Imtiaz Gul is a noted media analyst and author of several books. He is also the Executive Director at CRSS. He can be reached at [email protected].

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6.7 OPINION: NAP has to go a long way in KP/FATA by Shiraz Paracha

ThePakistanTehreek-e-Insaf(PTI)ledbyImranKhanhasbeenleadingacoalitiongovernment in theKhyberPakhtunkhwaProvinceof Pakistan for thepast twoyearsandahalf.

Thecricketer-turned-politicianclaimshisparty’sgovernmenthastransformedtheprovincialpoliceintothebestpoliceforceofthecountrybutitidhardtoprovethatclaimifonelooksatthelaw&ordersituationandthecrimerateintheprov-ince.

Justtwodaysbeforetheturnoftheyear,thecarnageinMardan,thesecondlarg-estcityofKhyberPakhtunkhwa,wasastarkreminderthatalotmoreneedstobedonebytheprovincialgovernmentbeforeitclaimsthatsituationisbacktonor-malintheprovince.Atleast26peoplewerekilledwhenasuicidebomberblewhimselfupattheofficeofNationalDatabaseandRegistrationAuthority(NADRA)inthecity.Another52werewounded.

Itwas thefirstmajorattack in theprovincesince thedastardlygunandbombattackattheAmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarinwhichnearly150people,mostoftheminnocentstudents,weremoweddownbyagroupofterroristsassociatedwiththeTehreik-e-TalibanPakistan.ItwastheattackwhichsentshockwavesnotonlythroughoutPakistanbutacrosstheworld.

ObserverssayhadsecurityguardbeennotpostedattheNADRAofficegateandhewouldnothavestoppedtheattackerfromgettingintotheoffice,thefatalitiescouldhavecrossedthe200marksastheNADRAofficewaspackedwithscoresofpeoplelookingfortheirnationalidentitycards.

QuestionsarebeingaskedthathowcouldthebombermanagetocometotheofficeoftheNADRAridingonmotorbikewithoutbeingnoticed.

Theattackisallthemoreshockingforithastakenplaceinanareawhichisthebirthplaceof2500-year-oldancientGhandharaCivilization.

MonkstrainedatBuddhistschoolsofMardanregionwouldtraveltopresentdayJapan,KoreaandChinatospreadBuddha’smessageofpeaceandtranquility.

Nearly90yearsago, fromhere,KhanAbdulGhafarKhanalsoknownasBachaKhan,hadlaunchedanon-violentmovementfortheindependenceofIndiafromthecolonialrulefromthesameregion.

Unfortunately,thisentireregionwasturnedintoabastionofTalibanandextrem-

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istsoverpastfewdecades.

ManypeoplesuspectthatextremismspreadinthePakhtunregionontheprod-dingofthepowerfulestablishmentwhichpamperedextremistsgroupstoachieveforeignpolicyobjectivesinAfghanistanandIndia.

Dubbedas“military-mullah”alliance,thethistwo-waycooperationandcoordina-tioncontinueduntiltheAPSdeadlyattackon16December2014.

Followingthattragedy,Pakistanipoliticalandmilitaryleadershipagreedonacom-prehensivestrategyintheshapeofNationalActionPlan(NAP)tofightterrorism.

ThegovernmentclaimstheNAPisbeingsuccessfullyimplementedbutthatclaimisbeingwidelydisputed.

Itistruethatoverthepastoneyearcoordinationamongintelligenceagencieshasimproved,aspecialcounterterrorismforcehasbeenestablishedinKhyberPakh-tunkhwa,but,targetkillings,kidnappingsandradicalizationofpeoplecontinuesintheprovince.

Governmentsourcessaythenumberofterroristattackshasbeenfallenduetothesuccessfulcrackdownof the lawenforcement forces’successfulandbettercoordinationamongvarioussecurityagencies.

Officialsoffederalandprovincialagenciesregularlymeet;exchangeinformationandplancounterterrorismaction.

Nonetheless,manyofficersadmitthatmutualtrustamongvariousagenciesoverinformationsharingisstillachallenge.

TheKPKpolicearebelievedtobeusedasPRtoolbythePTIgovernmentthoughinrealitythereiswidespreaddissatisfactionamongrankandfileofthepoliceforce.

Officersandconstablesfeelthattheirsacrificesarenotdulyacknowledged.

The Police have been pushed into awar forwhich they are neither properlytrainednorbeingequipped.ThePolicearenottrainedtofightterrorism.

Theprovincialgovernmentissaidtobenotsupportingthepoliceforcetheyde-servedtobebackedup.

Themoraleoftheforcecannotberaisedjustbyonlyannouncingfinancialcom-pensationforthosewholaydowntheirlivesorgetinjuredinthelineofduty.

Policeofficersexpectthatprovincialministerswouldstandshouldertoshoulder

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withthePoliceinthefightonterror.

NasirDurrani,theprovincialpolicechief,isacompetentofficer.

Mr.Durranihasbeentryinghislevelbesttomaketheforceworthofitsnamebutbuthehastogoalongwaytogotoachievethisobjectives.

Thereisadiscontentintherankandfileoftheofficersthroughouttheprovince,

Manycivilianofficersdeputedinthepoliceforcearenothappyeither.

There isaclear-cutdivisionamongcivilbureaucracyoverpromotions,postingsandtransfersintheprovince.

Itisunrealistictoexpectgoodperformancefromademoralizedforce.

Duetolackofappreciationandencouragement,civilservantsandpoliceofficersarejustdoingtheirroutinework.Thislackofinterestisnegativelyaffectingprog-ressintheimplementationoftheNAP.

InNovember2015,Isawhundredsandthousandsofhighlychargedpro-TalibanpeopleinthefuneralofareligiousfigureinAkoraKhattak,asmalltownjustsixkilometerseastofNowsheraCantonment.

Theseradicalizedpeopleweredrawnfromalloverprovince,FATAaswellasAf-ghanistantopayhomagetotheirteacherandspiritualleader,MaulanaSherAliShah.

ThedeceasedwasacolleagueofMaulanaSami-ul-Haq,who isknowntohavecontactsbothwiththemilitaryandmilitants.

NewconstructionisunderwayntheHaq’ssprawlingatDarulUloomHaqaniaorseminaryinAkoraKhattakwhichhasservedasaalmamaterforsevera;lTalibanleaders.

Moreandmoreyoungpeoplearegettingthemselvesenrolledwiththeseminary.Topgovernmentleadersarealsoamongthevisitors.

Justmilitary and police operations cannotwipe out terrorism. The places likeDarulUloomHaqanianeedtobeturnedintobastionoflove,peaceandhumanity.Untilthathappens,noNationalActionPlanwillwork.

Shiraz Paracha is an analyst, commentator, journalism professor, and his areas of interest include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Russia and China. He can be reached at [email protected].

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6.8 OPINION: Karachi’s Woes by Amir Zia

TheongoingoperationinKarachiremainsakeycomponentofthe20-pointNa-tionalActionPlan(NAP)withoutwhichPakistancannothopetoachieveadecisivevictoryinitswaragainstextremismandterrorism.

TheNAPdeclarationsaysthattheKarachiOperationwillbetakento“itslogicalconclusion.”Butmorethan twoyearsafter theparamilitaryRangerswereem-poweredtogoaftercriminalsandterrorists responsible forpoliticallyandreli-giously-motivatedkillings,extortion,kidnappingsforransomandterrorism,thismuchtrumpetedcampaign--launchedinSeptember2013--isnowhereclosetoits“logicalconclusion.”

Yes, theoperationbrought“targeted-killings” sharplydown in this restiveportcity.SindhPolicefiguressaythat986peoplewerekilledin2015comparedtothehighsofaround1,925in2014.In2013–thedeadliestinrecentyears–morethan2,500peoplehadbeenkilled,mostlyintit-for-tatkillingsamongcriminal-cum-po-liticalmafiasandvarioussectarianandreligiousgroups,whilein2012suchkill-ingswerealittleover2,000.

Thecrackdownalsohelpedendthereignofterrorofvariouspolitical,ethnicandcriminalmafiasinmanyvolatilepartsofthecity.Extortion,whichwaswidespreadandforcedshopkeepersandtraderstostageaseriesofunprecedentedlock-outsoftheirbusinessesin2009&2010onwards,witnessedasharpdecline.

Kidnappingforransomcases,whichpeakedto283in2013,fellto115in2014asaresultofthearrestsandkillingsofanumberofkidnappersin“encounters.”Andin2015,only25kidnappingforransomincidentswerereported,accordingtothefigurescompiledbytheCitizen-PoliceLiaisonCommittee,whichspecializesinre-solvingsuchcaseswiththehelpofthelawenforcementagencies.

TheHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan(HRCP)inits2015reportonKarachialsohighlightedthedecliningtrendintheincidentsoforganizedviolenceandter-rorism.TheHRCPfiguresshowalmosta50percentdropinthenumberofbombexplosionsinKarachiin2015.

Butdespitesuccesses,therearelegitimateconcernsaboutthesustainabilityofthesegains.

The ongoing tussle between the Sindh and the federal governments over theoperationalautonomyforparamilitaryRangers isnottheonly factortriggeringuncertainty.Thereareanumberofotherfundamentalissues,whichifremainun-resolvedwillnotjustobstructtheKarachiOperationfromachievingitsobjectives,

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buthurtthecountry’soveralleffortinthewaragainstterrorismandextremism.Therefore,thesuccessofKarachiOperationremainspivotalifthegovernmentisseriousinestablishingtheruleoflawandbringingpeaceinthecountry.

Toachievethisgoal,ourpoliticians–bothatthefederalandprovinciallevel–mustshowpoliticalwill,maturityandconsistency.Theyalsoneedtoriseabovetheirnarrowselfandpoliticalinterestsandsincerelyworktobreakthetiesbetweencrimeandpoliticswhichhasbeenthrivinghereforthepastseveraldecades.

However,theforemostandimmediatechallengethatthreatenstowipe-outthegainsofKarachiOperation stems from the lackof consensus amongkey stakeholdersregardingitstargets,directionandmethods.

ThePakistanPeoples’Party-led(PPP)SindhGovernmentistryingtocliptheop-erationalautonomyofRangersandnarrowdowntheambitoftheirassignmentafterraidsonprovincialgovernmentofficesandarrestof“itsownmen.”

The arrest of former federalministerDrAsimHussain – a close friend of PPPCo-ChairpersonAsifAliZardari–ontheallegedchargesofcorruptionandassist-ingterroriststriggeredfearsamongmanySindhGovernmentstalwartsandpar-ty’scentralleadersthattheycouldalsobeamongthepossibletargets.Therefore,thePPPaimstoblunttheoperationandrestrictitsfocusmainlytothebannedsectarianandreligiousgroupsortheotherpoliticalforces,includingtheMuttahi-daQaumiMovement(MQM).

However,theargumentofthelawenforcementagenciesmakessensethatwith-outchokingfinancesandapprehendingsupporters,abettorsandpatronsofcrim-inalsandterrorists,theirjobwillonlybehalfdone.

AlthoughthefederalgovernmenthassupportedtheRangers inthistussle,thefrictionbetweenSindhgovernmentandthesecurityestablishmentisabadnewsinPakistan’sfightagainstterrorism.

ThePPP,otheroppositionpartiesand the rightsgroupsmightbe raisingsomelegitimateconcernsabout theallegedhigh-handedactionsof theRangers,buttheyshouldbeaddressedwithoutcompromisingtheoperationalautonomyandindependenceoftheRangers.

TheauthoritiesshouldconsidersettingupanindependentmonitoringcommitteetoaddresscomplaintsorgrievancesabouttheconductoftheOperation.Thepro-posedCommitteecancompriseofretiredjudgesandcivilsocietymembersandworkintandemwithanin-housewatch-dogofthesecurityestablishment.

ThePPPandtheotherpoliticalforcesshouldrealizethatthereisanoverwhelm-

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ingsupportfortheoperationamongthemasses.Anyattemptstoderailitwouldonlycreatecomplicationsandunintendedconsequences.Therefore,thepoliticalforcesshouldsupporttheoperationinitspresentformandrefrainfromchangingrulesofthegametosaveaselectfew.

Besides,thecivilianleadershipmustfocusonthefollowinginitiativesiftheywanttoseeKarachiOperationasuccessandachievethegoalssetintheNAP.

Firstly,thegovernmentneedstomoveonawar-footingtoimplementthelongoverduepolicereforms.Thesereformsmustincludegrantingthepoliceforceacompleteoperationalautonomyandindependence.TheyshouldalsoputanendtopoliticalinterferenceinthePoliceDepartment,establishamerit-basedrecruit-mentprocess,ensuremoderntrainingandguaranteetransparencyinalltransfersandpostings.

Secondly,sweepingjudicialreformshavealsobeenpendingforalongtime.TheNAP declaration calls for upgrading the judiciary. This includes increasing thenumber of judge and courts, establishing a protection program forwitnesses,prosecutorsandjudgesandcapacity-buildingandtrainingofprosecutorsandin-vestigators.

Thirdly,thegovernmentshouldalsofocusonabolishingthebreedinggroundsofcrimeandterrorism.Thiscanbedoneonlythroughinvestmentoneducationandsocial,economicandinfra-structureupliftanddevelopment.

Sadly,civilianauthoritiesfarepoorlyonthesethreefronts.Themedia,thecivilsocietyandvariousstakeholdersshouldcreateawarenessandbuildpressureonthefederalandprovincialgovernmentstoinitiatemeasuresonthesethreekeyfrontsasarrestsandkillingsofcriminalsandterroristscanonlyworktoanextent.Therealchallenge in themid- to long-term is toeliminatethose factorswhichbreedcriminalsandterrorists.KarachiOperationcanonlybesuccessfuliftheau-thoritiestakeaholisticapproachandalongwiththeuseofforce,focusonreformsanddevelopmentaswell.

Amir Zia is a senior journalist, who has worked for some leading national and international media organizations in a career spanning over two decades. He can be reached at [email protected].

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6.9 OPINION: The Balochistan Saga by Shahzada Zulfiqar

Thegovernmenthassucceededincontrollingterrorismtoaconsiderableextentin Baluchistan, particularly in areas affectedby theBaluch separatist violence,withtheimplementationoftheNationalActionPlan(NAP).

HoweverithasnotyettakenanytangiblestepstoinitiatedialoguewiththeBa-lochseparatistslivinginexile.

InthefirstapexcommitteemeetingheldinQuettainFebruarylast,aroadmapwasdrawnfortheimplementationofNAP.

Themeeting,chairedbythePrimeMinisterNawazSharifandattendedbyArmyChiefGeneralRaheelSharifalongwithheadsofsecurityagencies,formulatedapolicytoimplementtheNAPbyusingcarrotandstickpolicy.

Under thispolicy, themilitarywasallowedto launch intelligencebasedopera-tionsandatthesametimetheprovincialgovernmentisdirectedtostartreconcil-iationeffortswithBalochseparatistleaders.

Theapexcommitteealsoapprovedageneralamnestyschemeunderwhichmon-etarybenefits,employmentopportunitiesandsecurityforthosewhoarewillingtosurrenderhavebeenannounced.

Underthispolicy,halfamilliontotwomillionrupeesweretobeawardedtothefighters ranging fromanordinaryfighter to a local commanderwho laydowntheirarms.

Thepolicywasaimedatluringthemilitantstoabandonfightinginreturnformon-etarybenefitsandsecurityassurances.

Ithasalsobeendecidedthateffortswouldbemadetoseekdeportationoftheseparatistsleaderslivinginexileinthewesterncountriesaswellasconfiscationoftheirallmoveableandimmovablepropertiesinordertochokethefinancingtotheirbannedorganizations.

BesidesfederalagencieslikeFIA,CustomsandNAB,Policehavealsobeendirect-edtoprobefinancialsourcesoftheseparatistandinsurgentgroups.

ThepeopleprovidingmoneytotheseinsurgentsthroughHawalaunderthegarbofmoneyexchangebusinessarebeing interrogatedwhile revenue recordsarebeingcheckedatthetehsil leveltoobtainthepropertydetailsoftheinsurgentleaders.However,nobreakthroughhasbeenachievedonthiscount,sofar.

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Thepro-governmenttribalChieftainslikeNawabSanaullahZahri,NawabChagaizMarri–sonandsuccessoroftheseparatistleaderNawabKhairBuxMurri--andSardarSarfarazDombki--thegrandsonofNawabAkbarBugti--playedactiveroleintryingtopersuadetheoutlawedcomradestolaydownarms.

Aroundsixhundredfightersbesidessixcommandersofthebannedorganizationshaveso far surrendered fromAwaran, Lahri,DeraBugtiandKohlu ina specialceremonies.

There are some suspicions among general public about genuineness of thesesurrenderingpeopleamidstreportsthatthetribesloyaltopro-governmenttrib-alnotableswereincludedinthelistof‘surrendering’insurgentsforthesakeofmonetarybenefits.

Ontheotherhand.majorseparatistelementsrejectedthegeneralamnestyofferandvowedtocontinuefightingtillindependence.

The Baloch nationalist groups, however, believe that such amnesty schemesaimedatwinningloyaltiesthroughmoneyinsteadofaddressinggenuineissueswouldnotyieldanypositiveresultinthelongrun.

Intheanti-insurgentsoperation,threenephews,abrotherandabrother-in-lawoftopfugitiveDrAllahNazarbesidesanumberofcolleagueswerekilledinAwaran.

Initially,therewerereportsthatDr.Nazar,whoheadsseparatistBalochLiberationFront,wasalsokilled,but lateravideowasreleasedpurportedlyshowinghimalive.

Some 204 suspected terrorists of banned organizations including TTP and LEJwerealsokilledand29injuredin1935operationsduringlastoneyearwhile9176werearrestedbesidesrecoveringof3290weapons.Nofigureisavailableaboutthecausalityofforcesintheseoperations.

EightlawswereproposedtoreformtheCriminalJusticeSystemandtwoofthemhavebeenapprovedbytheprovincialassemblywhilerestarepending.

Inordertocurbhatespeech,13peoplewerearrestedwhile1200booksand284hatematerialwereconfiscated.

HowevernoactionhasbeentakenagainstMadarisfuellingsectarianhatred.

116casesofsectarianmilitantsarependingincourtswhile54caseshavebeenreferredtoSpecialTrial(military)courts.

ThesecurityforcesarecreditedwithkillingoftopmilitantsofLashkar-e-Jhangvi

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likeUsmanSaifullahandMahmoodKurdaliasWadeed,themastermindsofdead-lysuicideattacks,killingsofhundredsofShiaMuslimsinBalochistanandSindh.

AfterthekillingofLeJleaderMalikIshaqalongwithhiswholetophierarchyinpo-liceencounterinPunjab,therewasgeneralexpectationsthattheircounterpartsinBaluchistanwouldalsobebroughttojustice.

AnimportantcommanderofAl-Qaeda’sUmarLateefwaskilledinAugust2015inChaghiareaborderingAfghanistanwhilehiswifeTayyabawhoissaidtobeheadofthewomenwingofthebannedorganizationwasarrested.

Hisbrother,identifiedasBilal,however,managedtoescapeintoAfghanistan.

Aprovincial governmentdelegationcomprisingministersandparliamentarianscumtribaleldersoftheNationalPartyinRamadanpaidavisittoKhanofKalatMirSulemanDaudlivinginexileinLondon.

NawabSanaullahZahri,thenewlyappointedChiefMinisterandprovincialheadofPML(N),hasalsovisitedLondontomeetKhanSuleman.

Although government and its ministers have been claiming success, but bothmeetingsremainedinconclusive.

Khan went abroad to fight a legal battle in the International Court of JusticeagainstPakistanfor its failuretoabidebythe instrumentofaccessionreachedbetweenQuaid-e-AzamandMirAhmadyarKhan, the lastKhanof theprincelystateofKalat.

AfterkillingofNawabAkbarBugtiinamilitaryoperation,KhanofKalathadcon-venedatribalJirgainKalatinSeptember2006thathadgivenhimthemandatetoseekjusticefromICJ.

The outgoing ChiefMinister Dr. AbdulMalik Balochmet Brahamdagh Bugti inSwitzerlandandisbelievedtohaveconveyedsomeofhisdemandstothemilitaryestablishment.

NoBalochpartyexceptNationalPartyofDr.MalikBalochisinthefavourofmak-ingGwaderportoperationalandconstructionofCPECunlessreservationsofBa-lochpopulationthatitisbeingturnedintominorityduetothesemegaprojectsareremoved.

Anothermajor issueBalochpopulationisconfrontedwith istheregistrationofAfghanrefugeesinmillionsasPakistaninationalsinNADRArecordbesidesvoters’lists.

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DrMalikandotherBalochpartiesopposedholdingofcensusin2016inthepres-enceofAfghanrefugeeswhoareestimatedtobetwoandanhalfmillioninBa-lochistan.

Themilitaryhighupsinapexcommitteemeetingshaveassuredprovincialgovern-menttoapprisetheirtopbrassaswellasfederalgovernmentaboutitsreserva-tionsandapprehensionsthroughtheirchannel.

PashtoonbasedpoliticalpartiesparticularlyPKMAP,however,rejectthesereser-vationsandopposetheproposalofprovincialgovernmentinthisregard.

AlthoughHomedepartmentclaimstohavetakensternactionagainsttheprivatemilitias,butmanypeopledoubtit.

Thesearmedgroupsarebelievedtohavebeengiveninthecontrolofpro-govern-menttribalnotables.

TheofficialsclaimthatgovernmenthasenoughevidencethatShafiqMengal,whoheadsagovernment-backedprivatemilitia,harborsthehardcoreelementsfrombannedsectarianorganizationsandTTPwhoalsoinvolvedinkillingofeightLevymen.

ThereligiousminoritiesparticularlyHindushavebeenpersecutedbythesemili-tiasduringthepast15yearslonginsurgency.

Hindu traders in restivedistricts particularly Khuzdar, Kalat andMastungwerebeingforcedtopayBhathatotheseprivatemilitias.ConsequentlyhundredsofHindufamilieshavemigratedtoIndiaortoneighboringSindhprovince.

Theactivistsofthesemilitiashavebeeninvolvedincrimeslikehighwayrobbery,rape,carsnatching/liftingandabductionforransom.

AccordingtoareportoftheHomeDepartment,2441seminarieshavebeenreg-isteredwhile518haveyettoberegistered.

Some143,446students including5,862foreignershavebeenenrolled in theseMadaris.

Still,itisbelieved,aroundathousandMadarissituatedinthefarflungareasoftheprovincehaveyettoberegistered.

Dozensof facebookaccounts, tweetersandwebsiteshavebeenblockedwhichwerebeingusedforpropagandainfavourofseparatistsoragainstthestateandsecurityagencies.

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Shazada Zulfiqar is a veteran journalist from Balochistan who reports for AFP. He can be reached at [email protected].

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