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A Tale of Two Cities: Violent and NonViolent Neighborhoods withinMetropolitan Area of San Salvador

Violence Research and Development Project

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Research Line

Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods

A Tale of Two Cities: Violent and NonViolent Neighborhoods within the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador

José Alberto Salguero

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers

No. 5

A Tale of Two Cities: Violent and Non -

Papers

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 5

International Center for Violence Research – ICVR A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG Universität Bielefeld Universitätsstraße 25 33615 Bielefeld Germany Project Webpage http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/ Violence Research and Development Project | Papers http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html Contact [email protected] The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author(s). Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University. If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence Research please send an e-mail to: [email protected] The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the author(s).

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 5 1

Acknowledgements The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary

results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social

science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of

the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa,

Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence

research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop

scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.

For that purpose, the Bielefeld University’s International Center of Violence Research (ICVR)

entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin

America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad

Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin

City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic

University of Peru in Lima.

The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines:

“Parties, Passion, and Politics”, “Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence”, “Violent

and Non-Violent Neighborhoods”, “Violence in the Twilight Zone”, and “Violence against

Women”. These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at

aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events,

violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and

vigilantism.

This chapter documents research that was conducted in the Research Line “Violent and

Non-Violent Neighborhoods”. Within the context of the Global South, research on violence

mainly focuses on issues related to violent countries, national histories, periods, and policies,

as well as institutions and phenomena such as police, military, youth gangs, militias, drug

economies, and violent religious groups. The research mainly approaches violence from a

national perspective, but also broadens the scope to include larger entities, such as

continents and sub-continents. The aim of the research on “Violent and Non-Violent

Neighborhoods” is to identify local social mechanisms for a) direct control and prevention of

violence and b) factors in the social context which enable or restrict the success of both

community-based and national measures designed to achieve control and prevention of

violence.

Bielefeld, February 2015

Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann


Research Line

Violent and Non-Violent Neighborhoods

A Tale of Two Cities: Violent and Non-Violent Neigh borhoods within the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador


Abstract The purpose of this research was to explore how control measures work within a specific

neighborhood in order to reduce the incidence of crime there. Two cases were selected from

the historical centers of San Salvador and Santa Tecla. The study findings suggest that for

social control measures by local residents to succeed, certain conditions should be met, such

as clear territorial control, openness to citizen’s participation, and efforts to include gang-

controlled communities in local socioeconomic life, rather than choosing direct confrontation

with law-enforcement agents.


José Salguero holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics from the Universidad

Centromericana (UCA) of El Salvador. Until winter 2014 he was a researcher for the Public

Policies Studies Program at FUNDAUNGO (Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo) in El

Salvador, where he published several documents on: homicide statistics and georeferencing,

insecurity perceptions, criminal victimization and the determinants of crime; among other

topics related to development and democratic governance. His research interests include:

Socioeconomic development, social control and violence, inequality and conflict, corruption

in Latin America, institutions and policies effectiveness on crime prevention.


1. Introduction

Despite a decline in homicide rates during 2012, El Salvador is still one of the top 10

countries with homicidal epidemics in the world (UNODC, 2013). This problem, as shown by

available statistics from government sources, is not concentrated equally throughout the

country, but rather in specific cities and neighborhoods. Authors such as Baires et al. (2006)

and Enríquez & Rodríguez (2009) have explored some of the micro-dynamics of crime within

the country's major cities. However, little has been done so far to understand which control

measures within neighborhoods led to the differences in homicide rates and how these might

have a positive influence on preventing violence in those specific contexts.

When both urban and criminal violence, as well as social mechanisms of local prevention

and control are analyzed, nations are not necessarily a useful unit of analysis, because they

are so large that they lack rich, diverse and specific social information (Weisburd, Groff and

Yang, 2012). Previous academic attention has been given to describing the correlation

between preventing violence and control measures at the local level (e.g. Skogan, 1989;

Bellair, 1997; Sampson, 1997; Bursik, 1999), but most of these studies have only focused on

the United States or the European Union and were carried out using quantitative methods.

Thus, qualitative analysis is still lacking with regard to explaining the way in which these

control measures work, especially within Latin-American contexts of violence, such as that in

El Salvador. In this research I explore this gap.

The research question was: how are social control measures brought to bear within a

specific neighborhood in order to explore the presence or absence of criminal activities? In

order to answer this question, I compared a violent and a non-violent urban neighborhood in

the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (AMSS). These cases had similar contexts1, but

contrasting outcomes2 in terms of the various manifestations of crime. Fieldwork consisted of

34 semi-structured interviews with local residents, with questions regarding historical

changes, security perceptions, experiences of victimization, the most influential people in the

neighborhood, attitudes to violence, and measures designed to prevent and repress

violence.

The paper has five sections. First I explain the national criminal context in El Salvador,

mentioning public strategies for crime control and recorded differences in homicide rates

between regions. Second, I briefly review the literature about crime and violence as well as

current research on social control. Third, I include some methodological notes on the

fieldwork. Fourth, the empirical findings of the research are presented: neighborhoods

context, crime analysis, attitudes to crime and control measures. Fifth, conclusions are drawn

1In terms of socio-economic factors (e.g. human development indicators). 2 Significantly different levels of crime manifestations: homicides, thefts, robberies, etc.


about the key factors for success and failure in controlling violence within neighborhoods in

El Salvador.

1. The National Criminal Context

With the Peace Agreement of 1992, El Salvador ended a period of civil war that lasted 10

years and a new political model was established based on democratic principles. A new

economic model was also ushered in with the privatization of several public services, labor

flexibility measures and free trade agreements among other economic policies inspired by

the Washington Consensus of 1989. By 2014, the nation was afflicted by several structural

and contextual dilemmas, such as the high urban concentration of its population, the

increasing levels of illegal migrants to northern countries, slow economic growth and

saturated labor markets. Of all those difficulties the one that has had most impact nationally

and internationally is the homicide epidemics that started during the last decade. To address

this phenomenon, measures of preventing violence and repression have been launched; and

their success or failure is intertwined with the homicide problem in the country. In this section

I present a panoramic view of both the homicide-related history as well as the control

measures that were introduced to respond to this problem.

The Human Development Report for 2013, which was produced by the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP), shows that the average homicide rates in recent years were

highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (22.2 per 100,000 people). El Salvador’s

homicide rate per 100,000 people in 2012 was 41.2 according to FUNDAUNGO (2013). This

figure far surpasses the region’s average; making the criminal portrait created by recent

homicide statistics in El Salvador an alarming one3 and one of the country’s most pressing

issues today.

Based on media coverage, academic research and state discourse as well as public

opinion, gangs have been at the center of the social debate on crime and violence4 in El

Salvador. Since their appearance, society has identified them as the main source of violence,

especially in terms of homicide and extortion rates. After a significant decline in homicides

during 2012, the current disturbing increase in these rates during the first quarter of 2014 has

been linked to the end of the so-called Gang Truce process5. However, in April 2014, an

3 Further information available in: FUNDAUNGO (2012a), Banco Mundial (2011) and IDHAC (2009). 4 A detail track of historical evolution of gangs can be seen in: El Faro (2013) “Evolución de las pandillas en El Salvador desde 1945 hasta 2013”, available online at: http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201301/cronicas/10756/ 5 An informal agreement between major gangs: 18th Street and Mara Salvatrucha 13 and sponsored by ex-guerrilla members and catholic church officials, to cease attacks between rivals and the general population; many linked the national government with several discussions held with the principal gang leaders since 2012, but no solid or final statement has been issued so far. More on this matter available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-president-gang-truce-breakdown


average 9.4 homicides per day was registered by the Legal Medicine Institution6 (the official

forensic entity in the country) and if this tendency continues, there will be around the same or

an even higher homicide rate in 2014 than in 2011, representing a major setback in crime

reduction efforts. In brief, it can be said without doubt that the main public problem in El

Salvador is violent delinquency (e.g. homicides, extortions) and the response to this critical

situation may come from different sources such as the central government, municipalities,

civil society organizations, private sector, neighborhoods initiatives, etc. So, what has in fact

been done and by whom?

1.1 National Public Strategies on Crime Control

As can be seen in Córdova & Meléndez (2009), responses to the violent homicide epidemics

have come mainly from state legislation and policies, international cooperation programs and

local government strategies.7 It would be no small task to assemble and organize an

inventory of all experiences, plans and similar items of violence and crime prevention, given

the lack of records for neighborhood initiatives, but Table 1 and 2 briefly summarize the

milestones of national and municipal public strategies on crime control in El Salvador during

the last few years.

At the national level it is evident that during the administrations of Presidents Francisco

Flores (1999 – 2004) and Elías Antonio Saca (2004 – 2009), the main targets of state

persecution were gang members. These repression measures didn’t seem to pay off and by

2009 El Salvador had an unprecedented homicide rate of 71.2 per 100,000 inhabitants.

When President Mauricio Funes took office in 2009, a new approach to the crime situation

was promised based on social prevention of violence rather than open counterattacks on

criminal offenders. The situation didn’t seem to have changed by 2011 when El Salvador

scored a 70.1 homicide rate. In this context the process called Gang Truce appeared mixed

with the reinforcement of military participation in police patrolling and crime fighting

operatives. Much debate is still ongoing on the nature of the process and the exact role that

official institutions played in it, but many consider it to be the source of homicide reductions

nationwide during 2012 and subsequently in 2013 (see Table 1).

6 To see more, visit La Prensa Gráfica (2014), “En abril fueron asesinados 281 salvadoreños”, available at: http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2014/05/09/en-abril-fueron-asesinados-281-salvadoreos-medicina-legal 7 More information on Violence control and prevention measures in Central America can be seen at http://www.amuprev.org/home/.


Table 1. Summary of National Public Strategies on C rime Control (1999-2014) Presidential period

Strategy Name Main Objectives

1999 – 2004 Plan Mano Dura

-Reduce criminal rates through the open persecution and eradication of gang members. -Recover lost territories from gang control. -Add Militia members to Police patrolling and crime fight activities. -Apprehend all gang leaders to disarticulate gang structures. -Reinforce legal system on punitive measures for minor offenders.

2004-2009

Plan Súper Mano Dura Reinforce general objectives established by Plan Mano Dura and provide further resources to crime fight institutions.

Plan Mano Amiga / Mano Extendida

A complement to Plan Super Mano Dura focused in processes of rehabilitation and social reinsertion for imprisoned gang members and other criminal offenders.

2009-2014

Política Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública y Convivencia & Estrategia Nacional de Prevención de Violencia

Guidelines for a new strategy based on Social Prevention of Violence mixed with crime repression and punishment; attending in the legal and institutional reforms needed for it. Strengthening and depuration of institutions that work in crime control and repression. General framework to support measures that promote social cohesion and community participation within municipalities.

Gang Truce?

Allegedly the government never officially participated in any discussion with gang leaders. Nevertheless this particular measure consisted in the cease of fire between the two major gangs in El Salvador, 18th Street gang and Mara Salvatrucha gang.

Source: Own elaboration based on Ardón et al (2013).

On the municipal level, two main experiences can be seen as milestones of policies on the

social prevention of violence (see Table 2). In 2005, Mayor Óscar Ortiz (the municipality of

Santa Tecla) launched an innovative strategy to address the high levels of violence there. Its

main objectives were to promote cohesion between community members and make them

part of the decision-making process within the municipality, with a particular focus on public

space recovery and reorganization, and the encouragement of social and cultural activities to

strengthen individual and group quality of life. Later in 2008, the 14 municipalities of the

Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (AMSS) launched a joint policy guideline for preventing

violence within their respective local governments. The latter document signified another

breakthrough in municipal efforts for crime reduction and prevention based on cultural

promotion, campaigns on community cohesion, citizen’s empowerment and inter-institutional

coordination.


Table 2. Summary of Municipal Public Strategies on Crime Control (2005-ongoing) Time period

Strategy Name Main Objectives

2005 (ongoing)

Política Municipal de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana en Santa Tecla

Specifically designed for the municipality of Santa Tecla. It constitutes a policy plan of social prevention for violence and crime based on the strengthening of local institutions, inter-institutional articulation of efforts, empowerment and promotion of citizen’s participation in local decisions, social cohesion campaigns alongside cultural and recreational activities to build social capital, public space recovery and reorganization.

2008 (ongoing)

Política Metropolitana de prevención de la violencia en el Área Metropolitana de San Salvador.

Policy for the 14 municipalities within the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (AMSS). It constitutes an effort to: 1) Promote community cohesion and peaceful coexistence between citizens. 2) Promote cultural norms based on tolerance, solidarity and mutual respect. 3) Strengthen coordination and cooperation between civil society members, public, international and private in crime control and prevention measures. 4) Improve the municipalities’ logistic and economic capacities for governance. 5) Improve resource administration to potentiate preventing violence programs.

Source: Own elaboration based on official documents made available by AMUPREV (2014), AMSS (2014) and AMST (2014).

1.2. Recorded inter-region homicide rates differenc es

As stated by OPAMSS (2012c) and PNUD & STP (2012) the AMSS8 is composed of 14 out

of the 262 municipalities in El Salvador. This highly urban area includes 27% of the country’s

population, 70% of its entire public and private investment and only 3% of its territory. In

addition, according to FUNDAUNGO & PNUD (2009), this area supports both the highest

and the lowest quality of life and socioeconomic indicators in the country.

Homicide figures reveal clear differences within the country’s regions. The highest

homicide rates per 100,000 habitants in the AMSS in 2012 were found in the northern

municipalities of Nejapa, Apopa, Tonacatepeque, San Martín and San Salvador, while the

lowest correspond to the municipalities in the south, such as Santa Tecla, Antiguo Cuscatlán

and San Marcos. As argued by Córdova et al. (2013) these differences between the

homicide rates in the municipalities are partially explained by different social and economic

backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are certain cases that contradict these patterns; for

example, in terms of the Human Development Index9 presented by FUNDAUNGO & PNUD

8 The AMSS is presented in Appendix 5 with a yellow color. 9 This index created by the UNDP measures advances made in three different areas of development according to PNUD (2009): 1) Be able to enjoy a long and healthy life, 2) Be able to acquire knowledge and skill to participate in life´s productive stages and 3) Be able to obtain a reasonable income.


(2009), San Salvador10 (0.82), and Santa Tecla11 (0.78) have a comparable quality of life for

their inhabitants and yet their homicide rates (per 100,000 habitants) in 2011 were

substantially different: 52.2 and 20.3, respectively (FUNDAUNGO, 2013).

Although homicide divergent rates between municipalities could be accounted for

economic and social dissimilarities in most cases, little has been done at a neighborhood

level to understand different homicide magnitudes and most analysis still depends on how

local measures designed to control violence in those areas work and whether they are

effective or not.

A review of the national context of preventing violence and repression as well as a

description of its generalized homicide problem reveals a lack of knowledge at the local level,

especially when it comes to understanding recorded differences of homicide rates between

areas of comparable outsets. How does controlling crime and violence work within a

neighborhood in El Salvador? And how do inhabitants perceive their circumstances in this

context? The aim of this research is to fill in this gap in knowledge, in order to understand

which control initiatives within neighborhoods led to the differences in homicide rates and

how. Detailed information about the two specific cases, within the AMSS, that are analyzed

can be found in the section on Findings.

2. State of the Art

This section contains two complementary parts: In the first one, I present an overview of

theories that mainly ask: what are the determinants that induce crimes? In the second part

we take a look at theories with a mirror question: “What are the determinants that stop crimes

from happening?”

2.1. Theoretical approaches to crime

As presented by UNDP (2007), the dynamics of crime contain a complex series of

motivations (internal) and causes (external) that stimulate the commitment a criminal act.

This crucial distinction between motivations and causes gives birth to two main theoretical

schools of thought in criminological studies: one that sees crime as a personal election and

another one that repairs on it as a product of multiple social realities. The perspective of

rational expectations, on one side, considers that behind committing a crime there is an

individual cost-benefit evaluation of getting involved in illegal acts. On the other hand, the

10 Complementary socioeconomic indicators: Population of 316,090 inhabitants, Territorial extension of 72.25 km2, Total households: 87,186 and an average level of education: 8.9 years 11Complementary socioeconomic indicators: Population of 121,908 inhabitants, Territorial extension of 112.20 km2, Total households: 31,855 and an average level of education: 9.2 years


socio-pathological perspective considers that what compels people to commit felonies is

determined by their social interactions and the social constructs of a particular environment.

According to the rational choices approach – generally recognized as the economy of crime

(Becker, 1974) –, individuals weigh up their psychological and economic rewards against

their costs, whether these are psychological, economic or ‘opportunity’ costs. Decision-

making can then be economically reduced to a measure of possible gains against perceived

costs: if the pros weigh more than the cons, the criminal act is committed. In contrast, the

ecological model of violence (Morales et. al, 2007 ; Bursik, 1988 ; Bursik, Robert & Harold

Grasmick, 1993) identifies a group of ‘risk factors’ that may push someone – on an individual,

relational, community or social level (see Appendix 6)– to commit a crime in a specific

context. Therefore both violence and crime require a multidisciplinary approach, since they

don’t depend on one exclusive explanatory factor.

As UNDP (2009) emphasizes, crime is just as much an individual's voluntary act as it is

the edification of social relationships and manières de vie. Its determinants create an

environment of vulnerability, of a propensity to commit crimes, which means that the cause-

effect relationship between risk factors and crime is not strictly linear and does not constitute

a generality for all sorts of social environments. In this sense, both theoretical perspectives

are complementary to each other, not exclusive, leading us to a more integral view of

criminal phenomena, mainly because it manifests in many different ways: robbery attacks,

extortions, rape, and homicide. Table 3 presents a helpful comparison between the two

visions explained above, as it points out their particularities.

Moreover, the original Social Disorganization Theory , as conceived in the seminal

works of Shaw & Mckay (1942), focused specifically on urban areas of Chicago that were

experiencing rapid changing in their social structures12. Those areas were regarded as

“disorganized” since they were undesirable residential communities (slums) that people left

as soon as possible; while simultaneously there was also a major influx of immigrants, which

finally resulted in the near impossibility of establishing conventional institutions of social

regulation (e.g. church, school, family, etc.). As can be expected, neighborhoods that were

considered disorganized constantly had the highest crime rates and reproduced those

criminal patterns over time13. More recent research done in this perspective can be found in

Bursik (1988; 1999), which will be commented on in the next section.

Another theoretical tradition based on understanding causes and motivations for criminal

activities is Strain Theory. Many authors have researched crime rates from this perspective,

two of the most noteworthy being Merton (1938) and Agnew et al (2002), who noted that

12 They called them “zones of transition.” 13 Reproduction of this pattern depended on lack of control mechanisms of behavior and cultural transmission of criminal values.


people with low levels of social constraint and negative emotionality were more likely to

engage in criminal activities when presented with pressures to achieve a goal14.

Merton (1938) argues that in a society the inflexible attachment to a set of values could

translate into high crime rates. Specifically for the case of the United States, holding a

particular value such as economic success (“The American Dream”) led to focusing on the

most efficient ways of achieving it, regardless of the legality of the methods employed.

Moreover, as Merton elaborates, establishing a goal as economic success has free upward

social mobility as a vital assumption. Nonetheless, those people on the lower scales of the

socioeconomic structures are relatively disadvantaged in comparison to the ones in the

upper levels. Therefore, to achieve the goal of economic success, legitimate means are not

always available.

The core of this theory is the relationship between any culturally set goal for any individual

within a society and all the available means to pursuit that goal. If the legal means cannot

provide a way to achieve this goal, the author argues, cultural norms will be pressured in

such a way as to bend the legitimized means to effectively achieve the established goal

(even though these could be still illegal). Using a term from the seminal work of Émile

Durkheim, Merton (1938) called this bend/shifting or weakening of cultural norms (towards

illegal means to achieve a goal) “anomie”.

2.2. Theoretical approaches to social control of cr ime

So far the literature discussed in this paper has centered on possible explanations for crime

and outbursts of violence. But why are crime and violence sometimes absent? The most

remarkable element of the perspective pursued here is that, whereas conventional theories

center on the reasons that drive criminal actions, this approach also helps explain why those

crimes are not committed or why people desist from committing them.

As explained by Gibbs (1981) Social Control is an attempt by one or more individuals to

effectively influence the behavior of another individual or a group of individuals15. Therefore

14 In previous research, Agnew (1985, 1992) aims at setting the basis for a general strain theory. Strains of any sort may lead to negative emotions, which concordantly may lead to several different outcomes, including criminal actions. The strains could be negative perceived stimuli, the removal of positively perceived stimuli and failure to achieve valued goals. 15 This manipulation Gibbs argues is done through five different methods: A. The First party communicates the Second party some reference to a Third party. B. The First party punishing, rewarding or rectifying a Third party’s behavior. C. The First party manipulating a Third party’s behavior by communicating allegations about the Second party’s behavior to the Third party. D. The First party using the presumed influence of a Third party on the Second party’s behavior, without exclusive reliance on communicating an allegation about the Second party to the Third party or without exclusive reliance on communicating the Second party a reference to the Third party. E. The First party (1) using a Third party in gathering information on the Second party, or (2) the First party directing a Third party to limit the behavior of the Second party to certain social contexts through


institutions such as families, churches, community organizations, etc. have been able to

regulate behaviors of residents within their neighborhoods, even criminal ones. It is important

to point out that with this broad concept of social control (the main concept used throughout

this paper) 16 at least one consideration must be taken into account: any type of social control

measure could come from formal entities (e.g. State) or informal ones (e.g. neighborhood

networks) and still be effective in influencing people’s behavior, regardless of its origins.

As made by Sampson et al. (1997, 1999), the social capital and collective efficacy

framework suggests that a lack of organization within a society diminishes social capital

(trust and solidarity among residents) and collective efficacy (effectively control undesirable

behavior inside their neighborhood)17 and subsequently allowing for increases in crime and

violence rates. Accordingly, Bursik (1999), in a modern Social Disorganization Theory

approach, sets to find out the dynamics of control that are exercised through community

relational networks; as these linkages are thought to have regulatory capacities on crime.

Through a multilevel model, the paper examines the degree to which neighborhood

networks serve as mechanisms of social control of crime for a sample in Oklahoma City;

finding evidence that supports the fact that while degrees of integration into private and

parochial networks within the neighborhood have the expected associations in social control

of crime, that is not the case for more diffuse relational structures such as friendship and

familiar linkages (all variables are quantitative measures).

Skogan (1989) states that participation in collective efforts (actions by neighborhood

residents) against crime is confined to places where the existence of local organizations

makes that possible, in fact where there’s already some form of established social control.

Furthermore, Bellair (1997) places social interaction among neighbors as a key element in

the control of community, constructing 10 different measures of regular social interactions

and separately testing the effects of each one against the rates of three types of crime

(burglary, motor vehicle theft and robbery) in 60 urban neighborhoods in Chicago. The

findings suggest that the type of interaction matters and that the gathering of neighbors on

coercion or the threat of coercion, or (3) the First party taking any action with a view to facilitating the manipulation of the second party’s behavior through a Third party. 16 As objective crimes are the focus of this research, an important phenomenon has not been introduced. Fear of Crime is a crucial point of debate in violence literature. However, residents’ perceptions about their fear of victimization within a neighborhood are analyzed in several research papers. (e.g. Palmer et al. 2005; Greenberg, et al. 1982, Ferguson and Mindel 2007). In these studies several topics are discussed such as the relationship between fear of crime and crime itself; finding that although there is a strong link, fear of crime is also based in other external social variables. Also the effects of Fear of Crime on social interactions and building of social capital -within the residents of any neighborhoods- are analyzed. This topic raises many questions of academic and public policy interest, nevertheless in this paper it would only be casually referred as the perception of insecurity that might be present within a neighborhood and could have effects on social control measures. In any case, I strongly remember that this is not the main focus of research at hand. 17 In this sense, people may come together to achieve a common goal or face a threat without actually having strong neighborhood networks.


more than one occasion a year has the most consistent and robust effect on reducing all

three types of crimes.

Additionally, Sampson (1997) explores how social cohesion (e.g. level of interpersonal

trust) among residents of a neighborhood in Chicago, Illinois; combined with their

participation on community decisions is linked to crime reduction. The model was made

based on a survey of 8782 residents of 343 neighborhoods in the year 1995. Relevant

findings included evidence of how high cohesion and reliability between neighbors is

negatively associated with variations in criminal indicators.

From this brief reading into some relevant literature of social control of crime and the role

of neighborhood networks it can be seen that most of the research has been done in the

United States and European contexts and with a quantitative approach. In that respect some

aspects of the way those neighborhood dynamics of controlling violence come to bear e.g. in

the case of El Salvador still need to be explored. The main focus of this paper is to address

this theoretical gap.

Illustration 1 shows the integrated framework of the theoretical approaches discussed

here. The main issue discussed in this paper is ‘Crime as a problem in any neighborhood’18.

The left side of the diagram contains several reasons why the problem might arise, such as

rapid urbanization (from disorganization theory), social strains, and social pathologies (from

the ecological model of crime) as well as rational incentives (economics of crime approach).

On the right side we can see all those measures or factors who cope with or prevent the

problem arising. Social Capital may enforce crime (as “anomie”, among other theories,

suggests), but it can also interfere with the appearance of crimes in a neighborhood. In that

same way, collective efficacy and social control are forces that can prevent violence taking

place.

18 As mentioned in a previous footnote, Fear of Crime is not the main focus of this research, but a dimension of it, such as the perception of insecurity of the residents is taken into account. To elaborate further on this decision It would important to comment that Fear of Crime in its own is a public problem that demands solutions, and those actions may come from the State, the private sector, civil society organizations, neighborhood initiatives, etc. It is clear that although highly related to the “objective” side of crime, is independent of it and would require an independent analysis entirely and this surpasses the present research limits of this paper and would be an interesting opening for future research.


Illustration 1. Literature overview: Violence and n on-violence framework

Source: Own elaboration, based on Huhn.

3. Methodological Framework

The method applied during the research was qualitative cross-sectional, because during

fieldwork we wanted to obtain the stories and experiences of the residents from the selected

neighborhoods. Thus, interviews with local actors (carefully selected) were made as well as

in-field observation of the local context. The validity of the information collected was secured

through the contrast of testimonies between all 34 interviewees and triangulation of

information from different sources (e.g. field observations, maps and available statistics).

Fieldwork was done in five stages through the months of December 2013 and May 2014.

The first stage was to select the neighborhoods, which had to have similar social contexts (to

reduce the number of factors who could be considered as explanatory variables) and

different manifestations of violence. The selected neighborhoods include a public space

(specifically a park) as their epicenter and imaginary limits established according to

references made by local people.

Table 3. Selected Neighborhoods Name of the Municipality

HDI19 Homicides rate per 100,000 habitants 20

Selected neighborhood

San Salvador (AMSS)

0.82 52.221 Vicinities of the Centenario park in the Historic Center of San Salvador

Santa Tecla (AMSS)

0.78 20.3 Vicinities of the San Martin park in the Historic Center of Santa Tecla

Source: Own elaboration with data presented by FUNDAUNGO (2012a), FUNDAUNGO & PNUD (2009), OPAMSS (2012b) and PNUD & STP (2012).

19 For the year 2007, data available in FUNDAUNGO & PNUD (2009). 20 For the year 2012, data available in FUNDAUNGO (2013). 21 This figure is higher than the national average by eleven points according to FUNDAUNGO (2013).


Taking into account the lack of statistical data below the municipal level22, the criteria used

for selecting neighborhoods with a similar socioeconomic context in San Salvador and Santa

Tecla consisted of the following.

Economic-comparable factors: It was important that certain economic activities as well as

economic actors were present in both areas to avoid “wealth” becoming an axiomatic answer

for different crime rates within the neighborhoods23. In this regard, in both neighborhoods I

asked about noticeable drug and sex commerce, proximity to large market areas, the

presence of both formal and informal economic activities and whether they were known as

“dormitory24” areas for employees. With these selection criteria we expected to select

neighborhoods of comparable economic performance.

Territorial-comparable factors: Much such as wealth, urbanization can also be an axiomatic

answer for different crime rates between neighborhoods. To go deeper into underlying

processes beyond urbanization that might be behind those differences in violence

manifestations, we controlled for certain territorial factors such as residential mixed with

commercial areas, proximity to the Historic Center of the city (slum-conditions), illegal land

occupancy and abandoned houses, the existence of recognizable public spaces (parks,

courts and/or squares), high levels of traffic of people and automobiles during the day,

functioning transportation facilities (e.g. roads, bus stations, traffic signals) and the presence

of other important private and public facilities such as schools, churches, newspapers, and

municipal offices.

Security-comparable factors: It could also be argued that a lack of security institutions

(understood as a lack of a formal presence, not as a complex measurement of their actual

level of intervention) in a specific area could lead to an outbreak of crime; for this matter the

selection of neighborhoods had to incorporate cases with nominal access to security

institutions (because we can only account for their presence at this point, not they actual

correct employment). In the neighborhoods selected there were private security agents in the

area, formally assigned as local government security agents (known as CAM, Cuerpos de

Agentes Metropolitanos), various NGOs working in the district and a known presence of

gangs.

Following these criteria, the concept of neighborhood was operationalized using geographic

references, setting main parks as the epicenters of the selected cases and stretching to a

diameter that contained all the referred places and buildings.

22 Data on access to water supply and healthcare, income average or illiteracy rates aren’t produced below municipal level. 23 For they might have the possibility to spend more money on defensive methods or even move out to another neighborhood. 24 This refers to the fact that adult people living in the area usually doesn’t work in the same neighborhood.


The second stage of work consisted of elaborating an interview25 guideline that would help

gather information on local criminal manifestations, perceptions, attitudes and responses

towards violence, control measures and how this measures are brought to bear or not within

the neighborhoods. For this reason a semi-structured interview format was chosen that

inquired about essential categories that cover the main dimensions of crime and social

control used for this research.

General questions: Historical events, perceived social class, links to the neighborhood,

media coverage, quality of life, etc.

Problem perception: sources of conflict, risk situations, socioeconomic conditions, main

authorities/influential people, day-to-day interactions, neighborhood activities, commercial

endeavors, experiences of violence and perception of insecurity and perceived people who

are responsible for violent acts.

Violence prevention activities and measures of protection/repression: attitudes to violence

and recommendations for improving the situation.

The third phase of fieldwork took place in San Salvador and Santa Tecla. A total of 17

interviews with local members of the Centenario neighborhood were conducted in April (after

a previous pilot test had proved the interview guidelines usable). Accordingly, 20 interviews

with local members were carried out between April and May in the San Martín neighborhood.

All interviews were taped with the consent of the informant and also contain an original map

drawn by the interviewee. In this map, they were asked to delimit what they considered to be

their neighborhood of work and/or residence and also indicate the places that they

considered to be secure or insecure (see Appendix 1 and 2).

It is important to mention that participants (interviewees) for the research were selected by

using a purposive technique. In a nutshell this means that the people who were interviewed26

were likely to share rich and in-detail information about the reality within their neighborhoods.

Moreover, the final list of interviewees included 17 people for each case study27:

1. Local government representative

2. Local leader/gatekeeper/ renowned member of the community

3. Local community association representative

4. Religious leaders

5. Taxi driver or motorized messenger

6. Police officer

7. Syndicate representative

25 All questions were originally posed in Spanish; therefore all subsequent translated quotations are my own. The original format in English was the result of several weeks of group work between Sebastian Huhn, Noam López, Nauman Aqil and Princess Hamman-Obels. 26 It was also required that the interviewees live, study or work within the neighborhood. 27 In Appendix 7 the selection of interviewees is discussed.


8. NGO representative

9. Private enterprise owner

10. Private sector employee

11. Bar/restaurant owner or employee

12. Private security agency employee

13. (Informal) Market place owner/employee

14. School teacher/principal

15. Local Media representative

16. Sex worker

17. Local youth leader.

4. Empirical Findings

This part of the analysis is divided into four subsections. First, I present a brief collection of

important historical and context data collected from fieldwork; this is done in order to highlight

relevant changes and facts regarding living characteristics within the neighborhoods.

Secondly, a comparison of crime is done between the selected neighborhoods, addressing

their characteristics, perceived causes and the actors responsible. Thirdly, we review the

reported attitudes to crime and violence and the perceived measures of control in both

cases. The fourth section contains a debate on the key elements of success or failure in

measures designed to control violence within a neighborhood in the Salvadoran context.

4.1. Neighborhood context: Centenario

As portrayed by Baires et al. (2006), the Centenario neighborhood is located within the

biggest and most important municipality; the country’s Capital City, San Salvador. Placed at

the north-east sector of the Historic Center of the city and surrounded by a large residential

zone, Centario Park, the neighborhood’s main public gathering place, was inaugurated at the

beginnings of the 20th century and named after the celebration of the hundredth anniversary

of independence movements of 1811 and 1821.

After an earthquake in 1986 and a large period of abandonment during the national

conflict between 1980 and 1992; most of its infrastructure is in poor condition and is kept

rather unchanged except for sporadic interventions by the local government and other

construction initiatives of the Public Works Ministry, such as the enlargement of the Juan

Pablo II Avenue, that travels from east to west, for the Public Transportation System, called

SITRAMSS (Sistema Integrado de Transporte del Área Metropolitana de San Salvador) that

will pass through directly in front of the Centenario park and allow for a larger traffic of both

automobiles and people in the area. Additionally, no major changes in infrastructure came


from private owners of residence or enterprises because of lack of resources or legal

permits, thus contributing to the general appearance of the area. Local (inhabitants or

residents) perceives the degradation of the infrastructure and environment, and its effects on

their daily life, as one local private enterprise owner states:

“Most of us are already old people, we only rent the places we use and we aren’t allowed

to make big changes, even if we had the money, because most of these buildings have

been declared historical patrimony by the local government; that’s why recently only

people with commerce in mind pay for them. I don’t mind this myself, because I wouldn’t

such as for my sons to continue in this work [printing press establishment] since the whole

area is really dangerous...”- Local Private Enterprise Owner.

In contrast to the core of the Historic Center, streets in the Centenario neighborhood are not

only covered by market owners and to this day, the zone sustains the interaction of multiple

dynamics: formal and informal market places, recreational spots, houses, bus stops, schools,

factories, private enterprises (shoe repairing, printing press, electronic sales, etc.) two major

newspapers, motels, local government buildings28, restaurants and so forth (see Map 2).

Nevertheless this area is also a notorious Red Zone, where there has been drug commerce,

gang members29, abuse in alcohol consumption and prostitution for several years, a fact that

is consistent with the municipal history which places San Salvador as one of the top 5 most

violent municipalities30 in the country. In brief, the use of public spaces in the area seems to

be a story of its own, of a society with many issues where homicidal violence is more recent.

A local taxi driver and resident illustrates this further:

“There, at the old basketball court, there is where you can see them [18th Street gang

members] during the day, playing and there they spend during the afternoons sometimes

and just behind the park you can see all those houses with ugly doors; those are the

motels and bars. There you can see plenty of prostitutes and drunks if you want to. They

have always been there.” - Local Taxi Driver.

A last important characteristic of the area describes a situation known as a dormitory city,

which refers to the fact that most of the people who live there tend to work somewhere else

28 The presence of this particular building explains why repeatedly during the year, protests for diverse purposes are seen in the vicinities. 29 Some of the abandoned houses in the neighborhood are said to be called “Casas Destroyer” for its illegal detainment by local gangs 30 FUNDAUNGO (2012a) places San Salvador in the top five positions in all four rankings for homicide, theft, robbery and extortions per 100,000 inhabitants during the period from 2005 to 2011.


(and vice versa). In this particular neighborhood it was also reported that most of the

students who attend public and private schools do not come from the vicinities and only stay

in the area during class hours.

4.2. Neighborhood context: San Martín

San Martín neighborhood is in the middle of the Historic Center of Santa Tecla, one of the

major municipalities of the country and the Departmental Capital of La Libertad. The park at

its core is called Parque José María San Martín, after the Salvadoran President who signed

the City’s Foundation Decree in 195431, and it was recently restored (in 2001) during the

administration of Mayor Óscar Ortiz.32

After the earthquake of 2001, a large number of buildings were damaged, including local

landmarks such as El Carmen Church, Guirola House (historical patrimony), Tecleño Palace

(Former municipal main building, now considered a historical patrimony), Dr. Manuel

Gallardo Public Library, the Municipal Penitentiary (now an Art Museum) as well as other

housing, industry and schooling buildings (see Map 3). From then on, several restorative

initiatives were born, led by the local government and sponsored by local residents, private

enterprise owners and international cooperation.

Then, in October 2008, the Tecleño Palace was finally rebuilt and it promoted several art

programs such as poetry workshops, theater plays, and concerts. This same building would

become the first stone in a larger urban project funded and was erected with private and

public joint efforts, now called Paseo El Carmen. It’s a large pedestrian area from Tecleño

Palace to Cafetalón recreational center that includes a series of restaurants, hotels,

handcrafts shops, art plazas, museums, etc. The initiative required a large investment with

reallocation of informal vendors, street and house restoration and placement of public

illumination, etc. The whole strip became a commercial area and there’s little residential

property. Nowadays local public opinion is critical of the consequences such as busy traffic,

public contamination, constant late-night loud noises, etc. Also, the benefits in terms of

touristic and economic success that the measures have brought are praised by some and at

the same time critiqued on the way they have been distributed. This would suggest an

internal system that allows for unequal sharing of the social benefits produced by

government initiatives. A local NGO representative describes the issue:

31 For more historical details, please consult: http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2004/08/09/metro/met1.asp 32 He was active mayor for Santa Tecla during the 1rst of May 2000 to 1rst of June 2014, when he assumed the charge of Vice-president of El Salvador.


“At the infrastructural level, the whole of Santa Tecla has made great improvements in

recent years. It isn’t the same city as 10 years ago. But the area that has improved greatly

is the Historical Center, specially the area of Paseo El Carmen. There many colonies and

houses in the vicinities that have been forgotten, there’s still much organization and

cleaning missing.”- Local NGO representative.

For the most part of the 2000’s decade33, Santa Tecla was still among the most violent

municipalities in the country and couldn’t have been regarded as a Touristic Hotspot, but in

2012, Paseo El Carmen was declared as a Relevant National Touristic Destination by the

Touristic Ministry of El Salvador34. The recent history shows that San Martín neighborhood is

part of a convergence of multiple dynamics of formal and informal economic activities,

several recreational spots, houses, bus stops, private and public schools, restaurants, private

enterprises (computer repair shops, banks, mechanic shops, etc.), numerous catholic and

protestant churches and other cultural landmarks. Even though people who work and live in

the area say that they feel secure in their neighborhood, most of them describe that the

major source of discomfort comes from communities on the outskirts of the neighborhood,

peripheral residential zones that are, as described by the interviewees, the main source of

criminal activities, especially gang-related activities. A local NGO leader comments:

“Around the school area, for example, a lot of people live there who have no access to

water or sanitary services. They won’t come out of there in fear of losing their homes; they

won’t talk with the municipality and plenty of stuff is hidden in there, arm trafficking, drug

abuse, gang members on the run. You cannot take the bus in the near stop, because

you’ll get robbed, and it’s the same people from those communities.” - Local NGO

representative.

A last important characteristic, as in the case of Centenario neighborhood, is that Santa

Tecla is also a dormitory city and people from San Martín neighborhood point out that this

has become even more common in recent years, since the jobs opportunities for a large

share of the residents are still higher in the capital, despite recent improvement in economic

welfare in the area.

33 FUNDAUNGO (2010) places Santa Tecla at the top positions of the rankings for homicide per 100,000 inhabitants during the period from 2005 to 2009. 34 Please see periodical note: http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=47976&idArt=7518618


4.3. Criminal Manifestations

In order to address a specific context as Violent or Non-Violent, a description of its crime

must be made, especially in El Salvador where there seems to be a tendency to believe that

criminal activities occur consistently in all its regions. Table 5 contains the most important

distinctions found between Centenario and San Martín neighborhood, regarding the main

types of crime committed, security perception, perceived causes for criminal activities and

perceived main perpetrators and victims.

Centenario is primarily afflicted with crimes such as homicides, gang quoting, extortions,

drive-by shootings, etc. A local police officer says:

“During the weekend there were two homicides around the market place. Some gang

members tried to murder a security guard, and immediately there was crossfire. One gang

member was captured when we arrived, another one died during the shootout as well as

the private security guard. This happens around these parts.”

Among the words shared by the residents who were interviewed, this one stood out for the

swift simplicity to exemplify the normalization of violence in the area. "This happens around

these parts" summarizes both a violent reality and a consequence: i.e. how people are no

longer shocked by extreme events such as shootouts.

Furthermore, most people point out how accustomed they are to witness or hear about

someone being victimized in some way in their neighborhood; for example, a local syndicate

representative speaks about how extra costs are imposed on local enterprises by gangs as a

usual practice:

““Everyone who owns a business around here has to pay the quote. At least 40$ per

month, in December we even have to pay them [gang members] a special fee. So, that is

what we call gang-quote [Renta] and that’s different to extortion; that’s when either a gang

member or someone else contacts you asking for a lot of money and says: “you have to

pay or we’re going to kill you” or “your family and friends will suffer”. They called me once

last month, but I changed my phone.”

Another striking element of this process that familiarizes people with extreme and persistent

manifestations of violence is that they consistently quote measures to cope with it that are

mostly evasive and when authority in the area is mentioned, it is only to remark on its poor

control of the situation (this will be discussed further in the next section).


Even though petty burglars were frequently mentioned as authors of plenty cases of thefts

and robberies; it is believed that the main responsible for the crime intensiveness of the

neighborhood are gang members. They are said to be in control of the whole area and have

constant quarrels with rival gangs or people who challenge them over territorial disputes,

control of drug distribution, and ownership of prostitutes and recruiting young people. In

addition, it was mentioned that they tend to be linked or in control of other members of the

neighborhood, as a local school teacher mentions:

“the very same salesman at the market place is either a delinquent or related to gangs.

They disguise what they’re really doing. Inside of those places you’ll find that they move

drugs around while selling you other things. It’s a mixture between legal jobs and they true

intentions.”

Security-wise, people had mixed opinions at Centenario. Some claimed that they have lived

there long enough to know what they are allowed to do and what not, and to follow these

rules is to be safe. Nevertheless there’s a general sense of insecurity, because there’s no

assurance that those rules might not change arbitrarily at any point, since leadership is a

process that is obscure within the gang structure and people would only acknowledge any

change of the status quo through the punishment that is received after breaking a temporary

rule. Gang control over people's lives seems to be strongly embedded in the rest of the

inhabitants’ actions, but this is never described as a reciprocal channel of interaction. As a

local market owner states:

“As I told you before, I cannot guarantee anything, especially around the Juan Pablo

Avenue, and the other streets around Centenario park (…) before you know it someone’s

was robbed and shot by them (...)”

In general, it can be harshly stated that the measurement of a person's freedom in these

parts begins and ends with whether it fits in with gangs interests.

Table 4. Comparison between crimes (Perceptions wit hin the selected neighborhoods only) Topic Centenario San Martin Social context Dormitory neighborhood. Dormitory neighborhood.

Main types of crime (in order of perceived importance)

Homicides, extortion, gang-quoting, gang-recruiting, drug trafficking and consumption, drive-by shootings, robbery, theft, prostitution, rapes, public disorders/fights, alcohol abuse, domestic violence.

Robbery/theft, car-theft, gang-quoting, extortion, gang-recruiting, traffic accidents, domestic violence, prostitution, drug consumption and public disorders/fights, homicides Other permanent conflicts: argues about


Other permanent conflicts: argues about prices between enterprise/market place owners.

prices between enterprise/market place owners. Constant arguments between residents and restaurant owners over lack of parking places and constant loud noises.

Security perception

Some people they feel safe because they know “how things work” and what they are allowed to do and what not at the neighborhood. There’s also a general sense of insecurity within the whole neighborhood, increased during the night and special holidays (payday and mayor gatherings). The park and its immediate vicinities, specifically the motels associated with prostitute and drug commerce, are said to be places of high risk of robbery, where rapes and murders occur frequently. Many point out to bus stops as hot spots for quick robberies and even murders.

There’s a general sense of security within the neighborhood’s epicenter and it is reduced during the night and special holidays (payday and mayor gatherings). General sense of insecurity in all peripheral surroundings and around the park areas where robberies are said to occur, as well as constant prostitution commerce. Drugs are believed to be moved around secretly in restaurants and some market places. Buses and bus stops are mentioned as hotspots for armed robberies or thefts.

Perceived direct causes (for main crime)

Inter-gang disputes (over territory and economic resources control), Gangs fight over weapons control Gang financing activities Lack of dissuasive and repressive measures

Lack of dissuasive measures, Gang activities to seek financing

Perceived long-term causes (for main crime)

Fractured families Ongoing high criminal context Poverty conditions Lack of employment opportunities Lack of education facilities and projects Lack of recreational places and activities

Lack of employment opportunities Poverty conditions Lack of values

Perceived main responsible (of main crime)

Local MS-gang members and petty burglars

Peripheral MS and 18th Street gangs and petty burglars

Perceived main victims (of main crime)

Gang members (from rival gangs) Security guards Other local residents linked to gangs (freely or not)

Local residents and tourists

Source: interviews with local residents, 2014.

On the other hand, inhabitants of the San Martín neighborhood reported mainly property-

related crimes, such as robberies, thefts and car thefts. Nevertheless they also reported

being afflicted by gang-quoting/recruiting as well as extortions; it’s remarkable to note that

homicides are mentioned as a less recurrent crime in the neighborhood. Some mentioned

that murders that had been counted as such didn’t even occur in the area rather they were

“dropped” there by the killers. On the issue, a local government representative claims:

“I believe that Santa Tecla has improved a lot over the years towards respecting life,

which is a human right. So we don’t have a lot of homicides anymore, they have become


uncommon, but there’s still much to be done regarding robberies and thefts. Around the

Second and Tenth Street, that is to say around the historical center area, if you are not

cautious you’ll probably get pick-pocketed, especially during the night”.

It can be thus inferred that this neighborhood has a completely different criminal footprint,

since homicides figures have diminished substantially in recent years, but still has an

important level of crimes such as robbery.

Like in Centenario, people interviewed in San Martín neighborhood pointed to gang

members as the main perpetrators of criminal activity in the area; with an important

difference: they say that those gangs actually come from outside the neighborhood; from

peripheral communities located on the neighborhood’s outskirts. This general perception is

reaffirmed when they vaguely mention that both gangs (MS and 18th Street) have influence

in the area, but are not able to pinpoint a specific one when talking about the crimes they

have committed; whereas in Centenario, people clearly stated that MS was the ruling one.

Furthermore, in Appendix 2 it can be seen that most people consistently drew a map of their

neighborhood and when asked to mark insecure places they chose to make references to

external, yet close, communities where they believe to be both insecure and the source of

criminal perpetrators.

Opposite to what is stated above, another group of interviewees mentioned a different

group responsible for crimes in the area, who they said were common burglars with origins

different from gang associations. They believe that the main reason for these burglars to be

seen in Santa Tecla is its recent touristic growth, since it constitutes an excellent opportunity

for committing crimes:

“Well, they were dressed as clowns when they got inside the bus. They told some jokes

and people were laughing but then they took out their guns and starting to collect wallets,

cell phones and cash one by one. After they got off the bus I saw that there was a car in

the corner already waiting for them” - Local private enterprise employee

Finally, if homicides are taken as reference of the most violent type of crime in both

neighborhoods, given the evidence collected during fieldwork, Centenario can be classified

as a violent neighborhood due to the constant presence of homicides perceived by local

residents, whereas the almost lack of that same crime in San Martín makes it a much less

violent one.


4.4. Attitudes to violence and control measures

After differentiating the two cases as Violent and Non-violent, this section sets out to explore

two main phenomena: Attitudes to violence and control measures35 reported by local

residents in Centenario and San Martín neighborhoods. Given the large variety of responses

registered during fieldwork, Table 6 compiles the majority of control measures and attitude to

violence that local residents declared as present within their neighborhoods, divided

according to the 12 relevant actors who are perceived as responsible for them.

Table 5. Attitudes to violence and control measures Comparison (Perceptions within the selected neighborhoods only )

Relevant actor Centenario San Martin Private security agents

Armed-guarding at commercial and official buildings

Armed-guarding in commercial, official and some residential buildings

Army Patrolling (along with Police agents) Gang persecution

Patrolling (along with Police agents) mainly in peripheral communities

Police agents

Patrolling Gang persecution Highly regarded as absent within the neighborhood,

Patrolling Camera control system in some areas Gang persecution in peripheral communities Joint efforts with CAM agents an military forces in crime fight

CAM agents Highly regarded as absent within the neighborhood, only present at municipality facilities.

Patrolling Violence prevention campaigns and workshops Attending to local government and neighborhood institutions meetings on crime prevention

Schools

Work within institutional boundaries (no deep communication with other members of the neighborhood)

Sponsor scholarships (financed by local government, other official institutions, International cooperation or NGO’s) Violence prevention campaigns and workshops directed both to students and community in general

Private enterprise members and market place owners

Payment of gang quota Participation in drug mobilization Discussion about prices settlement

Discussion about prices settlement Payment of gang quota Funds donations to some programs led by the municipality Attending to local government and neighborhood institutions meetings

Local government

Highly regarded as absent in crime control and prevention within the neighborhood

Coexistence, tolerance and citizen’s participation campaigns Joint work with neighborhood, police, CAM, government institutions and NGO’s (decision-making and implementation of controlling violence measures) Funds donation to some private programs led by third parties in various local initiatives

Churches Spiritual guidance and advice Spiritual guidance and advice Attending to local government and neighborhood institutions meetings

NGO’s Aid to sex workers Housing deficit relief

Violence prevention activities (gang rehabilitation, awareness campaigns, workshops, victim’s assistance, etc.) Housing deficit relief

35 Control measures are understood as a manifestation of social control, which means that they are designed to modify individual or group behaviors.


International cooperation

Funds donations to some programs led by the municipality or NGO´s

Funds donations to some programs led by the municipality or NGO´s Violence prevention workshops

Neighborhood institutions and members

Strangers mistrust and ostracism towards other neighbors. Evasiveness from other members to avoid problems (Resignation) Gated Community (fences, bars, etc.) Participation in Church-related activities.

Open debate and participation / public awareness of local effort in preventing violence Several committees combined with local government participants to address matters regarding specific needs and challenges: security, public spaces, education, etc. Avoid know insecure places and activities. Gated Community (fences, bars, etc.) Individuals or groups of people hire private security agents to keep guard in their streets as well as other security measures such as razor wire or fences.

Local Gangs

Quota collection (known as “Rent”) Territorial division and control “Gang truce” (ill-perceived)

Quota collection (known as “Rent”) “Gang truce” (ill-perceived), but some say that gang members are more commonly attempting to leave the gang and its’ activities.


In the previous section we found out that Centenario interviewees persistently stated that

gang members were the most influential group in the neighborhood and now, when their

constraints over the local residents are analyzed, it can be stated that they’ve got a grasp in

a large variety of social dynamics within the area: commanding payment from local

enterprises (gang-quote), regulating movements inside the neighborhood (territorial

administration), having a share in profits that come from prostitution and drug commerce

from the vicinities) and intimidating residents in any other way that suits their intentions (e.g.

recruiting young people into gangs). In the word of a local taxi driver: “Listen, here one learns

how to adapt. If they come [gang members] and ask you to pay them if you do there’s no

problem; if you don’t, that’s another story.” Gangs are not only an obstruction to otherwise

regular activities of the inhabitants, but clear regulators of actions. They not only disrupt

people’s behavior, but rather completely influence them (e.g. through physical threat,

emotional dominance or economic pressure) in line with their own given interests and

purposes.

Given that the violent context within the neighborhood has solidified during the last years, the

stances that its inhabitants have assumed are highly evasive. Some declare that the best

way to feel safe is to concentrate on personal affairs and work. This practice has led to a

general state of atomization of the inhabitants, where personal interchange is inherently

avoided and reduced as much as possible and to the extent that only information and objects

that are regarded as vital are exchanged. A local enterprise owner illustrates the situation:

“People around here don’t such as to talk about these things. Maybe they’re scared,

maybe not, but, in general everyone lives his own life, one may say an individual one,

concentrating in one’s business or one’s job. Everyone thrives as they can and it’s best

not to go around talking about things that don’t concern you.”


This attitude to violence hasn’t allowed people to assemble and discuss their problems

openly. At school they concentrate on academic matters and at work they only discuss office

topics; and so forth. Another remarkable constant was their general point of view on the role

played by the church in the area. It brings messages of comfort and reassurance to all those

living within this violent context, reinforcing the general non-confrontational stance of the

inhabitants; as a resident puts it:

“I attend the church that is two blocks north from here, we don’t place bars or razor wire

there; we don’t have a security guard either. God knows that either way we’ll die sooner or

later; it may come from the hand of a killer or a car crash. So the only true protection that

exists comes from God, why should we expect something to come in our way from

anywhere else?” - Local restaurant owner

As for security agents such as police officers or local government security corps (CAM), they

are reputedly perceived as absent within the neighborhood and many consider that they are

either incapable of combating gang members because of their lack of power or negligence

and even affirm that some are involved in criminal activities themselves. As an indicator,

Appendix 1 shows how maps drawn by residents are clearly more detailed and extensive

compared by those made by local government and security agents36. In addition, a local

school principal said this in regard of police work in the area:

“From my point of view? Well, I don’t such as at all how they work and much of them even

know who the criminals are and do nothing; some of them even get paid to look

elsewhere. People often complain that they feel as if there’s really no one to go to when

something bad happens and if they actually call them to denounce something, well, pizza

gets here faster than the police.”

In contrast, San Martín residents who were interviewed thought that local government was

the most influential group in their neighborhood. Their control measures cover a wide range

of activities for economic and social development: environment campaigns, employment

fairs, cultural workshops, private enterprise endorsement, community public meetings to

discuss local issues, etc. Although it wasn’t universally accepted (for many said they were

against some particular decisions), the local government was always declared as the most

36 Which in itself is not enough a fact to prove the mentioned distance between local institutions and the ground-needs and demands of the people, but enough to illustrate the general feeling of discomfort and abandonment.


important driving force within the area, since they are perceived as the coordinated entity of

combining efforts from a distinct sector of the community to fight crime. A school teacher

from the area says on the matter:

“We can also see organizations that the municipality brings to train teachers. Not long ago

we had a Congress about water resources and supply; topics that were never openly

discussed before. We also have public transportation committees, education committees,

employment affairs committees that are all organized by the municipality and people get

together and work on these issues, and myself I’m involved in the education committee.”

As described above, many changes have taken place in Santa Tecla during the last decade;

many of which have had the local government at their core. People’s attitudes to violence

and their perceptions of it as well as the control measures they have set in motion to prevent

it; they have all benefited from the changes designed by, primarily and most importantly, a

formal institution. As in the case of Centenario, people from San Martín refrain from certain

actions to ensure their safety, such as avoiding walking alone at certain moments during the

day (mostly at night) or not visiting specific places where they consider the risk of been

subject of a crime to be much greater; nevertheless, they don’t reach the same level of

ostracism a in San Salvador. It’s common to hear that members participate in meetings and

committees that exchange ideas about controlling violence, and the ones that don’t

participate directly ensure some level of awareness of the processes that are discussed. This

apparent openness to participation from the people is said to rest in their trust of the local

government as an institution that is perceived as in fact trying to solve their issues. A local

youth leader says:

“Some time ago the municipality created an Inter-institutional Council for Violence

Prevention in Santa Tecla and many people are part of it. The church, community

associations, all the different committees, police and CAM representatives and of course

delegates of the municipality. I also attend the Council as a youth leader representative,

because I’m the president of “Casa de la Juventud37”. I believe that Santa Tecla is a really

comprehensive and tolerant city. I repeat: at least there are ways in which people can

express themselves and discuss the problems that they’re having.”

On the social control measures used by security agents in San Martín it is important to

mention that many people have contradictory opinions on the camera control system that has

37 A local youth association that promotes cultural and educational activities in El Boquerón park as well as art and sports gatherings.


been installed around the Historic Center. Some say it has helped reducing most of the

robbery and thefts that occurred at the areas where they were installed and the places that

remain insecure are because of the lack of vigilance, others criticize the whole system, since

robbery and thefts still occur within the covered area and that a great proportion of cameras

are not real ones, so burglars already know which are the blind sectors. Beyond this contrast

of opinions, in general, people regard both police and CAM members within the

neighborhood as a constant and trust working force, but they underline that there are places

outside the boundaries of the neighborhood, where they don’t really are the most influential

force:

“Here in this zone, around the Historic Center it’s really safe, you can see the agents

walking around, it’s really quiet and when something happens people look for them [police

or CAM agents]. But in those communities that you see in the surroundings, such as ‘El

Pino’ o ‘Las Garitas’, there you have to be careful, when they say [gang members]

something is theirs, it’s such as their home and they take care of it, they won’t let anyone

inside without their permission.”

To summarize, fieldwork in the selected cases reveals a clear distinction between control

measures and perceptions of violence in Centenario and San Martín. Meanwhile residents in

Centenario are driven to undertake evasive responses, San Martín inhabitants, thanks to the

opening of participation spaces by the local government, have been able to strongly

contribute to discussions and decisions around their own problems. Additionally, the most

influential groups are different: for the case of Centenario, gangs are widely recognized as

the main source of control, while in San Martin, people point out how the local government

supports and directs a large range of actions to organize the development of the whole

neighborhood; always emphasizing how this power diffuses when it comes to peripheral

communities.

4.5. Key factors of success in controlling violence within the neighborhoods

After analyzing crime and control measures within the selected cases, some of the relevant

questions that remain are if those control measures have been effective in reducing crime

within the neighborhoods as well the general sense of security and, more importantly since

we are dealing with a qualitative research: have they been successful? And, if so, what are

the key elements of their efficacy?

Many people emphasized the absence of local authorities in controlling violence in

Centenario, as well as their general sense of mistrust and lack of linkages to local institutions


in charge of security within the neighborhood: CAM, police and the army (see Appendix 3). In

addition, when their control measures were reviewed, it was evident that evasion was their

primary attitude to violence and their daily lives have been hindered, also when we consider

the fact that their liberty to interact freely according to their will and intentions might be limited

out of fear, and specifically punishment by the gang members who control the area. Avoiding

known places, activities and other people was their first method to provide security for

themselves and their families. Even though some stated that if called by the local

government to discuss the community problems they would attend, they also mentioned the

lack of those initiatives and the escalating feeling of a lack of improvement alternatives. It is

relevant to highlight that the most influential group in the area and the surrounding vicinities

was gangs, who are said to control many aspects of the dynamics within the neighborhood:

e.g. mobility, economic performance, and permitted social interactions. This fact alone is a

key factor to take into account for future interventions that seek to prevent crime, as gangs

are strongly embedded into the local dynamics that disregarding them as a role-changing

factor for public policies would be a big mistake.

On the contrary, interviewees in San Martín identified their local government as the main

force beyond a decade’s work on preventing violence and control within the area. They see

in the authorities’ efforts (CAM, police and the army) a source of security and order. More

importantly they see local government efforts as the origin of their attitudes to violence. Even

though some say they undertake evasive actions to avoid been victimized (private security

agents, avoid certain places at given times, etc.) the vast majority state that even if they don’t

participate openly in committees and other community’s work for violence control, they are

aware of the activities been done and would participate if they sought to. Also, a relevant

aspect of resident’s more active knowledge of their reality can be seen in their observations

about the necessity to progressively include gangs in the development model of the

municipality, because they see the communities where they reside, just in the peripheries of

the neighborhood, as a task to be addressed and reckon with. Consequently, based on the

prevalence of homicide in the area it is possible to affirm that control measures alongside

attitudes to violence within Centenario have not had an impact that reduces crime in the

neighborhood. In contrast, San Martín has achieved such a reduction through their control

measures thanks to three main categories that have not been equally developed in

Centenario neighborhood: territory, population and inclusion.

Territory

Through extensive work of improving public spaces (parks, streets, public facilities, street

informal commerce reallocation, etc.) as well as constant police and local government agents

presence, (more recently a camera system) control of the territory was slowly established in


San Martín neighborhood in efforts organized by the local government and intertwined with

other local institutions (private enterprises, syndicates, schools, church, etc.).

Population

Having more direct contact with residents and both promoting and facilitating their

participation in decision taking within the neighborhood, propelled a general sense of trust in

local institutions of Santa Tecla. This created the environment needed to empower and reach

awareness from residents who later would start social, cultural or economic initiatives for

local development and/or preventing violence that are not directly linked to the local

government, but that’s always present as a sponsor or promoter.

Inclusion

With more advances in authority-resident relationships, there’s a larger generalized sense of

freedom to criticize the general arrangement of affairs within the neighborhood. Gangs in

peripheral communities (see Appendices 2 and 4) still prevail in Santa Tecla’s public debate

as an important issue that needs to be addressed, specifically with regard to their inclusion in

the general model that so far has had the tendency to keep them at arm’s length. People

seek to widen the access to social benefits38 for those communities and try to integrate them

in the general dynamics that are already present inside the neighborhood.

Conclusions

In this paper I have sought to answer one main question: how are social control measures

brought to bear within a specific neighborhood in order to explain the presence or the relative

absence of criminal activities? Although several research projects, through a strictly

quantitative approach (based on the context of OECD countries) show evidence of the direct

role played by social control mechanisms in preventing violence within neighborhoods, there

is still a big gap in our knowledge of the internal processes behind this relationship and in

relationship to the validity of such processes in countries in the Global South.

Previous work by Sampson et al. (1997, 1999), Bursik (1999), Skogan (1989) and Bellair

(1997) provided robust proof to support the linkages of social capital, neighborhood networks

and collective efficacy in explaining an increase in criminal levels for specific scenarios.

Nevertheless, as stated above, these results are mainly quantitative relationships, with

specifically constructed variables to be measured and thus, most of the mechanisms that

may or may not allow for any given social control initiative to work effectively in preventing

38According to the interviewees those social benefits should be: proper residential conditions with a good supply of water and electricity, a safe school environment, security from CAM agents, more recreational areas as well as cultural activities, alternatives for those who want to leave the gangs, private enterprise amenities for inexperienced workers, job fairs, etc.


crime, has not yet been addressed. This blind spot in urban violence research becomes

more noticeable when taking into account that most of the literature previously mentioned

lacked a focus in the developing countries, of which El Salvador is an example.

In order to answer the stated question and contribute in sharing light on the gap, a violent

(Centenario) and a relatively non-violent (San Martín) urban neighborhood in the

Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (AMSS) were compared. These cases had similar social

contexts with contrasting criminal outcomes. Fieldwork consisted of 34 semi-structured

interviews with local residents, with questions regarding: historical changes, security

perceptions, experiences of victimization, the most influential people in the neighborhood,

attitudes to violence and measures designed to prevent and repress violence.

The results suggest that local control initiatives play a key role in crime reduction over

time inside the studied neighborhoods; since, as the theory predicted, the place that has

more positive control measures also has the lowest levels of crime. More importantly, the

way that these measures were brought to bear suggests that success is not only a question

of a particular initiative executed by a given actor, but rather the level of embedding achieved

by that measure in a specific context. The main findings were that this level of embedding –

and later success in controlling violence – for the Salvadoran cases depends in three key

factors (TPI): Territory ( improving public spaces, territorial control), People (empowering the

public and awareness) and Inclusion (widening the access to social benefits and increasing

dialogue with perceived “excluded/marginal” groups). None of these factors is a sufficient

condition for social mechanisms to control or reduce crime, but they are in fact the strategic

elements than, when combined, seem to create a virtuous cycle of preventing violence in

Salvadoran neighborhoods.

The historical background, drawn by people’s perceptions of the most relevant changes

during the last few years, shows clearly that local governments and people’s trust in them

have played a crucial role, by engagement or omission, in the current state of crime. While

gangs are seen as the most influential actors in the Centenario neighborhood, mainly by

bending people’s behavior towards the boundaries of what the gang tolerates (based on their

own prerogatives and interests) in San Martín (though critiqued by many of the interviewees)

people point to the municipality as the main organizer of control measures affecting criminal

activities and also the main promotor of public life in the community: through art, education,

sports, etc. This finding also indicates that positive results in both changing the social

environment of a neighborhood and gaining people’s trust do not happen overnight. This is

very important for the creation of crime prevention and control measures and for the

evaluation of what might be populist political promises.

Direct social measures such as community committees, social and cultural meetings and

workshops, public debate, wider participation of the residents in the decision taking


processes were only achieved in San Martin through a slow course of integration between

residents that ultimately helped produce a non-strictly evasive attitude to violence. That

integration progress was led by the local government and slowly came to be owned by the

people. Also, data seems to suggest that direct social control measures that come from

residents themselves only arrived at San Martín once the local government had created the

grounds for them to be feasible.

As stated by its inhabitants, the Centenario neighborhood is mainly troubled by homicide,

gang quoting and extortions. On the other hand San Martín experience has not been perfect,

since thefts and robberies are still a pressing issue, but its example in homicide reduction

could be a starting guideline for any plan to improve Centenario’s current reality. While gangs

are still present in both neighborhoods, investing in improving public spaces and securing

territorial control over a given area allowed creating a space where public life could take

place, thus replacing gangs as most relevant actors. Nevertheless, improving infrastructure

and patrolling wasn’t enough; people’s initiatives had to be encouraged and the process that

initially was organized by the local government was later directly administered by those

residents who now even point out how the general neighborhood plan and development idea

could be improved and how peripheral communities should be invited to be part of the

process, as inclusion is a center element for security and stability.

Knowing that inclusion is both an essential – and still not fully developed – element in

crime prevention at the neighborhood level, any honest critique of a process such as the

Gang truce should bear in mind that its nature is fundamentally unilateral, with no clear

negotiations or knowledge of the true participants, and thus strongly likely to be ineffective in

the long run. Even though it might be arguable that in fact homicide figures went down for

two years, the sudden rise in the same statistics during 2014 is an example on how

unsustainable these initiatives are, since they are not embedded in the community with trust

in social institutions and people’s empowerment. In fact, the presence of a device such as

the Gang truce (where criminal groups arbitrarily decide to reduce an ongoing homicide

outburst) is already enough evidence for weak institutions and a lack of traditional social

control of violence.

An important topic for future research would be to explore how assembling resources and

administration has differed within the different municipalities. It would be relevant to see the

way in which the availability of resources and their distribution at the local level have altered

government actions and how this then translates into social control measures that are either

able or unable to modify a criminal context. Given the fact that the fight against crime – not

only in El Salvador, but also in the whole Central American region – has become a pressing

one, new answers and fresh ideas to tackle these issues are needed. This research has

sought to raise questions on how local experiences and realities could contribute to policy


making, scientific approaches to violence, but ultimately how to improve people’s quality of

life. In this context the story of San Martin is worth telling.


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Appendices

Appendix 1. Secure and Insecure Places in Centenario Neighborhood (San

Salvador)

Centenario Neighborhood – San Salvador Local government Representative

NGO representative

Police Officer

Taxi Driver

Source: interviews with local residents, 2014. Notes : A general direction was given to color red the places that they would consider insecure and blue for the ones that they considered secure. Sometimes this instruction was disregarded and interviewees used an “O” for secure places and an “X” for insecure ones.


Appendix 2. Secure and Insecure Places in San Martín Neighborhood (Santa

Tecla)

San Martín Neighborhood – Santa Tecla

Bar owner

Local government representative

Youth leader

Local leader/gatekeeper/ renowned member of the community

Source: interviews with local residents, 2014. Notes : A general direction was given to color red the places that they would consider insecure and blue for the ones that they considered secure. Sometimes this instruction was disregarded and interviewees used an “O” for secure places and an “X” for insecure ones.


Appendix 3. People’s Opinions on local Authorities’ Work Tackling Crime

(Centenario Neighborhood, San Salvador)

“They told me they really couldn’t have done anything, that they saw, the police saw! And they did nothing, because that wasn’t their jurisdiction; that job wasn’t their responsibility they said. And I got really mad at them and said: So you see a woman getting robbed in front of you, who could have been murdered, but you do nothing, not putting your boots on the floor and cross the street to protect her because that’s not your jurisdiction!?” – Private sector employee “a lot of the authorities are infiltrated by gang members, everyone here knows that! You might want to have an honest job and dedicate yourself to your business, but if something happens and they come to trouble you, you can’t simple go to the police, ¿why not? Because you don’t really know who you are talking to, he could be bought by the gangs, threaten by them or be a gang member himself!” – Syndicate representative “The local government really needs to get inside the community and know what’s happening. I mean, if they are interested in having a local project that could be functional they have to get out of their walls and get to know the surroundings. If they don’t see our problems, they can’t really help us” – Local school principal “I don’t think that it isn’t worthy, it’s just that we never see that kind of things around here. Someone from the municipality who gets in here and says: ‘ok, everyone, we’ll get together and talk about what’s going on’; you never see that. You see them repairing this or that street and trash trucks coming to pick up garbage, but we never hear about something to fight back violence. I own a printing business in here for a lot of time now, and I have never received a call from them” – Private enterprise owner “It doesn’t really matter that houses are falling down, what we need is more security. Security will benefit us all, really” – Local taxi driver “I can tell you this because, personally I know a lot of people who are gang members, so, from their own words I can tell you that the Truce is a big lie. Or have you seen killings to diminish around here? No! That’s just a show from the government, well, maybe not from the government but from the people who can say: I did this! But in this neighborhood things haven’t changed” – Local sex worker “I don’t think people don’t denounce the crimes they are witness or have been victims of, because they fear us; I think that it’s because they live among gang members. To tell you one example, those people who live next to the markets, the very same fact of been surrounded by gangmembers, mareros, to live among them, well, that makes them to settle down and say: why should I report on them if they’ll be always here next to me?” – Local police officer Source: interviews with local residents, 2014.

Appendix 4. People’s Opinions on Managing the “Gang Issue”

(San Martín Neighborhood, Santa Tecla)

“We have been addressing this issue from some time now, and I think that a stronger position is required, not only from us, but from the whole community. We should address the gang issue from the base and have more workshops, public talks, presence in schools to be more informed and to persuade kids from entering those groups. Things might seem


desperate, but we are working to get schooling and job opportunities to the neighborhood, but that won’t work if they are not aware of the dangers of entering a gang. People must know that their future is next to their families and that their efforts at schools and their jobs will be seen in the future as rewards” - Local government representative “I believe that if we all get involved we can get out of this problem. But if we always are accusing them of everything, even if they have the conviction to change, then we’re been unfair. They are human beings as well, they have their rights and we should start to listen to them and see what can we do to help them and in time we’ll see the benefits in more security not only in the center but also in all the places around it” – Local youth leader “I such as the development course that Santa Tecla has taken recently, but I look down on the fact that it’s only focused in a certain area and that only people from the middle class can really benefit from it. They’ve forgotten people in poverty, people from the communities all around the neighborhood; those places where they live are not been included.” – NGO representative “The idea of a Truce I don’t mind, it’s just that I think that it has to be done with more transparency. I think that there has to be an evaluation of the neighborhood’s context. Gather everyone and if gang members are to be included, that’s all right, but we must establish goals and to avoid the criminal activities to keep growing” – Local Private Enterprise owner “If we don’t start helping them and trying to get them to be part of our community and abandon that type of life. They’ll keep on seeing us as their enemies. We should be offering something different, or else we’ll always be complaining about things that happen around here” -Local restaurant employee “In my opinion to reduce violence the first one that has to talk with gangs is the government. But not what they have done like, “I stop killing today and then I start again”, that’s only an excuse to make paper headlines. No, I think that they should have a discussion to get them working and away from committing crimes for good. A gang member cannot get out of the gang, but we could have the entire gang stops doing crimes”. –Local media employee Source: interviews with local residents, 2014.


Appendix 5. The Metropolitan Area of San Salvador ( AMSS) within the

Country’s Regions

Source : Tablas & Salguero (2013).

Appendix 6. Risk Factors related to the Ecological Model on Violence (Levels of

Analysis)

Level Risk Factors

Individual Determinants of individual behavior: biochemical, psychosomatic factors, personality profiles. Demographic, socioeconomic characteristics: age, income and educational level, drug use, etc.

Relational Qualitative examination of the individual’s interaction with their primary spheres of socialization: family, couple and friends.

Community Behavioral development on neighborhood, school and workplace’s relational circles. Influence of problems that usually affect communities: high overcrowding and unemployment levels, easy access to drugs or weapons, etc.

Social

Drug and weapon trafficking, social and economic inequality, public policies effectiveness on most social areas (health, education, social security and public safety), efficiency of legal and justice systems, cultural background and regulations, etc.

Source: OMS (2011).

Appendix 7. Technical Note on Interviewees’ Results

Between the two selected cases, slight differences start to appear from data gathered during

fieldwork and thus they were accounted for in the stages of analysis but not mentioned in the

main text. The mentioned differences make reference to three relevant factors: Perceived

social class, which is tend to be evaluated as “Lower or Middle” at Centario neighborhood,

meanwhile the interviewees at San Martín neighborhood regarded themselves as “Middle or


Upper Middle” class. Educational level, 53% of interviewees reported a college/university

education at San Martín and only 41.2% at Centenario. Additionally, the perceived income39

at Centenario was reported by local people as below the minimum wage whereas the people

at San Martín stated that their average incomes are either equal to the minimum wage or

above it.

Appendix 8. Neighborhood General Background

Neighborhood Number of Interviewees

Age average

Perceived social class average

Sex Highest education level achieved

Perceived Income

Centenario - San Salvador 17 45

Middleclass, Lower Middle class

65% Men, 35% Women

Middle school 29.4%, High school 29.4%, College/University 41.2%

Below minimum wage

San Martín - Santa Tecla 17 41

Upper Middle Class, Middle class

65% Men, 35% Women

Middle school 29.4%, High school 17.6%, College/University 53.0%

Around or above minimum wage


39 People were not asked about specific amounts of income, but to make a comparison against the minimum wage in the national manufacturing sector ($202.80 per month or $6.76 per day), figures that are valid since January 2014. Data available at the Department of the Treasury of El Salvador webpage: http://tinyurl.com/m8omykb

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