pakistan development advocate 3 · 41 hayat omer malik 42 sarah hayat 40 fahand mahmud mirza 43...

DEVELOPMENT ADVOCATE

PAKISTAN Vo

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Civil ServiceReforms in

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© UNDP Pakistan A Police Officers’ Training Workshop in progress.

Development Advocate Pakistan provides a platformfor the exchange of ideas on key development issuesand challenges in Pakistan. Focusing on a specificdevelopment theme in each edition, this quarterlypublication fosters public discourse and presentsvarying perspectives from civil society, academia,government and development partners. Thepublication makes an explicit effort to include thevoices of women and youth in the ongoing discourse.A combination of analysis and public opinion articlespromote and inform debate on development ideaswhile presenting up-to-date information.

Editorial Board

Ms. Tracy Viennings

UNDP Deputy Country Director

Mr. Shakeel Ahmad

Assistant Country Director/ChiefDevelopment Policy Unit

Mr. Aadil Mansoor

Assistant Country Director/ChiefCrisis Prevention and Recovery Unit

Mr. Amir Goraya

Assistant Country Director/ChiefDemocratic Governance Unit

Mr. James Littleton

Chief Technical AdvisorStrengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes

Ms. Fatimah Inayet

Communications Analyst

Disclaimer

The views expressed here by external contributors or the members ofthe editorial board do not necessarily reflect the official views of theorganizations they work for and that of UNDP’s.

Editor

Maheen Hassan

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Hasnat Ahmed

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For contributions and feedback, please write to us at:[email protected]

ISBN: 978-969-8736-15-6

Hayat Omer Malik41

Sarah Hayat42

40 Fahand Mahmud Mirza

Mariah Atiq43

41 Daniyal Ahmed Javed

Youth Voices

New Public Passion: Motivation in PublicService – A New Zealand PerspectiveRyan Orange

200 Years of Civil Service Reform:What can we learn?

Assessing Public Service Deliverythrough Citizen Surveys:Key findings of Two Perception Surveys

Opinion

Analysis

02

19

25

28

31

34

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Technology, Innovation and e-Governnace –The Case of PakistanHasaan Khawar

Public Sector Training: EquippingCivil Servants for the Challenges ofModern Day GovernanceArifa Saboohi

Using Social Media to Push forGood GovernanceDr. Idrees Khawaja

Interviews

Ahsan IqbalFederal MinsterPlanning Development and Reform

38

Dr. Tahir Hijazi

37 Member (Governance and Reform)Planning Commission of Pakistan

Umar Nadeem

Open Data - Improving Public Service

CONTENTSSeptember 2016

Saleem MandviwallaProvincial nominee for NFC - Sindh

www.twitter.com/undp_pakistan

www www.pk.undp.org

/undppakistan

Follo

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18 Inspector GeneralNational Highways and Motorway Police

Shaukat Hayat Khan

© UNDP Pakistan The Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform and UNDP collaborate to promote key governance reforms at federal and provincial levels.The Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform and UNDP collaborate to promote key governance reforms at federal and provincial levels.The Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform and UNDP collaborate to promote key governance reforms at federal and provincial levels.

Public service has remained key to the achievement of nationaleconomic and social goals across the world. There is sufficientevidence to suggest that capable and motivated bureaucracy hasplayed an instrumental role in economic growth and overallprosperity. The way Britain became a dominant economy in the 18thcentury, especially militarily, is attributed to its competent andefficient public administration to raise taxes. The UN SustainableDevelopment Goals (SDGs) also recognizes the important role thatstate institutions play to achieve these goals. Goal 16 of the SDGsfocuses especially on building institutions that are accountable,inclusive and characterized by representative decision making.

This need for efficient service delivery is greater for developingcountries facing issues of poverty, inequality, hunger, limited accessto quality education and health services, lack of clean drinking waterand sanitation facilities and other issues the SDGs aim to address.,The state cannot resolve these development challenges without anefficient civil service, which, in turn, cannot perform its functions in amanner characteristic of the SDGs without continuous reform. Theincreasing demand for service delivery (and accountability) calls forrealigning public administration with the broader goals ofdevelopment.

Effective civil service is characterized by good governance whichmeans sound policymaking, efficient service delivery, andaccountability and responsibility in public resource utilization.

Pakistan's civil service saw 38 major reform initiatives between 1947and 2016 and many analysts consider these to be unsuccessful. Thereforms have largely been politically motivated and have failed toaddress critical issues of accountability, meritocracy, capacity andcompetency. The good news is that public administration reformhas been on the agenda of successive governments in one form oranother. The Pakistan Vision 2025 also prioritizes civil service reformas a key objective and the Ministry of Planning Development andReforms is spearheading a process focusing on specialization andprofessionalism, outcome-based performance evaluation andmeritocracy in appointments.

Like other countries, civil service reform in Pakistan has been largelydriven by issues concerning salaries, perks and other �nancialincentives. There is ample research within and outside Pakistansuggesting that �nancial incentives do improve performancedepending on context. However, there is also substantial evidenceto suggest that many people still join the public service on the basisof intrinsic motivation— for example a feeling of pride andnationalism— to serve in public service. Non-�nancial incentives arerequired to award and support intrinsic motivation like bestemployee awards, empowering good performers though increaseddelegation etc.

Public sector reform should also go beyond incentives. For example,organizations play a key role in attracting and retaining talent. This isnot an aspect looked at in reform initiatives thus far. The NationalHighway and Motorway Police is a case in point: besides theprovision of incentives and employing a merit based system for

recruitment, the Motorway Policy created and sustained anorganizational culture which motivates its staff for highperformance. While higher wages can attract skilled people, acongenial and enabling organizational culture is needed to driveperformance. Reform is a continuous process and it should not betreated as a one-time effort. For any major reform process to besuccessful, it requires multi-stakeholder engagement and aholistic and evolutionary approach.

The overnment should implement reforms as and whengrequired to maintain a modern and efficient civil service thatbene�ts from consistent and high level political commitment.Political will is key to successful reform initiatives. Countries whichhave gone through major reform and whose publ icadministrations are considered efficient, were championed at thesenior most level of political offices and sustained over longperiods of time. Singapore and Malaysia are good examples.

Around the world, efficient public administration andbureaucracy have been characterized by factors such asmeritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders whichprovide long term tangible and intangible rewards. Max Weber,the German Sociologist in his work in early 20th century argued,for the fundamental value of bureaucracy as one of theinstitutional foundations of capitalist growth. Others haveemphasized the positive role of bureaucracy in the East AsianMiracle of the 1970s and 1980s. Given the fact that governmentprovides public goods to which market mechanisms often do notapply, an efficient public administration remains the only optionfor addressing citizens' needs. Efficient and capable public serviceis therefore impor tant for both economic and socialdevelopment. Certainly, an efficient and transparent civil serviceis far more likely to be able to address the 2030 SustainableDevelopment Agenda. This can happen if a long term, continuousand comprehensive approach to public service reform isemployed, which is championed at the highest political level.

Editorial

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Civil ervice eform and the 2030S RSustainable Development Agenda

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Analysis

Note: Major analysis has been conducted by Usama Bakhtiar Ahmed (Advisor – Governance and Institutional

Reform, UNDP Pakistan) and Adeel Khalid (Advisor - Result Based Management, UNDP Pakistan), with some

analysis contributed by UNDP Staff.

200 Years of Civil Service Reform:What can we learn?

Pakistani civil services have perhapsbeen the most often reformed withleast effect than anywhere else in

the world. Nearly 40 separate efforts havebeen launched by both elected governm-ents and military regimes since 1947. Yet,�the consensus view today is that civilservants continue to fail in performingtheir roles and responsibilities to globalstandards of modern governance. Whenpolled in 2007 (Box 1), the overwhelmingmajority of civil servants agreed with thisassessment – 93 percent said that civilservice performance had deterioratedover the years, with over a third characteri-zing this deterioration as “ ”.extreme �According to academics and practitio-ners – even civil servants – the service� ⁴today, generally tends to lack capacity,motivation, neutrality, meritocracy,transparency and accountability. In mostcases, these weaknesses are linked toperverse incentives embedded in theinstitutional environment within whichcivil servants have arguably functioned forover 200 years.

But the difficulty of introducing real civilservices reform in Pakistan is exceededonly by the necessity of doing so. Civilservants make policy, prepare budgetsand develop plans. They manage cruciallocal ser v ices such as health andeducation. They de�ne property rights,enforce laws, adjudicate disputes andregulate industry. They collect taxes, buildpublic works and run public corporations.They organize elections, advise electedrepresentatives and backstop legislatures.Recent public management literature isreplete with cal ls for a ' whole - of-government' approach to public sectorreform. In Pakistan's case, 'whole-of-government' the civil service. Ameanssmall step for civil service reform couldarguably be a giant leap for the govern-ment of Pakistan and its citizens. Accele-rating growth, raising per capita incomes,or improving social indicators – none of

these goals can be achieved or sustainedwithout tangible improvement in civilservice performance.

Fortunately, recent governments haverecognized this reality. The New GrowthFramework published in 2011 confessedthat, “No public sector setup can intervenee ff e c t i v e l y w i t h o u t c o m p e t e n t a n ddedicated public servants” and called forthe swift implementation of the NationalCommission for Government Reforms(NCGR) reform proposals. More recently,the Vision 2025 developed by the Ministryof Planning, Development and Reformprioritizes “a complete overhaul of the civilservices” to realize their vision of Pakistanjoining the ranks of the top 25 economies

of the world and becoming an upper-middle-income country during the nextdecade. The Ministry has subsequentlymoved to launch a full-edged program incollaboration with UNDP to design andlead a comprehensive reform agenda.Perhaps the greatest challenge to currenta n d f u t u re re fo r m e ffo r t s w i l l b edismantling 'rules of the game' that pastdependence has preserved as a coloniallegacy.

Colonial LegacyFirst, loyalty is primarily owed to the

state. In 1886, the Aitcheson Commissioncreated two distinct service cadres: theIndian Civil Service (ICS) manned byformally contracted regulars (Covenanted)

� Civil servants are demoralized: They acknowledge that the service is corrupt, whichis a serious problem, and that their public approval rating is low.

� There seems to be no trust in the accountability process.� The civil service appears to have little faith in their human resource management.� While acknowledging the bene�ts of meritocracy, they continue to prefer seniority-

based promotion and reward system.� Written job descriptions as well as criteria for performance evaluation are generally

not used.� Connections' are perceived to be the major determinant of nominations for training

especially foreign training.� The civil service fears that their independence has been curbed through repeated

political interference.� Fear of competition is clearly evident even when they recognize that merit and

professional competence are important.� The motivation for joining the civil service is clearly not money. Power prestige and

status are cited as the main reasons for joining the service.� Despite low salaries, the majority is satis�ed with their civil service job. Police-

probably because of the power—Foreign Service and Commerce andTrade—probably because of choice foreign postings— record relatively higherlevels of satisfaction. Majority of the officers would like to stay in civil service.

� On their bene�ts, a majority favours portability of pensions and monetization ofperks. Portable pensions cut down the cost of switching jobs and hence encouragemobility. However, we also see that because of job security and power, civil servantsdo not show a preference for mobility.

Box 1: Key �ndings of Perception Survey 2007

Source: Nadeem Ul Haque &Idrees Khawaja “Public Service through the eyes of Civil Servants” in PIDE Series on Governance & Ins�tu�ons,2007

1 Ishrat Husain, Governance Reforms in Pakistan; See Annexure I for details2 http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Books/PB_Service.pdf3 See for instance: http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/1999/Volume4/995-1017.pdf4 See for instance: Aminullah Chaudry, 2011 and Saeed Ahmad Qureshi, 2016

who were mostly English; and theProvincial Services employing mostly Un-covenanted Indians. This ensured that theadministrative leadership was institutio-nally disconnected from the indigenouspopulation and would serve the interestsof the Crown, not the colony. Whilesubsequent reforms attempted to disma-ntle entry barriers for Indian inductees tothe ICS, and provide upward mobilityoptions from the Provincial Services,(including the Government Resolution,1892; Islington Commission 1917; LeeCommission 1924); the ICS retained itsessentially elitist, centralized, Europeancharacter.⁵

Second, the most important service

required by the state is the collection of

revenue. This ICS character was typi�edby the district administration posts ofDeputy Collectors and District Magist-rates, created by Regulation 9 of 1833,later merged into the same office and thensubsumed into the ICS. These fewhundred officials were charged withlegislation, criminal investigation,adjudication, property rights administ-ration and a number of other governancefunctions affecting the lives of 300 millionIndians. These responsibilities however,⁶came secondary to the taxation of land-holdings and agricultural production. Asunder the Mughals, land revenue⁷accounted for over 50 percent of allbudget receipts under the Raj. From the⁸ver y outset, this “ ”�scal imperativedominated all other public goods andser vices – educat ion, health, andinfrastructure were subordinated totaxation. The overriding concern was⁹delivering money to the state, rather thanservices to the citizens.

Third, governance is the domain of civil

servants more than political leaders.

What Saeed Shafqat has termed an “anti-p o l i t i c s” att itude among Pak istanibureaucrats, predates Pakistan itself. The�⁰period from 1909 to 1947 may bedescribed as the run-up to independence,where Indian political leadership wasincreas in gly emp owered through

constitutional/legal instruments, towardself-rule. Parallel to this effort, however,the bureaucracy was also strengthened asa counterweight. The Rowlatt Act passedin 1919 is a key example. “Civil servantswere given vice regal assurances so as todispel the fears aroused by the pace ofconstitutional development”. By the time��they quit India, the British had concen-trated most power in the “ ” ofsteel framecolonial administration i.e. the bureau-cracy.��

Fourth, the public is patronized, not

served. With the bureaucracy preocc-upied with revenue collection andrepresentative institutions neutralized,political stability came from co-optedlandlords, religious leaders and tribalelders. This patronage included lands,titles and pensions. While these clients��held the native populace in check, they inturn were reined in by a police forceheaded by the local revenue collectors.�⁴Citizens, therefore, did not have to beserved directly, only controlled indirectly,to keep resources owing in the correctdirection.

Fifth, �nancial resources are prioritized

above human resources. The businessmodel of the Company, and later, theCrown, did not permit adequate �nancingfor the civil service. Covenanted serviceswere introduced in India at the behest ofLord Cornwallis who found corruption sorampant upon his arrival that pay reformwas deemed necessary. Following the Actof 1873, only covenanted officers couldhold high positions. The centerpiece ofthese covenants was that officials wouldnot trade or receive presents, and in returnthey could hold high office and be paidmore than 800 pounds a year (worthabout 844,700 pounds per year in 2011).�⁵However, beyond this high-water mark forcompensation levels, they registeredintermittent cuts throughout World War Iand its aftermath where the Britishgovernment found itself with limited �scaloptions. Facing exceptional inationarypressures from 1930 onward, ad-hocsupport measures were introduced, such

as the Grain Allowance in 1940, replacedby the Dearness Allowance in 1942. Thisfailed to arrest the overall downwardtrend in real term compensation. �⁶

By 1946, the rising cost of living forced theBritish government to appoint yet anotherPay Commission chaired by Sir SrinivasaVaradachariar which (unlike its predec-essors) concluded that civil service paystandards: could not be set belowminimum living wage levels; must reectthe payee's education, training and jobdescription; and the government was nota “monopolist employer” assured ofsuitable human resources regardless ofpay offered. �⁷

Post-independenceWhen the former Indian Civil Service (ICS)was renamed the Civil Services of Pakistan(CSP), administrative positions were �lledby civil servants who arguably lackedappropriate training, except for only 92ICS officers inducted into CSP. The�⁸problem was compounded by a weakpolitical leadership which found it difficultto surmount the head-start enjoyed by thebureaucracy, in terms of legitimacy andpower, for a number of reasons. ,First

politicians had little experience in state-b u i l d i n g, w h i c h i n 1 9 4 7 e n t a i l e d�re�ghting a host of crises – the settle-ment and rehabilitation of 7.2 millionrefugees, division and cultivation ofabandoned land, restoring law and orderin the tribal areas, and resolving hostilitieswith India – all this from makeshiftbuildings in Karachi which was just thebeginning of the colossal infrastructurechallenge faced by the new state. Jinnaheven resorted to an appeal to civil servantswho had opted to serve in Pakistan, toaccept a voluntary pay cut.

Second, according to most historians, thepolitical party instrumental in thefounding of the state i.e. the MuslimLeague, had only shallow electoral roots inthe territories of Pakistan. With weak�⁹credentials in political policy terms,andpolitical leaders were inevitably sidelined

03

5 Charles Kennedy, (Karachi, 1987)Bureaucracy in Pakistan,6 Clive Dewey, (London, 1993)Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service7 (Swamy, 2010)

8 (Stern, 1991)

9 (Swamy, 201010 Shafqat,S.(1989),Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy, Lahore: Progressive Publishers.11 Report of Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-committee of Indian National Congress (New Delhi, reprint 1976) p.2512 Kashif Noon, 200513 Ishrat Husain, Governance Reforms in Pakistan14 (Petzschmann, 2010)

15 Based on the economic power value of the income relative to the total output of the economy, which is different from purchasing power calculation based on Relative PriceIndex used in the UK. It essentially measures the relative 'inuence' the income recipient holds over production in the economy, which is best suited to our argument.16 Anti-corruption and its Discontents, Daniyal Aziz & Usama Bakhtiar, 201217 Ibid18 Aminullah Chaudry, , Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, Annexure I.Political Administrators19 India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths, Philip Oldenburg, 2010

04

by the bureaucracy, who were cheered onby the international press: “With so manyilliterate people, politicians could make amess of things… A district officer ormagistrate must be given full powers to dealwith any situation. Politicians could makepolicy, but they must not interfere…”�⁰

Third , early disputes between civilservants and politicians were mostlysettled in the bureaucracy's favour.According to one of the most renownedpolitical scientists from Pakistan, Khalidbin Sayeed, politicians were placed“underbureaucratic tutelage” as Jinnah reliedincreasingly on the civil service toward theend of his life. ��

Fourth, the death of Jinnah in 1948, andthe assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, hissuccessor, in 1951, left the politicalleadership rudderless, and fated tobecome the disadvantaged 'middle-child'in the struggle for legitimacy and power,against its colonial siblings: the militaryand the bureaucracy. ��

It was in this context that the Justice MunirCommission was tasked with the �rst civilservice reform effort in Pakistan's history.The Commission reacted more to theprevailing economic crisis rather than thecore problems of civil service salarystructures. The Munir Commissiontherefore based its recommendations onthe principle that it was an incorrect policyto“offer such salaries to the servants so as toattract the best available material. Thecorrect place for our men of genius is in theprivate enterprise and not in the humdrumof public service where character and adesire to serve honestly for a living is moreessential than outstanding intellect. Wecannot therefore prescribe our pay scaleswith the object of attracting to public serviceall the best intellect in the country.”��

They recommended across-the-boardcuts in salaries, especially for higher postswhere it found them unjusti�ablygenerous. At the lower-paid end, itrecommended raise in the standard ofliving. It divided all employees into 30broad categories and recommended asmany standard pay scales which wereintroduced in 1949. A drastic reduction�⁴in salaries of all categories of employees

followed. By its self-admitted goal ofcompromising on the quality of humanresource, it implicitly deprioritized bothperformance and integrity concerns.Worse, it precluded any comparisonbetween public and private salaries byassuming that the labour supply wasfundamentally different i.e. the privatesector required the very best, while thegovernment could make do with the rest.

The Ayub Khan EraThe next reform effort was preceded by apurge among civil service officers,resulting in some 3,000 dismissals. In 1958,an Administrat ive Reorganizat ionCommittee was constituted which ush-ered in a number of unprecedentedreforms: �⁵� Multiple layers in the Secretariat

hierarchy were collapsed into oneSection Officer system;

� Financial control, budgeting andaccounting was overhauled;

� Administrat ive M inistr ies were�nancially empowered to circumventcumbersome clearance proceduresalong with �nancial advisory servicesbuilt into Ministries to improve fund-management;

� An Economic Pool was created to �llsenior positions in the Ministries ofFinance and Industry;

� The Foreign Service was empoweredto perform commercial and publicrelations functions abroad, that werepreviously performed by the Ministr-ies of Commerce and Information.

W h i l e a St a n d i n g R e o rg a n i z a t i o nCommittee oversaw implementation ofthese reforms through 1964, a number ofadditional measures were also intro-duced: �⁶� A network of new training institutions

w a s e s t a b l i s h e d, i n c l u d i n g a nAdministrative Staff College in Lahore(for senior government officers) andthree National Institutes of PublicAdministration in Lahore, Karachi andDacca (for mid-career officers).

� 14 Civil Awards were instituted torecognize excellence in public service.

Unfortunately, the Pay and ServiceCommission constituted in 1959, underthe Chairmanship of Chief Justice A. R.

Cornelius, was less successful in pushingits proposals through to implementation.It was meant to analyze the structure ofthe CSP and recommend improvements.The Commission envisioned an entirelynew 7-tier salary structure with 3-4 gradesunder each service group. This wasreminiscent of the structure prevailingprior to the Islington Commission's post-World War I reforms. It also suggested thatthe CSP be replaced by a PakistanAdministrative Service with admissionopen to technical services. The govern-ment rejected this radical departure fromthe prevailing system and chose instead torevise the pay scales prescribed by theMunir Commission. But the report was notreleased publically and its proposals werenot implemented (Ziring and LaPorte,1974).

On balance though, the overall civilservice structure (especially the inuenceof the CSP) remained intact under themilitar y regime. “Most of the 3,000dismissals, compulsory retirements andreductions in rank, took place at the lowerranks.”�⁷ The purges at the political endwere less merciful – 6,000 politicians weredisquali�ed and barred from public officeunder the Elective Bodies (Disquali�-cation) Order, under what many believe tobe trumped-up charges of corruption.�⁸Commissioners and Deputy Commission-ers were further empowered to take upthe slack in administrative governance.�⁹By 1961, a group of 371 CSP officials locallyadministered a country of 100 millionpeople. Moreover, civil servants retained�⁰their discretion in the arena of policymaking. For instance, the PlanningCommission which previously had a minorrole, was converted into a full-edgedDivision in the President's Secretariat withcivil servants in key positions. ��

TheYahya Khan EraYahya Khan, after coming into power in1969, repeated the purge-and-reformexercise, by �rst suspending 303 officers,and barring their re-entry into the serviceand then appointing Chief Justice A. R.Cornelius as the head of a thirteen-m e m b e r S e r v i ce R e - O rg a n i z a t i o nCommittee. Echoing the Pay and ServicesCommission of 1959, the Committeerecommended abolishing both the PSP

20 The Times (London), October 30, 195421 Sayeed, K. B. (1980) . New York: Praeger.Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change22 A number of experts have highlighted this phenomenon. See for instance: The Dynamics of Power: Military, Bureaucracy and the People, Akmal Hussain, 1993.23 h� p://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/civilservicereform/faizbilquees.pdf

24 Public Accountability Ins�tu�ons and their Macroeconomic Impacts, Governance Ins�tutes Network Interna�onal (GINI), 2008

25 The Civil Service under the Revolu�onary Government in Pakistan. Author(s): Albert Gorvine Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 321-336.

26 Ibid

27 Ibid

28 Noman 1988, Sayeed 1980, Feldman 1967

29 Pakistan Times,14th October,1958

30 The Civil Service under the Revolu�onary Government in Pakistan. Author(s): Albert Gorvine Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 321-336.

31 (Kalia, 2013, p. 162)

and the CSP and replacing them with aPakistan Administrative Service wheregeneralist officers would be recruited byprovinces while remaining positions atthe Centre would be �lled from specialistcadres. The Committee reasoned that asofficers with technical backgroundsunderwent more rigorous academictraining, they should be appointed at thehighest tier of the ministries and theirdivisions. The Committee also suggestedthat an elected district council should beset up, with provincial government'srepresentatives appointed as the districtcommissioners. It may be surmised thatJustice Cornelius was looking to tie uploose ends from his previous stint as headof a civil service reform body – but thisnew effort did not fare any better in termsof implementation.

A Working Group established under D.K.Power in 1969 again arrived at similarproposals, recommending that the CSPshould become only one branch of auni�ed central service, with its jurisdictionlimited to law and order and revenuecollection. And again, these proposalswere not implemented.

The Zul�qar Ali Bhutto EraW i t h t h e o u s t e r o f A y u b K h a n ' sgovernment, the Civil Services of Pakistan(perceived as the “ ” of his regime)bulwarkcame under increasing criticism andwidespread public resentment. The civil��war of 1971 and the secession of Bangla-desh was largely blamed on policiesenacted by senior civil servants, while theinuence of the Civil Services of Pakistan(descendants of the elite Indian CivilService) cadre was reduced by the loss of89 members who opted for the newstate. Zul�qar Ali Bhutto, who rode a��wave of socialist populism to a disputedelectoral victory, and eventual power in1971 had made no secret of his antipathytoward the bureaucracy, calling them“ ”, “ ”, and “Brahmins Naukar-Shahi BaraSahibs”. He went beyond the traditional�⁴purge (removing 1,300 civil servants) toactually abolish constitutional guaranteesagainst wrongful dismissal or otherarbitrary action against their terms ofservice that had been a part of theconstitutional framework since theGovernment of India Act, 1935. The 1973Constitution subjected the terms ofservice for civil servants to ordinarylegislation passed by Parliament and the

provincial assemblies.

It was in this context that two reformbodies initiated seminal changes to thestructure of the civil service: the NationalPay Commission was set up in 1970,presenting its report in three volumesduring 1971-72; and the AdministrativeReform Committee set up under KhurshidHasan Mir, Minister for Establishment (andthe �rst politician to head a high-poweredcivil service reform body). Together, thesereforms set in motion the followingstructural changes:� The abolition of service cadres, their

func t ional replacement by the“Occupational Groups” and thediscontinuation of service labels aspart of a single service;

� The adjustment of 4 Classes and some622 pay scales into 22 Uni�ed orNational Pay Scales (NPS) applicable toboth federal and provincial emplo-yees; �⁵

� Lateral entr y of pr ivate sec torprofessionals into the public sectorand vice versa;

� Any major addition, subtraction oralteration to the uni�ed scales wasbanned;

� Selection grades, special pays andtechnical pays were also abolished;

� The formulae for determining payscales for officers in BS-16-18 and BS-19-20 were amended;

� T h e ' m o v e - o v e r ' f a c i l i t y w a sintroduced which allowed defaultentry into the next grade when thescale maximum was reached;

� Greater opportunity for vertical andhorizontal mobility and equal opport-unity for advancement across theservice; and,

� Grading of each post to be determinedby job analysis and job evaluation.

In addition, the elite CSP was arbitrarilysplit into the Secretariat Group, DMG andTAG with �eld servants being posted tothe latter two groups, while the CSPAcademy was abolished outright. ServiceAssociations were also banned.

The last two reform proposals were not farimplemented. Occupational groupscontinued more or less as watertightcompartments, while the All PakistanGroups (Secretariat, District Management,Police andTribal Areas) continued to enjoybetter advancement prospects thanothers. The technically correct (though

practically infeasible) job evaluationproject never got off the ground.

In terms of civil service pay, the reformmade rigid and static what was alwaysexible and adaptable. World War I hadcost the British Empire £ 3.2 billion (in 1900p r i ce s ) , n e a r l y b a n k r u p t i n g t h e� ⁶government. Even so, reform proposals asradical as these had not even beenconsidered for their Indian colony. Thesereforms could not therefore be explainedin terms of �scal prudence alone. If �scalprudence – or even performance andhonesty among civil servants – had beenthe driving priorities, autonomous andsemi-autonomous bodies would notperhaps have been excluded from thesereforms. But the scheme was not madeapplicable to employees of these bodies,which in 2004-05 almost equaled thenumber of core civil servants. In 2008,there were around 210 such bodies andeach could technically set its ownsalaries. An attempt has been made to�⁷try and place the key 'pillars' of the reformin the foregoing political and economiccontext:� Reduction in the number of pay scales –

This would essentially reduce theconventional �scal superiority of thehigher services which they hadenjoyed since the Company era. Itwould also fall in line with the publiclyespoused socialist principles of thenew government.

� National standardization of pay scales –The move toward centrism andnational uniformity in administrationwas understandable given that 'half'the country had just broken away anddeclared independence.

� Simpli�cation of the operation of payscales – By scrapping the complicatedweb of rules and regulations guidingpay policy, the bureaucracy would berobbed of its monopoly over anesoteric 'science' that could be used tobrowbeat politicians.

The Secretariat Group supported lateral/horizontal movement from other cadresi.e. officers moving into the SecretariatGroup if they felt that their original cadrehad limited or no prospects of promotionfor them, which resulted in a certaindegree of alleged misuse for promotionand personal bene�ts. The introduction�⁸of lateral entry arguably had a net adverseeffect, with serious lapses in transparencyand meritocracy of recruitment being

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32 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/185%20Reforming%20Pakistans%20Civil%20Service.pdf33 http://www.saeedshafqat.com/articles/pakistan.pdf34 Ibid35 It must be noted that the Commission had recommended 26 NPSs but the government essentially 'decapitated' the top 4 scales to meet an arbitrarily determined lowcompression ratio.36 http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zqhxvcw37 Public Accountability Institutions and their Macroeconomic Impacts, Governance Institutes Network International (GINI), 2008

reported – 150 out of the 201 deputysecretaries were chosen from the CSS(section service cadre) and among them al a r g e n u m b e r w e r e t h o s e w h o s eperformance was below-average in theFPSC examination. There were even a�⁹few cases where Section Officers becameDeputy Secretaries as a result of thereform. In fact, numerous deputy⁴⁰secretaries were appointed without everappearing in the examinations or theinterviews. ⁴�

The CSP was a cadre established by thethen Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan afterdetailed discussions with the AGG inBaluchistan and the Chief Ministers ofPunjab, Singh, NWFP, and East Bengal, in1950. The reforms under Bhutto left this⁴�cadre unrecognizable, while none of thechanges were held up to the scrutiny ofprovincial governments, or even thefederal cabinet. The FPSC was similarly⁴�left out of any consultation whichweakened its role and undermined itsauthority.

The General Zia-ul-Haq EraAfter coming to power in 1977, GeneralZia ul Haq established a Civil ServiceReforms Commission appointing theChief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Anwar ulHaq as the Chairman. The Commissiondiscontinued lateral entry, and examinedappointments made under this program.Among these, 199 cases of appointmentin the Secretariat Group were scrutinizedclosely. Some officers were reverted totheir former positions, some weredismissed and some were retained inservice. The FPSC also reviewed how�tting lateral entrants were to be retainedin the service. The induction of armedforces personnel into the civil services wasinstitutionalized through a 20 percentquota. ⁴⁴

The Anwar-ul-Haq Commission thenmoved to “rehabilitate and promote somelevel of con�dence among the Civil Services,particularly the CSP.” The TAG was⁴⁵merged into the DMG with the latter beingpositioned as the second-generationreboot of the CSP. This was despite the fact

that the DMG had a much higher ratio ofnon-FPSC members than the originalcadre. The Secretariat Group was notsimilarly merged, causing resentmentamong its members. In addition, the⁴⁶Commission opened up entry to theSecretariat to all public personnel creatinga National Administrative Reser veconstituted by Grade 20-22 Officers whocould serve in headquarters organizationsin the federal government. ⁴⁷

The General Pervez Musharraf EraThe revolving door democracies of the 90ssaw increasing politicization creep intoappointments, postings and transferswithin the service, especially at thepolicymaking levels in federal andprovincial secretariats as well as districtadministration. According to experts,party loyalty generally trumped merit inthese decisions. ⁴⁸

National Reconstruction BureauYet another military coup in 1999 broughtGeneral Pervez Musharraf to power. TheN a t i o n a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n B u r e a uestablished under the leadership of Lt.-Gen. Tanvir Naqvi designed and set aboutimplementing the most ambitious reformagenda since the Bhutto era i.e. theDevolution Plan. Through the LocalGovernment Ordinance 2001/02 and thePolice Order 2002/04, the Devolution Plansought to implement the followingmeasures (relevant from a civil servicereform perspective): ⁴⁹� The Executive Magistracy and office of

the Deputy Commissioner wereabolished and its powers transferredto District and Sessions Judges,District Nazims (mayors elected byDistrict Councils) and the DistrictCoordination Officers (DCOs).

� The Nazims were authorized to initiateannual performance reports of theDCOs and the District Police Officers(chief of district police).

� For the �rst time, revenue collectionwas relegated to one of several otherlocal public services provided by thedistrict administration i.e. ExecutiveDistrict Officer, Revenue (EDO-R) was

only one of several other EDOs incharge of health, education and otherline departments serving under thecoordinating role of the DCO.

� Sectoral line functions and responsib-ilities (most importantly health andeducation) were devolved fromcentral and provincial governments tothe district governments.

� District administration was placedunder oversight by elected represen-tatives, accountability by citizens andresponsible for grievance redressagainst complaints received bycitizens through a host of institutionalmeasures.

Unfortunately, the reform suffered from asigni�cant implementation de�cit.Devolution of power was limited toadministrative responsibility and �scaldecentralization was successful only tothe extent of allowing local governmentsto pay salaries. Provincial line depart-ments continued to manage de factoservice delivery. The agenda for intro-ducing new accountability relationshipsalso fell short as most of the newstructures (e.g. the District Ombudsman)contemplated by law remained absent onground. Service delivery performance ofelected local governments was alsomixed. ⁵⁰

However, multiple independent studiesconcluded that the citizen's preferencewas not rollback but adjustment in thereform. According to a study published⁵�by the Urban Institute in 2010: “there is noprima facie case for taking back control oflocal affairs to the provinces on the justi�-cation that they are more accountable,transparent or responsive…Whatever thesenior bureaucrats in the provinces mightthink about it, these results suggest thatthere is no strong public support for the ideaof increasing bureaucratic control over localaffairs.”⁵�Despite this, the elected local governmentsystem did not survive the return tonational democracy in 2008. The lack oflegitimacy faced by the parenting regimewas a key factor in this failure, which wascompounded by the absence of any

06

38 Aminullah Chaudry, Political Administrators, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, p. 117.39 ibid40 ibid41 ibid42 Aminullah Chaudry, Political Administrators, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, p. 119.43 ibid44 Pakistani Bureaucracy and Political Neutrality: A Mutually Exclusive Phenomenon? Maryam Tanwir and Shailaja Fennell, 201045 Ibid46 Aminullah Chaudry, Political Administrators, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2011, p. 119.47 Problems and Issues in Administrative Federalism by Shriram Maheshwari, 199248 See for instance, Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, 6 November 2009; and Shafqat and Wahla, op. cit., p. 208.49 Voices of the Unheard: Legal Empowerment of the Poor in Pakistan, UNDP-UNOPS, 201250 Ibid51 Ibid52 Ibid

consultation at the design stage, beyondan inner circle of experts. However, the⁵�centerpiece reform of the devolution plani.e. abolition of executive magistracy wasnot rolled back, in the light of a 2011decision of the Balochistan High Courtwhich declared the attempted revival ofthis office unconstitutional. ⁵⁴

National Commission for Government

ReformsA National Commission of GovernmentReforms (NCGR) was set up in April, 2006under Dr. Ishrat Hussain. The civil servicereform package developed by theCommission represents a seminaldeparture from the way such efforts wereconceived in the past. The reform took awhole-of-service view, covering the entire“ ”of:value chain ⁵⁵� Recruitment and Induction

� Post-InductionTraining� Career Path Planning and Progression� Performance Management� Training and Development� Compensation and Bene�ts� Discipline and Code of Ethics� Severance� Retirement and Bene�ts

Th e s e s e r v i ce -w i d e re fo r m s we rethemselves nested within a still broaderreform opus, capturing reorganization offederal, provincial and local governmentsas well as inter-governmental relations,size and composition of the public sector,internal structures of Ministries andbusiness processes, as well as sectoralreforms in land revenue administration,police, health and education. The terms ofreference for this reform clearly outstri-pped the terms of its implementation. ByDecember, 2007 after failing to convince a

care-taker government to endorse thereform, Dr. Hussain was reported to havepublicly conceded failure and asked to bereplaced. ⁵⁶

But in two major ways, the reform hasarguably come to de�ne the debate oncivil services reform in Pakistan: a) Theanalytical work carried out by the reformto technically backstop its myriadproposals has become essential readingfor current governance practitioners andfuture reformers, while the proposalsthemselves are the 'go-to' benchmarksagainst which all future reforms will bemeasured; and b) The de�nition of aholistic, all-encompassing view of the civilservice has shaped the policy narrativeand carved out the reform landscapewithin which ideas and proposals can bediscussed and debated.

03

M e a s u r e m e n t o f i n s t i t u t i o n a lperformance remains a critical weak link inthe value chain of Pakistan's public sectorgovernance. There is a political consensuson the signi�cance of holding institutionsaccountable for results and successivegovernments have stressed on itssigni�cance publicly. However, a chasmpersists between the desired policyobjective of being able to distinguishbetter from poor performing institutionsand the real izat ion of a credible,systematic and iterative mechanism formeasuring, benchmarking and reportinginstitutional performance. Whateversystems that do exist remain secretive,obscure and opaque. Moreover, efforts tomeasure the ability of institutions toachieve what they set out to and to do itwith fewer resources are compromised byweaknesses of instruments for thisdetermination and the sporadic nature oftheir use. In short, political will forenhancing institutional performance isp o o r l y b a c k e d b y s y s t e m s a n di n s t r u m e n t s f o r b e n c h m a r k i n gperformance.

ObjectiveThe BGI will be an initiative for measuringa n d c o m p a r i n g p u b l i c s e c t o rperformance and comprise a range of

relevant metrics that will:� Serve as a tool for benchmarking

p e r f o r m a n c e o f p u b l i c s e c t o rinstitutions;

� Drive better performance, providingpublic sector managers with a tool foridentifying areas for improvement inindividual institutions as well as in agroup of institutions;

� Help create a competitive market forpublic sector institutions, leading toenhanced accountability, improvedservices and lowering of transactioncosts; and,

� Likely evolve into an accreditationsystem for public sector, providing abasis for budgetary allocations, linkingindividual career progression withinstitutional results and �nancial andtechnical support from donors withper formance on donor-assistedprojects.

Target Audience and MethodologyThe BGI is intended to cover the entirespectrum of public sector institutions inthe country. Moreover, it will be cross-government, meaning that it will be usedfor Federal and Provincial governments aswell as for local administrations; both atthe Federal and Provincial levels, it will alsoinclude the full range of SOEs, attached

departments, and autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations.

The reason for this ambitious coverage isto be able to gauge the performance ofeach and every type of institution in thepublic sector, allowing the governmentand legislators, as well as citizens andother stakeholders, to hold themaccountable for their actions and fordelivery of better quality of public policiesor public services. The three ways in whichthis task is proposed to be mademanageable are: implementation inp h a s e s , s e g m e n t e d s t r a t e g y f o rdeveloping BGIs (e.g. overall BGI, sector-speci�c BGI, tier-speci�c BGI) enabling anevolutionary and organic growth of theinstrument; and focusing—in the initialstages of implementation—on basicinstitutional functions performed by alltypes of public organizations.

Measurement Areas and CriteriaThe BGI will use �ve measurement areasand �fteen criteria for calculating thescores.These are outlined in �gure 1.

53 Ibid54 http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/global-centre-for-public-service-excellence/integrating-civil-service-reform-with-decentralisation.html55 http://www.ncgr.gov.pk/forms/presentation%20on%20the%20ncgr%20to%20pm.ppt.56 http://aaj.tv/2008/02/reforms-commission-fails-to-complete-task-ishrat/

The 'Better Governance Index' (BGI)

07

08

5 A

RE

AS

15

CR

ITE

RIA

, 26

IN

DIC

AT

OR

S

QUALITY OF

GOVERNANCEACCOUNTABILITY

INCLUSION AND

OPENNESSEFFECTIVENESS RESPONSIVENESS

� Clarity ofinstitutional visionand mission

� Budget accuracy

� Gender equity inhuman resourcemanagement

� Investment ininstitutionalcapacity

� Politicalaccountability

� Accountability ofcitizens

� Participatory andinclusive decisionmaking andoversight

� Proactive publicdisclosure

� Budget execution

� Implementationof priorityprograms

� Strengthening ofimplementationcapacity

� Linkage withnational/provincial/sectorial prioritiesand programs

� Mechanisms forfacilitating accessto information

� Mechanisms forpublic grievanceredress

� Use of ICT tools

I n d i c a t o r s f o r M e a s u r i n g

PerformanceT h e i n d i c a t o r s u s e d f o r e a c hmeasurement area and criteria are as

presented in Table 1, which also indicatespossible data sources. A total of 26indicators are proposed for the 15 criteriaunder �ve measurement areas. Since in

Phase I, the BGI is to be developed forFederal line ministries, the indicators areaimed at measuring performance at thatlevel.

Figure 1: Measurement Areas

Table 1: Indicators For The BGI

Quality of Governance

Clarity of institutional visionand mission

Budget Accuracy

Gender Equity in HR

Investment in CapacityBuilding

Statements are clear, brief and reect thevalues, philosophy and culture of theinstitution

Vision statement expresses in sensory terms,the future position or image of the institution

Variance between revised budget and budgetestimates

Proportion of female employees in totalworking staff

Training budget as a proportion of totalPersonnel budget

Institution's website

Annual Budget andCGA


Green Book

Measurement Area Criteria Indicators Source

Mission statement focuses on one or a fewstrategic goals

Accountability to citizens

Publication of Annual Budget on institution'swebsite

Publication of Yearbook

Majority of tenders follow PPRA rules

Use of social accountability tools

Citizens' Charter issued



PPRA reports



Accountability

Political Accountability

Timely and complete responses to PAC reviewqueries

Regular submission of brie�ngs to theStanding Committees of Parliament

PAC reports

Public Relations Officerin the institution

Inclusion and

Openness

Participatory and inclusivedecision making andoversight

Proactive public disclosure

Forums on which citizens, private sector,academia or civil society are represented

Publication of updated policies, strategies onwebsite

Availability of expenditure data Institution's website


Institution's' websiteand Public RelationsOfficer of Institution

Effectiveness

Budget execution

Implementation of priorityprograms

Completion level of priority programs

Proportion of released annual budget actuallyutilized


Strengtheninginstitutional capacities forimplementation

Training expenditure as a proportion of totalpersonnel expenditure

CGA

Green Book

09

Explicit linkage of priority programs with theVision 2025

Explicit linkage of priority programs withrelevant sector policy

Designated Official nominated under Right toInformation Act 2010

Standards for access to information servicesclearly mentioned

Designated Official for public grievanceredress and addressing references fromOmbudsmen

Availability of online services for complaints,information, registration, social media






Green Book

Green Book

Responsiveness

Linkage withNational/Provincial sectoralpriorities and programmes

Mechanisms for facilitatingaccess to information

Mechanisms for publicgrievance redress

Use of ICT tools

Standards for grievance redress servicesclearly mentioned

Note: This Summary has been extracted from a longer paper entitled, “The Better Governance Index: A Conceptual Framework for Measuring Institutional Performance”, yet to be released byUNDP Pakistan.

10

Pay and Pension Commission, 2009In 2009, the government again appointeda Pay Commission, headed by Dr. IshratHussain. The Commission based itsrecommendations on the following policyprinciples: ⁵⁷� The need to “attract, retain and

motivate talented young men andwomen into its ranks” was paramountfor effective government, whichwould lead to development andg r o w t h . T h i s w a s a c o m p l e t erepudiation of the Justice Munir thesis.

� Disparity in public and private paylevels is especially acute for highergrades (because of erosion in realterms) and technical and professionalservices. Civil service pay should belinked to comparable private jobs. Thisset aside the 'monopolist employer'theory of the Islington Commission,just as the Srinivasa Commission haddone in 1947.

� Ad hoc allowances could not offset themotivational drawbacks of low pay forpotential and current employeesgiven the risk of reversal. Similarly,perks and privileges provided in-kind,cost the government far more thanthey motivated recruitment, retentionor performance.

� Education, healthcare, law and order,and the administration of justiceshould be prioritized for pay reform.

� Pay and promotion must be linked toboth performance and ination.

� Fiscal constraints could not be igno-red. Pay reform should be phased toparcel out the �nancial burden overtime.

Broadly, the Commission proposed thefollowing measures:� All ad hoc relief allowances granted

since 1999 to be regularized as part ofthe NPS.

� The number of pay scales to bereduced from 22 to 14 – �ve for officersand nine for other grades.

� Pay scales to be raised by 50 percent inphased annual increments till 2012.

� In-kind perks to be monetized andmade part of NPS.

Implementation of these recommenda-tions has been uneven and the results areas yet unclear. The NPS were clearly notreduced in number. In 2010, the governm-

ent did provide the 50 percent increase insalaries but not through a revision in payscales and not through phased increm-ents, but as a lump sum 50 percentincrease of the BPS 2008. In 2011, �ve ad⁵⁸hoc allowances granted since 1999 to2009 were in fact, merged into the BPS-2008 which were reintroduced as the BPS-2011. ⁵⁹

Lessons LearnedThis paper offers no speci�c policysolutions, but certain 'lessons' can bedistilled from the foregoing narrative tohelp evolve a meaningful approach to theproblems highlighted throughout.

� The objectives of civil service

reform must be aligned with the

broader goals of the incumbent

government. While this may soundobvious, past pay policies have notful�lled this basic requirement.Governments have officially soughtand/or accepted 'second-best' civilservants while expecting delivery ofthe best governance/developmentoutcomes. I f the goal is socio-economic turnaround to mirror theachievements of countries such asChina, Malaysia, Singapore, South⁶⁰ ⁶�Korea, Taiwan, (among others) then⁶� ⁶�it may be remembered that thesegovernments not only explicitly soug-ht the 'best and brightest' for publicservice but also reformed theirsystems to achieve this goal.

� The Government of Pakistan does

not monopolize the 'best and

brightest' human resource. It isunclear i f this assumption wassupported by evidence even when itwas �rst declared a policy principle bythe Islington Commission in 1919. Butnow it has certainly been falsi�ed byrecent evidence which indicates botha thinning of suitable recruits and ahemorrhaging of talent from amongserving ranks. Over 57,000 posts inministries, divisions, and semiautono-mous bodies of the federal govern-ment were reported vacant in 2014.⁶⁴Currently, the government competesas an employer with the corporatesector, the international developmentindustry within Pakistan as well aspublic and private employers in other

countries, for the high-end labourmarket. It has not sufficiently corneredthe market to be able to procure thebest services without offering a viableservice structure in terms of pay,career-progression, capacity develop-ment, performance evaluation, andtenure security.

� Civil servants are not immune to

established economic principles. Anumber of reforms have miscast civils e r v a n t s e xc l u s i ve l y a s ' h o m opatrioticus', assuming that the 'bestand brightest' will opt to join, stay andperform in the service driven solely byn o n - e c o n o m i c v a l u e s , c h i e ypatriotism. Most available evidencenegates this assumption. Civil servantsare 'homo-economicus' – rationaleconomic agents seeking to maximizeutil ity. In fact, recent empiricalevidence (in sub-�elds such as public-choice theory and new institutionaleconomics) suggests that this may bemore true of civil servants than othereconomic agents. In their roles as⁶⁵service-providers, regulators andpolicymakers, civil servants may beafforded opportunities for promotingself-interest unavailable to privateactors.

� Political or ideological factors

s h o u l d n o t d o m i n a t e r e f o r m

agendas. Reforms should ideally bedesigned exclusively on an evidence-based considerat ion of humanresource requirements. In the past,structural changes have been widelyp e r c e i v e d a s b e i n g d r i v e n b yi d e o l o g i c a l a n d / o r p o l i t i c a lconsiderations. Political feasibilitymust of course remain a key criterionfor assessing any policy option, butshould not completely outweigh theneed for efficiency, effectiveness andh i g h p e r fo r m a n c e . U n l i k e t h ehistorical periods recounted in thispaper, democratic governments todaya r e t h e n o r m r a t h e r t h a n t h eexception. Gains and losses in politicalcapital should therefore be seenacross a longer-term horizon than waspreviously conceivable. In the longrun, expediency may turn out to be themore politically expensive policyposition.

57 2009 Pay and Pensions Commission Report. Based on a lecture delivered by Dr. Ishrat Hussain at '94th National Management Course held at the National ManagementCollege, Lahore on Feb 25, 2011.58 http://www.�nance.gov.pk/circulars/adhoc_allowance_medical.pdf59 Office Memorandum, No.F.1 (5) Imp/2011-419, Finance Division, (Regulations Wing), 4th July, 201160 http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/44526166.pdf61 Public Administration Singapore-style, Jon S. T. Quah, 201062 http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/eropa/unpan033712.pdf63 Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: an Impossible Dream? Jon S. T. Quah, 201164 http://tribune.com.pk/story/781234/this-seats-not-taken-thousands-of-federal-govt-jobs-remain-un�lled/65 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11077-005-2309-2

� Costing for pay reform must be

holistic and speci�c. Pay policy hasbeen driven by a narrow accounting orbudgeting perspective, given ever-present �scal scarcity concerns.Affordability models which take �xedwage bill ceilings as their point ofdeparture take a narrow view of theproblem, excluding multiple relevantfactors from review. First, historical

trends matter for pay polic y.

Calculating affordable incrementsfrom static salary budget lines ignoresreal term erosion over decades.Dozens of such scale revisions haveproved ineffectual. Second, the costs

of pay policy are not limited to the

wage bill. Any resulting attritionentails sunk costs in training as well ascosts of recruiting and retrainingreplacements. Disruption of activitiesmay cause cost overruns and delays.Turnover at senior levels may causesigni�cant losses in institutionalmemory. Un�lled vacancies createcost ly gaps, which, in suppor tMinistries/Divisions such as Planning,Law, Establishment and Finance affectall spheres of government. Corruptiondriven by under-compensation is also

a signi�cant economic cost. As aresocial welfare losses resulting fromsub-optimal policies and unevenimplementation where poorly paidcivil servants perform below par.Evidence suggests that neither theC o m p a n y, t h e C r o w n n o r t h eGovernment of Pakistan lookedbeyond the most direct �nancial costswhen determining pay levels for theiremployees. , a strictly 'dollars-Third

and-cents' approach oversimpli�esthe pricing of incentives becauseindividual positions are hidden withinstandardized grades. Optimal paysetting should be based on jobevaluation and job analysis whichbrings to light the following factors,inter alia:� Moral hazard which is likely to be

very different for a Customs Officerposted in Chaman versus a SectionO ffi c e r p o s t e d t o a Fe d e r a lministry;

� Switching costs and opportunitycosts (represented by comparableprivate sector pay) which deter-mine turnover;

� Quantum and predictability ofworkload;

� Nature of responsibility i.e. amountof �duciary risk managed, inclu-ding both �nances and personnel;

� Security of tenure and the implicitcertainty of perks and privileges;and,

� Degree of informality associatedwith access to perks and privileges;

� Premium on skills and quali�cationgiven the expected rate of returnon education and training;

� Pay levels prevailing above, belowand at par with the job in question.

� Under-implementation of reform is

counterproductive. Past govern-ments have 'cherry-picked' measuresfrom proposals submitted by reformbodies. They have also chosen todisregard proposals in their entirety orimplement them half-heartedly. Thesedecisions not only distort civil servicestructure and function but alsodiscredit reform itself.

11

12

Analysis

A n o n l i n e s u r ve y, t a rg e t i n g 1 5 0 0respondents, was conducted to gathercitizen's feedback on public servicedelivery. The survey gave an opportunityto hear from the general public being theultimate bene�ciaries of public servicesregarding their experience in dealing withand availing of services from public sectorinstitutions. The objective was to identifyinterventions to strengthen capacities andbuild effective institutions for theprovision of services for the post 2015development agenda.

AccessibilityAccessibility of the social services contin-ues to be an issue despite increased �scaltransfers and administrative powers to theprovinces.

Among the problems identi�ed in availingpublic service, poor quality of service wasranked as the highest with 18 percenturban and 13 percent rural respondentsdeeming it as such (Figure 1). Poor qualityof service was found to be most prevalentacross all sectors: 64 percent males and 49percent females rated health facilities intheir locality unsafe and inadequate; 62percent respondents raised issues withlow quality of education being given totheir children; over 60 percent respon-dents reported to have faced a problem inavailing electricity and gas supply andcomplained of the poor quality of theservices and 79 percent respondentsmarked transport facilities as non-compliant to basic safety measuresthereby hinting that the quality of servicein this sector was also unsatisfactory.

While addressing the reasons for poorquality of service, lack of technical skill wasfound to be the most common reasonamongst respondents (Figure 2). Again,there were several sector wise differencesand commonalities in identifying whatreason was most prevalent. In the healthsector, unavailability of quali�ed staff,inadequate health emergency infrastr-ucture, and no or expensive medicationswere identi�ed as the major reasons forpoor quality of service. Likewise, lack ofstaff and missing facilities were found to bethe most common reasons in the

education sector. The electricity and GasSupply Sector identi�ed long waitingt i m e s, h i g h p r i ce o f s e r v i ce s a n dincompetence of staff as the main culpritsbehind poor quality of service. Lowincentives, lack of technical knowledgeand lack of staff were the problem areas inthe transport sector. There was a lowfemale response rate with reference toaccess to police services. This may be

attributed to: a) women's low levels ofinteraction with police and legal servicesin Pakistani society, and b) fear of reportingto police or formal justice mechanisms.Over half the sample reported: 'Policematters should only be dealt by malemembers in household or communities'.Therefore, factors of pre-de�ned genderroles also shone through.

Assessing Public Service Deliverythrough Citizen Surveys:Key �ndings of Two Perception Surveys

Figure 1: Problems in Availing Public Service20%

18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

4%

9%10%

6%

13%

18%

14%

4%3%

6%

8%

6%

ExpensiveService

InhospitableStaff

Poor Qualityof Service

UnhygenicEnvironment

Long waitingtime

Other

Dimensions of Public service delivery covered in the online survey:Efficiency: The respondents were asked about the quality, timeliness and accessibilityof the range of services they have availed. This also included safety measures, staffquality etc.

Inclusivity: Respondents were asked about the ability of institutions and serviceproviders to foster inclusivity and managing the demand from an increasing diversity ofactors.

Accountability: Respondents were asked if they were aware with the policy and legalsafeguards available for the accountability of the public service providers.

Transparency: Respondents were asked if they had sufficient access to information onpublic utilities and their services.

Grievance redress: Respondents were asked questions related to grievance redressmechanisms, whether they know where to �le a complaint, if yes, had they �led acomplaint, received a response, and were satis�ed with the response?

Rural

Urban

Survey 1: Online Survey on Citizen's Feedback on Public Service Delivery

13

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Figure 2: Reasons for Poor Service Delivery

Lack ofStaff

9%

21%24%

26%

12%

7%

Staff notavailable

Lack ofperformance

incentives

Lack oftechnical

skill

Lack ofrequired

equipment

Others

Figure 3: Percentage of Respondents Awatre of Institutions/

Legislation/ Mechanism Available for Public Service Complaints

20%

Not aware at all

15%10%5%0% 25%

Lack of clarity

Somewhat aware

Fully aware

17%

12%

13%

5%

23%

15%

9%

6%

Urban

Rural

10%

27%

40%

23%

Figure 4: Effectiveness of Madia in Ensuring Accountability

of Public Institutions

Very Effective Slightly Effective Not Effective Don’t Know

InclusivityThe top three reasons why respondentsmay have faced difficulty in accessing apublic service included: a) favoritismresulting in discriminatory supply of suchservices (42 percent), b) deprived due togender (26 percent) and deprived due tosome disabil ity or being par t of amarginalized cohort (11 percent).

A follow up question asked if suchdiscrimination in supply of public serviceswas a regular phenomenon. For 27 percentthe incidence of discrimination inaccessing public service is recurring. 61percent had reported this discriminationor grievance however less than half wereprovided relief.

Survey results also disclosed that majorityrespondents suffered a lack of awarenesson government policies, legislative mech-anisms and anti-corruption institutions(Figure 3).

It was also useful to discover that majorityof respondents obtained informationregarding public services through thewebsite (28 percent urban and 17 percentrural). It is also interesting to note that avery integral source of information, themedia, was seen by majority as 'slightlyeffective' in ensuring accountability ofpublic institutions (Figure 4).

IntroductionA s u r ve y o f 4 8 5 co m m u te r s b o t hcommercial and non-commercial wasdone in the months of September andOctober at four locations – Karachi, Sukkur,Lahore and Peshawar. The main objectiveof this study was to focus on thebene�ciaries/feedback regarding theser vices of Nat ional H ighway andMotorway Police (NHMW) as an institution.Several factors were kept in considerationwhilst conducting this study, includingage of respondents, educational backgr-ound, nature and frequency of travel.

Summary of �ndings

i. Vehicle Breakdown and the

Response of the NHMW PoliceOn Grand Trunk (G.T) Road/Highways, 76percent of all such respondents thatwitnessed a breakdown, owing to anaccident or otherwise, reported calling theNHMW Police (Figure 1). This shows thehigh level of con�dence that people havein this institution. While only a fewreported not calling the police, when

Survey 2: Assessing the

feedback of a high performance

public institution-The National

Highways and Motorway Police

14

% of respondntse

Figure 1: No. of respondents who called the NHMW Police

Motorway

G.T Road/ Highways

74 75 76 77

Figure 2: Rating of Police Performance on Timeliness in

Reaching Out to Vehicle Breakdown Sites

EXCELLENT GOOD SATISFACTORY POOR

150%

100%

50%

0%

SUKKUR KARACHI LAHORE PESHAWAR

Figure 3: Rating of Police Performance on

Helping/ Providing Assistance


150%

100%

50%

0%


asked for reasons, more than 50 percentreported that there was no need to call thepolice for the incident as the matter wasmutually resolved by the commuters whowere involved and bystanders. Only 3.1percent reported not calling the policebecause the police helpline did notrespond or the police did not show updespite been sent messages.

On Motorways, 75 percent of all respond-ents reported calling the police. Not even asingle respondent reported that the policewas not around in case of an accident. Onlyone percent reported that the policeshowed up late at the site of the break-down.

Respondents were also asked to rate theperformance of the police on a scale of 1(Excellent) to 4 (Poor). Figures 2 and 3depict their performance in two differentcategories.

These �gures are highly indicative of theexcellent performance of the NHMWpolice as a force which is ever present tohelp and resolve situations arising frombreakdowns on the NHMW network. Noreasonable complaint was found.

ii. Accident and the Response of

the NHMW PoliceThere were a total of 124 accidents on theG.T Road/Highway as opposed to only 34on the Motorway. Overall, 76 percentrespondents reported calling the police incase of an accident on the G.T Road/Highway, and 77 percent on the Motorway.The respondents were asked to rate thepolice in terms of timeliness in respondingto accidents. Figure 4 sums up the results.The overall rating for performance waspositive.

iii. Police Checking for Violation

for Road Use LawsRespondents were asked if they were everapprehended by the police for violation ofroad use laws like over-speeding, notwearing seatbelts etc. A total of 386respondents on the G.T Road/Highwayanswered in the positive, out of which 82percent reported that they were �ned onbeing apprehended. As opposed to this,128 respondents on the Motorway answe-red in positive, out of which 78 percentreported that they were �ned on beingapprehended. This indicates a betterfollowing of the law on part of the latter.

Respondents were also asked to rate theseactions based on their fairness. The ideawas to see how these apprehensions wereviewed by those who were targeted. The

Table 1: Responses on NHMW Police Fairness in Apprehensions

GT ROAD/HIGHWAY MOTORWAYAPPREHENDEDBY THE POLICE

FAIR FAIRUNFAIR UNFAIR

91 percent

100 percent

86 percent

94 percent

96 percent

9 percent

0 percent

14 percent

6 percent

4 percent

-

-

90 percent

92 percent

91 percent

-

-

10 percent

8 percent

9 percent

SUKKUR

KARACHI

LAHORE

PESHAWAR

CUMULATIVE

15

Police force must not look vindictive andmust not be seen to be unfair. Table 1 sumsu p t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g l y p o s i t i v eresponses. The fact that the NHMW Policeare able to apprehend without being seenas unfair is a great achievement on theirpart.

iv. NHMW Police's Role in

I n c r e a s i n g R o a d L a w s

AwarenessThis indicator tried to assess how muchawareness was imparted by the NHMWPolice in order to educate commutersregarding laws and the bene�ts of abidingby them. As per cumulative results, out oft h o s e w h o d i d re c e i ve t r a ffi c l awawareness on the G.T Road/Highway, onlyseven rated the Police as unfair, whereas133 rated it as fair. Likewise, out of thosewho did receive traffic law awareness onthe Motorway, 18 rated the Police as unfair,whereas 35 rated it as fair. However, amongthose who did not receive such awareness,38 percent believed that the Police wasunfair in its apprehensive action. Thisunderscores the need for the NHMW Policeto remain communicative towardsc o m m u t e r s a n d k e e p i m p a r t i n gknowledge about traffic laws.

80 percent respondents who receivedtraffic law awareness from the NHMWPolice believed that the knowledgeimparted helped them immensely. Theyopined that such awareness made theirjourney easier, free from accidents andvehicle failure, and reduced the risk oftravel signi�cantly.

v. Safety and Security of

Travelling on the NHMW

NetworkRespondents were asked if they felt safeand secure when traveling on the NHMWNetwork. Figures 5 and 6 sum up theirresponses.

Out of all the reasons respondents saidthey felt safe, two particularly went to thecredit of the Police, including forbiddanceof over-speeding and overloading(especially in case of the Motorway,) andpresence of road reectors.

vi. Public Rating of NHMW Police

on Honesty and FairnessRespondents overall gave a good rating ofthe Police on honesty and fairness in itsdealings. Commuters generally expressedsatisfaction with the Police for honesty andfairness.Table 2 sums up the results.

Mo

torw

ay

G.T

Ro

ad/

Hig

hw

ays


Figure 4: Rating of the Police on Responses to Accidents

in Terms of Timeliness

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

PESHAWAR

LAHORE

KARACHI

SUKKUR

PESHAWAR

LAHORE

KARACHI

SUKKUR

Figure 5: Feeling of Safety and Security whenTraveling

on G.T Road/ Highways

PESHAWAR

LAHORE

KARACHI

SUKKUR

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

YES NO

Figure 6: Feeling of Safety and Security whenTraveling

on Motorway

PESHAWAR

LAHORE

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

YES NO


INDIFFERENT

POOR

SATISFACTORY

GOOD

EXCELLENT

0 20 40 60 80

16

vii. Rating of NHMW Police on

H e l p f u l n e s s t o w a r d s

CommutersRespondents were asked to rate theNHMW Police on how helpful it wastowards various types of commuters onthe intercity roads. Table 3 sums up theresults. Major consensus tilted towardsgood behavior on both road networks.Overall the performance was satisfactorybut Motorway Police performed better interms of helpfulness.

viii. Rating of NHMW Police on

Respect for CommutersPolice are symbols of security andtherefore should not be associated withfeelings of hostility and negativity.Respondents were asked to rate how theNHMW Police treats them. 90 percentreported that the Police was respectfultowards them. Figure 7 sums up theirresponses.

ix. Rating of NHMW Police on

Enforcement of the LawOne of the reasons for the effectiveness ofthe NHMW Police is their commitmenttowards enforcing the law. Respondentswere asked to rate on the same. 86 percentgave positive responses thereby furtherstrengthening the service delivery of theNHMW Police. On helpfulness, vantransporters (50 percent) and bus drivers(35 percent) gave the most positive reviewto the NHMW Police on its enforcementefforts of the law. Table 4 depicts thecumulative results.

i. Rating of NHMW Police on

Abolition of theVIP CultureSpecial treatment given to VIP's has longbeen a common complaint against thepolice force in the country. Respondentswere therefore asked to rate as to whetherthe NHMW Police was equal in terms oftreatment with VIP's and the generalpublic. 75 percent respondents felt thatthe Police was doing enough to curtail theVIP culture on the intercity road network.Figure 8 sums up the responses.

xi. Rating of NHMW Police on

PatrollingPolice patrolling ensures law abidingbehavior by commuters.When questionedon whether commuters were satis�ed withpolice patrol, 87 percent responded in thepositive thereby reinforcing that theNational Highway and Motorway networkis well protected with effective policesurveillance and patrol. Figure 9 illustratesthe results.

Table 2: NHMW Police Rating on Honesty and Fairness

GT ROAD/HIGHWAY MOTORWAY

40 percent

35 percent

16 percent

5 percent

5 percent

EXCELLENT

GOOD

SATISFACTORY

POOR

INDIFFERENT

RATING

58 percent

21 percent

14 percent

2 percent

5 percent

Table 3: NHMW Police Rating on Helpfulness towards Commuters

GT ROAD/HIGHWAY MOTORWAY

28 percent

46 percent

17 percent

5 percent

5 percent

EXCELLENT

GOOD

SATISFACTORY

POOR

INDIFFERENT

RATING

30 percent

50 percent

14 percent

2 percent

4 percent

Figure 8: Rating of the NHMW Police on Abolition of the VIP Culture

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

EXCELLENT

9%

21%24%

26%

7%

GOOD

SATISFACTRY

POOR

INDIFFERENT

INDIFFERENTRATING

CUMULATIVE


16 percent

Table4: Rating of NHMW Police on Enforcement of the Law

45 percent 25 percent 7 percent 7 percent

Figure 7: NHMW Police Rating on Respect towards Commuters

CUMULATIVE

14 percent

86 percent

YES

NO

0 percent

100 percent

0 percent

100 percent

11 percent

89 percent

7 percent

93 percent


Table 5: Does the NHMW Police Seek Bribes?

17

xii. Rating of NHMW Police on

I n c r e a s i n g R o a d S a f e t y

AwarenessKnowledge on road safety and laws isintegral to ensure safety on the road. TheNHMW Police here play a critical role inspreading awareness so that people areconstantly reminded and are well versedwith rules and regulations. When askedabout the NHMW Police efforts to increaseroad awareness about traffic laws, 83percent respondents gave the Police apositive rating on its law awareness efforts.Satisfaction was the highest in Sukkur with93 percent positive rating and lowest inLahore with 71 percent. Figure 10 sums upthe results.

xiii. Rating of NHMW Police on

Issuance of Fog and Weather

InformationFog becomes a critical issue in the winterseason. This is especially true for Lahoreand adjoining areas that experience themost amount of fog. Many a times, LahoreAirport and the Motorway M2 have to beclosed down owing to poor visibility dueto the fog. Therefore the NHMW Policehave a critical role to play by providingawareness and counsel to travellingmotorists so as to increase their safety.

The results on this question regarding thepolice's efforts on issuance of fog andweather information were received mostlyas satisfactory, however, 68 percentsatisfaction at Lahore is critical since it isthe most affected area. Figure 11 depictsthe overall picture.

xiv. I l l e g a l P r a c t i c e s a m o n g

NHMW PoliceRespondents were asked whether thePolice had been seen taking bribes fromthe commuters (as is the norm with thelocal police) or forced bus drivers to carrytheir friends as free riders. The latterappeared to be a minor issue with only 12percent reporting such incidents. In termsof the former, seven percent reported thatPolice sought bribes from the commuterswhich is not very satisfactory (Table 5). Itwas expected that the incident of Policebribery would be lower. Efforts need to bemade to ensure that the NHMW Policedoes not turn into in-city police which inknown for its corruption and bribery.

ConclusionThe performance of the National Highwayand Motorway Police has been found to besatisfactory. Satisfaction being morepronounced since most governmentorganizations perform so poorly, theperformance of NHMW Police lookssharper by contrast. There is signi�cant

Figure 11: Rating of NHMW Police on Issuance of Fog and

Weather Information

INDIFFERENT

POOR

SATISFACTORY

GOOD

EXCELLENT

0% 20% 30% 40% 60%10% 50%

PESHAWAR KARACHI LAHORE SUKKUR

INDIFFERENTPOORSATISFACTORYGOODEXCELLENT

Figure 10: NHMP Rating on Efforts to Increase Awareness

about Traffic Laws

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


Figure 9: Rating of NHMW Police on Patrolling

INDIFFERENT

POOR

SATISFACTORY

GOOD

EXCELLENT

0% 100% 150% 200%50%

PESHAWAR KARACHI LAHORE SUKKUR

18

room for improvement. Any effort in thisdirection should focus on areas fromimproved recruitment, hiring and training,to the selection of new leadership

structures. All organizations are capable ofself-learning, adaptation, adjustment,experimentation, and innovation. NHMWPolice must develop an indigenous

research wing so that change manage-ment clues emerge from within theorganization.

Inspector GeneralNational Highways and Motorway Police

When the motorway police was established, it pulled most of

its staff from the police force. Latter was generally considered

to be corrupt and inefficient whereas motorway police is

considered corruption free with high standards of services.

What made it possible?What were the key enablers?

When an organization is conceived on the basis and intention ofmaking it as a benchmark for others, then that is the real factorbehind it becoming a success story. The initial idea conceived wasaimed at establishing a police force that would be different thanthe existing one. One factor kept in mind was that all recruitmentdone was on the basis of education and fair competition, withoutany external influence. Second, the deportation formula was alsodevised on qualifications and other very specific requirements thatmade it a very tough screening process. The Motorway Institutionpresented a very different environment for candidates who cameon deputation from their traditional background, for instance, thesalary package at that time was almost a hundred percent more,there were eight hour work shifts instead of the usual 24 hour shiftsin the regular police force, the working conditions were simpler andservice conditions were cleaner. There was always an emphasisplaced on the three core values including integrity, courtesy andhelp towards general public. The major task here involvedpatrolling only. Third, immense focus has always been placed onproper training of the force inculcating in them the mindset of'service' and not of 'officer'. When the public witnessed suchinstances of humble behavior, a positive image of the MotorwayPolice began to bloom. Finally, the process and procedures such asthat of ticketing, violations etc were based on different dynamicswhen compared to traditional police. Budgetary allocationsprovided to the institution were also very substantial. A rewardsystem was also put in place whereby 25 percent of the force wasevaluated on the basis of performance, education and quantum ofhelp provided to public and then subsequently awarded with threebasic bonus salaries. The welfare package was also higher than thatof the traditional police.

Higher salary was considered one of the motivations for

joining the motorway police. However, as of present, there is

not much difference between salary and other remuneration

packages of the traditional and motorway police, as well as

other such institutions. Still, motorway police is considered

efficient and corruption free. In your view, what other non-

financial factors keep the motorway police committed and

motivated?

Non-financial factors would include the shift system andrecreational facilitation. Traditional police personnel work roundthe clock but the Motorway Police has eight hour shifts. Thensufficient recreational facilities including better accommodation,entertainment and sufficient welfare are also provided.

It is said that achieving excellence is difficult but sustaining it is

more difficult. We have seen in Pakistan that institutions take a

good start but don't maintain it in the long run. What has kept

higher standards in motorway police sustainable over such a

long time?

Ups and downs are a natural way for any process. What is importantis that that the ups are substantial and downs are marginal. Thehard work and consistency of our senior past leadership in the corevalues of the institution has a major factor to play in the longstanding success of this institute. Another major factor in the longterm success of the Motorway Police has been the zero tolerance ofexternal and internal influences. All positions and promotions arebased purely and only on merit and this merit is evaluated on anextensive monitoring system, the reporting of which reaches tillthe headquarters therefore enabling the system to be completelytransparent. We are extremely conscious in upholding the corevalues and maintaining a corruption free system. Recently, we havealso devised a new set of National Highway and Motorway Policeefficiency rules that will be notified soon, based on carefulplanning, monitoring and evaluation. Lastly, accountabilitymechanisms are vigilant and quick thereby maintaining thesmooth working of the system.

Motorway police is a success story as a public sector

institution. Keeping in view the motorway police experience,

what are the 4-5 recommendations that you would like to

provide that could make public sector institutions service

oriented, corruption free, client friendly and attractive to

competent professionals?

The major factor in the success of any institution is reflected in theinputs i.e. the human resource employed. Therefore, ensuring thatthe selection of this human resource is based completely onhonesty and integrity is a major factor in making public institutionsservice oriented, corruption free and client friendly.

Also as the famous saying goes, 'as you sow so shall you reap,'therefore proper structured training is also an integral factor in theeventual success of the institution. The training imparted willreflect in the later functioning of all the personnel and if they have aclear vision and understanding on the core values and procedures,then that will ensure a smooth functioning of the institute onground. A transparent and legal equitable reward system is alsoimportant to establish in any public service institute. It promotesmotivation within the team and pushes them to performeffectively.

Finally, the style of administration also matters. Communicationwithin the organization and different counterparts is key.

Shaukat Hayat Khan

Opinion

New Public Passion:Motivation in Public Service –A New Zealand Perspective

Ryan Orange

IntroductionIn a complex and rapidly changing worlddelivering and sustaining signi�cantimprovements in public services is criticalto quality of life and sustainable develop-ment. Public service reform is beingpursued with mixed results in a great rangeof jurisdictions to respond to this changingenvironment. Drawing on the experienceof reform in New Zealand and engage-ment with other jurisdiction's reformendeavours this article seeks to identify,what is universal and what is contextuallyunique about public service reform andidentify approaches to strengthen thechances of successful reform.

The article will focus on the concept ofNew Public Passion (NPP) and theimportance of intrinsic motivation tosustainable reform. The idea that intrinsicmotivation matters – that we will tryharder if we feel we are doing the rightthing, be more engaged if we �nd our workinteresting and more passionate about thepursuit of our values – does not appear tobe a controversial statement. The very ideaof public service is a call to intrinsic valuesof service to our community. However the�importance of intrinsic motivation is beingunderestimated or ignored in civil servicereform all over the world – right now. Too

often we fool ourselves into believing thatextrinsic motivation – the promise ofrewards and the threat of punishment –through compliance and accountabilityare enough and that intrinsic motivation isnot reliable so cannot be systematised.Intrinsic motivation is important for civilservice performance and is essential todynamism. Dynamism – the ability toadapt at pace to respond to rapid change –is essential for the civil service required in acomplex and fast changing world. If youare working on reform and not thinkingexplicitly about harnessing the intrinsicmotivation of civil servants you are notheading for the right destination andundermining the likelihood of sustainablechange.

While intrinsic motivation is criticallyimportant, it is only one aspect of

sustainable reform. The piece wil lconclude by setting out key lessons fromthe reform experience to identify what elseis required for successful and sustainablereform. This section emphasi es thezimportance of the Reform Moment andthe need for reform to be sharply focused.

The challenge: change is accelerating,complexity abounds, money is shortand morale is lowThe challenge is that the goalposts keepshifting – for the public, private and non-pro�t sector. The rate of change isaccelerating in an increasingly complexglobalised and interconnected world.

In complex networks decision-making is,fragmented but interdependent leading,

to unpredictability and rapid change as“patterns arise out of a vast array ofinteractions and seemingly out of

Fragmentation - diversesources of authority

and points ofdecision-making

Interdependence -decisions are inuenced

by the decisions ofothers and expectationsof what others might do

Micro Computer Internet

From to

Spread sheets Google

Increasingly complexand interconnected -

information technology,globalisation, rise of the

third sector

Unpredictability andrapid change - patternsarise out of a vast array

of interactions andseemingly out of

nowhere

A more interconnected, diverse and unpredictable world demands anincreased ability to adapt to a rapidly changing environment

Figure1: Change is accelerating, complexity abounds...

Ex- eputy State Services CommissionerDNew Zealand

1

1 This opinion piece is summarised from a longer paper written for and soon to be published by the UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence2 This paper does not make a distinction between Public Service Motivation (PSM) and intrinsic motivation. The core dimensions of PSM – compassion, civic duty, self-sacri�ce and attraction to public policy-making – are treated here as integral rather than separate to intrinsic motivation. For clarity 'recognition' is considered in this paper to be an extrinsic motivator that is given as a reward or withheld as a punishment.

19

20

nowhere”.�

So if a signi�cant increase in adaptability isrequired it would be ideal to be operating,in an environment of resource exibilityand enthusiastic appetite for change.However, even as demands increase, manycivil services are confronting tighter�nancial constraints and low levels ofmorale. The Sustai⁴ -nable DevelopmentGoals cannot be achi-eved without overco-ming this challenge.

New Public

Passion

The toolkit: neces-sary but insufficientThe obvious solutionto this challenge is toemploy super-heroesin every seat. If everycivil servant couldonly be trustworthy,collaborative, citizen-c e n t re d, c re a t i ve ,driven and brilliantthen surely this challe-nge would be surmo-unted. However, inthe absence of a ste-ady supply of super-heroes we have to relyon very ordinary civilservice heroes and thequality of the publicmanagement systemsthey work in reallymatters.

Most of the publicmanagement toolkitthat we rely on, how-ever, was not desig-ned for managingcomplexity and rapidchange. The historicalt o o l k i t o f P u b l i cAdministration andNew Public Manage-ment is necessary butnot sufficient andNew Public Gover-nance is attempting to bridge that gap. Itwill only do so successfully if it harnessesintrinsic motivation and builds New PublicPassion.

The idea: intrinsic motivation reallymattersNew Public Passion is about harnessingthe intrinsic motivation of public servantsto improve performance. The centralmessage is that intrinsic motivation reallymatters.

Through a primary focus on accountability

a n d m a n a g e r i a l i s m , o u r p u b l i cmanagement systems have come to over-rely on extrinsic motivation.The alignmentof incentives to drive extrinsic motivation

is a critical tool for improving performancebut will work best in partnership with thealignment of values to harness intrinsicmotivation. High levels of intrinsicmotivation are the public services naturaladvantage but that advantage needs to beencouraged and stewarded or it is lost.

We need to harness intrinsic motivation toenable dynamic andadaptive civil servantsto respond to increa-s i n g c h a n g e a n dcomplexity. In enviro-nments with constr-ained resources andlow morale, more effe-ctively harnessingintrinsic motivation isa critical lever for mai-ntaining performanceduring periods of cha-nge. Too often refor, -ms are implementedwithout any real effortto engage civil serva-nts in the drivers orbene�ts of reform in alanguage they canu n d e r s t a n d o rthrough the lens ofvalues they can relateto.

New Public Passion isnot a brand new ideabut it is a timely draw-ing together of impor-tant thinking aboutt h e l i n k b e t w e e nmotivation and perf-ormance in a publicservice context. Inaddition to practicalexperience the idea is,based on well-establi-shed theory and thedirection of privatesector thinking abouthow to respond to thechanging nature ofthe global market-place.

The idea draws onPublic Service Motivation and seeks tobuild the lessons from this body ofresearch into the heart of our public

Levers for improving motivationThe UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence identi�es the following strategiesfor strengthening New Public Passion in developing countries in the paper: The SDGs andNew Public Passion: What really motivates the civil service?��

Developing Pride and Recognition in Public Service – which stems from asense of purpose – of public or moral duty, or nationalism. It is not just about seekingreward from �nancial gain or obvious power, but reward from stimulating intellectualapplication, involvement in matters of the state, a secure �nancial life and respectedsocial standing. The sense of pride among civil servants and the public image of public��institutions represent intrinsic sources of motivation or commitment that eventuallyaffect civil servants' performance. �⁴

Establishing a Merit-based, Professional Civil Service – evidence suggests thatbuilding a merit-based civil service has been the most effective way of incentivising staff,while pay reform and performance monitoring have been less effective. Even in an�⁵environment where the civil service is politicised it is possible for the merit principle to,be implemented. In China, despite corruption, nepotism and cronyism, there exists alargely meritocratic and competent civil service, geared to advancing the commongood, which has made the world's second largest economy what it is today.�⁶

Promoting a Values-based Public Service – values such as transparency,responsibility, accountability and impartiality underpin public service. To be credible, allhuman capital management practices need to be consistent with the message that'public service matters', and these practices, from recruitment to performance�⁷management, should be reviewed to emphasise public service values in an integratedway.�⁸

Empowerment and Autonomy – civil servants need to feel that the organisationprovides them with a degree of discretion and autonomy to undertake tasks they �ndmeaningful. Very bureaucratic organisations, with high levels of red tape, are de-motivating for public managers. However, active reform efforts to increase managerialauthority and focus on results can reinvigorate Public Service Motivation. Explicitly�⁹linking the role of public officials to the Sustainable Development Goals acknowledgesthe pivotal role they play in achieving important national and global outcomes.

Employee Engagement – there is a growing trend in public sector organisations totrack 'employee engagement', in order to take action on issues raised and enhanceengagement. Given that high Public Service Motivation has been positively correlated�⁰with job satisfaction and organisational commitment, it should be incorporated intoemployee engagement practices.��

3 Bourgon, Jocelyne. 2009. . Public lecture hosted by the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, Australia, 24New Governance and Public Administration: Towards a Dynamic SynthesisFebruary.4 Bourgon, Jocelyne. 2009. New Governance and Public Administration:Towards a Dynamic Synthesis. Public lecture hosted by the Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Canberra, Australia, 24February.12 UNDP GCPSE 2015.13 Chapman, Richard A. 2013. Leadership in the British Civil Service (Routledge Revivals): A study of Sir PercivalWater�eld and the creation of the Civil Service Selection Board. Routledge, p.195.14 Haque, M. Shamsul. 2001. Pride and performance in the public service: three Asian cases. International Review of Administrative Sciences 67 (1): 99-116.15 Rao, Sumedh. 2013. Civil service reform:Topic guide. Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.16 Berggruen, Nicolas, and Nathan Gardels. 2013. Re-Politicisation vs. De-Politicisation. New Perspectives Quarterly 30 (2): 45-50.17 O'Riordan, Joanna. 2013. Public Service Motivation. Institute of Public Administration, p. 9.18 Paarlberg, Laurie E., and Bob Lavigna. 2010.Transformational leadership and public service motivation: Driving individual and organisational performance. Public Administration Review 70 (5): 710-718.19Yousaf, Momna, et al. 2014. 'Do public service motivation, red tape and resigned work satisfaction triangulate together?' International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management 63(7): 923-945.20 Manning, Nick. 2012. Improving the Contribution of Senior Staff to Program Performance presentation delivered to the BCOP of the PEMPAL network meeting March 2012. PEMPAL.21 Crosby, Durand. 2014. Improving Employee Retention in the Public Sector by Increasing Employee Engagement in Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Engaged Management Scholarship,Tulsa, OK, September 10-14, 2014.

management models. James Perry de�nesPublic Service Motivation (PSM) as “anindividual's predisposition to respond tomotives grounded primarily or uniquely inpublic institutions”. Perry's own 2010⁵review of 20 years of PSM research arguesthat the studies condu cted have built up-the evidence to indicate that high PSMimproves the attraction, selection andretention of individuals as civil servants;that PSM matters for performance (butthat there is more evidence of this at theinstitutional rather than the individuallevel); and that high PSM has an inverserelationship with preference for monetaryrewards.⁶

PSM research has shown a link betweenhaving a mission of public good, reformand effective transformational leadership.Wright found that“thei m p o r t a n c e o f a norganization's miss-ion increases emplo-yee work motivationin the public sector bymaking the job moreimportant, even aftercontrolling for theeffect of performance- r e l a t e d e x t r i n s i crewards”. Moynihan⁷and Pandey's researchindicates that red tapeand length of organi-zational membershipare negatively relatedt o p u b l i c s e r v i c emotivation, whereashierarchical authorityand reform effortshave a positive relati-onship. Together, Wright, Moynihan and⁸Pandey concluded that “given both thepublic service orientation of public organi-zation missions and the attractiveness ofsuch goals to many public employees,public sector transformational leadersmay be in a better position to activate thehigher-order needs of their employeesand encourage them to transcend theirown self-interest for the sake of theorganization and its clientele”. ⁹

The importance of intrinsic motivation isabsolutely not unique to the civil service.Gary Hamel, as an inuential thinker onimproving the performance of privatesector businesses, argues that The Future of

Management is about re -inventingmanagement to deliver innovation andrequires shifting from hierarchies tocommunities of purpose. His recipe for�⁰success is a workforce motivated to becreative rather than obedient and heargues that engagement of this workforcewill be driven by passion (35 ),percentcreativity (25 ), initiative (20percentpercent percent) and intellect (15 ) whilediligence (5 ) and obedience (0percentpercent) cease to be strong drivers.��

For the public and private sectors, theworld is becoming a more complex andrapidly changing environment.To adapt tothis environment we cannot afford to lookonly to extrinsic motivation but mustharness intrinsic motivation to driveperformance.

T h e b e n e � t s : g e n e r a t i n g t r u s t ,s u p p o r t i n g r e s p o n s i v e n e s s a n denabling dynamismHarnessing intrinsic motivation can helpto generate trust, support responsivenessand is critical to building and sustainingdynamism.

Trust is foundational. It is very difficult tohave a civil service that is responsive anddynamic if there is a de�cit of trust. Inenvironments with low levels of trust avicious circle of helplessness, apathy andself-interest can eventuate. Harnessingintrinsic motivation is one of the few waysto break out of this vicious cycle.

Responsiveness is vital and accountabilityis the chief engine of responsiveness.Wherever it can be, accountability shouldbe clear ly de�ned and r igorous lya cco u n te d fo r. H owe ve r, i n t r i n s i cmotivation particularly matters in times of�nancial constraint and low morale astapping into it more effectively may be theonly way to deliver more for less for aperiod of time and create the momentumto get over a change 'hump'.

Dynamism is critical for responding toc o m p l e x a n d r a p i d l y c h a n g i n genvironments and effectively harnessingintrinsic motivation is essential forenabling dynamism.

Sustainable Reform

T h e a p p r o a c h i npractice: sustainablereformI t i s t h r o u g h t h epractice of reform thatone learns the hardway that you underes-timate the transfor-mative potential ofintrinsic motivation atyour peril. The keylessons learnt fromthe practice of reformare summarised inFigure 2.

DiagnosisMost jur isdic t ionsalready know what isw r o n g w i t h t h e i rsystem. They may notbe having an honest

conversation about it. They frequently areconfounded by the entanglement ofpolitical dynamics (that civil service reformcannot directly address) with bureaucraticdysfunction and feel that change is toohard. But in a Reform Moment, if an honestconversation can be had that is focusseddirectly on the role of the civil service, theproblems identi�ed are usually both clearand longstanding.

Reform MomentTiming is everything in civil service reform.In a perfectly dynamic system continuous,improvement would avoid the need forreform as civil service change would keeppace with the environment in which it

Figure 2: New Zealand’s Public Passion and Reforms

What is thespeci�cproblem?

Why is now thetime to try forchange?

� Professionalism

� Accountability

� Networks

� Motivation

� Trust

� Responsiveness

� Dynamism

Diagnosis Reform Moment Focus Destination

Pick a fewthings

That areImportant and

on the path

Get the rightmandate

Announceyour intent

Move at paceand adapt as

you go

1 2 3 4 5

5 Everest-Phillips, Max. 2015.The power of 'new public passion'.The StraitTimes. November 5. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-power-of-new-public-passion

6 Perry, James L. andWise, R. S. 1990.The Motivational Bases of Public Service. Public Administration Review. 50: 367-73

7 Perry, James L., Hondeghem, Annie and Wise, Lois R. 2010. Revisiting the Motivational Bases of Public Service Motivation: Twenty Years of Research and an Agenda for the Future. Public Administration Review.70(5): 681–90.

8 Interviews with managers engaged in information management activities at US state-level primary health and human service agencies: Moyhihan, D. P., Sanjay, K. P. 2007. The Role of Organizations in FosteringPublic Service Motivation. Public Administration Review. 67: 1: 40-53. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00695.x

9 A nationwide sample of senior managers in U.S. local government jurisdictions with populations of more than 50,000: Wright, B., Moynihan, D. P. and Pandey, S. K. Pulling the Levers: Transformational Leadership,Public Service Motivation, and MissionValence.

10 Hamel, G. 2012.What Matters Now: How toWin in aWorld of Relentless Change, Ferocious Competition, and Unstoppable Innovation. Jossey-Bass.

11 Hamel, G.What Matters Now: How toWin in aWorld of Relentless Change, Ferocious Competition, and Unstoppable Innovation.

21

operates. However, we do not work inperfectly or even particularly dynamicsystems and step-changes in technology,expectations and complexity demandperiodic reforms that break parts of thesystem in order to remake them in a �t-for-purpose fashion.

There are four primary features that areconducive to a Reform Moment in whichthere is real stimulus for signi�cant changeand a chance of success.� Change gap – Where it is obvious that

what a system is capable of doing fallsshort of what is required or expected,there is a change gap. Change gaps arenecessary for a Reform Moment but arenot enough without the followingthree aspects being aligned.

� Change readiness – Any system has a

threshold for how much change it canhandle. Repeated change, whethersuccessful or not, leads to changefatigue and can have a catastrophicimpact on the harnessing of intrinsicmotivation. Picking a Reform Momentrequires an understanding of theappetite for change and the capacityfor the system to take on change at thattime.

� Trigger crisis or opportunity – Even if acivil service has a clear change gap andhas a degree of change readiness, aspeci�c trigger crisis or opportunitycreates a catalyst for change and thepotential for focus to build reformmomentum.

� Reform leadership – Leadership is vitalfor successful reform and if there is noreform leadership then there is noReform Moment. Reform leadership isrequired to break with past practiceand take the risk of doing things

differently.

If you do not have and cannot generate aReform Moment, do not attempt reform.Reform is hard, expensive and disruptivewith a high risk of failure.

FocusThe need to focus is the single mostimportant lesson that can be derivedbased on the practice of reform. There willalways be more things that would bene�tfrom change than there will be thecapacity to change them.

M ,ost importantly do not waste time andenergy on things that you cannot changein this Reform Moment. While the ultimatedestination may be to change culturalnorms in your system if you start by trying,

to change all of these at once reform will,fail.

Focus is the driver of the �ve key reformsteps:� Pick a few things – Do not try to be

comprehensive as there will always bemore things to change then there iscapacity to change them.

� That are important and on the path –Youare better off moving with urgency andcommitment to address selectedissues that are clearly important and onthe path to the destination you aretrying to reach th n running an, aexpensive and time - consumingprocess to be sure about what to do.

� Get the right mandate – Know who thecritical decision-makers are and ensurethey are signed up to the reformendeavour.

� Announce your intent – Announce yourintent to ensure that critical decision-

makers and actors are openly commi-tted to change to help sustain resolvethrough the difficult times ahead.

� Move at pace and adapt as you go –In acomplex environment it is simply notpossible to predict the full impact ofchange so be prepared to adapt as yougo to sustain momentum.

DestinationIn a complex and rapidly changingenvironment reform is a tool for impr, -oving the ability of a system to respond tochange on an ongoing basis.

The question: what does this mean foryou?Nothing is more certain than that everyReform Moment is unique and will require

a different response to enable change.There are no silver bullets for successfulreform and if someone is offering to sellyou one, think again.

However, the challenges of reform andenhancing civil service performance are auniversal experience. Every community inthe world has and will struggle with thatchallenge in their own context. Theproblems are common (e.g. politicisation,fragmentation, poor implementation,corruption, information de�cits, culturalbarriers, performance measurement) butthe experience is unique to that particularenvironment.

So in this universal and unique changeenvironment the claim of New Public,Passion is that it is important to thinkabout the intrinsic motivation of civilservants in the design of your publicmanagement system and in planning and

Diagnosis Reforms Moment Focus Detination

� Change gap� Globalisation, IT,

rise of third sector� Change readiness� 2 5 y e a r s s i n c e

major reform� Trigger crises� 2008 GFC� Reforms leadership� Deputy PM and

Finance MinisterBill English

� Trust� Responsiveness� Dynamism� Highly empowered

integrated frontlinedecision making

Poor Outcomes oncomplex cross-agency issues

� Results� Capability� Resources� Decision-rights� Data� Stewardship� Chief Executive role and incentices� FourYear Plans� Reformance Improvement Framework� System leadership� Head of State Services� Functional Leadership� State Sector Reform Leadership Group and CE

away days

Figure 3: New Zealand’s Better Public Service Reforms

22

driving reform efforts to change thedesign of your public managementsystem.

A practical example: New Zealand's

Better Public Services reform

New Zealand's Better Public Servicesreforms (2010-2015) successfully rewrotethe rules of the New Zealand publicmanagement system to enable focussedwork across agency boundaries to deliverresults, longer term planning to supportstewardship and changed leadership rolesand incentives to strengthen systemleadership. The features of the reform are�2

summarised in Figure 3.

There were four key factors that made thisthe strongest Reform Moment in New

Zealand since the 1980s reforms:� C h a n g e g a p – T h e i n c r e a s i n g

complexity and rate of change of theworld in the 2010s was impacting onNew Zealand through globalisation,information technology and the rise ofthe third sector.

� Change readiness – Radical changecomes at a high cost and after a reformas large as New Zealand's New PublicManagement changes the system can,take a while – 25 years in this case –before it is ready to take on large-scalechange again.

� Trigger cris is – The 2008 GlobalFinancial Crisis shifted New Zealandfrom surplus to de�cit and fundame-ntal ly constrained the �nancialexibility available in the civil service.While New Zealand did not enter aperiod of signi�cant austerity, agencybudgets and staff numbers werecapped after a decade of year-on-yeargrowth. Delivering better serviceswhile absorbing annual inationarypressures requires new ways of

working.� Reform leadership – Bill English, the

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister ofFinance from November 2008, was acritical champion of change and wasable to secure the support of the PrimeMinister and Cabinet for the reform

effort. He was also highly skilled atusing the language of results-ledreform to harness the intr ins icmotivation of civil servants to want tomake a difference to the lives of NewZealanders in the greatest need, whilenot resiling from providing extrinsicmotivation through clear articulationof his expectations of senior officials tosustain reform momentum.

The ten Prime Minister's Better PublicServices Results for New Zealanders have��been the central focus of successful reformimplementation. These Results wereselected because they were important andlong-standing problems that had provenresistant to previous attempts at changewhere making meaningful progress would

require collaboration between multipleorganisations (Figure 4)

The Better Public Services Results haveworked as a reform tool because of theirdegree of focus.� Pick a few things – There are only 10

Reduce working age client numbers by 25% to 220,000 from 295,000 asat June 2014, and an accumulated actuarial release of $13 billion by June2018

In 2016, 98% of children starting school will have participated in qualityearly childhood education

Increase immunisation coverage for children at 8 months to 95% byDecember 2014

Reduce �rst episode rheumatic fever hospitalisations annual rate to 1.4per 100,000 by June 2016

Reduce children experiencing substantiated abuse to 2,954 annually byJune 2017

85% of 18-year-olds will have achieved NCEA Level 2 or an equivalentquali�cation in 2017

60% of 25-34-year-olds having a quali�cation at Level 4 or above in 2018

Reduce the June 2011 violent crime rate by 20% and the youth crime rateby 25% by June 2017 and the total crime rate by 20% by June 2018

Reduce June 2011 reoffending rate by 25% to 22.5 by June 2017

Reduce December 2012 business costs from dealing with government by25% by 2017.Government services to business will have similar key performanceratings as leading private sector �rms by July 2017.

An average of 70 per cent of New Zealanders' most common transactionswith government will be completed in a digital environment by 2017

Reducing long-term welfare dependence

Increase participation in Early ChildhoodEducation

Increase infant immunisation

Reduce rheumatic fever

Reduce Assaults on children

Increase proportion of 18 year olds withNational Certi�cate of EducationalAchievement Level 2

Increase proportion of 25 to 34 year olds withNew Zealand Quali�cations framework Level 4or above

Reduce the rates of total crime, violent crimeand youth crime

Reduce re-offending

New Zealand business have a one-stop onlineshop for all Government advice and support

New Zealanders can complete theirtransactions with Government easily in adigital environment

1

2

3a

3b

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Figure 4: The Better Public Services Results and targets as at March 2016

22 See the range of Cabinet minutes on Better Public Services at: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/bps-cab-papers-minutes

23

Results: they are not everythingimportant government is doing in NewZealand and they are not evennecessarily the 10 most importantthings that government is doing.

� That are important and on the path –The Ministerial decision to not engagein a lengthy analytical and consultationprocess for determining the 10 Resultswas key to capturing the ReformMoment in early 2012.

� Get the right mandate – Labelling theResults as the ResultsPrime Minister'ssent a clear message to Ministers andcivil servants that the Results matteredand that they needed to be prioritisedagainst other work.

� Announce your intent –The radical stepof publicly declaring the Result, thetarget and accountable Ministers andofficials before having an agreedapproach was a catalyst to cross-agency engagement in a system wheremost incentives ran in the otherdirection. Six monthly reports havebeen publicly released on the progresson Results including the Cabinet paper,dashboard and underlying data.�⁴

� Move at pace and adapt as you go –There was a clear imperative foragencies to develop an approach withurgency to deliver on Ministeriale x p e c t a t i o n s a n d m e e t p u b l i creporting requirements. Having atarget in place provided a catalyst foraction and the targets and measures inturn can be strengthened on the basisof experience.

While the Results have created a successfulcentral focus for reform the challenging,reform environment and difficultiesimplementing broader change high-lighted a number of key lessons aboutwhat not to do:� Do not try and �x everything at once.

Through the early phases of the reformprocess signi�cant amounts of time,were spent trying to generate grandstructural solutions and compreh-ensive frameworks. With the power ofhindsight, these efforts carried theseeds of their own failure. The reformsprogressively gained momentum byshifting the focus from comprehensiverestructuring to improving the rules toenable change and then focussing onspeci�c areas for implementation.

� Do not focus your energy on the thingsyou cannot change directly in thisReform Moment. Whenever civil serviceleaders were brought together todiscuss reform, Chief Executives andSenior Officials would focus on the roleof Ministers and the interface between

Ministers and Chief Executives as a keybarrier to effective cross-agencycollaboration. Changing the role ofMinisters was not up for debate andconcentrating on it reduced ratherthan increased the potential forsigni�cant change. As a consequenceof focuss ing on change to thebehaviour of civil servants, the reformshave ultimately had some impact onMinisterial arrangements and behavi-ours.

� Do not ignore intrinsic motivation. Thepolicy and design work for the reformssought to harness accountabilities,i n c e n t i v e s a n d p e r f o r m a n c emeasurement to drive change. How-ever, coming from a New PublicManagement mind-set led to underp-laying the importance of capturinghearts and minds in reform implemen-tation. The ten Results successfullya l i gn e d i n t r i n s i c a n d e x t r i n s i cmotivation, but this was more byaccident than design. The Resultsspoke to the key drivers of why many ofthe people working on the Results hadbecome public servants in the �rstplace. The passion of the leaders andteams for improving the lives of newZealanders was essential in sustainingtheir efforts to overcome resistance toworking differently. .

23 Available at: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/�les/Snapshot-March2016.pdf24 See: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/better-public-service

24

Opinion

Technology, Innovation ande-Governnace – The Caseof Pakistan

Introduction and ContextThe quest for innovation in public sectorgovernance and service delivery is notnew and political governments all over theworld have been seeking better ways toserve their citizens. Innovation is oftenconsidered a 'magic concept' that can be�used to improve not only the effectivenessand efficiency of the public sector but alsosometimes its legit imac y throughimproved capability to handle societalchallenges . Governments all over the�wo r l d t h u s co n t i n u o u s l y l o o k fo rinnovations in public service delivery withvarying objectives such as improvingefficiency, reducing costs, enhancingcitizen satisfaction, introducing freshmanagement paradigms or creating newcapabilities to improve overall capacity.These innovations can be motivated bypolitical point scoring, �scal constraints,inability to tackle particular challenges oreven purely altruistic reasons, butirrespective of the driving force behindthem, these often result in betteroutcomes for the public.

The advent of technology during the lasttwo decades has especially changed theface of governance globally, bringing in ahost of innovations in various aspects ofpublic service delivery. However, theseimprovements have also increasedcitizens' expectations, who in the 21stcentur y have become increasinglydemanding and quality conscious. Thechanging role of the private sector in thisarena cannot be ignored, where it hasventured into various domains creatingnew solutions and exerting additionalpressure on the governments to performbetter.

Situation in PakistanThese global changes, coupled withincreasingly aware 21st century citizens,have also compelled public sector inPakistan to evolve and make way fortechnology. The country experimentedwith various institutional models duringthe past few years, both at federal andprovincial level, to promote e-governanceand stimulate innovation, through use oftechnology. Although these institutionshave witnessed mixed success, the face ofthe government has evolved signi�cantlyin recent years, with rampant use of socialmedia, video conferencing facilities forcommunication, websites and portals for

various departments, use of onlineservices in selected areas and digitizationof massive government archives such asland records, etc.

However, it is not all good news asaccording to the UN Global E-governmentSurvey (2014) , Pakistan ranked 158th with�an e-government development indexmerely at 0.2580, putting it amongst thebottom 30 countries globally, anked by⁴others like Afghanistan, Myanmar andTimor. The situation has only worsenedwith time, as Pakistan was ranked 156th in2012, with an e-government developmentindex of 0.28. Other countries in the regionincluding India, China and Bangladeshoutperformed Pakistan and were ranked at1 1 8 t h , 7 0 t h a n d 1 4 8 t h p o s i t i o n srespectively, improving from 125th, 78thand 150th in 2012 (Table1).

This table also reveals that while Indiaexceeds Pakistan on all counts, whencompared with Bangladesh, Pakistan fareswell in terms of infrastructure but lagsbehind in online services provision andhuman capital.

Despite this fall in international rankings,the last few years have witnessed anumber of new technological innovations

Country RankOnline Service

Component

Telecommunica�onInfrastructureComponent

Human Capital

Component

Pakistan

India

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Malaysia

China

Myanmar

Afghanistan

158

118

148

106

52

70

175

173

0.3228

0.5433

0.3465

0.3622

0.6772

0.6063

0.0236

0.1811

0.1174

0.1372

0.0941

0.3054

0.4455

0.3554

0.0084

0.1472

0.3337

0.4698

0.3866

0.6786

0.7119

0.6734

0.5288

0.2418

Source: UN E-government Survey 2014

Hasaan Khawar

�Pollitt, C. & G. Bouckaert (2011, 3d ed.), Public Management Reform: A comparative analysis. Oxford: OUP

�Bekkers, V., J. Edelenbos & B. Steijn (2011) An Innovative Public Sector? Embarking on the Innovation Journey, in: Bekkers, V., J. Edelenbos & B. Steijn (eds.), Innovation in the public sector: linking capacity and

leadership. Houndsmills: Palgrave McMillan; 197-222

�United Nations E-Government Survey 2014, Annex p.202. Available at https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/portals/egovkb/documents/un/2014-survey/e-gov_complete_survey-2014.pdf

⁴The survey covers 193 countries worldwide and is conducted every two years.

Former civil servant belonging toPakistan Administrative Service

(formerly District Management Group)

Table 1: Coutry Rankings

25

emerging on the public sector governancecanvass in Pakistan. These innovationsvaried greatly in their nature and rangedfrom themes like m-governance, datamining and big data, to automation ofprocesses and digitization of records; anduse of satellite imagery and GeographicInformation System (GIS) to open data,citizen engagement and social account-abil ity. The sector spread of thesetechnological innovations also appears tobe quite vast, covering rural and urbandevelopment and planning; agricultureand livestock; justice, law and order; waterand sanitat ion; health; education;transport and communications; irrigation;excise and taxation; relief and rehabili-tation; and travel and tourism.

While it may be difficult to mention all ofthese brilliant innovations, there arecertain enabling initiatives and dominanttrends that have changed the landscape ofe-governance in the country. NationalDatabase and Registration Authority(NADRA) for instance is one of suchexamples. The organization has reportedlycreated one of the largest biometricdatabases in the world, registeringmillions of citizens in the country. Theinnovation that may seem simple in natureinvolved multiple technological andpolitical challenges. Based on this massivedatabase, the government now hassigni�cantly enhanced capability for a hostof ancillary services such as mobile usersveri�cation, voters validation, tax payersidenti�cation, etc. Similarly, World Bankfunded Project for Improvement toFinancial Reporting and Auditing (PIFRA)provides another example of a landmarkinitiative, strengthening the �nancialmanagement backbone of the country.The project spanning over many yearsbrought basic �nancial discipline at alllevels of government including federal,provincial, and local governments,through implementation of SAP-basedsystem. The project also helped in creatinga repository of all government expend-iture and receipt transactions withimproved transparency and account-ability.

At the provincial level, two leading trendsthat have been adopted across a numberof sectors in recent years include the use ofsatellite imagery and GIS technologycoupled with android-based smart phonesand introduction of extensive citizenfeedback and communication systems.

The former trend, popularly known as'smart monitoring', makes use of geo-tagged data to improve teachers 'attendance, enhance functioning of publichealth facilities, augment solid wastem a n a g e m e n t s y s t e m a n d b o o s tvaccination coverage. The latter model,originally pioneered in Jhang, a ruraldistrict in Punjab, has resulted in itswidespread replication whereby citizensare proactively contacted for theirfeedback regarding public services.Furthermore, projects like Safe City aregenerating loads of data for providing real-time information and intelligence andcreating a superior quality emergencyresponse system, whereas massivedigitization of land records in Sindh,Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa havefacilitated citizens' access to these records.Online interfaces for various servicesincluding job applications and admissions,FIR registration and passport tracking havea l s o g r e a t l y b e n e � t t e d c i t i z e n s .Consequently, these technology-backedinnovations have greatly enhancedgovernment's capability to improvegovernance.

Way ForwardWith the limited overall use of technologyin the government and a fairly smalltechnological base, public sector providesplent y of room for appl icat ion oftechnology with signi�cant expectedimpact. However, promoting innovation ingovernment relies on multiple factors thatneed to be present in parallel to ensuredesired results. Many of these factors areoften beyond the control of individualorganizations and are rather dependenton the macro environment outside,meaning thereby that complexity of theinstitutional surroundings and politicalcontext can make a signi�cant difference(Bhatta, 2003 ; Pollitt 2003 ; Hartley 2005 ).⁵ ⁶ ⁷Therefore, in order to stimulate innovation,there is a need for a coherent framework ora well-synergized innovation ecosystem,formalized through a national innovationpolicy. Such an ecosystem can providefavourable infrastructure and an enablingenvironment for innovations to take roots.Countries in which governments havecreated such ecosystems, such asSingapore, Sweden and Finland, withe m p h a s i s o n b u i l d i n g n e t w o r k s ,improving coordination and regulationsand promoting awareness have witnessedg r e a t e r s u c c e s s w i t h p r o m o t i n ginnovation .⁸

The ecosystem, amongst other integralco m p o n e n t s , s h o u l d h ave a we l l -structured mechanism to encourage andstrengthen innovations and providingthem with an enabling environmentwhere they can be nurtured. Despite therecent proliferation of technology ingovernance, the government does nothave a consistent approach to motivatevarious untapped sources of innovations,such as citizens, employees and externaland internal partners.

From the e-governance perspective, thereis a need to develop a comprehensivedigital government strategy on how e-governance would be embedded in thei n s t i t u t i o n a l a r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h egovernment. Such a strategy would play acritical role in complementing variousinnovations in the public sector andfacilitating a digital transformation. Thisshould be supplemented throughpermanent institutional anchor forinnovation-related measures to drive theinnovat ion agenda across var iousfunctional areas and sectors. The visionshould be to promote widespread use of e-governance within government throughc r e a t i n g f u n c t i o n i n g m o d e l s f o rreplication across the country, ultimatelyleading to establishment of smarter cities.

Last but not the least, knowledge creation,transfer and commercialization are alsocritical for a well-functioning innovationeco system. While this role is played byacademia in the developed world, there isa need to stimulate such knowledgec r e a t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y a n d t h egovernment can catalyze this processthrough targeted interventions andfacilitating research. This could be donethrough making research grants onpriority areas, in line with nationalinnovation policy and private sectorgrowth needs. Such grants can also bemade for establishment of technologytransfer offices within universities, so thatthe research produced can be linked to thep r i v a t e s e c t o r. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h egovernment can play an effec t iveregulatory role in intellectual propertyr i g h t s e n fo rce m e n t to e n co u r a g einvestment in knowledge creation.

ConclusionThe increasing mobile density has played ak e y ro l e i n d e e p e n i n g t h e u s e o ftechnology and spreading innovations.With more than 130 million mobile phone

⁵ Bhatta, G. (2003) Don't just do something, stand there! – Revisiting the issue of risks in innovation in the public sector,The Innovation Journal,Vol. 8. No. 2

⁶ Pollitt, C. (2003),The Essential Public Manager, Buckingham, Open University Press

⁷ 7 Hartley, (2005) Innovation in governance and public services: past and present, Public Money & Management, pp27-34.

⁸ Vertova. G (2014).The State and National Systems of Innovation: A Sympathetic Critique. Retrieved from http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_823.pdf

⁹ The Public Innovator's Playbook: Nurturing Bold Ideas in Government

26

subscribers, 39 million Internet users andnine million smart phone owners, Pakistanis at the threshold of technological takeoff,offering an unprecedented opportunity

for the government to better serve thisexpanding pool of digitally connectedcitizens. The only way to make it happen isstrong political commitment with a well-

thought out policy leading to creation of avibrant innovation ecosystem.

A Technology and Strengthening Democracy Workshop underway

© UNDP Pakistan

27

IntroductionSince the turn of the century, Pakistan haswitnessed a rising demand from thecitizens for better service delivery by thestate machinery. This, along with vocalelectronic and print media, technologicala d v a n c e m e n t m a k i n g a c c e s s t oinformation faster and easier, has createdenormous performance pressures onpublic officials, who are responsible for keyinputs in policy formulation and itsimplementation. This consequently,underscores the need for capacity buildingof public sector managers in new skills,tools and methods with regard to publicservice delivery mechanisms. There is alsoa n e e d fo r p u b l i c s e c to r t r a i n i n ginstitutions to constantly review and revisetheir training programmes in the light ofemerging challenges. �

Evolution of public sector trainingOn independence, Pakistan adopted, witha few modi�cations, the structure ofservices existing in pre-independenceIndia. At the federal level (BS-17 and

above), the two categories of services were(a) All Pakistan Service (comprisingPakistan Administrative service and PoliceService of Pakistan), and (b) The CentralServices. The latter consisted of 13 servicesin all, including Pakistan Foreign Service,Accounts Services, Pakistan Customs andExcise Service, Pakistan Taxation Service,etc. 2 “The inherited administrative systemwas based on the generalist tradition whichemphasized learning through experiencerather than through conscious formaltraining”. 3

Post independence, four distinct phasescan be traced with regard to policyinitiatives in public sector training. Till theearly 1960s, the training offered to publicsector managers was, by and large, of pre-service nature. The �rst major traininginstitution to be established in 1948 wasthe Pakistan Administrative ServiceAcademy (later renamed as Civil ServicesAcademy), which imparted pre-servicetraining to officers of Pakistan Adminis-trative Service (PAS). Subseq-uently, pre-ser v ice tra in ing inst i tut ions wereestablished for other services also forspecialized, job related training. 4

The requirement for in-service trainingwas �rst highlighted in the �rst �ve yearplan ( launched in 1955) . The Planrecognized government's need for anadministrative machinery, capable ofeffectively implementing its economicand social programmes. This resulted in5

the Public Administration Training Policyof 1960, focusing on preparing civilser vants for national developmentt h ro u g h t r a i n i n g i n d e ve l o p m e n tadministration. A number of institutionslike the Pakistan Administrative College(PASC), Lahore, and National Institutes ofPublic Administration (NIPA), Karachi andLahore, were setup to provide in-servicetraining to high ranking and mid-

management level civil servants. The maincourses conducted by these institutionsfocused on policy development, manage-ment and economic and social develop-ment. 6

The major problem in the implementationof the above training policy was the federalagencies' reluctance to nominate officersfor training. Thus, some key decisions weretaken in 1961. For the �rst time, trainingwas linked with promotion; various levelsof officers to be trained in differentinstitutions were de�ned, and quotas forfederal and provincial services in eachtraining institution were �xed. The policyalso required preparation of evaluationreports by the training institutions andtheir consideration at the time ofpromotion, and a post training impactassessment. These policy initiatives, at7

best, had partial success only.

The third phase of public sector trainingcame about after the AdministrativeReforms of 1973, which replaced thefederal civil services with occupationalgroups and re-classi�ed bureaucracyunder 22 salary grades. Accepting theneed for esprit de corps and harmonyamong members of the federal civilservices, a pre-service Common TrainingProgramme (CTP) for all occupationalgroups immediately after recruitment, wasinstituted at the Civil Services Academy(CSA), in 1973. On completion of the CTP,8

each occupational group proceeded to itsrespective specialized training institution,for job speci�c training. This pre-servicetraining structure continues to date.

The last major change in public sectort r a i n i n g r e g i m e o c c u r r e d a f t e rimplementation of the devolution plan in2000, when the government re-organizedthe training structure of the civil servicesthrough establishment of National School

Public Sector Training: EquippingCivil Servants for the Challenges ofModern Day Governance

Arifa Saboohi

Director GeneralCivil Services Academy

Lahore

1Public Sector Training in Pakistan Conference Report 2012, http:// www.asp.org.pk/knowledge_base/pdfs/Public_ sector_training-institutiious.pdf

Dr. Agha Iftikhar Hussain “The Civil Services” in Government & Administration in Pakistan; Editor Jameelur Rehman Khan; Pakistan Public Administration Research Center 1987; p127-1312

Dr. M. Fazil Khan, “Administrative and Management Training and Education in Pakistan” in Government & Administration in Pakistan; Editor Jameelur Rehman Khan; Pakistan Public Administration Research3

Center 1987; p 368

Ibid, p 374 -3784

Ibid, p 369 - 3865

Ibid, p 3706

Ibid, p 371-3737

Dr. Agha Iftikhar Hussain “The Civil Services” in Government & Administration in Pakistan; Editor Jameelur Rehman Khan; Pakistan Public Administration Research Center 1987; p1398

Opinion

28

of Public Policy (NSPP), under the NSPPOrdinance, 2002. An autonomousorganization with a Board of Governors(BOG) headed by the President of Pakistan,NSPP has been given the mandate toprovide pre and in-service training,instructions and research in public policy,public administration, law, economics,�nance and management sciences. ItsBoard has the power to declare anygovernment training institution as itsconstituent unit (so far, these powers havebeen exercised in case of CSA and NIPAsonly). It is also required to serve as aresearch institute for federal governmenton matters of public policy.

The structural changes resulted in themerger of PASC and NIPA, Lahore, in theNSPP. PASC was converted into theNational Management College (NMC), andNIPA Lahore into Senior ManagementWing (SMW) of NMC. NIPA's at Peshawar,Quetta and Karachi were renamed asNational Institutes of Management (NIMs)and, along with CSA, Lahore, were madethe School's constituent units. A Mid-career Management Course was intro-duced for BS-18 officers at NIMs. Two newinstitutes, National Institute of PublicPolicy (NIPP), and Executive DevelopmentInstitute (EDI) were established as NSPP'sintegral units to conduct quality researchon public policy issues, and providecollaborative learning opportunities toleaders in public and private sectorsrespectively.

Situational analysis of Current

Training RegimePublic sector training institutions havecome a long way since their inception. Interms of training infrastructure, they arewell established. Training provided atthese institutes, at various levels (from BS17-21), has developed and matured over aperiod of time. Since the establishment ofNSPP, training is more rigorous and there isa renewed focus on developing corecompetencies required at var iousmanagement levels. Competencies likeevidence based decision making andproblem solving, leadership, teambuilding and resource management,remain common to all managementcourses conducted by the NSPP and itsconstituent units. The Senior and NationalManagement Courses also focus oninculcating skills like policy formulationand strategizing policy implementation.The curriculum, training methodology andevaluation of training programmesconducted for the same level of officers atNIMs located in all provincial headquartersand Islamabad, has also been standard-

ized.

While the nature of courses conducted atthese inst i tut ions stays rooted inm a n a g e m e n t a n d l e a d e r s h i p, t h ecomplexity of modern day governancechallenges is increasingly compellingtraining institutions to focus on new skillsin partnership with other institutions. Onesuch partnership is with the Centre forEconomic Research Pakistan (CERP). Thishas enabled NSPP to use training moduleson evidence based decision makingdeveloped by CERP in association withJohn F. Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University. The ICT module hasbeen revamped and reinforced keeping inview the emerging need for e-governance.The current ICT and Apps developmentmodule, designed and conducted with thehelp of Punjab Information TechnologyBoard, sensitizes participants about use oftechnology tools for enabled monitoring,intervention and decision making basedon data, for better governance and servicedelivery. By and large, the trainingmethodology is now more focused onworkshops, seminars, simulation exercisesand syndicate mode learning.

Despite the above gains, most civilservants perceive public sector trainingprogrammes as a means for termination ofprobationary period (in case of pre-servicetraining), and promotion (in case ofmandatory in-service courses). Thereappears little motivation to undergotraining for skil l development andprofessional growth. In a perceptionsurvey of civil servants conducted in 2007,80 percent respondents cited foreigntraining superior to domestic training,identifying the quality of faculty and bettertraining content and methodology, as themajor reasons (Figure 1). 9

The efficacy of any training institution is

dependent on the quality of its faculty.Attracting and retaining the best facultypositions, from the academia, andespecially from within the services,remains the greatest challenge for publicsector training institutions. Unlike thearmed forces, where being selected for aninstructional assignment is a matter ofprestige, a civil servant opting for thetraining institute is generally, looked uponas having failed in the mainstream. Postingat a training institution thus, needs to beincentivized, not only monetarily (whichhas been done in the shape of anadditional salary to instructors), but also interms of giving preference to faculty thathas proved its worth in training institu-tions, in selection to key positions in thegovernment and promotion to higherrank. Training institutions also need todevelop a recruitment structure and salarypackage that will attract the best from theacademia, so as to have the right mix ofacademics and practitioners on theirfaculty.

Another reason for the less than optimalperformance of the training institutions isthe lack of coordination between theformer and the government departments,to determine the desired outcomes of thetraining programme. Training needsassessments (TNAs) have, at best, beenconducted infrequently, by the employersor the training institutions. The traininginstitutions thus depend on the faculty'sexperience, and feedback received fromthe participants of each course, todetermine the training needs andformulate and revise i ts curr iculaaccordingly. Conducting periodical TNAs,based on stakeholders needs in terms ofrequired competencies to achieveorganizational goals, are thus essential.

There is no formal mechanism to evaluatewhether training positively affects thetrainees performance at his/her workplace. Human resource issues preventtraining institutions to follow up ontrainees' performance pursuant to thetraining course. Third party impactevaluations would assist training institutesre-examine their training curricula andteaching methodology.

On completion of a training course, adetailed evaluation report on the trainee'sperformance is sent to the employer,which includes an assessment on his/herfuture posting and promotion potential.T h i s a s s e s s m e n t i s b a s e d o n t h edemonstrated performance of the traineeduring the period of the course. Theevaluation criterion is well identi�ed and

44

25

20

Better Instructors

Figure 1: Training: Foreign v/s

Domestic (%)

Richer Content Better Methodology

Nadeem Ul Haque &Idrees Khawaja “Public Service through the eyes of Civil Servants” in PIDE Series on Governance & Institutions, 20079

29

has evolved over a period of time.Unfortunately, the Human ResourceM a n a g e r s o f v a r i o u s g ove r n m e n tdepartments rarely use these reports fordetermining future postings of the traineeor their capacity building in weak areasidenti�ed in the reports. These reports areconsidered only at the time of promotion.The weightage assigned to training withinthe promotion policy (15 percent), is notsigni�cant. Consequently, more often thannot, the recommendations of the traininginstitution with regard to promotion andfuture posting potential, are ignored bythe selection/promotion board, unless it isa borderline case. There is a strong case forenhancing the training reports weightageas these can effectively offset the assess-ment of the annual Performance Evalu-ation Reports, which are generally exagg-erated.

Except for the Specialized traininginstitutions whose courses are morealigned with the speci�c job requirementsof their trainees, the main training coursesoffered by NSPP and institutions under it,a im to enhance management andleadership skills. Domain related trainingabove BS-17 has yet to receive theattentions it deserves. This is also an areai d e n t i �e d b y p a r t i c i p a n t s o f t h emandatory courses held by the NSPP andits constituent units for BS 18 and above.Short duration but intensive courseswhich build upon the domain knowledgeof the officer and improve his/hertechnical skills, can signi�cantly enhancethe officer's ability for better servicedelivery. Such courses can be conductedbest at the SpecializedTraining Institutionsof different services.There is thus, a need tostrengthen the Specialized TrainingInstitutions (STIs) as well as moreinstitutionalized collaboration among thevarious STIs to leverage each other'sstrengths.

Lastly, the technical and professionalcadres at the federal and the provincialgovernments, do not receive systematictraining during their careers to acquirenew techniques and knowledge, relevantto their professions. This is also true for BS16 and below officials who comprise thebulk of government employees and inmost cases, have a direct interface withpublic-'patwari' in the revenue depart-ment, an inspector in the police depart-ment, an appraiser in the customsdepartment being a few examples. Publicservice delivery cannot improve withoutequipping them with the required skills.There has to be a bottoms up approach totraining as well.

ConclusionVision 2025 developed by the governmentof Pakistan, recognizes institutionaldevelopment and modernization of publicsector as one of the pillars of developmentand growth framework. It also stresses theimportance of having a skilled, motivated,result focused, high performance civilservice which is responsive to citizens'needs. Public sector training institutes canplay an important role in improving theknowledge and skill set of civil servants.But for this to happen, the gaps identi�edabove have to be bridged. It also needs tobe noted that training alone cannot bringabout a signi�cant change. Rather, theentire human resource management valuechain, i.e., recruitment, training, promo-tion, performance appraisal, compensa-tion, welfare and post retirement bene�tsneeds to be targeted in a holistic (butphased) manner.

30

Go o d g o v e r n a n c e h a s e i g h tcomponents-it is: participatory,a c c o u n t a b l e , t r a n s p a r e n t ,

responsive, effective, efficient, equitableand follows the rule of law . Much, if not all,�elements good governance would accrueon their own if the government isreceptive, transparent and open toaccountability. The question is how tomake this ?happen

Citizens have typically used a variety ofmeans to convey preferences, voiceconcerns, demand transparency and holdthe governments accountable. Thetraditional means, of pushing for goodgovernance, though useful in speci�csituations have their downsides. Informalmeans like advocacy, protests, strikes,petitioning the government, de�ancecampaigns and civil disobedience etc. aredifficult to organize and sustain. Moreover,organizing these is subject to preferencesof the leaders. No wonder these are usedsparingly and only for issues of concern toa larger segment of the society. Formalmeans, for example, participation ofcitizens in decision making forums of thestate, like nomination on governingbodies of public entities, are prone toselection bias of the state, and the citizens

being out numbered. State forums, wherecitizens have won seats for themselves,may witness the leaders, being eithercoopted or pushing their personal agenda.Thus it is not difficult to see that all suchmeans of pushing for good governanceare open to elite capture and have oftenstood captured.

Periodic elections offer citizens anoppor tunit y to hold governmentsaccountable-voting out non-performerspenalizes the incumbents and imparts alesson to the incomers. However, electoralaccountability is difficult in countrieswhere politics is dynastic or personality-based, and is driven by patron-clientrelationship-a job offered here, an FIRregistered there and a land right hounou-red elsewhere in return for votes . Add to it�the possibility of electoral malpractices infavour of one or the other candidate andthe die is cast.

What may the citizens use then to push forgood governance? Experience suggeststhat the executive fears bad-publicitytickers on electronic media. Therefore, oneway to make the executive lend ears to thecitizens and to follow the law, is to useelectronic media. However the media doesnot pick every other issue of interest to thecitizens. The questions then are, how cancitizens seek attention from electronic

media, make it to ' andbreaking news bars'get through to talk shows?

Again, experience suggests that whatevergoes viral on social media is picked up byelectronic media.The question then is howto make governance de�cit of one or theother kind, viral on social media.

Social media has several feathers in its capwith regards to good governance,including Egypt's Tharir square and morerecently, the failed coup in Turkey. Moregenerally, social media has been used byc i t i z e n s t o r e p o r t n e w s , e x p o s ewrongdoings, express opinions, mobilizeprotests, monitor elections, scrutinizegovernment and deepen participation .�

It is not uncommon to hear of a trendingissue on social media making waves onelectronic media. Hashtags on Twitter andFacebook are a good option to raisegovernance issues and make these viral. A

citizen concerned about a particular issuecan post a comment or a clip, and add to ita hashtag. If the hashtag starts trending,chances are it will be picked up by theelectronic media. Almost any instance, forexample corruption, injustice, maltreat-ment in jails, cheating in exams, state ofschools, state of health services, irregular-ities in recruitment, promotions andprocurement in public entities and civic

Principal Economist and Unit HeadPublic Finance Unit

Social Policy and Development Centre(SPDC)

Dr. Idrees Khawaja

Using Social Media to Push for

Good Governance

The example of Nigerians comes to light here, who have successfully used

hashtags on Twitter to raise various governance concerns. Examples include ,4

OccupyNigeria

a social-political protest after the government put an end to fuel subsidy;

BringBackOurGirls

a movement meant to secure the release of abducted school girls,

NigeriaDecides

to ask questions and demand answers from the electoral body duringelections and

NigeriansMarchAgainstCorruption to announce protests march againstcorruption.

�Gramberger, Marc. "Citizens as partners: OECD handbook on information, consultation and public participation in policy making." (2001).

Rajan, Raghuram, 2008, “Is there a Threat of Oligarchy in India” Speech to Bombay Chamber of Commerce.�

Diamond, L. Liberation Technology, Journal Democracy, volume 21, No. 3, July 2010, pp.69-83.�

Inuwa, A. Social Media: A Catalyst for Good Governance, Opinion, Peoples Daily http://weekend.peoplesdailyng.com/index.php/opinion/opinion/6957-social-media-a-catalyst-for-good-governance⁴

Opinion

31

issues etc have the opportunity to beraised in this manner.

‘A picture speaks a thousand words' andthis is the beauty of social media whichallows a message to be communicatedeffectively-for those short on time, thisfeature provides them the opportunity tocomplain, advocate or read. Moreover,further facil itations in the form ofautomatic services are also gainingmomentum whereby simply signing up fora campaign enables the user to receiveregular updates without even having toindividually follow a campaign.

The chief advantage of using social mediais its uncoordinated nature, unlike printand electronic media. Being uncoordi-nated, it is neither opinionated nor drivenby an ideology or vested commercialinterests. Therefore,no issue that a personyearns to raise getsexcluded. This makess o c i a l m e d i a l e s ssusceptible to elitecapture.

Governments too, aree m p l o y i n g s o c i a lm e d i a t o f u r t h e rgovernance ends. It isnow inconceivable fora municipal body indeveloped countriesnot to have an electr-onic mechanism ofregistering civic com-p l a i n t s w i t h m o s tbodies having Twitteror Facebook accounts.When hurricane Sandy struck the UnitedStates, the Governor's office in New Yorktweeted over 800 times in just three days.Similarly, the city of Boston uses a mobileapp to alert citizens about civic issues likepotholes .⁵

Examples at home and around are not few.Raids conducted on several eateries by thePunjab Food Authority caught attention ofelectronic media after the Authority'sDirector posted raid-images on herFacebook page. In 2012/13, then ChiefSecretary of Gilgit-Baltistan addressedcomplaints ranging from a delay incompletion of a bridge, to irregularappointments in education department,through Facebook . In neighbouring India,⁶the traffic police in Bangalore successfullyused Facebook to announce rerouting of

traffic to allow a religious procession .⁷

The lesson then is that in order to makegood governance possible, all publico ffi c i a l s n e e d t o h a v e e l e c t r o n i cmechanisms for a two way communi-cation with citizens as well as theirsubordinates and the citizens need to askfor such mechanisms. Governments wouldbe well served if they were to make thesocial media, their eyes and ears.

To mobilize citizens for a cause, access topublic data on the subject, in a formunderstandable by a non-technical personis crucial. Experts can voluntarily sharesuch data on social media. Citizens canthen glance over the easy to understand,for example, data on national budget, toreect upon whether national expenditurepriorities match preferences of the citizens

at large. In case of ambiguities andmismatches, the concern would go viral onsocial media thereby prompting electronicmedia to highlight the issue as well andquestion the government on reassessingpriorities. At times social media createsfurther hype on an issue raised onelectronic media. A limitation is that theunregulated nature of social media canmake it difficult to sift fact from �ction.Therefore what appears on the mediashould only be used to initiate seriousinquiry rather than jump to conclusions.

The problem still remains! What wouldprompt citizens to take out time fromsharing jokes, clips and photos of familyevents on WhatsApp and instead,comment on a serious issue such as theskewed distribution of national fundsamong different regions of a country?

Instances of pedestrians capturingparking violations on their cell phone andsharing it with the traffic police arecommon occurrences in some countries;but can this apply in Pakistan or in lessdeveloped countries?

Citizens may lack the exuberance to voicetheir concerns on local and national issues.They may carry their own historicalbaggage of ' (nothingkuch nahein hoga'will happen). To counter this sort ofattitude, which is but natural given pastexperience, people need to be convincedthrough proper advocacy and motivatinghistorical examples of resilience andsustained struggle. The public are alsohesitant in speaking up on sensitive issuesin order to avoid the possible wrath of theauthorities. Numerous countries have lawsthat protect the whistle blowers. Countries

also have non-pro�torganizations thatprovide legal help tothe whistle blowers.Such non-pro�ts mig-ht be needed in Pakis-tan as well.

The key to citizens'push for good gover-nance lies in citizensfeeling the urge topush. How may thisurge be developed? Itstarts from the mind:the virtues of citizens'push for good gover-nance and the bene-�ts of collective actionfor oneself and thesociety, are ideas that

need to be inculcated in the minds of thecitizens. How can this be achieved? Shortterm would include advocacy, preferablythrough the electronic media owing to itshuge impact, whereas long term wouldinclude revising curriculums and teachingmethodologies at schools.

Despite social media's lesser susceptibilityto elite capture, the low level of internetpenetration beyond large cities and thelow literacy rate makes it difficult for themarginalized to use social media, though25 million Facebook users as of March 2016is not a small number .⁸

To institutionalize the use of social mediafor governance, a framework needs to bedeveloped. This would not be easy aswould-be losers would pose resistance. To

Right to information Act stands promulgated in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhawa. Theacts, if used extensively, carry enormous potential to improve governance at theprovincial level. With the perception that Pakistan enjoys regarding the extent ofcorruption, favouritism, nepotism and inefficiency etc, one would have expected aood of questions regarding costs of projects, reasons for delay in completion, basiceducation and health costs, queries regarding number of doctors posted in Basic HealthUnits, budgets of police stations, allocation of development funds in districts and so onand so forth. Questions like these, answers to these and the publicity that the answersmay receive in the media have the potential to improve governance. The questions thatremain are plenty: Why is the Right to Information Act not being utilized extensively bycitizens to seek information?Why journalists, in search of juicy stories, not using the act?The answer to these questions can help evolve strategies for greater use of the act whichin turn is likely to inuence governance for the better. Possible reasons for little useinclude fear of facing the wrath of the state and the lethargy of the citizens-they do notwant to spend time involved in preparing the petition, posting the application andmaking good use of the information provided.

Right to information Act – why is it barely utilized?

⁵ Sreeram Ananthasayanam, “Social Media for Good Governance,” (2013). Available at

http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-miscellaneous/tp-others/social-media-for-good-governance/article4480396.ece

⁶ Hussain, Y. Social Media as a Tool of Good Governance in the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan. Cross Roads, Asia, Working Series 22.

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Umair Qureshi, “Pakistan Facebook Users crosses the landmark of 25 Million users,” (2016). Available at http://umairqureshi.com/pakistan-deepens-facebook-user-base-with-over-11-million-users/

32

begin with, speci�c individuals ingovernment offices should be appointedto duly track and report (to their seniormanagement) of any department relatedconcern trending on social media. Manypublic offices already follow this system forwhat appears in print media.

Initial failures of social media in helpingimprove governance may cause disap-

pointment among citizens at large andstrain their energy to carry on.Therefore, asaforementioned, advocacy is an extremelyintegral component in order to harnessand fully utilize the potential of socialmedia for good governance. Change is aslow process which calls for struggle withpen and voice. The power of advocacy canbe measured by citing the contrastbetween the French Revolution and

Egypt's Tharir Square-the former rooted incenturies of indigenous advocacy fueled inpart from enlightenment literatureproduced by French philosophers likeVoltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu-was asuccess while the latter still seems to be astruggling cause.

33

Opinion

An emerging concept that hasgained immense popularity ini m p r o v i n g g o v e r n a n c e a n d

accountability of governments is OpenData. Open Data refers to a governmentopening up data for the public to access,use and reproduce freely. This requiresproactive disclosure of public sector datawithout restrictions (barring informationclassi�ed as sensitive for the state). In orderto promote and ensure Open Data, manygovernments have legislated access topublic sector data through laws coveringRight to Information (RTI) or Freedom ofInformation (FOI). These legislationsestablish protocols, measures and boundsof information to be granted to public atlarge especially focusing on mechanismsfor requests and retrieval of informationpertaining to affairs of the government.Information disclosure and/or provision isrestricted to disallow information ofpersonal nature, pertaining to nationalsecurity etc. RTI / FOI laws can alsomandate proactive disclosure of data as ameans to grant access to information.

An integral part of improving public sectorperformance and service delivery isaccountability. Efforts at enhancingcapacity, improving resource allocations,developing institutions and creatingincentive structures will eventually fail toachieve the desired impact without havingrobust controls and measures thatstrengthen systems. While it is an implicit

function of the state to have internalmechanisms for accountability at all layers,spanning across various measures ofperformance and delivery, more oftenthan not, such functions have not beenable to ful�l the purpose of improvingperformance in developing countries.Open Data can help pivot improvementsin governance across a range of domainsand is hence important for both thegovernment and the public. A briefsynopsis of key impact areas is presentedbelow.

AccountabilityMotivation to showcase high performancewhen data is made public adds a healthypressure on the government to achievetargets, improve outcomes and be able toh i g h l i g h t t h e i m p a c t a c h i e v e d .Institutionalization of transparencythrough open access to data, statistics,documents, reports, analysis and comm-unication helps keep matters in check. Thepublic eye for review brings to lightmalprac t ices and hence increasesaccountability. Collection of data fromvarious corners and consolidating it in ausable manner creates a meaningful poolof resources that helps increase know-ledge and information sharing. Insightsinto government operations and analysisof trends, achievements, progress andperformance can help identify bottlenecksand take corrective measures.

PlanningSimilarly, public having access to granulardata will help improve planning of thenon-government sector with regards tovarious programs, initiatives, develop-ment efforts and opportunities. Efforts tointroduce and mainstream participatoryforms of governance can be implementedbetter using open data. Credible data andimproved knowledge about working ofthe public sector supported by platformsaround this data can help improvedecision-making of the private sector.

EmpowermentOpen data also paves the way for citizene m p o w e r m e n t t h r o u g h i n f o r m e ddecisions about public services andresource allocations. Having detailed

information on performance measures ofbasic services like health and educationcan enable citizens to make the bestchoices to avail such facilities, identifyshor tcomings and have a voice indemanding actions to improve servicedelivery. Continuous availability of thedata allows monitoring and evaluation ofnew projects, corrective actions taken,efficacy of actions and resulting impact. Ina nutshell, data helps maintain a pulse ondeviations.

Problem SolvingAnother increasingly popular use of opend a t a i s p r o b l e m s o l v i n g f o r t h egovernment. Active collaboration ofcitizens with policymakers, backed bydata, is helping improve the approach tosolving long-standing issues facing thepublic. Support from citizens in terms ofcontribution to ground level data, analysisand bringing together expertise fromvarious quarters can help improve theresolution cycle for addressing inefficie-ncies.

RTI laws have been enacted as early as1951 (Finland). However, traction gainedover the last few decades has primarilyb e e n f u e l l e d by d e ve l o p m e n t s i ntechnology on the supply side, and theawareness by the publ ic of beinganswerable to them on the demand side.Citizens electing governments should beable to understand how responsibilitieshave been discharged. In South Asia,Pakistan was the pioneer in enacting aFreedom of Information Act in 2002followed by India in 2005 and Bangladeshin 2008. Enacting legislation, however, isonly a �rst step. Quality of the legislation interms of how open it makes the govern-ment is critical. Global rankings comparingcountry legislations put India at 3 (1 beingthe highest quality legisla tion), Bangla- -desh at 20 and Pakistan at 84.

Once a law has been enacted, implemen-tation of the law is the next big challenge.Proactive disclosure to make data avail-able publicly in a usable manner and beingable to implement the mechanics to caterto information requests through therequired institutional structures is of

E-Governance Consultant

34

paramount importance. In addition to aFederal FOI Act, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistanand KP have also enacted their ownprovincial laws. KP and Punjab had clearprovisions on the implementationmechanisms to cater to informationrequests and have already set up struct-ures to comply. The legislation in Sindhand Balochistan however does not containany such mechanisms and no formalstructures have been implemented as yet.Pakistan, in its nascent stages of movingalong the open government curve, hasunfortunately not been able to establish

any signi�cant platforms that offer thescale and reach to allow meaningfulexchange of information that leads topositive impact. Our political economyand social context, however, offerimmense potential to create an open dataregime to improve transparency, account-ability, data availability and resultantlypublic services. The richness of open datais bound to help government and citizensalike. Some nascent and basic effortshowever have been undertaken. Theyinclude:� Pakistan Data Portal – collaboration

between CSOs to collect and makeavailable public data sets.

� Open Data Initiative – a limited scaleportal that puts key datasets of thegovernment of Punjab in the publicdomain along with offering visualiza-tions to analyze and present infor-mation.

� A number of department/entitiesmake data available through their ownwebsites which includes federalagencies and provincial departmentsincluding Pakistan Bureau of Statistics,Education, Health, etc.

Case-studies of open government/open data initiatives from across the globe

The portal contains �ve key types of information : 1) Direct spending by federal government agencies through contracts1

and tender processes; 2) All �nancial transfers to states, municipalities and the federal district; 3) Financial transfers to socialprogram benefactors; 4) Administrative spending, including staff salaries, staff travel expenses and per diems and officeexpenditures; and 5) Information on all government official credit card spending. Another important component is aNational Debarment List, which provides a background check for all companies and individuals who have committedfraudulent practices before issuing new public contracts.

B r a z i l –O p e n B u d g e t

Transparency Portal: atool to increase �nancial

transparency of the ederalfgovernment and is now

used as one of Brazil'sm a i n a n t i -corruption tool.

07

35

Making government open is a paradigmshift in the governance philosophy. Itrequires moving away from a walledgarden approach to restrict informationow and control insights to making itpublic to collectively improve outcomes.Embracing the move to being 'open'requires strong implementation supportin addition to policy guidelines. Whilelimited scale efforts in silos are underwayin Pakistan at the federal and provinciallevels to proactive disclose data, there isneed for a concerted strategy andimplementation plan to support opendata. For example, a lot of data availabledoes not cover the entire disclosure cycleand hence is of limited utility in achievingthe desired impact. The Ministry ofPlanning, Development and Reform underits joint project with UNDP has alreadyenvisaged development of a Data Portalthat builds on the individual efforts inplace now and serves as a �rst step inensuring public access to current andusable data for Pakistan. At very initialstages yet, this data portal will start withexisting available data sets. It is imperativethat, at a later stage, this portal moves tomore granular data on governmentperformance and service delivery whereapplicable.

Keeping in view the challenges oftransparency, accountability, planning,resource allocations and service deliverystandards that Pakistan faces acrossadministrative units and sectors, an OpenGovernment approach may catalyse thereforms underway to further boostoutcomes. Key areas that should be thefocus of proactive disclosure by thegovernment are:� Financial Transparency/Procurement –

budget, spending, process� Processes Complianceand� Performance Management Frame-

works andTarget Benchmarking� Service Delivery KPIs and Achievement

– Service Standards on provision ofHealth, Education, Law Enforcement,Judiciary, Infrastructure Development

To ensure adequacy of data made publicand its relevance to improving outcomes,it is essential that robust systems andcapacity are in place that connect allrelevant provincial and federal layers torecord/collect and report such data.Development of technology tools/platforms to enable collection andutilization of data is a simpler task. Datametrics that provide a 360 degree of thevarious functional domains of thegovernment is a complex change manage-ment exercise. Development of such data

instruments, their timely reporting andeventually making it public will require thehighest levels of political and bureaucraticsupport. With federal and provincial lawsin place, and fragmented precedents thathave opened public sector data withinspecialized domains, open data can helpcreate a nexus of public-private collabor-ation to improve performance of thepublic services. Active engagementbetween provincial and federal govern-ment will be required to ensure a sustain-able data collection process that helpspresent a holistic view of service deliverydomains. Similarly, a structured resultsbased management framework will haveto be conceived, designed and imple-mented to create open data as a by-product. The boom in information andcommunication technologies in Pakistanalready provides a ready landscape toallow utilization of data even at grass roots.As a �rst step, a single national data portalshould be created that is populated withall public sector information that exists indigital form and a roadmap for progressionmade public.

36

Interview

Dr. Tahir HijaziMember (Governance and Reform)Planning Commission of Pakistan

What are the governance and civil service reforms being

pursued by you and the Planning Commission, and how much

progress has been made so far?

The Planning Commission has initiated civil service reforms inaround 43 focus areas. These focus areas include but are notlimited to recruitment, selection, training, performanceevaluation, promotion, compensation etc. Recommendationsfrom our end have been completed and have been shared withrelevant stakeholders for further action and approval. In somecases, the reforms have already been approved and are beingimplemented, for example, raising the age limit from 28 years to30 years for entry into civil service.

Progress entails two broad phases. The first phase relates to thepreparat ion of documents outl ining the process forimplementation, and extensive discussion with stakeholders, astep which has been in progress since the last two years, with theresultant consensus having been reached and ripe forimplementation. The second phase includes approval byconcerned authorities. Phase one has been achieved andcompleted almost entirely whilst phase two is still in progress.

What are the key changes that the Planning Commission

endeavours to bring through civil service reform? In other

words, what improvement does it intend to bring in the

services of public sector institutions?

The aim of the Planning Commission is to improve the overallefficiency of civil servants through better government structures,better incentive systems and better accountability mechanisms.The Planning Commission continues to propose recommen-dations to enhance and improve the services of public sectorinstitutions. A few example recommendations include, but notlimited to, strengthening of the Federal Public Service Commi-ssion (FPSC) in terms of technical expertise, two-stage entryexaminations for CSS that would enable thorough screening,specialized cluster for entry exam, strengthening of theestablishment division to look after all the civil servants in theirpromotions, transfers, trainings, performance evaluations,pensions, rewards, punishments etc. and as part of this, we haverecommended hiring professional human resource management,legal experts etc.

Q3. What factors are negatively impacting or resisting

governance and civil service reform initiatives in Pakistan and

how are you addressing those?

Economic factors of financial constraints offer resistance in termsof advancing the cause. Politically, no resistance has beenexperienced. A major issue is that of inertia-there is not much willor motivation for change to take place. Although there have beenmultiple complaints regarding the system over the years, yetpeople are comfortable in their current situations and are resistantto change. This resistance to change might be due to a number offactors including a hidden fear of being adversely affected by thechange and the unwillingness to adapt, considering change ispsychologically very difficult to absorb.

Any lessons learnt so far from your efforts related to civil

service reforms? What will you continue to do and what will

you do differently next time?

Our approach to reform is based on a strategic framework basedon institutionalization done in collaborative, inclusive and citizenfocused programs (ICIC). This model has been conceived bydifferent public sector representatives in collaboration with theFederal Minster of Planning, Prof. Ahsan Iqbal. Every reform actionintends to be sourced from this framework. The Minister's plan ofaction to involve as many stakeholders as possible in the dialoguehas proved to be a very positive and effective approach. Sodiscussion on forums etc is a mechanism that we would continueto practice in the future as well. Having said that, discussion, ofcourse, is just the first step, and it should be followed by a strongimplementation strategy.

The role of technology and social media cannot be ignored andthis is one facet that we intend to work upon in the future. Apartfrom this, more frequent trainings and workshops, talks byinternational consultants and experts, increased involvement ofuniversities as well as inclusion of related courses as part ofacademic programs, are all novel ways to take the cause of theeffective implementation of civil service reforms forward.

Based on my experience, the biggest lessons learnt are that firstly,change cannot occur unless one is determined to work for it, andsecond, Civil Service Reforms can only be brought when there aremore agents of change, increased collaborations and team work.

say that again

“...Civil Service Reforms can only bebrought when there are more agents ofchange, increased collaborations andteam work”

37

Interview

Tell us about the civil service reforms you are pursuing.

It is quintessential to contextualize the historical background ofcivil service in Pakistan. As an independent country, Pakistaninherited civil service from British colonial India. In the colonialservice, the purpose was essentially to collect taxes and maintainlaw and order. After Pakistan got its independence, it wasburdened by the refugee crisis and did not have sufficientresources to invest in development of institutions. Moreover, itlost its founding leaders in quick succession. This resulted inconsolidation of power by civil-military bureaucracy whichcarried strong imprints of colonial legacy. As a result, theorientation of civil service was not to serve but to rule.Undemocratic regimes being non-representative andunaccountable to the people of Pakistan did not have the will toreform the civil institutions. On the other hand, political instabilitydid not allow democratic governments to focus on reform agendaas they were mostly operating in survival mode. The year 2013marked the watershed moment in Pakistan's history as for the firsttime, one civilian elected government transferred power toanother. So, in 2013, the government of Prime Minister Sharif afterassuming power took up a reform agenda to reorient civilinstitutions to provide quality service delivery to citizens. Theobjective of the reform agenda is to enhance capacity, efficiencyand effectiveness of civil institutions. Being a representative anddemocratic government, the current regime has to deliverservices to the people of Pakistan.Therefore, it is deemed essentialby Prime Minister Sharif's government to modernize the publicsector and it is in this backdrop that civil service reforms arepursued. To take a holistic approach towards reforms, thegovernment devised Vision 2025 that provides a roadmap forinstitutional reforms in the context of the broader developmentagenda. As part of the implementation ofVision 2025, the Ministryof Planning, Development and Reform is pursuing civil servicereform in the areas of recruitment, selection, training, promotionand career progression, performance evaluation, incentivestructure, posting and other HR related issues.

In terms of progress, what has been done so far?

A Number of attempts were made in the past to reform civilservice. Dozens of commissions were formed to pursue civilservice reforms but their recommendations could not beimplemented due to a lack of ownership by the civil service.Therefore, an extensive consultative process was initiated by thecurrent government to create ownership among the civil serviceof the reform process. Moreover, it was prioritized by thegovernment to sensitize civil servants about the urgency ofreforms. More than two thousand civil servants were engaged inthe consultation processes in all the provinces. Consequently,

some key reforms have been finalized and are in the process ofimplementation. For example, performance contracts for elevene c o n o m i c m i n i s t r i e s ; c l u s t e r b a s e d e n t r y e x a m fo rprofessionalization and induction of civil servants; reform oftraining programs by introducing new subjects based on modernmanagement and technology through Training NeedsAssessment (TNA); and, relaxation in the upper age limit toprovide an opportunity to applicants with higher qualificationand experience for entry in to civil service.

What is the motivation behind Civil Service Reform?

Civil service is the primary instrument of service delivery.Unfortunately, due to its poor performance and dated structure,the gulf between citizens' expectations and state's response haswidened. This has led to a growing trust deficit in society on stateinstitutions. In order to restore trust of citizens on stateinstitutions, civil service must be restructured on a highperformance organization model. Thus, the basic motivationbehind civil service reform is to improve service delivery forcitizens and effective implementation of the government'sdevelopment agenda. The context in which the colonialbureaucratic structure was developed is redundant in today'scomplex and changing environment. With the increasingempowerment of citizens, it has become necessary to reform thepublic sector to match citizens' expectations. Moreover, theservice revolution in the private sector has also raised the benchmark many folds for public sector service delivery. Citizens are nolonger passive actors in governance. New power centers haveemerged in society. Therefore, the motivation behind the civilservice reform initiative is to develop a new paradigm of publicsector management based on institutional, collaborative,inclusive and citizen-centered governance.

In the past there have been a number of attempts to reform

public sector and civil service. They have not been very

successful. What do you think is different this time that makes

you confident that your reforms will bear fruits?

As mentioned above, previous attempts of civil service reformsfailed due to a lack of ownership by key stakeholders. Beingcognizant of this historical fact, this time we have taken allstakeholders on board for civil service reforms. We haveundertaken extensive consultations with key stakeholders whichincluded two annual governance forums and twenty fivestakeholders' workshops on civil service reforms. We haveconsulted all relevant departments and groups of the Ministrieswhile developing reform proposals. We have also engaged mediain this process to disseminate information. Due to detaileddeliberation among multiple stakeholders, we can see that this

38

Ahsan IqbalFederal MinsterPlanning Development and Reform

Interview

39

say that again

“...It is important to create a network ofpro-reform agents to provide an enablingenvironment for reforms.”

time there is a wider ownership of civil service reforms. Moreover,we have prioritized the implementation side of these reforms.Predicated on all these factors, we strongly believe these reformsare going to yield positive outcomes.

Have you faced any obstacles to the civil service reform in

Pakistan?

There was an inertia of a status-quo which gradually meltedthrough engagement and consultation processes. However, therewere some skeptics who argued that this attempt would fail likeprevious attempts. Furthermore, there is a strong inter-servicerivalry which touched fault lines of internal conflict within civilservice. However, I am confident that the inclusive andconsultative approach accompanied by political ownership of thewhole process is going to yield positive outcomes and set goalswill be accomplished soon.

Any lessons you learnt based on your previous efforts so far

that you would like to share with those engaged in similar

initiatives?

First of all, a broad coalition must be created to support a reforminitiative. Without creating a strong and compelling sense ofurgency for reform, it is difficult to push people out of theircomfort zone.The political ownership of the chief executive is verycritical to send a signal of seriousness and commitment at alllevels. Institutional reform process is not mechanical in nature, ithas to be an organic process that requires careful nurturing andperseverance to bear fruits. At times, setbacks and resistance willcome in the way and it is important to remain positive andcommitted to the reforms agenda. It is important to create anetwork of pro-reform agents to provide an enablingenvironment for reforms. Unless the reform process is linked toincentive and evaluation system, it is difficult to expect anybehavioral change.

Youth Voices

40

Why did you join the Civil Service?

In my opinion, Civil Service is the only platform which allows you to facilitate the public intheir affairs, in your own capacity and competence, because the only objective here is tomeet Pakistan's goals, as opposed to the private sector where meeting organizational goalsare the mainstay. This check is my motivational impetus to serve Pakistan as much aspossible.

In your opinion, are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the Civil

Services?Why?

With the number of applicants and aspirants for Competitive Examination rising each year,the youth is more motivated to join the Civil Service because it complies with every person'sself-esteem and self-actualization to be a part of the most respected group in the country,which is a very positive idea. On the ip side, one very valid reason is job security andavailability since the major private sectors are saturated and many professional degreeholders take their chance by competing here, keeping in view the physiological, safety andsocial needs of every human, naturally. The competition is increasing with every passingyear through the inux of more quali�ed individuals coming from all parts of the country,but there is still a major portion of our society that completely neglects joining the civilservice.

What key reforms should be initiated to encourage youth participation in

civil services?

� Exposure needs to come from an early age. Curriculums at school and college levelsneed to incorporate an introduction to civil services, its structure and stature both, sothat civil services is encouraged to not only be taken up as a mere job but as part of ahigher purpose to serve the country. Often, small children aspire to become doctors orengineers from an early age, but none of them aspire to become civil servants. Thismentality needs to be changed: the elements of social responsibility and duty towardsour country, rather than merely attaining professional degrees needs to beindoctrinated from a very early age.

� Research Attachments' need to be established whereby government ministries inaffiliation with universities create programs for the youth to conduct researches onpressing issues in the major sectors of Pakistan. Such avenues will open up the realitiesof the public sector to the youth, in contrast to what is read or heard on social media.Theconclusions and recommendations on these research activities will help formulize abetter way forward, and encourage youth participation as well. The key forencouragement is active participation, and getting a avour of the service.

� The time frame for the selection process, from the date of examination till entry intoservice, needs to be cut down by half. The long one year waiting time period before the�nal selections are announced is extremely demotivating for all candidates. In order toaddress this issue, the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) should conduct eightexam papers only (four compulsory and four optional), instead of 12.This will marginallydecrease the work load and time for announcing the results and encourage moreparticipants to take the exam.

� Finally, a good pay structure needs to be introduced to elevate levels of motivation andpush youngsters in choosing the civil service over the private sector. The SingaporeanCivil Service Model is a good example in this respect, as its focus is on giving highersalaries in order to promote participation and combat corruption.

Fahad Mahmud Mirza

Section Officer

(large Enterprises Development)

Ministry Of Industries And Production

Youth Voices

41

Why did you join the civil service?

The legal regime in Pakistan is rickety. Employees are not provided adequate rights in theprivate sector. Most jobs are predatory and exploitative in nature. However, MNCs do offeran alternative. Sadly, their presence is limited and prized roles are scarce. Meanwhile, localcorporates are run by the whims of nonprofessional owners. Even where there is somesemblance of joint liability company, ownership and management lines are diffused.Therefore, civil services with its autonomy, prestige, de�ned career path, latitude in decisionmaking and society wide impact offers itself as an attractive option. It is a merit basedtransparent system that discriminates on ability only. Moreover, one can bring relief tomasses and in this process achieve higher satisfaction.This nonmonetary bene�t cannot bemonetized in the form of higher salary.

In your opinion are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the civil

service?Why?

This translates into a pass percentage of one percent only. The thriving academy industrywitnessed in urban areas is a testament that youth looks up to civil service as a desirablecareer choice. A slow job market, diminishing foreign direct investment and retardedgrowth in an overseas economy makes CSS a credible opportunity for urban youth.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, a predominant chunk of our demographic baseresides in rural areas. The private sector and entrepreneurship is restricted to urban areas.Hence with limited avenues, a swarming number of rural youth takes CSS as a viable optionfor social mobility .


civil services?

Without sounding condescending, I would state that civil services is an elite club. It has adifferent philosophy, evolution and history. Whereas, the democratic model is inclusive andparticipative, the bureaucratic approach is selective but competent. Therefore, it is notabout the quantity of youth participation but the quality. In this regard, human resourcemanagement needs to be streamlined. Modern HR tools in selection, training andcompensation should be applied to attract able, young people to this sector.


Civil Service of Pakistan provides an opportunity to an individual that is both unique andworthwhile. It pushes a civil servant in to situations where he can both lead and serve at thesame time. This opportunity instills in an officer a spirit that other professions lack andtherefore makes it worth it.


services?Why?

Unfortunately this is not the case right now. Urban cities where private sector opportunitiesare ample do not leave much incentive for youngsters to opt for the civil service. As opposedto this, individuals from rural backgrounds tend to be more aware of the civil services as aprofession. It also pertains to society's belief that the civil services are only a tool for gainingpower and inuence rather than a proper profession.


civil services?

Instead of mere advertisement, the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) needs tocreate awareness as its �rst step in outlining how an individual can pursue his/her 'personal'and 'professional' development as a civil servant. This is severely lacking as a policy goal forthe FPSC, thus individuals with dubious intentions and those hailing from well entrenchedpolitical and bureaucratic families are the only ones who end up joining the civil service.

Daniyal Ahmed Javed

Officer

Police Service of Pakistan

Hayat Omer Malik

Assistant Commissioner (UT)Inland Revenue Service

Youth Voices

42


Upon receiving my graduate degree from abroad, I returned to Pakistan and joined theEconomics Department at a prestigious university in Lahore as a Teaching Fellow. At thatmoment, I had not decided on a career for myself although I was quite interested ineconomic research.The position provided me with an opportunity to contribute to researchinvolving IFIs as well as government departments. Though this experience wasintellectually satisfying, I was not completely happy as I realized that most of the policysuggestions and research �ndings were not followed up at the implementation stage,which left them completely in the hands of government departments that may or may nothave the technical capacity to see things through to the end.With my training in Economics,I believed I could bridge this gap by being on the implementation side of things and make asubstantial contribution to society.


services?Why?

In short, yes.The volume of candidates that register for the exam every year is a testament tothis fact. At the expense of sounding pedantic, whether the motivation of aspirants is fueledby the“right”reasons is a separate issue. I should take a moment to explain what I mean by“right” here: In my experience, many candidates sit this exam because a) they do not haveany other option; b) they think this career will be �nancially rewarding; or c) they have seenthe perquisites and the authority that officers of very senior ranks have access to. These, Ibelieve are all the wrong reasons for wanting to join the civil services as this is a career that isexceptionally challenging and not proportionately rewarding �nancially. If we take theexample of PAS, erstwhile DMG, young officers who have been urban city dwellers all theirlives get posted to remote locations in Gilgit Baltistan (GB) or Balochistan with meagre�nancial compensation. Unless a candidate joins the civil services with the rightexpectations he/she is bound to be dissatis�ed. Save for a few service streams, all civilservants have to experience an arduous journey that puts their fortitude to the test.Withouta genuine interest in the workings of the State and public service delivery, I �nd it hard tobelieve that a civil servant can succeed at their job.


civil services?

Four key reforms come to my mind:� The starting point should be the implementation of measures that boost information

dissemination to all parts of Pakistan. For remote areas belonging to Balochistan,Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, GB and Kashmir, this is important as their inhabitantsmight not even be aware of the opportunities that exist. In the case of Punjab, it isimportant to attract candidates from some of the best private and public universities.Toillustrate, a step that could be taken in the immediate run could focus on increasing theoutreach of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) over social media. In thelonger run, civil services could also be advertised through institutions of secondary andhigher education.

� Reformation is needed to reduce the timeframe of the whole recruitment cycle. Atpresent, it is nearly 16 to 17 months long. If we add to this the time it requires to preparefor the exam, we are looking at nearly two full years. This, in my opinion, is a majordeterrent for most university graduates and de�nitely contributes to repelling some ofthe brightest youth.

� Presently, promotions to higher grades are time bound and individual performance is asecondary criterion, which I think discourages many ambitious members of the youthfrom pursuing civil services as a career. The order needs to be reversed, whereby meritand performance take the centre stage, instilling some of the qualities of the privatesector in the public sector.

� Finally, I think �nancial compensation will need to be increased for civil servants if thebest talent is to be attracted. I understand that there are a number of challenges inimplementing such a reform but it is one that is needed nonetheless and there is noalternative to this.

Sarah Hayat

Assistant Commissioner

Lahore Cantt

Youth Voices

43


Prior to joining the civil service I was engaged as a marketing officer with a Dutchmultinational company from the oil and gas sector on a handsome salary. Over the courseof time, I realized that though high salaries are a de�nite incentive offered by the privatesector, the prestige that comes with joining the civil service has an air of its own. Althoughserving the country can be done in whatever capacity, however the armed forces and civilservices are in my eyes, the two best opportunities to serve the country. In this regard,Foreign Service was a natural choice that would enable me to present a positive image ofPakistan abroad.

In your opinion are the youth of Pakistan motivated enough to join the

civil services? Why?

Recent statistics indicate an upward trend with regards to the youth joining the civil service.Ten years ago, the number used to stand at four to �ve thousand. Now, however, it isincreasing with each passing year. The increase in the age limit has also encouraged moreparticipation. However, in a country of 20 million where more than half of the populationcomprises of youth, it would be encouraging to see more and more candidates appearingin the exam.

What key reforms that should be initiated to encourage youth

participation in civil services?

One key reform should be the hiring of professionals, especially in service groups like InlandRevenue Service and Audit and Accounts, where individuals with relevant quali�cations beinducted. In this regard, such service groups should be placed in one cluster and relevantdegree requirement be mandatory for it.

E-government should be introduced at the federal and provincial level so that thegovernments can right-size the huge number of unskilled people posted on Groups to 1-16.These employees get 85 percent of the wage bill of the ministries while the CSP officers onlyget 15 percent.

The system of promotions should be based on accomplishments rather than on levels ofseniority. Some measures have been introduced in this regard; however, the process shouldbe transparent.

Finally, the salary package of civil servants is quite negligible when compared with theprivate sector and needs to be revised.

Mariah Atiq

Assistant Director (UT)Ministry of Foreign Affairs


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