overseas development administration: emergency relief

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE

REPORT BY THE

COMPTROLLER AND

AUDITOR GENERAL

Overseas Development Administration: Emergency Relief

ORDERED BY THEHOIJSEOFCOMMONS TO BE PRINTED 25 OCTOBER1993

LONDON: HMSO 933 f8.15 NET

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: EMERGENCY RELIEF

This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act.

John Bourn Comptroller and Auditor General

National Audit Office 13 September 1993

The Comptroller and Auditor General is the head of the National Audit Office employing some 800 staff. He, and the NAO, are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies have used their resources.


Contents

Report

Appendices

I. Non-governmental organisations and other agencies with whom the National Audit Office had discussions

2. 1990-91 Emergency relief responses:

Angola drought Uganda displaced persons

3. 1991-92 Emergency relief responses:

Albania food shortages Bangladesh cyclone Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea Iraqi refugees The Philippines Typhoon Thelma Turkey earthquake

4. 1992-93 Emergency relief response:

Somalia famine

5. Disaster preparedness

Page

1

6

7 9

12 15 19 23 27 30

33

37


Report

1 The Overseas Development Administration provide emergency relief to help alleviate natural disasters anywhere in the world and man-made disasters in developing countries, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Only short-term relief, including that for famine and refugees, is covered in this Report.

2 In the two and a half years to September 1992 they responded to 150 disasters, involving over 770 separate responses and El35 million. Two- thirds of this sum was provided directly to the countries concerned, usually through voluntary agencies; the rest was channelled through multilateral agencies, such as UN bodies and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the UK provided E75 million through the European Community. The distribution of relief is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Allocation of relief by country and means of distribution, April 1990-March 1992

Uganda

The Philippines

Albania

Sierra Leone

Cambodia

Liberia

Malawi

‘Turkey

Angola

*Iraq(N)

Jordan

*Iran

Somalia

Bangladesh

Mozambique

*Iraq/Turkey

Sudan

Ethiopia

*Iraq

Other Countries I

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 21.0 2

fmillion

m Non-governmental organisations Other 0 Multilateral organisations

Note: ‘f35.25 million for the lraqi refugee emergency is included in these countries’ figures.

Source: Brftish Aid Statistics.

This shows the distribution of emergency relief over the two years 1990-91 and 1991-92.

1


Figure 2: Distribution of emergency aid by organisation, April 1990-March 1992

Source: Analysis of ODA expenditure.

This shows that most of the relief provided by the Administration over the last two years was channelled through non- governmental organisations.

3 The Administration draw a distinction between sudden-onset and slow- onset disasters. The former, such as cyclones and earthquakes, require immediate relief assessments and a rapid deployment of supplies and personnel. Slow-onset disasters, such as famine and drought, require a longer-term and wider-based relief effort, enabling assessment of need to be monitored progressively and continuously.

4 The National Audit Office examined nine cases: two from 1990-91 -the Angola drought and displaced persons in Uganda; six from 1991-92 - Albania food shortages, Bangladesh cyclone, famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Iraqi refugees, typhoon Thelma in The Philippines and an earthquake in Turkey; and from 1992-93, famine in Somalia. The National Audit Office also examined co-ordination arrangements and a number of disaster preparedness projects. These responses consumed SO per cent of the Administration’s emergency relief funding in the two and a half years to September 1992. The results of this examination are set out in Appendices 2 to 5.

5 The National Audit Office visited the scene of the emergencies in Bangladesh and Ethiopia/Eritrea, and had discussions with eight non- governmental organisations in the UK, and the UN Disaster Relief Organisation and the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva (Appendix 1).

6 The Administration’s objectives in providing emergency relief are broad. They are to alleviate immediate suffering from famine and disasters and to save lives.

2


7 Responsibility for assessing and responding to need in respect of sudden- onset disasters is centralised in the Emergency Aid Department. Longer term disasters, such as famine in Africa and, from April 1992, humanitarian assistance in Iraq, are dealt with on a collaborative basis between the relevant geographical section in the Administration and the Emergency Aid Department.

8 The three major disasters which occurred in 1991 -the Bangladesh cyclone, Iraqi refugees and famine in the Horn of Africa-stretched the Administration’s resources. It was an internal review in April 1991 which led to the establishment of the Emergency Aid Department in August. This incorporated the existing Disaster and Refugee Unit and added a new section, Disaster Planning Policy, to deal with disaster preparedness and the continuing crisis in Iraq. Staffing was increased from six to 12 full-time and one part-time member of staff, of which seven had responsibility for emergency relief.

9 The review also led to an increased emphasis on disaster preparedness and the announcement of a Disaster Relief Initiative. By maintaining close contact with other interested bodies and with non-governmental relief agencies in the UK, this provided the Administration with options for making rapid assessments of need by experienced assessors; appointing field co-ordinators for major disasters: and developing a rapid response capability with disaster relief teams of skilled, dedicated, trained people ready to be flown to the scene of an emergency.

10 Rapid assessments under the Disaster Relief Initiative have so far been put into action three times. An assessor was sent to Turkey in March 1992 following an earthquake [Appendix 3.6); he recommended that no assistance was required beyond the Administration’s immediate response. Following an earthquake in Egypt in October 1992 an assessor identified an immediate need for hospital supplies and tents. And a series of assessments is being carried out in the former Yugoslavia.

11 These actions have been successful but progress on other parts of the Initiative has been slow. By September 1992, the Administration had spent E420,OOO on its development, focusing on preparing registers of suitable personnel, organising training for those registered and providing equipment.

12 With much of the work on establishing the Initiative completed, the Administration re-assessed their staffing needs. Because of the level of emergencies in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the Administration decided in January 1993 to strengthen their Emergency Aid Department to 18 full-time and one part-time member of staff.

13 Although the Emergency Aid Department now has the capacity to carry out direct assessments of need, in practice it continues to make use of a wide range of existing independent sources of information. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s network of Embassies and High Commissions, and non-governmental organisations overseas provide considerable data. Other information on a centralised basis is also provided by the UN Disaster Relief Organisation and international agencies such as the Red Cross. The main source of information on food shortages is the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s and the World Food Programme’s annual crop assessments.

3


Response time 14 All eight non-governmental organisations visited by the National Audit Office considered that liaison arrangements with the Emergency Aid Department were good and that responses to their proposals were generally commendably quick.

15 The Administration announced their commitment to spend money on a disaster very quickly after it occurred. Further time was then needed to approve specific proposals. For sudden-onset disasters approval was usually quick. Decision-making on slow-onset emergencies was affected by the greater amount of information available and the tendency for needs to change. The National Audit Office found speed of response variable: the Administration took from one day to 62 days to approve the initial requests for assistance.

16 Other than initial responses, the longest time to approve a request related to the Angola drought (142 days). This arose because the Administration needed to satisfy themselves that the goods were appropriate and because of a delay by the Angolan Government in agreeing to free importation.

Delivery 17 There was limited evidence of the dates of delivery of the aid. Where information was available, initial relief was generally provided quickly but delivery times over the duration of emergencies varied widely, ranging from the same day to 13 months. The longest delay was in delivering lentils to Eritrea, caused by a shipowner holding goods as a bargaining lever against an insurance claim.

18 There were few reports of misappropriation of UK relief supplies. While the Administration seek to minimise such losses, they recognise that, in emergency situations, they are sometimes inescapable.

Reporting 19 The level and standard of financial reporting on the use of the Administration’s money was good; most organisations produced timely statements. This was not the case for narrative reports, which were often late or not provided. The National Audit Office noted an absence of clear guidelines on reporting requirements and wide variations in standards - many of the reports which were received consisted of long general descriptions without giving all the necessary information. Moreover, although there were indications that some of the reports had been examined by the Administration, there was limited evidence that lessons learned had been identified or fed back to interested parties outside the Disaster Unit.

20 Most of the organisations interviewed commented that the Administration’s current requirements for narrative reports were less stringent than other donors’; they would readily provide reports if they were going to be used. One organisation said that its understanding was that it need provide only accounting information and that no narrative was necessary; most others said that they gave the matter a low priority as the Administration did not follow up outstanding reports and appeared to show little interest in those submitted. The Administration explained that, because of the heavy workload in the Emergency Aid Department, especially during periods of multiple disasters, low priority had been given to pursuing the receipt of narrative reports.

4


21 In November 1992 the Administration introduced a standard form of agreement which specifies the accounting requirements and, for the first time, requires interim reports; it does not, however, specify the required content of interim or final narrative reports which is left for decision by the Disaster Unit when a particular grant is issued.

22 The National Audit Office suggest that the reports should include objectives; the aid supplied (with dates]; explanations for any subsequent variations; cost of aid: number of recipients; benefits of the aid: problems encountered; lessons learned; and whether objectives were achieved. This could be covered simply in 3-4 pages. The National Audit Office considered that the Administration should press more strongly for such reports, which could also facilitate the assimilation of lessons-good and bad - for wider dissemination.

Co-ordination and preparedness

23 The enormous range of relief agencies, donor countries and international agencies, all of which need to act quickly in an emergency, creates a considerable risk of confusion and duplication. The UN has sought to strengthen its emergency response capacity to limit these difficulties. It has created a Department of Humanitarian Affairs and appointed a Humanitarian Relief Co-ordinator to improve the co-ordination of emergency responses.

24 The 1990s are the United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. All UN member countries have been invited to focus their emergency relief activities on reducing the effects of disasters by preparing for natural hazards. The Administration have spent E695,OOO (0.6 per cent of emergency relief expenditure) since April 1990 on 10 disaster preparedness projects. The National Audit Office looked at five of these (Appendix 5), from which it seemed that these efforts had been largely reactive rather than pro-active.

25 British High Commissions and Embassies in disaster-prone countries have a role in facilitating an effective response by appropriate agencies; and the Administration have indicated a willingness to help with disaster preparedness activities. After the Bangladesh cyclone the High Commission in Dhaka developed co-ordination procedures which the National Audit Office suggest should be provided to Missions in other disaster-prone countries.

26 The National Audit Office also consider that there is a need, at a national and local level, for all agencies to help people to help themselves, particularly in the hours or days immediately following an emergency until help arrives. Apart from potential reductions in the loss of life and human suffering, there are likely to be savings in cost and response time and improvements in the effectiveness of the aid provided.

5


Appendix 1 Non-governmental organisations and other agencies with whom the National Audit Office had discussions

In the United Kingdom: British Red Cross Society’ Catholic Fund for Overseas Development’ Care Britain’ Christian Aid’ Concern’ Feed the Children’ Oxfam’ Save the Children Fund’

Bangladesh:

Ethiopia:

Geneva:

Armed Forces? Emergency Relief Department3 Ministry of Relief3 Planning Commission3 Disaster Co-ordination and Monitoring Unit3 Disaster Preparedness Centre3 UN Development Programme2 Action Aid’ Care’ Concern’ Gonoshaystya Kendra Savar’ Oxfam’ Red Crescent Society’ Save the Children Fund’ World Vision’

World Food Programme2 World Food Programme Transport Operation Executive2 UN High Commission for Refugees* UN Development Programme2 Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Association’ Joint Transport Operation’ Christian Relief and Development Association’ Concern’ Oxfam’ Save the Children Fund2

UN Disaster Relief Organisation2 International Committee of the Red Cross*

Notes: 1 Non-governmental organisations 2 Multilateral organisations 3 Bangladesh Government 4 Other (includes MOD, transport organisations and cash through Foreign Office posts).

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Appendix 2 1990-91 Responses

1. Angola Drought

Nature of emergency: Drought

Date of emergency: On-going (currently in 4th year)

First ODA response: December 1990

Period of assistance: December 1990 to date

I------ Expenditure fOO0

Catholic Fund for Overseas Development 269

International Red Cross Society 200

Save the Children 150 UN Development Programme 130

124 112

47

1,065

7


Background

Assessment of need

Speed of response

Delivery and use

1.1 Until the ceasefire in May 1991, Angola had been involved in civil war for 16 years. In addition the south-east of the country is now facing its fourth successive year of drought. Combined with breakdowns in farming and transportation following the war, an estimated 1.9 million people are in need of emergency assistance.

1.2 In the six months to March 1990 over 10,000 people died as a result of the drought and in 1990 one million head of cattle died in the southern part of Angola. The National Audit Office examination covered the Administration’s response to the drought during 1990-91.

1.3 Responsibility for assessing emergency requirements in Angola rests not with the Emergency Aid Department but the Administration’s Central and Southern Africa Department.

1.4 In September 1989 the UK pledged fZO.5 million to the drought. A further fl million was pledged in two announcements in June and December 1990.

1.5 The Administration received information and assessments of need from the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross and from UK non- governmental organisations working in Angola. The extent of this continuing emergency is such that the Administration’s main concerns are how best to distribute the emergency relief pledged by the UK Government.

1.6 In 1990-91, in addition to requests for food, five UK non-governmental organisations put forward eleven proposals for other emergency relief. This was mainly for transport (f308,OOO); seeds, tools and medicines (f278,OOO) and airlifts (f 100,000).

1.7 The average time taken by the Administration to approve specific proposals was 39 days, varying from one day for the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development’s proposal for transport needs at the end of 1990-91 to five months for Save the Children’s request for funding household items, tools and vehicles. The delay in the latter case was because the Administration needed to satisfy themselves that goods were appropriate and because of a delay by the Angolan Government in agreeing to the free import of supplies.

1.8 For the 14 responses the National Audit Office found 13 progress/ completion reports. Generally, it seemed that the geographical desk had higher reporting expectations than the Emergency Aid Department. For example, detailed reports were required within six months of the distribution and goods had to be specifically monitored to ensure they reached intended recipients.

1.9 Where reports were available, and where the National Audit Office were able to obtain additional information, delivery of aid was established. The longest delay was in delivering building materials because of difficulties in obtaining the materials locally. Distribution did not begin until May 1991, some five months after the Administration approved the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development’s proposal, and was completed in September 1991.

8


2. Uganda Displaced Persons

Nature of emergency: Displaced persons, Kumi District

Date of emergency: February 1990

First ODA response: 18 July 1990

Period of assistance: July 1990 -March 1991

Expenditure

British High Commission Save the Children Special Projects in Christian

Missionary Areas

Total

fOO0

15 156

34

205

9


Background 2.1 Following attacks by armed guerillas early in 1990 13 ‘protective’ camps were set up by the Ugandan Government in the Kumi region for about 120,000 people. The camps suffered from a lack of food and poor sanitation: high mortality rates were reported; and there were high levels of malnutrition among the under-fives. The camps were internationally criticised and the Government disbanded them between June and September 1990, after which relief work continued.

Assessment of need 2.2 The first independent survey of the camps was carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross in March 1990, which identified need for sanitation, food, water and medicines. The Teso Relief Committee surveyed the camps in June and reported that deaths had reached over 700 although the smaller camps were said to be more satisfactory.

2.3 The British High Commissioner visited the camps in late June 1990. He noted a significant improvement in conditions and that arrangements were well advanced to return the camp residents to their homes. But he was concerned at reports of diversions of food.

2.4 The Administration also received a large number of reports from Special Projects in Christian Missionary Areas. At that time this was the only non- governmental organisation to request financial assistance but, because of the organisation’s suspected political involvement and the delicate political situation in the area at the time, the High Commission was reluctant to endorse its requests for financial assistance. The Disaster Unit considered its programme too small but granted f34,OOO towards the purchase of milk and medicines.

2.5 In July 1990 the Disaster Unit agreed to the High Commission’s proposal to purchase a Land Rover to help the Ugandan Government’s monitoring of the relief effort. The vehicle was purchased locally, saving freight costs of around E~O,OOO.

2.6 At about the same time, Save the Children, which had withdrawn for safety reasons, resumed emergency relief operations. The Administration approved E97,OOO for a supplementary feeding programme at five camps for six months. They also decided to provide flOO,OOO to purchase goods for camp returnees. In addition f60,OOO was granted to Save the Children to purchase tools for 25,000 households. However, because of some confusion about the method of payment, Save the Children was not financed until 1991-92; in the meantime, Save the Children used its own funds.

2.7 After the camps were disbanded the Disaster Unit was reluctant to approve further support and rejected requests from Oxfam, World Vision, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Speed of response 2.8 The Administration’s response was limited by the withdrawal of the major non-governmental organisations at a crucial period. When requests were eventually received they were generally dealt with within two weeks.

2.9 The longest delays occurred in approving funds for the Special Projects in Christian Missionary Areas. It first applied for financial assistance on 5 June but failed to specify its requirements until three months later, when seeking f48,OOO to provide 28 tonnes of milk powder. The Disaster Unit approved

10


f 10,000 for the immediate airfreight of four tonnes but did not contribute to the rest of the programme until 11 November (f25,OOO for milk and medicines).

2.10 Delays in dealing with these claims were caused by: the High Commission’s advice that it would be politically undesirable at that time to channel funds through the organisation; a lack of formal proposals; and staff shortages in the Disaster Unit. The organisation was not given any written guidance by the Administration on how to submit requests for financial assistance.

Delivery and use 2.11 Delivery of supplies of milk and medicines did not take place until February/March 1991. All other items were delivered soon after the Administration’s approval. The Land Rover was presented to the Ugandan Government within eight days of funding. Save the Children’s feeding and tools distribution programmes started within a month.

2.12 The Disaster Unit received feedback on all five responses: the High Commission reported on the use of the Land Rover; the Special Projects in Christian Missionary Area’s reports on its programme indicated success, although the numbers benefiting were not stated. Save the Children’s report on its supplementary feeding programme identified that 386 tonnes of food were distributed to 6,422 children and 3,368 adults; 70 children died but 44 per cent recovered completely. Save the Children’s resettlement funds were used for 25,000 pangas, considered to be the most useful farming tool.

11


Appendix 3 199142 Responses

1. Albania Food Shortages

3 Yugoslavia

Albania

‘L,

Nature of emergency: Shortages of food and medical supplies

Date of emergency: March 1991 onwards

First ODA response: 17 September 1991

Period of assistance: September 1991 to date

Expenditure (to September 1992) fOO0

Feed the Children 380 British Red Cross 200 Oxfam 35 Eastwood (committed) 6

Total 621

12


Background 1.1 The Albanian emergency came to the world’s attention in spring 1991 when 25,000 migrants sought refuge in neighbouring countries from economic hardship. Rural areas in particular were suffering from food shortages. As western agencies began to visit Albania, the dilapidated infrastructure following 40 years of isolation became evident.

Assessment of need

1.2 initially the Disaster Unit relied on information from appeals by the Red Cross, launched in March and June 1991. The first focused on the need to re-invigorate the national Red Cross society in Albania, while the second centred on food supplies for eight vulnerable districts. The Administration did not consider the Albanian situation as an emergency but provided Q million from their food aid budget as their share of the European Community’s contribution.

1.3 At this stage Feed the Children was the only British non-governmental organisation operating in Albania. The Administration had not worked through it before but in September 1991 they approved a grant of E50,OOO to provide relief supplies to mentally handicapped and orphan institutions. The Administration accept that the lack of an alternative was a factor in deciding to use this organisation.

1.4 Needs assessments were subsequently made as the Feed the Children and Red Cross operations progressed. The extent of the problem then became evident. Oxfam carried out an assessment mission in January 1992 and in the same month the Administration committed over EO.5 million to this disaster. Feed the Children was granted f330,000 and the British Red Cross E200,000.

Speed of response 1.5 As this was not a “sudden-onset” disaster, the speed of the Administration’s response is harder to assess. The needs of Albania became widely known in spring 1991; Feed the Children made requests from August onwards: and the Administration’s first bilateral response was in September, with the first relief supplies arriving a few days later.

1.6 The Disaster Unit approved Feed the Children’s November 1991 request in January 1992 and the December Red Cross request within two weeks.

1.7 The delay in responding to this emergency (paragraph 1.2) does not appear to have reduced significantly the impact of the aid. Both the British Red Cross and Oxfam consider that the Administration’s response was justifiably postponed in the light of other more serious emergencies and that the more urgent needs were for food in the rural areas, rather than for the Albanian institutions on which media attention had focused.

Delivery and use 1.8 Regular situation reports were provided by the Red Cross but no-one gave a specific assessment of the impact of the relief. There was a three-month delay in delivering cooking oil supplies because of port blockages and problems in the then Yugoslavia. Sugar and medical supplies were delivered as planned.

1.9 Feed the Children’s convoys suffered from looting but it contends that this did not adversely affect the impact of the relief operation as the looters were themselves needy people.

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1.10 The Administration have emphasised the importance of using reliable implementing agencies for all their relief efforts. However, despite qualms about Feed the Children’s ability to deliver supplies securely and effectively (paragraph 1.3), they made no formal requirement for progress reports or evaluations. The absence of such reports makes it difficult to confirm that supplies were appropriate, or that they were distributed effectively.

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2. Bangladesh Cyclone

Nature of emergency: Bangladesh cyclone

Date of emergency: 29 April 1991

First ODA response: 3 May 1991

Period of assistance: 3 May 1991 to March 1992

Expenditure fOO0

British High Commission 975

Ministry of Defence - Fort Grange 616 UN Disaster Relief Organisation 500

Concern 450 World Vision 350 Care 300

Save the Children 266

League of Red Cross 250

Christian Aid 191

Action Aid 144

Catholic Fund for Overseas Development 116

Oxfam 100

Salvation Army 100

Other Non-governmental organisations 123

Total 4,481

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Background 2.1 Bangladesh is arguably one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. In the last 30 years it has suffered more than 150 disasters-floods, cyclones, tornadoes and tidal bores.

2.2 On the night of 29 April 1991, a severe cyclone hit the islands and south east coast of Bangladesh. Winds of up to 150 miles an hour whipped up a tidal surge of 25 feet which swept across the coastal areas of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. Estimates put the number of deaths at 138,000; 1.5 million homes and 6,700 schools destroyed or damaged: roads, embankments and communications were badly damaged; 700,000 acres of crops were lost or partially destroyed.

2.3 News of a cyclone in the Bay of Bengal was given by an early warning centre from four days in advance. Its path was obviously uncertain but its progress was continually tracked. Those that heeded the cyclone warnings headed to the few cyclone shelters, which apparently were fully used and effective; others sheltered in brick buildings and on killas (earth mounds). Many, however, were reluctant to leave their homes because shelters were some distance away or they were afraid that their homes would be looted or taken over by squatters.

Assessment of need

2.4 First news of the aftermath of the cyclone was given by local non- governmental organisations - few people in the capital, Dhaka, were aware what had happened because the cyclone had interrupted communications.

2.5 After the initial break in communications, the Administration referred all proposals from non-governmental organisations to the High Commission in Dhaka for comment. The presence of experienced aid officers in the High Commission and the secondment of the First Secretary [Aid] to Chittagong enhanced the quality of information that the Administration received and enabled a thorough assessment of requirements.

2.6 There were few foreign non-governmental organisations in the cyclone areas and they were not able to make immediate assessments. Local non- governmental organisations provided emergency relief, counselled those affected, brought families together and provided general help in assessing needs.

2.7 Thirteen UK non-governmental organisations submitted 20 proposals, mainly for food, water, shelter, clothing and medicines. The Administration recognised that major rehabilitation projects would be needed after the initial emergency relief efforts had been completed.

2.8 Initially, helicopters were expected from India and Thailand to help in the emergency. As these failed to materialise, RFA Fort Grange was diverted from the Gulf to Chittagong on 8 May.

2.9 The High Commission received a large number of funding requests from local non-governmental organisations, 80 per cent of which were rejected. Those which were approved mostly involved help through loans and savings schemes.

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Speed of 2.10 The Disaster Unit reacted quickly, authorising the High Commission, on 30 response April, to spend E250,OOO. The first local grants were made on 3 May.

2.11 Written approval for most of the UK non-governmental organisation proposals was given within four days -in many instances following up earlier oral approval. The first oral approval was given on 3 May.

2.12 On 2 May the Administration announced their initial allocation for the relief operations of f2.5 million, which included El.2 million provided via the European Community. An additional E3 million was announced on 3 May and a further E2 million on 8 May. The availability of f 5 million more for longer-term rehabilitation projects was announced on 20 May, separate from the emergency aid budget.

Delivery and use 2.13 f 1 million was made available to the High Commission to spend locally on emergency relief. They disbursed f 894,000 to 25 local non-governmental organisations for the cyclone and used f61,OOO to help alleviate two smaller disasters (floods in Sylhet and a tornado in Gazipur).

2.14 Of the 43 responses funded by the Administration, progress and/or monitoring reports had been received in 27 cases. Many of the reports consisted of general descriptions of the cyclone affected areas and relief efforts - some of which w&e funded from several sources. Few provided sufficient information to assess whether funds had been used for their intended purpose. Housing for cyclone victims was still being provided three months after the disaster struck. The Administration pointed out that this was not unreasonable given the enormous logistical problems of reaching the area, which included offshore islands.

2.15

2.16

2.17

Co-ordination 2.18

In four cases funds were under-spent by UK non-governmental organisations or their implementing partners. This was because costs were lower than expected or because more funds were received than required when multiple applications were successful. The largest unspent balance in September 1992 was flOO,OOO remaining from Concern’s f450,OOO grant; this was spent on rehabilitation.

The initial requirements identified by non-governmental organisations were, on occasions, changed at an early stage when it became apparent, for example, that the supply of food would not be a major problem but the destruction of homes was higher than expected.

Two weeks after the disaster, overseas military assistance arrived. The USA diverted a fleet of ships to the area, using four of them, 28 helicopters and IO landing craft: their main role was to transport food and supplies from Dhaka to Chittagong. RFA Fort Grange, working off Cox’s Bazar, used four helicopters and seven assault boats, transporting 382 tonnes of stores and over 500 passengers by sea and air from Chittagong to isolated areas. One helicopter was lost on the last day of operation.

The High Commission and several non-governmental organisations reported a lack of effective local co-ordination, especially at the field level. On 1 May the Administration agreed to fund two extra UN staff in Dhaka.

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Disaster preparedness

2.19 Many non-governmental organisations (local and foreign) tried to co-ordinate their respective responses to limit the extent of duplication. Nevertheless, some carried out their relief work in areas where assistance was already being provided. After one week, the Bangladesh Government’s Zonal Relief Co-ordinator allocated eight badly affected areas to specific agencies.

2.20 Disaster preparedness has been a priority in Bangladesh-for example, the building of concrete cyclone shelters in a co-ordinated donor programme and the UN-led flood action plan. Many of the non-governmental organisations interviewed stressed the importance of being prepared to cope with disasters - especially in a disaster-prone area like Bangladesh. Following the initial disaster relief operations a preparedness meeting was held in Dhaka in which a number of the donor countries and non- governmental organisations were represented. The meeting stressed the importance of encouraging governments and non-governmental organisations to draw up co-ordinated preparedness plans.

Rehabilitation 2.21 In the course of their investigation the National Audit Office noted that a number of non-governmental organisations said that they had more than enough money to meet their immediate needs for the emergency. They had used the balance, usually with the Administration’s consent, for rehabilitation work. Reports were not available on f0.3 million of the f2.1 million centrally allocated to non-governmental organisations; of the remaining fl.8 million, it appeared that about f0.75 million (42 per cent) was spent on rehabilitation work. In addition the Administration allocated E5 million for rehabilitation work following on from the emergency, mostly for cyclone shelters.

2.22 Following an earlier severe cyclone, 238 shelters were built in the 1970s and a further 123 in the 1980s. Many were inadequately maintained and v\iere of limited use in the 1991 disaster; those that were available were well used.

2.23 An extensive study into the need for additional cyclone shelters has recently been undertaken by the UN Development Programme. Plans are being considered for providing more than 2,500 shelters at a cost over f 200 million. These would help about 10 per cent of the population. They would, however, be multi-purpose buildings, normally for use as schools or community centres.

2.24 Most of the work in this area has so far been concentrated on design. The buildings are expensive but little attention has been paid to the alternative proposal for purpose built schools and hospitals, with cyclone-proofing as the secondary aim. This would be cheaper and is based on the fact that, despite the severity of the 1991 storm, only three brick-built buildings were destroyed. Others have expressed the view that it would be more practical to spend considerably less on simple training on what to do in an emergency -for example burying food and water to recover after the event.

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3. Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea

Nature of emergency: Famine, displaced persons

Date of emergency: Slow-onset continuing

First ODA response: 15 May 1991

Period of assistance: May 1991 -March 1992

Expenditure 1991-92

By recipient: fOO0

CAFOD 1,385 Oxfam 1,370 Christian Aid 1,248

Care 1,207 United Nations (misc) 1,024 Save the Children 852 Int’l Cttee Red Cross 500 Concern 500 World Vision 233 ;ct;; Aid 35

25 ODA direct (bridges) 103

Total 8,481

By activity: fOO0

Supplementary food/ feeding programmes 2,474

Trucks and repairs 2,117 Health/medicine 722 Displaced soldiers 500 AgriCUltUre 476 Water 420 Refugees/returnees 395 UN food airlift 315 Roads 220 Emergency stocks 172 Other 672

8,481

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Background 3.1 Ethiopia and Eritrea have suffered from drought and famine for many years. Their problems have been exacerbated by a long running civil war, which finally ended in May 1991. Since then, relief operations have generally become much easier. However, pockets of insecurity still exist and relief access there remains difficult. Eritrea is now administered as a separate country following a referendum in April 1993 which showed strong support for independence.

3.2 In 1991, despite a record national harvest, Ethiopia was struggling in some areas to cope with a second successive year of severe drought. In Eritrea, 75 per cent of the crops were lost and the harvest was worse than the last major famine of 1983-85. The UN estimated that 9 million people were at risk and 1.2 million tonnes of food were required.

3.3 Displaced people were also in need of assistance. There were about half a million homeless Ethiopians, including ex-soldiers expelled from Eritrea and returnees from Somalia. In addition another half million refugees from Somalia and Sudan were sheltering in the country.

Assessment of need

3.4 In an effort to avert a tragedy in Africa, a massive international relief effort was mounted to which the UK made a substantial contribution. On 15 April 1991, the Minister for Overseas Development pledged E30 million for humanitarian assistance, supplemented on 20 May by a further E20 million. From these pledges Gt.5 million was spent on emergency relief, excluding cereals food aid, in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

3.5 The Disaster Unit relied on the geographical desk to assess needs and priorities; they in turn relied on a variety of sources for situation reports, including the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, non-governmental organisations, UN agencies, the Red Cross and local charitable bodies.

3.6 To supplement cereals provided through the regular Food Aid programme (over 37,000 tonnes at a cost of nearly f7 million), the Administration made f2.5 million available from emergency funds for lentils and vegetable oil. Most requests for supplementary food were met in full but a request by Oxfam for ?Z400,000 in March 1992 was halved to f?200,000 because of competing pressures on funds at the year-end.

3.7 The supply of trucks to UK-based non-governmental organisations was another major priority. Many had been using the same fleet since the emergency of 1983-85 and needed replacements. E2.12 million was provided for truck purchases although World Vision’s applications for 27 trucks (El.6

million] were rejected as having no link with the supply of UK aid or with the “Southern Line Operation” to which priority was being given at the time; World Vision did, however, receive fX.OO,OOO for spare parts for its existing operations and a fuel tanker.

3.8 Other support totalled E3.9 million, covering rehabilitation schemes, health and water projects, displaced ex-soldiers and the installation of two Bailey bridges to replace those destroyed by rebel forces.

Speed of response

3.9 A National Audit Office analysis showed that the Disaster Unit took an average of 24 days to clear each request. This reflected the need to consult the geographical desk and the Embassy, and competing demands on its time, particularly the crisis in Iraq.

20


3.10 Many urgent and straightforward applications for emergency assistance were approved quickly, some on the same day. The longest delay arose on Save the Children’s application for a survey in Ogaden, which took 83 days to process, because of the need for more information to support the application and the desire to identify a co-funder; there was, however, no delay in starting the work, which had begun before funding. Concern’s request for a nutritional programme in Wollo and Sike took 62 days.

Delivery and use 3.11 It often took some two to three months between approval and the actual shipment of aid, particularly food and trucks. After approval, non- governmental organisations needed to charter a suitable ship, organise purchase and packing, and arrange collection from the port. Port congestion and inefficiency, poor roads and insecurity in some areas added to the problems of swift delivery.

3.12 Serious delays in delivery arose with a Christian Aid shipment of 600 tonnes of lentils to Eritrea. A grant of f260,OOO was approved on 16 October 1991, supplemented by f36,OOO in December to reflect increased lentil prices: the goods were shipped in February 1992 but did not arrive in Eritrea until April. This was because the shipowner held the goods in port in Egypt as a bargaining lever against an insurance claim - a ploy apparently used before but unknown to the donors.

3.13 Trucks took up to nine months to be delivered, mainly because they needed to be built to high specifications to withstand Ethiopian roads. Managers of the Save the Children/Oxfam local Joint Transport Operation and Care truck activities in Dessie, interviewed by the National Audit Office, considered that the delays were not crucial but had resulted in old vehicles being used for longer than planned.

3.14 Bailey bridges supplied directly by the Administration were quickly approved and flown out to Ethiopia in just over a month. A suggestion by the World Food Programme that better value for money would be obtained by shipping stocks of Bailey bridges in advance was rejected as it would have involved supplying relief in advance of need, with a risk also that the equipment might not be used for emergency purposes.

3.15 Of the the 41 responses funded by the Administration, the National Audit Office found reports for 28 -although 10 of the remaining operations will be covered by general year-end reports by the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The National Audit Office obtained additional information on some responses during their visits to non-governmental organisations and to Ethiopia.

3.16 Feedback on aid to Eritrea was generally poor, mainly because of the absence of non-governmental organisations in the area during the war and communications difficulties. The local Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency received Administration funding indirectly through Save the Children and Oxfam. The Agency told the National Audit Office that it did not have a strong reporting capacity for the aid it managed although efforts were being made to improve the position. The smaller organisations which it used locally had even less capacity.

21


Co-ordination

3.17 In May 1991, several of Concern’s stores were looted. Large stocks of food funded by the Administration had built up in the port of Assab, partly because other items were given priority-fertilisers, for example, which are a seasonal requirement. The Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front appropriated and distributed foodstocks when it took control of Assab port. A recent report by the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development estimated that at least 550 tonnes of the 861 tonnes of supplementary food funded by the Administration in January 1991 (at a cost of EO.5 million] was taken. The Administration view these misappropriations with serious concern. They made strong representations to the Eritrean authorities.

3.18 A second consignment, shipped out in September 1991, was still being distributed in September 1992. The delays were blamed on communication problems, inadequate port facilities, port congestion and inadequate security.

3.19 While in Massawa, the National Audit Office noticed Oxfam consignments of vegetable oil packed in unsuitable plastic containers which had leaked in the heat. To prevent further loss, port staff poured the oil into tin drums, a process they said they had carried out on previous occasions. The National Audit Office established that this consignment had been funded by the European Community but in so doing discovered that plastic containers had also been used for 400 tonnes of vegetable oil financed by the Administration, which arrived in port in June 1992.

3.20 The Administration financed the purchase of 32 trucks but had limited information on their use. The National Audit Office’s visits to truck workshops in Dessie and Addis Ababa confirmed that the trucks were well utilised, apart from one which had been off the road for six months after an accident. The 21 trucks purchased by Care at a cost of over fl million, however, had a design fault: stabilisers were prone to snap, leaving the vehicles off the road for several months at a time. The National Audit Office observed that, in contrast to trucks provided by other countries, Administration-funded trucks did not carry any identification to show that they had been donated by the UK Government. The Administration are taking steps to improve the visibility of British-gifted supplies and equipment.

3.21 The International Committee of the Red Cross told the National Audit Office that it considered that its E31 million programme for ex-soldiers had achieved its objectives.

3.22 Oxfam water programmes served some 300,000 Somali refugees and management of its schemes will shortly be transferred to the local water authority. The Save the Children survey of the Ogaden, although mainly about food aid needs, resulted in further support from the Administration with a f120,OOO grant for veterinary drugs.

3.23 The Administration’s emergency relief to Ethiopia and Eritrea was part of a large international response. Some problems with co-ordination were reported. Non-governmental organisations told the National Audit Office that co-ordination in the region since the war was generally reasonable and bodies such as the Christian Relief Development Association were well respected but there was a need for stronger central co-ordination.

22


4. Iraqi Refugees

Nature of emergency: Refugees fleeing from Iraq to Turkey and Iran -in need of food, shelter and medical aid,

Date of emergency: April 1991 onwards

First ODA response: 4 April 1991

Period of assistance: April 1991 to date

Turkey Iran Airlift UN appeal Mobile team Simple Truth Post Op Haven

Total

% of total

iupplier

581 553

792 4

186

2,116

6%

ii&T-L ‘ran Kurdish Care Other

78 72 70

t-t+

955 846 200 122 329 219 350

67i 5741 641332

,648 1 1,419 1 I,2701 532

23


Background 4.1 The crisis arose because of attempts by Saddam Hussein to suppress uprisings in northern Iraq (Kurds) and southern Iraq (Shiites) following the Gulf conflict. Early in April 1991, thousands of families began to flee the advancing Iraqi forces, fearing a repeat of the 1988 massacres.

4.2 Kurdish refugees fled to south-eastern Turkey and north-western Iran over freezing mountains, while the Shiites fled to southern Iran. In both cases, the refugees suffered from exposure to the elements and a lack of food, medical supplies and suitable clothing.

4.3 Media attention focused particularly on the Kurds on the Turkish border, where initially they were trapped in the inhospitable mountains by Turkish troops stopping them fleeing further into Turkey. By 10 April, about 850,000 were encamped at the border, in places almost inaccessible by road.

4.4 The Iranians had experience of coping with refugees during the war with Iraq and were relatively quick to set up camps. However, the large number arriving soon threatened to overwhelm them: estimates varied from 1.2 million to 2 million by mid-April.

Assessment of need

4.5 Assessments of need were carried out by the UN. Its initial view was that relief supplies needed to be flown in as soon as possible. The Government decided to use military airdrops on the Turkish border mountains, co- ordinated with an American operation. For refugees elsewhere, supplies could be distributed by road from the airports. The extra costs of the airlift were financed from the Contingencies Fund.

4.6 In addition to UN, military and non-governmental organisations’ assessment teams, the Administration’s own Health and Population Adviser spent two months in Turkey and northern Iraq assessing needs. It was on his suggestion that the Administration recruited 165 professional volunteers to assist in the mountains and in the move down to refugee camps during May and June.

4.7 Once the Kurds moved off the mountainsides into the “safe haven” in northern Iraq, the Administration’s needs assessment focused on proposals by non-governmental organisations. This was not, however, before they had granted f89,OOO to a Care Britain request to hire rough terrain vehicles to reach the Kurds on the mountains. These were not needed by the time they arrived as the refugees had left; the vehicles were briefly used elsewhere before being returned to the UK.

4.8 After the military operation ceased, continuing needs were identified in the latter part of 1991 on the northern border and new ones in southern Iraq, where there were severe shortages of food and medical supplies. Care and the Red Cross made proposals for Iraq but for the Kurdish area the Administration had to rely on previously untried local non-governmental organisations. The Administration recognise that they took a necessary risk in agreeing to fund these organisations.

4.9 Although twice as many sought refuge in Iran as in Turkey, only 15 per cent of the relief was allocated to the area. The Administration’s information to assess needs came partly through the Iranian Embassy in London and soon afterwards from the British Embassy in Tehran. These initial assessments

24


Speed of response

led to several relief flights carrying tents and hlankets, and later medicines and food. In May/June 1991, further proposals were made by Care, Oxfam and Save the Children for the provision of camp infrastructure and emergency supplies.

4.10 The British Embassy and local Red Crescent advised against sending surgical teams as the main necessity was supplies and medicines for camp diseases. The Administration nevertheless sent the South Manchester Accident Rescue Team at the request of the Iranian Government. Its special skills were inappropriate to the need but it was able to set up camp clinics which it turned over to the Red Crescent.

4.11 The aggression against the Kurds was generally known. Details of urgent humanitarian needs were published in a joint Oxfam/Save the Children report on 21 March 1991. News of major refugee movements came in during the first few days of April and from that point the Administration’s response was fast. The first UK relief flights began delivering supplies on 8 April two days after the decision to provide aid was taken.

Delivery and use 4.12 At a time when there was no alternative means of delivery, the combined airlift operation achieved its goal through the sheer volume of supplies dropped, though some refugees were reportedly killed by falling supplies. However, at a cost of E6.8 million, it represented nearly 20 per cent of the Administration’s relief effort.

4.13 Of the 47 grants given by the Administration, follow-up reports could not be found in 18 cases. The reports that were received indicate that relief channelled through the major non-governmental organisations was used for its intended purpose.

4.14 The Administration contributed El0 million towards the Simple Truth appeal for the Kurds, which centred on a concert held in London in May 1991. +Z5 million was given to the British Red Cross and the remainder was part of a $10 million donation to the UN. The British Red Cross told the National Audit Office that they had spent E576,OOO on trucks for the Iranian Red Crescent and would be providing information on how the rest of their E2.5 million direct expenditure had been incurred; the remaining E2.5 million was passed on to other non-governmental organisations. The Administration have not sought reports on the impact of the Simple Truth expenditure.

4.15 The post “Operation Haven” response began in the winter of 1991-92 and some projects were still continuing at the time of the National Audit Office’s examination. In all, g2.8 million was committed to this response, of which over EO.5 million went to Kurdish non-governmental organisations. The National Audit Office found no follow-up reports which specifically related to this funding.

4.16 The British Embassy relief co-ordinator reported that, overall, UK aid to Iran was well targeted. He also reported an element of over-assessment and competition between non-governmental organisations. There was a tendency by many donors to place an emphasis on medical teams when the major need was relief supplies for competent Iranian personnel.

25


4.17 The airlifted supplies accounted for about half of the relief sent to Iran. It was not possible for the Embassy to monitor distribution through the Red Crescent as much was in the north-west of the country, where the provincial government often ignored distribution instructions from Tehran.

4.16 In May/June 1991, 165 British volunteers with medical, engineering and building skills, were selected by the Administration and sent to northern Iraq and Turkey (paragraph 4.6). The operation, which cost about El.2 million, was mostly paid for by the European Community with the Administration contributing E71,000.

4.19 Questionnaires completed by the volunteers after their period of service formed the main feed-back on this operation. Most said that their time was very worthwhile, although some criticised the lack of communication from London and the late arrival of some important equipment; others felt that the teams lacked recognised leaders which sometimes hampered their work. This experience led directly to the Administration’s disaster relief initiative in August 1991.

Co-ordination 4.20 In Turkey/Iraq the initial co-ordination of the airlift was America’s responsibility. British commanders decided on how and where to drop supplies and when to’end the operation. Turkey’s refusal to admit the Kurds as refugees in terms of international law prevented the UN High Commissioner for Refugees from responding legally.

4.21 In Iran poor co-ordination existed between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Community and the Iranian Government. Local authorities prevented the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the European Community from taking a co-ordinating role as they wished to maintain control. To an extent this blunted the impact of relief.

4.22 Overall donor co-ordination was the task of the UN. Experience from this crisis contributed to a Humanitarian Relief Co-ordinator being appointed to strengthen the UN’s co-ordinating role.

cost of 4.23 The National Audit Office examined the charges made by the Ministry of Operation Haven Defence for their part in the airlift. The charges were fully documented and

were in accordance with the agreement that only additional costs are passed on.

26


5. The Philippines Typhoon Thelma

.

Nature of emergency: Typhoon Thelma

Date of emergency: 5 November 1991

First ODA response: 7 November 1991

Period of assistance: November 1991 to March 1992

Christian Aid 25

World Vision 30

Save the Children 38

Hanover Aviation 50

British Embassy 11

1

27


Background

Assessment of need

5.1 Typhoon Thelma struck The Philippines on 4 and 5 November 1991. Dumping six inches of rain in 24 hours it caused extensive flooding, and widespread destruction: water cascaded down from the mountains into lowland areas, destroying irrigation dams and sweeping through inhabited areas, destroying buildings. The worst hit areas were cut off for several days. It caused 4,000 deaths and injured 3,000; some 3,500 people were made homeless. Thelma caused the worst flooding in The Philippines for seven years.

5.2 The first indications of a disaster were provided by a Press Association report on 5 November which stated that over 120 people had drowned in flash floods and many thousands were homeless. However it was not until 7 November that the scale of the disaster became clear. The UN Disaster Relief Organisation’s first information report described the floods as ‘devastating’ and said there were more than 2,000 casualties.

Speed of

5.3 The Administration’s main sources of information were eight situation reports from the UN Disaster Relief Organisation and reports from the British Embassy in Manila, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and World Vision.

5.4 The Disaster Unit relied on the Embassy’s local knowledge when assessing requests for assistance. This proved useful when assessing a request for E82,OOO from World Vision for emergency relief for 1,000 families. The Embassy pointed out that other countries had agreed to contribute and commented that some of the costs looked excessive and the wrong exchange rate had been used. As a result, the proposal was revised to f30,000 and granted.

5.5 The Philippines Embassy in London sought help with the transport from UK of 1,000 boxes of basic relief supplies, worth over flOO,OOO, donated by Rotary International. The Administration do not normally agree to finance the airfreight of supplies as it is generally cheaper to obtain goods locally. However on this occasion they decided that the specific embassy request should be met. The Disaster Unit ensured that other goods were loaded on the return flight to minimise costs.

5.6 The Administration received a relatively small number of requests for assistance. There is no evidence that any requests for assistance were refused although the Disaster Unit considered that other donors, such as the USA and Japan, were geographically better placed to help. By November 1991 the international community had donated $5.6 million [E3 million) to the disaster; the UK was the fourth largest donor.

5.7 Following immediate approval of the British Embassy’s request for ElO,OOO for urgent medical supplies, the Disaster Unit’s policy was to wait to see how other donors reacted and what specific needs were identified before providing further assistance. It was another five days before the first non- governmental organisation request was received; this was approved one day later. The average approval time for all requests was less than a day.

20


Delivery and use 5.8 World Vision reported that just over half of its grant was used to purchase 1,700 sacks of rice and the balance on blankets, mats and cooking materials. It also said that its aid had been fully distributed by the end of December. The Rotary International relief boxes were flown out on 9 December 1991 and arrived on 11 December; the Philippines Embassy orally informed the Administration that they had been distributed by 5 March 1992. There were no reports from the two other non-governmental organisations and it was not possible to identify when the aid was provided.

5.9 The British Embassy bought medical supplies immediately and handed them over to the local Red Cross the following day. The Disaster Unit received an informal complaint from a private individual that the medicines bought were mainly cold remedies. The Embassy confirmed that cough and cold mixtures had been purchased, along with antibiotics and fever tablets. These medicines were those available at short notice from local companies, which did not produce the chlorine tablets or formalin requested. The Embassy did not seek advice from the Red Cross or the Disaster Unit but relied on the expertise of local companies, based on information from previous local disaster needs; they considered that they served a useful purpose and that other medicines required were probably provided by other donors from outside The Philippines.

5.10 While typhoons will inevitably cause damage, Thelma highlighted the devastating impact of deforestation on the severity of the outcome and the need for disaster mitigation action.

29


6. Turkey Earthquake

‘blurs of smer9eney: Earthquake

late of smer!~e”cy: 13 March 1992

:irst ODA response: 16 March 1992

Period of assistance: March 1992 -April 1992

Expenditure

British Red Cross Turkish Red Crescent UN Disaster Relief Organisation Ministry of Defence ODA rapid response assessment Miscellaneous

Total

fOO0

140 50 50

7 1 1

249

30


Background 6.1 On 13 March 1992 an earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale hit Turkey, 40 kilometres east of Erzincan, causing severe damage to the city and the adjacent rural areas. Almost 500 died and 1,000 were reported injured. Preliminary estimates put the number of homeless at 30,000 but subsequent estimates indicated that 100,000 needed shelter. The Erzincan area has a history of earthquakes: in 1939 40,000 died and another 1,300 were killed in Erzrum in 1983.

Assessment of need

Speed of response

6.2 Reports of the earthquake arrived quickly from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation, the British Embassy in Ankara and the media. Initial information on requirements was confused and conflicting advice was received from the Turkish Government and the Turkish Red Crescent. There was also a short delay before international relief assistance was requested by the Turkish Government.

6.3 Based on their initial assessment, the Administration gave assistance for the provision of shelter and for the local purchase of essential relief materials. The provision of water purification equipment and supporting water engineers were also offered but were not, in the event, required. Instead, they funded three Ministry of Defence flights ferrying pallets of boxed mineral water supplied by the USA and additional shelter needs. Initial arrangements were also made to send a search and rescue team but these were not pursued when the Turkish authorities indicated that they would not arrive in time to find survivors.

6.4 This earthquake was the first opportunity the Administration had of initiating their rapid response capability. An experienced assessor (a doctor) was sent to Turkey on 15 March, arriving in Erzincan the following morning, to assess the impact of the earthquake and to advise on requirements. He recommended that no further assistance was needed. This first deployment of an assessor highlighted some practical lessons for the disaster relief strategy - the value of conducting a rapid initial assessment at the scene before committing support; the assessor should be sent out more quickly and should be given more facilities to undertake his task; and there was a need for improved information flows within the Administration.

6.5 There was an initial delay of eight hours before any information of actual requirements was obtained. The Administration then acted quickly. The disaster occurred at the weekend but demonstrated the Disaster Unit’s ability to react to sudden crises and tested their “out of hours” procedures.

6.6 The Administration made E50,OOO available to the Turkish Red Crescent within two days of the disaster. They took initial steps to mobilise a search and rescue team and granted El40,000 to the British Red Cross for flying out 600 tents and 500 plastic sheets - all before their assessor arrived in Turkey.

6.7 Eighteen hours elapsed before a decision was made to activate the Disaster Relief Initiative and it was two and a half days before the assessor arrived in the disaster zone. The exercise, however, ensured that unwanted supplies and personnel were not sent.

31


Delivery and use 6.8 Three reports have been produced on the assistance provided by the British Red Cross, the Administration’s assessor and the Head of the Disaster Unit’s evaluation of the first use of the Disaster Relief Initiative.

6.9 Distribution of aid was initiated quickly, although a serious disruption occurred on 15 March when some 500 people helped themselves to some 6,000 tents and 10,000 blankets held in the Erzincan stadium. By 7 April over 26,000 tents and 50,000 blankets had been distributed, by which time the Turkish Red Crescent Society considered that virtually all victims had been given the shelter, food, blankets and clothing they required.

6.10 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees had 950 prefabricated housing units in a regional stockpile in Diyarbakir, Turkey. However, UN administrative difficulties made it impossible for these stocks to be used immediately. After an initial delay the UN agreed that the stocks could be drawn upon, on a replenishment basis. The Administration provided ~XO,OOO

to release 20 units. No information was available about the eventual distribution of these units.

Co-ordination 6.11 There was an overwhelming international response. At least 27 planeloads of supplies, equipment and more than 300 personnel were sent by donors. However, not all the aid was needed or used and in many areas it was quite inappropriate. Most foreign relief workers were unemployed or grossly under-used; in addition, the needs of these workers imposed a significant management burden on the local authorities. Co-ordination problems were to an extent attributable to the fact that the Turkish administration was very new, following recent elections.

6.12 The assessor considered that there was virtually a complete failure of field co-ordination of donor assistance in the crucial early days of the disaster. He also identified a need to strengthen the local co-ordination capacity to increase effectiveness in the use of emergency relief.

6.13 In addition to the practical lessons learned from the first activation of the Disaster Relief Initiative, there were general lessons from this disaster:

. improvements are needed in the initial needs assessment; l disaster preparedness should be increased and should be mandatory in

all disaster-prone areas; . search and rescue activities should be initiated within 24 hours; . co-ordination arrangements between various agencies should have been

set up earlier.

32


Appendix 4 1992-93 Response

1. Somalia Famine

Nature of emergency: Famine

Date of emer9eac.y: January 1991 onwards

First ODA response: February 1991

Period of assistance: February 1991 to date

Expenditure fOO0

1991-92 1992-93 Apr-Sep Ott-Oec Save the Children 1,014 Care 357 500 Oxfam 460 International Red Cross 250 MBdecines cans Frond&es 440 Concern 227 434 Cars 165 Christian Aid 235 so2 International Red Cross 150 Save the Children 130 240 Others 525 Oxfam 246

World Vision 21 210 Total 2,754 Others 2

-- Total 1,220 2,134

Overall total 6,108

Note: the NAO examined responses to September 7992

33

0VERSEASDEVELOPMENTADMINISTRATION:EMERGENCYRELIEF

Background 1.1

Assessment of Need

Speed of Response

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

Somalia is one of the few African countries united by a common language, religion and culture but it is deeply divided by a nomadic clan structure. Over the past two years this has erupted into widescale violence and the virtual collapse of any form of recognisable government, the rule of law and the country’s economy. Fighting in the capital, Mogadishu, between rebel groups and the forces of the then President, Siad Barre, came to a head in January 1991. Dead and wounded (mainly civilians) were thought to exceed 30.000.

Barre was ousted but fighting continued and was at its most intensive in the normally agriculturally productive areas of the south. By September 1991 rival factions within the main rebel group had turned upon each other. In November 1991, heavy fighting in Mogadishu effectively closed this key port in the relief effort. It has since re-opened but operates sporadically.

In March ISSZ the UN negotiated a cease-fire in Mogadishu which has more or less held for several months. But the situation is extremely volatile and a high level of violence prevails throughout the country.

Agricultural production in 1991 was very poor and the situation deteriorated as farmers were left without seeds, diesel and spare parts for irrigation pumps. Little fobd had been available since the beginning of 1992 and in February, one year after the outbreak of the civil war, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that, of a population of 7 million, 1.5 million were starving and 4.5 million faced starvation within weeks.

The British Embassy and other western missions evacuated Mogadishu in January 1991 and have not returned. Initially, the Administration relied almost entirely on the Red Cross and the few non-governmental organisations which remained to provide assessments of the aid requirements. The withdrawal of most agency staff for safety reasons early in 1991 slowed the process but as they returned the Administration and the UN received situation reports.

In March 1992 the Administration agreed to contribute f2.7 million to relief programmes. Since then the Administration have provided increasing amounts of emergency relief to Somalia as the crisis has intensified and new possibilities for delivery to the needy have opened up. They drew down an additional E7.5 million from their contingency reserve for this purpose. By November 1992 they had committed f6.1 million. In addition 34,000 tonnes of cereals food aid and f2.5 million for the Red Cross were also provided from outside the emergency relief budget.

Until spring 1992, the UN provided two planes for non-governmental organisations to transport relief personnel and supplies. When these were withdrawn because of worsening security, the Administration funded Save the Children to charter a replacement (El30,OOO). Approval was provided within 5 to 13 days for the three requests involved.

The Administration approved the request by the International Committee of the Red Cross in June 1992 to purchase and distribute food within nine days. They considered that the proposal (f2.6 million) warranted co-funding from other donors and they agreed to contribute f 250,000.

34


1.9 Requests were received from Concern for emergency food supplies for malnourished children (f227,OOO) in May 1992: Christian Aid for the funding of 25 relief flights (f235,OOO) in July 1992; and Care for the provision of seeds and tools (f350,OOO). All three were approved within three weeks.

1.10 In August 1992 Oxfam proposed a f 273,000 programme for seeds and tool distribution. The Administration initially rejected the application as its viability was in question and it was insufficiently focused on immediate relief needs. However, after further discussion with Oxfam and clarification of security conditions, a grant of E75,000 was approved.

Delivery and use 1.11 The Administration have received two situalion reports and a brief note on the first three weeks aircraft operation from Save the Children. Concern provided reports for their May to July 1992 operations recording that some 14,000 children had been fed.

1.12 The Administration seek to assess the viability of projects before approving emergency funding. However, aid to Somalia is being provided in extremely difficult conditions and famine relief is not a high priority for the warring factions. Despite the 1992 ceasefire, looting remains rife and aid convoys continued to be severely at risk from armed gangs. This has forced aid agencies to hire rival gunmen to protect their convoys. Local businessmen are charging inflated prices for transporting goods and there have been demands at Mogadishu airport for percentages of the cargo to ensure safe passage.

1.13 There are as yet no reports of specifically British-funded relief supplies being looted, though this cannot be ruled out. Save the Children’s compound in Hargeisa was looted of equipment and vehicles in March 1992. In Berbera, Care had a $125,000 programme deposit stolen and food stocks looted. And as the security situation deteriorates the risk of looting and attacks on food trucks increases. As a general rule, bulk food (or “dry rations”) are more attractive to looters than food supplied cooked and direct through a network of kitchens, which are not receiving substantial support from emergency aid funds.

1.14 Large quantities of aid are being provided to Somalia in the hope that some reaches the starving population.

Recent Developments

1.15 Towards the end of 1992, operating conditions for relief agencies worsened due to insecurity. Acting under the authority of the UN, a US-led Unified Task Force was deployed in Somalia from early December with the aim of securing the relief effort. As a result, food availability increased leading to a dramatic decrease in mortality due to starvation.

1.16 In March 1993, the Administration made a further commitment of 10,000 tonnes of food aid. They continue to provide emergency relief including support for carefully targeted rehabilitation activities-seeds and tools, basic education and health services.

1.17 The Administration also seconded an official to the office of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Somalia to assist with drawing up a recovery programme for Somalia. They have offered further technical

35


expertise and funds to support an assessment mission and are planning to support a modest programme of assistance for essential services in the northwest where conditions are more stable.

1.18 Since 1 January 1993, the Administration have allocated a further f4.1 million in emergency non-food assistance. The UK’s total commitment since I January 1992 now stands at more than f44 million (including bilateral food aid) of which f 16.68 million represents the UK share of Europen Community aid amounting to f 100 million.

36


Appendix 5 Disaster Preparedness

1 Since April 1990 the Administration have spent f695,OOO on 10 disaster preparedness projects. The National Audit Office examined five of these.

Health preparedness 2 In December 1990 the Pan-American Health Organisation sought assistance in the Caribbean from the Administration to fund their preparedness activities. These

involved helping government health sectors in the Caribbean to prepare for any type of disaster or strife. The objectives of the project include strengthening national and regional disaster reduction programmes in the health sector and contributing to inter-country disaster co-operation.

3 The Administration agreed to fund the project for 1991 and 1992 at a cost of f 300,000. Progress reports had been received and disaster mitigation guidelines produced. The Administration intend to send an evaluation team to the area to assess the project’s achievements.

Disaster Management 4 In April 1991 the UN Development Programme sought support from the Training Administration for its Disaster Management Training Programme. This was

aimed at building up the capacity of staff of the UN Development Programme and host governments to respond to disasters and to plan and conduct their own continuing training in disaster reduction. The Administration agreed to contribute f250,OOO to this $4.3 million programme for two years. At the Administration’s insistence, an evaluation of progress was put in hand in late 1992.

Building improvement 5 In March 1991 proposals were put forward by two research organisations to programmes in design a training programme in earthquake resistant building design. The hazard prone areas cost of the two-year project was originally estimated at f220,OOO but was

subsequently increased to f 330,000.

6 The project aims to promote building improvement programmes by major disaster-linked organisations through the production of technical guidelines, a workshop to disseminate research findings and field application trials in Pakistan and Peru. It should be completed in March 1993.

7 In March 1991 the Administration agreed to underwrite the production of 200 permatents which were to be field trialled by the British Red Cross. Initial estimates were put at E24,500 but final costs were over f51,OOO because of higher specifications and higher transport costs than expected.

8 The Red Cross was initially to test the tents in Iraq with the Kurdish refugees but this did not take place. It subsequently was to try them in Bangladesh but this did not happen either. Care agreed to trial 100 permatents in northern Iraq in April 1992 and the rest were placed on trial in Bangladesh.

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9 The results of the trials were encouraging although several problems were identified.

Oil Pollution 10 In December 1990 the Administration considered providing advice and assistance to Caribbean countries to establish a contingency plan to deal with oil spills.

11 In 1992 discussions took place with the Clean Caribbean Co-operative, a private sector body, to provide specialist equipment and manpower not available in the area. The Administration financed two consultants to negotiate the terms of the agreement and to set up internal co-ordination arrangements between the Caribbean countries and the Co-operative. The consultants also provided advice on the equipment and training necessary to respond to possible future incidents.

12 The consultancy report was produced in May 1992. It suggested that Caribbean countries concentrated on dealing with oil when it arrived on the beaches. It said that about f230,OoO was needed to fund cleaning equipment and relevant training. The report recommended that the Administration finance oil spillage refnedial work in the future, recovering the money from compensation claims. The Administration are considering the report.

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overseas development administration: emergency relief

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