REGULATED RIVERS: RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT, VOL. 2, 471-477 (1988)

OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN RIVER REGULATION

RICHARD WOOD Severn Trent Water Authority, Abelson House, Coventry Road, Birmingham

ABSTRACT Integrated river basin management has been the backcloth against which river regulation has been practiced in England and Wales for the past 14 years. Its success is reviewed and the forthcoming changes in legislation are critically examined. A number of problems facing the emergent National Rivers Authority are discussed. The need for co-operation rather than conflict is advocated wherever environment is to be protected and when competing pressures impact on river resources. A number of technical issues remain unresolved and the need for continuing work is recognized. KEY WORDS Integrated river basin management National Rivers Authority Water Resource Management Scheme operation

and promotion Environmental assessment Pollution control

INTRODUCTION

Since the Water Act (1973) introduced into England and Wales in April 1974 integrated river basin management, international acclaim has been given to the way in which much of the U.K. Water Industry is operated. The Water Act established multipurpose authorities combining water supply, sewage treatment, and river management functions to operate within the public domain, as semiautonomous government regulated bodies. The Act swept away a host of small independent bodies responsible for sewage treatment and water supply, and promised to offer an exciting era in which there would be radical improvement in environmental standards whilst consumers enjoyed the traditional benefits of wholesome water supply and effective sewage disposal. In 1987 it is possible to look back over the past 13 years and to see whether or not integrated river basin management has lived up to all it promised.

T H E EXISTING SYSTEM

There are undoubtedly several virtues of the present system including the ability to plan and to manage effectively water resources, water supply, sewerage, and environmental matters over very sizeable areas and in a variety of timescales. In particular the planning and control of major water resource systems has benefitted from integration and large-scale operation. It is no longer necessary to examine the individual demand predictions of every Water Board and Water Company nor to consider their individual applications to provide increased resources. The promotion of major schemes such as the Teddington Flow Proposal (Sexton, this volume) or the development of a new reservoir source can provide resources for a whole river basin. Similarly, making day-to-day provision for a secure water supply is more readily and economically achieved over large areas. Thus, the interdependence of supplies achieved by the Water Authorities using aqueducts and river systems has meant that droughts affecting one particular type of source are less likely to cause pressure problems or cut-offs to consumers. The occurrence of three severe droughts in between 1975 and 1984 has taught the Water Authorities a number of lessons about how to manage and to provide secure water supplies. It is unlikely that small independent Water Boards would have been able to respond to all the lessons of these droughts.

It is also true to say that a single body, with statutory responsibilities for environmental and regulatory matters as well as for water supply and sewerage, can by internal debate and discussion resolve priorities,

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in particular involving money and manpower, more speedily than could be achieved where two or more bodies are involved. It is certainly true to say that little money is spent in resolving potential areas of conflict. Priorities are today established by individual Water Authority Boards without extensive public debate or delay.

One of the great virtures of the 1973 Act was to establish sizeable Authorities who were able to achieve considerable economies of scale. Thus it was possible to see a significant reduction in the capital spent, in the manpower numbers employed, and in the revenue expenditure of the Water Industry during the 1970s. There is little doubt that these reductions could not have taken place without the prior establishment of large-scale water utilities.

Finally, it can be argued that the acclaim given to the U.K. Water Industry by international interests, has enabled a number of Water Authorities to earn a limited amount of foreign currency. Several Water Authorities have won a number of overseas consultancies, in part due to their holistic approach to water management. With central government increasingly interested during the 1980s in making the British Water Industry self-financing, these foreign earnings may well be important in the future. Currently Water Authorities have a self-financing ratio of 80 per cent and as we move towards privatization there is likely to be an increased emphasis on the ability to earn money both at home and abroad.

Despite the international acclaim of the 1973 Water Act, the reality is that many management issues do not involve river basins, and that a number of Water Authorities manage much of their day-to-day business without considering the natural boundaries, indeed several have established internal operational units which transgress river basins. Although there is interdependence of these operational units, for example in water resource terms, many are independent in terms of water distribution, sewerage, sewage treatment, manpower deployment, and other activities. The Water Authorities’ core functions are water supply, sewage disposal and sewage treatment, and to a certain extent environmental issues tend to be submerged in the day to day management of these functions. It is also true to say that large organizations find it difficult to maintain local contacts, although attempts are made to do this by establishing regional committees having environmental and other responsibilities.

Water Authorities also have had difficulty in deciding the relative merits of a number of competing objectives. For example, it may be difficult to choose between investing in increased reliability of supplies or a revised water quality objective. Without external influence it perhaps has been less attractive to spend monies achieving environmental objectives, especially where there is little tangible benefit either to the Water Authority or to its consumers.

Over the past several years, Water Authorities have been subject to increasing control from Central Government. This control has been exercised in terms of capital and revenue expenditure. Increasingly tight performance objectives, which have forced down the total number of employees in the industry have been accompanied by much slower improvements in water quality than was envisaged in 1974. In the recent past several Authorities had difficulty in meeting their own consent standards at a large number of works. This issue is complex in that compliance with consents is not readily understood. However, leaving aside the technical issues, the Authorities have now taken steps to improve their own environmental achievements. Critics of the industry, have pointed out that an independent regulatory body might have observed and acted upon this issue more quickly.

This epitomizes the environmentalists’ long-standing criticism of the Water Act. That is that the regulatory powers are given to the Water Authorities, who also control the water reclamation works which are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the pollution load. An independent regulatory body has long been discussed, and is now being proposed by the Government following the opposition voiced to the 1986 White Paper which proposed that the Water Authorities should be privatized with their regulatory and operational functions intact.

THE NATIONAL RIVERS AUTHORITY

As a result of that opposition and because of the legislative difficulties, involving both U.K. and E.E.C. law, the government is now proposing to establish a national body which would retain the Water

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Authorities’ regulatory and river basin functions within the public sector whilst privatizing the other functions. Central Government published its proposals for a National Rivers Authority in July 1987 and, in December 1987 published a further policy document, following extensive consultation.

By the time this chapter is published, the Government will have brought in enabling legislation which will allow preparations for the transfer of the utility functions to Public Limited Companies. These will be subsequently offered for sale. Water resource planning and control, land drainage and flood protection, the protection of the water environment and the improvement and development of fisheries, and navigation where it applies, are to be transferred to the National Rivers Authority. The National Rivers Authority will seek to recover much of its costs directly from users, by way of abstraction charges, but will still depend to a certain extent on public funds.

The National Rivers Authority will manage its functions on the same regional boundaries i.e. river basin boundaries as the existing Regional Water Authorities. Specialist committees will be established at local level so that flood protection and environmental issues can be managed effectively. In particular, a Regional River Advisory Committee will be established to represent interests such as conservation, recreation, industry, agriculture, and local government. These committees would be advisory in nature but would not manage the regulatory responsibilities of the NRA. The Regional Fisheries Advisory Committees would continue in addition in their present form. In Wales it is not intended to establish a separate NRA but a special committee would be formed to advise the Secretary of State for Wales.

The NRA will have responsibilities for safeguarding water resources, but the utility companies will be responsible for forecasting demand and taking the necessary steps to ensure that adequate supplies are available for their consumers. The PLCs will assume responsibility for existing reservoirs. In cases such as regulating reservoirs, a basis for payment has yet to be worked out whereby money can be transferred between the NRA and the utility company to reflect that element of the yield of the reservoir used to support river interests other than water supply.

The Government intends to constitute the National River Authority immediately after the main legislation has received the Royal Assent (autumn 1989). In order to allow this immediate implementation, substantial preparations are being set in hand. The Public Utility Transfers and Water Charges Bill, will give Water Authorities express powers to prepare themselves for privatization and for the formation of a shadow NRA. It is likely that a shadow NRA unit will be formed by April 1989 and that Royal Assent will be given to the main legislation prior to the 1 October 1989.

These far reaching proposals have been the subject of an extensive period of consultation. Of the 349 responses received by the Government, 179 supported the establishment of a National Rivers Authority and 39 opposed it, whilst the remainder expressed no view either for or against. The issue raising the most concern was the presence which the NRA would have in the river basins under its control. In particular how the Authority would be organized, its relationship between the centre and its regional elements, and its relationship between the river basin users and its regional centre. Many commentators were concerned to formalize the representation of users’ interests in the Regions.

Extensive comment was also received on the suggested mode of operation of the NRA. The Government proposals included the possibility of some of the NRA functions being undertaken by the Water Authorities. Some of the strongest comment came from environmentalists who were seeking to ensure the impartiality of the regulatory functions vested in the NRA.

One potential area of difficulty is the possible conflict with the role of the office of the Director General of Water Services (OFWAT) which is to be set up to deal with the economic regulation of the privatized water utilities. There is a need for coordination of the different types of regulatory impact, since the NRA will have significant cost implications for the utilities which OFWAT will have to bear in mind in its decisions on the charges and the quality of the services provided by the utilities. Again a number of commentators felt strongly over the need to separate the responsibilities of the NRA from those of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution. The Twelfth Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution has requested clarification of the interface with the NRA and a strengthening of the role of HMIP.

Individual Water Authorities have also responded to the Government and have made some of their

474 R. WOOD

responses public. Several of the Authorities still feel that all elements of their present functions should pass into the private sector, although at least one has been vocal in applauding the proposed arrangements. Many professional water engineers and environmentalists do acknowledge that the present proposals are workable and even preferable to the present arrangements. It is true to say that they will go a long way towards appeasing the opposition voiced to the 1986 proposals and as such may be taken to be a necessary pre-requisite to privatization. Nevertheless, a number of problems lie ahead including financial ones, the resolution of potential areas of conflict, and key issues such as the size and strength of the NRA. The financial issues include questions of how to raise the shortfall in income for the new NRA, the proportion of its income deriving from public funds and the conflicting financial pressures between OFWAT and the NRA.

Conflict seems inevitable between the NRA and the privatized utilities. Not only will there be pressure to reduce monies spent on the environment, but the Government’s views as to the size and political strength of the NRA will influence its effectiveness. A slimline body may not be able to police the existing consent system, taking sufficient samples to ensure that compliance is achieved. In turn this could possibly lead to fixed emission standards and random spot checks, which might require considerable investment both by industry and by the PLCs since many of their sewage works fail to meet existing standards. It is difficult to see at the moment how a slimline Authority can operate the present complex system of consents and the extensive sampling programme undertaken in U.K. rivers. It would seem likely that either this must change or the Government’s slimline Authority may end up employing far more people than some of the lower forecasts have indicated.

CO-OPERATION NOT CONFLICT

As some of the chapters in this book have illustrated, the history of British river management is based on cooperation and not conflict. This is true whether one looks at pollution control, or the operation of a river regulation reservoir, or the construction of a flood relief scheme. The history of pollution control and the way in which discharge consents were framed and interpreted is probably the best example of this. Prosecution of offending dischargers who failed to meet their discharge consents was a rare event. Even then fines were very often small. Nevertheless the system led to radical improvements in river water quality. These investments were often achieved by River Authority and subsequently Water Authority staff persuading industrialists and influencing their own organizations to raise the level of investment in effluent treatment plant. The NRA will closely parallel the previous River Authorities in its functions, but if it is established with a small staff and with weak powers, the manpower intensive role of persuader, supported by extensive and independent data, will be lost.

At the end of the day, it is difficult to see how the NRA, of whatever size, can attempt to influence river management except by persuasion. Not only in pollution control but in it’s dealings over the regulation of rivers from reservoirs or groundwater schemes, it will have to take into consideration all of the needs of the river, whether they be recreational, fishery, invertebrate biology, or water supply. The operation of such schemes could not be successful if cooperation did not exist.

The promotion and operation of major water resource schemes are already beset with technical difficulties in environmental assessment. A good example is the Teddington Flow Proposal where the establishment of a minimum acceptable flow for the Thames was not easy. In the new political environment it will be even more difficult. The technical difficulties of establishing minimal acceptable flows (Bradford, 1980) are well known, nevertheless flow is persistently used as a surrogate for other environmental measures. There is sometimes little relationship between flow and water quality, for in a drought year water quality can actually improve whilst flows fall. This is due to the slow travel times and the higher temperatures experienced in these years. Nonetheless many schemes are based on the premise that low flows are by definition to be avoided since they must mean poorer water quality and must endanger ecology. In the absence of any better information many rivers are regulated to flow thresholds. One way around the problem has been the increased use of water banks to ensure the retention of a

OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS 475

volume of water in a reservoir which can be released to improve downstream conditions. These water banks have been used to improve water quality, fisheries, and recreation. It would seem worthwhile to look more carefully at their impact. Few of them have been established following scientific study and many have been offered by Water Authorities and their predecessors as a bargaining point during the promotion of a scheme.

When a water resource scheme is being promoted, it is very easy to overlook the practical problems associated with its operation. Very often these problems are not apparent until the scheme is constructed. For example, in the past, many of the shortcomings of river hydrometry have not been revealed until low flows occurred. This is because open channel flow measurement is usually fairly successful at average flows, but difficulties and uncertainties with stage discharge relationships may become apparent when the stage drops. At very low flows, especially when weed growth can be prolific in hot dry summers, the stage discharge relationship may become uncertain. If the flaw is not known accurately, it may become difficult to operate the scheme, and there may be a tendency either to under-regulate the river, or more likely, the scheme will not provide its design yield because overcompensation may be provided. Thus hydrometry needs to be considered during the design of a scheme, and this may require substantial investment in flow measurement, both below the reservoir or contributory groundwater scheme, and close to the point of control. Because of the shortcomings of open channel hydrometry, it may be preferable to provide flow measurement by weirs or by electromagnetic or ultrasonic techniques. These can add significantly to the cost of scheme development, but are a necessary part of effective river regulation.

Under the Government’s proposals for the NRA, it is not yet clear who will control and pay for hydrometric work. It is likely that utilities and the NRA will share a common hydrometric network, although it may be that individual utilities and the local regional centre of the NRA each decide to collect their own information, exchanging data which is common to both their needs. It would seem desirable to establish a single hydrometric service, which can devote adequate resources and which can support professional staff, so as to provide all of the interests with adequate information. River management has suffered for too long with inadequate data, and with limited manpower resources. Unless a common service with professional support is established, there is a danger that standards will fall. Hydrometry could be one of the areas which would suffer if a slimline NRA were established. In particular, stations which appear to have no immediate operational requirement may be closed, although they may provide information essential to the establishment of long-term relationships such as flood or drought return periods.

In operating a river regulation scheme, there are difficulties over and above those associated with obtaining reliable hydrometric data. Some schemes depended in their promotion upon assumed knowledge of times of travel, and of likely losses to the system. The translation and attenuation of water released from a point upstream down to the control point may not be necessarily predictable from theoretical equations. There are a number of methods available (e.g. NERC, 1975). However, many methods depend upon a knowledge of the translation of flood waves and not of relatively small hydrographs superimposed upon much lower discharges. The difficulties of theoretical equations are compounded in practice by a variety of phenomena. For example, the occurrence of rain shortly after a release may confuse the picture. This can lead to misunderstandings about the observed time of travel of a release, or if the rules for regulating the river are inflexible, wasteful over-releases may occur. On the River Severn, a number of such wasteful releases had occurred prior to the changing of the control rules. Previously, the control rules required that a regulated flow was matched every day. The present set of rules now allows a five-day rolling average, so that individual mismatches in flow can be compensated in the subsequent day’s release.

In operating future river regulation schemes, much more attention is likely to be paid to water quality issues. In the past, it has been difficult to monitor water quality automatically, because of the limitations of sensors. Nevertheless, many regulation schemes have been established, primarily to maintain water quality, albeit that a flow has been used as a surrogate measure of quality. In the future, water quality should be easier to monitor, and river regulation schemes may well be operated on quality as well as

476 R. WOOD

quantity thresholds. That being the case, it will be necessary to better understand the way in which the water quality hydrograph translates downstream, for it moves at a different speed to the flow hydrograph. Little work has been undertaken in the past in the United Kingdom.

In the first few years existence of a river regulation scheme, it is rare that a mature set of operating rules are available. These are usually deduced from a number of years of experience under varying conditions. For example, the occurrence of droughts of different severity and duration, or the impact of winter flooding on a community downstream, or the impact on the ecology of sudden releases, may not be understood when the scheme is new. Operating rules, developed from the experience of all river users, have been formalized by water authorities for most of their schemes. It is apparent that in the 1970s, many rules were dominated by considerations of hydrological yield, whereas in more recent years operational cost has been a significant feature controlling the more general application of operating rules (Walsh et al., 1988). In the 1970s, a series of droughts caused many water authorities to revise their assessments of the yield of individual schemes and of the part each scheme had to play in the provision of basin-wade supplies. Thus operational rules were very often developed by simulating the most severe droughts. More recently, it has been realized that by considering the day-to-day operation of these schemes, significant savings can be had in water supply cost. Thus many operational rules have been modified so that pumping costs are reduced and the cheapest water supply sources are preferentially used. Optimal operating rules switch over from cost-driven considerations to hydrological considerations in sufficient time to protect the yield of the system. One of the features of the changed responsibilities is that there may be a temptation on behalf of the public utilities to allow day-to-day operational costs to continue to dominate the control of the reservoir beyond the point at which hydrological considerations should apply. That being the case, it would lead to an increased frequency of drought orders (Ministerial approval to the temporary alteration of a compensation flow or prescription on use), since neither NRA nor public utility could argue that needs of the river should be put before the safety of water supply. Such increased drought orders would allow abstraction to take place at lower flows, and would therefore represent some danger to the environment. One of the parameters the NRA must surely monitor, is compliance with agreed operating rules and the frequency with which drought orders are sought.

In the next 25 years, industrial demand for water in Britain is likely to remain static as the traditional heavy industries continue to decline or make improvements in their conservation of water use. Population will probably only increase slowly, but individual water use within the home is thought likely to rise by about 25 per cent. The effects of introducing metering on increased consumption are not yet known.

Although it is unlikely that any major new water resource schemes will be required in the coming decade in the United Kingdom, since the overall demand for water is increasing very slowly, there are areas where modifications and enhancements to existing schemes will be required. The Government envisages that these will normally be undertaken by the utilities, although the NRA will itself have powers to promote new resources. In deciding the size and the mode of operation of individual schemes, it will be important that both the NRA and the utilities co-operate fully. Consultation and co-operation are required, and disputes should be avoided. Much will depend on the relative political strength and the philosophy operated by senior management within the NRA. However, if the public is to receive value for money, and the environment is to be protected, it is imperative that the two factions co-operate and do not antagonize each other. Many such alterations or enhancements to existing schemes will have to be heard before a public enquiry, and the working relationship between NRA and public utility will be exposed. Whilst the NRA must not be seen to be hand-in-glove with the public utility, it must not always adopt a position opposed to it.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The current Government proposals leave unresolved a number of areas. These include the question of how river water quality objectives should be established and who should be responsible for setting them. Currently river quality objectives have been decided by Water Authorities without extensive public debate and surprisingly with little controversy. The pace at which improvements in water quality have

OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS 477

been implemented has also raised little public interest. Despite the slow down in achievements, there has been relatively little pressure brought to bear to restore the 1974 timescales and to revise the objectives. The NRA could take the opportunity to involve the public in a debate on environmental objectives and they must find ways to measure the impact of any proposals on existing standards.

The Government has also chosen to ignore the possibility of introducing the ‘polluter pays’ principle. Thus the NRA’s observed shortfall in income is to be raised either from the public purse or from water abstractors and not from a levy on discharges. Many environmentalists have argued in the past that such a principle would be equable and would provide additional monies to improve the environment. However, industrial interests have ensured that the principle has not been considered and is unlikely to be so under the present Government.

Even with the introduction of the E.E.C. Directive on environmental impact assessment, it is unlikely that the pragmatic British approach to environmental management will change radically. The need to evaluate carefully any future projects is not necessary for operational water related schemes, although the construction of major undertakings such as reservoirs would require environmental impact assessment. The West German precautionary approach embodied in Vorsorgeprinzip is likely to be strongly resisted particularly by the Confederation of British Industry. It is unlikely that environmental impact assessment will be undertaken extensively in the U.K. Water Industry and there seems to be little appetite for the adoption of techniques and practices used elsewhere. Until the political mood of the Country changes or the interest in techniques used elsewhere is awakened, then radical improvements in water quality or radical changes in our river management practices are unlikely.

ACKNOWLEDG~MENTS

I am grateful for the permission of the Director of Operations, Severn-Trent Water Authority to publish this material. The views expressed therein are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Authority.

REFERENCES

Bradford, W. T. 1980. Minimum Acceptable Flows reconsidered, Proceedings of IAWPR Specialist Conference. Department of the Environment 1987. The National Rivers Authority-The Government’s Policy for a Public Regulatory Body in a

1975. Flood Studies Report, Natural Environment Research Council, London. HMSO 1988. Best Practicable Environmental Option, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report, HMSO,

Walsh, P. D . , Walker, S. , and Pearson, D . 1988. ‘Derivation of Operating Policies for Surface Water Sources in North West Water’,

Privatised Water Industry.

London.

Journal of the Institution of Water and Environmental Management, 2 , 1, 51-60.