P H I L O S O P H I C A L I N Q U I R Y , 1991, VOL. X I I I No 1-2

OUSIA, SUBSTRATUM, AND MATTER Stanley Sfekas

Athens

It is my thesis that the notion of substance as a characterless substrate is an absurd one, and that Aristotle never held such a notion. I wish to show that a disservice has been done to Aristotle by his translators, most notably the O'xford Edition. A very great deal of devoted — and extremely valuable — scholarly work in the form of texts, commentaries and tran­slations of Aristotle, has been done by scholars impeded by a Lockean conception of substance. This view is based on the unconscious assumption ~ notoriously operative in Locke — that one can identify a thing without identifying it as a such - and - such. The thing, then, that is taken to be postulated becomes a thorougly mysterious entity which in itself has no characteristics: A 'something we know not what' which is postulated as underlying the characteristics that it is said to 'have' and which alone enables us to conceive it. It follows that the ultimate subject of predication must be something without predicates. Consider, for example, this passage f rom Ross^:

Reflection on a statement like "Socrates is pale" shows that it is not paleness, nor any of the qualities combined with it in Socrates, nor the sum of these qualities with paleness, that is said to be pale, but something which has all these qualities, the individual thing which is the substratum of them and in which they are united. This is undoubtedly the view of the "plain man". I t is still debated by philosophers whether substance implies over and above a sum of qualities an "unknown somewhat" which is their substratum. Aristotle sides with the plain man. A substance is for him (if we leave out of account God and other minds) a unity involving not only qualities but also a surd or unknown element which he calls matter or substratum.

I contend that this was certainly not Aristotle's view. In modern times the understanding of Aristotle's conception of substance has been impeded by the imputation to him of a doctrine that is at war with the

Ousia, Substratum, and Matter 39

very spirit of Aristotelianism. Aristotle was interested in 'substance' in another sense, that, namely, in which a substance is necessarily imper­manent, or, at least, is not necessarily permanent. Aristotle held that in the case of substantial change, since the name of a ('second') substance told one what a thing was, it is an error to think that one can ask concerning the subject of change: 'But what is it all the time?'. In this he was in conflict with the Greek natural philosophers and Plato as well who sought after the permanent element in things. I t is also significant to note that when Descartes asked, 'What is substance?' he, too, was asking for what persists unchanged throughout change, what it is in change that does not itself change. And in Locke and in Kant, in fact, throughout modern philosophy, 'sustance' has been taken as the unch­anging, the permanent in change, whether Locke's ' I know not what', or Kant's 'permanent in relation to phenomena'. But for Aristotle, who — since he gave the technical meaning to the term ousia rendered into Latin as substantia - ought to know, ousia or substantia is defined presicely as that which undergoes change in change, what is at the end of any procces different f rom what it was at the outset. And in the most important and fundamental kind of change of all, genesis kaiphthora, "generation and corruption", a new ousia or substance is present at the end that was not there at all in the beginning, or a substance has disappeared completely. Change is thus a pattern of novelty that emerges in process.

Understanding Aristotle's position thoroughly requires working out what he says in Book Zeta of the Metaphysics, about the relation between a substance and its essence. I shall argue that Aristotle identifies substance and essence, an that he does so as a response to problems about the transitoriness and indefinability of particulars: i f one understands that a substance is a persistent form that is at any time associated with some matter or other but not identical with i t , then one can see how and to what extent a substance abides through change and so can be known. A substance abides through change and so can be known. A substance is the sort of thing it is by nature of its fo rm or essence, which is therefore at least a necessary condition of it. I wish to argue for a further advance, suggested by Hartman^, namely that an essence is a sufficient as well as a necessary contition of a substance, and even that the relation between each substance and its essence is identity. I f follows from this that Aristotle is an essentialist.

The interpretation offered in the following pages is meant to be applied in its entirety to books V I I - I X of the Metaphysics, without any attempt to determine how far it is applicable to Aristotle's other writing.

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Passages from other works are referred to only in illustration or explanation. I have wished thereby to avoid the problems of chronology and the development of Aristotle's thought which have occupied so much space in Aristotelian literature since the nineteenth century and especially since Jaeger's epoch-making studies.

Before we proceed for the exposition and defense of the position just oultined, it wil l be well to examine a preliminary issue, namely, the claim that the terminology employed in the Latin tradition for the translation and discussion of Aristotle's metaphysics does not exactly correspond to Aristotle's Greek terminology and that this discrepancy in terminology has been partly responsible for some inadequacies in the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine. This point has been definitively made by Joseph Owens^ in his monumental work and represents a signal contribution to Aristotelian interpretation.

Owens observes that i f a translating term is not able to signify all the various things denoted by the original Greek work, it wil l mislead the reader in following the path of Aristotle's thought. Correct vernacular idiom has demanded renditions in which the primary meaning of the Greek word has been lost. Or, else, post-Aristotelian, notions are frequently insinuated into the text by the use of term in a modern sense, even though these words are meant to be the exact equivalent of the Greek expression. This is most notably the case for the translation of ousia. On account of the Lockean background, 'substance' is a misleading rendition of the Greek term. Beacause of Locke's influence, 'substance' in English philosophical usage strongly suggests exactly what the etymology designates. I t conjures up the notion of something 'standing under' something else. Its etymology hingers it f rom conveying the notion expressed by the Greek ousia. The nearest equivalent in the Metaphysics of the notion expressed by substance is hypokeimenon. The term ousia, however, expreses a direct relation with Being morphologically, ousia is derived f rom the GrecK verb meaning 'to be'. I t is formed f rom the feminine singular of the present participle. Its meaning is accordingly connected f rom this point of view with the notion of Being: The word 'being' could well serve as an adequate translation of ousia except that it is too abstract and the Aristotelian term often denotes something concrete.

The earhest translators, aware of this difficulty, chose essentia as an equivalent for ousia. Essentia followed the morphological pattern of the Greek term. Essentia was based on a supposed participle 'essens', formed from 'esse'. The word 'essence', therefore, stands as a reasonable candidate to translate ousia. 'Essence' has the advantage of immediate origin f rom

Ousia, Substratum, and Matter 41

the verb 'to be' in its Latin form. But its disadvantage is that it conveys to modern ears a sort of opposition to 'existence'. There is, however, no trace of any such opposition in the Greek terminology. Greek employs the same verb for the English 'to be' and 'to exist' and their derivative forms. A translation which implies an opposition between essence and existence would be highly prejudicial.

Nor wil l the translation problem be solved, Owens tells us, by em­ploying a simple transliteration, for the frequent use of the Greek term in philosophical discussion may have already fixed its meaning as equivalent to the current notions of either 'substance' or 'essence'. It has probably become as familiar to its reader of it as his native language and with the same fixation of meaning. What is required, says Owens, is an English word which not only implies no prejudice in favor of any post-Aristotelian theory of being and not only denotes the concrete individual, but also can express to English ears an immediate realation with Being. The English word that answers these requirements, he tells us, is 'entity'. It can refer to Being, (derived as it is f rom the participle ens), suggest something concete, and apllies equally to essence and to existence.

Now, it might be maintained, in opposition to Owens' thesis summarized above, that although 'substance' is an accurate translation of ousia f rom the purely linguistic point of view, it can nevertheless be justified on doctrinal grounds; i.e., it might be affirmed that the meaning which ousia has in Aristotle's system is adequately represented by 'substance'. Such a justification of'substance' is ruled out i f the interpre­tation offered in the following pages is correct.

Now Aristotle does speak of ousia as that which is not predicated of any subject but of which everything else is predicated, or as that which is neither predicated of nor present in any subject; in short, as 'to hypo­keimenon', 'subject' or, literally, in 'that which underlies', Zeller^ calls this a definition of substance. Ross^ calls it 'the primary meaning of substance'.

There is not much difficulty in this notion as it occurs in the Categories, where Aristotle's concern is largely with words and where ousia is considered f rom the point of view of logic as the subject of a sentence. What is there asserted is that proper names and designations, such as 'Socrates', 'a certain man', 'a certain horse', which denote concrete individuals, cannot be predicated of anything else, i.e., you cannot say of anything other than Socrates, this man, or this horse, that it is Socrates, this man or this horse. The concrete individuals are f rom this point of view, the primary ousiai. When the notion of ultimate subject or substratum is carried over

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into metaphysics, however, it creates a problem. I f we strip the subject of all predicates or attributes in order to f ind that which is absolutely and solely the subject or substratum, to which all the attributes belong, we are reduced to an unknown and unknowable X. This is the conception of substance which prevailed in modern philosophy after Locke defined it as a supposition of we know not what support of qualities or accidents^, and which succumbed to the attacks of phenomentalists and idealists.

But this modern rejection of the concept of substance cannot be taken as a rejection of Aristotle's concept of ousia, for Aristotle refused to define ousia as a substratum for very much the same reason. In Metaphysics Z, chapter 3, where, after listing four possible definitions of ousia (substratum, essence, genus and individual), he proceeds to the discussion of one of the candidates, viz, substratum or subject (to hypo­keimenon). He declares that it cannot be regarded as a sufficient or clear definition of ousia to say that it is that which is not predicated of any subject, but of which everything else is predicated, for on this definition, ousia would be simply matter. Moreover, since it would be what is left after all attributes have been taken away, it would be a sort of matter of which, itself, nothing either affirmative or negative could be said. Ousia, he says, cannot be matter as thus conceived, for ousia is pre-eminently something separable, and definite.

The conception of substance as an unknown support of accidents, so prominent in the history of modern philosophy, has surfaced in A r i ­stotelian interpretation, I submit, because the treatise on the Categories has been given more importance in discussions of Aristotle's metaphysics than it deserves. The attitude of some scholars is to treat the Categories as i f they presented Aristotle's doctrine of substance in a nutshell. This overlooks the criticism to which Aristotle subjects the judgment that ousia is the ultimate subject or substratum, so very similar to the modern objections to the Lockean concept of substance. The crucial passage in Book Zeta, chapter 3, may be translated as follows:

The sub ject, or substratum (to hypokeimenon), is that of which the other things are predicated, while it is itself not further predicated of anything else, wherefore we must first decide about this, for the primary subject, or substratum (to hypokeimenon), especially seems to be Entity (ousia). In one any matter is said to be underlying, in another way the shape, and in a third way that which is made up of these (I mean by the matter, e.g., the bronze, by the shape the figure of the form, and by that which is made up of these the statue, which is the whole); and so, if the form is prior to the matter and is being (to on) more than matter is, the form will also be prior to that which is made up of both, by the same argument. It has now been said in outline, in answer to the question what Entity

Ousia. Substratum, and Matter 43

(ousia) is, that it is that which is not predicated of a subject but is itself the subject of which the other things are predicated. But we must not describe it only thus, for it is not enough; for this is itself unclear, and besides it is matter that turns out to be entity (ousia). For if this is not entity (ousia), what else is escapes our grasp; for if the other things be stripped away, there is apparently nothing remaining underneath, for the other things are affections and doings and powers of bodies, while length and breadth and depth are quantities and not Entities (ousiai), for quantity is not Entity (ousia). It is rather the first thing to which these belong which is Entity (ousia). But if length and breadth and depth are taken away, we see nothing left underneath, unless these is something bounded or determined by these; so that, necessarily, matter alone appears as Entity (ousia) to those who view the matter thus. Now, by matter I mean that which in itself is not said to be something, or so much or any of other things by which the existent {to on) is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whise being {einai) is other than the being of each of the predicates, for the other things are predicated of Entity (ousia), while this is predicated of the matter; so that to which we come in the end is in itseld not something and not of a certain quantity and not anything else; but neither is it the negations of these, for the negations also belong to it accidentally. Hence, if we take this yiew, it turns out that the matter is Entity (ousia); But this is imposible, for being separate and being a this seem especially to belong to Entity (ousia); wherefore the form and that which is made up of both would seem to be Entity (ousia) more than the matter. Now the Entity (ousia) which is made up of both, I mean of both matter and form, may be set aside, for it is posterior and obvious, and the matter, too, in a way is obvious. Hence we must examine the third sort of Entity (ousia), for this presents the most difficulties.

A question which arises with regard to this passage is whether it is to be regarded as a repudiation of the proposition that Entity (ousia) is that which underUes eveything else and which has nothing else underlying it. I t is clear that Aristotle does not wish to deny that entity (ousia) is in some sense subject or substratum. He accepts this characterization of ousia as permissible when he says (1029a 7-9): " I t has now been said in outline, in answer to the question what Entity (ousia) is, that it is that which is not predicated of a subject but is itseld the subject of which other things are predicated". His objection is thas it is not a sufficient characterization of the notion of Entity to equate it with the bare notion of a subject underlying predicates and having no further subject underlying it of which it might be predicated in is turn. I f Entity were nothing but subject, or substratum, it could only be matter. This matter, moreover, would be what is left after we take away f rom our conception of a particular individual everything which might be predicated of it; and such a matter, regarded purely by itself, could not be said either to be or not to be anytjing, or od any quantity, or determined in any other way, for all of these predications would only be accidental characterizations

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of it. This cannot be the fundamental meaning of Entity (ousia), for an Entity must be separate, individual and distinctly characterized.

I f , however, being a hypokeimenon is regarder as a property of Entities (ousiai) rather than as their essence, the reduction of ousia to prime matter does not follow. By the assertion that ousia is subject or substratum Aristotle commonly means that concrete individuals are the logical subjects of predication, or the substances to which attibutes belong, e.g., we may say that 'Socrates is a man' or that 'Socrates is white', but we cannot say of anything other than Socrates that it is Socrates. This is the doctrine other than Socrates that it is Socrates. This is the doctrine of the Categories, where it is set out at greatest length, and it is the doctrine implied by the description of the hypokeimenon with which Aristotle begins in Metaphysics Z3, the chapter we are considering. Moreover, f rom the conception of ousia presented in Metaphysics Z. I , it necessarily follows that ousia is the ultimate subject of predication, but never itself a predicate; for ousia is there said to exist simply or absolutely (hapJos), everything else has being only as belonging to some ousia. That which exists simply and which, therefore, may be said to have an existence of its own, does not need something else to be it; indeed, one Entity (ousia) could not be another, for then two actual entities would be one, which Aristotle later declares to be impossible^ Hence the traditional translation of ousia as "substance" is justified insofar as ousia is subject or substratum, but it is misleading because it presents a constant temptation to regard ousia as primarily, or by befinition, that which underhes, and obscures its real meaning in Aristotle's philosophy. It points to a conception of ousia which, as Aristotle says, is "unclear" and "insufficient".

The purpose which the characterization of Entity (ousia) as subject or substratum seems to serve in Aristotle's search for Entity is to indicate the place where one must look for it . Obviously, the fundamental sort of Being, ousia itself, cannot be found in those Entities which are only attributes of something else, which are only in virtue of the subject in which they inhere. Hence Entity (ousia) must be sought in those things which are always subjects and never predicates; The things which we perceive in the world about us: animals, plants, and inanimate bodies seem to be such subjects, and so we may begin our search for Entity in them. Our conclusion must be that although Aristotle warns against

Ousili, Substratum, and Matter 45

taking hypokeimenon as the definition of ousia, he does not cease to maintain that ousia is hypokeimenon in a secondary sense.

It may now be remarked that to describe substance as a support of attributes, or as that which underhes everything else is a mere tautology. This is not surprising if , as seems to be the case, the description came first and the word substance was adopted as a suitable name for the thing that is described^. On the other hand, the assertion that Entity has nothing underlying it and itself underlies everything else, which is Aristotle's meaning i f ousia means Entity, is not a tautology but a significant statement.

A second question which arises in connection with the passage under consideration is what place the completely indefinite matter (or "prime matter" as it is usually called in Aristotle's system) of which Aristotle here speaks has in his metaphysical theory, and what is its relation to ousia. We must begin by recognizing, I think, that a primary matter of the completely indeterminate sort described in the passage we are discussing is a necessary part of Aristotle's theory^^.

He maintains, especially against Empedodes, that all the elements can be generated f rom one another^ ^ He maintains also that in every change there must also be a substratum as well as a pair of contraries'^. It follows necessarily that there must be one substratum, or matter, underlying all the elements, since each can be changed into any one of the others. Of this prime matter Aristotle says that it is not a body, not perceptible, and not capable of separate existence'^ It is clear, therefore, that we should be wrong if we thought that he conceived of prime matter as a sort of indeterminate stuff. Prime matter is introduced to explain universal transformability, and as such it is simply the potentiality, present in every material thing, of becoming any other material thing, directly or indirectly"^. In what sense can this potentiality in becoming everything be called ousia? We must note, first, that when Aristotle applies the term ousia not only to the concrete individual, but also to the form and matter of which the individual is composed, he cannot be supposed to mean that the material itself regarded as what it actually is, e.g., bricks, is ousia, for then he would have reduced the meaning of ousia as matter to one of the other meanings, viz., the composite whole of matter and form. He means, rather, that the potentiality of the matter for entertaining

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the form, which, in combination with it , makes up the concrete Entity (ousia), may itself be called Entity (ousia) — not, however, in the sense of actual Entity, but in the sense of potential Entity. The bricks, as bricks, are actual Entity? regarded, however, under the aspect of their potentiality for being the material of a house, they are potential Entity. Applying this to the prime matter, we may say that prime matter is Entity in the sense that it is the potentiality for all physical, perceptible Entity.

Substratum, as underlying matter, is the indeterminate, the not-yet definite which is to become definite, or the no longer definite which has lost its determinacy; the seed or the cadaver, not the man. And as indeterminate it cannot exist without determinacy, without form. Matter is in itself nothing in particular, nothing existing 'separately' f rom the foi^m for which it is material, the function of which it is the instrument. Therefore, matter in itself, matter in abstraction, prime matter, is not Entity (ousia), since what chiefly distinguishes Entity is separability and thisness. The criteria of'separability' and 'thisness', (which any candidate for ousia must be seen to possess), which he introduces in Chapter 3, evolve naturally out of the analysis and are by no means arbitrary. Entity is, as the Categories have taught us, what is neither predicated of nor present in another: not predicated, therefore, not general, but this; not present in , therefore, not dependent on, but independent, existing in itself, separate. To be separate and a 'this'; these are the characters which any candidate for substantial status must exhibit i f it is to pass the test.

F O O T N O T E S

1. Ross, W^ D. , Aristotle's Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Com­mentary; p. 131.

2. Hartman, Edwin; Substance, Body and Soul. 3. Owens, Joseph; The Doctine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 4. Zeller, Eduard; Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy; PP. 191-195. 5. Ross; op. cit sup. 6. Buchanon, Emerson; Aristotle's Theory of Being; p. 8. 7. Aristotle, Metaphysics; 1028b 36-1029a 33. 8. Ibid? 1039a3 ff. 9. Buchanon; op. cit. sup.; p. 4. Bunchanon holds that the descri-ption came first. 10. Grene, Marjorie, Portrait of Aristotle; Grene supports this view of primary matter. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Buchanon; op. cit sup.; p. 29, 14. Ibid.

Ousia, Substratum, and Matter 47

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

1. Aristotle; The Basic Works of Aristotle; Richard Mc Keon, ed., Random house. New York, 1941.

2. Buchanon, Emerson; Aristotle's Tlieory of Being; University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1978.

3. Grene, Marjorie; Portrait of Aristotle, Faber, London, 1963. 4. Hartman Edwin; Substance, Body and Soul, Princeton University Press; 1977. 5. Owens, Joseph; The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics; Pontifical

Intitute of Medieval Studies; Toronto, Canada, 1951. 6. Ross W. D.; Aristotle's Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Com­

mentary; Clarendon, Oxford, 1924. 7. Zeller Eduard; Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy; Meridian Books; New

York, 1960.