operations report 101st airborne division, period ending 31 october 1967
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OFTHE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18,U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OFITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BYLAW.
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CONFIDENTIALTN DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
IN I.MY NOR TO
AGAM-P (M) (8 Mar 68) FOR OT RD-T674249 13 March 1968
SSUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Brigade,101st Airborne Division, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)
0 SEE DISTRIBUTION
S1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accord-ance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actionsshould be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during currentoperations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
1 Incl KENNETH G. WICKHAMas , Major General, USA "77 "_
.~, .~ ~The Adjutant GeneralDISTRIBUTION e .Commianding GeneraIl '
US Continental Army Commf~%-US Army Combat Developments'Qopi"ind
CommandantsUS Army War College 4,US Army Comand and General Staff Col'1ee'% %.U9 Army Adjutant General SchoolUS Army Air Defense School . .US Army Armor School Ale- %,'US Army Artillery and Missile SchoolUS Army Aviation School NWUS Army Chemical SchoolUS Army Civil Affairs S'tol Regraded unclassified when separatedUS Army Engineer Sehool from classified Inclosure.US Army Infantry SchoolUS Army Intelligence School
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DISTRIBUTION (Cont'dvUS Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police SchoolUS Army Missile and Munitions SchoolUS Army Ordnance SchoolUS Army Quartermaster SchoolUS Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal SchoolUS Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare SchoolUS Army Transportation School
Copies furnished:
Office, Chief of Staff, US ArmyDept-y Chiefs of StaffChiei of EngineersChief of Research and DevelopmentAssistant Chiefs of StaffThe Surgeon GeneralThe Provost Marshal GeneralDefense Documentation Center
CG, Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
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D)E h'1NT OF THE ARJ1X5EAD LUAhj2S 1S1 EIGUE IOIST AIRE3,11 DIVISICUAVB-Hist APO 96347
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967(RCS CSFOc-65) (U)
TO: See Distribution.
References: AR 1-19 dtd 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 1-19 dtd 8 Feb 1967.
SECTION I
(C) Significant Unit Activities: Elements of the Brigade were invol:,_combat operations during the ertire reporting period with the excepti.r o '-4ugust - 2 September 1967 when the Brigade moved from CWJ LAT to !)UC T:;:(. and9-11 September 1967 when the Brigade moved from DUC PHO to C-i !Al. ',ratra,.*was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during ,eriod whe. untswere refitting and preparing for future operations.
ACCkozbat Operations: A 9umcary of the concept and execution of each of
the Brigade operations is given below:
IC)O-ration NMAIEUR
a. Dates: 11 May 1967 to 2 August 1967.
b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations againstVC/WVA forces in QUANG NGAI Province.
c. Location: QUANG NGKI Province, Republic of Vietna&.
d. Commander: Brigadier General Sal%m H. Matheson.
e. Forces involved:
(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and one p.atoon,Company C, 34th Armor (OPCON).
(2) Other: CIDG companies from BA TO, 11NH LONG and Gl, VUCSpecial Forces Camps.
f. Concept and execution:
(1) See Inclosure 3 (Combat Operations After Action Repxt,Operation MAJ.MEUR).
(2) Operation 1AKE, a one battalion task force operationconducted concurrently with Operation MkIHEUR, was previously reported in theOperational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967. it copy of theafter action report for Operation LAKE is inclosed as Inclosure 4 (CombatOperations After Action Report, Operation LAKE).
2C)Operation HOOD RIVER
a. Dates: 2-13 August 1967.
b. Mission: To conduct operations to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/WVA base camps in Base Area 121 in coordina-tion with ARVN, ROK and CIDG forces.
c. Location: QUANG NGA1 Province, Republic of Vietnam.
d. Coo'ander: Brigader General Salve H. Matheson.
e. Forces involved:TZ" '- Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 yearsDOD D 2.10 CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ei.1in 31 October l,7(RCS CSFCR-65) (U)
(1) US: Lx Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
(a) Other: Two =01O caspanies from HA .THANH Special For-esCp; two Mk Force companies from Company C, 5th Special Forces (DA ,)|one platooq of Hatior!4 Police. Field Forces from QUkNG NHAI Province; twoinfantry battalions and two ringer batallons from the 2d ARVN Division; andthO battsl1ionw-ot RO(-WvNae.
f. Concept rW exicution: See Inclosure 5 (Combat OperationsAfter Action Repor, (* atio HOD RVER).
3 (c agri tion MMl0~.
a. Datesi 13-2v August 1967.
b. Hissioa; To conduft operstions to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralise W/NVA bas coampes in and around Base Area 117.
c. location: QUANG TIN Province, Republic of Vietnam.
d. Commander: Brigadier General Salve .H, Matheson.
e. Forces inVolvedt
(1) US: lst Frigade, 101st Airborne Division.
(2) Other: Two ClDG coanies from TZN PHUOC Specia ForcesCamp and two Mike Force companies frcm Coimpny C, 5th Sepcial .For~es (D MANG).
f. Concept and execution: See Inclosure 6 (Combat Operations
After Action Report,: Operation BErr(1O).
a. Dats: 31 August - A September 1967
b. Miasion=.. One Infantry battalion conducts airmobile "aids on31 August 196?- at tANG DI (BS 123513) and QUMT THANG (HS 316535) to liberateUS and Vnetamsee I'a held captive.
a Lcaticn: QUANG Na Province, Republic of Vietnam.
d. Commander: i4eutenant Colonel Ralph-puckett, Jr.
e. Fbrq Involved:
(1) US, 2dbittA. ion (Airborne), "Od I antry,
(2) Other: Non ,
f. Concept and execution: . See Inclosure 7 (Combat OperationsAfter Action Report, Operation STMIZ FaRCE).
a. Dates: 2-9 September 1967.
b. Mission: To conmuct operations to find, fix and destroy' VC/NVA forces and to neutralize V /riA base camps in and around Base area 121and northern portion of the SONG E Valley.
c. location: QUANO NG0I ',ovince, Republic of Vietnam; Map
sheets, Vietnam, 100,000, series L7014, sheets 66381, 663-1, 673911, 6738IV.
d. Ccmander: Brigadier General Salve H. Matheson.
a. Forces invylved,
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(1) US: let Brigade, 101st Airborne Divisix.
(2) Otter: Two OTDG companies from HA Ti.hIH Specl''. 'o:'eaCup and on. Mike Force company from Company C, 5th Special Forces (U.. LNG).
f. Concept of operationt On 2 September 1967. the 2d Battalion(Airborne), 327th Infantry conduc ae airmobile assaults into the SONG VEValley area and commenced search and estroy operations in zorn~. On 4 andSeptember 19674 the let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry and 2d Battlion(Airborne), 502d Infantrirespectively, displaced by air to QUAtG 14CAI Air-field, conducted airmotdle assaults into l&nding zones west of the SOfl VZValley and commenced. search and destroy operations in zone. Two ^IDG comp.niesand one Mike Force Compay. established blocldng positions to the n,'rth of theBrigade area of operation.
g. Execution: The operation was conducted as planned and allinfantry battalions conducted extensive saturation patrolling throughout their
areas of operation. The operation, previously thought to be a two to threeweek operation, was terminated prematurely by higher headquartirs and the Bri-gade was ordered to move all elements to CHU IAI and establish a base camp Inpreparation for future oerations. All lmente were extracted from the fieldon 8-9 September 1967. No significeant ctions took place during OperationCOOK. For a detailed account of Operation COOK, see Brigade $3 Journals.
kC)Oneration WHIER
a. Dates: 31 September 1967 - continuing at close of rep tingperiod.
I .b.. Mission: To conduct operations northWest.of TAM NY (BT0627)to fd, fix and destroy VCAiVA forces and to neutralize VC/NVA base cpmps,
c. Location: QUANG TIN Province, Republic of Vietnam; Mapsheets, Vietnam. 1:50,OO, seriesL7Ol4, sfeets 66391, IV, 664011, 111, 67391,IV, 6740111.
d. Ccmander: Brigadier General Sa;v H. Matheson.
e. Forces Involved:
(1) US: let Brigade, IOst Airborpe Division; let Battalion,14th Infantry (OPCON U-24 September 1967); let Battalion, 35th Igantry (OPCOH4 October 1967 - continuing at close of reporting period).
(2) Other: One Mobile -Strike Force Company from Company C,5th Special Forces (I, NANG) (i September - 2 October 1967); one Camp StrikeForce Company from TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp (11 Septembcr - 17 Octotoer1967); and one 2d ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company (28 September - 7 Octo-ber 1967).
f. Concept of operation: On 1.11000 September 1967, the let Bat-talion (Airborne), 327th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults into landingzones west of ThX KI, followed by the 2d Battalion (Airborne). 3Z7th Infantryand 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry with one Mobile Strike Force Com-pany on 12 September 1967. All bttalions coenced search "nd destroyoperations with the objective of blocking likely enemy routes of egress andCestroying any enem base camps that were found. The Camp Strike Force Com-pany from TIEN PHUOC screened likely routes of egress to the southvest of theBriade area of operation. The let 3attalion, 14th Infantry, OFCVJ to theBrigade, was given an on-order mission to conduct search and destroy opera-tions within Its assigned area of operation. Engineer LZ clearing and denoli-tion teams and scout dog teams were attached to the Infantry battaLS ons. The2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery (105-" Howitzers) collocated onebattery with each of the infantry battalion tactical command posts.
S. Execution:
(1) Troop A, 2d squadron (Ai.rborne), 17th Cavalry was placed
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under operational cQntrol of the 2d Scutdrou, 11th A.-and later under the .et Souagdroh, -let Ar~ared Caosh'-, and .- .,o .....-in Operation WMIE.
t) The Brigade cbmened" Operation'WfMIER on 11 September
1967 am planned. '&11 battaUins' conducted alrm6ile asepults iiWo *?. -'landing zones. The let Battalion,' lath infbntry' was emploud - 14 --1967 to the. south of the Brigade, The' terrain in the area of operttAon cor-sisted of jungle covered.nills, rolling hi-le with elephant arass and flat,cultivated lowlan"s with rice jAddles. Tactlce employed by the Brigade includedextensive saturation patrolling, da and night ambushes and xdall u-it staybehind patrols. The 'initial phase of Operation *WMEZER (i-25 bepte;mer 17u7)produced no large size significant enoriy contacts -nor any inforl4tion to suggestlarge size enemy forces had operated in the.area. Doily enemy -dlied (by to.ycount), howew r, averaged fifteen per day. The lst Battalion, 24th lnrXnt,was released- from Brigade control on 24 September 1967,
(3) litelligence reports began to indicate that large sizeenemy forcesa- to-include the. 26 NJA Division Headquartei's, were located approx-mately seventeen kilometers to the west of the Brigade's area uf operqtior.
(AT9324). The Brigade developed a new concept of operation designed to bloekenemy routes of egress in Afl directions and slowly close in on the encircledenerv.
(4) The second phaseeof Operati.Wif..I.ER was initi'tcc on26 September 1967 by air assaulting the 1st and 2d Battalions (;lrbor. ,, 37thInfantry into landing zones to the south and west of the suspected eneay loca-tions. The 2d Battalidn, (Airborne), 502d Infantr7, east of the enemy loe tions,cmmaenced search &nd destroy operationa to the west on multiple axes. To hlocknorthern routes of egresS, one ARVN Reconnaissance Company wao air assaultedinto blockigpositions and. operated with the Brigade fr 28 Fep.ember 1 -1to 7 October 1967. A MW.,ine reconnaissance teem from the 5th Mrine Reg'jaentassisted by screening areas west of the ARYN companF, One Camp Strike ForceCompany from TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp assisted In securing the Brigadefire base wich conaited of one battery eac)- of 105em and 155ma howitzers.
(5) The battalions began to close on and patrol nearer thesuspected enemy division hqadcuarters. Juwrous small contacts were reade dailywith the enemy. Significant contacts are libted below.
(a) The tactical conmand post of the 2d Battalion (Air-borne), 502d Infantry (.0"3226 at 0050 hours, 27 September 1967, received anenemy mortar, hand grenade and sml afs attack for approximately fifteenminutes. Results were 7 US wouhded (medevac.), Interrogation of a HOI CHdhH(NVA rallier.,'later,'Indicated tht the-mortars fired too soon, landed on theattacking enemy and broke up the attack. Indications were that 'the attack hadbeen well coordinated but poorly executqd.
(b) At 271645 September 1967, Company A:- 2d 3ttalion(Airborne), 502d Infantry (BT6473) engaged a dug in enemy force that euplo ed60m mortars, automatid weapons and rockets. Weather at the W preventedthe tine of air strikes ahd gunehits, The contact lasted into the night, re-sulting in 2 US klleo 6 wund~ed,(mdevaoed). I NVA KIA (C) and 1 SKS captured.
c) Copany 0s. Rd Battalion (Aitoornd)p 5C2d Infantry at290 2 September. 16T heat BT03l4i'2 fnade contact h a zodpny size enenyforce. Heavy coutAct .d4lkaopef vi i artiiezy, ip aodalf strikes- inc.ztq.*tzn ",nort. Contact was broken .at 1A13 1o4ss. s elts weie 3 US illed,15 woumded (medevaced), 9 NV A (C)' 3' AK-47, 1 RPD, 1 B4b rociet lata.ca-er,1 60ms mortar base p'late and bipod captured.
(d; The ARVz comoany, blocking routes of egress to thenorth, ambushed an NVA platoon at 301300 September 19"67 near BT983272 lillirs13 NVA and capturing 3 AK-47 and P earbines.
(e) At 021445 October 1967, Company A, 2d Battalidn(Airborne), 502d infantry near BT023239 received heavy fire fron, an unknownsize force employing 6ims moi-tart, autbtic weapons and .50 caliber machine
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guns. Company A maneuvered throughout the afternoon employing artillery, airstrikes and gunships. Results were 7 US killed and 17 wounded (medevaced).Enemy losses were unknown.
(f) Battery C, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th ,.rt:-.rywas subjected to a 50-60 round mortar and recoilless rifle attack at 02181,October 1967 near BT073226. Results were 11 US wounded (medevaced).
(6) Visual reconnaissance missions flown over the Brigade'soriginal area of operation reported numerous sightings of enemy activity. Toexploit this intelligence, the Brigade requested a fourth infantry battzli'mbe placed under operational control of the Brigade. The let Battalion, 35J1Inrantry, part of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at DUC PHC, was i-
lifted on 4 October 1967 to TAM KY (east of the Brigade area of optrLt ';joined the Brigade. The battalion conducted airmobile assaults on 5 Octo•1967 into the northern portion of the Brigade's original area of operatio ,-dcomnenced search and destroy operations.
(7) Numerous contacts with the enemy continued and the Brigadeemployed large n-bers of air strikes throughout the area of operations on knownand suspected enamy locations. Weather throughout the area of operation ham-pered operations, and when numerous sampane were sighted to the west ('78126)moving, what was believed to be elements of the enemy division headcurters,action other than combat skyspots cGuld not be taken.
(8) Three significant enemy contacts were made until thebattalions had swept ovur all suspected enemy locations.
(a) Company A, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 5021 Infantry(17034235), occupying a defensive perimeter while resupplying and refitting on7 October 1967, was attacked at 0245 hours by an estimated NVA conpany employ-ing mortars, machine guns and automatic weapons. Artillery, gunships andflareships supported the company. Contact was broken at 0620 hours with theenemy withdrawinr southeast. Air strikes wr employed on the withdrawingenemy. Results-were ?'US killed, 6 wounded (medevaced), 18 NV., KIA (C), I RPD,2 RPGB, 12 AK-47's and l flame thrower captured.
(b) At 081340 October 1967 near AT 940270, Company A,2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry made contact with an estimateo two NVAcompanies. The NVA employed 82m mortars, rifle grenades and automatic weapons.The enemy conducted a two-pronged attack, surrounding one platoon of Company A.Hand to hand combat ensued. Company b and the Reconnaissance Platoon of thebattalion maneuvered against the enemy caught the .ithdrawing enemy by surp,-ise,and assaulted. Results of the contact were 17 US killed, 3 wounded (medevuced),60 9VA KIA (C), 21 small rAa weapons and 1 RPD captured.
(c) Compny A, let Battalion, 35th Infantry at 091830October 1967 made contact with an NVA company near Brl10225. Company h, sup-
ported by artillery and gunshipe, engaged the enemy. Heavy fighting oevelopedand continued until 2155 hours when the enemy broke contact and withdre,. i.orth.Results were 10 US killed, 17 wounded (medevaced), 24 NVA KIa (C) and 3 AN-47captured.
(9) With the present area of operation searched and weatherrestricting operations and resupply of units, the Brigade, starting on 9 Octo-br 1967, reoriented itself back to the original area of operatilon wnere the
let Battalion, 35th Infantry was making daily contacts with the enecr,. Simul-taneously with reorienting units, the Brigade begn rotating cxspuniE =. tothe Brigade base camp at CHU IAI for btahd-down. the last company in forstand-down was reinserted into the area of operatien on 27 October 1967.
(10) Nupaerous sall 'contacts with the enemy continued. Sig-nificant enemy contacts up to thA close of the reporting period re as folZowF:
(a) At 150315 October 1967, Battery A, 2d Battalion(Airborne), 320th Artillery located adjacent to the tactical coemand post ofthe let Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry (1066253) was subjected tW a
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mortar and ground attack. One Camp Strike Force -ompany from TIEN PHUOCSpecial Forces Camp was assisting in the security of the battery. The enem.,30-40 personnel, managed to disarm all early warning devic(s and nov .&e: - ;heoutside perimeter. They attacked using automatic weepons, ren~dee z.. Tc-charges. At one point, the artillery's inner perimeter was penetrateS. Baweather precluded the use of air strikes and gunships. Counter mortar r .dar,positioned near the battery, located the enemy mortars whic, were iftr,'ia 'Iengaged. Contact was broken at 0530 hours. Results were 6 US killed, 21wounded (medevaced), 6 CSF killed, 4 wounded (medevaced); 6 rVr,. KIA (c), 1 AK-4.7and I 9mm pistol captured.
(h) On 22 October 1967 at 1630 hours, the fleconnais~ancePlatoon, let Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NV.A bc t-tallon (BT175210). Company D of the battalion maneuvered to reinforce t!reconnalssance platoon. Heavy contact ensued and the enemy assaulted thepositions using hand grenades and automatic weapons. Company C was air absa ltedinto a blocking position at 1BO" hours to the southeast of the contict. "Spoo14"was requested and arrived at 1910 hours. Contact continued until 2-5 hourswhen the enemy withdrew. Results were 2 US killed, 13 wounded (medevaced),6 NVA KIA (C).
(c) On the same day at 1824 hours, the tactical commandpost of the 2d Battalion (Alrburne), 502d Infantry (BT238126) receivcd 26rounds of 60am mortar fire followed by six rounds of rocket fire (e ticwtedB-40 rocket&). Results were 8 US wounded (medevaced).
(d) Company B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantrymade contact with a well entrenched enemy at BT093296 or 27 October 1967.Approximately ten minutes after landing on an LZ, two platoons, whilt sweepingwest from the 1Z at 1245 hours, became engaged with an estimated J.VL zo:-ipanyfiring automsilo weapons. The corpany maneuvered and employed gur.ships, artil-lery and air strikes. At 1607 hours, Company A of the battAlion air asEaulted
into Jloccng positions at BT160305. Contact with the enemy continued until1835 hours when the enemy withdrew to the west. Results were 11 US killed and18 wounded (medevaced). Enemy losses were unknown.
(11) Results of Operation MMIER at the close o- the report-ing period are.
(a) lst Brigade, 101st Airborne Division:103 Killed Hostile Action314 Wounded Hostile Action (medeveced)61 Wounded Hostile Action (minor)
(b) lt Battalion, 35th Infantry-16 Killed Hostile Action59 Wounded Hostile Actioh (modevaced)0 Wounded Hostile Action (minor)
(c) Eemy losses:261 NVA Killed (body count)5W VC Killed (bod7 count)21 Captured26 VCAIVA Killed .(probabla)
158 Sall aims weapons captured28 Crew served wuapons captured
139.6 Tons of rice captured
B. Tactics sad ?eeTndyoes.
1(C)The missions assigned the Brigede during the reporting period weresearch and destroy missions against VC and NVA forces. To.accompliah its as-signed missions and effectively defeat the guerrilla in his environment, theBrigade cntinued to assiie a seui-garrilla posture and to modify its methodsof operation. 71fe tactics employed while -,n a seal-guerrilla posture weredeiigned to off-set se of the advantages the guerrilla has when operatingin terrain he knows; hmver, once the Brigade established cont.-ct with the*en, the clook of the sem-guerrilla a. removed and all available firepowerwe placed pa the amey. Som of the tactics and techniques used whil- 4" tM.
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posture are discussed below.
&. Tactics: The tactics employed included saturoior. p, tr=li:.g,ambushes, stay behind patrols and raids.
* (1) Saturation patrolling: Berause of the very nature of theneefay, specific or "hard" Intelligenne of the enemy's disposition, stren-th
and methods of operation are difficult to obtain. N|ormally only the generallocation (several grid squares) of an ene unit is known. To compensate forthis, all u.its of the Brigade conducted extensive saturation patrolLrn.Companies were air assaulted Into multiple landing zones, and once or theground, they began patrolline.on three or four axes with a platoon size -aoceon each axis. All platoons were normally kept within supporting orrdistance of tach other (normally thirty minutes marching tLe). As
searched along their axes, they periodically sent fire team or squadpatrols to -the flanks. Th.s technique allowed a large area to Le ae:detail, decreased the enemy's ability to determine the size of the unir in V earea and general direction of movement, and gave the compan, comander theflexibility to reinforce, attack or encircle an enemy forr:e once a platoonmade contact.
(2) Ambushes: With a search and destroy mission assigned,
nite of the Brigade seldo moved at night unless there was a Justifixble reason.Movement through the Jungle and detailed search of an area at night arc diffi-cult. To deny the enemy complete freedom of movement at night, companisnormally ambushed trails found during the day's search. If none had been found,likely routes of movement such as stream beds and ridgelinos iere at ushed.Periodically, when a well used trail was located during the day, E unit wouldimmdiately set up an a6mbush for one ur two hours. If no enemy used the trailthe unit continued in its search.
(3) Stay behind patrols: the enemy7 frccuently rsturns tothe battle area or to kmown bivouac sites of US units. To exploit this tenden-cy, units of the Brigade positioned platoon or larger size forces in concealedpositions. An imedlate reaction force was designated to reinforce the staybehind patrol if necessary. The length of time a patrol remained behinddepended on many factors to include the higher unit's overall mission andmethod of operation, terrain, and eie of stay behind forcb."
(4) Raids: When specific or "hard" intelligence was obtained,raids were planned and executed to exploit the intelligence.
b. Techniques: With twenty-sewn months In Vietnam and havingfought in all types of terrain in I, II and III Corps Tactical Zones, the Bri-gad* has developed certain techniques. Techniques employed durine the report-ing period are discussed below.
(1) large area of operation: Areas of operation (AO) areno~rWlly cleared with ARMN forces and are, therefore, subject to being compro-wised. When only AO's large enough for a unit to operate in are requested,and assuming the information is obtained by the enemy, the location of posi-ble landing so"ee, fire bases, etc., can be surmised by the enemy. To counterthis possibility, the Brigade habitually requested AO'e several timge the eisi
it could .operate in effectively at one time. In addition to adding a degreeof security, a larte AO provided the cmander with sufficient room to maneu-ver and eploit intlllgencoe from long range patrols and aerial visualreconnali seance.
(2) Deploying with 3-5 days rations: The rigs'oe norwallydeployed into' an AO with 3-5 days rations, and at times with seven days, aendthen resupplied units in the field every 3-5 days. This a:llowed companies tofads Into the Jungle and prevented their locations from being coripro.Zsed bythe helicopter bringing in a daily resupply. Only for emergency situationswere helicopter# allowed to land at the unit's location.
(3) M vement from high to low ground: The terrain in Vietnmiparticularly dense, jungla covered mountainous terrain, gives the enejy a
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distinct advantage over friendly units. To decrease this disadvantage, unitsconducted search and destroy operations by moving from higher to lower groundwhere ever possible.
(4) Ccllocating artillery battery with battalie.. t c-command post: To provide close and continuous fire support and to insuremaximum coordinatWon between the artillery and infantry, one batter, from thedirect support artillery battalion was collocated with the infantry battaliontactical command post.
C. Traininag. M t of the reporting period was spent in the conduct ofcombat operations. During brief periods of refittinF and preparinm for future.operations, training was oriented towards areas needin, improvement notedduring previoms operations, with emphasis on small unit tactics. The fclowinpadditionel training was co-ducted by the Brigade:
1. All incoming rersonnel, regardless of rank or MOB, continued tobe processed through the Erigade Replacement Detachment in PFAN RANG. EachIndividual-a ttended the Brigade's six day Proficiency Training Course consis-ting of small unit tactics-to include patrolling and ambushes, adjustment ofsupporting fires, land navigation, mines and booby traps, first aid, and physi-cal conditioning. The training also served as an acclimatizing period for thepersonnel.
2(v)At the Brigade base camps, CARENTAN and later 1OS &.NOs, live fireranges were established to zerc weapons anm conduct other live fire exerciseswith all weapons during stand-dow. periods.
3(V)A total of ten personnel from the Brigade were sent to the MYCVRecondo School conducted at NHf, -1JNG.
4(V)Due to a high turno-er of personnel and battle casualties duringthe reporting period, the Combat Leader's Course (conducted once a week) andthe Sniper School (conducted ser.- annually) were not conducted to allowmaximum effort in training replacements.
D. OPLANS and OPORDS: The following operation plans and orders werepublished during the reporting period:
l(C)OPORD 32-67 (BNTON) (U) dated 091800 August 1967. The order waspublished to implement verbal orders from Task Force CEG0N directing the Bri-gade to conduct operations on 13 August 1967 to find, fix and destroy VC/NVAforces and to neutralize VC/NVA base camps in and around Base Area 117.
2(C) CRD 33-67 (COOK) (U) dated 311200 August 1967. The order waspublished to i=plement verbal orders from Task Force KCtOON directing the Bri-gade to conduct operations on 2 September 1967 to find, fix and destroy VC/VAforces and to neutralize VcNWM base camps in and around Base area 121 andnorthern portion of the SONG VE Valley.
-O MD 34-67 (W LJIZR) (U) dated 091800 September 1967. The orderwas published to implement written orders from Task Force ORECGM directing theBrigade to conduct operations on n/ September 1967 northwest of TAX KY (YiO0627)to find, fix and destroy VC/NVA forces and to neutralize VC/rVA base c&L1s.
E. Oranization: The Brigaae organization is as shown in Inclosure 1(Brigade Organizational Chart). Two units were assigned or attached to theBrigade during the reporting period and changes in the organization of theartillery battalion and engineer company were made.
1103d Battalion (Airborne), 506 Infantry: The battalion was assignedto the Brigade effective 25 October 1967 by Department of the Army with a mis-sion of closing with and killirg or capturing the enemy.
21U)9M Combat Tracker Team (Provisional): The team was attached tothe Brigade on 14 September 1967 by Department of the Army with the mitaiun of
C
CONFIDENIIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-HictSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period m ' I
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
assisting units in reestablishing contact with the enemy through trackihgmethods.
3(0)A fourth battery of 105m howitzers was organized from currentlyassigned persormel and eouilpent by the 2d Battalion '(Aitborne), 320th Artil-lery. The battery was organized to provide direct support artillery to thenewly assigned 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry.
4(U)A fourth nr~gneer platoon.was crganized from currently assirerpersonnel and eouipnent by Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) tosupport the new infantry battalion.
F. Payhological ODerations.
l(U)General: During the reporting period 19,086,OOO leafletE w.dlsseminated and 165.6 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were made in support ofBrigade combat operations. Demoralization and CHIEU HUI themes were utilizedagainst both VC and NVA audiences. Population control appeals targeted againstthe civilians in the combat area stressed sdpport of OVN ,curfew instructionsand informaiion reward themes.
2(c)Operations:
a. PSYPS for operations HOOD RIVER, BNTON and COOK were conductedusing standard tape and leaflet appeals. The exceptions to this were two leaf-lets used during Operation BENTON. One leaflet, hand delivered by US troops,informed the civilian recipients that US forces would evacuate them to a GVNsecure area if they desired evacuation and status as refugees. The secondleaflet was distributed throughout GO)H AO (Opn ENTON) imediately followingthe termination of the operation and publicized enemy losses inflicted duringthe operation.
b. During Operation WHEEIER several PSYOP programs have been con-
ductd whichbutilize both standard and special leaflet and loudspeaker appeals:
(1) Program 1: Program 1 is a leaflet program which is beingeotl4cted in three phases. During the first phase primary emphasis is givwn topopulation co-trol and VC/Vjk deroralization themes. The second phase cont.nuesemphasis on phase 1 themes but adds support of GJN and CHIU HOI Themes. Thefinal' phase involves the distribution of a special leaflet which announces toall audiences the cmulative eneiv losses incurred during the operation.
(2) Program 21 Program 2 is a loudspeaker proGram in whichthe daily and cumulative enemy body count and a Province Chief CHIEU HOIappeal are broadcasted over as much ol the AO as possible.
(3) Program 3: Propram 3 is a leaflet and loudspeaker pro-gram targeted against Uie VC infrastrncture. VC personalities are identifiedby detainees; the names of these VC are then mentioned by name in loudspeakerappealb made to their followers. Safe Conduct passes and rallier instructionleaflets aie disseminated in the target area in.conjunction with the broad-casts.
c. During the reporting period a special leaflet was developedto generate refugees on a very limited scale since province accoamodations forlarge numbers of refugees were not available. The leaflet was printed both inEnglish and Vietnamese to assure the soldier's understanding of what action wasdesired of the Vietnamese. These leaflets were utilized during Operatiuns HEN-TON and '4EER.where large numbers of civilians were located in the combatarea.
d. During the Brigade overland displaceme~t fro CHU L.I to DUCPHO following Operation HOOD RIVER, a loudspeaker message was broadcast ex-ploiting the opening of Routs I between CHJ IAI and DUC PHO emphasizing thebenefits accruing to the citizens.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CnmriENTIAL \I
AVBD-HistSUBMCT: Operational Report for Qu .Ly Perloa Lruing 31 Oct-..
(RCS CSFR-65) (U)
e. 'During te month of October, visual reconnaissance f1a.ntssupervised by the -Brigade . S-?. c4rrl 4 e elayvd Opening Leaflet Bundles (DOL)prepared by Brigade PSYCOS for diseuination over -areas-in which enemy activitywas observed. Each bundle contained 20O-45 I IEU f01, Safe C6nduct, halierIntruttion and Demoralization leaflet, for a total of 800 to 'IMO leaflets perbundle.
f. During the, latter '64i'tn of the reporting period, high windsadwere ' at|'fctd toau~Ubi!ttyof loudspeaker broadcasts in the area ofoperation. During i r .usatb4er, ;wever; the messages we-- eompletely under-standable when broadcast from an aft-tude of 3,OO feet.'
3(0)Supporti
a. u-ang the reporting- $riod the Brigade was supported h:24th PsohlpJc!gf Operations Compme: -wd "Ali Ylight, 9th Air Commando Squadronlocated in DA MANd
b. The two-ma ground loudspeaker team from the 244th PSYOP Com-pany-;*IA attached to the Brigade und conduct d four groiznO missios in
direct support of'combat operations. The majortlty of the team's effort wasdevoted to broadcasts made to the civilian population adjacent to the Brigadebase camp in support of civil affairs and revplutioriary development. Followingthe national electlons, loudspeaker broadcasts were also -twducted to dissemi-
nate theelectI66 results to the populace.
.c. Dwlrlig 'the reporting pariod thq 9th Air Commandos flew 187loudsreaker and'63 leaflet missions in support of prigads operations in bothC-47 awv O-2B aircraft.
. d. .upport reteived by Brigado PSYCP was less than satisfactory.Printing reaction times on special leaflet reqUests were excessive. Two Prior-ity I (highest priority) leaflet requests required eleven.days to fill (requestto rovipt tiwm. Though night loudspeaker missions were requesed- on a con-tnuing ba is no such mlisions were flown during the reporting period. -Daylightserial 3IeA ,aker support Was inadequate to cover the requested target areaseffectm~c s8ulted in a backlog of exploitable targets awaiting -iesionato bhe floe. (O twenty-nine Program 3 (Untra st tre) m'desions' requestedsince I Octob :*nly six had been conducted by 26 Ober).
s. Leaflets printed by the 244th PSYOP C m~n lack a prmfessionallook, Picture reproduction is unsati.sfactry on many leaflets. Most "ep~cialleaflets look like ,,rush Jobs,, when In fact, the delay'ln procurement was also
exceesive.
f. Dir$ng the conduct of 0-29 loudspeaker missions in the Brigadeopeitional area, control-of the aircraft is nonr-axistent. The aircraft-periodically interfere with artillery fire missions supporting troops in contact,which results In considerable time lost tryin to. contact :te aircraft to get
it to lea". the area. Attampts have been made by Brigade PSYC! to originate acontrol- eyatsu ftr these aircraft through AmerIcal Division PSYO!' with no re-sults. A sysi df.eoanvtt control of PSYOP aircraft by the using unit isessential to the mooth conduct of tactical operations by the ground combat
4WAnnalyeis of Operationsl
t. During the reporting perioo the following numbers of HOI CHA H.- lid to the WN i .the rigsd's. are of interest (nunbee in parenthesis
indicate increase Or decremae by numer shown for &" period last ear - Julyshown for comparison purposes ony)"
QUANO TIN (P) QU&NNO U (P)
o (;-M) 78 (+38)Augst 54 ( 29) 103 (+65'
September 14 (-8) 20 (-33,October 31 (+6) 04k (-lOO,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
AVB-HtstSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Octo',- ' m_
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
1l) Operations HOOD RIVEa and BENTON were conducted in QUANGTIN Province during the month of August. The number of H01 CHANI who ralliedin QULNO TIN during August represent a distinct increase over the preViousmonth of July and over the nubez who rallied in August of last year. Prigadecombat operations, exploited by PSYOP, would appear. to be the primary reason forthe August Upturn i1 QUANO TIN. The continued increase. in QUANG NMI Provinceis creditd to the continued operatonsr of-the 3rd Bde, 4th Inf Div and the !stAir Cav Diviwion, the latter contirgii- operatjons in the area given up b- the
Iet Bdes 101st Airborne Division.-
(2) Operations COOK and IEELER were conducted in Septemberin QUAMG NCAI and QUANG TIN Provinces, respectively. The downturn in bothprovinces was forecast by JUSPAO as the natural, result of. the uncertainty £.-lowing the Vietnaese national elections.
(3) During October Operation WlEIER continued in CQUt.;; 'Li;Provine whAle allied combat operations diminished in the QUANG NrU area. The3rd Bde, lot CavDiv also ehifted operations to northern QUANG TIN Provincewhich further increased the tactical pressure against VC/VA forces in the area.
(4) Interrogation of HOI CHANH and detainees failed in allcases to pinpoint a particular appeal which had been or could be effective.The Brigade can not prevent tactical evidence to claim credit for any HOI CHANHwho r lied during the reporting period. However, i% would appear that theconduct of sustained combat operations in an area by US uits favorably affectsthe nmber of-dI CHANH who rally to the government.
5..(U~rainingl
a. During the reporting period, one man from A/2-17 Cav and oneau, fro the brigade S-3 drafting section attended the three day 11I F PSY00*en atiPn Course coructed at DA NANG. The S-3 draftsman remained with the2A4tJ. PST* Compny and rocivv- two days additional instruction on the oper-ation of the U4ht Mobile Printing Set Platemaker in preparation for thea-Avk.rl of Viat pice of eauiprnt wbich in e)Tected shortly.
b. A PSTOP orientation of 30 minutes dujration has been preparedby Rrisde F-310 for presentation to the members of the.newly arrived 3rd Bat-talin- (Airborne), 506th Infantry. The clase will be presented at FHAN RANGIn coomwetiah wlAh P-Training for tbe battalion.
(0U) Squipment:
a. 7he Datilith Printng rpoos and Pqper Cutter have not yetben uncrated. igad'printini is not plenndd to coumince until after thearrival of the plate-makerp shipment of Xhich was delayed.
b. Motificatiot s has been given the Brigade PP 0? Of lcer by the8-4 that the Wigade is soon to receive the remainng two AEM-ABS- loispeakersestm ad two AS-PS-1561 tape recorders. Action has been taken throughsupply ehaimwl to eojedlte the issuance of this equipment to the Brixade.
7(C)Plazcss Future PSYOPS include the eatablistpent of three new pro-grae and am special operation in addition to continuation of programs alreadyin operation. The thre now y-ogramm will point out to innocent civilian, andrvefmg th .le. 'T the VC regardig flI-treatont to be expected at the handsof alied forces, Ue f' boe VC reearding 111-tresAment of. PW's and ouick re-aetien appeals exploiting Information obtained from apprehended dotaireea. Thespecial operation Involvs the explaitatoa of Improved enwW detection tech-niques made available to the Briadea during this past reportin; period.
Sc)Prolism Area,
a. lack of a4equate resources (both organic and supporting) con-tin e ato pose difficulties in conducting PSY0' PS in the Brigade operationalares. Thefe cadet ma more exploitable situations than the current level ofpereewel an equipnt can cope with. Mission priorities are established
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-His,SUBJECT: Operational Report for uarterly Period Ending 31.Oct Ver )..'
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
based on . ISgwstimate" of relative program effectiveness since no concreteindications am available. This relatively arbitrary establishment of prior-itiea is "xnatisfadtory notwithstanding the fact that it ic the only methodcur2ently available, Information concerning the effeativ iess of various pro-grams is all but ron-existent. Until this situation dan e remedied, thepractical solution from- strictly a PSYOP viewpoint is to raise the level ofpersonnel and equipment resobrces to a point at which all exploitable situationsencountered can be exploited, thereby insuring smaxmum effectiveness (assumingthat all programs implemented will produce some positWe results).
b. Lack of PSYOP inte.ligence continues t4 cause delays in theestablishment of programs in new areas into which the Brigade moves. Thia lkckof intelligence necessitates the use of general appeals in conducting PSpjgrams. In order to progress to a more specific appeal, concrete evidmnefmust be present to confirm the existence of a specific vulnerability. *. n%*tcases the first indication of a specific vulnerability (obtained prinarithrough interrogation of detainees, Pt1W's, HO CHANH, etc.) constitutes .ll tloeevidence 'the psychological operator will get concerning it. The decision toexploit the intelligence must take into account the possibility of compromisingcredibility, In this situation, the decision, in most cases, is not to eq'it,with the hope that further 'verification can be obtained. This necesary prac-tice delays the exploitation of the vulnerability and once further ev..dence isprocured, often results in a request for a special leaflet on short notice tomake up for lost timej whicl further disrupts the planned use of the limitedPSOP resources available. This sit 4 at4on cnuld be relieved in a large part,by a greater consciousness, of PSYOP intellisce requirements on the part ofall agencies currently Involved in procuring and disseminating tactical Intel-ligence. In recognizing, collecting and disseminating P3YOP intelligence,these agencies would provide a valuable assistant to PSYOP by making moreeffective programs possible.
W.J).Coordination: During the reporting period coordination was con-tinued with the 244th PSYOP Company through the Amrical Division S-5., PSYOP
Officer. Additionally, direct coordination was established with the G-3, PSYOP,
I FFCRCEV and the CO 245th PSYOPS Company in NHA TRANG.
G. Intelligence:
lbC)The enemy force disposition prior to each operation is listedbelow:
a. Operation HOOD RIVER: Most of the contacts were with small
units, the largest of which was 15 men. The weapons captured were various but
mostly semi-automatic types such as carbines and very few automatic weapons.1he foregoing items coupled with the lack of significant contact lcaZt us to
believe the area's enemy forces consists of guerrillas and local force units.Prisoner of War interrogation reports and documents captured revealed littlewith regard to -rnit locations and strength. Ill general, intelligence .atiiredwa9 insignificant.
b. Operation BENTON: The largest known unit operating in thearea was the 21st Regiment NVA. of the 2d NVA Division. Other units operatingin the AO were the 70th Battalion of the 1st VC Regiment, the 70th Coopany ofthe 409th Engineer (Sapper) Battallon and the 72d local Force Battalion. The21st Regiment is a strong NVA troop representation. They will fight when firedupon and attack when they think they can annihilate the enelit. They use goodtactics and deploy their support vvel. Though the 1st Brigade as well as otherAlled/ARVN forces had fought and defeated them in several eiigaLc:dents, theystill remain marginally combat effective. Their mbrale is low due to laok ofsupplies and rest. Their replacements are Slacking .ff due tL the monsoonseason and slow replacement capability. The operation has shown, with constantpressure, the NVA/VC will breakdown and give up easily. The results of thisoperation were successful dispersion of the regiment. I
c. Operation COOK: There was no significant contact during thisoperation. Captured documents revealed the possibility of the 2d VC Regimentin conjunctiop with the 3B IF Bn, would initiate pre-eleotion operation within
12
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CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-HietSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS C5FOR-65) (U)
the NGHIA HAKH - NJ UUC areas. This could not be substantiated as the operationtermnrAt*d prior to the proposed eroe y operation. Due to the insignificantcontact it can only be aaebrtAihed that only local units operate in this area.
d. Operation W I.ER: The largest known unit operating in theTactical Areas of Operation (TAOR) were elbents of the 2d NVA Division inclu-ding 21st NVA Regiment, 31st NVA Regiment and let VC Main Force Regiment.Along with the NVA/VC forces, the ProvMIeial units are still operating in thismtrea at a reduced strength because of Operation HENTON. The strength of corn-iitted forces-in this TAOR is appromately 7,2O bnemy. All of-the regiments3f the 2d NVA Division have been reduced aW bx'okeh dowh by the Pree WorldForces since the beginning of operations in this area of the country. Due toChieu Hol's and document readouts, several of the battalions are numbered lessthan 250 persons. Though hard hit and at a reduced strength, they renaln com-bat effective because they seem to get replacements from the north more-redily
than in the southern areas of Sout Vietnam. Though there is a large corizcdbody count the weapons count is still low. In contrast to previous experiencecthe weapons are salvaged from the battle area and enemy bodies are left behind.The returnees have given us valuable information on unit locations, strength,capabilities and morale. Morale is low because the Allies keep pressing ar.dmaking the enemy troops move often. Their food supply comes mainly from thepeople but the people are becoming uncooperative with the enemy. They do notwant trouble in their areas so they try to keep the enemy out. Documentsrecovered reveal low morale because the soldiers are sick of war and bad food.They want to stop and return to North Vietnam. The enemy nas shown in thisarea that though they are defeated they will withdraw, regroup, and fight againin a short time. Their tactics and weapons deployment is improving. Their useof support and artillery, transportation and anti-aircraft fire have provedeffective in this operation. Although Operation WHEE!ER is still continuing,it has already surpassed any other Brigade operation total enemy losses.
0) Many of the agent reports received through US Intelligence collec-tion efforts utilizing VN Nationals have proved to be erroneous as to the sizeand/or identification of units reported. Exploitation of agent reports hasseldom proved fruitful. Because of this, all agent reports must be classifiedF-6.
3.(Ckbhe following is a statement of enemy losses by operation:
PERSONNWL HOOD RIVER BENTON COCK WHEELER TOTAL
VC/NVA KiA (C) 63/0 303 54 582/261 1002/261
VC/KVA EIA (P) h-o 1 0 26/o 38/0
VCC/NVAC 13/0 13/2 5/0 20/1 51/3
Returnees 1 0 0 1 2
Detainees 67 116 9 258 450
WEAPONS
Individual 37 74 11 134 256
Individual (Cache) 0 49 2 24 75
Crew Served 5 3 0 19
Crew Served (Cache) 0 5 0 9 14
Crenades 23 173 3 54 253
NMOE: Entered in S-2 Journal 31 October 1967.
4(C)Problam Areas
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CONFIDENTIAL \qI
AVBD-HstSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October i967
(RCS CSFCil.-65) (U)
a. Probm: Aviation support has not been adequate and has notfulfilled the daily requirements for aircraft to support People Sniffer and VRoperations. When the OlE aircraft allocated for the Brigade's use was down formintenance or repair, no replacement aircraft was scheduled. The Rri:a de re-quired OIE aircraft be allocated on a, daily basis to support VR operations.This requirement was not met and UH-lD back up for other aiation requirementsoriginally designated for People Sniffer operations were usually committed tohigher priority missions; This resulted in an inadequate coverage of suspectcdSeane movement.
Discussion: People Sniffer operations have aided in loc~tingconcentrations of enemy forces and, when flown on a daily basis, establisresa pattern of movement or exact locations of enemy which cannot be seen beo 'the jungel canopy. Visual Reconnaissance (VR) Is used to determine whiz ' -sare being used or improved by the enemy and to observe the general flow o,enemy movement. The more frequent the flights, the more detailed the anal.'sis.
Solution: The Americal Division Artillery has eight DIE's to
'be used in support of Division Artillery and attached artillery units. Theprimary duty is to register the batteries daily and conduct limited reconnais-sance. Additional 01! aircraft are required when the Brigade is In continuouscontact. Artillery AO's should pass visual sightings to the Brigade TOC andactively contribute to intelligence collection.
b. Problem: The .secure mode of transmission for battalion in the,field was operational less than 50% of the tine since it became available.Reports received at this section indicate equipment malfunction hs the mainproblem.
Discussion: The only method by which certain Intelligencereceived at the Brigade can be transmitted in detail to the battalions in thefiel-is by secure counication.
Solution: Recommend excess equipment presently on hand bekept at both Brigade and battalion level to insure continuous secure capaility.
c. ?roblem: To insure suspicious civilians and civil dcfendantsare proporly screened and. accounted for after release to Vietnamse authorities.
-Discussion: Detainees classified as civil d':fendants or assuspicious innocent civilians by the 181 I Dot, were returned to their origi-nal district and placed in the custody of the District Chief for appropriatecivil action. A follow up check at TIEN PHUOC and THANG BINH. dietricts showedthat District Chiefs had little or no records indicating the disposition ofpersonnel previously released to their, custody, and could not account for them.Since no civil records were maintained the assumption can be mr.de that thepeople in queetion were released without e,6tiun. AK KY District is capableof handling civil defendants and has a system to record their disposition, butonly has a limited capability to Impound personnel until their final disposi-tion was decided.
Solution: Until an adequate government administration isestablished;at each district all detainees classified as suspicious InnocentCivilians or Civil Defendants should be released to province control where theadedmnistration is able to screen properly and make a final determination ofstatus. This course of action was followed in QUANG TIN Province and isworking quite well.
d. Problem: There has been several instances :here 'tttliondirect support IPW teams were left with line companlee for exceszive periods,rather than being retturned to the battalion CP after a specific mission. Thisdenied their use by tht other ccmpanies and hindered proper handling of indi-viduals who shouLl be s=reened and classified prior to being turnd ovdr tobrigade IPW for formal interrogation.
Discus c Xnterrogatlcjn of Prisoners of WAr (IPW) teams arebeing utilized at battalion level. This preliminary interrogation aids the IPWteam at brigade as it weeds out Innocent Civilians (IC) or these personnel who
14CONFIDENTIAL
(CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarter-ly - i" . . ,(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
would be classified refugees. It also gives the IPW team at brigade a startingpoint for their formal interrogation by providing complete factual data concern-ing the circumstances of capture and other information usually four.' nn -'.ecapture tag.
Solutioni IPW teams may be sent to companies but they shouldonly be used to screen large groups of people or for periods less than 24 hoursto exploit known intelligence of ismediate tactical value.
e. Froblem: Incomplete or no capture tag means the Brigade -V'Section must start from scratch on their interrogation. If the detaine- l'1 cthere is no reason to disbelieve him when data is not available. Document andweapons that toluld be used to confront the individual with factual evide:;_-were separated from, the detainee.
Discussion: Recently many POW's were received at Brigade !F'.qwithout or with incomplete capture tags. Some capture tags indicate the PQ;was apprehended with documents and/or a weapon but they did accompany the indi-vidual to the Brigade IPW Section and was not identified with a particulardetainee.
Solution: Battalion S-2's must utilize their DS IPW teamsand make the companies provide complete capture tags and data. They must alsoinsure that documents and/or weapons captured on POW's accompany them to theBrigade IP Section.
f. Problem: Detainees, if not properly received and handled, canrid themselves of incriminating evidence, endangering US lives, and observefriendly unit disposition and fortifications.
Discussion: Detainees have been received at Brigade IFf;Section improperly secured, and not properly searched. There has been oneinstance of a PeW carrying the documents captured on him to the rear and anotherwho had two M-26 grenades on his person.
Solution: Company comnAnders and battalion 5-2's must insureat detainees are weaporless and bound to include restricted vision, Documents
muot accompany but should be given to the helicopter crew it no one froa thecapturing unit is available to accompany the detainee.
H. 7ersonnel.
l(C)Vtnit Strength:
a. Brigade personnel strength at the and of the reporting period,minus attached units, was as follows:
Authorized Augmented (MMT) 4920Assigned 5252Present for Duty 4883Not Present for Duty 369
b. The assigned strength as 107 percent of the authorizedstrength. The present dor duty strength was 99 percent of the authroizdstrength.
c. lt Brigade unit assigned strengths as of 31 Octobcr 1967:
OFF WO 7ij T.Yb...
lst Bn (Lbn), 327th Inf 37 1 716 7542d Bn (Atei), 327th Inf 34 1 741 7762d Bh (Abn), 502d Inf 38 1 758 7713d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf 37 2 731 7702d En (Abn), 320th Arty 40 3 40 483HHE, ist Brigade 45 8 285 338
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CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-HistSUBJECT: Operati-nal Report for Nuarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
Spt Bn, (Incl Repl Det) 68 0 5 - ';Co A, 326th Engr Bn 6 0 201 207Trp A, 2/l7th Cav 0 4 150
TOTAL 310 16 406 52-6
d. Of the "Not Present for Duty" strength, 32 were intransit, 126were on R&R and TDY/5D, 9 were AWOL, 7 were in conflnement, 194 were on leave,and 1 was missing.
2(C)Attached Strength:
a. Personnel strengths of units attached to the 1st Prigade, 131stAirborne Division at the conclusion of the reporting period were as r?"" .
Authorized 267Assigned 338Present for Duty 328BaSe Canp - Phan Rang 83Vot Present fot Duty 10
b. Tho asigned strbngth was 126 bercent of the authorizelstrength. The present for duty strength was 125 percent of the aut.horizedstrength. The present, for duty strength was 95 percent of the as ;tg.. , t.,th.
a. Of the not present for duty strength, 6 were on Wt anci 'aY/D,4 on leave.
d. Assigned strength of attached units as of 31 October 1967 wereas follows:
lOi Doet 74406 RfD 5646th APU 942d Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) 3645th P.1. Det 422d Military History Det 2501st Sig Det 122
181 14 et 2920th Chem Det 6
TOTAL 338
*. Casualties as a result of hostile action for the period (I Aug
thru 31 Oct 67) wser as follows:
MO-RIVR BENTON COOK WHEELER T~k
EHA 2 41 1 110 154fHk 20 251 5 398 574MIA 0 0 0 0 0
*b. Total casualties as a result of hostile action-from 29 Juljy65 to date are as follows:
e4640 3408 3
*¢. Total casualties as a result of non-hostile actions for the
period (I Aug thru 31 Oct 67) were as follows:
KILLED INJURED T.rA
10 54 &4,
*d. Total casualties as a result of non-hostile actions fram
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CONFIDENTIAL%N
AVBD-HistSUBJECT: Operational :,eporT f~r Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) U)
29 July 1965 to 31 October 196 are as foll,'s:
KILLED I TOA._L
85 575 660
*S-1 Journal, let Brigade, 1l1t Abn Div, 31 Oct 67.**15 personnel died of wounds after being evacuated from this comar,i,
14C)Pereonnel. Programs: The following programs were initiated or con-tinued during this period:
a. To provide artill~ry and engineer support for the 3d Bat' l-.on,506th Infantry, Battery D (Prov), 2/320th Artillery and the 4th Platoor' thEngineer Ba talion, weee activatedl the Artillery Battery was activsttd(0 2049, dtl 30 Sep 67; the Engineer Platoon was organized from precnt _n i.-eroverstrengti rrsulting in change in MCE under which the Brigade wa operating.
b. The advance party of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry, arrivedat Phan Rang on 26 October 1967. The battalion received in-country briefingsand orientation by brigade staff personnel. Comanders, staff personnel, andfirst sergeants, were briefed by the brigade staff sections.
c. USARV requiree the reporting cf twice wounded pcruorjne.1 forreassignment, unless the individual signs a waiver to remain with the wit.The brigade policy has been to reassign there personnel from line units to TOEpositions in the Support Battalion and Brigade Headqunrters Company, wherethese personnel can be assigned to duties for which they ar qualified by virtueof their grade and MOS. This policy is to be continued so long as vacanciesin the Support Battalion or Headquarters Company exist.
d. USARV has directed units to eliminate overstrengths; however,an enlisted strength of 105% for infantry battalions, 100% for officers andwarrant officers, and 90% for aviators will be authorized. This reou-ementwill require the elimination and/or reduction of personnel working in r; ' alionclubs, beach facilities, base area security plitoon, Long Range Re~-onai3.,Patrols, Post Exhange and other such activities. A study is now being conductedtc analyze o',erstrengths in certain brigade units with a view of seeking addi-tional personnel authorizations to continue these activities more prevalent inthe base arba at Phan Rang than elsewhere.
e. Headquarters USARV directed IFFV to activate a Long RangeReconnaissance Company NLT 15 October 1967. The brigade was given the respon-sibility to provide 221 personnel from its personal resources to unet therequirement NLT 1 October 1967. Personnel were interviewed and selected byofficers assigned to the Long Range Reconnaissance Compary. By 15 October 1967all personnel had reported; the IRRC moved out of Phan Rang on 22 October 1967.
f. On 1 September 1967, a commercial show, consisting of a fourman band and two Korean exotic dancers, entertained units on stand down at DucPho. On 14 October 1967. personnel of the brigade attended the Martha RaysShow at the Marine Amphitheater at Chu IAi.
g. Awards and Decorations:
(1) Suspense loss rosters are prepared NLT the 15th day ofeach month and sub itted to each battalion and separate company for personnelscheduled to rotate during the second subsequent month. These rosters areforwarded to unit comnder to assist and serve a dual purpose. First, to veri-fy rotation dates; and second, to remind corbnders of their responsibility toinitiate recommendation for meritorious awards for deserving personnel to allowsuff icient time for processing so the individual can be presented his awardprior to departure.
(2) The following awards and decorations were approved during
the reporting period:
DSC SS LOM DP S1 BS(V) 2
1 44 5 2 8 222 405
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AK(V) jN ARCGJ B 1 -iIL
20 166 168 1099 267 870 69 3346
(3) The Brigade received 12) Vietnamese Awarde for icparticipation in Operation HOOD RIVER. Reoapitulation of awa.6 are t
CAW1RY CRUSS
w/AI w1221S STAR wALERSA w./BION4E sTAR TOTAL
HC3 8111/327 nf 2 6 6 13 27./327 Img 2 6 *5 13 2;2/502 f 2 6 6 13 272/32O Arty 1 2 3 10 16IUP 1 2 3A 326 Sa 4 4epta 1 5 6
TOTAL 10 20 30 60 120
*2/327 Inf gave one Silver Star to their Arty FO from 2/320
Thirty personnel were presented awards, personally by Preza er Kr andCmneral This*, Republic of Vietnam. at QUhNG TIN Province Headquarters, TAX KY,on 12 Sept4er 1967.
h. An ID Card production capability is being established by theBrigade AG Section to provide complete photo and laminating servico.
1. A handbill court and a basketball court wer- completed and arein use in the rear base area at Phan Rang.
3. To facilitate rapid breakdown and improved mail service, theArM Post Office wan expanded by the addition of a new buik'ing. This givesnew mail sorting storage area, and will assist in meeting the expected Christ-mas mail peak period.
J. Members Of the AG Section attended the USARV Infusion .un.fer-ence ad were briefed on the Jnfusion plans outlined in USARV Reg 614-9 andprocedures necessary to implement the program. At present, the brigade iscapable of solving its own rotational hump problems, by readjusting persconralresources.
1. Reception of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry was acomplished.Al personnel recorde were givcn a thoroigh review and checked for accuracy ofvital information. The battalion has been integrated into the Brigade's admin-ietrave system.
m. Records Check: A 1009 records audit was performed by the AGAecdrds Branch and Brigade Finance for all units during stand down on 31 August1967 at DUC PRO.
n. Administrative personnel from the AG Section accompanied theBr"igade IQ Teais giving forward and base camp units & pro-inspection and assistedin correctng deficiencies on the spot.
o. A document was published that depicts the TCE, GO, a;J -WOB tables affecting the brigade since its arrival overseas for the conven-leae of casaers and staff. This gives them a comprehensive working tooland a picture of the authorized strengtt !hangs effecting their units.
p. Enlisted Promotions: During the reporting period, this conmandutilized the following number of enlisted promotion allocations:
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(Rc CSF-MP65) (U)
Ak M r F2 0 1 TOTA L
AUG 269 105 25 1 C 1 401MP 40 78 11 1 4 1 135OCT 270 114 17 2 1 0 404
q. Postal Activities
(1) During this period the postal section handled an averageof a ton and a quartar of nail daily. Average time for first class mailed fromOW(S to the britha wai fivtee ps sal ecel aS averaged 12days.
(2) Mornew €rors &alo average 410,339,59 mont ,l:- L11--*rthe reporting period. Money sta sales averaged $6,645.00.
r. Personnel PIaaw A data procesing sysem is presently
nder study, whereby punched cards can be intaned on all members of the Br'-ad: and used to produce machine prepared reports. At present, it is antici--
pared that thr Air Force Data Processing Center in Phan PAM will assist us inthis endeavor. The lack of this capability is the greatest single weakness in
the Brigades administrative aupplr system, The hand manipulating and countingof records required to support the Brigade's management system is a time con-suming effort that If replaced by a data processing capability, will save manyvaluable an-hours.
s. Brigade Orgaizational Changs:
(1) General Order 2049, K 1st 35e, 101st Abn Yi, 30 Sep 67,was published to organize a provisional Battery "D" in the 2d Battalion, 320thArtillery.
(2) General Order 1836, W, lsr Ede, 101st Abn Div, 9 Sep 67,was published to organize a Provisional Signal Cepany within the Brigade.Personnel spces were derived from HHC Brigade and the 5016t Signal Platoon.
(3) A Combat Tracker Team (Provisional) was as spned to t.eBdgade per General Order 1428, HO USAR , 5 Sep 67. AUth 1 officer and 9 EN.
(4) The 204th Military Intelligmee Detachient was attashedto the Brigade, per General Order 5021, l USALRV,'2 Oat 67. Auth1 offier and3 EM IJ Red Cross:
a. The Red Cross mode atotal of 3 clubbile visits to the for-ward deployed units at DE PRO and CHU IAI during the reporting period.
b. Average attendance at Red Croas activities was S)27 monthly.
c. The Red Cross povided outstanding service in the area ofpersonal Problem,
&V)lorales Ibrale remalned "Zxoellent, tnrcugiout the period.
7.(Okdical:
a. Organic medical support continued to be provided by "D" Com-pftz. 326th Pbdica4 battalion. A clearing station with minor sU"';7, pection,omrgeny treatment section, dental section, evcuation section and a 40 bedholding section was established in the area of operations.
b. Non organic support was supplied by elements of the 55th16dial rov, is.,67t wd85th 3vacustion Hospitals UIKO,2dSria
Hopita (CH AI,563d N il Cgw y (DUCPH 90hdial CopsI Mbieacopter Anbulancs)-..QUI IMHlM), and the 54th Mesdical (elteopt.er Ambulance). Detaciet. (CM IAI).
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(Rcs CsFOR-65) (U)
c. Significant Diseases:
Malaria 157 122 118Scrub Trphus 0 0 3Gastroenteritis 44 29 45Hepatitis 4+ a 5
Psychiatric Observation 8 12 SFUO 137 59 &Respiratroy Infection~ 14 10Skin Disease 53 51 42Foot Problems 11 27 i1Venereal Disease 43 115 98
d. Health of the Comand:
(1) Health of the Command is overall excellent. Stand dovntime has been quite minimal this quarter averagini- out to approximately 10days total spanning four separete operations. However, no specific diseasetrends have been elicited which can be attributed to increased physical oremotional fatigue per se.
(3.) Although malaria rates have fa Uen to approxirmntely onehalf that experienofd duxng the previous quarter, malaria contines to hieadthe list in the morbidity statistics of the command. Tactical effectivenessmust be weighed against ths increased malaria hazard known to. exist duringnight operations, upder uns phisticated living conditlon8, in hiAlly endemicareas.
e. Environmental Sanitation:
(1) No major problems have developed in this area. One out-break of minor gastro-inteetinal upset in the area of operations was attributedto hot meals delivered on a company resupply miseion. Mess sanitation has beenre-emphasized and deficiencies corrected.
(2) Insect and rodent control has been adequate in the basecamp situation but no effective insect control measures have been eaployed inthe area of operations.
(3) Waste di "osal problems become accentuated during monsoonconditions. Burn out latrines and soakage pit urinal continue to be utilized.
f. Ars7 level Medical Support
(1) Air ambulance support use initially provided by the 498thMedical Company (Air Ambulance), until arrival of the 54th Mbdical Detachment(Helicopter Ambulance) In mid-September.
(2) Quick response to recuests for Watient evacuation havebeen the rule. Although deteriorating weather conditions have caused occasion-al delays in location of pickup sites, no instance has yet occurred where anurgent extraction was impossible due to weather conditions alone.
S. Commanders and Prinicipal Staffs
a. Brigade Headquarters:
DG Salve H. Msthe son Bde CGCOL John W. Collins III DCOLTC Ralph Puckett Jr. XOLTC Elliott P. Sydnor 5-3LTC Richard A. Kupau 5-1i&J Rdwin P. Oeey 5-219J Robert M. Elton S-4WiJ Wayne J. Prokup 3-5
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b. Battalion Comandes?
LTC Gerald t. Morse CO, 3t Bn (Abhb) 327t InfLTC Robert G. Yorks 00, 9 Bn -bn, 327th InfLTC Howrd H. Danford CO, 2d ft (Aka), 502d lnfLTC John P. Geraci CO, 3d Bn (Abn, 506th iLTC Andrew S. Bolear 00,2 Rn (Ahn), 320th ArtyLTC Quinton P. Sunday CO, Spt Bh
c. Separate Companies:
CPT James R. Harding CO, A Tbp, 2d Sqdn (Abn), 17t; CavCPT Michael Ward CO, Co A, 326th Engr Zr. CPT Isroy 0. Stevens CO, HKC, let Bde
d LTC Ralph Puckett Jr. c endd 2d En (Abn), 502d Inf. fro,31 July 1967 to 27 September 1967, was reaesigned as Brigade Executive Officerbecaus f wounds received in action. LTC Danford assumed command of the 2d
/ n (sAbn), 502d Inf.
o. LTC Harold P. Austin, who previously commnded the let Battal-Ion, 327th Infantry, was replaced by LTC Gerald E, Mors or, 9 Augus 1967.
f. LTC Edmond P. Abood who previously coanded the 2d Battalion,327th Infantry, was replaced by LTC Robert G. Yorks on 29 August 1967.
g. Major Richerd orton who was previously the Brigade S-Z wasreplaced by Major Geesey on 4 September 1967.
h. Major Benjamin R. Schlapak assud dutieb as Brigadc Engineeron 14 August 1967. Captain Ward assumed command pf Co A, 326th Engineer Bat-talion.
#) Concept of Support.
a. General. External logistical support of the Brigade was pro-vided by the 15th Support Brigade, Americal Division and 80th General SupportGroup, let lo Co nd while operational in the CHU IAI area; a ForwardSupport Area (FSA) provided by QUI NHON Logistical Comand while operationalin the DUC PHO area, and PHAN RANG Subarea Comand for base camp elementslocated at PA.N RANG. Internal logistical support was provided by therigade'sorganic support battalion. , I
b. Field Trains. All classes of supply and servicee were provided
to the headquarters and maneuver elements by the field trains consisting of aForward Support Element of the Support Battalion and battalion trains elements.The Forward Support Element provided all classes of supply to the collocatedbattalion trains who in turn supplied the rifle companies exclucively by airWC direct fros the field trains location,
c. Combat Trsine. During the greater part of the reporting period,all resupply was .accmplished directly from the field trains to the rifle con-ponies without establishment of a combat trains element by any of the Brigadeunits. This resupply directly to the using unit required an average of .30 min-Uea flight time one way. During the latter part of the reporting poriodo badmnsoon weather required units to establish combat trains at their fire ba- -TAC CP areas. Due to the unpredictable nature of the weather it became e: *troely difficult to effect resupply fro the field tains area. When theweather became clear enough to effect resupply to the rifle companies, utiliza-tion of combat trains cut down the helicopter flight tim by one quarter or tatroquired to fly from the field trains area.
d. Forward Supply Points
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AV H-4stSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period En*i' 31
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
(1) General. Forward Supply Points were established whenevera secure area wa available that could be readily resupplied. These *iere estab-liahed in an attempt to shorten IDC and thereby cut down to miitauma te. air tlmcof army rotary wing resupply missions. To be effective, the FSP had t becapable of stockage by US Air Force fixed wing aircraft or by vehicle convoy.FSPs utilised by the Brigade were limiteU in nature containing 3tockag. of onlythe essentials - Class I (M4I), Class III, Class V, water and fast moving iI &lV.
(2) QUANG NCPI. During Operations OOD RIVER and COOK theBrigade wse supported by an FSP established at QUANG KGI b, 15th Support 'rl -gede, Azerical Division. This FSP was resupplied by vehicle convc!, frar CHU 1A1with back up by C130 aircraft. Due to its capability of being resupplied 1:yboth road convoy and air, it was relatively easy to maintain and ver; effective.It contained a 5 day stockage level of Class V, 3 day stockage of 'C' ra;onE;fast moving II & IV, and a helicopter 60,000 gallon refuel and rearmament point.The bulk of the personnel came from 15th Support Brigade with a amall coordi-nating element from the Support Battalion (FSE). Representatives from the threeinfantry and the artillery battalions were collocated with the FS? to receiverequests from forward unite, prepare sling loads and load resupply aircraft.
k3) CHU LAI. During Operation BNTON an FSP was establishedby the Forward Support Element of the Support Battalion on CHU LAI post. ThisFSP as very limited in nature. consisting mainly of coordinating persornel fortbe various classes of supply to provide a link between the battalions and thesupport facilities maintained by 15th Support Brigade and 80th Gencr.l SupportOroup also located on CHU A1 post. A skeleton battalion trains element fromthe three infantry and one artillery battalions cillocated with the FSP andaccomplished. all resupply to the line units fro. that location.
(4) TIEN PHUOC. During Operation WHIER the Forward SupportElement of the Support Battalion established an FSP at TIEN PHUOC Special ForcesCamp. This FSP contained Class V (without artillery ammunition), Class I, fastmoving II & IV engineer water point, and a limited 6000 gallon helicopterrefuel and rearm point. Resupply of the FSP was accomplished by C123 and C7Aaircrft over iir I.0. Prpblems were, ensounterk in maintaining the FSP dueto lack of space, nonavailability of aircraft, and bad weather which damagedthe airfield and limited the number,©f eALizraft sortlds. Attempts were made to#took the FSP by CH47 helicopter but.they ddft unsucesful due to low priorityand the limited number of aircraft available. Finally, it was decided tochang the concept of the FSP from one of 5 days supply to one for emergencyresuppl only. Weathr improved the last week of October permitting the stock-age to be again built up through CA sorties.
(5) TA Kr. An FP was established at TAX XY by 15th SupportBrigade to effect resupply of the let Battalion, 35thintaatry and the 2d Bat-talion, 320tk Artillery's firing batteries. Due to the lirgo numb.r of ruunrsand weight of siaumition required to resupply the batteries. and because oflimited airlift, resupply of TM PHUOC with artillery ammunition was impossi-ble. Hence, TAM Xa was resupplled by truck convoy. Subsequent airlift fromthat location cut the air time to battery positions to half of that reou3.redto resupply directly from CHU LAI. The FSP was effective until the arrival ofthe monsoon season when. flooding prevented further stockage of artillery amu-nition. This problem whe solved by sending a convoy to TAM KY every morningand litng the previously slung amntion right from the SLP trailer to thefirebase by CH47 helicopter.
2LOrganiaation for -Support. A Forward Support Element (FM) i: sprovided by the support battalion to sustain the combat olement&. The ,upportBattalion (-) provided support for elements located at PHnN RANG and supportfor the FP. The FW included the following elements:
a. Headquarters Detachnt provded command and control an-_ wasorganized into ommand, operations, cemuniation, and movement control subelements.
b. AdnmIrstrative Detachment provided personnel actions, mailservices, and pay services.
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c. Supply *cehsient received, stored, and issued all classes ofsupply and provided a limited, rgiag capability.
d. aintenanoe Detachment provided a rAir capability for artil-1ery, small arms, tdgnal, autmotive, edgineer and quartermaoter equipweno.The detachment was orgarized into a shop offits and recovery and contact teams.
'(C40berlal Und Services
a. Sipoly
(1) Cass 1: "C" rations continued to form the bulk of allclass f-cesid buring the period. Consumption of 1L2' iatione inore, F: 'A500 to $00 cases fo the irigade,. "A'-ratiOp supplements weri aer-edposslble. 'Thh" vireno significant -Class l, shortages during the reportiperiod. Vegetables and pptahe Ice were ade4U'a' throughout the period; .,owever,fresh fruit was seldom received.
(2) Class II & iV: The Support Battalion drew the bulk ofII & IV..suppl.ee from Cam Ranh Bay cr Phan Rang Sub Area and sent such suppliesto the43S in the forward erea, Th-FSE also drew a large portion of II & IVthroughithe FSA (TF Gallahar, ,TF McDonald) while the 11.igade operated in theDUC PO-are&, and later In ,the quarter through the 94th Supply and Service
Battalion of the 15th Suppozt Brigade. Heavy mortar- attacks created idditionalrequirements for Battalion TOC building material. Significant II &- I7 short-ags inoluded fatigues In small siee, mine sweeper batteries, poncho liner?and rucksacks.
(3) Class llIt Class III suppises were drawn from TF (hila-gher iv thW%'Mf? At of the reporttng period and from the 221st Supply arAService Company, )4th Support Brigade during the Utter part of the .eportingperiod. There were no shortape of any Class lIZ products.
(4) Class V. Class V scpport funlehe by 7 %llaaher, TibDonald and 221st Aaomuition platoon of. the W0t Oeneval Support Orqup ha,been adequate with no major shortages. On aevetl occasien# th*%prigade didexperience shortages of 105 NEI however. earenty blipments brought theetockage level back up a.t the 22lat, ASP before the sittatibn became critical.A total of 580.59 short tons of Clas V was issued during the reporting period.
(5) Water: Potable water was provided primarily by Co A,326th Engineer Bn (Abn) vhich operated two water points. During this pbrlod,I'igae units were issued 250 gal collapsible fabric drum for resupply ofater to forward units. These druma proved more cftpatible to aerial r6kpplyhan the 400 gal water trailers and lees susceptible to damage if dropped fromn aircraft. A ma~dua of three bladders .. an be earrod externallv by CH47.
b. Ser ibe-T.
(1) Launtdr Baths Adequate servies Vero provided by theFSA (TF Gllagher, V McDonald) ad by tne 8Oth Doneral Support Grouu throufh-out the reporting period.
(2) Grkaev Registration Adequate Verices wer providedby the 80th Ceneral Support Droup wft!e the larit operated in the CHUITAI area,and the FPS (27 Oallagher, TF McDonald) In the DUC PHO area.
0N) -Ypeeoi:D~q iqport.-Wnt@;Utce was frcvldedby a detachment *X-. Gq9 '8Ql' B4*4Ow eVtn e~h ?. hils opera-ting out of cuu Wl dJIIt oa1pfr r, were .pe .de4through B Co. 801st
Xf a by the 20hI, 1.15e. 64,t P( b-1e bnslyultaificant problemdawloped in the replceivent of parts for tio Artillery radar generators(400 cycle, 12.5 kw, 120 vatl. Two upw generatore Were e~ovtually securod.
(4) T'ransptyrtations
(a) land. rack transportation was utiliaed extensivelvin resupplying the QUAG NCAI ar TAM Ir Forward Supply Points. In adeltion,
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AVED-HiatSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Tn,.ine 37 'V .
(Rcs CSFOR-65) (U)
a total of four brigade convoys were run between DUC. PHO and CHU fAI,
(b) Sea. During the reporting period.onesealit*I wasconducted from DUC PHOto CHU IAI. The move required 6 vesselb (5 M., j JCU,to move 174.2 short tons and 4,788.? measurement tons of cargo. The move wasconducted in conjunctionwith an airlif t and convoy and did not include theentire brigade.
(c) Air. USAF C7a, C123 and C130 flew most Class II.&IV supplies, mail, and transient personnel between' the field trains area andbase camp. Additionilly, unit moves were conducted by C130 aircraft from DUCPHO to CHU IAI, from CHU IAI to DUC PHO, and DUC PHO to QUANG NMAI. C7A air-craft provided resupply missions to the FSP at TIEN PHUOC. Sorties and torv'ageflown in support of the brigade during the period were as follows:
Sorties Cargo Short Tons Passeni ers
August 272 756,602 6,122
September 141 510,069 2,522
October 179 594,983 3,116
TOTAL 592 1,861,654 11,760
34C)Problem Areas: The major problem that occurred during the report-ing period was the inability of units to resupply their rifle companies due tobad weather, The monsoon rains rendered air lines of communication tenuous atbest. Attempts were made to shorten LOC by stocking the TAC CP areas, but nocompletely satisfactory solution was found. At the end of the reporting periodunits were pulled back to areas of operation close to the TAM KY FSP and thisgreatly alleviated the problem.
J. Civil Affairs.
l(U)General: During the reporting period the brigade was involved infour operations conducted in two provinces. Operation HOOD RIVER and OperationCOOK were conducted 2 - 12 August and 3 - 9 September, respectively, in QUANGNGI Province. Operations EENTON and WHEIER were conducted in QUANG TIN Prov-ince. Operation EENTON lasted from 13 thru 29 August. Operation WMIER beganon 32 September and continues to date. Civil affairs work was tailored to sup-port the tactical elements of the brigade. The three prineipal civil affairsactivities were refugee control, food extractions and the return of innocentcivilians.
2(U)Civil Affairs:
-a. Operation HOOD RIVER centered in the districts of TU NGHIA,TRA BONG, SON HA and SON TINH. During the operation a total of 1179 refugeeswere moved and relocated" to the headquarters of the district in which they werefound. All food caches discovered were extracted and totaled 36.5 tons. Thefood was retuirned to CWN control.
b. Operation ENTON was conducted in the districts of TIEN PHUOC,LT TIN, HAU DUC and TAM KY. This operation required the movement of 701 refu-gees. All'persons were taken to the Province headquarters at TA, KY. Frequentenemy contact combined with very rugged terrain resulted in all food cachesbeing destroyed.
c. Operation COOK was a very short operation which was conductedin SON HA, TU NGHIA, NONIA HANN, MO DUC, and MINH LONG districts. Fourty-four(44) refugees' were moved to 'government control. No food caches were extracted.
d. Operation WHEELER encompassed the districts of TIEN PHUOC, TAMKY, HAU DUC, HIEP'DUC and THANG BINH. Three hundred eighty six (386) refugeeswere extracted from the area of operations and taken to TAM r'- Province Head-
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AVBDA tist CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Oprational Report for ;0uarterly Period .h,'!n- " -.
1'cS CSOR-65) (11)quarters. Caches totaling 24,5 tons;of food were extracted and returned toGYN control. One hundred ninety six (196) Inrcceit civilians were returned tothuir resident districts.
e. Quarterly Recapitulation
(1) Refugees moved 2310 persons
(2) Food extracted 61 tons
(3) Innocent Civilians returned 301 persons
3.(V)ivic Action:
a. Operation HOODRIVER: The only civic action during this .J-ation were NEDCAPS. 335 persons and 157 domestic animals received medicaltreatment under the program.
b. -Operation ENTON: 2EDCAPS treated.22 persons during thisoperation. Additionally, 10 domestic animals received medical treatment.
c. Operation COOK: MEDCAPS were performed treating a total of546 persons.
d. Operation WHEEIER: Based upon previous t.rYperier:ce in CU'2GTIN Province the brigade coordinated with units responsible for civic actionareas close to the Brigade Tactical Coimand Post at CHU IAI. By acquiringareas readily accessible to the brigade it was reasoned that a more effectivecivic action program could be initiated. Coordination was effected with the196th Light Infantry Brigade and 1st Squadron, lst Cavalry Regiment, towardthis end.. The areas procured were located in LY TIN District in the hamlets ofLY TRA, LMG BINH, and TICH DONG. NEDCAPS were begun in -these hamlets and wereconducted three times weekly. One battalion was assigned to each hamlet forNEDCAP purposes, The remaining battalion began IEDCAP operations in TIEN PHUOCSpecial. Forces Camp. Additionally, medical treatment was administered in theArea of Operations and the Brigade Forward Base Camp. A total of 7654 personswere treated during MEDCAPS. The Brigade Civil Affairs section undertookseveral civic ;action projects-in LY TRA Refugee Hamlet. The hamlet was in needof an adequate drainage system, roofing for its school, fresh water wells,facilities .or personal hygiene, and furniture for classrooms. During thereporting period, the school roof was completed, one fresh water well was dug,a water tower was constructed wIth a 532 gallon water tank, shower facilitieswere built, work was begun to correct permanently the hamlet drainage problem,and lumber was .provided to construct school furniture.
e.(Ulupport Battalion: Throughout the quarter the Support Battal-ion of this Brigade has maintained an effective Civic Action Pro.7ram in theRear Base Camp at PRFMN.RG. The results of this program are consideredseparately since this static situation presents opportunities seldom-enJoyedby the tactical maneuver elements. Support Battalion treated 2104 perzor.medically during the period. Other civic actidn projects include: constructionof two market places, repaired one bridge, installed a pedestrian wal.kcJ--adjacent to the bridge, constructed on culvert, installed permanent electricalfacilities at the PHAN- RkNG recreatdon..area, and renovated an old garage fornurses living quarters
4U) Civic Action Recapitulation:
a. Health nd -anitation.
'(1) A total of 43 WEDCAPS were conducted by US tresting 7195persons and 51 WEDCAP5'were conducted by US/V' treati.ng'3466 persona. MEDWAPfigures include 64 persons treated in area of operations, 28 barbers givenphysical examinations, and 93 Vietnamese that received dental treatment.
(2) 32 classes on personal hygiene were conducted duringl.DCAPS.
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(R S CSFOR-65)
(3) local VN nurses and midwives of the PHAN HANG area weretrained by working with MEDCAPS teams.
(4) 53 homes were sprayed by US/VN during tfED0APS.
(5) -te hundred and sixty-seven (167) domestic animals receivedmedical treatment by US.
b. Public Works: Construction of, or repairs to the followingwere completed:
I-Bridge repaired with 1-532 gal water tank installedpedestrian walk way
1-Living cuarters 1-School roof constructedconstructed
3-lectrical facilities 10-Benches constructed for school
installed
1-Road repaired (400 ft) 2-tarket places constructed
1-School yard landscaped 23-Class room doors repaired
2-Culverts constructed 1-Drainage ditch dug (400 ft)
1-Water well constructed 1-Public shower installed
1-Exterior school walls cemented
c. Transportation: The brigade provided transportation for evac-uating 1971 refugees, returning 301 innocent civilians to the district fromwhich they were apprehended, 51,810 lbs of cement, 23,200 lbs of tin, andextracted 43,000 lbo of unpolished rice, 39,000 lbs of polished rice, and40,000 lbs of salt. Vehicles transported the daily hire laborers twice dailyexcept Sundays and national holidays.
d. Labor: The forward brigade elements employed 4,990 laborerson a temporary daily hire basis. The payroll was 399,200500MI for an averageof 0.80$VN per laborer per day.
.. Education and Training:
(1) Daily English classes were taught by a brigade member,for an average of 56 teaching hours per week, to ar average of 1350 studentsmon thly.
(2) On 14 August 1967, an Elementary School Sponsorship Pro-gram was initiated in PHAN RANG, by Support Battalion. The purpose of theprogram is t6 enhance the educational standards through films and providematerials to repair and improve existing facilities.
(3) On 3 October a High School Stholarship Program was initi-
ated by Support Battalion for 125 Vietnamese Students.
f. Distribution of Comodities:
Food 8,805 lbs Water Pumps 4j HP 4Powdered Milk 100 gals Door Lack assemblies 20Fruit 44 crates Crushed rock 22.5 cu yds :Rice 240 lbs Screen wire 2,400 sc ftCandy 1,915 lbe Barbed wire 4,000 ftToothpaste 75 tubes Engineer stakes 455 lbsSoap 2,899 lbe Cement 51,810 lbeClothing 1,613 lbs Limber 56,478 bd ftTobacco 47 lbs Paint 43 gale Z
26-¢
.- _ . - - _'-.t -,,, . .
CONFIDENTIAL
AVE-HistSUBJECT: Operational Report for Q(uarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RGS CSFOR-65) (U)
Corrugated Culverts 18"431 Student Care Kits 2,696
Rice bags 3,904 $and bags 8,077-School supplies 10 boxes Educational Toys 1 bcxChalkbo&rds 3 Fiat tin 800 sheets
g. Recovered Goods Returned to GVN:
Unpolished Rico 43.0OO lbsPolished Ritce 39,000 lbsSalt 40,000 lbs
h. Voluntary Contributions:
62,000.00$VN was donated to the Thap Ch&t. Igh School P'.Phan Rang, for school construction costs.
84,500.00VN was contributed to the high school ScholarFLipProgram, Phan Rang, for 125 VN students,
I. Efforts not otherwise mentioned above:
Seven soccer and two volleyball gamfs between US/i; tec.ms wereplayed during the period.
The Brigade S5 and Section Sergeant attended the Ila Ci,Action Course in DA NANG, RVN.
The Brigade S5 and Battalion 65, 2/327 Infantry, attended theMKCV Advisors Orientation Course in Saigon, FVN.
The Support Battalion sponsored the Free World F-iendshipCouncil Luncheon in October.
Seven entertainment a"tiviiies were conducted for Vietn&.csechildren. A musical comsbo played once and American movies were shown on sixoccasions.
The QUANG TIN Province Chief presented an RVN flag to theBrigade. A joint flag raising ceremony was conducted commemorating the event.
c. Artile re
l(C)0ps.-tion HOWL RIVER (I 13 August 1967)
a. tiVon: The 2d battalion (Airborne), 320th Lrtillerv supportedthe lst frigade, 10 a 'jl(borne Division. Battery C, 2d Bat .alion {155.-s Towed),11th Artillery as placed under the OPCQ .of the ht %talon and providen rin-forcing fitre's. 'Bat , ryC, 3d Be-tt&2on (159= towed), 16th, Artillery end
Dattery*", ' 3d'SLttallon (31/175=~ SP), 28th itilry -provided generaI supportto the Brlg&ae. F~res of a battery of 155mm gurn ard h battery of B' howitzer!of the 5t0 Mwrinee were also avlliable.
* 5. .- waey Y of Opera rie ,.ThO th.ee oratmi batteries of the 2dq.tan(Arl boL ( eA 320lf. Artillery provoed iupX rtfor their nonri] j asso-ciated lfantfy ba~ttlons from. firing pqsitioels in the. vicIzity of ti e infantryTAC CPs. The radk r was oit empyed ,,. ta" ". of operatlia .rand remained insupport of tb D'ODC ? Ease Cep area. The, Xttalion was piven the rii sion rfestabllh ing a "c'sbinek Firn Support C.ordinatiqn Centei in con znc+.i 3n w- .,the 2 AM Division and let Korean Marine Brigade. The FSCc was estab2i n~dat &Odha Mottnt.a. (S 660757) in the vicinity of QUANG NGAI on 1 August andfuanctiorme4 'iqt4 j9'Aixgust. The p'urpot. of the, faqili-iy 'ws to cocrdime~te firewithini cleoe Wt %7 af boundaries And toyrmvide additional fires *FreeWorld AU'WVy Fpocie as requeete4. A#ditiomlly, tw baitt4ion opreted an..air traffic control station to all N1t aircraft operating In the area of Oper-ation OM RIVR. .Oce eptablished tw. FSCG, 4ntiuned swothly and the flowof art!llery Ijnformaton between the pezticipating forces was timly andeffective.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIOENTIAL~30
I AVED-MietSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFCOt-65) (U)
iC)0eration M iCR (13 - -29 August 1967)
a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery sup-ported the let Brigade, 101st Airborne DiVision. Battery C, 3d Battalion (1552mTowed), 16th Art4lery was placed under the OPCON of the Battalion and providedreinforcing fires..
b. Simry of Operations: The three organic batterips of the 2dBattalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided support for their normall- asso-ciated infantry battalions from fihg positions n the Vifinity of the infantryTAC CPs. The radar was not employed in the rea of~uperatione; however, it vasdisplaced from DUC PHO to CHU IAI on 16 August for a period of seven days. Onthe afternoon of 13 Auguet, a grass fire Ignited by an u6rmwn source burnedover the firing position of Battery B, and the ThC OF of the 2d Batt-, Lc- (Air-borne), 327th Infantry. Exploding ammunition forced evacuation of the positionand precluded movement of howitzers and equipment, After a nimht urnder enemymortar and all arms fire, the battery was extracted to CHU IAI Base and beganrefitting operations. Battery C, 3d Batta]ion, 16th Artillery, assumed themissions of Direct Support, 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry (vice Battery B), untilreconstitution of Battery B was complete, and the battery was displaced backinto the area of operations on 16 augut.
3(C)Operation COOK (2 - 9 September 1967)
a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery sup-ported the let Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. A Battery, 2d attalior (155 "Towed), l1th Artillery was placed under the OPCCN of the Battalion and providedreinforcing fires.
b. Susmary of Operations: The three orgapio batteries of the 2dBattalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided support for their normally asso-ciated infantry battalions from firing positions in the vicinity of the infantryTAC CPs. The radar was not employed in the area of operations and remained insupport of the CMU LAI Base Camp area. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artilleryws located at a firing position within the HA TN Special Forces Cam (W391701).
4(C)Operation WHMEIER (11 September - 31 October, continuing)
a. Mission: The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery con-tinues to support the let Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery C, 3dBattalion (155mnm Towed),- 16th Artillery was assigned the mission to proviedreinforcing fires. From 11 to 24 September, Battery B, 2d Battalion (lO15nTowed), 9th Artillery was placed under the 0PCC of the Battalion and providedsupport of the let Battalion, 14th Infantry. On 4 October, Battery
° A, 2d Bat-
talion, 9th Artillery was placed under the OPCCN of the Battalion and c.)ntinuesto provide support of the lst attalion, 35th Infantry.
b. Summary of Operations to date: The three organic batteriesof the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery continue to provide support fortheir normally associated infantry battalions from firing positions in thevicinity of the infantry TAC CPs. On 26 Septembe', a firebase was establishedin the vicinity of +he TAC CP of the let Battalion (Airborne), 327tn Infantr-,(AT 992182). Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery conducted an airmohiledisplacement from TIEN PHUO Special Forces Camp to the firebase to be collo-cated with Battery A, 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery. The radar was placedunder the OPCCN of the Americal Division on U -September and remained in theCHU IAI areA. On 3 October the radar section terminated OKOF ef the Divisionand conducte(" an airmobile displacement to the firebase. On 15 Octobcr, ::at-tery A was subjected to a heavy mortar and grouno attack that resulted in 6friendly ERA and 29 WHA (21 medevaced). The following morning Battery A wasaxtrEcted to 10 B.1OS Base and the recently formed Battery D assumed theirmission. Upon extraction from the firebase, the radar section conducted anairmobile displacement on 17 October to the TAC C11 of t.he let Battalion, 35thInfantry (BT 132202), and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th rtillery returned tothe firing position at TIEN PHUOC Special Forces Camp (BT 109142.
28CONFIDEN~iALI
CONFIDENTIAL
AVE)-qiatSUBJECT. Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1967
(RC CFOR-65) (0)
S.OThe fdllwirg internal training has been conducted during the reportingperiodt
&. During Operation EONC, the 218 Field Artillery igital AutomaticComputer (FADAC) was issued to the Battalio.. ne basis of issue was one perfiring battery and one to battalion FDC. Issue ws made at the completion ofa five day course conducted by a New Equipment Training Team and attended bytwo personnel par battery sized unit. Each unit currently has two trainedoperators while, the battalion connunications section has two perscrnnei iicaif.edas maintenance techricianp.
ib Due to the reouirement to provide an additional firing batter. _the arrival of the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry, Batter-.- V Fr -sional), 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery was orgardzed Un' IC -Z:,1967. Personnel and eauipmeit were gathered from existing resources wi*-the Battalion. Each existing firing battery supplied one complete hcwitz.sectdon while two float howitzers were acouired from Support battalicn Firedirection classes were conducted by the Battalion FDC section, .ile fa ringbattery classes were conducted on the howitzers. On 6 October, Battery D din-placed by road to a firing position at BT 523035 and conducted a live 'ireexercise. On 12 October the personnel of Battery D made an airmobile displace-ment from LOS BANOS Base to the Battery C position and assumed the 0 tatter.mission for three days. Subsequently, the personnel of Battery D reievedBattery A personnel for seven days and Battery B personnel for three days. Cn1 N6ember Battery D will displace by LST to PHAN RANG and connence support ofthe 3d Battalion (Airborne)', 50'.th Infantry.
0, On the morning of 15 October, Battery A was subjected to a heavymdf-tar nd ground attack that resulted in 6 KRA and 29 WHA to battery personnel.The remaining personnel were extracted to LOS BANOS Base for a standown andretraining. Within three days the Battery received 17 replacezents, 2 of thezbeing infantryha . On 19 October the battery was reorganized and receivedtraining in intenance', nomenclature and laying of the .(02 Howitzer. Thefollbwing day was devoted to other firing battery techniques. The new batteryFDC received training frum battalion FD personnel for three days. On 21 Octo-ber, the.reformed battery made an overland diiplacement from LOS BAMtS Base to
"firing position at BT 523035 and fired over 200 rounds at known and suspectedtifemy locationa. In the afternoon, the battery received training on airmobile
displacement and displaced the howitzers to 1,OS BANOS Base by CH-47 helicopter.On 22 October, attery A returned to the area of operations and resumed supportof the lst Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.
The following prbblem areas have been encountered during the reportingpehiod:
lp:11Cack of readily available tpply parts, and Technical AssistanceRepresentatives for the Battalion Ccntermortar Radar (AN/*Q-4).
a. In order to-become completely effectv6, the radar s'-ctionmut be provIdd with a readily available supply of critical parts. At present,most parts' n 0e ciitical category' are available on a loan status only and arealmost Impossible to obtain throughnormal requisition channels. Repair partspreviousl* fV uis5t1ona4 for as- long as 210 days on 0-2 priority requisitionsb etill2nt beersn;J0ived. Furthermore,-on-the-spot repair of the radar isgreatly hindered due to the authorization to stock only running spares.
b. Tethrnacal AuIstanee Representatives for the AN/1., ,-4 :iadarshou24 be' loatik i" critical areas In order to be availabl for 1_.6ediatereqtuifa ls .. ~t.s* 1Z the case of' tUs battalion, when technical assistar.ceIs re( u d, 4 i imxis of two days ais required for transportation of personnelto.. i. .a 6 Ci es W at 'last bve day for trouble' shooting. In addition,At Ai ro ' e/t-.-arAnt b O~csRadar~'Techpclan, who are trainedand- suport e Chelo6 tovole* of milntenance, be authorized to
re ctck Ci c atuaton. At present,the radar im, i is authorized two'nerators, the PU/C77-i/U CSidd Aounted)md the Ptr -06 (?nt in'a 3/4 ton trailer). If this generator power supply"e rep ed'by military standard: endnes, the immediate procurement of repairparts woiA be fabilitated.
29
CGNFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 5",AVBfl-ietSUBJECT: Operational Report for Cuartcrly Period Ending 31 Octo:c:' .;67
(RCS CSFCR-65) (U)
2C)Replacement of Combat Lose Howtsers, 10Mmp Towed, M202.
'. During the reporting petiodi a totil of five 105m hCowtzers,?1O2, were damaged beyond repair due to combat operitions. Of the five hoWit-zero, foUr had the corresponding fire conttbl ad obctioti equipment desttoyedsimultaneouesiy Apropriate requisitions and fookbat Idosee" were aubetttdimmediately, resul h in the receipt of four howitzer's m1hus fire control and
necessary section eouipmeflt With the acceptance of the four howitzert, minusequipment, this unit reportedly dangelled the request for four howitzers itheouipment, even though the Initial request Who tof four complete howittets,The fifth combat loss was requisitioned for the howitzer mInu6 eoulpieht, adwas received as such. Recent information received by Wbie unit indicates tb--tthe majority of roplaceeonthItzers in-country are without fire control a-section equipment. It has been the experience of this unit that, wer a ha-t-zer is damagd beyond repair, the accompanying fire control equipment is alsodestroyed. The fLire control equipment is vital to the weapon since it ca:.i-cbe fired without it.
b. The necessary lire conT. o. and section equipment to operate tthhowitzers was obtained from the Brigade ktrt Battalion and/or. xvedit:,trdfrm within the Battalion. This reduced7 00 overall efficiency of the battericzbut did not hinder the mission of the Battalion. Reqaisitions for each singlemissing item was processed immediately. However, as of this date, .itjch oa" tieequipment has still not been received. This problem could re-occur if suffi-cient complete howitzers are not available in country.
1. The following oat& is submitted concerning Operatioual Report-Ieasma lerrmed for the quarter)4 reporting period ending 31 Otgter 1967.
a. During the reporting period the iWY any e M4., W&Pdirect combat su~ort to Infantry afteuver battb iorkO in 44i f~w Thissupport Included, but se nct limited t dl n 34 5 ad j b sq "-ance, tunnel Oar bunker destruti, Oeteti 11 e a .
and enemy land mines and tooby traps, qonstruction qf TAe 'I 4n frghtina 40infantry. In addition to combet activity in the a.-ea of operations, engineereffort accounted for construction of the Brigade Base Camp forward. This work
Included building an extensive road net, layinQ sixteen 35 foot culverts,installing three and one half kilometers of triple concertina protective fence,construction of approximately thirty tent floors and ten tent franes andgeneral ground preparation for tent sites. Other engineer effort for theperiod was solicited by the Marine Corps and by clvnil affairs. This unitexpe nded approsdmtely 300 dump truck hours assisting the Marines in routeimprovement of QL I between CHU LAI and DA NANG, and provided sweep teams an
call for clearing this stretch of road. T- the area of caii affaira thisunit constructed a complete drainage system for the refugee hamlet of LY TRA,assisted the villagers In the construction of a new school house, and put inapproximately 400 cubic yards of fill.
b. A fourth line p)Atoon was organized and trained in August toprovide combat engineer support for the 3d Battalion (Airborne), 501th Infantryin November 1967. The platoon trained in demolition techniques, mine clearing
methods and helicopter I. construction. The platoon operated in September andOctober In support of lt Battalion, 14th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 35thInfantry, both of which were CPCt to the brigade at the time.
c, Training conducted during the period consisted prinmrily ofrefresher demolition classes and training on new demolition materials and thedestruction of US dude and enemy mines and booby traps. This training isnecessary to keep all men current on demolition practices, overcome careleenessand familiarization with new equipmen* ,d techniques the enemy may employ.
d. Problem Area.
CONFIDENTIAL
( CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD0-H~s tSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 8nding 31 OC;ob,. T
(RCS CSFoR-65) (U)
(1) Problem area: The major problem area concerning theengimer capability is in the maintenance field on engineer equipmenti Spareparte and replacement for chain saws, grader and 1.5 W DC generators have beenconsistently critical.
(2) Discussion: This Problem come about primarily becausethe chain saws and airborne gader are not Army standard equipmnt. Because ofthies it to inelble to requisition patt. For e .le, the primary causefor breakdown on the chain saws is magneto malfunction. The majority of thesaws ar Wrigh brand raw and there is n1o replacement magneto in the Arzkysupply sem to replace them. The graer Is affected by the saw circumarnces.As a t.on-standakd piece of equipments roesir parts cannot be requisitioned. Inthe case of the DC generators, appareitly motors for 1.5 DC generat.ors are In
short supply throughout the theater.(3) Action taken: In order to solve the problems of Mainto-
nnce for these particular pieces of bqiapnt. the items are being turned infor salvage when they break down and staard equiset is being requested asreplacement.
XJU ftros~t Marshal.
1. The Brigade Provwost Marshal supports the tactical elementa of theBrigade In the following manner,
a. Convoy escort and security.2. PV escort and security.
c. Check point and traffic control operations.
d. Escorting and security of inesweep operations.
e. Escorting and security of HDCAPS.
f. Cordon and search of villages and hamlets, acodmaplshed witha platoon of National Police Forces, recently attached.
g. Rotta reconnaissance prior to and during Brigade dielacemente.
2. A general briakdown of support rendered during this period is asfollowel
a. Security and escort of teae- motor marches of 50 miles orfarther.
b. Secured and processed over 400 detainees/PW's.
C. Escorted sixteen W)DCAP operations.
d. Normal personnel and traffic control functions.
e. Normal daily mineaweep operations until the Brigade left theDUC PHO area.
f. Extensive village and hamlet cordon and search operationsduring July, August and part of September, in conjunction with the N&tionalPolice Field Forces.
g. Road reconnaissance conducted prior to all motor marcheb.
3. Problem Areas.
a. Problem: Employment of National Police Fled Force..
(1) Discussion: Ooneral employment of National Police FieldForces will generate operational problems unless conmanders ewploying this
31CONFIDENTIAL
ABHsCONFIDENTIAL
i AVBD-Hist
SUBJECT. Oper tonal Report for Quarterl ' Period Ending 31 October 1967(RCS uSFCa-65) (U)
agency are properly educated concerning the capabilities of these individuals.Utilization with lead elements exposes these personnel to unnecessary hazards,thus often mitzjio2iing their effectiveness when needed in other areas. Theirprimary mission is population and resources control and are best utilized inconjunction with operation in heavily populated areas and on check points usedfor traffic control.
(2) Recamendationt That definite guidelines should be es-tablished for employment of National Police Field Forces.
NEU)Ar- Aviation.
L General concept of operations during the reported period remainedunchanged from the previous quarter. The type terrain remained the same, theprincipal objectIves paralleled those of the previous quarter. The two UH-lDaircraft provided the required vehicle to ccmand and control the Brigadeelements by the Comander and the Deputy Comander. The OH-23 type helicoptersprovided limited comand and control vetdcles as well as a suitable means oftransporting other Staff and Liaison Officers, as necessary, to accomplish themission assigned. The U-6A aircraft, when available, permitted suitable trans-port between the forward area and the base complex located some 200 milesaway. The aircraft was not available for a period of approximately 30 daysfor inetc.llation of a more desirable avionics system.
4,j) The 176th Aviation Company remained in direct support to thisBrigade and the ll th Aivation Battalion provided general support from the 161stAviation Company, and the 178th Aivation Company. Specific support providedby iach is best reflected in the individual supporting unit OPREP 5 report.
0<UVa.
1. General. During the period the Brigade Signal Section plannedand supervised the comunications support for the Brigade during all phases ofthe operation.
2U)Signal Assets. The counicatione were provided during the firsthalf of the period by the organic comunications platoon from headquarters andheadquarters company and the attached forward support platoon from Company B, ".p501st Signal Battalion. On 15 September 1967, both pla* one were functionallycombined into a provisional signal company. The General Order used as author-ity for this organization is attached as Ici 1.
34C)Neans of Communicatione. During the period the means of communi-cations available to the Brigade were used as fol.ows:
a. Radio.
(1) FM Radio. FM radio continued to be the principal coandand control counications meane. Utilizing the AN/PRC-25 at company andplatoon level and the AN/VRC-46 (dismounted) at battalion and brigade lr 1,the Brigade maintained continuous and positi% contact with all element, -fthe commcand. The new squad radio (Ai/P T-4 and AN/PRR-9) was Introduced aLand below company level during the last twv weeke of the period; however, itsImpact on low level cm~aand control camnicatons cannot be stated at thistime.
(2) TM Radio with X-TS&C Equipment. During the periodheavy emphasis was placed on the use of secure FM voice between the battalionTAC CPI' and Ue MW. The use of this capability simplified the trensmissionof classified Information by limiting the requirement to use complicated Code3.The secure capability ales permitted extensive and detailed coordinationbetween adjacent units.
(3) AM Radio. The use of AM radio was considerably upgradedduring the period. Three new SSB rigs (AN/VS-2) were received to replacethree of the oki, obsolete and worn-out A/VSC-l equipment. Two AN/VSC-2'e
32
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
AVBD-HistSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(Rcs CS DR-65) (U)
were employed to provide secure RAT? between the Support Battalion in PHAN RANGand the Forward Supply Element (FSE) at Brigade Main CF. When the supplysystem extended itself to a forward location (FSP) the third rig was employedthus provoling secure RATT at all echelons of the brigade supply system.Notification has been received from USARV that four more kN/VSC-2's are readyfor issue, These will replace all but one of the brigade's AN/VSC-l's andprovide the secure RAT? capability at battalion level.
b. Tactical Wire. The brigade continued to use tactical wiresystems extensively in the brigade CP and in the battalionst rear CP's. Limiteduse uas made of tactical wire at TAC CP's principally for perimeter defense nets.In each of three principal brigade CP's during the period the Brigade averaged15 milee of wire in its operation.
c. Land Line Teletype. land line teletype (secure) was used toterminate one circuit from higher headquarters and one circuit between thebrigade Main and Fear CP's. Additicnal use was made of the MaijV Rear circuitby the use of TEIECCN service. This service permitted passing of bulky routineadm3-nistrative traffic in a timely and efficient manner.
d. VHF. ,F was the only means of communications available tothe brigade which was not used during the period. The principal reason for notusing it was the failure to include it in the concept of operation. Futurecommunications plans will include the VHF utilization recommendations.
4. External Signal Support. The brigade was supported by higherheadquarters communications as follows:
a. VHF. The Americal Division provided VMF to the brigade, ;.o-viding bott voice and teletype access to higher and adjacent units.
b. DCA Support. The Defense CniLcations Agency provided twolow quality circuits between Main and Rear. One was for voice; one was forte le type.
P. Chemical.
lM)Concept of Operation: Dhuring the reporting period all chemicaloperations were controlled at brigade level under the rtsff supervision of theBrlgadt Chemical Officer. To facilitate a "quick response" capability theBrigade Chemlal Section maintained personnel in the TC between 0700 - 2000hours daily. The 20th Chemical Detachment maintained personnel on 15 minutenotice for employment within the brigade area of operation during this period.
20hraining.
a. Portable Flamethrower Training: During the months of Augustanu September two (2) individuals from each riflq company in the infantrybattalions And ten (10) i9divid;iala from the Security Platoon pfnd A/326 Engi-nwra received training in the maintenance, operations and employment of theM2A7 portable flamethrower. All personnel trained had a six (6) mouth retain-ability in the brigade.
b. In September four (4) personnel from the 20th Chemical Detach-ment and the Brigade Chemical Officer rete',ed seven (7) days of training inthe care and maintenance and employment of the Manpack Personnel Detector(Airborne Mods). The training was conducted by Mr. Weis of General ElectricCompany.
LC)Oprations: A brief summry of chemical operatiorduring the period are se follows:
a. CS Grenade drope: A total of 3,168. M7A3 CS grenades weredropped in support of infantry troops during the period. 2,688 were drorped i.support of troops conducting Operation WMIER weBt of TAN K. Targets cpnsis-ted of enemy snipers, fortified defensive positions and fortified VC/NVA/
3)
CONFIDENTIAL
S&j-: Operational Report fer Quarterly Period Ending 31 ctober 1967(RCs cSFoR-65) fu)
controlled hamlets. On 19 September a CS grenade drop wa integrated witt aaoka grenade drop to support an attack of a fortifled hamlet. The purpose of
this mission was quick incapacitation by the CS a d screening of friendlyelements assaulting across a rice paddy. The operation was seccessful intro-ducing a now type of chemical support to the Brigade.
b. CS Persistent g Drops: 2, 40 powvdr of persistent CS-i wasdropped .on eneoW defewdvs positions. bass camps, hoepital sites and routes ofagrees. The priwy purpose of thees missions were to deny the eno use ofthese areas and restrict his nmoewnt.
a. Rice/Salt Destruction: During the period 141 tons of esrice was destroyed utlzing 1800 pounds of bulk CS-I. In addition to seedingthe cache with CS-l, an additional 1880 poumds of CS-I was air dropped in theItwdiate area surrounding each cache.
d; bnpack Personnel Detector - ,People Sniffer": "People Sniffer"operations c-nced in September 1967. As of the close of this reportingperiod 35 misaIons had "ben
J conducted. Significant readings were recorded on
23 of these miesios. In each instance, this information was immediatelyrelayed to the battalln S-2's and the Brigade FSC. An artillery concentrationwas fired in all areas which were suorted by othrr intelligence sources.
C it's OE 4\
AVD-Hiet CONFIDENTIALSUBJr: peational Report for Quarterly Period inding 31 Oc,ober 1967
(R5CSR)R-65) (M3BCTION 2
Commanders Observations and Recommendations
Part I: Obeervations (Lessons Learned)
A. Operations
C) Item: Construction of landing zones.
a. Discussion: When unite are opere.ting in densely vegetatedjungles, areas suitable for helicopter landing zones for emergebcy medicalevacuation a"d resupply are dirf1cult to find and construct.
b. Observation: haximuma ,se should be made of preplainedPir strikes and Combat Skyaspot6 using large size bombs forward of advancingtroops to insure that emergency landing zones are available if needed.
2 C0tem: Tunnel denial
a. Discussion: -ny-tunnel complexes are too large to destroythem easily to prevent the enew from using them again.
b. Observation: Denying the enemy the use of a large tunnelcan be accompliehed effectively by contaminting the tunnel with persistantCS. Bags of CS are placed three nmeters apart within the tunnel and all en-trances are closed using demolitions.
3.(Oktem: Bunker destruction
a. Diecussion large overheaded bunkers are difficult to de-"atroy completely without using large aOunts of explosives,
b. Observation: One efficient method of denying the bunkerto the enem without completely destroying the bunker is to seed the .buAkerwith persistant CS. Then, with only a smel amunt of exploalveso collapsethe overhead covering.
10) Item: Air to ground radio nets
a. Discussion: Air force forward air controller radios mountedin the O-1E aircraft do not have the capability to transmit and receive,on thehalf megacycle. In addition, the radio's highest frequency is 51.9 megacycleswhile the AN/PRC-25 radio sed by the A"m has a frequency up to 75.95 megacycles.The result is insufficient air-to-ground frequency to suppLy all maneuver-units.
b. Observation: Priority of frequoncies with whole megacyclesmust be allocated to maneuver units to iasure adequate air-to-ground communica-
p tione.tine 5)Item: Debriefing of Pilots
a. Discussion: All available so,'xres of intelligence informationmust be sought. Pilots of the daily co=-And and control, utility and "slick"helicopters fly over the area of operation each day and become familiar withthe terrain.
b. Observation: All pilots should be debriefed after every mis-
sion to asceretain any possible intelligence information.
6M)Item: Prevention of grase fires at tactical coind posts.
a. Diecussion: Fires become a potential hazard when battaliontactical command posts and fire bases are established on hills covered withtall elephant grass. In one instance, a fire started at the babe of a hillby an u-nown source swept over the artillery fire base and rendered the artil-lery battery ineffective for several days.
35
CONFIDENTIAL
o v1 F I-D ti~
AVD-HistSU8JECT: Operational Report for a'uarterly Period Lnding 31 October 1967
(RGS CSPUR-65) (U)
b. Observetion: The grass on the hill should be burned offprior to establiehing a 1re base. White phosphorus rockets or napalmplaced on the hill prior to establishing the base will help in eliminatingfire hazards.
7(O)Item: Comunications during monsoons
a. Discussion: Konsoan weather greatly decreases the rangeand efficiency of the F11 radios currently assigned to infantry units.
b. Observation: In addition to protecting the radios from therains, plar. should be. made to. establish radio relay stations so that ill theecent communications problums develop, the relay scation can be rapidly est-ablished and maintain the required comumjicatione.
8(V)Item: Evacuation of downed aircraft
a. Discussion: Helicopterdowned in enemy territory because ofmechanicel failure or ground fire must be evacuated as rapidly as possible.Without prompt evacuation, a maneuver nit is required to secure the downedaircraft which, in turn, jeopardizes the acoomplishment of the mission andallows time for the enemy to r--auver and attack.
b. Observation: Plans must be made and recovery aircraft oncaAl to insure tbgt downed aircraft are evacuated promptly.
IF) Item: Compromise of Unit location by helicopters
a. Discussios: The presence of helicopters resupplying a 'wit,extracting wounded or injured personnel or comnand and control helicopterlanding for a conference between commanders, while necessary, compromises aunits location. This, in turn, allows the enemy to fix the unit's locationand attack with ground forces or with indirect fire weapons.
b. Observation: To midie the vulnerability of a unit andreduce the ene's. cogbility of pinpointing the location, r unit shouldimediately move away form the landing one. anothkr effective method ofguarding against a possible mortar attack is to displace a short distance
mters) after dark.
v) Intelligence:
1. Item: The Use of Province Reconnaissance Units (PFtU)
a. Discussion: The employmert of PE'e with line companiesand reconnaissance elements of the battalion has proven successful especially
in populated areas, bince they are ueally from the area in which theywere ueed, they the area and the people. One unit was employed with a HUICHAI4 who provided general information concerning the location of a cache.The PKa'e were then able 1,o de+ect the exact spot anC point out several known VC.
b. Observation: The continued -en of PRU'a and almilar indigenous
groups is recommended.
2,(OCtem: Joint Use of Aircraft and Poople Sniffer:
a. Discussion: Recent use of the People Sniffer in conjunctionwith the. VR aircraft has shown that each complements info'.mation gained by theother. Often the People Sniffer will find concentrations of aneiV, who thentry to evade. With the VR aircraft in an adjacent area, the direction of =nve-mant and the accurate aise of the enemy force can be. determined.
b. Observation: When aircraft are available or when a prioritymission exists, the People Sniffer and Vi, aircraft should be flown jointlythereby doubling the capability to gather intelligence.
36
Cori ri: oav -tAL
AVBD-HistSUBJEMt Operational Report for-Qwarterly Period Lndipg 31 October 1967
(RCS CSNFL.65) (U)
C. Engineer
1 CJte: Tunmel datrution
a. DigcuasiA-. During operatims in Uden aD in I Corps, en"Wtunnels were discovered which Mre extZremely opatic&ated and extensive indesign. Denial of future use by the qnew of these fortifications has provedto be a considerable problem. Tunnels diecovorednidicated that the systemswere constructed over a long period of time without interference from friendlyforces. Some complexes foeid were estimated to have been emplaced. and improvedupon over period of ten years. In one case, a I00 meter long tunnel complexlined with concrete and tile was discovered. Entrenceb are always well cam-ouflaged and the tuhnels are seldom built with les than 10 feet of overbur-den, providing protection against artilery fire and air strikes.
(i) Considering these factors, complete destruction .is fro-quently rot feasible under the. limitations of time and damolitiop materials a-vailablo to the unit. Tunnel destruction demolitions available inlude C-4,TNT, cratering chaPges, shaped charges :and acetylene destruct kte. - 1he acetylenekits do not warkceffectively when olesburden exceeds 7 feet and have not beenused for tunnel destruction in Uderi* A,.The amount of standard demlitionneddto completely destroy the type oi tunnels ftund i* thq, son. would requirea special s1ipply ship to come to the tunnel site. Singe a upit $s vulnerableto enemy attack wnen stationary, few unit comanders desir, to stay .n oneplace too long. Therefore, the general accepted seas of deni.al of a tmelis to seed the tunnel with ehemicals and cl se the entrance. Although thisis by.no means a permanent measure, suc action will deny mediate reoccupa-tion. If the allied forces operate in the area, the eneu wi11 not have thefreedom of movement to reopen the tunnel.
(2) A request for a new tunnel destruction system .wich usesthe new explosive "ASTROLITE G" which has 5 times the power of C-4 has beensubmitted. Comwnd emphasis dctates whether enough time *1n be taken to pro- 7perly destroy tunnels.
b. Observation2 The following netheo of sealing entrances has.boesnwdeveloped. Upon discovery of. a tumel, the length is explored andWx vnVa"and escape holes. xre plv.ged as using brush and.dirt, making the tmnil,.".air tight -as possible. " average thickness of. overburde.; is determtn@0ta 15 pound shaped charge ie set in the cei)in& nf the tunnel. The charge islocated the same distance in from the tunnel entrance as the thicknee of theoverburden in reet. The shaped charge blow a bole suitable for the placin4of a cratering charge or a TNT charge. If TNT is used, the amount of explo-sive required is calculated by P.RUKC. The main charge is placed in the bolecreated by the shaped charge, tamped and pIopped in place. the tunnel is thenseeded with cans of crystsline CS and the whole packet is blowi-.. This methodhas ro,erto bt effective for tunnel denial.,
zif"hItee, lT-ding Zone Clearing Operation
a. Discussion: . Landing Zone clearance for a combat assaultbecame a matter of greet concern to Pattalinn Co-mnders in the early assaultson Operation Wheeler. kined landing zones 6.Dr- ncountered frequentlT. T.heLZ's were often covered by fire, both sniper and automatic weapons. The re-sulting casualties received when personnel leAped from the helicopters and hitanti-personel mines had considerable effect upon the morale of men going intoa combat assault and upon the time involved in getting off the 1U. Therefore,5 procedure had to be developed to insure that at least the assault troops beprovied wiLa nine free terrain on which to land, and a saft path off the 1Z.
(1) In Uden AOnmst U2 sites were oious to the esneW, and hekadamplotineto prepare the LW'e with anti-helicopter p ji4*takes and anti-personnel mines. In most cases, the AP mines wre of the;hs 6 .'uncB.inc Ttty"type. Since surprise is the primary advantage of -a emb;;t aosawlt, the 12'sare prepared from the air just prior to the assault. Due to the time limit-ations on the LZ and the fact that the l-'s are often subject to eqw4 fire,engineers cannot clear s f. too Z",- either prior to t ), inxaintry an-
37
AVD-IistSUBJECT: Operational RporDt for Quarterly Period Wding 3t October 1967
(Ros CSFOR65) (U)
sault or during the assault. This necessitated development of a fast and ef-ficient means of clearing a 12 or landing space for troops and pathways offthe 12 during the assault. An approach to the solution is described below.
(2) The first problem solvea was that of providing the heRa-copters with a safe place to discharge troops. To this end the 12 is preparedto receivw three ships simultaneously. The "daisy cutter" was developed forthis purpose. The bomb is a standard 50D poujd bomb with a three foot lengthof pipe attached to the detonator. "he bomb explodes oft ts ground and clearsan area approximately 20 feet in radius of punji stakes. ALP mines within 9 feetof the point of detonation are exploded by sympathetic detonation. A three shipLZ is prepared by a minimum hit on the LZ of six 50 pound bombs and six daisycuttera. Th's gives at least 12 locations wh're a shipmdischargs troops
safely. The next problem was to get troops off the 12 without detonating anti-personnel mines. The solution to this problem was the MkE Projected Charge.This charge coiaes complete in a package weighing 92 pounds. It consists of170 feet of detonation cable which is 38 times as powerful as norml det cord.The cable is fired over the 12 by means of a mall rocket wtor. 1han the ca-ble explodes, it clears a path one foot in width and exposes azW mines one footon either site .f the path. Set up and detonation can be accomplished by twoengineers in less than four minutes. To employ this method, each of the firstthree helicopters in the assault carry two engineers with one projected chargeand four infantrymen. The ships discharged the troops over a crater made bya 500 pound bomb. The engineers set up the projected charge on the lip of thecrater nearest the 1Z edge. Infantr7 provided security from the crater. Thecharge is set and blowo and a clearly visible path is produced. If the 1Z isabnormally large, a series of charges are used between craters until there isa path off the 1Z.
b. Observation: A safe landing zone can be constructed with lanes
to move off the 1Z without exposing troops to mine and punji stake obatacles.
Part II: M00&N DATIONS.
A(U)Wnen operating in dense jungle covered mountains where landing senseare difficult to find or prepare, resupply of units and evacuation of non-critically wounded/injured or killed in hostile action becomes a serious pro-blae. Yedevac helicopters are not authorized to winch non-critically woundedand killed personnel in hostile action. Unite mwt post.one their assignedmission to find or prepare a landing zone to accomplish resupply of evacuation.Reommand that all assault helicopter companies have organic to their unit twowinches for evacuation and resupply of units in areas where landing toes arenot available.
BWO)hat "ASTFOIATE G" explosive be procured mder the ISURE program forfield evaluation,
CSOrhe need for this Brigade to operate 6 LDH type helicopters, 2 UH-IDhel copters, and one U.-6A fixed-wing aircraft has been reconiized by higherheadquarters. The 9 aircraft assigned requires a minimu of 11 pilots; in ad-dition this Brigade must have an -Avial.ion St ,f Cfficer to coordinate the sup-port )f other than organic aviation. Prose. marli level is based or. author-ize4' personnel strength and not assigned aircraft. Therefore two officers and.,- "-rant officers are currently authorized. A USARV-uide 90 percent factor
has been appLied to the seven pilots. This further reduced the manning levelto six aviators to fulfill the need to occupy the 11 aircraft seats and I SaffAviation Cfficer position. The operational requirements of this brigade arenot in xnyway reduced accordingly so the needs which nor-ally would be fulfilledby organic aircraft must then be handled by the already over-taxed direct Sup-port Aviation Company which seriously affects the efforts of the combat elements.It is redonmended that aviators be authorized besed upon the need which hae beenrecognized. Considering the ArmV wide shortage of aviator perponnel, the 90 per-cent factor applied to the 12 aviators reouired would be acceptable.
L(U) Diming the post qucrter we hare operated in the Chu Ii area where theonly army level medico.l facility has been the 2d burgiczI Hospital. During the
38
Co1A~ e DriA
l AVBD-Hiert
SUBJaCT: Operation eport for Quarterly Period Endlft 31 October 19677RC. CSF-R45 (U)
cuarter, in addition % austaintng over 800 battle casualties, we have evac-uated over 1000 medical paftents. hpprox;Jipatey 70% of thesq patients returnto duty within 30 day6. Since the 2d :uriical Hospital has an average stayof only 2.9 days, it follows t#at the majority. of patients must go to evacuationhospitals (the closest being- 125 miles south). The lack of a nearby facilitywith longer holding capacity causes undue delay in returning troops to duty.An udditional. disdvetage experieuced io .use to the problem involved in bb-taliing outpatient onaults apd: laborabory work. Lhie to the troop and casual-ty density of the Chu Lai ares, recommend that-.Additional medical facilities beplaced in this arpa,
E(V)The policy of. forwarding all requests for rbegistration of War Trophiesto the Headquarters Areap ( nd krovost hiprhal'. in Saigon Is an extreme in-convenience to personnelaesigied to tacticallor4ganitations far removed fromthe Saigon area. .JSkRV heg 643-20 directs that the completed DO Form 603t a-long with the authenticated DD Form 603-1 be. i:rwarded to the PH RegistrationSection, HAC, APO 96243. .Jt often takes ix, country mi.l in excess of seven'aye to. reach baigaon from this location. Troopers anticipating DUnS Oftennly have four or five days to travel to the rear base camp area and cloarrior to departing for 00NIJS. Experience has proven that the majority of sol-
diers in this brigade do not get around to thinking about registering war tro-phi -s until it'a DEWS time. This does not allow time for registering war tro-phiev by mail, and-nereasiates a personal trip to 4aigon or, behalf of the oin-er. This means a full dis in travel gettirg to Saigon and the same returning.Additionally, once in baign it is extrewl4 difficult for troops to findtransportation, etc. The regulation seems to 66 written for those people inthe Zaigou area. Recommend that Field and area irovost harshals be authoriz-ed to register war trophies.
F (0)ommanders in this brigade continue to experience the need for anadditional Installation Stockade being established in the certral or NorthCentral area of South Vietnam. The distance and time factors presently in-volved ere so great that they influence legal proceedings within this brig-ade. Recoond that, if planning efforts have not been i ntiated for t sec-end USARV Installation Stockrde,lconseideration be given to same.
G.U)The shorage of cable installAton kits for the la4ToBC eqiiipmoiplaces a serious limitation on the use of secure Ft. voice. The brigade hason hand thirteen KY-8's but only five L-cmde cables. Th . limits the use ofthe ecuipment to three battalions and brigade headquarters. The.fifth cableis used for a running sparb. The lack of -- mode cables precludes the use ofsecure Fh within the artillery battalion. Priority 2 requisitions nave beenplaced for the KY-8/TC installation kits. The requisitions are now, nearing90 days longevity despite the continual follow-up by supply personrel. In viewof the emphLsis being placed on secure communications by higher headquarters,recommend action be taken to ensure that adequate KI-8/TSEC installation kits(581c-G70-1558) are available within the supply system.
HCU)The two circuits provided between main and hear by Defense Comiunica-tions Agency were of marginal quality and the outtage time vina expessive. Boththe %9'et;me and voice circuta between Nain and ear experienced 15% and * .out.,ige respectively during the period. Th- voice circuit was out for as longcs 72 hours at cne tine o:% numerous occasior.., and the teletype cir~uit experienced up ta 120 hours of continuous outtaga, The circuit quality for bothcircuits has been consisetntly marginal at best. This brigade is noted forits frequent and varied movements throughout Vietnam, resulting in frequentreliance upon DCA for communications between Main and Hear CP's. hec,.enendnigher headcuarters study thie DCA system to determine w a it j.- not respon-sive to tactical requirements.
39
CONFIDENTIKL
AVBD.HistSUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterlr-PSlod FTng 31 October 9967
(nCS CSMR-65) (U)
SECTION 3
A. Su-vey Information (Reference USARV keseage &VHGC.ZDT 8003)
1 IC ugmentation of Lang Range Meoronnaisance Parol Units.
a. Organization & Training: The Brigade Long Range ReconnaissanceDetachment is composed of oixty-one personnel, comprising eight aix-man pat-rol teams, two radio base-stations, and a Detachmnt Headquarters section.
embers are recruited from exsting brigade assets and the replacement str-eam with emphasis on Ranger qualified. Special Forces, or Recondo trainedpersonnel. Allocations are filled for the MACV Recondo School and severalteams attended the let Marine Recon School in CRU LA. The reconnaissanceelements has only recently been organized as a Detachment, and. appropriateTOtE and SOPs are in the development stop. hore demanding missiona are inthe planning stage and the detachment's capabilities capitalized =re fully.It is felt that two officers are required: one i.nvolved with the planning,training, and tactical employment of patrols and another officer to supervisetraining, coordinate with adjacent units, ahd fulfill administrative require-ments of the detachment. A detachment debriefing report or after action re-port will be initiated to better evaluate the employment and training of theunit.
It was determined that further training, after completion of RecondeSchool or let Karins Recondo school, was needed in the areas of TaC Air e-ployment and adjustment of artillery. This training was accomplished with-in the brigade and has proved invaluable in recent operations.
b. Techniques of Faoloyment: In the past the detachment has fre-quently beer employed as an additional msneuver element under the operationalcontrol of one of the rifle battalions and has seen few legitimate "Long Range"missions, however, this has proved effedtive also and is an inc ication of theversatility of the unit.
NO mobile Long Range Reconnaissance, in the technical sense, has been.employed by the brigade. The most often used method of employment has beenas an immobile surveillance - observation post. A brief discussion of onesuch operation followg: The units wee employed as a stationary observationpost, establishing a rddto base-station at an adjacent t .ttalion command postand maintaining one radio base-station at the brigade forward area in CHU LAX.ApproxLmately twenty men occupied the tops of prominent terrain features pro-
viously used for the same type of mission by Recon teams of the let harins R-con Battalion. They made helicopter assaults on the chosen LZs after exten-sive artillery and TAC Air Preps, necessitated by previou incidents of miningand ambushing of lucrative LZL within the area by the enemy. The mission wasto maintain surveillance on natural routes of infiltration and communication.Since insertion was not clandestine, defensive facilities not normally used bya reconnaissance element were employed. For example: bunkers with overheadcover were constructed, sandbags were brovut in by helicopter, and concertinawire laid around the perimeter. Effective employment of TAC Air and artiller-
greatly reduced the enemy's daylight -mvement and a well pLanned artiller tprogram undoubtedly hidered enemy operatiore at night.
In enes,- base areas containing large concntrations of enemw forces,,clandestine entry of Long Range Patrols by helicopter is impractical and in-secure. The method of clandestine entry intc the pr-posed area of operationon foot, from en adjacert %tit perimeter, usually a battalion TAG CP or ar-tilery fire base, ha proved more secure; however, it is possible on. wrenthe LRRP area of operation is within a praticel distance of an adjacent unit.Due to the lack-of an uncomiitted unit of platoon or company size to act asan immedirte reaction force for the reconnaissance detachment, the brigadehas hesitated to commit patrols in areas far beyond direct support artilleryfans and has usually employed them within a portion or on the periphery ofthe brigade arLo of operption.
c. Iroblem ,rea: Training has been affected by the lack of LongRange missions; employment only as a heco.-naiesance element should be empha-sized to all sections and commanders controlling the detachment's employment.
40
COMFID IAL
CONFIDENTIAL
)AVBD-HIset
SUBJET: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967(hL;S CSFO;-65) Mu
Employment as a rifle platoon or on other than legitiwte recon missionsoc-ntributes little to the mission training of the LRRP's; in addition, thisis not their primary mission, and their TOtE is not designed for engagement(e.g., no LUG carried).
A problem presently confronting operations is the lack of one officer.If one officer conducts the operation in the field, no one is available tohandle administrative action and control operations from the rear. Closecoordination with the Brigade S-2 is essential even during the operation,therefore an XD or training officer is required. The need for a conmanderoas opposed to a platoon leader is obvious. As more long range patrollingIR implemcuted further advance planning will be necessitated.
Inclosures 'JUHNW.COLINS III1. Organiztional Chart /Colonel, Infantry2. m-,:9-_ ___-"__d - Acting Cozmanding Officer9 - 15t7 (5j .1 Withdrawn, Hqs, DA
3. Support Battalion QuarterlyOperations Report
f.. .t .A tl ub:-t Y4-^ *lh , Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; CAAR 67X0475z Afte -L." .- -- ppr, - "re4j*. ':-Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAF 67X0446 t... 4 ..".n- -r p- F1t--'---I Withdrawn Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X067," A,f- - - , '-ete- ant 3- Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR 67X061-- : ..L,, fl.. ., Oj .pah.t.. St e ;: t ' lihdtown, Hqs, DA; pub as CAAR
6 7X 87DISTRIBUTION:2 - CG, Americal Division2 - Rsst CofS for Force Developmsnt, DI, Washington D.C. 20310 (thru channels)2 - CinCU-oRPaC, aTTIN: GFUP.H -PO %5586 - DCG, USArV, ATTN: -VHCC..fDH APO 963751 -.CG, 1Oist Abn Div, Fort, Campbell, Ky.
1N
CONFIDENTIAL
COflEM 11ALAVDF-5C Ist Ind 28 DEC1967SUBJaCT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (aC-CSF(it-65)(U)
DA, d, Americal Division, APO 3an Fr:ancisco 90374
TO: Cornanding General, United 6tates Army Vietnam, APO 6an Francisco96375
1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 1st Brigade,101st air.;orne Division.
2. (C) The following coments are made concerning the referencedparagraph of the basic comiunication.
a. "Ieference: Section I, para A6 g(10)(a), pg 5. The mortar andground attack on Battery A, 2d Sattalion, 320th Lrtillery illustrated twoadditional points which merit mention.
(1) Tne defensive perimeter of an artillery battery must beestablished so that the enemy can not penetrate the outside perimeterwithout being detected. When allied forces ire used to man the perimeter,personnel from the battery must be integrated into the defense to insurethat standard U.6. policies are adhered to. Frequent checks of theperimeter by the battery comander or his representative should insurethat all personnel are alert.
(2) The ANi/MP(C4A Countermortar Radar was successfully usedto guide evacuation helicopters into the position when darkness andweather conditions prevented visual flight control. This technique,while not new, should be disseminated so that other units having theNAJ\-4A are aware of this c-.pability.
b. heference: bection I, para 10, pg 9, and H4, pg 17.Although the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery formed a fourth howitzer batteryfrom oattalion resources while remaining optrational, it is not recommendedthat other artillery battalions be required to do so. The four firingbatteries were considerably reduced in strengtn and, awitoug; the battalioncontinued to operate effectively, a dangerous situation could have developed.Reduction of the strength of an artillery battery in combat hampertheresponsiveness and/or Accuracy of supporting fires.
c. Aefcrence: Section I, para IN3A(1), p9 31; inoloyment ofK!ational rolice Field Forces. Concur. The America1 Division ProvostMarshAl has provided guidelines to the com.iand for-utiliaition of theseforces.
d. Reference: 3ection 11, Part I, para A4, P 35; Air to GroundRadio 'ets. Concur. Insufficient number of r1 frequencies 4vailable isdue to the use of the /Puu-10 by F....F and the AW%,rC-J4 utilized in 0-iaircraft. Although only a limited number of air-ground frequencies(30.0 - 51.9 ..ZA) are issued kmerical Division l III 4AF, each infantry
WNJIIfi flhA Downfgraded at 3yerItVODeclasified after It VeaO
DOD DIR 520040
i .tDF-GCLUB~zC?: Operational Report -Lessons leArned (II;S-CbFUa~-65)(U)
and artillery b.-ttalion is furnisiied at lea~st one aixr-ground frecuencyenabling t~hut wnit to corl.iniate .Ath 0-1 aircr,.ft. lUpun ccmversion to0-2 aircraft, tne problem iil lie al-levi-tLd clue to thu wi,;er frequencyrange of 0-2 radios.
FAc rt WilmNera1
44,
CONFIDENTIAL
AVHGC-DST 2d Irxi (C)SUBJECTs Opcrational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Cctober 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETnAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 6 JAN 1968
TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTii: G?0P-DT,APO 96558
1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LessonsLearned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Heedquarters,ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (A4A) as indorsed.
2. (C) Fertinent comments follvws
a, Reference item concerning winches for evacuation, page 38, para-graph A: Concur. Internal rescue hoists have been developed for use withthe UH-i helicopter. These hoists are presently in short supply and havebeen issued only to Air Evacuation M:edical Units. When adequate stocks be-come available, they will be issued to Assault Helicopter Companies on ab 4is of two per company.
b. Reference item concerning Astrolite G be procured under theENSURZ program for field evaluation, rage 38, paragraph A: Nonconcur. Arequest for a more acceptable tunnel destruction system has been subrittedbased on an evaluation of the XK-69 system. In addition, R&D has been re-quested to develop a liquid explosive which car, be employed to destroytunnel complexes.
c. Reference item concerning nedical fecilities, page 38, paragraphD: Concur. Additional medical facilities have been programmed for the ChuLai area and should be operational in the near future.
d. Reference item concerning reEistration of war trophies, page 39,paragraph E: lbknconcur. A Vietnamese export license must be obtained priorto exporting war trophy f~rearms from Vietnam. Since the export license isissued only through the US nbassy in Saigon, the Provost Earshal, Headquar-ters Area Command is designated to act in behalf of the Commanding General,United States Arny Vietnam for the registration of war trophy firearms.USARV Regulation 643-20 indicates that application for export license shouldbe initiated 60 days prior to DEROS and mnxes " ision for issue of tempo-rary export licenses.
e. Reference item concerning need for an additional stockade, page39, paragraph Fi Concur. Action has been initiated by this headquarters toesablish an additional USARV Stockade in the north central area of SouthVietnam.
Downgrocd at 3 yeear lnte"va&JDeclasified aft er 12 Year#LDOD DIR 6200.10
CONFIDENTIAL
_ _-:i
CONFIDENTIAL
AVFKC-DST 2d Ind (C)SUBJECT, Operational Report for Quarterly Feriod Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)
f. Reference item concerning shortage of cable installation kits,p ge 39, paragraph G: Concur. The X-mode cables have been placed on req-uisition. A small quantity of cables has been allocated to the units.The ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, is scheduled to receive four.This should relieve the problem until such time as the total quantity ofcables is received.
g. Reference item concerning DCA system, page 39, paragraph H.More information has been recuested to enable this headquarters to iden-tify nroblem circuits. 1st Signal Brigade and 21st Signal Group havebeen contacted, but no Information is available from these sources toidenti fy subject circuits. Circuit designations or points of termina-tion of circuits are required in order to evaluate the nroblem.
3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furrdshed to the reportingunit through channels.
FOR THE OCYANrDERi
C S. NAKATSUASACaptae. A(,CAssistant AdjuIA, 1t General
Copy Furnished:
HQ, let Bn, 101st Abn DivHQ, Americal Div
45
CONFIDENTIAL
GPOP-DT(undtd) (U) 3d IndSUBJECT: Operational Report for the urterly Period Ending 31 October
1967 from HQ, Ist Bde, 101st Abn Div (UIC: WAB4AA) (RCS CSFOR-65)
HQ. US AiNY. PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 2 IAAR 1968
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310
This headquartors has evaluated subject report and forwardingindorsemonts and concurs in the report as indorsed.
FOR THE COCMANDER IN CHIEF:
K. F. OSBO
AM, AGCAsst AO
46
.I
'JOJ
Jov
4-4
CP
I\7
PM1D1M P BGS -LAM T 1r1D=
( CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMMT OF THE ARMYHEADQUARTERS, SJPPORT BATT.JALI1I, IST BR GADE, 101ST AIRBORUE DIVISIU
APO US Forces 96347
AVBD.EC 30 October 1967
SUBJECT: Quartorly Operation Report
TO: Commanding General1st Brigade, 101st Urborne DivisionATTN: HistorianAPO US Forces 96347
SzCTICH I (C)
Significant activities: During the poriod 1 August 1967 to 31 October1967, Support Battalion provided close and continuous combat service sup-port to the Brigade in its counterinsurgency operations against the VietCong and tho North Vietnamese ,Arm. Support Battalion actcd as sponsor to
the 3/506 who arrived in country on 25 October 1967. Replacement trainingcontinued. Basic airborne training was condvctod for non airborne qualifiedpersonnel assignod/attached to the Brigade and a limited number of otherspecial category personnel. Support Battalion continued to operate theInstallation Coordination Center f6r all United States and Free World MilitaryArmed Forces in the Phan Rang Area.
A6 Operations supported:
1. Oeratiod: 8 ealhaur IT
a. Period: 8 Auge 1967 to 2 August 1967.
b. Location: Qung Ngai Province.
c. Commonders:
(1) Support Battalion& LTC Quinton P. Sunday
(2) Forward Support Element: MaJ John A Chabers.
2. Operation Hood River:
a, Period: 2 August 1967 to 13 August 1967.
b. Location: Quang Ngai Province. Dovngraded att 3 y/ear 1nt# a
c. Commaners DeC148 6ift"d ZDOD DIg 5200-10
(1) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday.
41 CONFIDENTIAL
3. Operation Zenton:
a. Period: 13 August 1967 to 29 kagwI 1967.
b. Locatio: Quang Tin Province.
co Coimder j
(i) &Wprt &ttal4 s LTC Qu ntq P..Sunudy.
(2) Fotard. Suppcwt Elets Maj John A.Chambera.
4 Operation Cooks
a. Period: 1 September 1967 to 9 September 1967.
b. Location: Quang Nga± Province.
c. Comanders:
(13 Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Studay.
(2) Forward Support Element: Maj Jobn A 0jambers.
5. Operation Wheeler:
a. Periods 11 Septembtr 1967 to Present.
b. Location: Quang Tin Province
c. Commandcrs:
(i) Support Battalion: LTC Quinton P. Sunday.
(2) Forward Support Elenents Maj John A Chmnbers.
B. Traning:
1. Replacement Trairlng Company (Provisional) continued its trZifp-ing activities to include proficiency training.
a. There vere twenty-seven (27) pro±tciency training classescomducted during the rcporting period. Seventy-five (75) officers, twohuidred end thirty nine (239) NCO's and 1,100 124 reciovod this training.
b. The combat leaders course was not conducted during thisquarter in compliance with Brigade directive to discontinue the courseuantfl further notice.
c. Training facilities wore improved. An electric mines &ndbooby trap course was constructed to enable students to become fully awarec the inhrent dangers and the proper handling of mines and booby traps.
2
A booby trapped vilac was also constructed to facilitate tl~s training.A repelling tower w*ao constructed to giv tho st&elets thu opportniity topractice proper repelling techniques. Cenral improvments woro made anall training courses and firing ranges to accomidate a greater number oftrainees.
d. Additional subjects were introduced into tbe proficimcytraining program, Classes on Code of Conduct, Combat Intelligence, CivilAffairs, and Psychological perations ware In.-tiated,
2. Normal unit level training was conducted to increase the unitscapability to provide combat service support, strngthen security of thebase camp and the FSE, and increase weapons proficiency.
3. Support B.ttalion conducted jump training for selected nonairborne qualified persornel during the period 14 to 21 August 1967.Forty three (43) students completed the training and made the five qual-ifing jumps. Including prev4eusly airborne qualified Bdo personnel therewere a total of 573 jumps without injury or significant difficulties. Alldrops were made on Bu Gia drop zone (BN 727890).
C. Out Processing: During the period I August 1967 to 31 October 1967the out processing section of the replacemnt training compmy processedthe following number of pursonnel:
1. DEROS 673
2. R&R 624
3. Ordinary Leave 230
4. Emergency Leave 44
5. Hospitaql Returnees 919
6. Other Abscenses
7. Total Processed 3,O67
D. Logistical 0pcrations:
1. Concept: All combat service support was provided Odrectlyto unit field trains iccated in Carenton Base Camp, Duo Pho, and LosBanos Base Camp6 Chu Lai. Americal Divisi)at First Logistical Command,15th Support Bdo and the 8th General Suppo.:s Group provided the necessarysupport for the conduct of all operations during this report period. The2nd Surgical Hospital (Chu Lai) provided medical Support. The tacticalsituation dictated the establishment cf FSP's at Quang Ngai and Minh Longduring Operation Hood Riv3r (2 Aug 67 to 13 Aug 67 and at Ti% Phuoc duringr'keration Wheeler (ii Septembcr to Present). These FSPIs were operated bypersonnel from the FSE and provided all classes of supply to include water.
2. Medicals See Annex 1.
603
C-'L
3. Maiiitenance:
a. General: The Brigade r intcionce CoL",x:ny con.tLuaed its
missioa of providing direct support mintenanco and Cl-hs VI ropair partsto thQ Brigade. Due to the tactical doploymont of the Brigade, a forward
support eleeent was established to provide ernediato response to the needs
of the Brigade Units.
b. Organization: B Conrpmy rer ained under the presentmodificd TOE and was. dividoa into two olnents; a forwarl support olemontand the base ca:np olcment. The forward support olemcnt consist3 of 44 nonand was adapted to the maintunonco rcquiremnnts of the brigade tactical units.
c. Logistical Operation:
(1) I tintonance: During tho puriod 1 August 1967 to 31October 1967, the company performed the followLig job order requests:
Rea Eleiornt Received Renoared
Automative 237 230
ArLneat 117 17
Instrument 60 64
Signal 376 354
Engineer 68 63
Forward Ele mcnt Received Ronairod
Autoative 143 149
Armament 633 631
Signal 211 254
Engineer i, 417 1,360
At the end of the reporting p,-riod, B Company had the follaiing open
maintenance work requests:
Auto dive 14
Araneio. 10
Instrument 31
Signal 120
Engineer 17
Scl
(2) Tech sup ly continued its nission of Class VI repairparts requisitioning stockage -Td issue to the Brigado and installation taits.Zero balance on the authorized stockage 3ist rise to 48%. The followingarc the Tech SWulAy activitioc for this rcl:arting puiod.
Total requoest received 14129
Tot-a ASL 9,931
Total ASL Issued 5,919
Total Fringe Issued 0
Total Receipts 3p264
Total Due-out Releases 3t190
Total Passing Orders 3,997
Total Roplonishment 2p695
Warehcuse Refusals 329
Total Transacticos 20,150
Average Dannd Satisfaction 59%
Avorage Demand fill 7..
do The maIntemance standdown was conducted from 29 August to 2SeTi~ber 1967; it revealed 30% of armament, 33% o Signal, .nnd 50% ofartil) ory repair parts wre within the operation/orecniz. tional maintenancecapability.
e& The most significoit maintem-nce problem emccuntorod during thepcriod was the shortage of M-113 Pantel Sights for the X4102 Howitzer.Repair pjrrts for the M .13 were also in a shortage.
4. Supplyi
e., Ccept of Logtstical Operations:
(1) Operation Hood River cometiced n 2 August 1967 and con-cluded on 13 August 1967. L:giqtical support for the Brigade was providedby Support Battalion (Fwd) FSE through facilities at Duc Pho and by the ItSupport Brigade# Americal Division FSE thresigh our FSP at Quang Ngai. Allclasses of supply except clrss II & IV were obtained by the FSE from the1st Logistical Ccmemd FqA, Task Force McDonald. Enirency class Io II & IV#III aad V incluing watew wero supplied thcugh the FSP at Minh Long. TheMinh Long FSP was resupplied from Duc Pho Support Battalion (Pyd) M3E byfixed .ing aircraft as requiiod to maintain a 3 day level of selecteditcms.
(2) Operation Benton commenced on 13 August 19,7 and concludedon 28 A-ngut 1967. Logistical cupport for the Brigado was provided by the
Ii
Support Battalion (Fo a basis only. The FSPwhich was established at Chu Lai provided the principal support. The ChuLai FSP was supported by the 15th Spt Bde and the 80th General SupportGrou.p for all classes oC supply and maintenance. 2nd Surgical Hospitalprovided medical support.
(3) Operation Cook comenced 2 September 1967 andconcluded on 7 September 1967. The same logistical concept as w--- cu4loyed,during Operation Hood River was in effect, however the 15th Spt Bde FSPat Quang NCai was excluded from the support plan.
(4) Oper tion Whaeler fzmfenced 11 September 1967and is still in progress at the conclusion of the reporting period.Logistical support is being pruvrlded to the Brigade by the Spt Bn (Fwd)FSE at Chu Lai. The PF is resupplied by fixed wing aircraft from the SptBu (Fwd) FSE, aso required to maintain a 4-5 day safety level (6-8 daysafety level as the monsoon season approaches). The Spt Bn FSE is sup-ported by the Americal Division, 15th Spt Bde, and 80th General SupportGroup's to include all classes of supply (Limited Class II & IV), maint-enance and medical (2d Surgical Hospital).
b. Statistics. (Shcrt Tons)
OFERTI K CLASS I CLASS 11 & IV CLASN III I
Malheur Ii (1&2 Aug) 33.3 1.8 30.6 1.9
Hood River 132.0 28,6 3.50,3 5.8
Benton 196.4 75*1 214.6 12.2
Cook 166.9 48V7 185.0 20,1
Wheeler 716.8 956A A 1
TOTAL 1,245.4 640.0 1,275.5 1,528.4
5. Transportation.
a. During this qurter air, sea, end land transportationWee tftilizud o
b. Tactical Moves. The forward support eament and somecommand elements moved by air and vehicle to Chu Lai in support of Opera-tion Benton. Upon completion of Benton these elemnts returned to Due Phoo. . rnvoy. The Brigade moved to the Los Banco Basn Camp in ChuLai by vehicle convoy, air and LST for Oper 'tion Wheeler.
c. UI]S support consisted primarily of C-123 and C-130aircraft. These aircraft were used to shuttle personnel, fast moving classII & IV items, APO and PX items, and miscellaneous equipment betw.en PhanRang and the Area of Operation. During this period 670 sorties moved11,781 passengers and 1,026.3 short tons of cargo.
6
63 mm•
E. Installation Coordiunation.
1, General: The Brigades rcoponsibilitios for installationcoorpiLnavion wore discharged by support battalion through the Installationcourdination Center. Daily and weekly meetings with representatives of allthe Free World Forces in the Pii-n Rang !arca wore conducted. 17FV letterc ted IL oupuember 1967 desipnatad CG, 1/101st as thc Phaa Rang installa-' icn Defense Commander. The OFTIl for the defno of the Phan Rang installa-tion was r writton and s umittod to IFYV for 7pproval. Monthly Friend-ship Council Meetings, wore 1e J. to Thsuie a continuation of the excellentrelaoions enjorod bctwoon allied forces and the Vietnamese pe'plo
2. Security: During the period 1 August to 31 October 1967,two installation wide practice alerts were hold to insure a constant stateof readincss. On three occasions base reaction forces were deployed toprovide reenforcement for threatened areas. ICC end~ifted 5 Spooky missions.1 flareship mission, 1 gunship missinnr. r~a : n,-.davaes. I cAvtrike wasrequoteU ~~~,di, C. The ICC has continued to act as the oinnt~ug agency for artillery nd nortar fires. The bulk of local artillerysupport is supplied by the ROKA 52nd FA. Two of the Zea 112 3 "t so,.rchlightsfrom Battery B, 29th Artillery we±'e taken from the Phan Rang area. Hawevcr.,duo to the ideal terrain foat~ncc tLe remaining two lights are capableof iLLutinating the majority of' te perimeter. On 7 September 1967 ICCcoordinated the recovery of a 101st 3/4 Ton vehicle that had been ambushedvic BN688556. The two accupants hr.d excuted a wrong turn -and ha d bothbeen wcunded in the ambxsh that cnsuL,. They were evacu:.ted by the MACVC&C. A tabk force composed of 101st and ARVIT personnel recovered the veh-icie with no problems encountercd.
3. Friendship Council Activities: During the reporting period,3 friendship council meeting were held, The October council meeting washosted by the lt Bde, 101st Abn Div. Thap Ch.-a, Fhan Rang, Strip andsurrounding areas were placed off limits, from 020600 Sep to 040600 Sep(during the national electicn) for security reasons. These areas were alsoplaced off limits during the lower house elections for a period 210600 Otto 240700 Oct. in-addition 6 bars and two iceplants were declared offlimits to US forces for an indeffinemt period of timo.
F. Civil Pffairs
1.- During the period 1 Aug to 31 Oct the civil effairs act-ivities of the Support Battalion in Phan Rang were concentrated in the fol-lowing areas:
a. Constrtction: The accomplishments of the civil affairspersonnel in the field of construction were considerable during this report-ting period. A 40' x 10' market place was constructed for the people ofTu-ng Cong halet, Buu Son district. $62,000 VN from the ast Bde, 101stAbn Div civic action fund was donated to the Thtp Ch:.m high school for theconpletion of construction of a new 4 classroom sohool. A combined 101stand Victnnnse effort was mnade to rebuild the 523 fot bridge connectingBuu Son itnd An Phioc districts. The $5 section of Sapport Battalion pro-vided the transportation, tools# bullding tertcials, cud L gjac t 1an 'for this project. Routo 804 in An Phuoc district was reopened as a resultof repairs made byr the Spt Bn civic action team. A permanent electrical
- Al-7
facility was constructed at the Phan Ring rucuational area. A joint SupportBattalion and USAF project team rnovated an old garage in Phan Rang toprovide suitable living quarters for the hospital staff of Ninh Thuan Pro-vince hoaptial. In October a 50xlO feet market place was constructed forthe people of Ninh Chu hamlet.
b. Health and Sanitation: Fo7rt ; two (42) I.-DCAP's wereconducted treating 2,045 Viotnamese. Twenty nine (29) classes on sanitationand personal hygiene were held in an effort to bring up thestanards of thepeople.
c. Education: Daily English classes are taught by a rep-resentative of Spt Bn S5 in the Phan Rang High School and the Ninh ThuanProvince Hospital. A total of 56 hours of instruction is givcn to over1,900 Vietnamese each week. A high school scholarship program was initiatedfor 125 VN students. The program involves monthly contributions to deser-ving students in order to enable them to continue their oducation. Themoney distributed is from the voluntary contributions of the officers andmen of Spt Bn.
d. Commodity Distribution: Necessities, primarily soaps,food -md clothing were distributed in conjunction with nDCAP and hyginneclasses. During this quartcr 1i9 pounds of soap, 8,165 pounds of food and1,325 pounds of clothing were distributed.
e. Recreation: American movies 4ere shown on nine Sat-urday evenings at the Pnan &'ng recreational area to local VN children.On two occasions an Army omba performed for the entertainment of the Viet-namese people. Seven soccer and two volleyball games were played with VNteams.
2. There is no doubt that the effect of the Sp' Bn CivilAffairs progrnm has been substantial. The-fine US Vietnamese relationshipIn the Phan R'.ng area is due in no smill part to the community relationsprogram. Thu training, developoacnt and welfare progr-ims have had a greatimpact on the living standards of thu local people. A sense of pride andincreased self sufficiency can be noted in the h _mets e. ffccted by the SptDn Civil Affairs Proeram.
G. Base Camp Developcmcnt:
1. General: A directive from USARV dated 12 September 1967has just about brought the 1st Brigade BL-se Development to a complctc halt.It directed all construction in the Phan RFnng Army area to coase. Over-all reasons and alternate actions have not yet been defined. Cnly nec-essary and mininnm construction requirements are being met at this time.
2. Training: On the job training in carpentry and concretelaying is givon to non-er.gineer military supervisors and to non-skilledVictnamese labors.
3. Construction: Construction projects have been limited incompliance with the 12 September USARV directive. The projects oompltedincluded 17 concrete forms constructed, 15 concrete pads poured, 38
I II II II II
buildings constructed. In addition 370,000 squaro fet of land was cl.:trcdand leveled for thL follcvi n are s; Recreational Field, 3/506th Inf MotorPool, 406 RRD Ilotor Pool, -nd the! Lrig d( 'elip-do Misellneous workincluded the cutting of access road across Bu Gia Drop Zone, inprovmcntof contoncnt area roads and tho gcncr.l refine.-,t af existing facilitios.
H. Activities of Baso Cerv Service C,pc-'y (Comprn- E (Prey)Support Battalion).
1. General. Co E (Prov) continucs to exist under BrigadeGO 475 with no change in missicn. The following officer conaonded the unitduring this period; Major Jimes L !K-ssey Jr, 30 June - Present.
2. Security Operations:
a. Security Platoon continued to provide 8ecurity forthe base camp and a reaction force for the Phan Rang Installation.
b. An elcment from security platoon continues to providesecurity for a fresh Water well site located 3,000 meters VW of the basecamp.
3. Maintenance and Holding Teas:
a. The maintenance and Holding toems continued the maint-enece and storage of equipment and pcrsonal property not required in thearea of oper'tiona.
b. Naintcnance and Holding Tcaras coordin-tcd the movementof necessary TOE equiptuent and supplies to the area of operations.
SECTION 2 (C)
A. Geeral:
Support Battalion provided combat service support throughoutthe ptriod with outstanding support by Qui Nhon Support Coanand's ForwardSupport area. Support provided by the 94th Supply and Service Company andthe 188th mainteannco Company at Chu Lr was outstanding. The air LOC,between the Brigade poraunat Base nd the AO eva th.-,Wh ovx 200 znil0in length, was still within the Support Battalion Capability.
B. Training:
During this period all pursonnol received familiarizationfiring cf individual and crew served weapons. Driver training was conductedthroughout the ,uartcr. Normnnal OJT continued throughout the period to fillshortage MOS's.
C. Prc'blems:
TI're were no major problem encountered during this qiuartcr
OF9
that affected the combat service suppo:t aisaio. of the Rattalicx.
FOR THE CM.LAIDER
SCOTT A GRAVESCPT, InfAdjutant
GROUP0OMMAD AT 3 YEAR INTERVALSDECLASSIPIED AlTE 12 YEARS
10
11NCAqkjTPDSecurity Citifiotiotfn
f~curtyitua~lrlln f ite, DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA.- R& D(Sfurly eapafivllo oftite. odyof Abstract and lndealnA annotaion amifI be qjnterml whon five overall reporf Is elommifled)
1. ORIOINAVING A4.TIVITY (Corporal* author) 20a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 2010 Confidential ___
2b. GROUP
4s. RPORT TITL9
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (U)
4. OESCRIPTIVEl NOTES9 (7oIS! rfeport and inclusive dates)
Exoeienes f unt eigd in counte insurgency operations.1 Au~ 1 c 9.
Acting'Comuander, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
S. REPO0RT DATE 4.TTLNOPAE r .OFRS
undated 5$41. CONTRACT on ISRANT NO. to. ORIGINATORS REPORT NUMmRIRS)
6. PROJECT NO. T6 74249
N/A ~ob. OTHER REPORT NOISI (Any other numbers that may be assigned
I0. DISTRIOUTION STATEMENT
II. SUPOL.EUNTARY NOTES 12I. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
*N/A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310-
58
DD . UNCLASSIFISD