operations of encircled forces

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Historical Study

Operations of Encircled ForcesGerman Experiences in Russia

Department of the Army

Pamphlet 202!"

#ashin$ton% D& '()2


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Operations of Encircled Forces

PREFA&E

This pamphlet was prepared by a committee of former German officers under the supervisionof the Historical Division, EUCOM !mon" the contributors were former corps commanders and"eneral staff officers at corps, army, and army "roup level, who had e#tensive e#perience on the

$ussian front durin" the period %&'%(') The main author, for instance, saw action before*enin"rad, near +oroneh, and later at -talin"rad Toward the end of the war he servedsuccessively as chief of staff of !rmy Groups .orth and Centre, durin" their withdrawal from$ussia

/n addition to discussin" the tactical and lo"istical problems peculiar to operations of encircledforces, the authors ta0e issue with Hitler1s conviction that si"nificant advanta"es can be "ained byleavin" isolated forces behind the advancin" enemy lines /t was this notion, e#pressed innumerous specific orders that made the desperate stand of encircled German troops a fre2uentoccurrence durin" the $ussian campai"n

The problems of air support for encircled "round troops are described in a separate appendi#,which deals with tactical air support, air reconnaissance, supply by air, and the employment of

antiaircraft units 3ased on the e#periences of the German !ir 4orce in $ussia and presented by aformer *uftwaffe officer, the views e#pressed are necessarily coloured by the or"aniationalpeculiarities of the *uftwaffe and its relations to the German !rmy

The reader is reminded that publications in the GE$M!. $E5O$T -E$/E- were written byGermans from the German point of view and are presented without interpretation by !mericanpersonnel Minor chan"es in form and in chapter headin"s have been made to secure "reaterclarity However, passa"es, which reflect the authors1 pre6udices and defects, whatever they maybe, have not been chan"ed and find the same e#pression in the followin" translation as they do inthe ori"inal German

This pamphlet supersedes M- T(%7, 8Operations of Encircled 4orces,8 which was "iven alimited distribution by the Office of the Chief of Military History, -pecial -taff, U- !rmy

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&HAP*ER +

+,*ROD-&*+O,

5oc0ets are formed as the result of operations in which the attac0er entirely surrounds a lar"e

number of the opposin" forces -uch encirclement is usually followed by a battle of annihilation,the classic "oal of all types of "round combat The principles involved in carryin" out penetrationsand envelopments, and in closin" the rin" around an enemy force are well established in tacticaldoctrine /n the followin" study, however, the problem is approached e#clusively from thedefender1s point of view German poc0ets in $ussia9often the result of peremptory orders to holdout in the face of certain encirclement9are used as e#amples to illustrate the tactical principlesapplied by the encircled units and the measures ta0en in each instance to permit a brea0out in thedirection of the German lines

The e#periences of :orld :ar // demonstrate that under conditions of modern, mobile warfaresuch poc0ets are more easily created than in military operations of the past Their tacticalsi"nificance has chan"ed considerably The encirclement of military forces by the enemy no lon"er

si"nals the end of their usefulness 5oc0ets have become fre2uent occurrences in modern combatand must be countered by appropriate tactical measures desi"ned to tie down lar"e numbers ofthe enemy and, eventually, to rescue the encircled troops

Generally, encirclements are effected by an opponent with considerable superiority in men andmateriel :ithout these prere2uisites, only superior plannin" can lead to the entrapment ofsubstantial military forces -uch cases are e#tremely rare

The manoeuvre of deliberately allowin" one1s forces to be encircled by the enemy so as to tieup his troops in sufficient numbers to even the odds, rarely achieves the desired result -hould thetotal opposin" forces be appro#imately e2ual, such a manoeuvre can be of value, but only if thenumber of enemy troops en"a"ed in maintainin" the encirclement is lar"e enou"h to affect theoutcome of other operations Even in this case, however, the deliberate creation of a poc0et is a

costly enterprise, which will hardly 6ustify the probable loss of the entire encircled force-uccess or failure of the encircled troops in fi"htin" their way bac0 to the German lines

depended almost entirely on the tactical situation in and around the poc0et :hereas a discussionof strate"ic decisions is normally outside the scope of tactical studies, the situations described inthe followin" chapters are the direct result of decisions by hi"her head2uarters and can only beunderstood a"ainst the bac0"round of these decisions

/n addition to minor German poc0ets in $ussia, the battles of encirclement near Cher0assy and;amenets(5odols0iy


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&HAP*ER 2

*HE PO&.E* OF ./+,1REA.O-* OF A PA,ER D+3+S+O,

:hen the German offensive a"ainst Moscow came to a halt on > December %&'%, the %st

5aner Division was located at a point fifteen miles north of the $ussian capital /t was immediatelyordered bac0 to ;lin


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The intended deception of the enemy was accomplished with full success ! well(or"aniedGerman tas0 force fell upon the $ussians at Golyadi and cau"ht them by surprise !t theappearance of German tan0s the $ussians immediately shifted their reserves to meet thediversionary attac0, which they assumed to be the main German brea0out The attac0in" Germantroops, incidentally, had not been informed that their effort at Golyadi was no more than a feint /twas felt that they would not fi"ht with 2uite the same eal if they 0new that they were merely tryin"to deceive the enemy Only the division artillery commander was entrusted with the full details ofthe plan, includin" the code word for shiftin" fire to his new tar"ets on either side of the ;lin(.e0rasino road The German tas0 force too0 Golyadi and pivoted south !s e#pected, the enemybe"an to pull out from the area of the main road and to move north across the railroad line,determined to counter the threat of envelopment

This was the appropriate time9about noon of the same day9to launch the main brea0outalon" the road to .e0rasino Upon prearran"ed si"nal, artillery and antiaircraft weapons shiftedtheir fire Only one artillery battalion continued to fire on the old tar"et so as to cover the withdrawalof the diversionary force from Golyadi -imultaneously, on the road leadin" out of ;lin toward thewest, the main attac0 "ot under way The division1s armoured infantry battalion drove the first "apinto the lines of an enemy ta0en completely by surprise Dismounted armoured infantry and

motorcycle troops followed and widened the penetration -ome of the tan0s initially en"a"ed in thediversionary manoeuvre had made their way bac0 to ;lin and were now committed on both sidesof the road Under their protection, the wounded on truc0s and sleds and accompanied byarmoured personnel carriers were moved out of the town 3y now the artillery was coverin" theflan0s of the brea0(throu"h column /n the eastern part of the city combat en"ineers held off theenemy while the evacuation too0 its course :ith the rate of pro"ress determined by the movementof numerous vehicles, and by the need for "radual displacement of the artillery which was in turncovered by tan0s and armoured cars operatin" north and south of the road, the entire force fou"htits way throu"h to .e0rasino, where it was received by other German units

Undoubtedly the division owed much of its success to the proper employment of its combatelements, but it was primarily the maintenance of strict traffic control that permitted the evacuation

of an unusually lar"e number of vehicles and thus determined the outcome of the entire operation!ll vehicles that bro0e down were immediately pushed off the road to 0eep the column movin"without interruption ! lar"e number of officers and non(commissioned officers with minor combatin6uries had been added to the military police to assist in the strict enforcement of traffic disciplineThe division staff, at first located at the western ed"e of ;lin and later with the main body of thedivision, directed the initial brea0(throu"h and the subse2uent movements of individual elementswith the use of radio and messen"ers, but without telephone communications

-ubstantially intact, the division emer"ed from the poc0et of ;lin, ta0in" alon" its casualtiesand nearly all of its e2uipment Twenty(four hours later, on a different sector of the front, it wasa"ain in action a"ainst the enemy

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&HAP*ER !

E,&+R&/E4E,* A* 3E/+.+5E /-.+FA+/-RE OF A RES&-EOPERA*+O,

3y mid(.ovember %&'7 the northernmost corps sector of !rmy Group Centre e#tendedseventy miles, from the town of +elih north to the army "roup boundary /nade2uately covered by*/A Corps, the line contained two lar"e "aps, each about ten miles wide and partly swampy but notentirely impassable There, only reconnaissance and combat patrols provided a minimum ofsecurity Despite persistent re2uests by the army "roup commander, no reinforcements arrived tostren"then the precarious German defences on that sector

*ate in .ovember the $ussians attac0ed north and south of +eli0iye *u0i


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northeast with the so(called citadel9a part of +eli0iye *u0i west of the *ovat $iver9desi"nated asthe primary ob6ective


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/nside the poc0et, the citadel on the left ban0 of the *ovat $iver had meanwhile become therefu"e for some )@@ wounded from all parts of the city On ) Fanuary the $ussians attac0ed fromthe north and succeeded in cuttin" throu"h the town and severin" the citadel from the main part of+eli0iye *u0i Thus two separate poc0ets came into e#istence, each one precariously defendedafter the loss of all positions beyond the ed"e of the town, and particularly threatened by enemyattempts at infiltratin" from bloc0 to bloc0

*iberatin" the main German force encircled in the eastern part of +eli0iye *u0i had becomeeven more difficult /n any event, the immediate ob6ective was to cut throu"h the rin" ofencirclement that surrounded the smaller poc0et west of the river ! "eneral advance of the corpsfront, however, as demanded by Hitler, was by now definitely out of the 2uestion

!fter len"thy ne"otiations the !ir 4orce finally released one battalion of its parachute divisionfor commitment at +eli0iye *u0i /t was too little and too late, but a last attempt had to be made toopen a rescue corridor to the citadel /n order to bolster the fi"htin" stren"th of the encircled"arrison, a reinforced company of li"ht infantry ridin" on truc0s and tan0 destroyers was to ram itsway throu"h the enemy into the surrounded citadel On %@ Fanuary, in a darin" dayli"ht attac0, thisforce too0 the $ussians by surprise and succeeded in 6oinin" the German defenders inside the

poc0etDurin" the ni"ht of %'(%) Fanuary, the parachute battalion was to advance in a surprise attac0

to the southwest side of the citadel There, by @%@@, the fresh troops recently arrived in the poc0etwere to attempt a brea0out, ta0in" with them all wounded who were still able to march !lthou"hinitially led by a re"imental commander familiar with the area, the parachute battalion lost its way inthe featureless terrain and failed to reach its ob6ective The citadel force bro0e out nevertheless,and in the early mornin" hours, reduced by casualties to about %)@ men, appeared at the corps1advance command post on the .ovoso0olni0i(+eli0iye *u0i railroad line

3y now, irreplaceable losses in the ran0s of the German relief force made it impossible torepeat the rescue attempt !lso, no more radio si"nals were comin" from the eastern part of+eli0iye *u0i9a clear indication that in si# wee0s of relentless fi"htin", despite the most

determined resistance, the German force in the eastern poc0et had been wiped out to the lastman The poc0et commander1s final radio messa"e, received on %' Fanuary, was, 8:ith laststren"th and ammunition still holdin" two bun0ers in centre of city Enemy outside my commandpost8

The stru""le for +eli0iye *u0i was over :hile it had the erect of tyin" down a "reatly superiorand constantly "rowin" enemy force for si# wee0s, it also resulted in the annihilation of the German"arrison, e#orbitant casualties amon" the relief forces, and a loss of terrain alon" the entire corpssector


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' /f an encircled force must be liberated by a relief thrust from the outside, only the best troopsshould be used in that operation The more rapidly such a mission is completed, the fewer will bethe casualties, and the "reater the success The maintenance for any len"th of time of a lon",narrow salient obviously pointin" at the poc0et will involve murderous casualties /n the end suchtactics are almost certain to fail because of the pressure e#erted by the enemy on both flan0s ofthe salient

) -peed is an absolute re2uirement, but should not be "ained at the cost of hasty andinade2uate preparations The selection and assembly of the relief forces involves carefuldeliberation and considerable effort /n the situation described, the supreme commander, onwhose specific order the date for the attac0 had been moved up, was far away from the fi"htin"front, and the effect of this intervention proved disastrous There was nothin" to 6ustify such lac0 ofconfidence in the 6ud"ment of the local commander or in the recommendations of army "roup

> Constant communication with the encircled forces was maintained via radio, whichfunctioned smoothly and met all re2uirements On several occasions the artillery fire of the reliefforce was actually directed by observers inside the poc0et -huttle fli"hts by liaison aircraft werepossible only in the be"innin", and then only at ni"ht

Havin" the li"ht infantry unit brea0 out of the citadel at ni"ht proved to be a wise decisionDirection toward the forward elements of the rescue force was maintained with the aid of prismaticcompasses !dvancin" in several sin"le files, the men succeeded in inchin" their way forwardthrou"h the hollows and silently overpowerin" the $ussian sentries

? -upply of the German poc0et was at first affected from reserve stoc0s available at +eli0iye*u0i -oon, however, airdrops became necessary, mar0in" the first occurrence of a situation thatwas later so characteristic of all German poc0ets in $ussia9the pli"ht of encircled forces,inade2uately supplied with ammunition, rations, and e2uipment, who were e#pected to do theirutmost in a hopeless situation /f Hitler himself had ever been an eyewitness to suchdevelopments, Gorin"1s arro"ant promises of ade2uate air supply for German poc0ets mi"ht havebeen discounted once and for all The *uftwaffe units concerned were not in any way to blame

The missions assi"ned to them proved impossible of fulfilment, but they did their duty a"ain anda"ain in a superior manner, at +eli0iye *u0i, as well as at -talin"rad, and in all subse2uent caseswhere German "round troops found themselves in hopeless encirclement

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&HAP*ER "

*HE PO&.E* #ES* OF &HER.ASS5*HE +,S+DE 3+E#

Section +6 E3E,*S /EAD+,G *O *HE FOR4A*+O, OF *HE PO&.E*

3y the end of December %&'B9with ;iev


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4rom mid(December %&'B until its brea0out from the poc0et on %> 4ebruary %&'', A*// Corpswas actually never in a position to offer effective resistance to a far superior enemy who attac0edwith numerous tan0s if it could not dod"e enemy attac0s by timely withdrawal, it was constantlythreatened by $ussian penetrations of its lines !uthority for any withdrawal, however, could onlybe "ranted by !dolf Hitler in person, and no such decision could be obtained in less than twenty(four hours One can easily visualie the difficulties, mountin" from day to day, which the corps hadto face under these circumstances

The $ussian attac0s on 7) Fanuary and the followin" days had produced a deep penetrationseparatin" A*// and +// Corps :ith its left flan0 and rear threatened by the enemy, A*// Corps wasforced to establish a new front alon" the "eneral line 3o"uslav(-teblev 4or a short time itappeared that +// Corps would be able to close the "ap and restore the situation, but after a fewdays, as the $ussians succeeded in widenin" their penetration, it became evident that +// Corpswas rapidly withdrawin" toward the southwest !t this sta"e the German forces east of the $ussiansalient were ordered for the first time to ma0e preparations for fi"htin" their way out of theencirclement that was now ta0in" shape ! brea0out toward the west was clearly out of the2uestion, thus southeast or due south were the only possible directions Durin" the first few days of4ebruary, however, another $ussian penetration turned the ri"ht flan0 of A/ Corps and made its

position untenable :ith its centre withdrawin" west and its ri"ht win" northwest the entire corpswas rapidly movin" away from its nei"hbourin" units ad6acent to the southeast /n that area, too, acontinuous German front had ceased to e#ist, and a brea0out in that direction was no lon"erpossible

Moreover, since 7? Fanuary the sole supply roads leadin" to A*// and A/ Corps 4ebruary, in a radio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy, D Day for the brea0out and rescueoperation was set for %@ 4ebruary 3ecause of the sudden start of the muddy season, however, thedate had to be postponed for nearly a wee0 /n order to establish unity of command inside thepoc0et, the two encircled corps were placed under the control of General -temmermann, thecommander of A/ Corps, and desi"nated 4orce -temmermann

Meanwhile, repeated $ussian attac0s9from the southeast a"ainst ;orsun and -henderov0a,and from the west a"ainst -teblev9had threatened to split up the German poc0et !lthou"h all ofthese enemy thrusts were repelled, they further reduced the forces available for the brea0out andhad a detrimental effect on the morale of the encircled troops

On %' 4ebruary elements of A*// Corps succeeded in ta0in" ;hil0i and ;omarov0a


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ammunition the $ussians were willin" to e#pend /t was feared that at any moment Germancasualties mi"ht amount to an unbearable level The $ussians themselves, however, werehampered by snowstorms and poor road conditions and could not use their artillery to fulladvanta"e Thus the German troops inside the poc0et were able to rally for their last effort

The brea0out be"an, as ordered, on %> 4ebruary at 7B@@ Fumpin" off from the line ;hil0i(

;omarov0a, three divisional columns struc0 in a southwesterly direction their mission was to reachthe forward rescue position established by the leadin" elements of /// 5aner Corps at *isyan0aand O0tyabr, and to 6oin forces with 4irst 5aner !rmy

Section ++6 *HE -,+*S +,S+DE *HE GER4A, PO&.E*

The composition of the two German corps encircled in the poc0et west of Cher0assy was asfollows

A/ Corps consisted of three infantry divisions, the )th, 7d, and B?&th Divisions, each withouttan0s, assault "uns, or ade2uate antitan0 weapons Of these only the 7d Division was capable ofa""ressive combat The two other divisions, with the e#ception of one "ood re"iment of the )th,were unfit for use in the attac0 The )th -- 5aner Division Wikingwas part of A/ Corps until the

end of Fanuary Corps troops comprised one assault "un bri"ade of two battalions totallin" si#batteries, and one battalion of li"ht GHK artillery

A*// Corps included Tas0 4orce 3, the ??th /nfantry Division, and, from the end of Fanuary, the-- 5aner Division Wiking Tas0 4orce 3 was a cover name "iven to the %%7th /nfantry Division tohide its identity !lthou"h the unit carried a corps standard, it was an ordinary infantry divisionconsistin" of three re"iments, the normal complement of artillery, a stron" antitan0 battalion, but notan0s or assault "uns .ow at about four(fifths of its authoried stren"th, Tas0 4orce 3 had thecombat value of one "ood infantry division The ??th Division had been badly mauled durin" theprecedin" en"a"ements /t consisted of two re"iments totallin" five battalions and its artillery wasseriously depleted

/n terms of personnel, weapons, and e2uipment the )th -- 5aner Division Wikingwas by far

the stron"est division of A*// Corps /t was fully e2uipped as an armoured division and consisted oftwo armoured infantry re"iments, one tan0 re"iment with a total of &@ tan0s, the 3el"ian volunteerbri"ade Wallonienor"anied in three battalions, and one replacement re"iment of about 7,@@@men !ccurate stren"th reports from that division could not be obtained its effective stren"thbefore the brea0out was estimated at about %7,@@@ men

Section +++6 D+AR5 OF *HE &O44A,DER OF 7/++ &ORPS

The tactical situation between 7? Fanuary and %> 4ebruary, as described above, was modifiedby a number of developments inside the poc0et ! record of these events is found in e#cerpts fromthe diary 0ept by the commander of A*// Corps up to the time of the brea0out

7? Fanuary

Communications to the rear alon" the road -hpola(Iveni"orod0a have been cut :e areencircled 4irst 5aner !rmy to restore communication routes Our defensive mission remainsunchan"ed Telephone re2uest to Ei"hth !rmy 8Mission re2uires maintainin" northeast fronta"ainst stron" enemy pressure $ussian advance a"ainst -teblev necessitates main effort onsouthern sector $e2uest authority for immediate withdrawal of northern and eastern fronts Thiswill permit offensive action toward southwest and prevent further encirclement and separation fromA/ Corps8

7& Fanuary

$adio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy 85repare withdrawal in direction $ossava up to Mironov0a(3o"uslav 3e ready to move by %7@@ on 7& Fanuary upon prearran"ed si"nal 8!uthority for furtherwithdrawal li0ely within twenty(four hours $eport new situation8

$e2uested additional ammunition for artillery and small arms 4ood supplies in the poc0et areade2uate A/ Corps under attac0 by stron" $ussian tan0 forces -everal of its re"iments reduced

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to %@@ men !ir supply be"innin" to arrive Evacuation of casualties too slow More than 7,@@@wounded have to be removed

B% Fanuary

Messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy A*+/// 5aner Corps will attac0 on % 4ebruary toward *oovat0athree miles northwest of -hpola to relieve enemy pressure a"ainst A/ Corps

% 4ebruary

Daily losses B@@ men 4i"hter protection inade2uate !mmunition and fuel runnin" low

7 4ebruary

!ir supply improvin" $adio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy 8:ithdrawal of north front approved5repare for main effort on eastern flan0 of south front +ormann "eneral commandin" A*+///5aner Corps is continuin" the relief attac0 from the south 3reith "eneral commandin" /// 5anerCorps will attac0 B 4ebruary from southwest8

B 4ebruary

!ir supply continues to improve Unfortunately several transport aircraft with wounded aboardwere shot down on the return fli"ht Have re2uested that air evacuations be made at ni"ht onlyunless ade2uate fi"hter protection can be provided Messa"e from !rmy 8To stren"then southernsector, occupy proposed line without further delayin" action at intermediate positions8

' 4ebruary

Made a determined effort to ta0e 3o"uslav Commander of Tas0 4orce 3 seriously wounded.ow all the division commanders are artillerymen, includin" the present -- bi" shot The northfront is totterin" $ussian tan0s today captured a medium battery of Tas0 4orce 3 that was firin"from every barrel without bein" able to score a sin"le hit Evidently we have too few e#perienced"unners 3y ni"htfall our line is restored Daily ammunition e#penditure of the corps 7@@ tonsCasualties still B@@ per day This cannot "o on much lon"er Have re2uested 7,@@@ replacements,

also %7@ tons additional ammunition per day) 4ebruary

$adio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy 85repare brea0out for %@ 4ebruary 4urther instructionsfollow8

4ebruary

$adio messa"e to Ei"hth !rmy 8$oads deeply mired :ill re2uire more time for brea0outpreparations8 Messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy 8!t time of brea0out the followin" units will attac0 fromthe outside A*+/// 5aner Corps toward Olshana, /// 5aner Corps toward Morentsy 5oc0et forcewill effect initial brea0(throu"h and, coverin" its flan0s and rear, concentrate its entire stren"th inattac0 across the line -henderov0a(;vit0i toward Morentsy, to lin0 up with armoured wed"e of

relief forces $e"roupin" must be completed in time to permit brea0out on %@ 4ebruary 4inaldecision will depend on pro"ress of armoured spearheads -ituation does not permit further delay8

-temmermann "eneral commandin" A/ Corps assumes command of both corps in the poc0et$eport to !rmy that because of road conditions attac0 impossible before %7 4ebruary

Had a loo0 at the %%@th Grenadier $e"iment and Tas0 4orce 3 Morale of troops very "ood$ations plentiful Enou"h su"ar, sausa"e, ci"arettes, and bread to last for another ten days !rmyGroup Commander radios that everythin" is bein" done to help us

? 4ebruary

$adio messa"e to Ei"hth !rmy 8!rtillery, heavy weapons, and horse(drawn vehicles of 7d,B?&th, and Wiking Divisions, as well as hundreds of motor vehicles of Wiking carryin" many

wounded, are stuc0 in the mud at Gorodishche :ithdrawal from line held today, to effectre"roupin", would involve intolerable losses of men, weapons, and e2uipment *ine must be heldat least twenty(four hours lon"er8

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Today / saw many casualties, includin" four officers ordered more careful evacuation ofwounded, and destruction of all classified documents we can possibly "et rid of

& 4ebruary

Generals Ihu0ov, ;onev, and +atutin have sent an emissary, a $ussian lieutenant colonel,who arrived with driver, interpreter, and bu"ler at the position of Tas0 4orce 3 to present surrenderterms for -temmermann and myself He is treated to champa"ne and ci"arettes, receives no replyUltimatum remains unanswered

4orces for brea0out dwindle from day to day /n2uiry from !rmy Hi"h Command about *eonDe"relle, commander of 3ri"ade Wallonien He is a youn" man, 3el"ian / saw him a few days a"oamon" his men They are li0eable fellows, but apparently too soft for this business

!pproach of relief forces delayed by necessary re"roupin" .evertheless !rmy now insists webrea0 out on %7 4ebruary Much as we would li0e to, we cannot do it by then /n this mud theinfantry cannot possibly cover more than a thousand yards per hour

%@ 4ebruary

My old division commander of %&'@, General von -eydlit Ed Captured at -talin"rad by the$ussians Thereafter leader of the .ational Committee 84ree Germany8 composed of Germanofficers in $ussian hands today sent me a lon" letter delivered by aircraft He thin0s / should actli0e Jorc0 durin" the campai"n of %?%7 and "o over to the $ussians with my entire command / didnot answer

!rmy in2uires whether brea0out in direction Morentsy still feasible, or whether the operationshould rather be directed via Dhurhentsy(5ochapintsy toward *isyan0a $eply to !rmy8*isyan0a preferable if 3reith /// 5aner Corps can reach it -ituation on east front critical -everalenemy penetrations 4or the past forty(ei"ht hours A/ Corps unable to establish new defence lineTroops badly depleted and battle(weary A*// Corps front intact :e are attac0in" south of -teblev-erious dan"er if east front cannot be brou"ht to a halt A*// Corps will brea0 throu"h in direction*isyan0a The troops are well in hand Early advance of 3reith toward *isyan0a decisive8

$eply from !rmy 8Than0s for comprehensive information /n full accord concernin" newdirection of brea0out 3reith will attac0 %% 4ebruary in direction of *isyan0a :ill do all we canGood luc08

-eydlit today sent me fifty German prisoners with letters to their commanders in addition theyare supposed to persuade their comrades to "o over to the enemy / cannot understand -eydlit!lthou"h the events at -talin"rad must have chan"ed him completely, / am unable to see how hecan now wor0 as a sort of G(7 for Ihu0ov

%7 4ebruary

3reith has reached *isyan0a +ormann is advancin" in direction of Iveni"orod0a Our infantryhas ta0en the northern part of ;hil0i Map ) The re"imental commander leadin" the attac0 was0illed in action -o "oes one after another A/ Corps has ta0en ;omarov0a The $ussians,accordin" to intercepted si"nals, are about to attac0 our left flan0 $adio messa"e to !rmy8!bsolutely necessary that 3reith advance to 5etrovs0oye as 2uic0ly as possible, in order to effectlin0(up -peed is essential 4orward elements of A*// Corps now at ;hil0i8 $eply from !rmy8+ormann southeast of Iveni"orod0a 3reith will attac0 %B 4ebruary with stron" armoured wed"ein direction Dhurhentsy8

:as at ;hil0i this afternoon Thin"s loo0 bad Our men are e#hausted .othin" "ets doneunless officers are constantly behind them !m now 0eepin" my horses inside the hut they are inbetter shape than / My orderly is burnin" my papers and "ivin" away my e#tra uniforms

%B 4ebruary

!nother messa"e from General von -eydlit, this time addressed to the commander of the%&?th Division .ot bad they thin0 we are stron"er than we really are The letter was attached as

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usual to a blac0, red, and white pennant German colours and dropped from a plane Thesepeople never fail to find my head2uarters

3rea0out further delayed because of heavy enemy attac0s a"ainst A/ Corps1 east front $adiomessa"e to !rmy 8Concentration for brea0out prevented by heavy $ussian flan0 attac0s and finalmoppin" up at -henderov0a :ill shorten east front, involvin" evacuation of ;orsun, durin" ni"ht of

%B(%' 4ebruary 4orces thereby released will not be available for brea0out before %) 4ebruary/ntend to continue attac0 throu"hout %' 4ebruary 3rea0throu"h of 3reith1s armoured force toward5etrovs0oye indispensable to success8

$eply from !rmy 83reith under orders to thrust toward 5etrovs0oye His forward elements nowon line *isyan0a(;hichintsy8 Have re2uested stron" fi"hter protection for %' 4ebruary $ussianstrafin" attac0s are "ettin" increasin"ly serious in view of the "rowin" con"estion in the poc0et /am most afraid that !rmy cannot comply with this oft(repeated re2uest

%' 4ebruary

3reith will have to arrive soon *ast ni"ht the *uftwaffe dropped ammunition over the $ussianlines instead of ours .ow they are tryin" to put the blame on us, claimin" the drop point was

inade2uately li"hted-temmermann has 6ust issued orders for the brea0out The date %> 4ebruary $adio messa"e

to !rmy 8.orth front will be withdrawn durin" the ni"ht of %'(%) 4ebruary to the south ban0 of$oss $iver Main attac0 ordered for %> 4ebruary 4urther advance of tan0 force for direct supportabsolutely necessary8

:e are destroyin" all e#cess motor vehicles and e2uipment / have prohibited burnin"

%) 4ebruary

Our poc0et is now so small that / can practically loo0 over the entire front from my commandpost, when it is not snowin" Enemy aircraft are hard at wor0 luc0y for us it is snowin" most of thetime / was once more at ;hil0i to reconnoitre the terrain selected for the brea0out Then issued

final order -ince this mornin" there is trouble at the -- Division The :alloons and the Germania$e"iment are "ettin" fid"ety They must hold only until tomorrow ni"ht

4inal instructions from -temmermann :e are to 6ump off on %> 4ebruary at 7B@@, with Tas04orce 3 7d Division, and -- 5aner Division Wiking from ;hil0i(;omarov0a across the lineDhurhentsy(Hill 7B& to *isyan0a )th and ??th Divisions will cover the flan0s and the rear

:ith me, at my command post, are the three division commanders with whom / am supposedto perform the miracle tomorrow One of them is doin" this for the first time, the two others are oldhands

/ left no doubt in their minds that, in my opinion, this is "oin" to be one "iant snafu, and thatthey should not "et rattled, no matter what happens Jou need a "uardian an"el to brin" youthrou"h this 0ind of thin"

Have "iven my second mount to my G(B His Panjehorse will be used by the G(7

%> 4ebruary

!mple supply of ammunition dropped in aerial delivery containers as late as last ni"ht /n thisrespect we are now well off9 if we can ta0e it alon"

!fter consultin" -temmermann / decided to hand over to the $ussians some 7,@@@ woundedto"ether with medical personnel and one doctor from each division This is a bitter decision, but tota0e them alon" would mean their certain death

-aw -temmermann once more to say "ood(bye My orderly ta0es my diary he is a craftyfellow and will "et it throu"h somehow

Section +36 1REA.O-* ORDER OF 7/++ &ORPS

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On the evenin" of %) 4ebruary, at his command post at -henderov0a, the commander of A*//Corps had issued verbal and written instructions to his division commanders The brea0out orderfor A*// Corps read, in part, as follows

4or days the enemy has been attac0in" continuously alon" our entire defence perimeter, withtan0s and infantry, in an attempt to split up the poc0et and destroy our forces

!t 7B@@, on %> 4ebruary, Tas0 4orce 3 7d Division, and )th -- 5aner Division Wiking willattac0 in a south(westerly direction from the line ;hil0i(;omarov0a, brea0 the enemy1s resistanceby a bayonet assault, and throw him bac0 in continuous attac0 toward the southwest, in order toreach *isyan0a and there to 6oin forces with elements of /// 5aner Corps Compass number 77Ed The ma"netic compass carried by the German soldier had B7 consecutively numbered"radations .umber 77 e2uals an aimuth of about 7B>L indicates the "eneral direction of theattac0 This direction is to be made 0nown to each individual soldier The password is 84reedom84reiheit

4or the attac0 and brea0out each division will be or"anied in five successive waves, asfollows 4irst wave one infantry re"iment reinforced by one battery of li"ht artillery 4ebruary, at -henderov0a after 7@@@, at ;hil0i4rom the start of the attac0 the corps commander will be with the leadin" re"iment of the 7dDivision

The order was e#plained orally to the division commanders, and all details of the operationwere carefully "one over, especially the difficult relief of the -- Division near ;omarov0a by the

)th Division, whose GO was present durin" the briefin" conference

Section 36 *HE 1REA.O-*

Despite persistent enemy attac0s a"ainst the poc0et perimeter, constant $ussian shellin" of;omarov0a, ;hil0i, and -henderov0a, churned up roads, and numerous traffic bottlenec0s, theGerman forces inside the poc0et were able, by 7@@@ on %> 4ebruary, to report their readiness forthe brea0out Determination was the prevailin" mood !pparently the lar"e ma6ority of the troopswas not influenced by $ussian propa"anda, nor by the hundreds of leaflets dropped from $ussianplanes on behalf of the 4ree Germany Committee


17/52


3y 7B@@ the re"iment9two battalions abreast9started movin" ahead, silently and withbayonets fi#ed One(half hour later the force bro0e throu"h the first and soon thereafter the second$ussian defence line The enemy was completely cau"ht by surprise 5risoners were ta0en alon".ot until the followin" day did it become evident that the $ussians, under the protection of heavysnowfall, had pulled out most of their troops from the south front of the poc0et in order to use themin an attac0, on % 4ebruary, from the area west of -teblev

The advance toward the southwest continued .o reports from either Tas0 4orce 3 on the ri"htor the )th -- 5aner Division on the left That they were ma0in" some pro"ress could only beinferred from the noise of vehicles due north and south of us, and from the sounds of firin" thatindicated the location of their leadin" elements Over road less, bro0en terrain traversed bynumerous "ullies, our march proceeded slowly There were fre2uent halts Here and there, menand horses suddenly disappeared, havin" stumbled into holes filled with deep snow +ehicles hadto be du" out laboriously The slopes were steeper than could be presumed from loo0in" at themap Gradually the firin" decreased until it bro0e off entirely by @7@@ !bout two hours later theleadin" elements of 7d Division were appro#imately abreast of Dhurhentsy -till no reports fromWiking and Tas0 4orce 3 / could not "ive them my position by radio because by now myhead2uarters si"nal unit was missin" and could not be located

-hortly after @'@@ enemy tan0s ahead opened fire They were 6oined by $ussian artillery andmortars operatin" from the direction of Dhurhentsy, at first without noticeable effect The firin"increased slowly but steadily, and was soon comin" from the south as well :e be"an to suffercasualties The advance, however, continued 3y about @>@@ the leadin" units reached a lar"ehollow southeast of Dhurhentsy Enemy fire, "ettin" constantly heavier, was now comin" fromthree directions Elements of Wikingcould be heard on the left, farther bac0 .o messa"e, and nota trace of Tas0 4orce 3 Day was dawnin" The difficult ascent out of the hollow be"an The climbwas steep and led up an icy slope Tan0s, "uns, heavy horse(drawn vehicles, and truc0s of all0inds slipped, turned over, and had to be blown up Only a few tan0s and artillery pieces were ableto ma0e the "rade The units lapsed rapidly into disorder 5arts of the WikingDivision appeared onthe left

3etween @@@ and %@@@ the 7d Division made several attempts to mount a co(ordinatedattac0 toward southwest /t did not succeed The few "uns and most of the tan0s that were stillfirin" were soon destroyed by the enemy !rmoured cars and motor vehicles suffered the samefate E#cept for a few tan0s that had mana"ed to 0eep up, there were now only soldiers on footand on horsebac0, and here and there a few horse(drawn vehicles, mostly carryin" wounded

/n the protection of a ravine / was able to collect a small force of about battalion sie, mainlystra""lers from Tas0 4orce 3 and the WikingDivision :ith them / moved on toward the line Hill7B&(5ochapintsy, which was visible from time to time despite the heavy snowfall, and from wherethe enemy was firin" with "reat intensity $ussian "round support planes appeared, opened fire,and disappeared a"ain They were ineffective, and did not repeat their attac0, probably because ofthe difficult weather conditions

There was no lon"er any effective control there were no re"iments, no battalions .ow andthen small units appeared alon"side us / learned that the commandin" "eneral of the 7d Divisionwas amon" the missin" My corps staff still 0ept up with me, but the aides who had been sent onvarious missions did not find their way bac0 On the steep slope northwest of 5ochapintsy,defiladed from enemy fire, / found the G(B of the 7d Division He reported that infantry units of hisdivision had penetrated the enemy line alon" the rid"e south of Hill 7B& .evertheless, enemy firewas still comin" from there, maintained principally by about ten $ussian tan0s

3ehind and alon"side me thousands of men were stru""lin" southwest The entire area waslittered with dead horses, and with vehicles and "uns that had either been 0noc0ed out by theenemy or simply abandoned by their crews / could not distin"uish the wounded their banda"esdid not show, as we were all wearin" white camoufla"e clothin" Despite the "eneral confusion and

complete lac0 of control one could still reco"nie the determination in the minds of the troops tobrea0 throu"h toward the southwest, in the direction of /// 5aner Corps

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Durin" a lull in the firin" / readied my battalion for the attac0 across the line Hill 7B&95ochapintsy that unfortunately could not be bypassed My staff and / were still on horsebac0 !fterleavin" the draw that sheltered us a"ainst the enemy, we "alloped ahead of the infantry andthrou"h the "aps between our few remainin" tan0s, The enemy tan0 commanders, observin" fromtheir turrets, 2uic0ly reco"nied our intention, turned their weapons in our direction, and openedfire !bout one(half of our small mounted "roup was able to "et throu"h The chief of staff and theG(B were thrown, but later found their way bac0 to us The "reater part of the infantry battalion wasstill followin" behind me :hile ridin" throu"h the enemy sector, / noticed a few German soldierssurrenderin", but the main body was pushin" southwest without letup -oviet tan0s were now firin"at us from the rear and 2uite a few men were still bein" hit 4rom the eastern ed"e of the forestsouth of Hill 7B& came intensive enemy fire / led my battalion in an attac0 in that direction andthrew the $ussians bac0 into the woods $ather than pursue them into the depth of the forest, wecontinued advancin" southwest, still harassed by fire from $ussian tan0s

Gradually, between %B@@ and %)@@, lar"e, disor"anied masses of troops piled up alon" theGniloy Ti0ich $iver, east of *isyan0a Units from all three divisions participatin" in the brea0outwere hopelessly intermin"led ! few medium tan0s had been able to "et throu"h to the river ban0,hut there were no heavy weapons and artillery pieces left The river, below and above *isyan0a,

was B@ to )@ feet wide, had a rapid current, and reached a depth of about %@ feet in most placesThe ban0s were steep and roc0y, with occasional shrubs and trees -everal tan0s attempted todrive across, but the river was too deep and they failed to reach the opposite ban0

Heavy fire from $ussian tan0s located southeast of O0tyabr set the con"ested masses intoforward motion Many thousands flun" themselves into the river, swam across, reached theopposite shore, and stru""led on in the direction of *isyan0a Hundreds of men and horsesdrowned in the icy torrent !n attempt by a small "roup of officers to create an emer"ency crossin"for casualties succeeded only after several hours

Toward %>@@ the enemy fire ceased / crossed the Gniloy Ti0ich swimmin" alon"side myhorse, traversed the snowy slope southeast of *isyan0a, which was covered with movin" men, andfinally reached the town There / found the commander of the %st 5aner Division, the forward

element of /// 5aner Corps / learned that no more than one company of armoured infantry andthree companies of tan0s of %st 5aner Division were now at *isyan0a, while one armouredinfantry battalion consistin" of two wea0 companies was established at O0tyabr, the villa"eimmediately north of *isyan0a

! reinforced re"iment of Tas0 4orce 3 had made its way into *isyan0a, and / received thereport that the commander of Tas0 4orce 3 had been 0illed in action .e#t, the chief of staff of A/Corps appeared he had lost contact with General -temmermann in the mornin" of % 4ebruary,while marchin" on foot from ;hil0i to Dhurhentsy He reported that the rear "uard of the poc0etforce was in the process of withdrawal and that some of its units would soon appear

/ assumed command of what was left of 4orce -temmermann 3y now the situation was thefollowin" The 7d and WikingDivisions were completely intermin"led .o lon"er did they haveany tan0s, artillery, vehicles, or rations Many soldiers were entirely without weapons, 2uite a feweven without foot"ear .either division could be considered in any way able to fi"ht One re"imentof Tas0 4orce 3 was intact and still had some artillery support However, this re"iment also had novehicles and no rations left !ll wounded, estimated at about 7,@@@, were bein" "radually shelteredin the houses of *isyan0a, and later were evacuated by air

4or lac0 of vehicles and fuel, /// 5aner Corps was unable to reinforce its units in the area of*isyan0a and O0tyabr The corps commander, with whom / conferred by telephone, informed methat he had been forced to assume the defensive a"ainst heavy $ussian attac0s from thenorthwest in the area immediately west of *isyan0a He had no e#tra supplies of any 0ind, and hisforward elements were unable to provide rations for the troops emer"in" from the poc0et Thus /had to order the poc0et force in its miserable condition to move on westward, while / re2uested

supply, evacuation of casualties by air, and the brin"in" up of vehicles and weapons from the rear

The march toward the main rescue area continued throu"hout the ni"ht, despite fre2uentbottlenec0s, and was not completed until noon of %? 4ebruary $enewed $ussian flan0 attac0s

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from the north endan"ered the roads to the rear and necessitated further withdrawal southwestand south durin" the followin" day /n the afternoon of 7@ 4ebruary, havin" clarified the 2uestion offood supply for the poc0et force and dealt with a number of other problems, / was instructed toproceed to head2uarters of !rmy Hi"h Command in East 5russia 4rom that moment on / had nofurther connection with A*// Corps or 4orce -temmermann

Of the B),@@@ men launchin" the brea0out from the poc0et about B@,@@@ successfully fou"httheir way out ),@@@ were 0illed or captured The force lost all of its heavy weapons, artillery, tan0s,vehicles, horses, e2uipment, and supplies

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&HAP*ER )

*HE PO&.E* #ES* OF &HER.ASS5*HE O-*S+DE 3+E#8

Section +6 *HE E,&+R&/E4E,*

The second $ussian winter offensive of %&'B('' was launched early in Fanuary %&'' a"ainstthe German Ei"hth !rmy sector in the Dnepr bend The 4irst and -econd U0rainian 4ronts9thelatter consistin" of four armies, includin" one tan0 army9attempted to cut off German forcesdeployed from a point southeast of ;iev to the Dnepr estuary The -oviet offensive fell short ofaccomplishin" its purpose, but in twelve days of fi"htin" the $ussians drove a deep wed"esouthwestward across the Dnepr and captured the town of ;irovo"rad Two lar"e German salientsremained, one to the northwest, the other to the southeast of the ;irovo"rad area

Despite heavy tan0 losses, the $ussians could be e#pected to reor"anie their armouredforces in the shortest possible time and continue their heavy attac0s desi"ned to push !rmy Group-outh farther bac0 in the direction of the $omanian border /t was evident that the enemy wouldbend every effort to destroy the German bul"e northwest of ;irovo"rad, held by elements of Ei"hth

!rmy and 4irst 5aner !rmy

The commander of Ei"hth !rmy sent ur"ent messa"es to army "roup he e#pressed "ravedoubts about continuin" to hold the curvin" line of positions northwest of ;irovo"rad, whichcommitted an e#cessive number of men 5ointin" out the $ussian superiority in stren"th, herecommended withdrawal of the interior flan0s of Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5aner !rmy by retirementto successive positions, first behind the Olshan0a($oss $iver line, and eventually to the line-hpola(Iveni"orod0a(Gorniy Ti0ich $iver 5ermission for such a withdrawal, however, was deniedon the "rounds that the salient had to be held as a base for future operations in the direction of;iev

The e#pected attac0 was launched by the -econd U0rainian 4ront, on 7' Fanuary, a"ainst theri"ht flan0, and by the 4irst U0rainian

4ront, on 7' Fanuary, a"ainst the left flan0 and the rear of the German salient 3y 7? Fanuarythe armoured spearheads of both $ussian army "roups met in the area of Iveni"orod0a andthereby accomplished the encirclement of A/ and A*// Corps Havin" erected the ori"inal lin0(upwith elements of two tan0 armies, the $ussians rapidly committed stron" infantry units from fouradditional armies which attac0ed toward the west, southwest, and south in order to widen the rin"of encirclement and provide effective cover a"ainst German counterattac0s from the outside

Section ++6 P/A,S FOR *HE 1REA.O-*

/n this situation the German !rmy Hi"h Command directed !rmy Group -outh to assemble thestron"est available armoured units alon" the boundary between Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5aner!rmy These forces were to e#ecute conver"in" counterattac0s, encircle and annihilate the enemy

units that had bro0en throu"h, re(establish contact with the poc0et force, and re"ain a favourable6ump(off base for the pro6ected counteroffensive

!ctually, the assembly of the German attac0 force presented the "reatest of difficulties Two ofthe paner divisions of Ei"hth !rmy desi"nated to ta0e part in the operation were still in the midstof heavy fi"htin" in the area of ;apitanov0a They had to be replaced by infantry units withfronta"es e#tended to the utmost Two additional paner divisions, recently en"a"ed southeast of;irovo"rad, were on the march toward the left flan0 of Ei"hth !rmy Of these four armoured units,only one was at full stren"th, while the others, after wee0s of uninterrupted fi"htin", were actuallyno more than tan0(supported combat teams

This description of the encirclement west of Cher0assy was prepared by a German staff officer atarmy "roup level on the basis of his personal recollections and is presented as a supplement to theprecedin" narrative

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The relief attac0 from the ri"ht flan0 of 4irst 5aner !rmy was to be carried out by the fourarmoured divisions of /// 5aner Corps They were still en"a"ed in defensive operations on the leftflan0 of the army sector, and could only be brou"ht up after they had completed their previousmissions

The two corps inside the poc0et were to attac0 at the appropriate time in the direction of the

Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5aner !rmy units approachin" from the south and west /t was clear thatany build(up on the southern front of the poc0et could only be accomplished at the e#pense ofother sectors -till, !rmy Hi"h Command insisted on holdin" the entire poc0et area, and not untilthe situation of the encircled forces became far more critical was permission obtained forsuccessive withdrawals on the northern sector Even then, the poc0et had to be 0ept sufficientlylar"e to afford a certain freedom of movement !lso, despite the effort on the southern sector,ade2uate forces had to remain available to seal off enemy penetrations elsewhere

The plan for a two(pron"ed drive by /// 5aner Corps of 4irst 5aner !rmy from the southwestand A*+// 5aner Corps of Ei"hth !rmy from the south, to coincide with an attac0 launched by thepoc0et force, was adopted on % 4ebruary The units concerned were ordered to complete theirassembly for the proposed operation durin" the followin" two days Then A*+// 5aner Corps was

to 6ump off from the area of -hpola, thrustin" into the rear of the $ussian forces that werethreatenin" the southern front of A/ Corps -imultaneously, /// 5aner Corps was to launch asurprise attac0 in the "eneral direction of Medvin, where enemy units were operatin" a"ainst thesouthwest front of the poc0et defended by A*// Corps !fter destroyin" these $ussian units, ///5aner Corps was to pivot due east to effect close co(operation with the attac0in" elements ofA*+// Corps comin" from the south

Durin" a commanders1 conference on B 4ebruary, the Ei"hth !rmy commander voiced seriousdoubts whether, in view of the limited forces available and the muddy roads, this ambitious planwas practicable He recommended instead that the attac0 by /// 5aner Corps be led in a moreeasterly direction, which would assure early co(operation with the advancin" elements of A*+//5aner Corps This recommendation was turned down

Meanwhile, the enemy had committed stron" infantry and armoured units in an attac0 toward.ovomir"orod, temporarily tyin" down two of the paner divisions that were to ta0e part in the reliefoperation from the south The muddy season was rapidly ta0in" effect and as the roadsdeteriorated all movements became e#tremely difficult

-imilar conditions prevailed in the area of /// 5aner Corps En"a"ed in continuous fi"htin" onits left flan0, this corps also suffered considerable delay in the assembly of its units for thepro6ected relief thrust and could not be e#pected to launch its attac0 until ' 4ebruary

The forces inside the poc0et, in an attempt to 0eep the enemy from separatin" A/ and A*//Corps, had shifted their main effort to the south front of the perimeter Despite heavy losses indefensive en"a"ements they could not afford to "ive "round in that sector, as their only remainin"airfield, at ;orsun, had to be 0ept out of ran"e of the $ussian artillery !t the hi"h rate of

casualties, however, a continued stand alon" the entire perimeter of positions was obviously out ofthe 2uestion To conserve its stren"th and reduce the threat of $ussian penetrations, the poc0etforce eventually obtained permission to e#ecute limited withdrawals on the northern and easternsectors while bolsterin" its defences to the south

The full impact of the muddy season soon made itself felt on all fronts and, in addition tocausin" losses of motor vehicles and other e2uipment, be"an to endan"er German air supplyoperations The re2uirements of the encircled force called for supplies to be flown in at the rate of%)@ tons daily Despite the most determined efforts of the *uftwaffe units, this 2uota was neverreached Enemy antiaircraft fire from at least three fla0 divisions in the $ussian(held strip of terrainand interception by enemy fi"hter planes had seriously reduced the number of available transportaircraft To prevent further losses, stron" German fi"hter forces had to be committed in protection

of the vital air supply line instead of supportin" preparations on other sectors for the impendin"relief operation

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:ith the start of the muddy season, the lac0 of paved runways further a""ravated the situationOne airfield after another became unusable, and even the ;orsun field, the only one inside thepoc0et, had to be partially closed !irdroppin" supplies, because of a shorta"e of aerial deliverycontainers, met only a small part of the actual re2uirements Eventually, because of the roadconditions, the two corps approachin" from the outside also became dependent in part uponairborne supply, which forced a wide scatterin" of the air effort

Time was obviously wor0in" a"ainst the Germans !s their difficulties continued to increase, itbecame clear that each day of delay further reduced their chances for success

Section +++6 *HE RE/+EF OPERA*+O,

The assembly of an attac0 force on the western flan0 of A*+// 5aner Corps 4ebruary, !rmy Group -outh issued new orders to 4irst 5aner !rmy !fter re"roupin" its units ///5aner Corps was to attac0 due east, its ri"ht flan0 advancin" via *isyan0a toward Morentsy !tthe same time the encircled corps were ordered to prepare for an attac0 in the direction of ///5aner Corps, the attac0 to be launched as soon as the armoured spearhead of the relief force

had approached to within the most favourable distance from the poc0et

5lanned for ? 4ebruary, the attac0 of /// 5aner Corps, because of unfavourable weatherconditions, did not "et under(way until three days later /t was initially successful and, by the end ofthe first day, led to the establishment of three brid"eheads across the Gniloy Ti0ich $iverConcentrated enemy attac0s, however, prevented any further advance /n the difficult terrain eastof the Gniloy Ti0ich, the German armoured units were unable to ma0e any pro"ress, and thisattac0 also came to a halt in the mud

!rmy "roup now realied that it could no lon"er accomplish a reinforcement of the poc0et Theencirclin" rin", therefore, had to be bro0en from the inside The divisions of /// 5aner Corps wereordered to en"a"e and divert the $ussian forces located in the area of 5ochapintsy(;omarov0a(Dhurhentsy, and to establish on the hi"h "round northwest of 5ochapintsy a forward rescueposition that could be reached by the units brea0in" out of the poc0et

3y %%@), on %) 4ebruary, the brea0out order was transmitted by radio to General-temmermann, the commander of the encircled German forces /t read, in part, 8Capabilities of ///5aner Corps reduced by weather and supply difficulties Tas0 4orce -temmermann mustaccomplish brea0(throu"h on its own to line Dhurhentsy(Hill 7B& where it will lin0 up with ///5aner Corps The brea0out force will be under the command of General *ieb A*// Corps andcomprise all units still capable of attac08

4urther instructions, radioed on %> 4ebruary, emphasied the importance of surprise andproper co(ordination 8Durin" initial phase of operation toni"ht hold your fire so as to achievecomplete surprise Maintain centralied fire control over artillery and heavy weapons, so that in the

event of stron"er enemy resistance, especially at daybrea0, they can be committed at point ofmain effort in short order !ir support will be available at dawn to protect your flan0s8

Section +36 *HE 1REA.O-*

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Durin" the operation that was to follow, two separate phases could be clearly distin"uished !tfirst everythin" went accordin" to plan /n the proper se2uence and under perfect control, thetroops moved into position at ni"ht, despite the most difficult road and weather conditions !s theywere compressed into a narrow area, unit after unit had to be channelled across the only e#istin"brid"e at -henderov0a, which was under heavy enemy fire

The bayonet assault started on schedule The complete surprise of the enemy demonstratedthat the attac0 had been properly timed :ithout much action, and sufferin" but few casualties, theGerman brea0out force penetrated the enemy lines and in a relatively short time reached thevicinity of *isyan0a On the opposite front of the poc0et the rear "uards held fast and thus assuredthe success of the initial brea0out

The second phase, the evacuation of the remainin" poc0et force, rapidly deteriorated into awild sur"e toward the west 4ollowin" closely behind the successful spearhead, alto"ether aboutB@,@@@ men bro0e throu"h the $ussian lines in front of the poc0et !t daybrea0, however, they raninto an unsuspected enemy front of antitan0 "uns, tan0s, and artillery, located on the lineDhurhentsy(5ochapintsy Under massed enemy fire, enemy tan0 attac0s, and infantrycounterthrusts, the German force was split into numerous small "roups, each attemptin" on its own

to "et throu"h to the west wherever there mi"ht be a possibility Their "uns, tan0 destroyers, andheavy weapons, which up to now had been dra""ed alon" laboriously throu"h snowdrifts and overbro0en terrain, had to be left behind and were destroyed after the last round of ammunition hadbeen fired Here too, as the last vehicles were blown up, the wounded ta0en alon" at the insistenceof their comrades had to be left to their fate

Meanwhile a new complication arose that was to have disastrous conse2uences -ub6ected toheavy enemy fire, counterthrusts, and armoured attac0s, the "reat mass of German troopsbrea0in" out of the poc0et had deviated from their ori"inal direction of attac0 .o lon"er did theyadvance accordin" to plan toward the area northwest of 5ochapintsy /nstead of approachin" theforward rescue position established by /// 5aner Corps, they passed by at a considerable distancefarther south Here, their advance to the west was bloc0ed by the course of the Gniloy Ti0ich, theenemy holdin" the near ban0 of the river There were no crossin"s, nor had /// 5aner Corps

established any brid"eheads, since a lin0(up in that area had not been foreseen

!lthou"h "reatly e#hausted, the German troops were now forced to overcome the resistance ofthe $ussian security detachments alon" the river and to swim across, leavin" their last weaponsbehind They suffered considerable losses as both ban0s of the river were under heavy enemy fireand not until they had placed this last obstacle behind them were they finally received by theforward elements of /// 5aner Corps

The German holdin" forces on the eastern sector of the poc0et maintained contact with theenemy and successfully covered the brea0out of the main body This mission accomplished, theymade their way westward accordin" to plan and entered the lines of /// 5aner Corps durin" theni"ht of %(%? 4ebruary

Contrary to e#pectations, the brea0out had to be e#ecuted without air support Unfavourableweather conditions durin" the entire operation made it impossible for the air force to play its part inthe liberation of the encircled units

Section 36 /ESSO,S

The developments mainly responsible for the encirclement near Cher0assy and its seriousconse2uences mi"ht be summaried as follows

% Only the insistence of !rmy Hi"h Command to hold the Dnepr bend northwest of ;irovo"radled to the isolation of two German corps in that area Despite repeated re2uests, permission for abrea0out was not obtained until too late The enemy had "rown too stron" alon" the entire rin" ofencirclement, while the German poc0et forces had been wea0ened to such an e#tent, throu"h

losses of personnel and e2uipment and shorta"es of supply, that they were forced to surrendertheir freedom of action and manoeuvre to the enemy

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7 The two German corps encircled by the enemy were the flan0 corps of two ad6acent armies/mmediately after their encirclement, A*// Corps, heretofore part of 4irst 5aner !rmy, was placedunder the command of Ei"hth !rmy :hile this assured unity of command inside the poc0et, thesame was not true of the relief operation in which forces under the command of two differentarmies were involved The absence of a unified command on the army level made itself feltparticularly as the need arose to co(ordinate the actions of the poc0et force


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&HAP*ER 9

E,&+R&/E4E,* OF A PA,ER AR45 ,EAR .A4E,E*SPODO/S.+5

Section '6 *HE E,&+R&/E4E,*

/n mid(4ebruary %&'' the front of the 4irst 5aner !rmy e#tended across the western U0rainealon" a "eneral line north of +innitsa and -hepetov0a, northeast of Ternopol To the ri"ht, north ofUman, was the Ei"hth !rmy to the left, the -econd !rmy !fter the two corps encircled west ofCher0assy had made their way out of the poc0et


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perimeter of 4irst 5aner !rmy !pparently the continuous movements of German service unitssouthward across the Dnestr had led the enemy to believe that the 4irst 5aner !rmy was in fullretreat toward the south The $ussians, in an effort that turned out to be a serious mista0e, movedmore and more units in the same direction on both sides of the poc0et Their lines ofcommunication "rew lon"er and lon"er, and they be"an to face difficulties of supply similar tothose of the encircled German force

/n response to enemy pressure from the east and north, 4irst 5aner !rmy deliberatelyshortened its front until it ran alon" a much smaller perimeter north of ;amenets(5odols0iy,assurin" a "reater concentration of the defendin" forces and a more efficient use of the limitedammunition supply *ocal enemy penetrations were sealed off more easily and brea0(throu"hscould be prevented alto"ether !t the same time 4irst 5aner !rmy deceived the enemy intobelievin" that by day and by ni"ht lar"e(scale evacuations across the river were ta0in" place

Even before it was completely cut off, 4irst 5aner !rmy had re2uested authority to conduct adefence alon" mobile lines :hen this re2uest was turned down and the encirclement became afact, a brea0out remained the only possible course of action short of helplessly facin" certainannihilation 3ecause of unfavourable weather conditions, the 2uantities of supplies that could be

flown in were entirely insufficient to maintain the fi"htin" power of the encircled troops $elief of thepoc0et by fresh forces from the outside could not be e#pected /n this situation the enemy sent aterse demand for surrender, threatenin" that otherwise all soldiers of the encircled German armywould be shot

The reaction of 4irst 5aner !rmy was to immediately ma0e all necessary preparations toenable its total force of ei"ht divisions to brea0 out Once more, in a systematic cullin" process, thedivisions were relieved of all unfit personnel and superfluous e2uipment, while specialarran"ements were made with the *uftwaffe to assure that the transport planes brin"in" in supplieswere used to evacuate casualties on their return fli"hts

Section ++6 *HE 1REA.O-* P/A,

The 2uestion of the direction in which the brea0out should be launched played an important

part in all considerations :as it more advisable to stri0e toward the west, alon" the Dnestr, ortoward the south, across the ;hotin brid"ehead an attac0 in the latter direction would involve theleast difficulties, be opposed by the wea0est enemy forces, and perhaps permit the withdrawal ofthe entire German force into $omania /n this case, however, there would be one less paner armyfi"htin" the $ussians, at least for some time :est of the poc0et several successive river linesconstituted natural obstacles in the path of an advance There, too, the Germans had to e#pect thestron"est concentration of enemy forces alon" the rin" of encirclement 3rea0in" out in severaldirections at once was another possibility under consideration this would have forced the enemy tosplit his stren"th in numerous local countermeasures and mi"ht have enabled some small German"roups to ma0e their way bac0 to the nearest friendly lines with the least fi"htin"

The final decision was to brea0 out to the west, in the direction involvin" the "reatest

difficulties, yet assurin" a ma#imum of surprise -imultaneously, on the outside, another Germanforce was to attac0 from an area southwest of Ternopol


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Section +++6 *HE PO&.E* 4O3ES #ES*

On 7 March, havin" re"rouped its forces accordin" to plan and completed all preparations forthe thrust across the Ibruch $iver, 4irst 5aner !rmy launched its brea0out toward the west-imultaneously, the rear "uards on the eastern and northern sectors of the poc0et switched todelayin" tactics

/n the one of the northern attac0 force, the enemy alon" the Ibruch $iver was overrun withsurprisin" speed, and three undama"ed brid"es fell into German hands The advance of thesouthern attac0 force met "reater resistance, and considerable difficulties arose as the enemylaunched a counterthrust from the west across the Ibruch and was able to force his way into;amenets(5odols0iy The loss of this important road hub made it necessary to reroute all Germanmovements in a wide detour around the city, an effort that re2uired painsta0in" reconnaissanceand careful traffic re"ulation /t was not lon", however, until the enemy penetration was sealed on,and in this instance the Germans, themselves surrounded, were able in turn to encircle a smaller$ussian force which was not dependent upon air supply and could no lon"er interfere withsubse2uent operations !s soon as several stron" brid"eheads had been established across theIbruch $iver, new spearheads were formed which attac0ed the -eret $iver line Thus the paner

army maintained the initiative and 0ept movin" by day and ni"ht!pparently the enemy was still uncertain about German intentions /nstead of combinin" all his

forces from the eastern and northern sectors in an attempt to pursue and overta0e the Germanspushin" west, he persisted in attac0in" the poc0et from the east and north, in some instancesstri0in" at positions already vacated by the German rear "uards His units southwest of the poc0etactually continued to move farther south Meanwhile, 4irst 5aner !rmy 0ept up its westwardadvance on 7? March the southern force was able to cut the road leadin" to Chort0ov, severin"enemy communication lines in that area one day later German spearheads reached the -eret$iver, which they crossed durin" the followin" ni"ht

The $ussians then be"an to react They recalled elements of their 4ourth Tan0 !rmy fromsouth of the Dnestr and, by B% March, launched a stron" armoured thrust toward the north from the

area of Goroden0a !s a countermeasure, the southern attac0 force of 4irst 5aner !rmy,deployed mainly between the Ibruch and -eret $ivers, assumed the defensive and was able tobrea0 up the $ussian armoured attac0 Thereafter, since their supply lines had meanwhile beencut, these $ussian units no lon"er constituted a menace to the German left flan0

! more serious threat e#isted in the north where $ussian forces movin" west could haveoverta0en and bloc0ed the entire ri"ht win" of 4irst 5aner !rmy However, the enemy did notchoose to do so, and the northern attac0 force continued to advance and was able to cross the-eret without ma6or difficulty

Section +36 *HE ES&APE

The last wee0 in March was mar0ed by heavy snowstorms ! rapid thaw followed early in !pril,with the effect of seriously hamperin" all movements -upply durin" this period continued to be the"reatest problem !s the German force 0ept movin", the planes brin"in" in supplies had to usedifferent airstrips every ni"ht /n the final phase of the operation supplies could only be dropped byair, a procedure that proved wholly inade2uate to satisfy the re2uirements of an entire armyDespite the daily moves of the poc0et force, the maintenance of ade2uate si"nal communicationswas assured at all times, primarily by the use of conventional and microwave radio sets

-ince the troops were constantly on the move, launchin" successive attac0s toward the west,they never developed the feelin" of bein" trapped in the slowly ti"htenin" "rip of an encirclin"enemy force Conse2uently, there were no si"ns of disinte"ration or panic, and the number ofmissin" durin" the entire operation remained unusually low 3y ) !pril the leadin" elements of boththe northern and the southern attac0 forces reached the -trypa $iver On the followin" day, near3ucac, they were able to lin0 up with other German units comin" from the west

/n two wee0s of heavy fi"htin", but without sufferin" severe casualties, 4irst 5aner !rmy hadfreed itself from enemy encirclement $ear "uard actions continued for a few days and then theGermans succeeded in establishin" a new, continuous defence line runnin" from the Dnestr to the

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town of 3rody, which prevented any further advance of the enemy Moreover, despite theirconsiderable losses in materiel, elements of 4irst 5aner !rmy were still able to launch an attac0southeast across the Dnestr to brea0 up an enemy force, which had appeared in the -tanislavarea Enemy e2uipment captured and destroyed durin" the entire brea0out operation amounted toB) tan0s, '7 assault "uns, and 7?@ artillery pieces

Section 36 E3A/-A*+O,/n its encirclement and brea0out, 4irst 5aner !rmy "ained a number of e#periences that may

be applicable to many similar situations :hereas in previous wars the double envelopment andencirclement of a unit was tantamount to its annihilation, this is no lon"er true today Thepro"ressive motoriation of "round forces, combined with the possibility of supply by air, tends todo away with this hitherto characteristic aspect of a poc0et

:hile it is true that the decision to brea0 out from encirclement should not be needlesslydelayed, it is e2ually important to realie that definite plans for the brea0out should not be madetoo early, at a sta"e when the enemy is still movin" and therefore capable of ma0in" rapid chan"esin his dispositions Once the encirclement is completed, the enemy, since he is now operatin"alon" e#terior lines, encounters difficulties of supply and communication and has lost much of his

initial fle#ibility

/n an operation of this type surprise is the most important factor, particularly the surpriseachieved by choosin" an une#pected direction for the brea0out /n the e#ample described allmovement prior to the encirclement of 4irst 5aner !rmy had been from north to south ! brea0outin the same direction was definitely e#pected by the enemy, and therefore this would have beenthe least favourable choice The direction selected for the German thrust9practically perpendicularto the enemy1s lines of advance9offered the best chance of success the element of surpriseactually proved of "reater importance than considerations of enemy stren"th, terrain conditions,and the distance to the nearest German lines

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&HAP*ER :

&O,&/-S+O,S

Section +6 *HE S+G,+F+&A,&E OF A PO&.E*

/n modern warfare with its blit0rie" tactics e#ecuted by motoried and mechanied forces, theencirclement by the enemy of lar"e bodies of troops has become a fre2uent occurrence /t is,therefore, all the more important to be ade2uately prepared for this 0ind of fi"htin"

Combat in poc0ets, whether it is of lon" or short duration, has its own fundamental rules:hatever circumstances may determine the len"th of the battle, it will always be advisable to see0an early decision To ma0e this possible, the commander of an encircled force must, on principle,be "ranted full freedom of action He should be permitted, specifically, to use his own 6ud"mentre"ardin" all measures and decisions incident to a brea0out from the poc0et On many occasionsin German e#perience, the futile attempt was made to evaluate a local situation and to conduct theoperations of encircled troops by remote control from a far distant hi"her echelon, if not directlyfrom Hitler1s head2uarters /ndecisiveness on the part of the poc0et commander and measures,

which invariably came too late, were the conse2uences of such limitations imposed by hi"herhead2uarters :henever a commander receives ri"id instructions from a distance at which thecapabilities of his encircled forces cannot be properly 6ud"ed9and are usually overestimated9hiswillin"ness to accept responsibility will rapidly decline

The notion that poc0ets must be held at all costs should never be applied as a "eneralprinciple Hitler1s adherence to this mista0en concept durin" :orld !far // resulted in the loss of somany German soldiers that the lesson learned from their sacrifice ou"ht to be remembered for alltime

Section ++6 SPE&+A/ OPERA*+,G PRO&ED-RES

E#perience has shown that only seasoned troops, in the best fi"htin" condition and under the

firm control of their commanders, are able to withstand the mental strain of combat in encirclementand are li0ely to retain the hi"h de"ree of physical fitness needed under such circumstances 3uteven with troops that satisfy these re2uirements it is necessary to apply stern measures in order toprevent any slac0enin" of control, which would inevitably result in lowerin" their morale /t issurprisin" how fast the bonds of discipline will disinte"rate in an encirclement Mobs of unarmedsoldiers tryin" to proceed on their own, captured horses loaded down with superfluous e2uipment,and other similarly depressin" si"hts were not uncommon in some of the lar"er German poc0ets in$ussia They had a contaminatin" effect and called for swift and drastic countermeasures

The hi"hest standards of discipline, more important in this than in any other situation, must beupheld by the officers and non(commissioned officers of an encircled force it is their personalconduct that sets the e#ample 4orce of character, as in all critical situations, ac2uires the "reatest

si"nificance it sustains the will to fi"ht and may, indeed, determine the outcome of the battle Morethan ever the place of the commander, under such circumstances, is in the midst of his troopstheir minds will re"ister his every action with the sensitivity of a seismo"raph

5articular attention in all matters of discipline must be paid to rear echelon units and thepersonnel of rear area installations that may be present in the poc0et -ince these troops areusually the first to become unnerved, they must be held under strict control

!nother principle that has proved itself in the German e#perience is the dele"ation of authority


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defensive effort another


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assurin" direct support for lar"e parts of the front without displacement to new positions !lso,centralied fire direction can be more easily established ! practice that proved particularlyeffective was the firin" of a few batteries at a time, while the bul0 of the artillery remained silent toavoid counterbattery fire Massed artillery went into action only a"ainst lar"e(scale enemy attac0s

BArmour and Antitank Weapons

/n the defence of poc0ets, tan0s and assault "uns have a dual mission Contrary to the rules ofarmoured combat under ordinary circumstances, they are scattered amon" the infantry and ta0epart in the small(scale fi"htin" alon" the perimeter !t the same time, they must be able to revert2uic0ly to their ori"inal formation whenever they have to be used as mobile reserve a"ainst ma6orenemy attac0s -imilarly, the proper place for antitan0 weapons is with the front(line infantry !nantitan0 defence echeloned in depth, as is preferable in most other situations, must be ruled out forthe same reasons that apply to the employment of the infantry

The necessity for ti"ht or"aniation inside the poc0et has already been emphasied Thisapplies particularly to traffic control, which must be so enforced as to assure order and discipline,and to prevent panic /t may be necessary, for this purpose, to employ not only all available militarypolice but also seasoned combat troops under the command of forceful and e#perienced officers

!ll measures that must be ta0en inside a poc0et will vary dependin" upon local circumstancesno two situations are ali0e Therefore, set rules cannot be prescribed for fi"htin" in poc0ets anymore than for other types of military operations .evertheless, the fundamental principles outlinedabove seem to apply whenever the enemy encircles troops

-o lon" as the encirclement has not been completed9or before the enemy rin" has beenreinforced9an immediate brea0(throu"h offers the best chance of success 4ew tacticalpreparations will be necessary, if a command faced with encirclement can e#ploit the opportunemoment by brea0in" out as soon as the enemy1s intentions have been reco"nied /n mostinstances, however, all elements of the surrounded force will be loc0ed in battle for several days,and the opportunity for such immediate action will pass before the situation in the poc0et hasbecome sufficiently clear Then, especially in the case of lar"er poc0ets, a brea0out can be

launched only after the most careful preparations, which must include some or all of the followin"considerations and measures

Section +++6 *HE 1REA.O-* DE&+S+O,

Unless the encircled forces have e#plicit orders to remain in place, or are so wea0 that theymust rely on relief from the outside, the decision to brea0 out must be made before the enemy hasbeen able to for"e a firm rin" around the poc0et Only if this is done, and only if preparations arebe"un without delay, will all measures become part of one coherent plan, directed toward a sin"leob6ective

-uch situations brin" out the innate a""ressiveness, fle#ibility and initiative of a born leaderThe need for 2uic0 decisions, however, must not be permitted to cause action without plan The

proper time and direction for the brea0out, for instance, can only be determined after the followin"2uestions have been answered

a :hen9accordin" to the tactical situation9is the earliest suitable moment for launchin" theattac0N

b :here is the enemy the wea0estN

c :hich is the shortest way bac0 to friendly linesN

d :hat direction of attac0 would involve the least terrain difficultiesN

e :hat time of day and what weather conditions are most favourable for the attac0N

f -hould one or several directions be selected for the brea0outN

The answers to these 2uestions will vary accordin" to the situation, as can be seen from theprecedin" chapters !ctually, there may be situations in which9contrary to the principles

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advanced above9the direction for the brea0out should not be fi#ed too early, at least not until theenemy1s intentions can be clearly reco"nied


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However, the problem of traffic re"ulation inside a poc0et is not confined to troop movementsThe most carefully devised system of traffic control can be upset by streams of fleein" civilianswho are li0ely to be stric0en with panic when cau"ht in a poc0et !s a rule, therefore, it isimperative for the security of the encircled force to prohibit and prevent anymovement of localinhabitants Only in rare cases will it be possible to ta0e alon" part of the civilian population durin"a brea0out Then, while the roads are 0ept clear, special paths must be assi"ned for the tre0s ofcivilians 5articularly in lar"e poc0ets, the 2uestion whether able(bodied male inhabitants should beta0en alon" or left behind deserves careful consideration it can only be decided on the basis oflocal circumstances

E#tensive preparations will also be necessary if an encircled force is to be supplied by airthese preparations are described in detail in the !ppendi# to this study

Section 36 *A&*+&A/ PREPARA*+O,S

/n an encirclement a deliberate effort must be made to increase the effective stren"th of thecombat element at the e#pense of the service units -electin" the proper personnel to betransferred from rear echelon to combat duty may be a slow process, but it is of the "reatestimportance at a time when active fi"hters are needed more than anythin" else /n such situations,

the service units9havin" "rown out of proportion to the combat element9are lar"ely superfluousand actually impose a heavy burden on the command !t best, they constitute a manpowerreserve, which, after a thorou"h process of selection, will yield additional personnel for combatduty One should not e#pect too much of this reserve9while it is composed of military personnel, itwill include few combat soldiers !ssi"nin" an e#cessive number of rear echelon troops to front(line duty will only swell the numerical stren"th of the combat element without, however, increasin"its fi"htin" power to the same de"ree The procedure completely loses its usefulness when themen transferred from service units are no lon"er a reinforcement of, but a burden to, the combatelement $ear echelon troops whose services have become superfluous and who can no lon"er beevacuated, should be placed in a sin"le unit and held under firm control

Demolitions, which are to prevent rapid pursuit by the enemy or to slow his e#ploitation of

recently abandoned terrain, are to be ordered and e#ecuted in time condemned artilleryammunition ma0es a "ood e#plosive for this purpose /t is advisable, however, to confine suchdemolitions to a few important ob6ects E#perience has shown that as a rule the troops haveneither the time nor the inclination to carry out e#tensive and time(consumin" missions ofdestruction On the other hand, the commander must ta0e care to prevent senseless massdemolitions born of a spirit of destructiveness that is characteristic of encircled troops

The success of a brea0out will depend primarily upon the use of deception and themaintenance of secrecy The fewer subordinate commanders informed about the actual brea0outplan, the "reater the chances that secrecy can be maintained Especially telephone and radiocommunications must be carefully "uarded !t the same time, radio offers the best means fordeceivin" the enemy This may be done by transmittin" dummy messa"es about one1s ownintentions, calls to ima"inary relief units, reports that will confuse the enemy about the actualstren"th of the poc0et force, misleadin" re2uisitions for supplies, and false information about dropones and landin" areas !ll these ruses are certain to reduce the number of casualties durin" thebrea0out

Tactical feints and deceptive manoeuvres must "o hand in hand with the measures su""estedabove 3y movin" into different positions every ni"ht, launchin" attac0s with limited ob6ective fromvarious points of the perimeter, and stubbornly holdin" on to unimportant terrain features, theencircled force must deliberately convey to the enemy a false picture of its situation and of itsintentions This purpose can also be served by havin" a sieable column composed of all availablesupply units move laterally across the sector from which the brea0out will eventually be launched

Effective deception can always be achieved by concentratin" armour at a point other than that

of the intended brea0out /f these tan0s proceed to e#ecute a feint attac0, the enemy, believin" thathe has located the main effort of the brea0out force, will almost certainly divert the bul0 of hisforces to the threatened point The attac0in" tan0s are then shifted rapidly into the direction of themain brea0(throu"h, and success will usually follow


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dependin" of course upon the fuel situation, should be used both in the defence of the poc0etperimeter and9as an ace in the hole9immediately before the brea0out is launched The desiredresult can often be achieved by havin" a sin"le tan0 drive in circles at ni"ht to fei"n the assemblyof a lar"e armoured unit .o matter what measures of deception are used, they will only serve theirpurpose if they enable the brea0out force to ta0e the enemy by surprise /n this respect thepreparations for a brea0out do not differ from preparations for any other type of attac0 Here, as inany offensive action, secrecy, deception, and surprise are the basic elements of success

The most important tactical preparations for the brea0out9apart from diversionary attac0s9are concerned with the "radual chan"e of emphasis from the defence of the perimeter to theformation of a stron" brea0out force !s the situation permits, every soldier who can be sparedfrom the purely defensive sectors must be transferred9 possibly after a rest period9to the areaselected for the brea0out

This will wea0en the defence and, in some places, necessitate a shortenin" of the line, whichmay involve considerable ris0s Enemy penetrations are li0ely to occur, and such local crises,althou"h they may have little or no effect upon the over

operations of encircled forces

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