online activism in morocco (2012)

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Online Youth Political Activism

Rahman/ Online Youth Political Activism

ISSN 2162-6669 –issue no.1, Winter 2012 Zahir Rahman Wake Forest University Abstract This paper focuses on the development of online youth political organization in Morocco starting in August of 2009 leading up to the start of the 2011 February 20th Movement. The paper opens with a brief discussion of Facebook usage in Morocco, and then addresses the “In Morocco, I’m a 9 %” and the Alternative Movement for Individual Freedoms’ Ramadan public fast break of August 2009. The paper’s main focus is the February 20th Movement, specifically how the founding and early stages of the Movement fits into the overall development of online activism in Morocco. The paper argues that person‐to‐person, real world activism, as opposed to online activism, is an essential component of youth political activism in Morocco. Introduction Over the last ten years, the Moroccan youth have been characterized as frustrated with and weary of politics. Critics of this cohort point to electoral abstention and lack of political participation as proof of disinterest and distrust in the system. As Joseph Entelis (1996) explains, “the idealism of the youth combines with the cynicism of practical experience gained either directly through contacts with the system or indirectly through the experiences of others to create an alienated, disaffected, and disenchanted Moroccan student population” (p. 65). These feelings of alienation and disillusionment have historically prevented Moroccan youth from engaging in politics. Over the last two years, however, political activism among Moroccan youth has increased, in part to the activists’ use of the internet. Previously, Moroccan online activism predominately came in the form of blogging, but in 2009, Moroccan youth political activists began using Facebook and other social networking sites (SNSs) to organize and spread ideas. In the winter of 2011, online activism in Morocco intensified as the Arab Spark in Tunisia caught flame in Morocco. In its early stages of organizing, the “February 20 Movement,” a nationwide protest group, used Facebook as a tool to spread the movement and coordinate efforts across the country. This paper discusses youth political activism in Morocco, specifically recent efforts that combine elements of online and real world activism. The paper opens with an in‐depth analysis of Facebook and its use in Morocco. It will then explain how two youth political movements of 2009, the “In Morocco, I’m a 9%” and the Alternative Movement for Individual Freedoms (MALI) Ramadan public fast break groups used Facebook and online activism to organize their efforts. The next section of the paper turns its focus to the birth of the February 20th Movement and the role of Facebook and online and real world activism in the Movement’s founding. The paper closes with a comparison of these three youth political activism movements. Through this final analysis, the paper will argue that the use of Facebook by the February 20th Movement activists complements, not substitutes, the necessary component of real world activism, as illustrated in the Movement’s first nationwide protest. Terms and Methods I use the term “youth” throughout this paper, and “youth” can have several meanings. For instance, in the context of Moroccan politics, youth wings of political parties often are dominated by Moroccans ages up to 40 years old. My focus, however, is on activists under the age of 30. While the “I’m a 9%” Facebook group was started by older activists, ages close to 40 years old, between 2009 and the start of the February 20th Movement, younger online activists emerged. This rise in younger participation is explored in the “Facebook in Morocco” section of the paper.

Online youth political activism in Morocco: Facebook and the birth of the February 20th movement

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I use the term “real world activism” to refer to physical, in‐person forms of activism such as in‐person protest, marches, and sit‐ins. I use this term as the opposite of cyber, online activism, which is carried out via blogs, social network sites, etc. Around 30 activists and scholars were interviewed in the process of this research. Names of activists who provide direct quotations are not offered in the citations in order to protect their anonymity. Two thirds of the interviews took place in Rabat, Morocco, while the remaining interviews were completed via Skype. Most of the interviews were conducted in English or Moroccan derija. Translations were completed by the author with help from Nassime S., a PhD candidate at the Mohammed V University of Rabat. Facebook in Morocco With over 11% of the total population and 33% of total internet users “on” Facebook, Morocco ranks third in the Middle East and North Africa region with the most Facebook users (SocialBakers June 2011). Between February 2011 and June 2011, the number of Moroccan Facebook members rose by over 600,000 users to a total of 3,525,460 users (Internet World Stats 2011). In June 2011, Facebook was the most frequently searched and visited site in Morocco, ranking higher than the Google search engine (Alexa 2011).1 In a report released by Spot on Public Relations in late May 2011, this ranking was inversed (Malin 2011). Therefore, one can conclude that between May 2011 and June 2011, Facebook passed Google as the most used site in Morocco, highlighting the recent dramatic growth of Facebook in Morocco and the heavy usage by the country’s internet users.

Source: Spot on Public Relations, “Middle East & North Africa: Facebook Demographics,” May 2011 65% of all users in the Morocco are between the ages of 18 and 34. The younger half of this cohort, ages 18 to 24, makes up the largest part of Facebook users at 41%. In fact, users over the age of 34 comprise only 12% of all Moroccan subscribers. Additionally, Morocco has the second largest number of Facebook users under the age of 25 in the Middle East and North Africa region (Malin 2011). Indeed, while Facebook is used by people of all ages throughout the world, in the context of Morocco, it is dominated by young users. In their research on internet usage in Morocco, Chrifi‐Alaoui and Dahmen (2011) find that “all socioeconomic groups in Morocco, but particularly youth, now use the Internet, Skype, and Facebook” (p. 30). In fact, Morocco hosts the “cheapest and fastest internet services in Africa,” making the nation’s youth among the continent’s most

1 According to the Alexa database, globally, the Google search engine is the most popular, most visited, and most searched webpage, and Facebook ranks second

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wired (Chrifi‐Alaoui & Dahmen 2010, p. 30). It is under these conditions that online youth political activism in Morocco has flourished and grown rapidly over the last two years. A 2009 global survey of Internet activists found that “the plurality of respondents (37%) believe digital technology’s greatest value for activism is one‐way communication. What makes social media useful for digital activism may not be its interactivity but rather the fact that these technologies collapse the barrier to broadcast” (Brodock 2009, p. 3). This research suggests that SNSs serve as one‐way streets for information, as knowledge and communication travel from the provider to the receiver, without reply from the receiver. Along with activists around the region, Moroccan activists break away from this one‐way usage by utilizing Facebook in an attempt to engage others in on‐going debates over about politics. Facebook and Moroccan Youth Activism “In Morocco, I’m a 9 %” In the beginning of August 2009, the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior banned the publication of two independent periodicals, TelQuel, written in French, and Nishaan, written in Moroccan Arabic, because they contained the results of a poll in which Moroccans were asked their opinion on the ten year reign of King Muhammad VI. The poll expressed vast support for the King’s ten years in power, as 91% responded “positive” or “very positive.” According to Khalid Naciri, the minister of communication, the issues of TelQuel and Nishaan were nonetheless banned because “in Morocco, the issue of the monarchy cannot be put into equation, nor can it be subjected to a public debate through an opinion poll” (In Morocco, I’m a 9%, 2011). In reaction to this government censorship, a small group of young activists started an online campaign entitled, “In Morocco, I’m a 9%.” The group, whose name was derived from the 9% of those polled by TelQuel and Nishaan who did not respond positive or very positive to the poll, aimed to bring attention to government’s censorship of media in Morocco. The online activists of the “I’m a 9%” group used Facebook and blogs to expand the group. The “I’m a 9%” Facebook group information is written entirely in French. On the Group page, the contact information and names for the group’s administrators are provided. In August of 2009, the Facebook page was used as a place for debate, averaging over ten comments on the page per day (In Morocco I’m a 9%, 2011). There are only fourteen pictures on the group page, all of which are posters and fliers against government censorship and relative causes (In Morocco I’m a 9%, 2011). Anas Alaoui, an avid Moroccan politics blogger and online activists, designed this logo, and encouraged other activists to use the picture as their profile picture:

Source: Hisham G., August 2, 2009 MALI Ramadan Public Fast Break In August 2010, Moroccan youth activists used Facebook to organize a public Ramadan fast break in the city of Mohammedia. They wanted to protest against Article 222 of the Moroccan penal code which states, “A person

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commonly known to be Muslim who violates the fast in a public place during Ramadan, without having one of the justifications allowed by Islam, shall be punished by one to six months of prison” (Sandels, 2009). The youth activists challenged this legal code because, as one activist explains, it “was made at the French protectorate and has nothing to do with the religion and is contradictory to the Article six of the Moroccan Constitution which guarantees the freedom of beliefs.” Continuing, the activist argued that “the article of the penal code goes against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (Activist, April 29, 2011). The fast break activists organized under the Alternative Movement for Individual Freedoms (MALI). In September 2009, the MALI Facebook group page for the public fast break had 1,200 members (BBC, 2009). Leading up to the planned protest, youth activists and MALI organizers were visited by police who had used Facebook to identify the leaders. In addition, many of the leaders of the MALI Facebook page received private message death threats on Facebook profiles. Omar Radi, a Facebook administrator of the public fast break group, received many negative messages; one of which stated, “We’re going to cut off your head” (BBC 2009). Despite these threats, the MALI youth activists went ahead with their planned real world protest. On September 13, 2009, members of the Facebook group planned to meet in Mohammedia, a suburb near Casablanca, to open the fast publically. According to the Morocco Board News Service, on the day of the event, hundreds of police were waiting for the protesters to show up, and “70 people had planned to attend the picnic but that only a dozen managed to get around the security presence” (Sandels 2009). In the days after the event, at least four of the youth activists who organized on Facebook and advocated for the public fast break were arrested on unnamed charges (HRW 2009). In August 2010, MALI activists decided to re‐launch their campaign to challenge penal code 222. Instead of calling for a public fast break, however, the activists used Facebook and traditional media outreach to Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera in order to publicize their cause (The Economist 2010). The MALI activists received widespread attention from international news agencies and religious freedoms bloggers, giving new wind to the year‐old movement. The February 20th Movement The Origins The February 20th Movement, initially called “Freedom and Democracy Now,” began as a Facebook group discussion among Moroccan youth activists in early January 2011. The group’s first action was its organization of sit‐ins at the Egyptian embassy in Rabat to protest the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. The sit‐ins were exclusively advertised on Facebook and discussed by fellow activists. Activists made events to advertise to sit‐ins, edited their statuses to spread their movement’s message, and invited friends to participate in the activities. By constantly updating statuses, posting articles, and uploading pictures relevant to the sit‐ins, the activists ensure that their Facebook friends’ newsfeeds would be saturated with information about the sit‐ins. This was an online, grassroots effort, and many activists from the “I’m a 9%” and public fast break networks participated. At the Egypt sit‐ins, the activists discussed planning a day for a nationwide protest. Sunday, February 20th was selected, and the name “February 20th Movement” emerged (Activists, February 28, 2011). Through Facebook, blogs, and online news sites, news of the February 20th Movement and the upcoming protest of February 20th spread. On February 3, 2011, the group published its demands:

1. To nullify the current Constitution, and appoint a founding commission among uncorrupted and qualified countrymen, that would establish a new Constitution putting royalty at its natural place. ‐ To dissolve the parliament, the government, and political parties which contributed to the political corruption.

2. To take real and tangible action to relieve the suffering of the Moroccan people, and create an urgent fund to compensate unemployment.

3. To release all political detainees. 4. To appoint an interim government that would do management tasks temporarily, pending the

establishment of the Constitution and the consensus of uncorrupted factions and institutions on the actions to be taken, in the context of the new social contract between royalty and society.

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(Moroccan Tales 2011) In early February, the activists held their first official meeting at the headquarters of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) in Rabat. Most accounts agree there were 30 people in attendance, the vast majority of whom were under the age of 30. At this first meeting, it was established that there would be no “leaders” of the movement, no one or two people who held full responsibility or decision‐making power over the rest of the activists. Rather, the meetings would be conducted as open forums for everyone to talk and make decisions collectively. One activist explains that “there is no administrator for 20th February. There is no leader, we are all leaders. You can be a leader if you have the same causes; you can be one of us” (Activist, February 28, 2011). Online Activism At this meeting, the 30 activists were divided into groups, each tasked with different responsibilities. One of the groups was specifically dedicated to online publicity. One of its first priorities was to use Facebook to advertise the protest and to educate the public about the group’s demands. The heart of this effort was the “February 20 Movement” Facebook page. By February 2, 2011 the “The February 20 Movement” Facebook page had 3,000 users (Reuters, 2011). In order to attract more members to the group, activists designed an array of icons and logos which were uploaded to Facebook photo albums and used as profile pictures:

Source: February 20th Movement Facebook Page, February 2011 On February 8th, a 23‐year‐old male Movement activist from Salè filmed a YouTube video that introduced the February 20th Movement to the country and to the world. 14 activists ‐ nine young men, four young women, and one elderly woman ‐ were featured in the two‐minute video, entitled “I am Moroccan.” The video is a collection of solo vignettes. Each vignette begins with an activist saying, “I am Moroccan and I am partaking on February 20th…,” followed by the specific reason that he/she is protesting. The reasons range from corruption in government, to abuse of police power, to the rising costs of fruits and vegetables (The February 20th Campaign 2011).

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The video was re‐posted all over Facebook, blogs, and news sites when it was released on February 13th. A young activist featured in the video explained in an interview, “I joined the heated discussions on Facebook in January but those discussions didn’t gain much attention from public media so we have decided to do a video. We dared to put a face to the message, unfazed by the possibility of getting arrested. The video went viral and helped us convince more people to protest on February 20th” (M4C 2011). The video ends with the unveiling of the February 20th Movement’s new logo:

Source: February 20 Movement YouTube Page, February 2011 The Facebook and YouTube organizing and outreach by the youth activists were successful. By February 20th 2011, subscription to the “February 20 Movement for Change” Facebook page had risen to 20,000 members, up 17,000 members from just two weeks before. The group’s Facebook wall hosted fierce debates and exchanges of ideas. The administrators of the group quickly removed hateful language by both supporters and detractors of the Movement. The February 20th Movement was also effective in including language diversity on its page, perhaps leading to better success with all Moroccan youth. There is a clear progression in the pictorial and video activism, illustrated by the evolution from the initial logos/posters of the Movement. While the first pictures released by the group seem amateur and even cartoonish, by February 13th the logo of the group is sleek, professional, and perhaps revolution‐inspiring. Overall, Facebook is used by the February 20th Movement as a “decisive tool that served in expressing and voicing different claims, mobilizing masses with logos and posting videos, providing information in Facebook pages, coordinating the work of every city sections. Every city has a coordinator whose role is to stay in touch with the other sections of the movement” (Activist, April 29, 2011). Evidently, Facebook not only contributes to growth of the Movement, but also provides a space for members to coordinate and communicate with the Movement’s regional operators. Nonetheless, as the activist makes clear, Facebook and online activism are used as a tool in order to supplement and support the Movement’s real world activism.

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Real World Activism

Source: Zahir Rahman, February 20, 2011 On February 20th, the February 20th Movement held its first nationwide protest. No one, including the activists themselves, knew what to expect from the Movement’s first attempt at real world activism. The Facebook activists had used the social media platform to coordinate protests in Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Al Hoceima, Tangier, and other cities across the country. Despite heavy participation and support online, there was uncertainty as to how many people would protest and what would be the government and police response. The largest of these protests took place in front of the National Parliament building in Morocco’s capital, Rabat, the Movement’s main hub. Organizers claimed that a group of 20,000 protesters assembled. In contrast, the Associated Press estimated that there were 3,000 to 5,000 in Rabat, while government‐supported media sources that there was a “weak” turnout of 2,000 in Rabat (Associated Press 2011). However, most observers agree that there were approximately 5,000 protesters.

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Source: Zahir Rahman, February 20, 2011 There was great diversity among the protesters as they represented an array of civic groups and political persuasions. There were cyber activists, liberalists, Islamists, and 20 different human rights organizations represented (Lalami 2011). There were protesters who stopped in the middle of the day’s events to perform their daily prayers. In addition, there were people with signs advocating for a secular society. In general, posters were written in an array of languages including Arabic, French, English, and Amazigh. In fact, there were many protesters with the Imazighen flag in tote. There were men and women of all ages. But the February 20th event was more than just a symbolic meeting of different people. As one of the February 20th organizers explains:

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There were discussions, fruitful discussions, people were discussing for the first time political things. I see some women who could express themselves with no fear, about all the things that hurt them. It was great. Everyone wanted to talk; people were in circles and were talking. It was great. (Activist, February 28, 2011) The discussions between protesters, activists, and bystanders who were passing through center of were very valuable to the Movement. Another activist expresses a similar sentiment: [I know of someone] who was against the protest but he came to observe it. He told me that later in the day, in front of Parliament he saw the different groups having discussions and he said he listened to the discussions and loved it. He said he came to the protest against it, but then he saw these group discussions and understood it. (Activist, February 28, 2011) This type of understanding and outreach can rarely be achieved through online activism. On the other hand, real world activism can facilitate this sort of transformation because in bringing people together physically, discussions emerge between allies and enemies. By including real world protests in the Movement, February 20th organizers were able to achieve their goal of “getting people talk about things that they didn’t think they could talk about: to express themselves” (Activist, February 28, 2011). Comparison and Analysis There are many lessons to be learned from the “I’m a 9%” and public fast break movements. While the “I’m a 9%” group was one of the first to use Facebook as tool for activism in Morocco, it did not maintain or inspire significant popular momentum. Most opponents of the TelQuel and Nishaan censorship voiced their opinions through blogs and online new sources, while Facebook was not used to extensively publicize the controversy. Moreover, there were no real world protests in support of publishing the TelQuel and Nishaan poll. Since the “I’m a 9%” movement was resigned to the cyber sphere without an “in person” protest presence, it did not grow exponentially, and the member list for the Facebook group remained around 1,000 members (In Morocco I’m a 9%, 2011). In addition, it is interesting to note that the description and discussion on the Facebook group, “I’m a 9%,” were in French, even though Arabic was added as a language on Facebook in March 2009 (BBC, March 2009). At the group’s height, during August of 2009, the group wall was very active with supporters and non‐supporters furiously in debate. Between August 10, 2009 and August 20, 2009, there were 79 wall posts, only seven of which were written in Arabic. Linguist Fatima Sadiqi (2003) explains that French is the language of the social elite and it remains the language of choice in university and private education. Sadiqi goes on to label French as the language of secularists and European culture (Sadiqi 2003, p. 49). As a result, it is possible that the apparent language limits of using French prevent Arabic‐only or Amazigh‐only speakers from engaging the movement. As for the MALI public fast break, the Facebook and blog publicity surrounding the event outweighed that the “I’m a 9%” group. This could be for a number of reasons, including the fact that the public fast break was organized under a specific group (MALI), there was a real world activism component, and it challenged a specific portion of the Moroccan legal code. According to a young Moroccan blogger: Moroccan Gen Y‐ers do not hesitate to increase their growing field of individual liberties, even at the risk of offending or upsetting the sociocultural equilibrium of Morocco. The best example is the initiative of the Alternative Movement for Individual Liberties (MALI) which, using Facebook, has decided to defy the authority of the state by breaking the fast in public during Ramadan. (York 2010) On the other hand, the official and public response to the public fast break also discouraged future youth online and real world political activists. Facebook was used by the police to track down and intimidate the organizers, placing fear in the hearts of future youth activists. In addition, the negative response from fellow Moroccans, as displayed in the threatening Facebook messages received by the MALI leadership, illustrate the negative backlash from the Moroccan public towards challenging the political status quo. It is likely that for this reason, in 2010 when the MALI organizers attempted to revitalize the group’s mission, they decided to leave out the real world protest component.

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The February 20th Movement used the “I’m a 9%” and MALI public fast break movements as a foundation to propel a nationwide protest movement that inspired the nation’s youth. In analyzing the differences between three movements, one must take into account the neighboring revolutions of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. These movements undoubtedly had an “Arab Spark” effect on Morocco, inspiring many people across the nation to come together and protest for political change. Additionally, while the “I’m a 9%” and MALI public fast break groups focused on specific issues in society (government censorship and penal code 222, respectively) the February 20th Movement encompassed many political issues ranging from unemployment to freeing illegally detained prisoners. By leaving the mission and goal of the Movement broad, the February 20th Movement allowed for its single banner to represent a unifying goal of “reform.” Furthermore, unlike the “I’m a 9%” Facebook page, the February 20th Movement’s page posted information in Arabic, French, and English. Addressing the lingual diversity of Morocco in its outreach efforts was a nuanced and purposeful attempt to make the February 20th Movement inclusive to all Moroccans. This is reflected in the logo featured at the end of the “I am Moroccan” YouTube video, on which Amazigh, the native Berber language, is included as well. As of June 2011, 79% of Moroccan users choose to use the platform in French, 17% in Arabic, and 4% in English (Malin 2011). These numbers, however, can be misleading as between 2010 and 2011, while there was a rise of 404,950 Arabic users and a proportionate fall in French users. Currently, Amazigh is not a recognized Facebook language. By addressing linguistic diversity when using Facebook as a political tool in Morocco, the outreach and organizational efforts are strengthened. A great deal of the February 20th Movement’s success lies in its ability to translate online activism into real world activism. The in‐person, “real life,” human component of activism was a necessary and crucial component of the February 20th Movement’s initial success. For example, many of the founders of the February 20th Movement met at the anti‐Mubarak sit‐ins, not online through Facebook. Also, these activists held in‐person planning meetings at AMDH headquarters leading up to the national protest day. During the day of protest, the person‐to‐person contact among activists, civilians, and anti‐activists was crucial to the goal of spreading the Movement and developing the public’s understanding of the Movement. Moreover, the pictures and videos of the February 20th protest were universally available for publication by traditional media outlets, further extending the impact of the February 20th Movement’s efforts (Activist, February 28, 2011). In a discussion about the role of new media in the Arab Spring, Abdullahi Ahmed An‐Na’im explains that “new media provides tremendous opportunities for communications but it is not a substitute for the human agency of the actors. People need to communicate… so to be persuaded to other people, not only the people that they agree with.” He stresses that the value of activism lies in real world agency, and that it is through person‐to person contact that political movements can affect change and spread ideas. Abdullahi An‐Na’im also refers to the insular aspect of online activism; although debate between opposing sides can and does occur online, activists who share similar views often find themselves interacting with each other rather than challenging their opponents through online dialogue. As a result, the real challenge is for activists to “expand [movements]…through the new media, and to ultimately act on the ground, to defend [their] positions in real time and space” (Abdullahi An‐Na’im 2011). Conclusion As the Arab Awakening heated up in Tunisia and Egypt, many began to speculate about the necessary conditions for revolution in North Africa. Micah Sifry (2011), co‐founder and editor of the Personal Democracy Forum, criticized those who attributed Arab Spring youth activism to the internet and Facebook. He writes that “too many media outlets have offered us a view from afar, where some shiny new tools of communication are made out to be more important than the people doing the communicating and the messages and tactics they have chosen to use” (Sifry 2011). Rather than focus on the significance of the technology used by the revolutionaries, Sifry proposes that the youth are to credit for the revolutions, not Facebook. Indeed, Sifry’s analysis resonates with the Moroccan youth activist experience. While the online tools have played a significant role in organization and communication, the activists have made Facebook and the internet aid in their broader goal of engaging and inspiring the people of Morocco. All signs indicate that Facebook will continue to grow in user count, making the online outreach efforts of youth political activists even more effective. As the February 20th Movement expands its numbers, builds new alliances, and fights for political reforms, Facebook will continue to play a significant role in spreading information and

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