oil painting tragic prelude by j.s. curry structural-demographic causes of political instability
TRANSCRIPT
Oil painting Tragic Prelude by J.S. Curry
Structural-demographic causes of political
instability
Obama Faults Spy Agencies’ Performance in Gauging Mideast Unrest, Officials Say
By Mark MazzettiPublished: February 4, 2011
Rebellions and RevolutionsCauses of such outbreaks of political
instability may be separated into:• Structural conditions
– build up slowly and somewhat predictably – amenable to analysis and forecasting
• Triggering events– very hard, perhaps impossible to predict– example: self-immolation of the fruit
vendor that triggered Tunisian revolution• Focus on: structural conditions
Structural-demographic causes of political instability
• Popular immiseration and discontent• Elite overproduction• State fiscal distress
1. Introduction: The Theoretical Background
2. Medieval England: The Plantagenet Cycle (1150-1485)
3. Early Modern England: The Tudor-Stuart Cycle (1485-1730)
4. Medieval France: The Capetian Cycle (1150-1450)
5. Early Modern France: The Valois Cycle (1450-1660)
6. Rome: The Republican Cycle (350-30 BCE)
7. Rome: The Principate Cycle (30 BCE-285 CE)
8. Russia: The Muscovy Cycle (1460-1620)
9. Russia: The Romanov Cycle (1620-1922)
10.General Conclusions
Plan of the talk
• The dynamics of structural-demographic variables in the U.S., 1780–2010– demography and well-being– elite dynamics– socio-political instability
• Modeling the Antebellum Period• Lessons for today?
General principles from the structural-demographic theory:
I. Well-Being
• Excessive supply of labor drives down its price– consequence: falling living standards for
the commoner (nonelite) population, popular immiseration and discontent
Immigration: a major driver of labor oversupply
Col 1 vs Col 2
Percentage of population born outside the U.S.
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Pe
rce
nt
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16 Including the illegal immigrants
Measuring Well-Being
• Economic measures– real wages
• problematic for XIX c. because of rapidly evolving basket of consumables
– wages in relation to GDP per capita• an index of the share of GDP going to workers
• Biological measures– population stature (average heights)– average expectation of life
Demographic characteristics
1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Ave
rage
Hei
ght
168
170
172
174
176
178
180
Life
Exp
ect
ancy
of
10
y-o
ld
45
48
51
54
57
60
63
Stature (plotted at age=10)Life expectancy (plotted at age = 30)
Immigration and Stature
1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Pro
port
ion
For
eign
Bor
n
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Ave
rage
Hei
ght,
cm
168
170
172
174
176
178
180
immigrationstature
Note: stature is plotted by year when reaching age=10
This 1888 cartoon in Puck attacks businessmen for welcoming large numbers of low-paid immigrants, leaving the American workingman unemployed
Demography and Well-Being: summary
• 1780–1830– low immigration– GDP share to workers rising– increasing stature – increasing life expectation
• 1830–1920– high immigration– GDP share to workers falling (to 1910)– declining stature (to 1900)– declining life expectation (to 1890)
The Antebellum Model
• Purpose: to test the logical coherence of the argument not an empirical test, because data are
used in model construction a descriptive, rather than predictive
model
• The population component Rural population = growth – migration Urban population = growth + migration
The Antebellum Model, cont.
Labor dynamics:
• Demand for labor: D = growth at 3% p.a.
• Wage/GDP Index: W = (D/U)β
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880
Pop
ulat
ions
, m
illio
n
0
1
2
3
4
5
Wag
e/G
NP
inde
x
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Rural population, mlnUrban population, mlnwage/GNP index (right scale)
Figure 7.1
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880
Pop
ulat
ions
, m
illio
n
0
1
2
3
4
5
Wag
e/G
NP
inde
x
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Rural population, mlnUrban population, mlnwage/GNP index (right scale)
General principles, cont. (elites)• Low price of labor means not only
immiseration of a large segment of population, but also enrichment of those who consume labor – the elites and elite aspirants– elite numbers (and appetites) grow– high rate of upward social mobility
The Antebellum Model, cont.
Elite dynamics:
• Upward mobility: µ = µ0 (W-1 – 1)
• Elite numbers = pop. growth + µ
W: Wage/GDP Index
Estimated numbers (and proportion of population) of adult American males with wealth $10,000 or greater
year nn %
1850 85,000 1.7
1860 220,000 3.1
1870 365,000 4.2
General principles, cont.• Growing elite numbers and appetites
eventually overshoot the productive base– large segments of the elites find themselves
lacking resources to maintain status
• Since the number of power positions is limited, segments of elites/elite aspirants must be denied access to them
• Rise of the counterelites: “surplus” elites must challenge the established elites, even by violent means
• As a result, elite overproduction drives up sociopolitical instability
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Pol
ariz
atio
n In
dex:
Firs
t D
imen
sion
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Intraelite conflict
1856. Rep. Preston Brooks beating sen. Charles Sumner with a cane
General principles, cont.• Popular immiseration and elite overproduction
drive increasing sociopolitical instability
Figure 7.4
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880
Po
litic
al S
tre
ss C
ompo
nen
ts
0
5
10
15
20
MMPEMP
III. Instability
• Political Instability Event: lethal group-level conflict within a state
• Database: compiled from historical sources and compu-terized searches of newspapers
Political Violence: Main Types
1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
even
ts p
er 5
y
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
allriotslynchingsother
Components of instability: The Urban Riots ~1000 people were killed in riots between 1840 and
1860
1838 21 Missouri Mormon War (Haun's Mill massacre, Battle of Crooked River)
1844-5
2 Mormon War in Illinois and the Mormon Exodus
1857 120 Utah Mormon War (Mountain Meadows massacre)
Prelude to the Civil War: A War of Religion
1858. Kansas. Marais des Cygnes massacre
Components of instability: Sectional violence1855 1 KS Wakarusa War (Bleeding Kansas)
1856 5 KS Pottawatomie Massacre (Bleeding Kansas)
1856 5 KS Battle of Osawatomie (Bleeding Kansas)
1858 5 KS Marais des Cygnes Massacre (Bleeding Kansas)
1859 6 VA Harpers Ferry Raid (John Brown)
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880
Inst
abili
ty I
ndic
es
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Predicted PSIObserved InstabilitySectional Conflict
The Puzzle of the American Civil War
• There is no concensus among historians about the causes of the Civil War
• The role of slavery still debated• Why did the democratic process fail?
Structural-demographic theory: the key role of the elites
The American Civil War:the demographic-structural view
• Established elites: southern slaveowners, supported by northern seaboard merchants
• Counterelites: the “capitalists” (railroads, manufactures, mining, etc)
• Outcome: a social revolution– the antebellum ruling class destroyed– replaced with the new Upper Class of
northern “bourgeoisie”• manufacturers, bankers, wholesalers,
corporate lawyers, top professionals, etc
The “Slave Power”The southern domination of national politics, 1789-
1861• 12 out of 18 presidential terms
– plus northern “doughfaces” such as Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, etc
• >50% of the top government posts – 51% under John Adams, 56% under Jefferson,
57% under Jackson• Control of the Senate (but not the House)
– aided by northern “doughfaces”• 57% of Supreme Court Justices
and economic power:• 70% of the wealthiest Americans in 1860• In 1850 there were 300,000 slave owners
out of the total population of 20 mln.
The American Civil War:(1861-1865)
• not an isolated failure of policy• but a culmination of demographic-
structural trends during 1840s and 1850s:– popular immiseration – elite overproduction– elite fragmentation and conflict– increasingly lethal political violence
Lessons for Today?
• Elite overproduction was a common predictor of instability waves in all historical case studies examined in Secular Cycles
Overproduction of youths with advanced degrees
• Appears to be an excellent proxy for elite overproduction in the modern world
• It is statistically associated with revolutionary situations, e.g.– revolutions of 1848-49– USSR collapse in 1991
Egypt: proportion of the cohort aged 20-29 with tertiary education (World Bank data)