october 2010 philippine supreme court decisions on remedial law111

8/11/2019 October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law111

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October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Remedial Law (Part III)

Posted onNovember 29, 2010byCarlos Roberto Z. Lopez Posted inRemedial Law Taggedcounterclaim,extra-judicial foreclosure,forcible entry,foreclosure,injunction,judgment,

unlawful detainer

Counterclaims; tests to determine if compulsory. Going now to the first assigned error,petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is

in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitionerfor annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other

hand, alleged that petitioners counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed

docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the followingtests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the

same? (b) Would res judicatabar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsorycounterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as

well as the defendants counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and

the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim iscompulsory.

Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CAs view thatpetitioners counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by

Fernando from the CMTC is permissive.The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the

annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required toestablish petitioners claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., thenullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely

different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the

CMTCs rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became theowner of thesubject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its

favor. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et

al.,G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010

Docket fees; GSIS not exempt from payment. Petitioner [GSIS] further argues that assuming

that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same,considering petitioners exemption from all kinds of fees.

In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service InsuranceSystem from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the

GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments,

fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees.This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to

repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
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procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court

now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all

courts.

In said case, the Court ruled that:

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an

impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure

within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if theyenact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules

promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of

exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees

without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courtsindependence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the

Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance

for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expresslydeclare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence ofthe Judiciary as

mandated by the Constitution and public policy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a

vital source of the Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential element of theCourts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress

to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily

reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it

impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al.,G.R.No. 158090, October 4, 2010

Ejectment; forcible entry and unlawful detainer distinguished. Well settled is the rule that whatdetermines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are

the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such

statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.Subject to the provisions of the next

succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against

whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or

termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or thelegal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any

time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an

action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholdingor depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of

such possession, together with damages and costs.
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There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit:

(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the

defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession byforce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an

action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was

inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but becameillegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in priorphysical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by

any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat,

strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the

possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and thatdefendant holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the

right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et

al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.,G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer. An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by

Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.Subject to the provisions of the next

succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against

whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or

termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the

legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at anytime within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an

action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholdingor depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution ofsuch possession, together with damages and costs.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegallywithholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any

contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally

legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. An unlawfuldetainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies with the proper municipal

trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date

of last demand; and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession. Esmeraldo C.

Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound HomeownersAssociation, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig,G.R. No. 180687, October 6,

2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer; allegations constitute case of unlawful detainer. In the present

case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a

case of unlawful detainer:
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x x x x

3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved in the instant casecovered by TCT No. 222603 containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase

I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which property was place under community mortgage

program (CMP);

4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of defendant AMARA who,

through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the premises herein andconstructed their temporary houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from

using the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession thereof;

5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants, in conspiracy and

collusion with each other, defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes

Rodriquez, the alleged owner of the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff,lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul plaintiff

title;

6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff

demanded defendants to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the former to be given a

one (1) year period within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas ofdefendants, coupled with plaintiffs benevolence was repeatedly extended by said plaintiffstolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms and conditions. Due to failure to comply

with their undertaking despite repeated demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter

upon defendants;

7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to become members of

plaintiff, as qualification to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the CMP, towhich plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants possession by giving the same a period until the

month of December 1999, to comply with all the requirements pre-requisite to the availing of the

CMP benefits but failed and despite repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a complaintwith the Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action dated February 8, 2000;

8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere intruders or usurpers whohave no possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied by them, trifling

technicalities that would tend to defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is not

necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to afford a

sufficient period of time within which to vacate the premises peacefully another oral and formaldemands were made upon the same to that effect, and demolish the temporary office and

houses they constructed on plaintiffs property and instead defendants again, as representative to

alleged Estate of Julian Tallano filed a complaint for ejectment against plaintiffs formerPresident, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119, lodged, before

branch 11 of this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to peacefully turn over the

property they intruded upon in fact they even dared plaintiff to file a case against them boastingthat nobody can order them to vacate the premises;


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9. Defendants letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2)

formal demands letters. Thus, the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman

dated September 25, 2000;

10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of the undersigned

counsel in order to immediately institute the instant suit for which services plaintiff agreed to paythe amount of P35,000.00 plus P3,500.00 per court appearance;

x x x x

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the

plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of

the termination of the latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in

possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within oneyear from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the

complaint for ejectment.

Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated

petitioners stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming

members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the premises was subject to the conditionthat they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill theirobligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of

possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required

petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. Well settled isthe rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,

without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will

vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy againsthim. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA. Corazon D. Sarmienta, etal. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.,G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer; complaint sufficiently alleges cause of action for unlawful

detainer. Based on the foregoing, we have held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of

action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the

plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the

termination of the latters right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of

the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff

instituted the complaint for ejectment.
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In this case, respondents allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for unlawful detainer,

essential to confer jurisdiction on the MeTC over the subject matter. Thus, we accord respect to

the CAs findings, to wit:

A review of the Complaint readily reveals that land titles were issued in the name of the

respondent after it purchased the land referred to as the Bayanihan Compound through theCommunity Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.

The lots allocated to the petitioners formed part of the Bayanihan Compound which they

received as members/beneficiaries of the respondent. However, their refusal to pay the monthlyamortizations despite demands resulted in their expulsion as members and loss of recognition as

beneficiaries of the lots in question. Even when the case was referred to the barangay, no

settlement was reached. Petitioners likewise did not conform to respondents demand to vacate

the premises and return its possession. As such, respondentsought to recover possession of thesaid lots by filing a case for ejectment within a year after final demand.

Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound

Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig,G.R. No. 180687,October 6, 2010

Ejectment; unlawful detainer; sole issue is physical or material possession of property,

independent of claim of ownership. As to petitionersargument that MAHAs title is void for

having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawfuldetainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property

involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue

involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and

not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separateaction. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc.,G.R. No.

182953. October 11, 2010

Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; notice requirement. In Olizon v. Court of Appeals, the

Court expounded on the purpose for giving notice of the foreclosure sale; and if such purpose

could be attained by publication alone, then the absence of actual posting should not nullify thesale. Thus:

We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects

than posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an

announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed

nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board, nomatter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the

publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than

sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a

reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend the publicsale, and the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.

The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to

be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
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securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained,

immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or

omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, todepreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or

omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.

In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the

sale through the newspaper publication. There is completely no showing that the property was

sold for a price far below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing oreven an intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent

bank. This being so, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will

not justify the setting aside of the sale.

Olizon squarely applies in this case. It is not disputed that the Notice of Sale was duly published

in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks. Respondents did

not allege, much less prove, any mistake or omission in the published Notice of Sale calculated

to deter or mislead bidders, depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing afair price; or sale of the mortgaged properties for a price far below their value as to insinuate bad

faith; or collusion between Notary Public Magpantay, who conducted the sale, andpetitioner. Hence, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, shall

not justify the setting aside of the foreclosure sale. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T.

Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte,G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.

Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; requirement that debtor be in default. Foreclosure is valid

only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation. It is a necessary consequence

of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only whenthe debt remains unpaid at the time it is due. In a real estate mortgage, when the principal

obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on the mortgage, tohave the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the obligation. RCBCs ownAmortization Schedule readily shows the applicability of Article 1176 of the Civil Code, which

states:

Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the

interest, shall give rise to the presumption that the said interest has been paid.

The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall

likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid.

Respondents passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments even after it

made demands for him to pay his past due accounts, and even after the auction sale. RCBC

cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the deposits were notwithdrawn. It is not respondents fault that RCBC did not withdraw the money he deposited.

His obligation under the mortgage agreement was to deposit his payment in the savings account

he had opened for that purpose, in order that RCBC may debit the amount of his monthlyliabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the agreement. This bolsters the conclusion of

the CA that respondent had no unpaid installments and was not in default as would warrant the


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application of the acceleration clause and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of the

property. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura,G.R. No. 176479,

October 6, 2010

Factual findings of administrative agencies generally accorded respect and even finality. Factual

findings of administrative agencies are generally respected and even accorded finality because ofthe special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling

under their specialized jurisdiction. Given that the LMB is the administrative agency tasked with

assisting the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in themanagement and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, we defer to

its specialized knowledge on these matters. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos

Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No. 189859,

October 18, 2010.

Injunction; preliminary injunction; nature of remedy and evidence relied on. It must also be

pointed out that there was a preliminary issuethat of the parties respective petitions for

injunctionthat had to be determined before the resolution of the main case. When the case wastransferred from the SEC to the RTC, only the matter of the petitions for preliminary injunctions

had been heard and submitted for resolution. The hearings to resolve the petition to nullify theFoundations Amended By-laws were yet to be held.

An injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case. A writ of preliminary injunctionis generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the

hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete, for

only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary

injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.

An order granting a preliminary injunction is not a final resolution or decision disposing of thecase. It is based on a preliminary determination of the status quo and on petitioners entitlementto the Writ. Thus, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of

preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made before the trial on the merits is

commenced or terminated. There may be vital facts to be presented at trial which may not beobtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. The trial

court needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest. As

such, even as respondents claim that the RTC correctly ruled that the Amended By-laws are notvalid, they are still contesting the latters finding on the number of qualified apostles. This only

further underscores the need for trial to determine which of the parties claims are true and

relevant. There are other questions raised that cannot be answered in the present petition, and

nothing less than a full-blown trial is needed in order to test the conflicting claims of theparties. Manuel D. Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al.,G.R. No. 173179,

October 20, 2010.

Judgment; finality. Elemental is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be

determined by the averments in it and not by its title. Hence, while petitioners Motion (to Recall

the April 19, 2000 Order) was so denominated, it is not difficult to see that the remedy it wasseeking was actually a reconsideration of the dismissal of the Receivership Case. This Motion,
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to reiterate, does not appear to have been acted upon by the hearing officer at any time during the

interim that the subject order was issued and the two cases were eventually transferred to

Branches 138 and 142 of the RTC of Makati. In particular, when the Receivership Case wastransferred to Branch 138, petitioners Motion to Recall was still a pending incident in the

case. With the transfer of the records to the said court, the accompanying duty to resolve the

motion likewise had devolved on the said court. In other words, contrary to the findings of theCourt of Appeals, the Receivership Case has not yet attained finality, as indeed the motionseeking reconsideration of its dismissal had not been acted upon by the hearing officer himself

and had not yet, in fact, been acted upon by Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati. Moreover, the

November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc reads in full:

Under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission, parties in an

intra-corporate dispute are allowed to file a petition for certiorari questioning interlocutory ordersof the Hearing Officer based on grave abuse of discretion. Such remedy was allowed by the

Commission in order for it to have oversight power over the acts of the Hearing Officer. With

the passage [of] Republic Act 8799 otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the

jurisdiction of the Commission over intra-corporate dispute was transferred to the regularcourts. With the transfer of this function to the regular courts, the oversight power of the

Commission en banc over the acts of their Hearing Officers, has now become functusofficius. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari herein shall no longer be acted upon by theCommission and denied due course. A copy of this order, together with the records of the case,

[is] hereby forwarded to the Regional Trial Court where the main case shall be heard for their

consideration.

SO ORDERED.

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted order, the SEC En Banc has chosen not to act on

the Certiorari Petition which principally assailed the October 22 and December 16, 1999 Ordersof Hearing Officer Bacalla respectively accepting the Committee Report and denyingreconsideration, precisely because it acknowledged that it has lost jurisdiction over the petition

as a result of the supervening transfer of jurisdiction over the case to the trial court. This is

evident in its recognition of the fact that by virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, it hasthereby also lost the oversight power to correct abuses of discretion in the issuance of

interlocutory orders by its hearing officers. More to the point, it likewise ordered the transfer of

the records of the case to the trial court where it may supposedly be heard for further

consideration. On these observations, it is clear that this Order could not have written finis tothe Certiorari Petition for the basic reason that the SEC En Banc, at that given point, could no

longer validly act on the samemuch less to rule on the merits of the petition. Bank of

Commerce vs. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, etc., et al.G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010.

Judgment; finality. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective of

whether the decision is erroneous or not and no courtnot even the Supreme Courthas the

power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment isgrounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of

occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become

final at some definite date fixed by law.


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Admittedly, the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be

disturbed, altered or modified admits of exceptions in special cases. In filing the petition at

hand, however, ZFMC has once again hindered the proper appreciation of the facts of the case byfailing to submit copies of the BFD Directors orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11 November 1974,

a complete copy of the 25 June 1985 decision in MNR Case No. 4023 and the pleadings the

parties filed before the MNR and the Office of the President. Even if we were, therefore, toexcuse ZFMCs procedural lapses before the CA, there would still be a paucity of bases for thereversal of the 30 June 2003 decision in O.P. Case No. 5613. Zamboanga Forest Managers

Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply Company, et al., G.R. No. 173342. October 13,

2010.

Judgment; finality; party cannot re-litigate claims already resolved with finality. In their

Memorandum, respondents claim that CMTC cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds inany purpose other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence of a

corporate board resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued in

favor of the CMTC, should be nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel

have regularly performed their official duty when they conducted the public bidding; Fernando,as former owner of the subject property and former member of the GSIS, has the preemptive

right to repurchase the foreclosed property. These additional averments cannot be takencognizance by the Court, because they were substantially respondents arguments in theirpetition for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No. 156609.

Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated April 23, 2003,

for petitioners (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appealscommitted any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court

of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. [The petition was also denied for lack of proof of the

petition on the adverse party and its failure to attach the affidavit of service of copy of the

petition on the adverse parties. (Id. at 190.)] Said resolution became final and executory on June9, 2003. Respondents attempt to re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with

finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be allowed. Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al.,G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010

Judgment; immutability; exceptions. As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered,

amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct whatis perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the

highest Court of the land, rendered it. In the past, however, we have recognized exceptions to

this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justiceand where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.

Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Galman v.

Sandiganbayan, Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National TelecommunicationsCommission, and Republic v. de los Angeles, we reversed our judgment on the second motion

for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations

Commission, we did so on a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v.Romillo and Cosio v. de Rama, we modified or amended our ruling on the second motion for

reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals, Tan Tiac Chiong v.
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Hon. Cosico, Manotok IV v. Barque, and Barnes v. Padilla, we recalled entries of judgment after

finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:

x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the

parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering

(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling

circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault ornegligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the

review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly

prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the

attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities thattend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the

Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be sopervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be

final.

That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern fromthese discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important Billof Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent dom ain be just when

the payment for the compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To

claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this case is toforget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too, that

under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who carries the

burden of showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this case as aprivate interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leaveuncorrected. As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first impression in

our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just compensation have been

settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone accords this caseprimary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of grounds, all the

rulings we have established in the past. More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter

before us is of transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter involvedagrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in

the past half century. This reform program and its objectives would suffer a major setback if the

government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or unwittingly, through lack of good faith

in implementing the needed reforms. Truly, agrarian reform is so important to the nationalagenda that the Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked agricultural lands, its ownership and

abuse, to the idea of revolution. This linkage, to our mind, remains valid even if the landowner,

not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the distortion of the agrarian reform program.

As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid,

technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantialjustice. As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:


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Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to

facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in

technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always beeschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard

rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already

declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.

x x x x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of

technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be appliedrigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation ofjustice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mereslaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in

rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm

that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not theother way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,should give way to the realities of the situation.

We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a courts primordial

and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice,

it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment.

Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that

the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine andoverturn the assailed Resolution. We shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our duty as

defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the opportunity

pass. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines,G.R. No. 164195, October

12, 2010.

Judgment on the pleadings. At the outset, we lay stress on the Courtspolicy that cases should be

promptly and expeditiously resolved. The Rules of Court seeks to abbreviate court procedure inorder to allow the swift disposition of cases. Specifically, special strategies like demurrer to

evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judgment were adopted to attain this avowed

goal. Full-blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered on the basis of the pleadings,

supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions of the parties. In the instant petition, the Courtis confronted with the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the Makati City

RTC. Petitioners claim such adjudication on said papers and attachments is proper. The

petitioners position is impressed with merit.
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Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on

motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore,based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the annexes,

if any, without consideration of any evidence aliunde. When what is left are not genuinely issues

requiring trial but questions concerning the proper interpretation of the provisions of somewritten contract attached to the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is proper.

From the pleadings, the parties admitted the following facts:

(1) EIB is the stockbroker of petitioners.

(2) Petitioners and EIB entered into a SDAA, Annex 1 of EIBs answer, which governed the

relationship between petitioners as clients and EIB as stockbroker. Sec. 7 of the SDAA provides:

7. Lien

The client agrees that all monies and/or securities and/or all other property of the Client

(plaintiffs) in the Companys (defendant) custody or control held from time to time shall be

subject to a general lien in favour of Company for the discharge of all or any indebtedness

of the Client to the Company. The Client shall not be entitled to withdraw any monies or

securities held by the Company pending the payment in full to the Company of any

indebtedness of the Client to the Company. The company shall be entitled at any time and

without notice to the Client to retain, apply, sell or dispose of all or any of the [clients] propertyifany such obligation or liability is not discharged in full by the client when due or on demand in

or towards the payment and discharge of such obligation or liability and the Company shall be

under no duty to the client as to the price obtained or any losses or liabilities incurred or arising

in respect of any such sale or disposal. Subject to the relevant law and regulation on the matter,the client hereby authorizes the Company, on his/its behalf, at any time and without notice to the

clients property if any such obligation or liability is not discharged. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the SDAA that all monies, securities, and other properties of petitioners in EIBs

custody or control shall be subject to a general lien in favor of the latter solely for the discharge

of all or any indebtedness to EIB.

(3) From June 2003 to March 2004, petitioners, through their broker, EIB, bought 60,790,000

KKP shares of stock at the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE).

(4) On various dates in July and August 2003, petitioners bought 16,180,000 DMCI shares ofstock through EIB likewise at the PSE, while 16,000,000 DMCI shares of petitioners weretransferred to EIB by Westlink Global Equities, Inc. Thus, a total of 32,180,000 DMCI shares of

stock owned by petitioners were placed in the custody or control of EIB.

(5) On April 1, 2004, petitioners ordered the sale of 60,790,000 KPP shares to any buyer at the

price of PhP 0.14 per share. The KPP shares were eventually sold at PhP 0.14 per share to

interested buyers.


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(6) Petitioners failed to reacquire or buy back the KPP shares at PhP 0.18 per share after 30 days

from date of transaction.

(7) As petitioners failed to deliver funds to EIB to honor the buy-back obligation, not to mention

the cash account obligations of petitioners in the amount of PhP 70 million to EIB, EIB had no

recourse but to sell the DMCI shares of petitioners to reacquire the KPP shares.

(8) Thus, on various dates in June 2004, EIB, withoutpetitioners knowledge and consent, sold

petitioners 32,180,000 DMCI shares at the controlling market price. EIB later sent salesconfirmation receipts to petitioners regarding the sale of their DMCI shares, said receipts

containing the common notice, which reads:

All transaction[s] are subject to the rules and customs of the Exchange and its Clearing House. It

is agreed that all securities shall secure all my/our liabilities to e.securitiesand is authorized

in their discretion to sell all or any of them without notice to we/us whenever in the opinion ofe.securities my/our account is not properly secured. (Emphasis supplied.)

(9) EIB sent statements of accounts to petitioners showing the sale of the DMCI shares whichuniformly contained the following notice:

This statement will be considered correct unless we receive notice in writing of any exceptionswithin 5 days from receipt. Please address all correspondence concerning exceptions to our

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT. Kindly notify us in writing of any changes in your address.

(10) On January 12, 2005, petitioners wrote EIB demanding the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI

shares.

(11) On January 12, 2005, EIB rejected petitioners demand for the return of the DMCI shares, asthose were already sold to cover the buy back of the KPP shares.

(12) Petitioners prayer is the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI shares by EIB to them.

The principal issue in petitioners complaint is whether EIB can be compelled to return DMCI

shares to petitioners based on the alleged unauthorized disposal or sale of said shares to comply

with the buy back of the KKP shares. The threshold issue raised in the answer is the lack ofjurisdiction over the complaint due to the alleged nonpayment of the proper docket fees.

Affirmative defenses presented are that EIB disposed of the DMCI shares pursuant to Sec. 7 of

the SDAA, and the notices of sale, ratification and laches.

Based on the admissions in the pleadings and documents attached, the Court finds that the issues

presented by the complaint and the answer can be resolved within the four corners of said

pleadings without need to conduct further hearings. As explained by the Court inPhilippineNational Bank v. Utility Assurance & Surety Co., Inc., when what remains to be done is the

proper interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to the pleadings, then

judgment on the pleadings is proper. In the case at bar, the issue of whether the sale of DMCIshares to effectuate the buy back of the KKP shares is valid can be decided by the trial court


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based on the SDAA, Notices of Sale, Sales Confirmation Receipts, the letters of the parties, and

other appendages to the pleadings in conjunction with the allegations or admissions contained in

the pleadings without need of trial. The Makati City RTC is, therefore, correct in issuing theOctober 18, 2005 Resolution granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The CA nullified the October 18, 2005 Resolution on the ground that there are other issues thatmust be resolved during a full-blown trial, ratiocinating this way:

While it may be true that the Appellant has already admitted that the sale of the DMCI shareswas for the purpose of buying back the KPP shares and that such admission strengthened

Appellees claim that the sale of the DMCI shares is a nullity, there were other issues raised by

the Appellant that can only be threshed out during a full blown trial, viz: the average price of theKPP shares of stock, the scope of the collaterals stated in the Notices of Sale and the monetary

claims of the Appellant against the Appellees.

To the mind of the Court, these matters are not genuinely triable issues but actually minor issues

or mere incidental questions that can be resolved by construing the statements embodied in theappendages to the pleadings. The facts that gave rise to the side issues are undisputed and were

already presented to the trial court rendering trial unnecessary. Pacific Rehouse Corporation, etal. vs. EIB Securities, Inc.,G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.

Jurisdiction; bar by laches. For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitionersraise the trial courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity

of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the

IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous culturalcommunities and indigenous peoples.

As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of theproceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the

agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of

the complaint.

An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.

Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising thecourts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have

been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,

warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined toassert it. Wisely, some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam,except for the most

exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.

In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed

to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the suretyagain participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the

appellate courts adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to


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dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which

then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.

In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrineis called for because the presence of laches

cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction

for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue forthe first time in their petition before this Court. At the time that the complaint was first filed in

1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for

dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property didnot meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into

consideration. When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised

the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time

aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted bypetitioners lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it

was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its

jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the

validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had beenrenderedfunctus officiounder the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial

courts jurisdiction.

When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial courts

appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they

once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been renderedfunctus officioby theenactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial courts ruling for having been

rendered without jurisdiction.

It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had

already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellatecourt had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encounteredadverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courtsthat petitioners now want to expunge

all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all over

again. This practice cannot be allowed. Thus, even assuming arguendothat petitioners theoryabout the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already

barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances. Delfin

Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e,G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010.

Jurisdiction; determined by allegations in complaint. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in

ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to

depend on the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Neither can it bemade to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The test for

determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court

can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. Esmeraldo C.

Romullo, et al. vs.. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound HomeownersAssociation, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig,G.R. No. 180687, October 6,

2010
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Jurisdiction; jurisdiction by estoppel. Considering the foregoing discussion, we find no need to

remand the case to the trial court for the resolution of Bayerphils counterclaim. InMetromedia

Times Corporation v. Pastorin, we discussed the rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel appliesand when it does not, thus:

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appearsthat the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2,

Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs.

Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within

the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. InPeople vs.

Casiano(111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends

upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the

case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on

appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may notbe conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower

court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, forinstance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will

not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had

jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by

law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

In this case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the counterclaim although it erroneously ordered

its automatic dismissal. As already discussed, the trial court should have instead directedBayerphil to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable time. Even then, records show that

the trial court heard the counterclaim although it again erroneously found the same to beunmeritorious. Besides, it must also be mentioned that Bayerphil was lulled into believing thatits counterclaim was indeed compulsory and thus there was no need to pay docket fees by virtue

of Judge Claravalls October 24, 1990 Resolution. Petitioners also actively participated in the

adjudication of the counterclaim which the trial court adjudge to be unmeritorious. CalibreTraders Inc., Mario Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc.,

G.R. No. 161431, October 13, 2010.

Jurisdiction; payment of docket fees. EIB asserts that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the

complaint on account of insufficient dockets fees. Although petitioners paid a total of PhP

120,758.80 in legal fees with the RTC, EIB argues that what was paid is based merely on

petitioners prayer for moral damages of PhP 3 million, exemplary damages of PhP 3 million,and attorneys fees of PhP 2 million, but not including petitioners claim for PhP 4.5 million as

actual damages as averred in paragraph 9 of the complaint. Thus, EIB, relying onManchester

Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Manchester)and Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.

Asuncion, maintains that the RTC should not have entertained the case.
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It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the

prescribed docket fee. A plain reading of the prayer does not show that petitioners asked for the

payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million. The reliefs asked by petitioners in the prayer are:

1. Upon the filing of the Complaint, a writ of preliminary attachment be issued ex

parteagainst defendant pursuant to Section 2, Rule 57 of the 1997Rules of CivilProcedure;

2. After trial, judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant as

follows:

On the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONdeclaring void the sale by defendant of the 32,180,000

DMCI shares of stock of plaintiffs and directing defendant to return to plaintiffs the latters32,180,000 DMCI shares of stock, or in the event the return thereof is not possible, holding

defendant liable under Articles 1888,1889,1909 and other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.

On the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIONdirecting defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages in

the amount of at least P3,000,000.00;

On the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTIONdirecting defendant to pay plaintiffs exemplary damages

in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00; and

On the FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTIONdirecting defendant to pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in

the amount of P2,000,000.00 and such amounts as may be proven at the trial as litigation

expenses.

Other just and equitable relief are likewise prayed for.

Since the prayer did not ask for the payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million, the clerk ofcourt correctly assessed the amount of PhP 120,758.80 as docket fees based on the total amount

of PhP 8 million consisting of PhP 3 million as moral damages, PhP 3 million as exemplarydamages, and PhP 2 million as attorneys fees.

In disputing the fees paid by petitioners, respondent relies on our ruling inManchester, where wesaid that all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the

amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,

and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.

EIB insinuates that petitioners, by alleging the substantial loss of PhP 4.5 million from the sale of

the DMCI shares but not specifying the amount in their prayer, circumvented theManchesterruling to evade the payment of the correct filing fees. This postulation is incorrect. It is clear that

petitioners demanded the return of the DMCI shares in the prayer of the complaint and NOT the

alleged loss in the value of the shares. If the DMCI shares are returned, then no actual damagesare suffered by petitioners. A recall of the averment in par. 9 of the complaint shows that the

alleged loss of PhP 4.5 million to petitioners resulted from the sale of DMCI shares at PhP 0.24

per share when they acquired it at PhP 0.38 per share. More importantly, the court was

proscribed by theManchesterruling from granting actual damages of PhP 4.5 million to


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petitioners, because precisely the alleged damages were never sought in the prayer.Ergo, EIBs

attack on the trial courts assumption of jurisdiction must fail.Pacific Rehouse Corporation, et

al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc.,G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.

Jurisdiction; Supreme Courts certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of Commission on Elections

(COMELEC).First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Courtimproperly exercised its limited certiorarijurisdiction; they theorize that Mitras petition failed

to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

COMELEC. They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the COMELECsfindings of fact to be final and non-reviewable. The COMELECs submission in this regard

that the extraordinary remedy of certiorariis limited to corrections of questions of law and that

the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on

certiorariis wholly erroneous. This submission appears to have confused the standards of theCourts power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the

COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitras petition before the Court.

To recall, Mitra brought his case before us viaa petition forcertiorari

,pursuant to Section 2,Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we

emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and notunder the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground, i.e., on the

jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The basis for the

Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court isSection 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that [U]nless otherwise provided by

[the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought

to the Supreme Court on certiorariby the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)

specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.ThisRule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari,

subject to the exception clauseexcept as hereinafter provided.

InAratuc v. Commission on Elections andDario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-citedconstitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65

(although with a different reglementary period for filing) and not to an appeal by certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now

clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,except as therein provided. In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:

The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has actedwithout or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation

to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional

issues.

The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power,pointedly states that


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Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving

rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of anybranch or instrumentality of the Government.

This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave

abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review byappeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.

Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELECs position that patently

confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, withthe appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.

Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938,October 19, 2010.

Jurisdiction; Supreme Courts certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of COMELEC; review of

factual issues. We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition thatthe Court erred in exercising its limited certiorarijurisdiction. Although the COMELEC is

admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and the Rules of Court

provide, we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is tointervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been

given the authority to resolve the factual issues. As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in

the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in a

certiorari case the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. One such exception iswhen the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its

discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable. In this situation, we are duty bound under

the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant graveabuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.

Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse ofdiscretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a

COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material

representation to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the

COMELECs grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground todeny a COC is deliberate false representation. We completely addressed this issue and, in the

process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found

that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.

Second, the private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use subjective non-legal

standards (i.e., interior decoration of the room) in arriving at its decision; it merely stated how itperceived Mitras alleged residence. The private respondents additionally claim that the

quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the findings of the COMELEC should be clear and
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convincing evidence, which level of evidence does not obtain in the present case. The assailed

COMELEC ruling speaks for itself on the matter of the standards the COMELEC used. We

found that the COMELEC plainly used a subjective non-legal standard in its analysis andthereby, the COMELEC used wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitras

residence at the Maligaya Feedmill is not the residence contemplated by law. We reiterate that

the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on thephotographs of Mitras Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could nothave been a residence because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the

room. Thus, the COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution (which the COMELEC en bancfully

supported) did not merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; morethan this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the

qualities of a home that the Second Division wanted to see. To quote:

The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed residence are telling. The said pictures show

a small, sparsely furnished room which is evidently unlived in and which is located on the

second floor of a structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse. These pictures likewise

show that the residence appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any [personality]which would have imprinted Mitras personality thereto such as old family photographs and

memorabilia collected through the years. In fact, an appreciation of Mitras supposedresidence raises doubts whether or not he indeed lives there. Verily, what is lacking thereinare the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it ones residence. Perhaps,

at most, and to this Commissions mind, this small room could have served as Mitras resting

area whenever he visited the said locality but nothing more.

This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former employees and customers

of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitras residence is located in an unsavory location,considering the noise and pollution of being in a factory area, and that the same, in fact, had been

Maligaya Feed Mills office just a few months back, militates against Mitras claim that the same

has been his residence since early 2008. These information make it clear to this Commission

that this room is not a home.

Thus presented, the COMELECs requirement of what should be considered a residencecannot but be a highly subjective one that finds no basis in law, in jurisprudence, or even in fact.

Third, we cannot likewise agree with the private respondents theory that the quantum ofevidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the COMELEC should be clear and

convincing evidence, as it misappreciates that we nullified the COMELECs findings because it

used the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusions. The private respondents fail to

realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on thecancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate

misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan,

Palawan. While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra

adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlanbeginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. As our Decision discussed and as

repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently

convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only


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grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the

submitted evidence. To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out that

we (1) totally disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the otherhand, properly considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease contract,

which showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the

evidence showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of origin. These issues are not newissues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010Decision. At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents misleading

points in order to clear the air.

1. The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove

Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced. This

argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barredand was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties. That a lease

is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice. What is important is that it is renewable at the

option of the parties. In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply

continues and is deemed renewed.

2. In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, theprivate respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy

of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3,

2009 allegedly showing Mitras signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before

us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra. Although theprivate respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined the recently

submittedcolored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding;

the alleged signature appears to usto be a mere hazy superimposition that does not bear anyresemblance at all to Mitras signature. We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009

CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value. It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his

secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters

participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.

3. The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010,from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of

the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission

was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan. The Certification

pertinently states:

This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office

regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. However, the

Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list

of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.

This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident in Penida Subdivision, Puerto

Princesa City

october 2010 philippine supreme court decisions on remedial law111

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