Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial LawJurisdiction; appeal in case involving Sharia law.Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in 1989 of the law creating the Sharia Appellate Court and after the Court, per Resolution of June 8, 1999, authorized its creation, the Sharia Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices.Until such time that the Sharia Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the [Sharia District Court] filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules. To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating from Sharia courts. Among these was one involving the issue of whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of a motion to implement a writ of execution. Still another involved the Sharia courts jurisdiction in custody and guardianship proceedings, nullity of marriage and divorce when the parties were both married in civil and Muslim rites, and settlement of estate proceedings where the deceased was alleged to be not a Muslim, or where the estate covered properties situated in different provinces. The instant petition, involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of theSDCover a complaint for quieting of title, was properly instituted before the Court.SultanYahyaJerry M.Tomawisvs. HonRasadG.Balindong,etal.,G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010Jurisdiction; concurrent jurisdiction of Shariaa court and regional trial court in certain cases.As things stood prior to theeffectivitydate ofBP129, theSDChad, by virtue of PD 1083, original jurisdiction, concurrently with theRTCsandMTCs, over all personal and real actions outside the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved were Muslims, except those for ejectment. Personal action is one that is founded onprivityof contracts between the parties; and in which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages. Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored on theprivityof real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of real property or interest in it. On the other hand,BP129, as amended, vests the RTC or the municipal trial court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest in it, and the value of the property subject of the case or the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes within the jurisdictional competence of the RTC or theMTC.Orbetavs.Orbetadifferentiated personal action from real action in the following wise:A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from theavermentsin the underlying complaint, is basically a suit for recovery of possession and eventualreconveyanceof real property which, underBP129, as amended, falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC orMTC. In an action forreconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are two facts that, admitting them to be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely: (1) that the plaintiff is the owner of the land or has possessed the land in the concept of owner; and (2) that the defendant has illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the land. A cursory perusal of private respondents complaint readily shows that that these requisites have been met: they alleged absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land, and they were illegally dispossessed of their land by petitioner. The allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case for an action forreconveyance. Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether the jurisdiction of the RTC orMTCis to the exclusion of theSDC. Petitioners version of the law would effectively remove the concurrent original jurisdiction granted by Art. 143, par. 2(b) of PD 1083 to civil courts and Sharia courts over, among others:All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawfuldetainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. x x xPetitioners interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must bear in mind that even if Sharia courts are considered regular courts, these are courts of limited jurisdiction. As we have observed inRulona-AlAwadhivs.Astih, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws creating said courts was promulgated to fulfill the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced in their communities. It is a special law intended for Filipino Muslims, as clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides that The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies, this Code:(a)Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land and seeks to make Islamic institutions more effective;(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and(c)Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims.A reading of the pertinent provisions ofBP129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Sharia courts. A look at the scope ofBP129 clearly shows that Sharia courts were not included in the reorganization of courts that were formerly organized under RA 296.The pertinent provision inBP129 states:SECTION 2.Scope. The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment,BP129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts.In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed bySDCswith that ofRTCsunder PD 1083. . . . . While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of theSDCsand theRTCswith respect to cases involving only Muslims, theSDChas exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims to the exclusion of theRTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional conferment, found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim, who may be the opposing party against a Muslim. SultanYahyaJerry M.Tomawisvs. HonRasadG.Balindong,etal.,G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010Jurisdiction; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) without jurisdiction to resolve issues involving identification and selection of farmer-beneficiaries under CARP.Petitioners argue that theDARABis not clothed with the power or authority to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the same is an Agrarian Law Implementation case, thus, an administrative function falling within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Petitioners argument is well taken. InLercanavs.Jalandoni,this Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of theDARAB.RomanitaConcha,etal. vs.PaulinoRubio,etal.,G.R. No. 162446, March 29, 2010Jurisdiction; determined by allegations in complaint.Moreover,the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In the instant case, private respondents petition inCivil Case No. 102-97sufficiently alleged the concurrent original jurisdiction of theSDC.SultanYahyaJerry M.Tomawisvs. HonRasadG.Balindong,etal.,G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010Jurisdiction; jurisdiction of Special Agrarian Court over just compensation cases under CARL.Jurisdiction is the courts authority to hear and determine a case. The courts jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. In this case, the law that confers jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts designated by the Supreme Court in every province is Republic Act (R.A.) 6657 or theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Sections 56 and 57 are the relevant provisions:SEC. 56.Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court.The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts.SEC. 57.Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for a province has the original and exclusive jurisdiction overall petitionsfor the determination of just compensation in that province. InRepublic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases: (1)all petitionsfor the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657. By special jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located outside their regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts. R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the singlesalacourts of RTC, Branch 64 ofGuihulnganCity and RTC, Branch 63 ofBayawanCity as Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just because the lands subject of such cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.Since RTC, Branch 32 ofDumagueteCity is the designated Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction overallcases for determination of just compensation involving agricultural lands within that province, regardless of whether or not those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.Land Bank of the Philippines vs.CorazonM.Villegas/Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs ofCatalinoV. Noel,etal.,G.R. No. 180384/G.R. No. 180891, March 26, 2010Jurisdiction;Sandiganbayanhas exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of writs of sequestration issued byPCGG.The task of ascertaining the validity of writs of sequestration issued by thePCGG, when called into question, is the sole province of theSandiganbayan, the issues involved therein being factual in nature. It is well settled that theSandiganbayanhas full authority to decide any and all incidents pertaining to an ill-gotten [wealth] case, including the propriety of the issuance of the writs of sequestration. Thus, any question on the correctness of the lifting of the sequestration writ againstHeacockupon its motion, either in Civil Case No. 0002-hadHeacockbeen allowed to intervene-or in Civil Case No. 0101, hardly merits further discussion. TheSandiganbayans questioned resolutions lifting the sequestration writ could be, as it correctly was, decided independently of what petitioner claims to be the existence of other controverted issues that require trial on the merits before the reliefs prayed for . . . may be granted.Presidential Commission on Good Government vs.H.E.Heacock, Inc.etal.,G.R. No. 165878, March 30, 2010Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; lack of authority to sign not fatal in Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession.Petitioners further claim that the lack of authority to sign the certificate on non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession rendered the same worthless and should be deemed as non-existent.MBTCasserts otherwise, citingSpousesArquizavs. Court of Appealswhere we held that an application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding which is in substance merely a motion, and therefore does not require such a certification. Petitioners contention lacks basis. InGreen Asia Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,where the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was questioned in an application for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, we held that:x x x it bears stressing thata certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading.In this case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by private respondent is not an initiatory pleading.Although private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion.What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion is filed. (Emphasis supplied)It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of possession was denominated as a petition, it was in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by theMBTCdid not render the writ irregular. After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to the motion. Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in theMBTCs petition was signed by its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition defective in form.TheParents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy,etal. vs. The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; requirement of proof of authority to execute (CSC).With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case, Atty.Tiufailed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty.Tiudid not even bother to controvert Palers allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.Commission onAppointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L.Tiuvs.CelsoM. Paler,G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010Pleadings; verification(CSC).First, we tackle Atty.Tiusauthority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification.Its representative,lawyeror any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification.Commission on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L.Tiuvs.CelsoM. Paler,G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010Procedural rules; election cases.InHofervs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, a case that is closely analogous to the instant petition, the Court emphasized that[p]roceduralrules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also anexpeditiousdetermination of the popular will of the electorate.Thus, the time limit set by the rules is not something to be taken lightly, for it was stressed in the same case that the observance of theHRETRules in conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously. QuotingBaltazarvs. Commission of Elections, The Court reiterated inHoferthat:By their very nature andgiven the public interest involved in the determination of the results of an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be resolvedspeedily, otherwise the will of the electorate would be frustrated. And the delay brought about by the tactics resorted to by petitioner is precisely the very evil sought to be prevented by election statutes and controlling case law on the matter.From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best interest of the electorate, ensuring the determination of the latters will within a reasonable time. In sum, there is absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding that theHRETgravely abused its discretion by not granting petitioner an extension of time to present additional evidence and formally offer the same.Representative Alvin S.Sandoval vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,Josephine VeroniqueR.Lacson-Noel and Hon. SpeakerProsperoNograles,G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010Procedural rules; relaxation of period for appeal (CSC).Section 72 ofCSCMemorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999, provides for the period of appeal for non-disciplinary actions, to wit:Section 72.When and Where to File. A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the same period.Palersson received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Palers motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2004. Thus, Palers had until April 2, 2004 within which to file his appeal with theCSC. It was filed, however, only on April 5, 2004. Nevertheless, theCSCentertained the appeal in the interest of substantial justice. We agree with theCSC. We uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules becausePalersappeal was meritorious. This is not the first time that the Court has upheld such exercise of discretion. InRosales, Jr. v.Mijaresinvolving Section 49(a) of theCSCRevised Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled:On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of the respondent to theCSCwas made beyond the period therefor under Section 49(a) of theCSCRevised Rules of Procedure, theCSCcorrectly ruled that:Movantclaims thatMijares appeal was filed way beyond thereglementaryperiod for filing appeals. He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have given due course to said appeal.The Commission need not delve much on the dates whenMijareswas separated from the service and when he assailed his separation.Suffice it to state that the Commission found his appeal meritorious. This being the case, procedural rules need not be strictly observed.This principle was explained by in the case ofMaunavs.CSC, 232SCRA388, where the Supreme Court ruled, to wit:Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners appeal was filed out of time,it is within the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties.As held by the Court in a number of cases:x x xIt bears stressing that the case before theCSCinvolves the security of tenure of a public officersacrosanctlyprotected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and inordinate application of Section 49(a) of theCSCRevised Rules of Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)Constantino-David vs.Pangandaman-Ganialikewise sustained theCSCwhen it modified an otherwise final and executory resolution and awardedbackwagesto the respondent, in the interest of justice and fair play. The Court stated No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec. 3, Rule I, of theRevised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Servicethat [a]dministrativeinvestigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. This authority is consistent with its powers and functions to [p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws being the central personnel agency of the Government.Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of theCSCand a compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court. x x xWhen substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice on the part of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its face.Commission onAppointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L.Tiuvs.CelsoM. Paler,G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010Writ of possession; nature.The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond if the redemption period has not yet lapsed. If the redemption period has expired, then the filing of the bond is no longer necessary. Any and all questions regarding the regularity and validity of the sale is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding and such questions may not be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession. InSantiago vs. Merchants Rural Bank ofTalavera, Inc.,we defined the nature of a petition for a writ of possession:The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession isexparteand summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.By its very nature, anexpartepetition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.Gregorio Espinoza, in his own personal capacity and as surviving spouse, and Jo Anne G. Espinoza, herein represented by their attorney-in-fact, BanSangil,G.R. No. 175380, March 22, 2010Writ of possession; nature of proceedings for issuance.The petitioners argue that the court below did not conduct trial for the presentation of evidence to support its conclusion that the intervention would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession, thereby depriving them of due process. Petitioners contention is without merit. It is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the foreclosed property, uponexparteapplication and the posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period. Thisexpartepetition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a judicial process as contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code. As a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. InIdolorvs. Court of Appeals, we described the nature of theexpartepetition for issuance ofpossessorywrit under Act No. 3135 to be a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As anexparteproceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard.It does not matter even if the herein petitioners were not specifically named in the writ of possession nor notified of such proceedings.InSagarbarriavs. Philippine Business Bank,we rejected therein petitioners contention that he was denied due process when the trial court issued the writ of possession without notice. Here in the present case, we similarly reject petitioners contention that the trial court should have conducted a trial prior to issuing the Order denying their motion to intervene. As it is, the law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession may be granted only after documentary and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the court. As long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed for. There is no need for petitioners to offer any documentary or testimonial evidence for the court to grant the petition.TheParents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy,etal. vs. TheMetropolitan Bank & Trust Company,G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010Writ of possession; when exception to issuance does not apply.In this case, we find that petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because they are not claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor. Petitioner-teachers and students did not claim ownership of the properties, but merely averred actual physical possession of the subject school premises. Petitioner-teachers possession of the said premises was based on the employment contracts they have with the school. As regards the petitioner-students,Alcuazvs. Philippine School of Business AdministrationandNon vs. Dames IIcharacterized the school-student relationship as contractual in nature. As such, it would be specious to conclude that the teachers and students hold the subject premisesindependentof or adverse toSMCA. In fact, their interest over the school premises is necessarily inferior to that of the school. Besides, their contracts are with the school and do not attach to the school premises. Moreover, the foreclosure of the current school premises does not prevent theSMCAfrom continuing its operations elsewhere. At this point, it is relevant to note that in the Joint Decision dated August 16, 2005, the trial court found thatSMCAwas not a third party and was therefore bound by the said writ of possession. Consequently, it affirmed the issuance of the writ of possession.MBTCthus correctly argued that petitioners did not have superior rights to that ofSMCAover the subject property because their supposed possession of the same emanated only from the latter. Since petitioners possession of the subject school premises stemmed from their employment or enrollment contracts with the school, as the case may be, necessarily, their right to possess the subject school premises cannot be adverse to that of the school and of its owners. As such, the petitioners cannot be deemed third parties as contemplated in Act No. 3135, as amended.TheParents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy,etal. vs. The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010Writ of possession; when issued; period of redemption.As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing anexpartemotion under oath for that purpose in the registration orcadastralproceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law with the Regional Trial Court of the province or place where the real property or any part thereof is situated, in the case of mortgages duly registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also directs in express terms the said court to issue the order for a writ of possession. However, this rule is not without exception. InBaricanvs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of a court to issue anexpartewrit of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. This ruling was reiterated inPolicarpiovs. Active Bankwhere we held that:Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property. Thus, whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of possession, the trial court has to issue it as a matter of course.However, the obligation of the trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the propertyclaiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession. (Emphasis supplied)TheParents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy,etal. vs. The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010Writ of possession; remedy to challenge; appeal.Petitioners assert that Section 8 of Act No. 3135 specifically refers to the debtor as the party who is required to file a petition for the cancellation of the writ of possession in the same proceeding in which possession was requested. As they are not the debtors referred to in the said law, petitioners argue that the filing of a petition for the cancellation of the writ of possession in the same proceeding in which possession was requested, does not apply to them. Hence, they allege that it was improper for the CA to conclude that the Petition forCertiorariwas the wrong remedy in the case where the writ of possession was issued. Respondent, on the other hand, avers thatcertiorariis available only when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case, the respondent argues that the court merely granted the Writ of Possession in accordance with settled jurisprudence and that the remedy ofcertioraridoes not lie because there is an available remedy which is an appeal. We hold that the CA correctly held that the proper remedy is a separate, distinct and independent suit provided for in Section 8 of Act No. 3135viz:SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession canceled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during thependencyof the appeal.InDe Gracia vs. San Jose,we held that:x x x the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the court.And any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the consequent cancellation of the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such question is not to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since, under the Act, the proceeding for this isexparte.(Emphasis supplied)Since the writ of possession had already been issued inLRCCase No. 6438 per Order dated November 29, 2005, the proper remedy is an appeal and not a petition forcertiorari, in accordance with our ruling inMetropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. TanandGovernment Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals.As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctable by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved.TheParents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy,etal. vs. TheMetropolitan Bank & Trust Company,G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010EvidenceDocumentary evidence and oral evidence; weight accorded.Furthermore, petitioners failed to adduce any evidence to show that the real and personal properties acquired and registered in the names ofElfledoand respondent formed part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from Joses alleged partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. They failed to refute respondents claim thatElfledoand respondent engaged in other businesses. Edison even admitted thatElfledoalso soldInterwoodlumber as a sideline. Petitioners could not offer any credible evidence other than their bare assertions. Thus, we apply the basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the former carries more weight.Heirs of JoseLim, represented byElenitoLimvs. Juliet VillaLim,G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010Evidence of existence of partnership.At this juncture, our ruling inHeirs of Tan EngKeevs. Court of Appealsis enlightening. Therein, we cited Article 1769 of the Civil Code, which provides:Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:(1)Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons;(2)Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;(3)The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived;(4)The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is aprimafacieevidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:(a)As a debt by installments or otherwise;(b)As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;(c)As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;(d)As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;(e)As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or otherwise.Applying the legal provision to the facts of this case, the following circumstances tend to prove thatElfledowas himself the partner of Jimmy and Norberto: 1)Cresenciatestified that Jose gaveElfledoP50,000.00, as share in the partnership, on a date that coincided with the payment of the initial capital in the partnership; (2)Elfledoran the affairs of the partnership, wielding absolute control, power and authority, without any intervention or opposition whatsoever from any of petitioners herein; (3) all of the properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership, were registered in the name ofElfledo; (4) Jimmy testified thatElfledodid not receive wages or salaries from the partnership, indicating that what he actually received were shares of the profits of the business; and (5) none of the petitioners, as heirs of Jose, the alleged partner,demanded periodic accounting fromElfledoduring his lifetime. As repeatedly stressed inHeirs of Tan EngKee, a demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership.Heirs of JoseLim, represented byElenitoLimvs. Juliet VillaLim,G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010Evidence of ownership of real property.We agree with petitioners that respondents failed to present any evidence to show that they owned parts of the property in dispute. First, in the stipulation of facts during thepre-trial conference before theMCTC, respondents admitted that the land was owned by Adriano. While bothJuanitoand Ronald claimed that Adriano donated to them their respective portions of the property when they got married in 1978 and 1987, respectively, they did not present any deed of donation. As theMCTCstated in its 19 November 2003 Decision, the transfers cannot be by donation because the law requires that for donation to be effective, it must be in a public instrument and in this case there is none.Second, the tax declaration offered by respondents as evidence only mentioned Adriano as the owner of the whole property. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondents did not present any credible explanation why the tax declaration was only under the name of Adriano. Third, contrary to Ronalds claim, the June 1994 deed ofmortgageidnot clearly show that he was the owner of the property and that petitioners recognized him as such. While Ronalds name appeared in the body of the deed, the designation as owner of the property under his name was crossed-out. It was Adriano who signed the deed of mortgage and the designation as owner of the property appeared under his name. Fourth, Ronald was present when the deed of sale was executed on 22 September 1994 and he even signed as one of the witnesses. We find it hard to believe that Ronald and Adriano did not understand the contents of the deed when it was written in their local dialect. Moreover, it took respondents more than seven years to question Adrianos sale of the whole property to petitioners. Lastly, respondents claim ownership of the property based on OCT No.AO-7236. However, a certificate of title is not equivalent to title. InLeeTekShengvs. Court of Appeals, we explained:By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document [the Original Certificate of Title or the Transfer Certificate of Title]. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.Ownership is different from a certificate of title. TheTCTis only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeable.(Emphasis supplied)SpousesMelchor,etal. vs. Ronald B.Bernal,etal.,G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010Preponderance of evidence.In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.Preponderance of evidenceis the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with the termgreater weight of the evidenceorgreater weight of the credible evidence.Preponderance of evidenceis a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.Limsuccessfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other than their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.TeofistoOo,etal.vs.Vicente N.Lim,G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010Preponderance of evidence; how determined.Petitioners heavily rely on Jimmys testimony. But that testimony is just one piece of evidence against respondent.It must be considered and weighed along with petitioners other evidencevis--visrespondents contrary evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:SECTION I.Preponderance of evidence, how determined.In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.Heirs of JoseLim, represented byElenitoLimvs. Juliet VillaLim,G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010Presumptions; entries in public record.The memorandumof theDOJspecial committee also cited only the affidavits ofSolimanandPeraltaand then concluded that the evidence presented before the Senate Committees had overcome the presumption that the entries in the certificate of live birth ofQuintosareprimafacieevidence of the facts stated therein.We agree with the Court of Appeals that while the affidavits ofSolimanandPeraltamight have cast doubt on the validity ofQuintos certificate of live birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by competent authority. The rule stands that (d)ocumentsconsisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer areprimafacieevidence of the facts stated therein. x x x. We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons why theQuintosesandTomedaswere not included in the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration ofQuintos certificate of live birth was made 10 years after her birth and not anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the certificates late filing was meant to use it fraudulently. Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of 14 July 1999,Quintoshas not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy ofQuintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted bySolimanandPeraltato the Senate Committees.Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,etal. vs. MichaelAlfioPennisi,G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010Presumptions; presumption of authenticity and due execution of notarial document overcome by clear and convincingevidnce.It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys aprimafaciepresumption of authenticity and due execution and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption. However, such clear and convincing evidence is present here. While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details of Manuels Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Marthas are complete. The absence of Manuels data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have Manuels positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuels true signature.Titan Construction Corporation vs. Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David,G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010Presumptions; regularity in performance of official function.The key to resolving the petitions lies in the validity of thePagadiancase execution sale. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official function here applies.Conformably, any party alleging irregularities vitiating an auction sale must come forward with clear and convincing proof. InG.R. No. 176123,FPChas not discharged its burden of proof. Apart from its bare allegations, it has not come forward with any evidence, let alone a clear and convincing one, of non-compliance with the requirement of a minimum of five days prior notice of sale of property on execution. Hence, in the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the sheriff performed his official duty of posting the notices of sale within thereglementaryperiod. In finding otherwise, the Manila RTC placed the burden of proof on the sheriff without jurisprudential basis.JoseCabaralTiuvs. First Plywood Corporation/JoseCabaralTiuvs. Timber Exports, Inc. Angel Domingo, Country Bankers Ins. Corp.,PerfectoMondarte, Jr. and CesarDacal,G.R. No. 176123/G.R. No. 185265, March 10, 2010Presumptions; regularity of notarized documents.Notarized documents, like the deed in question [i.e., Sale and Transfer of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of Land], enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence. This petitioner failed to discharge.FlordelizaEmilio vs.BilmaRapal,G.R. No. 181855, March 30, 2010,G.R. No. 181855, March 30, 2010Presumption; regularity of tax declaration indicating assessed value of property.Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey by Engineer Robert C.Pangyarihan, which was attached to and formed part of the records, contained a tax declaration indicating that the subject property has an assessed value ofP110,220.00. It is basic that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. Honorio Bernardo vs. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas,G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010

Here are select February 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on remedial law:Civil ProcedureActions; cause of action; elements; failure to state a cause of action is ground for dismissal.A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant and(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of. A perusal of the Amended Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation of any act or omission on the part of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina;G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013Actions; moot and academic principle.Verily, inGancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor and Employment,the Court emphatically stated that:It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. There was no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders dated October 31, 2001 and April 10, 2002 since any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. By the very admission of PLDT, it can no longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking the telecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to Hong Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since, effectively, there were no more circuits to speak of.Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from the above discussion, and as succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more for the RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere surplusage.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Eastern Telecom Philippines;G.R. No. 163037. February 6, 2013Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions.A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Although the controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forwards and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was as issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words, many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed.Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra, etc., et al.;G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale.The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:Section 2.Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United StatesFederal Rules of Civil Procedure(Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal Courts (US Federal Courts), x x x.The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has been patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b). There is no obstacle to adopting such principles and parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated form or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the various US State Courts.x x xBearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum inCorrigan, supra,that a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts.Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G. Sandoval, et al.;G.R. No. 169677. February 18, 2013Appeals; issues raised for first time on appeal and not raised in proceedings in lower court are barred by estoppel.As to the first issue, there is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of respondents Motion to Dismiss petitioners Amended Complaint was not raised by petitioners before the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents petition forcertiorarifiled with the CA. It was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision that this matter was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule.Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina;G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013Contempt; distinction between criminal and civil contempt.InPeople v. Godoy,this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it cleat that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendants intent in committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the courts order is not a defense in civil contempt.Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.;G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013Contempt; contempt akin to libel and principle of privileged communication may be invoked in contempt proceeding.InPeople v. Castelo,the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of the appellant.Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.;G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013Execution; execution pending appeal; not a bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits. First of all, as held inLegaspi v. Ong,[e]xecution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal.O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge;G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013Execution; execution of RTC judgment does not automatically mean that issues on appeal have become moot and academic; Moot and academic principle.Moreover, even assuming that the writ of execution in the instant case were not void, the execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening event that would automatically moot the issues in the appealed case foraccion publiciana,which is pending before the CA. otherwise, there would be no use appealing a judgment, once a writ of execution is issued and satisfied. That situation would be absurd. On the contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or annulment of an executed judgment. Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should be restitution or reparation as warranted by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any supervening event, there is still the possibility of the appellate courts reversal of the appealed decision even if already executed and, consequently, of a restitution or a reparation.In any case, the issues in the appealed case foraccion publicianacannot, in any way, be characterized as moot and academic. InOsmena III v. Social Security System of the Philippines,we defined a moot and academic case or issue as follows:A case or issue is considered not and academic when itceases to present a justiciable controversyby virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or adeclaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.In such instance, there isno actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.Applying the above definition to the instant case, it is obvious that there remains an unresolved justiciable controversy in the appealed case foraccion publiciana.In particular, did respondent-spouses Oria really encroach on the land of the petitioner? If they did, does he have the right to recover possession of the property? Furthermore, without preempting the disposition of the case foraccion publicianapending before the CA, we note that if the respondents built structures on the subject land, and if they were builders in good faith they would be entitled to appropriate rights under the Civil Code. This Court merely points out that there are still issues that the CA needs to resolve in the appealed case before it.Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria;G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013Execution; effects of void writ of execution; requirement of good reason in execution pending appeal.In any case, proceed to rule that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and proceedings conducted pursuant to it were also void and of no legal effect. To recall, this Court affirmed the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84632, annulling the RTCs Omnibus Order granting the Motion for Immediate Execution pending appeal. We affirmed the CA Decision because of the RTCs failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for the issuance thereof as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for strict compliance with the requirement for the statement of good reason, because execution pending appeal is the exception rather than the rule.Since the writ of execution was manifestly void for having been issued without compliance with the rules, it is without any legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ was issued at all. Consequently, all actions taken pursuant to the void writ of execution must be deemed to have not been taken and to have had no effect. Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a violation of the right of due process of the judgment debtors respondent-spouses herein.Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria;G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013Hierarchy of courts; exceptions.Second,while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that recourse should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of certain exceptions under well-defined circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorarion the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition; when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy; when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our immediate and direct handling of the case.Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.;G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013Judgments; immutability of judgments.The issue on the nullity of Maniegos title had already been foreclosed when this Court denied Maniegos petition for review in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which became final and executory on 19 January 2012. It is settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust enrichment by Poblete.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete;G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013Judgments; pro hac vice; nature.Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to grant a motion for new trial after the judgment of conviction had become final and executory. InPeople v. Licayan,all the accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death by the trial court. More than two years after their conviction became final and executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court. They attached thereto theSinumpaang Salaysayexecuted by two of their co-accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and Licayan had not participated in the commission of the crime. Since the OSG also recommended the opening of the case, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of newly discovered evidence.It is worth pointing that the motion inLicayanwas grantedpro hac vice,which is a Latin term used by courts to refer to rulings rendered for this one particular occasion. A ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines;G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013Judgments; void judgment; nature and effect; may be resisted in any action or proceeding.A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.x x xAccordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla;G.R. No. 194168. February 13, 2013Liberal construction of the rules.In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula;G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013Motions; notice and hearing requirements; effect of non-compliance; notice requirement in the issuance of preliminary injunction.A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service, save only for those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the rights of the other parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon.x x xThe notice requirement is even more mandatory when the movant asks for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or a TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without a hearing and without prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined, the prior notice under this requirement is as important as the hearing, as no hearing can meaningfully take place, with both parties present or represented, unless a prior notice of the hearing is given.Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.;G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013Motions; motion to dismiss; defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; exceptions.Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded in the answer are deemed waived, with the following exceptions: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)litis pendentia;(3)res judicata;and (4) prescription of the action. Clearly, petitioner cannot change its defense after the termination of the period of testimony and after the exhibits of both parties have already been admitted by the court. The non-inclusion of this belated defense in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial. To rule otherwise would put the adverse party at a disadvantage since he could no longer offer evidence to rebut the new theory. Indeed, parties are bound by the delimitation of issues during the pre-trial.Licomcen, Inc. v. Engr. Salvador Abainza, etc.;G.R. No. 199781. February 18, 2013New trial; newly-discovered evidence; requisites.Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridels extrajudicial confession, executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridels apprehension.Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term newly-discovered. The confession of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water.Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the Philippines;G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013]Parties; duty of party to inform court of counsels death.The Court strikes down the argument that the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not attain finality because petitioners counsel, who died while the case was pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy thereof. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in this case that would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by petitioner, that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration. InMojar, et al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc.,the Court explained that it is the partys duty to inform the court of its counsels demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact shall be considered negligence on the part of said party. Expounding further, the Court stated:x x x It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm.x x x They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel. x x x xInAmpo v. Court of Appeals,this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercise by a party:x x x xLitigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party, such as petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA if the death of its counsel of record and have said counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the places or law office designated by its counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory when no motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period therefor.O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge;G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013Partition; stages; requisites.The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an addition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla;G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013]Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; rationale for the rule; exceptions.The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:Sec 15.Questions that may be raised on appeal. whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla;G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); questions of fact generally not reviewable; exceptions; difference between question of fact and question of law.We note that the matters raised by petitioner ATI involve questions of fact which are generally not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as the Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1 thereof provides that [t]he petition x x x shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issued does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; 7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the findings of the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.;G.R. No. 177116. February 27, 2013Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised.A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances which are not present in this case. Hence, factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us. In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego. In addition, the evidence is preponderant that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh the evidence again.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete;G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact.We stress the settled rule that a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. A question, to be one of law, must not examine the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties; otherwise, the question is one of fact. Whether an express trust exists in this case is a question of fact whose resolution is not proper in a petition underRule 45.Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch;G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); change of theory on appeal generally not allowed.Second, we find that the petitioner changed the theory of his case. The petitioner argued before the lower courts that an express trust exists between PALII as the trustee and the HEIRS as the trustor-beneficiary. The petitioner now asserts that the express trust exists between PALII as the trustor and UCPB as the trustee, with the HEIRS as the beneficiaries. At this stage of the case, such change of theory is simply not allowed as it violates basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Our rulings are clear a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change [it] on appeal, otherwise, the lower courts will effectively be deprived of the opportunity to decide on the merits of the case fairly. Besides, courts of justice are devoid of jurisdiction to resolve a question not in issue.Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch;G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013Pleadings; amended complaint; nature. Moreover, respondents filing of their Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint may not be considered as a circumvention of the rules of procedure. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. In the present case, the Amended Complaint is, thus, treated as an entirely new complaint. As such, respondents had every right to move for the dismissal of the said Amended Complaint. Were it not for the filing of the said Motion, respondents would not have been able to file a petition forcertioraribefore the CA which, in turn, rendered the presently assailed judgment in their favor.Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina;G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013Service of Pleadings; petition should be served on counsel of party; effect of service on party represented by counsel of record; exceptions.Lastly,under our rules of procedure, service of the petition on a party, when the party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.;G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); reglementary period.First,we find that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the private respondents position, the 60-day period within which to file the petition forcertiorariis counted from the Republics receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying the latters motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point In case a motion for reconsiderationor new trialis timely filed,whether such motion is required or not,the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.;G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); requisites.The following requisites must concur for a Petition forCertiorarito prosper, namely:(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.Salvacion Villanueva, et al. v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, etc., et al.;G.R. No. 178347. February 25, 2013Special ProceedingsWrit of amparo; nature; special proceeding.The remedy of the Writ ofAmparois a