nwaka, gabriel o gabriel o...nwaka, gabriel onyinyechi (reg. no. pg/m.sc/08/48777) being a project...
TRANSCRIPT
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TOPIC
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS OF SECURITY
COUNCIL’S RESOLUTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF
RESOLUTION
1718 (2006)
BY
NWAKA, GABRIEL ONYINYECHI
PG/M.Sc/08/48777
BEING A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER
OF SCIEENCE DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA.
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JANUARY 2010
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this study is the original work of Mr.
Nwaka, Gabriel Onyinyechi (Reg. No. PG/M.Sc/08/48777) being
a project submitted to the department of Political Science in the
partial fulfillment for the requirements for the award of master of
Science degree in Political Science (International Relations) of
the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. The topic of study has not
being carried out before in this University or any other institution
of higher learning known to us.
-------------------------------------
Supervisor
--------------
----------------------
--------------------------- Head of
Department
Dean of Faculty
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APPROVAL PAGE
This Project has been supervised and approved for the
department of Political Science of University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
By
------------------------------------------- ----------------
--------------------
Supervisor
External Examiner
------------------------------------------- ---------------
---------------------
Head of Department Dean
of Faculty
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DEDICATION
This project is dedicated to Almighty God, to Mr. Chuks
Amaefula and my family members and to the memory of my late
mother Mrs. Christiana Nwaka Amaefule.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The tremendous contribution of my supervisor (mentor) and my
lecturer and love ones towards the completion of this work
cannot be underplayed.
I greatly appreciate the patience, encouragement, intelligence
and persuasion enjoyed from my supervisor and lecturer, Prof.
Obasi Igwe. His humour particularly enabled me to retain most
of the things he taught in my memory.
I also wish to acknowledge the contributions, and overwhelming
supports of my roommates, in the areas typesetting, editing of
my work by Nwokocha Chukwumela Kenneth, and Ogenna
Christian.
I enjoyed the loving supports of my course mates especially
Alvan, Chinemere and Felix, Aja Nwachukwu for their unfailing
supports.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Approval page --------------------------------------------------------------------- i
Certification page --------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
Dedication -------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
Acknowledgment --------------------------------------------------------------------- iv
Table of contents --------------------------------------------------------------------- vi
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the study ----------------------------------------------- 1
1.2 Statement of The Problem --------------------------------------------- 53
1.3 Objectives of The Study ----------------------------------------------------- 55
1.4 Significance of The Study -------------------------------------------------- 56
1.5 Scope of The Study -------------------------------------------------------- 58
CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
2.1 Literature Review ------------------------------------------------------------- 59
2.2 Theoretical Framework ----------------------------------------------------- 128
2.3 Hypothesis ----------------------------------------------------------------------
132
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2.4 Methodology ------------------------------------------------------------------- 133
2.5 Operational Definitions ----------------------------------------------------- 134
CHAPTER THREE
THE KOREAN CONFLICT AND THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: A
BRIEF SUMMARY
3.1 Historical Background of the problem ----------------------------------- 137
3.2 U.S intervention in Korea crisis -------------------------------------------- 140
3.3 The atomic threat --------------------------------------------------------------- 141
3.4 Proliferation attempts of the two Koreas ------------------------------ 146
3.5 South Korea ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 146
3.6 North Korea ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 148
CHAPTER FOUR
THE LEGAL AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISPUTE
OVER THE RESOLUTION 1718
4.1 What is resolution 1718 all about? -------------------------------------- 156
4.2 The consequences of the Korean nuclear dispute ------------------- 163
4.3 The economic consequences ----------------------------------------------- 169
4.4 Diplomatic and political consequences --------------------------------- 172
4.5 Consequences on inter and intra Korean relations ----------------- 176
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4.6 Consequences on regional security --------------------------------------- 180
4.7 Consequences on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty ------------ 187
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
5.1 Ways to sustain nuclear weapons free Korea -------------------------- 192
5.2 Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 196
5.3 Recommendation ---------------------------------------------------------------- 197
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
United Nations (UN) is an international organization of countries
formed to promote world peace and cooperation. In this regard Feltham
(1988:35), succinctly described the United Nations as a “standing diplomatic
conference; … a worldwide association of states which on signin g the charter
of the United Nations subscribe to it’s purpose and agree to act in accordance
with its principles”. Paul and Curtis in (John and Smith: 2005:405) however
see the United Nations as “a grouping of Sovereign States”. Umozurike
(2005:233), notes that the United Nations is “…a permanent institutional
framework for the international community and comprises of the … states
that have accepted the obligations of its charter”. The common features of
these meanings of the United Nations by various scholars is the collective,
voluntary efforts in achieving common international goal, peace, unity and
secured world. Paul and Curtis in Smith, (2005:405) posited that “the UN was
founded after World War II ended on 1945 by 51 countries, as a result of
initiatives taken by the governments of the states that had led war against
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Germany and Japan..”. They further stated that by 2003, nearly every state in
the world, when joining the organization agreed to accept the obligations of
the Organization’s charter, an international treaty that set out basic principles
of international relations. The principles of the UN were derived from
concepts and ideas that found expression earlier in:
1. The Atlantic Charter declared by President Roosevelt of the US and
Prime Minister Churchill of Britain in August 1941,
2. The UN Declaration of twenty-six nations on 1st January 1942 after
Japan’s commencement of hostilities in the Pacific, and
3. The Moscow Declaration of October 1943 by Britain, China, the USA and
USSR recognizing the need for a universal organization to maintain
international peace and security, Umozurike (2005:233).
The United Nations Charter created elaborate machinery for
maintaining peace and security and for solving disputes among nations. It also
specifically directed the General Assembly to encourage the progressive
development and codification of international law. To carry out this task, the
General Assembly created two subsidiary organs: the International Law
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Commission 1947, and the Commission on International Trade Law 1966,
Rogers and, Peterson (1990:55).
However, the purposes for the formation of the United Nations
organization by the victorious allies are as follows:
1. To maintain international peace and security, to that end; to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression, or other
breaches of the peace, also to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principles of equality and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving problems of economic,
social and cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting, and
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encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and,
4. To be a centre for harmonizing actions of nations, for attaining the
common objectives. Paul and Curtis, (in John and Smith, 2005:401);
Feltham, 1988:28, Umozurike, 2005:231).
The purposes thus range from the maintenance of peace and security to the
solution of development problems and the protection or promotion of
fundamental human rights.
The principles of the United Nations Organization include the basic
principles that have been evolved within the international community
through treaty law and customs and they are namely:
1. The UN is based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all its
members. All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the charter, all
members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
13
such manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
2. All members refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistence with the purpose of the
United Nations. All members shall give the United Nations assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state which the United Nations is taking a
preventive enforcement action.
3. The United Nations shall ensure that states, which are not members of
the organization, act in accordance with these principles, so as may be
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
4. Nothing contained in the charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters of which are essentially with the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such
matters to settlement under the charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII,
(Feltham, 1988:55, Deutsch, 1989:101 Umozurike, 2005:234).
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The treaty that set up the United Nations was a treaty by which “each
contracting party assumed the obligations to use resources, military or
economic against those members of the tripartite pact and its adherents with
which such government was at war” Olusanya et al (1968:72). The treaty also
requires every signatory to cooperate with other states signatory thereto and
not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. The charter
spelled out the various organs and agencies in which the body will be made
off. The one hundred and eleven Articles of the charter provide for six
principal organs namely: The General Assembly, The Security Council,
Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat), as well as many agencies, while the statue of
the ICJ has seventy additional Articles.
They operate together to provide an instrument through which
collective effort can be made to deal with common international relations
problems, varying from socioeconomic crises to serious disputes and
international conflicts. According to Olusanya et al (1968:72) “issues which
are capable of disrupting international peace and security are handled within
the framework of the Security Council whose basis assumed great power of
unanimity and was never conceived as an organ for policing the five
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permanent members themselves”. As far as the other member states are
concerned, the council could impose its decisions, summon members to its aid
and use force against combatants. So far, it has been involved with the role of
a settler of disputes which comes by way of recommendations. But its forces
for institutional moral pressure remain unassailable. Through investigations,
imposition, conciliation, recommendation and appeal, it seeks to ensure
international peace and security. In the process, a circus for diplomatic
theatrics is created in which its members predominate and the next most
important organ, the General Assembly, could play its role of discussing and
recommending actions within the scope of the charter only with regard to any
situation and disputes with which the Security Council is not dealing.
According to Merriam-Webster Collegiate Encyclopedia (2000:1668-
1669) “the Security Council is the division of the U.N whose primarily
responsibility is to maintain international peace and security”. Stephen
(www.vicpeace.org), Retrieved on 25th December 2009 and Onyishi
(2007:302) corroborated this when they pointed out that “the Security
Council's primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, is for the maintenance
of international peace and security”. However, Igwe (2002:458) has noted
that, at the time of “creation, the council has 11 members 5 (China, France, the
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United Kingdom, the USA and the USSR-now Russia) of who are permanent
members, each with a veto power the non-permanent members continue to
increase in number…” Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
(1945), the Council is the only UN organ that can order enforcement action if a
case of aggression or breach of peace has been established. Enforcement
action can range from economic sanctions to military measures after a
disobedience to the council’s resolution(s) has been established. Disputes and
breaches of peace may be brought before the Security Council by any UN
member nation. Countries that are not members of the Council, if affected by
the issue at question, may be invited to participate in the discussion without a
vote. As at June 12, 2009, the Security Council has 15 members, of which 5 are
permanent: The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, and China.
The other members are elected by the General Assembly to serve
nonconsecutive two-year terms. Every year five new countries are elected to
these seats, which rotate on a geographical basis: five from Asia, Africa, and
the Middle East; two from Western countries; two from Latin America; and
one from Eastern Europe. The presidency of the Council is held for a month at
a time by each of the members.
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U.N members agree to abide by the Security Council’s resolutions when
they join. It has been noted that UN “investigates disputes that may cause
international frictions and advices on how to solve it” Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Encyclopedia (2000:1669). Deutsch (1989:233) has pointed out
that “the heart of the United Nations capacity to act is in the Security Council”.
UN charter speaks of the Assembly as making recommendations, it
empowers the Council to make decisions (articles, 25, 27, 39, 41, 44, and 48).
Nine affirmative votes are required to pass a resolution, “for a resolution to
pass, it must be approved by a majority of the total membership with no
dissenting vote from any of the five permanent members”, Stephen at
(www.vicpeace.org) Retrieved on 25th December 2009.
A negative vote from any of the five permanent members prevents the
adoption of any resolution, even if all other members vote in favor. This
negative votes is known as the veto right of the great powers and has been a
point of controversy since the establishment of the UN, the Council is the most
powerful body in the UN. It is responsible for maintaining international peace
and for restoring peace when conflicts arise. The Security Council has the
power to define what constitute a threat to security to determine how the UN
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should respond and to enforce its decisions by ordering UN members to take
certain actions. For example, the Council may impose economic sanctions,
such as halting trade with a country it considers an aggressor.
The Council convenes any time there is a threat to peace. A
representative from each member country who sits on the Council must be
available at all times so that the Council can meet at a moment’s notice. The
Security Council also frequently meets at the request of a UN member-often a
nation with a grievance about another nation’s actions.
The Council has a variety of ways it can try to resolve conflicts between
countries. Usually the Council’s first step is to encourage the countries to
settle their disagreements without violence. The Council can mediate a
dispute or recommend guidelines for a settlement. It can send peacekeeping
troops into a distressed area, if war breaks out, it can call for a ceasefire, it can
enforce its decisions by imposing economic sanctions on a country, or by
authorizing joint military action.
During the 1960s, as concerns grew that nuclear weapons were
continuing to proliferate and as the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race accelerated,
it become obvious that “quantities of arms have been stockpiled that all living
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things on Earth can be annihilated many times over” Military publishing
(1985:5), as a result of this arm build up, negotiations began on a global treaty
to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. Jean (1975:58), have it that it
was the Soviet government that “declared in January 20, 1969 that it was
General Assemble … prepared to begin talks with the U. S. on control of
nuclear armed missiles”. These negotiations resulted in the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty was opened for
ratification in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The treaty establishes two
classes of states: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
Nuclear weapon states are those that had conducted nuclear tests before
January 1, 1967 the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), Britain, France,
and China. All other countries are non-nuclear weapon states for the purposes
of the treaty. Some other treaties that where made to cub the spread of
weapons of mass destructions are:
a. Treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems (ABM),
b. The 1963 treaty banning Nuclear weapons tests in the Atmosphere, in
outer space and under water signed by more than 100 states, and
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c. The 1967 Treaty on the principles governing the activities of States in
the Exploration and use of Outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies. Military Publishing, (1985:45).
However, the signing of May 26, 1972, of the permanent Treaty on the
limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on
Certain measures with respect to the limitation of Strategic offensive Arms the
ABM Treaty became the cornerstone of the entire nuclear arms limitation and
reduction process.
One of the international agencies, institutions and bodies whose task is
to reduce, monitor, and regulate the spread of weapons of mass destruction is
the International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA). The International Atomic
Energy Agency is intergovernmental organization, part of the United Nation. Is
the Agency that is tasked with the regulating the use of Nuclear Materials, and
monitor the development of Nuclear technology by the United Nations
member states. The statute of the IAEA was drafted on the September 1956. It
entered into force on the July 29, 1957. According to Hovet and Hovet
(1986:56) the agency has as its purpose and duties:
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The IAEA encourages and coordinates research into the peaceful
uses of Atomic Energy. It advices member on such subject as the
development of nuclear power, the uses of radio active materials
in the fields of medicine, agriculture, etc. The disposal of
radioactive water, and water distillation; it provide experts where
necessary, and offer research fellowship and training facilities. It
also responsible for implementing the international Nuclear
information system (INIS) which collect and disseminates
information relating to nuclear matters. And in addition to its
purely technical role the IAEA has increased responsibility under
the 1968 treaty on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
weapons for ensuring adequate safeguards and preventing
diversion nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons
in those non-nuclear states which are signatories to the treaty.
The agency shared the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize with its Director,
Mohamed El-Baradei, for its ongoing efforts towards combating nuclear
weapons proliferation. IAEA has more than 130 member countries. The IAEA
also arranges for the supply of nuclear materials and reactors, finances
research projects, and acts as a central agency for the diffusion of information
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on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agency is also committed to the
research and development of energy sources that could replace conventional
fuel systems.
The IAEA’s activities emphasize work in the development of reactors
and nuclear power, including their use in water desalinization; application of
radioisotopes and radiation in agriculture, biology, hydrology, industry, and
medicine; establishment of safety standards for radioactive waste disposal;
transport of nuclear materials; and establishment of international guidelines
for nuclear legislation. After the accident that occurred in April 1986 at the
Chernobyl' installation in the Soviet Union the agency adopted an expanded
nuclear safety programme that covers safety of nuclear installations, radiation
protection, human health, radioactive waste management, nuclear power, and
the nuclear fuel cycle.
The Agency also prepared drafts of two conventions now in force: the
Convention on Emergency Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency and the Convention on the Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident. The agency’s system of safeguards is designed to ensure
that nuclear materials and facilities under its supervision are used only for
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peaceful purposes. In the field of disarmament the IAEA plays an important
policing role in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), which went into effect in 1970. Under the terms of the NPT,
countries without nuclear weapons agreed not to develop them, and states
possessing nuclear weapons agreed to work toward disarmament. The IAEA
inspects the nuclear power and research facilities of participating non-nuclear
weapons states to ensure that enriched uranium and plutonium byproducts
are not being diverted to nuclear weapons production. The IAEA, however,
has no authority to inspect the nuclear facilities of nations that do not
participate in the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA has also worked
to prevent terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda from developing or obtaining
nuclear weapons. The headquarters of the agency is at the Austrian city of
Vienna, and it is controlled by an annual Conference of member states and a
board of Governors of thirty-four.
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons to
countries or terrorist organizations that formerly did not possess them. Many
observers believe that the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation is likely
to be one of the most important issues facing the United States and the world
for many years to come. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
24
Weapons (NPT) attempted to address the problem, but the number of
countries possessing nuclear weapons has grown since the treaty went into
effect.
Nuclear weapons were first developed by the United States during
World War II (1939-1945) as a result of a massive, secret programme known
as the Manhattan Project. The United States tested the first nuclear weapon in
July 1945 at Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert, and then used two nuclear
weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and
Nagasaki (August 9, 1945). These are the only times nuclear explosives have
been used as a weapon of war, although there have been more than 2,000
nuclear weapon tests and more than 100 experiments using nuclear
explosives for peaceful purposes, such as excavation.
Today, the United States and seven other countries have openly
declared that they possess nuclear weapons and have conducted one or more
nuclear test explosions to demonstrate this capability. The countries and the
dates of their first nuclear test are: Russia (first test conducted by the former
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1949); Britain (1952); France (1960);
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China (1964); India (peaceful nuclear explosion, 1974; nuclear weapons test,
1998); Pakistan (1998); and North Korea (2006).
Israel is generally believed to possess nuclear weapons; the total
number of countries generally recognized as possessing nuclear weapons is
nine. A tenth country, South Africa, has also admitted that it developed a small
arsenal of nuclear weapons (first weapon completed, 1977), but it dismantled
this arsenal in the early 1990s. When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, 3
of the 15 newly independent countries, in addition to Russia, had nuclear
weapons on their territory. By the mid-1990s, the three countries- Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine- had transferred all of these nuclear weapons to
Russia.
Virtually all countries of the world- other than the nine nations believed
to possess nuclear weapons today- have formally pledged not to manufacture
them. This pledge was made under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. The treaty has
been ratified by 187 nonnuclear weapon states. Many nations have expressed
concern, however, that one such party to the treaty, Iran, may be actively
seeking to develop such weapons. No terrorist organizations possess nuclear
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weapons. Al-Qaeda is known to desire them, however, and a Japanese cult, the
Aum Shinrikyo, began an effort to develop them in the late 1980s, but was
unsuccessful.
Nuclear war would have devastating consequences. Even a conflict that
involved only the use of one or two fission weapons could cause many
hundreds of thousands of deaths and destroy the centers of major cities.
Large-scale nuclear war, involving the use of hundreds of thermonuclear
weapons, could cause many millions of casualties, destroy nations, and
permanently affect the global environment. Although some scholars argue
otherwise, virtually all governments believe that the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional states will increase the likelihood of nuclear war. This
is because many of the nations that possess nuclear weapons or have sought
to develop them have long had regional conflicts with each other. For
example, India and Pakistan have had a serious border dispute over Kashmīr,
China and India had a brief border conflict, Israel has fought several wars with
neighboring nations in the Middle East, and Iran and Iraq fought an eight-
year-long war. North and South Korea, now separated by a demilitarized zone,
fought against each other in the Korean War (1950-1953). These regional
27
conflicts and other potential conflicts provide the fundamental reason for the
international community to seek to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.
The spread of nuclear weapons can also permit aggressor nations to
intimidate neighbors and dominate their regions. Iraq under Saddam Hussein,
its former president, is believed to have sought nuclear weapons for this
purpose prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In addition, nuclear weapons
could be used as a threat by a country seeking to advance a global ideological
cause, such as the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism. A growing new
danger is that a national government, or senior officials within that
government, might provide nuclear weapons or the materials for making
them to terrorist organizations whose views they shared. While nations differ
on the particulars of such dangers, they generally agree that their own
security is best served by curbing the further spread of nuclear arms.
Nuclear proliferation also inevitably increases the risk of accidents
involving nuclear weapons- for example, during transport- which could cause
great devastation. This risk may be greatest in less technologically advanced
countries whose weapons may not include the built-in safety features found in
the nuclear weapons of the more advanced nuclear powers. In some countries
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(North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and India), nuclear weapon programmes can
divert scarce financial and technical resources from urgently needed
development projects, a challenge that can be severely worsened for states
engaged in open-ended nuclear arms races with rivals.
In 1946, in an effort to prevent a nuclear arms race with the Soviet
Union and avoid the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, the United
States proposed that all materials usable for nuclear weapons be placed under
international control. The Soviet Union, which was not yet a nuclear weapons
state, rejected the proposal, known as the Baruch Plan. Fearing that growing
interest in nuclear energy would lead nuclear technology to spread
uncontrollably, the United States in 1953 launched the Atoms for Peace
programme. Under the programme, the United States offered to share nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes with friendly states. U.S. inspections would
ensure that transferred items were not diverted for nuclear weapon
programmes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established
in 1957 to take over the inspections. By this time, the Soviet Union had
initiated a similar programme for its allies, also relying on IAEA inspections.
29
During the 1960s, as concerns grew that nuclear weapons were
continuing to proliferate and as the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race accelerated,
negotiations began on a global treaty to halt the further spread of nuclear
weapons. These negotiations resulted in some treaties earlier mentioned such
as the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The treaty(ies) establishes two classes of states: nuclear weapon states and
non-nuclear weapon states as mentioned earlier.
Under the treaty, the nuclear weapon states party to the agreement
pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices
(such as possible peaceful nuclear explosives for large-scale excavations) to
any recipient or to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state
to manufacture nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices. The
nuclear weapon states are not required by the treaty to give up nuclear
weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty pledge not to
manufacture or receive nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive
devices. To verify that they are complying with these pledges, the non-nuclear
weapon states agree to accept IAEA inspections on all of their nuclear
activities, an arrangement known as full-scope safeguards. All parties to the
treaty are prohibited from exporting nuclear equipment or materials to non-
30
nuclear weapon states unless the exported items will be placed under IAEA
inspection in the recipient country.
The treaty reaffirms the inalienable right of all parties to pursue the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the prohibition on the
development of nuclear explosives and calls on all parties to facilitate the
fullest possible sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The
treaty states that all parties shall undertake to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the (U.S.-Soviet) nuclear
arms race and to achieve complete and general nuclear disarmament. Any
party may withdraw from the treaty on three months’ notice if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
To persuade the non-nuclear states to agree to the treaty, the nuclear
states indicated that they would not use nuclear weapons in an attack on a
non-nuclear state unless the state was allied with a nuclear power. However,
this pledge was informal and not part of the treaty itself. Since then, Britain
and the United States have stated that they might respond with a nuclear
attack against a non-nuclear state that used chemical or biological weapons.
31
Some observers believe that, that was a preventive war doctrine, such as
those articulated by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, may
have the unintended effect of encouraging some non-nuclear states to develop
nuclear weapons for self-protection.
Korea, peninsula in Asia, divided since 1948 into two political entities:
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, (North Korea), and the Republic of
Korea (South Korea). According to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Encyclopedia (2000:897) the ancient Kingdom of Choson was established in
the Northern part of the peninsula probably by peoples from northern China
in the 3rd, millennium BC. The earliest known Korean state was the:
Old Choson (Joseon), in what is now northwestern Korea and
southern Northeast China; it was conquered by the Han Chinese in
108 BC. Thereafter the Chinese set up military outposts in Korea
that helped spread Chinese culture and civilization. The first of the
three main Korean kingdoms to come in contact with the
spreading Chinese influence was Koguryo (Goguryeo), which
emerged in the 1st century BC in the north. Paekche (Baekje) in
the southwest and Silla in the southeast, which emerged in the
32
3rd and the 4th century ad, respectively, had contact with China
as well. Peterson (2009: Para: 2).
To a degree these kingdoms accepted Buddhism, Confucianism, and
most importantly, Chinese characters as a means of communication and
education. Paekche and Silla also had contact with Japan, along with a fourth;
smaller kingdom called Kaya (Gaya), and located on the central southern
coast. Paekche and Kaya had political and military alliances with Japan.
Koguryo was initially the most powerful Korean kingdom, controlling most of
the peninsula and Manchuria by the 5th century. In the mid-6th century, Silla
conquered Kaya and seized the area around what is now Seoul in the Han
River valley, while inflicting steady territorial losses on Koguryo and Paekche.
By 668 Silla, in alliance with the Chinese Tang (T’ang) dynasty, had conquered
first Paekche and then Koguryo, creating the first unified Korean state, Unified
Silla, and ending what is known as the Three Kingdoms period.
During the second half of the 19th century, foreign powers sought to
increase their influence on Korea. These advances were rejected by the
Koreans, who believed the society they had achieved under the Confucian
system needed little or nothing from outsiders other than China. Christianity,
33
quietly introduced from China in 1784, was slowly and covertly propagated by
underground French Roman Catholic missionaries. The Korean government,
however, attempted to stop the spread of Christianity because it was not
compatible with Confucianism. In 1864 the Taewon’gun (meaning “Grand
Prince”), father of the boy-king Kojong, seized power, outlawed Christianity,
and sought to curb foreign contact. He then faced military interventions by
France (1866) and the United States (1871), which were attempting to
establish trade relations with Korea. These attacks were repulsed. At the same
time the Taewon’gun tried to eliminate corruption and refurbish the prestige
of the state. The political reaction triggered by these reforms, however,
resulted in his downfall in 1873.
In 1876 the Japanese forced Korea to establish diplomatic relations in
order to begin trade between the countries, thus weakening Korea’s
traditional ties to China. China then sought to neutralize Japan by promoting
Korean ties with Western countries, beginning with the Korea-U.S. treaty of
1882. During the succeeding years, many efforts were made toward
modernization and reform, but these were frustrated by the continued
influence of foreign powers. In 1895 Japan defeated China in the Sino-
Japanese War, and ten years later Japan was victorious over Russia in the
34
Russo-Japanese War. These victories cemented Japan’s power on the Korean
Peninsula, leading to the formal Japanese annexation of Korea and the end of
the Choson dynasty in 1910.
Japanese domination of Korea formally began with the Protectorate
Treaty (1905), forced on Korea after the Russo-Japanese War. Under this
treaty, Japan assumed control of Korea’s foreign relations and ultimately its
police and military, currency and banking, communications, and all other vital
functions. These changes were tenaciously resisted by the Koreans. In 1910
Japan formally annexed Korea when it realized Korea would not accept
nominal sovereignty with actual Japanese control. From 1910 to 1919 Japan
solidified its rule by purging nationalists, gaining control of the land system,
and enforcing rigid administrative changes.
In 1919 these measures, along with the general demand for national
self-determination following World War I (1914-1918), led to what is known
as the March First Movement. Millions of Koreans took to the streets in
nonviolent demonstrations for independence, but the movement was quickly
suppressed. In the following years Japan tightened its control, suppressing
other nationalist movements. As the Japanese imperialist government became
35
more militaristic and eventually went to war in China and then the Pacific and
Southeast Asia in the 1930s and 1940s, Japan imposed several measures
designed to assimilate the Korean population, including outlawing Korean
language and even Korean family names. Korea was liberated from the
Japanese by the Allied victory that ended World War II in 1945.
Shortly before the end of the war in the Pacific in 1945, the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed to divide
Korea at the 38th parallel for the purpose of accepting the surrender of
Japanese troops. Both powers, however, used their presence to promote
friendly governments. The USSR suppressed the moderate nationalists in the
north and gave its support to Kim II Sung, a Communist who led anti-Japanese
guerrillas in Manchuria. In the south the leftist movement was opposed by
various groups of right-wing nationalists. Unable to find a congenial moderate
who could bring these forces together, the United States ended up suppressing
the left and promoting Syngman Rhee, a nationalist who opposed the Japanese
and lived in exile in the United States.
North Korea, officially Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a
Country in northeastern Asia that occupies the northern portion of the Korea
36
Peninsula. North Korea is bounded on the north by China, on the northeast by
Russia, on the east by the East Sea (Sea of Japan), on the south by South Korea,
and on the west by the Yellow Sea. It has an area of 120,538 sq km (46,540 sq
mi). The state of North Korea was established in “1948 as a result of the Soviet
military occupation of the northern portion of the peninsula after World War
II. The capital and largest city of North Korea is Pyongyang”, Harrison
(2009.Para.1). Following World War II (1939-1945), the Korea Peninsula was
divided into two military occupation zones. The northern zone was occupied
by military forces from the Soviet Union, and the southern zone was occupied
by United States military forces. In 1946 the Soviet Union recognized a
government led by Kim II Sung, the leader of the Korean Communist Party, in
the northern zone. The Korean Communist Party merged that year with
another group to form the Korean Workers’ Party. In 1948 the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally established as a centralized
Communist state under the control of the Workers’ Party, which espoused a
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Following the departure of Soviet advisers and
forces in 1958, however, North Korea began to lessen the importance of
Marxism-Leninism compared to a nationalistic ideology known as juche (self-
reliance). Juche was linked to Kim II Sungism, which extolled Kim II Sung as
37
the personification of national pride. This ideology continued even after Kim II
Sung died in 1994 and was replaced by his son, Kim Jong II.
North Korea’s first constitution was approved in 1948. It was revised in
1972, 1992, and 1998. Before Kim II Sung’s death in 1994, executive power in
North Korea was vested in a president, who was head of state, and a premier,
who was technically head of government. The president was elected by the
Supreme People’s Assembly, the unicameral legislature, for a four-year term.
The president in turn appointed the premier and members of the Central
People’s Committee, the government’s highest policymaking body. The post of
president was vacant following the death of Kim II Sung and was later
abolished by the 1998 constitution.
Kim designated his son, Kim Jong II, as his successor; however, Kim Jong
II did not assume the presidency. Under a 1998 constitutional amendment, the
chair of the National Defense Commission, a post held by Kim Jong II, was
recognized as North Korea’s highest office. The 1998 constitution created the
National Defense Commission and gave the armed forces increased
governmental power. The commission was described as the supreme military
guidance organ of state sovereignty. Kim Jong II became chairman of the
38
commission as well as general secretary of the Workers Party. The office of
president was abolished.
Nominally, the Supreme People’s Assembly was to hold ultimate
authority in the land under the 1998 constitution. But the chairman of its
presidium, or executive committee, became a de facto ceremonial head of
state, whose major function has been to represent North Korea in dealings
with other national leaders. In June 1999 two official organs of the Workers’
Party Central Committee, in a joint article, indicated how powerful the North
Korean army had become. The article equated the North Korean army with
the people of North Korea. It declared that giving priority to the Army is the
perfect mode of politics in the present times … a mode of leadership which
solves all problems arising in the Revolution. Our revolutionary philosophy is
that the Army is precisely the Party, people, and state.
The highest executive office in North Korea is chair of the National
Defense Commission. The 1998 constitution created the National Defense
Commission and abolished the office of president. The state apparatus is
subordinate to the paramount authority of the National Defense Commission.
39
The legislature, which in theory is the supreme government organ, is the
unicameral Supreme People’s Assembly. Its 687 members are elected by
direct vote for four-year terms. The legislature generally meets only several
times a year; its day-to-day duties are performed by the standing committee
of the assembly. The judicial system of North Korea consists of the central
court and the provincial and people’s courts. The central court is the state’s
highest judicial authority; its judges are appointed to four-year terms by the
standing committee.
In 2004 the U.S. government estimated that the total personnel of the
North Korean regular armed forces were about 1,106,000, distributed as
follows: army, 950,000; navy, 46,000; and air force, 110,000. This total
excludes reserve forces. Estimates of weaponry were: tanks, 3,800; field
artillery, 12,000; surface ships, 430; submarines, 90; and jet fighter aircraft,
760. The North Korean forces are equipped primarily with weapons, such as
T-62 tanks, received from the former Soviet Union and China during the Cold
War.
In 2004 North Korea’s 760 fighter jets included only 60 advanced Soviet
models (MiG-23s, MiG-29s, and SU-25s). Most of its mainstay fighters are MiG-
40
19s, MiG-21s, Il-28s, and SU-7s. Some 320 are outmoded MiG-15s and MiG-
17s. By contrast, South Korea had 520 advanced fighters in 2004, including
162 U.S.-supplied advanced fighters. The United States, which has a military
alliance with South Korea, based more than 100 military airplanes in South
Korea in 2004, including 70 F-16s, most armed with smart bombs.
In addition to its conventional forces, North Korea announced in
February 2005 that it had become a “nuclear weapons state” in order to
defend itself against what it perceived as the threat of a U.S. preemptive
attack. Norman et al (2009:para.10) pointed out that “Americans have been
concerned in varying degrees about Korea since the 1870s, but only since the
United States in 1945 inherited responsibility from imperial Japan for part of
Korea has that involvement become important to Americans”.
In July 2006 North Korea launched seven test missiles, including a long-
range Taepodong-2 believed to have the range to reach North America. The
UN Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea, banning other nations
from supplying it with materials necessary for building missiles. In early
October 2006 North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in an underground
explosion.
41
Beginning in 2002, the government initiated economic reforms
designed to reverse the economic decline. These reforms included
decentralizing control over many state enterprises, which no longer receive
subsidies if they are unprofitable; a revised price and wage structure that has
given farmers higher wages for their production; new work rules in
agricultural cooperatives that reward the more productive farm workers; and
private markets in which individual vendors sell agricultural and consumer
goods. These goods, which are subject to government price controls, are either
locally produced or imported from China, Japan, and South Korea. Large-scale
mechanization, irrigation, and land reclamation have increased crop yields.
The principal crops (with their yields in 2006) include rice (2.5 million metric
tons), corn (2 million), and potatoes (2 million). Other important crops are
millet, barley, wheat, vegetables, apples, sweet potatoes, and soybeans.
Livestock number about 3.2 million pigs, 570,000 cattle, 172,000 sheep, and
27 million poultry.
The bulk of North Korea’s foreign trade through the 1970s was with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, and other Communist
countries. Since then, however, trade has been diversified to include non-
Communist countries. Bilateral trade in 2003 totaled $3.3 billion, according to
42
estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA estimated that North
Korea’s exports in 2003 totaled $1.2 billion, primarily minerals, metallurgical
products, manufactures (including armaments), and textiles. The principal
trade partners for exports were China (29.9 percent), South Korea (24.1
percent), and Japan (13.2 percent). Imports totaled $2.1 billion, primarily
petroleum, coking coal, machinery and equipment, textiles, and grain. The
principal sources of these imports were China (32.9 percent), Thailand (10.7
percent), and Japan (4.8 percent).
In July 2006 North Korea launched seven test missiles, including a long-
range Taepodong-2 believed to have the range to reach North America. The
UN Security Council imposed sanctions on North Korea, banning other nations
from supplying it with materials necessary for building missiles. In early
October 2006 North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in an underground
explosion.
In 2002, the government of North Korea announced the establishment
of a special economic zone in the northwestern city of Sinuiju, near the border
with China and linked by rail to Beijing. The zone will operate autonomously
with its own legal and economic systems, allowing free market principles that
43
promote foreign investment and trade. Its creation marked the most
significant reversal of economic policy in North Korea since 1948.
In the past, given its lack of proven petroleum reserves, North Korea
also relied on imports of petroleum to meet its energy needs. Initially, it
sought to reduce its dependence on these imports by maximizing the
production of coal and hydroelectric power. But North Korea proved unable to
keep up with its energy needs and turned to nuclear energy as the key to
energy self-sufficiency. The extent of its natural resource endowments made it
feasible for North Korea to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme and a
military one at the same time. North Korea possesses extensive reserves of the
graphite and uranium needed for the gas-graphite type of nuclear reactor.
While this type of reactor can be used to generate electricity, it is also
uniquely suited to the diversion of nuclear fuel for military purposes.
In 1989, U.S. spy satellites discovered that a reactor at Yongbyon,
nominally intended for civilian nuclear power generation, had been shut
down, offering an opportunity for the diversion of plutonium to military use.
This provoked a diplomatic crisis that resulted in a U.S.-South Korean-
Japanese commitment in 1994 to construct two reactors in North Korea of a
44
type not suited for military use. These reactors are known as Light-Water
Reactors (LWRs). Although the agreement broke down and the reactors were
never built, North Korea continues to seek LWRs, which Japan, South Korea,
and other countries use to generate electricity.
Kim II Sung was the leader of North Korea from 1948 until his death in
1994. Born Kim Sung Chu, he joined the Korean Communist party in 1932 at
age 19. He served as a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese in the 1930s and
was a Soviet soldier in a Korean unit during World War II (1939-1945). Kim’s
attempt to extend his power to South Korea led to the outbreak of the Korean
War in 1950.
The war caused enormous damage to North Korea. North Korea
endured three years of heavy U.S. bombing in addition to a ground offensive
by UN forces along the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and China.
Virtually the entire population of North Korea lived and worked in manmade
underground caves for three years to escape the relentless attack of U.S.
planes. Schools, hospitals, factories, and troop barracks were located in the
caves. Pyongyang was bombed until almost no buildings were left standing,
and an entirely new capital had to be rebuilt after the war.
45
In 1992 North Korea signed a pact with the International Atomic Energy
Agency IAEA (1957) to allow the country’s nuclear facilities to be inspected.
However, in 1993 the North Korean government refused to let inspectors
examine nuclear waste sites believed to contain undeclared nuclear material
that could be used for nuclear weapons. North Korea also suspended its
formal acceptance of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), which it had signed in 1985. In December 1993 the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA (1947) announced that North Korea had
most likely built at least one atomic weapon from plutonium extracted from
fuel rods at a nuclear power plant.
Throughout the first half of 1994, the North Korean government
continued to resist a full IAEA inspection of suspected nuclear sites. The crisis
was defused in June, however, when former U.S. President Jimmy Carter met
with Kim II Sung in North Korea. The following month Kim died unexpectedly.
Nevertheless, the United States and North Korea reached an agreement in
1994 known as the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to
suspend the operation of designated nuclear facilities capable of producing
and reprocessing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea also agreed to allow
IAEA inspections to verify the suspension. In return, the United States, Japan,
46
and South Korea agreed to construct two new reactors of a type not suitable
for nuclear weapons production. The agreement called for annual deliveries of
heavy fuel oil to North Korea as well as U.S. steps to end economic sanctions
against North Korea that had been in place since the Korean War. The
agreement also envisaged steps leading to the normalization of diplomatic
relations between the United States and North Korea. North Korea agreed to
dismantle the nuclear facilities suspended under the agreement, coincident
with the completion of the two new reactors and with U.S. fulfillment of other
provisions of the agreement.
Construction of the two reactors began in 1995 but stopped when the
United States abrogated the 1994 agreement in December 2002, charging that
North Korea had violated the accord by initiating a secret weapons-grade
uranium-enrichment programme. An American official who visited Pyongyang
said that North Korea had admitted its guilt; North Korea denied that it did so
and denied that it had such a programme.
In a formal proposal presented to North Korea in June 2004 in Beijing
and reaffirmed in the 2005 talks, the United States outlined a six-stage
denuclearization process. North Korea would be required at the outset to
47
acknowledge that a weapons-grade uranium-enrichment programme existed
and to make specific commitments providing for its elimination in a
denuclearization agreement. The U.S. proposal called for North Korea to make
a commitment to dismantle all of its nuclear programmes at the outset of the
denuclearization process and offered to discuss economic aid after such a
commitment had been made and the actual dismantling process was under
way.
Even after the dismantlement of these nuclear programmes, however, a
wholly transformed relationship with the United States would follow only if
North Korea changed its behavior on human rights, addressed the issues
underlying its inclusion on the terrorist list, eliminated chemical and
biological weapons programmes, put an end to the proliferation of missiles
and missile-related technology, and adopted a less provocative conventional
force disposition. North Korea rejected the U.S. proposal, calling for a U.S.
commitment to normalize economic and diplomatic relations in exchange for
a North Korean dismantlement pledge and a step-by-step denuclearization
process. In this process U.S. steps toward normalized relations and economic
aid for North Korea would be linked with parallel North Korean steps toward
dismantlement. North Korea also offered to negotiate a new agreement with
48
the United States to freeze the production of plutonium. In February 2005
North Korea announced that it had become a nuclear weapons state, declaring
that nuclear weapons were necessary to deter what it perceived as a U.S.
policy of regime change in North Korea.
The fourth round of the six-party talks recessed in early August 2005
without an agreement. However, in September 2005 the United States and
North Korea held bilateral meetings in Beijing, China’s capital, for 13 days,
leading to the resumption of the six-party negotiations. The fourth round
culminated in the adoption of a major declaration on September 19, 2005, in
which North Korea pledged to abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear
programmes in a step-by-step process linked to economic aid, security
guarantees, and the normalization of relations with the United States.
Soon after, the United States initiated financial sanctions against North
Korea. Invoking the Patriot Act, the U.S. Treasury Department obtained the
cooperation of China in freezing North Korean accounts in a Macao bank,
accusing North Korea of counterfeiting U.S. currency. At the same time, the
Treasury Department initiated broader efforts to persuade banks throughout
the world to shun all North Korea-related accounts or transactions as possible
49
conduits for trade relating to weapons of mass destruction. North Korea
charged that the sanctions were a violation of Article Two of the September 19
agreement, in which the United States pledged to normalize relations. North
Korea refused to return to the six-party negotiations and called for the United
States to engage in preliminary bilateral talks on the financial sanctions issue
prior to reconvening the six-party talks.
Then tensions in the region soared in early July 2006 when North Korea
launched seven test missiles, one of them a long-range Taepodong-2 missile,
which fell into the Sea of Japan. International military observers judged the
test-launches as unsuccessful but the concerned international community, via
the UN Security Council, led the call for economic sanctions against North
Korea.
Then in early October 2006 North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in an
underground explosion. United States intelligence agencies, after testing air
samples for radiation and measuring seismic readings, concluded that North
Korea had tested a plutonium bomb with an explosive force of less than 1
kiloton of TNT. North Korea became the eighth country in the world known to
50
have tested a nuclear weapon. United States intelligence experts estimated
that North Korea had an arsenal of six to nine nuclear weapons.
In response to the test the UN Security Council unanimously voted to
impose financial and weapons sanctions on North Korea for a clear threat to
international peace and security. The resolution called upon all nations to take
cooperative action, including through the inspection of cargo, in accordance
with their respective national laws, to prohibit the delivery of any materials
related to weapons of mass destruction. It also banned trade with North Korea
in heavy conventional weapons and luxury goods, and it called on nations to
freeze funds connected with North Korea’s nonconventional arms
programmes. However, the resolution left member states free to decide how
to implement its provisions, and it was not expected to lead to the interdiction
of North Korean ships at sea or to the imposition of a quarantine or embargo
on North Korea.
North Korea reacted angrily to the UN Security Council resolution,
calling it a declaration of war. While calling for stiff sanctions against North
Korea, U.S. president Bush said the United States had no intention of attacking
North Korea. Bush added, however, that the United States reserved the right
51
to consider all options to defend our friends in the region, a reference to Japan
and South Korea, U.S. allies that are nonnuclear weapons states. UN secretary
general Kofi Annan called on the United States to conduct bilateral talks with
North Korea, but the official U.S. position remained that it would only engage
in multilateral negotiations.
In a series of trilateral (U.S.-China-North Korea) and bilateral (U.S.-
North Korea) meetings on October 31, 2006, in Beijing, North Korea agreed to
return to the six-party talks in exchange for a U.S. agreement to seek a
solution of the Macao bank dispute and the issue of global banking sanctions.
The solution was to be negotiated through a working group linked to the six-
party talks.
A first round of talks in December ended in a stalemate. Negotiations
resumed in February 2007, resulting in a breakthrough outlining the first
concrete steps for putting into practice the September 2005 agreement in
which North Korea pledged to dismantle its nuclear programme if certain
conditions were met.
The agreement reached in February set deadlines for the first phase of
North Korea’s abandonment of all nuclear weapons and research
52
programmes. North Korea agreed to close and seal its main nuclear reactor
and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon under the monitoring of international
inspectors. In return, North Korea would receive 100,000 tons of fuel oil.
South Korea also agreed to provide 400,000 tons of food aid to its
impoverished northern neighbor as part of the deal. In addition, the United
States and Japan agreed to begin bilateral talks with North Korea on
normalizing relations. For the United States, that would involve the lifting of
financial sanctions. The United States also agreed to resolve the Macao
banking dispute within 30 days.
The February agreement also provided that North Korea would receive
another 900,000 tons of fuel oil, or equivalent aid, in stages after taking steps
to permanently disclose and dismantle all of its nuclear facilities and
programmes. The details of the second phase of the deal were to be worked
out in a new round of six-nation talks scheduled for mid-2007.
In July 2007 inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) verified that North Korea had shut down its main nuclear reactor and
all other nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon complex. In return, North Korea
received its first shipments of fuel and food aid. A new round of six-nation
53
talks ended later in July without an agreement on a timetable for North Korea
to fully disable and disclose all of its nuclear facilities and programmes. But in
further talks held in late September, North Korea committed to a deadline of
December 31.
In October 2007 Kim Jong II hosted South Korean president Roh Moo
Hyun in Pyongyang in the first face-to-face meeting of Korean leaders since
the historic summit of 2000. Their talks resulted in a joint declaration that
stated a bilateral commitment to work toward signing a formal peace treaty
for the Korean War and that outlined a number of specific projects to build
closer economic ties between the two countries. Among other projects, South
Korea agreed to build a special economic zone in the North Korean port of
Haeju, as well as a new railway and highway linking the Kaesong Industrial
Complex to other cities. Under the 2000 summit agreement, South Korea had
built the Kaesong complex as a special economic zone, and factories opened
there in 2004. In November 2007 the prime ministers from both countries
met for the first time in 15 years and held additional talks on improving
bilateral ties.
54
The government of North Korea’s declaration, that it has produced
nuclear weapons for self-defense and her announcement that it is
withdrawing from the six-nation talks aimed at ending its nuclear weapons
programme, and her renews calls for direct negotiations with the United
States produced widespread concern throughout the international
community, “although the test had only a small yield, North Korea continues
to defy the demands of the international community to halt its development of
nuclear weapons” Joshua el tal (2008:228).
Meanwhile, the United States under the administration of President Bill
Clinton reached an important arms control arrangement with North Korea in
1994. Although relations between the United States and North Korea
remained tense, under the arrangement North Korea agreed to freeze all work
on the infrastructure of reactors and reprocessing plants needed to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons. In exchange, Japan, South Korea, and the
United States agreed to provide fuel oil and other economic aid to North
Korea.
In 2002, however, this arrangement began to unravel. United States
intelligence agencies reported that while being paid not to produce
55
plutonium, there was evidence that North Korea might be at work to enrich
uranium or to create the facilities needed to enrich uranium, the other way of
obtaining nuclear weapons that triggered North Korea’s inclusion in the axis
of evil cited by U.S. president George W. Bush in his State of the Union speech
in January 2002. The United States also responded to this intelligence report
by halting supplies of fuel oil to North Korea. In October 2002 a U.S. official
reported that a North Korean official had admitted that North Korea had a
uranium enrichment programme. North Korean officials, however,
subsequently denied that North Korea had a covert programme to develop
nuclear weapons with enriched uranium. In January 2003 North Korea
expelled United Nations (UN) monitors with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
In April 2003 North Korea told U.S. officials that it possessed nuclear
weapons, and in October 2003 North Korean officials said they were
extracting plutonium from spent nuclear fuel rods to produce nuclear
weapons. In November 2003 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
repeated its belief that North Korea possessed at least one and possibly two
nuclear bombs. However, other former and current U.S. intelligence officials
said they were skeptical that North Korea had the technological know-how to
56
produce nuclear weapons. With this turn of events the Security Council in 14
October 2006, met and passed a resolution:
Expressing the gravest concern over the claim by the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it had conducted a nuclear
weapon test, the Security Council this afternoon condemned that
test and imposed sanctions on the DPRK, calling for it to return
immediately to multilateral talks on the issue. The Security
Council at (http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=
1745). Retrieved 12/06/ 2009.
In February 2007 the six-nation talks resulted in an agreement in which
North Korea pledged to shut down its main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon,
which produces plutonium as a byproduct, in exchange for aid.
That agreement led to a subsequent North Korean pledge in October 2007 to
disable its Yongbyon reactor by the end of the year in exchange for 950,000
metric tons of fuel oil or its equivalent in economic aid. North Korea also
agreed to disclose all of its nuclear programmes and promised not to transfer
its nuclear materials, technology, or know-how beyond its borders.
57
The reason for the United Nation’s Security Council resolution 1718
(2006) that places sanction on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) was based on the persistent call on the DPRK to halt her nuclear
programme, to honor the nuclear-non proliferation treaty, which North Korea
has defiantly ignored and went ahead to develop and tested various nuclear
devices and ballistic missiles (long and short rang) in the year 2006 and 2009.
One of the possibly reasons for the North Korean quest for nuclear
weapons is the threat posed by the American government towards her during
the Korean war of 1950/1953. The Korean war originated in the division of
Korea into South Korea and North Korea after the world war II (1939-1945).
Efforts to reunify the peninsula after the war failed, and in 1948, the south
proclaimed the republic of Korea and the North established the people’s
republic of Korea. In 1949 border fighting broke out between the North and
the South, On June 25, 1950, North Korea forces crossed the dividing line and
invaded the South. Soon, in defense of the South, the United States joined the
fighting under the banner of the United Nations (UN), along with small
contingents of some countries. In October 1950 China joined the war on the
North’s side. According to Bruce (2009:para.2) “as early as November 30,
1950, Truman said the United States might use any weapon in its arsenal to
58
hold back the Chinese, an oblique reference to the atomic bomb”. It has also
been stated that:
The U.S. government seriously considered using nuclear weapons
in Korea in early 1951. The immediate threat was the USSR’s
deployment of 13 air divisions to East Asia, including 200
bombers that could strike not just Korea but also American bases
in Japan; and China’s deployment of massive new forces near the
Korean border. On March 10, 1951, MacArthur asked Truman for
a 'D-Day atomic capability'-the ability to launch a massive nuclear
assault. Truman complied, ordering the Air Force to refurbish the
atomic bomb loading pits at Okinawa, Japan, which were used
during World War II.
Pyongyang’s basic stance is that:
As long as Washington remains its foe, it feels threatened and will
acquire nuclear weapons and missiles to counter that threat. But,
it says, if Washington, along with Seoul and Tokyo, moves to end
enmity and reconcile with it, it will no longer feel threatened and
will not need these weapons, Sigal (2009:3).
59
It has been noted that the use of such weapons could not only destroy
entire citizens and countries but also, conceivably the world’s entire
population Charles (2007:463).
With the advancement, invention and improvement on the existing
nuclear and other weapons of mass destructions and its concomitant use
prompted the nuclear states and non-nuclear state alike to call for the
regulation, control and disarmament and eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destructions in the face of the globe.
Owing to this danger of annihilation of human race that, Einstein the Prize-
wining physicist whose ideas were the basis for the development of nuclear
weapon was alarmed by the threat they posed. Darry (2006:500), has it that,
“he professed uncertainly about the weapons that would be used in a third
world war but was confident that in a fourth war they would be sticks and
stones”. He warned that inasmuch as the unleash power of the atom has
changed everything save our modes of thinking … we thus drift toward
unparallel catastrophe.
The United Nations Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter in respect of the North Korean nuclear test, never
60
theless it barred automatic military enforcement of its demands under the
Charter’s Article 41, the Council adopted resolution 1718 (2006), this
resolution prevents a range of goods from entering or leaving North Korea
and imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the nuclear-
weapon programme. With this decision, the Council prohibited the supply of
large-scale arms, nuclear technology and related training to North Korea, as
well as luxury goods, calling upon all member States to take cooperative
action, including through inspection of cargo, in accordance with their
respective national laws.
The purpose was to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery and related materials.
The freezing of assets has “limitations according to the Council specific
exemptions for the transfer of monies to meet various financial obligations
and humanitarian needs, specifying humanitarian exemptions for the travel
ban, as well” Security Council (2006). In order to ensure a compliance and
adjustment of the sanctions been imposed on North Korea, the Security
Council resolved to establish a committee of 15 members of the body, that
would provide a report every 90 days, starting from the passage of the
resolution.
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This study has been designed to critically analyze the consequences of
the violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, with the
Security Council’s resolution 1718 of 2006, on the Democratic People’s
Republic of North Korea as a case study.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Owning to the known deadly capability of the nuclear weapons as was
shown during the 2nd World war atomic bomb that was dropped at the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima, and Nagasaki by the USA. The Chernobyl’
accident, an accident at the Chernobyl’ nuclear power plant in the Ukrainian
republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that produced a
plume of radioactive debris that drifted over parts of the western USSR,
Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia. The Nuclear accident at the US Three Mile
Island in Pennsylvania in 1979 and the related nuclear dangers posed by the
nuclear proliferations many cases are some of the dangers which the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty is designed to avert. The IAEA was created to take
care of nuclear related matters around the world. While, Under Chapter VII of
the United Nation’s charter, the Security Council is the only UN organ that can
order enforcement action if a case of aggression or breach of peace has been
established as regards non compliance to the international laws and treaties,
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and with the coming into being in of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy
Agency) through the adoption of a resolutions. Enforcement action can range
from economic sanctions to military measures against any member states that
violate the Non-Proliferation treaty. The United Nations and the Security
Council has passed a lot of resolutions on various issues relating to the
Nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferations in the past for peaceful
resolution of international disputes.
The non compliance to the resolutions of the Security Council has wide
ranging implications for both the violating states and the world at large. A
good example is the nuclear disaster in Ukraine and Japan of 2nd world war
and the three Island of Pennsylvania in the United States of America. On the
other hand the likely implications of non compliance to the member states are
enormous. This is because; it will lead to more proliferation activities a good
example is that of Iranian proggramme.
The United Nations Security Council had adopted many resolutions
which are meant to ensure peace and security at international level. The
October 14th, resolution 1718 of 2006, is one of such, it was meant to control
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the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions around the world starting
from North Korea.
The questions that will form the foundation of this study are:
1. Does the United Nation’s Security Council’s resolution have a legal force?
2. Is there evidence that states are obeying the United Nations Security
Council’s resolutions?
3. Has resolution 1718 deterred North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapon?
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY.
The central aim of this study is to critically analyze, the consequences of
the United Nations Security Council resolution 1718 of 2006 on the effort
towards the control of nuclear weapon proliferations around the world. Apart
from this, the study will have the following specific, objectives:
1. To find out if the Security Council’s resolution have a legal force.
2. To find out if there is evidence that states are obeying the Security
Council’s resolution.
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3. To find out if the resolution 1718 has deterred North Korea from
acquiring nuclear weapon.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The United Nations Security Council plays vital roles in the maintenance
of peace, order and stability in the world. It is able to perform these through
the statutory powers vested in her which performed through passing and
adoption of various resolutions in the past on an important world issues since
it’s inception in 1945 in accordance to the United Nations charter and its
enabling laws. One of the resolutions of the UN Security Council is resolution
1718 of October, 2006, on the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea,
which places sanctions on the various categories of North Korean
establishments’ institutions and leaders.
This study is therefore fundamental in two significant ways. First, with
an appropriate theoretical framework, the study will established whether the
council’s resolution have a 45legal force. Also the study will equally find out if
there is evidence that states are obeying the Security Council’s resolution. And
to find out if the resolution 1718 has been able to deter North Korea from
acquiring nuclear weapon. With such a theoretical break-through, the
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enforcement of the Security Council’s resolution will not just be obeyed; it will
be used in resolving conflicts, disputes and in achieving the control of
proliferations of weapons of mass destructions all over the world and to know
if there is still be need for resolutions. And secondly this study has a great
prospect of extending the frontier of knowledge in the area of international
relations in general, dispute resolutions and, in the control of nuclear
weapons proliferation in particular. Scholars, postgraduate students and other
stakeholders will find the outcome of this study very illuminating. Finally,
students in the fields of international constitutional law, politics and,
organization will find this work of scholarly interest; it will be of practical
value to foreign policy makers and professions diplomats who are concerned
with the search for workable world order.
Empirically, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations,
and the member states of the United Nations and those institutions and
individuals who have been in the process of conflicts resolutions and are
campaigning for the nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the
eradication of nuclear weapons in the world, will find the outcome of this
study very useful. Finally, the United Nations member States, warring States,
nuclear weapons ambitious States like North Korea, Iran, Libya amongst
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others may learn one or two lessons concerning the would be consequences of
violating the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions, so as to know if
they too will continue with there own or embark on such programs for the
states that have on such proggramme on the other hand.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study is to find out if the Security Council’s resolutions
have a legal force. To find out if there is evidence that states have been
obeying the Security Council’s resolutions. Also to find out if the resolution
1718 has deterred North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons is the final
scope.
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CHAPTER TWO
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW.
According to Osuala in Eze (2008:15), the review of literature serves
two main purposes in research “first, it helps to set the theoretical base for a
research and secondly, it helps to set the current research into perspectives”.
In other words, the researcher comes to terms with the state of the art
through literature review.
The literature review for this study will be reviewed under the
following sub-headings:
1. Does the United Nation’s Security Council’s resolution have a legal force?
2. Is there evidence that states are obeying the United Nations Security
Council’s resolutions?
3. Has resolution 1718 deterred North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapon?
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DOES THE UNITED NATION’S SECURITY COUNCIL’S RESOLUTION HAVE A
LEGAL FORCE
One of the essential features of a legal system is people’s (states)
readiness to adhere to it. A law is effective when it is obeyed by the people
(states). For there to be a voluntary compliance with the rule of law by a
group, the people (states) concerned must accept its legitimacy by “legitimacy
we mean that people accept authority of the institution(s) that made the rules
or agree that, the so made are necessary to the reasonable conduct of society”,
Onuoha (2008:193).
Should the United Nations member states accept the United Nations
Security Council’s Resolutions? By the virtue of ratification, accession of the
UN Charter and acceptance of the membership of the United Nations, member
states are automatically bound by rules and regulations of the United Nations.
Traditionally, International law has often been defined as “that body of
principles and rules generally accepted by civilized states as binding upon
their conduct” Onuoha (2008:193). Meanwhile, George (1967:3) defines
international law as “the body of legal rules which apply between sovereign
states and such other entities as have been granted international personality”.
On the other hand, Umozurike (2005:1) defined it as “the rules and principles
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that govern states in their relations inter se”. Starke,(1972:1) however see
international law as “that body of law which is composed for its greater part
of the principles and rules of conduct which states feel themselves bound for
or to observe, and therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with
each other and which include:
1 The rules of law relating to the functioning of international institutions
or organizations, their relations with each other , and their relations
with states and individuals, and
2 Certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-state entities so far
as the rights or duties of such individuals and non-state entities are the
concern of the international community.
Even as states are one of the main subjects of international law
according to the traditional view of international law, Umozurike (2005:1)
have it that “the development of international relations in recent times,
especially the establishment of, a great number of international institutions,
and international recognition of rights and duties of groups and individuals,
have to that extent brought these entities within its purview”.
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At least there have been three schools of thoughts that have arisen in
connection with the issue of legality of international law. They are: 1 The
Austinian or Denier’s school of thought, (2) The Restrainer’s school of thought
and, (3) The consenter’s school of thought.
THE AUSTINIAN OR DENIER’S SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
This school insists that international law is a misnomer and that it is not
law at all, but a branch of international morality. They argued that
international law is nothing more than international usages or quasi-
authoritative communications. The Austinian school sees law as a rule of
conduct issued by a superior authority to persons over whom it has
jurisdiction. This is why they hold international law as not law. The school
believed that the United Nations agencies such as UNSC, UNICEF and other
international organizations hold no jurisdiction over persons, states or even
institutions. In this vein laws presumed to be raised to regulate their conduct
cannot be law.
The school measure international law by national or municipal law
standard, and say that the absence of centralized legislative, judicial and
Executive authority disqualifies international law from being law in deed.
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They contend that states have in existence, police force, prisons, law courts
and a judicial system to provide protection and apply punishment against
violators of the law, or enforce a judicial ruling.
According to the Austinian school, since international law cannot be
swiftly and surely enforced, as it lacks the ability to restrain by the use of
force, international law cannot qualify for the name or title ‘law’.
THE RESTRAINER’S SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
The restrainer school holds different view of international law. It
believed that international law is true law and that is binding and restraining
on states and other subjects of the law. The proponents see states as
belonging to an international community that creates legal obligations. By
virtue of membership of international community, each state is subject to
rules that make for peaceful coexistence in the community. They emphasized
that the words of statesmen at international conferences, such as at the United
Nations General Assembly which profess their states adherence to
international law is proof that international law is law and is functional.
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THE CONCERTERS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
The consenter’s school believed that international law is law because
states enter into it by consent. Restrainers see law as being the result of an
international community; consenters see international law as a form of social
control based on international consent. This consent may be expressed in a
formal or implied by way of generally accepted conduct. It is generally agreed
that such conduct may be basis for customary international law, which is as
binding as express law. “…so far as adherence to international law has grown
over the years, it has been based more on voluntary compliance than on
coercion”, Onuoha (2008:198).
The nature of the United Nations Security Council’s status in the
International society requires elaboration. Three notions from political theory
assist this task, Political legitimacy, political authority, and authoritativeness.
A body has political legitimacy when its decisions are justified by moral and
other social embedded beliefs about the end to which it exercises power, and
about the process through which its power is exercised. For any entity to have
political authority however it must have more than legitimacy, it must also
have the right to be obeyed by those who are within the scope of its rules. An
entity is authoritative ‘it and only if the fact that it issues a rule can itself
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compelling reason to comply within that rule. Political authority therefore,
entails political legitimacy, but vice versa. Authority involves a hierarchical
relationship were both the one who command and one who obeys recognize,
in their predetermined stable place.
When this notion is applied to the Security Council, it is clear that the
Council is not a political authority in the sense described by political theorists,
“but rather, a body that is at best authoritative with respect to the specific
issue, of international peace and security” Stephen (1954:93). The Council
does not according to Stephen (1954:90) in “practice command authoritative
obedience of states, and is continuously engaged in a process of considering
what measures the UN member states will be prepared to support”. The
Council remains a forum for interstate bargaining, where agreement is
reached by national representative directed by their governments. Moreover,
the council does pass binding resolutions, Anderson (2004:44) corroborated
this when he asserted that “States have given a very few international
organizations, such as the European Union and the UN Security Council, the
power to enact directly binding measures”. Without a centralized body to
offer a definitive interpretation, it is often left to the UN secretariat to
endeavor to secure compliance with resolutions, without any further guidance
74
from the Council for the implementation of a given mandate. With The “role of
unanimity applicable to the permanent members of the Security Council, a
rule warmly endorsed by the great powers themselves was regarded as a
guarantee that the interest of world peace and security would be constantly
safeguarded”, Thomas and Erica (1986:55). They note that, “the voting
arrangements in the security council were the provisions establishing a
military with responsibility for the direction of the military forces in the
interest of peace”, Thomas and Erica (1986:vii). In the same vein, Deutsch
(1988:240) has noted that “the Korean War was fought under the UN flag, and
the North Korean attack was thwarted; and cease-fire and armistice of 1953-
1954 left the territories of both North and South Korean Substantially
Unchanged…” According to Umozurike (2005:5):
…Although the United Nations does not embrace all the nations of
the world, its Security Council has the power to impose sanctions
in cases relating to breaches of the peace or threat thereto under
chapter 7 of the charter under Article 94, a state may report
another state to the Security Council if it fail to carry out a
decision … whereupon the Council may make recommendations
or decide on measures to take.
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According to Ruggie, (1998:23) “any Country, whose influence is
declining or that, is having a dispute usually insist on working with the United
Nations, in order to constrain the actions of more powerful states” According
to John (1999:219), “… the Security Council (UNSC), like its predecessor, is the
main peacekeeping organ and includes permanent members for five major
powers…”.It is however not the duty of the UN to enforce international law
generally and punish offenders, these belong to the enforcement agent of the
United Nations. The legal power of the United Nations Security Council is
enormous to the extent that the non Security Council member states play an
active part in the deliberative activities of the United Nations, which they
wholeheartedly support they contribute effectively to the law of the UN, which
takes account of the interests of the East, West and Non-aligned. They are
however weakest in the Security Council which has been paralyzed by the
veto and none of them posses that power.
The over barring power of the Security Council in the maintenance of
peace and security in the international community is evidenced in the fact that
when a member state is having a military conflict with another member state
it has to continue defending itself “until the Security Council has taken
adequate measures to restore international peace and security” John
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(1999:221). However; there are cases in which the Security Council did not
act as expected:
Between 1970 and 1978; the Security Council passed 15
resolutions on Namibia ordering South Africa to withdraw. One of
these found that it was guilty of brutal repression of the Namibian
people and that it persistently violated their human rights.
Between 1979 and 1982 the Security Council did nothing on
Namibia relying on the good offices of the contact group-Canada,
Britain, France, USA, and the West Germany who held out the
hope of persuading South Africa to yield to the demand of the UN
and respect the human rights of the people, Turner (1985:7).
Enforcement of contracts and regulations to deny oil to South Africa is
ultimately the responsibility of workers. Overall government guidelines on
specific monitoring procedures are vital. But their efficient application
requires that informed and vigilant workers exercise responsibility faithfully.
Such application is at the very practical solidarity with South Africa workers.
African workers participated in passing resolution on the oil embargo at the
March 1980 meeting of the 5th international oil workers Anti-monopoly
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Conference in Tripoli. The final communiqué committed over 50 national oil
workers’ union, to take effective measures to impose an oil embargo on the
racist regime in south Africa …The conference recommends that the secretary
of the conference should undertake the responsibility for the collection of data
from the other unions and organizations all over the world for a total
suspension of the supply of oil to South Africa … all oil workers obligate
themselves to unveil the actions of any company or country which supplies
the racist regime with oil, and to disclose their criminal activities.
A United Nations resolution 837/69 of December 1982, call an
international conference on embargo enforcement, sponsored by oil exporting
and transshipping countries. The text of the voting records is reproduced
below as appendix2:
a. Countries exporting oil and generating most of the world’s tankers cargos,
along with countries offering flag of convenience to tankers owned in
other countries all vote for the oil embargo,
b. Countries in which more oil companies are incorporated and which are
the home bases for most of the tankers owners, voted against the oil
embargo, with a few exceptions.
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Voting against the oil embargo resolution and proposal for an
international conference in December1982 were Belgium, France, F.R.
Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and the USA. Thirteen others
abstained, while 125 countries voted in favor.
In contrast to the campaigns for an oil embargo pursued by many
bodies, the Security Council vetoed such action in the context of a call in April
1981 for comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against South Africa for its
failure to concede to Namibia.
On April 30, 1981 Britain, France, and the USA vetoed four resolutions
inn the Security Council which would have imposed sanctions on South Africa
unless it accepted the United Nations plan for Namibian Independence
(resolution 435 of 1978).
On May 31, 1983 the Security Council decided unanimously to mandate
the secretary General to undertake consultation with the parties to propose
cease-fire in Namibia and to report back by August 31, 1983. No mention was
made of sanctions because the objective of the Security Council meeting was
to unanimous affirm resolution 435 for elections under UN auspices and put
the issue back into UN after more than 5 years of prevarication on the part of
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contact group. According to Turner (1985:7), “all international and regional
bodies’ recognize the importance of moving towards a United Nations Security
Council mandatory and comprehensive embargo against South Africa”.
Sanctions were to be raised again after the August 31, 1983 report of the
Secretary General.
The United Nations Security Council’s have preeminence over all other
regional security bodies or organizations such as Warsaw Pact, the collective
Self-Defense Pact of the Arab League, Manila Treaty ANZU Treaty, Rio Treaty
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization and sub regional ones like that of
ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Before
taking any actions the regional collective Security bodies should act in:
Accordance with the requirement of Article 51 of the UN Charter,
regional treaties expressly provide that measures taken in self-
defense shall not only be reported to the Security Council but also
be terminated as soon as the Security Council has been able to
take necessary action to restore peace, Turner (1985:7).
The similarity in the regulation of the use of force by both UN Charter
and regional treaties should not be permitted to obscure the important
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difference in the scope of the right of the universal and regional organizations
to employ force. As a collective security agency, the UN has been empowered
to maintain peace globally (Article 2(6). The right of the UN to enforce peace
when Disturb is not strictly speaking, limited to the situation of an armed
attack as is the case with of regional organizations. To further emphasis the
more stringent limitations impose upon the right of regional organization to
the use of force, “Article 53 prohibits regional enforcement measures except
with the prior approval of the Security Council” Akindele (1976:77). The
fundamental idea of international security is contained in the UN charter.
Article 1 commits all members:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to
take effective collective measure to preserve or restore the peace.
Article24 give to the Security Council the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security and by
Article 25, members agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Council. Article 42, gives the Security Council the authority to
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Key
language in Article 43 requires members to undertake to make
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available to the Security Council, on its call … armed forces…
necessary for the purpose of peace maintenance. John (1999:219).
Cuba in July, 1960, brought a complaint to the Security Council of
threats, intrigues harassment and aggression allegedly directed against her by
the United States. According to the Raul Roa in Akindele (1976:82), the Cuban
Minister of Foreign Affairs complained that, “the international behaviour of
the United States towards Cuba constitutes political intervention and
economic aggression which are expressly condemned in Articles 15 and 16 of
the Charter of the Organization of American States”. When the Security
Council went on session in 18th July, same year to consider the Cuban charge,
she; argued before the Security Council that if Article 52(2) of the UN Charter
was invoked to support the legal obligation on the her part to have recourse to
the OAS (Organization of American States) before going to the Security
Council, such contention ignores the important reservation in Article 53(4).
While acknowledging that the OAS Charter requires all international disputes
between American States to be submitted to the pacific procedures of OAS
before they are referred to the Security Council (Article 23),
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In furtherance to the Cuban complaint to the Security Council, Akindele
(1976:82) notes that the “the Security Council approved a draft resolution
which requested the council to take note of the fact that the complaint was
being investigated …” In the case of the Dominican Republican crisis of 1963, a
civil war broke out in April 1965; this brought the United Nations and the
Organization of American States (OAS, Founded in 1948 in Bogota, Colombia)
together in a concurrent but independent search for peace. The crisis brought
about the creation of an Inter-American peace Force, with a specific political
function assignment for the OAS Secretary-General. The Inter-American Peace
Force was, in conception and practice peace keeping and not an enforcement
force. The Security Council was called into to consider the question of the
armed interference by the United States in the internal affair the Dominican
Republic. In the course of deliberation on the issue a Jordan representative
posed a question to the Security Council thus:
Are we, in the world today, trying to establish International system
for world peace and order, or are we tending to substitute for a
regional system for the same objective? On the answer to that
question depends the course of action we should adopt, Akindele
(1976:87).
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These questions by Jordan representative to the Security Council
aroused as a result of the United States dominance in the OAS and her
interference in the internal affairs of the members of the Organization of
American States. This is in the light of the United States overshadow the
United Nations through her leaderships of the OAS. However, the United
Nations and the Organization of American States operated concurrently at the
scene of action in the resolution of a crisis. In the case of arm intervention
without an authentic request, the Security Council is not only within its rights,
but is in duty bound to give urgent consideration to the question. The Security
Council acts within it jurisdictional competence. Akindele (1976;88),
corroborated this when he stated that “the legal competence of the Security
Council, it was urged, rested firmly on the provisions of articles 24, 25, and 39
of the UN Charter”. Still on the Dominican crisis, the United States and her
supporters in the OAS argued that, the purpose of the United Nations Charter
will hardly be served if two international organizations are seeking to do
things in the same place with the same people at the same time. The coalition
(supporters) in support of the thesis of OAS Supremacy did not deny so much
the competence of the Security Council as assert the practical common sense
in allowing the regional organization to continue with the search for peace in
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the Dominican Republic. The importance of prior notification of the United
Nations Security Council before any action is taken by any regional bodies was
highlighted thus:
The attempt to reduce the essence of universal-regional
relationship in the peaceful adjustment of disputes to the
provision of Article 54, which require regional organizations to
keep the Security Council informed of their activities, leaves much
to be desired. A situation where charges of unauthorized armed
intervention have been made, merely keeping Security Council
informed of the activities of a regional organization is, as the
Cuban representative pointed out, a very poor substitute for the
direct cognizance of the situation by the Security Council,
Akindele (1976:89).
In a similar vein, Lebanon in 1958 faced a majored constitutional crisis
arising from the attempt by then president Chamsoun to amend the Lebanese
constitution so that he will again be a presidential candidate in the then up
coming election in Lebanon. The crisis led to disturbances organized by
forces hostile to his ambition. He accused the United Arab Republic (Egypt) of
85
supplying to subversive elements in his country and inciting them to
overthrow his legitimate government in Beirut. He appealed to League of
Arab States and the Security Council to condemn put to an end to foreign
intervention in the domestic affairs of his country. The Council convened to
examine the Lebanese complaint against the UAR. It was argued before the
Security Council that as Lebanon herself had appealed to the Arab League, the
Council had a duty to allow the regional organization to promote peace in the
Middle East.
Council voted to suspend consideration of the complaint when it was
lean that the Arab League was about to deal with the matter. The Lebanese
government who had called in the Security Council did not object to the
deferment of the Security Council’s move. To this end, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Jordan, Yemen, Libya, and the Sudan Sponsored a resolution, which among
other things, urge Lebanon to withdraw the complaint that it had placed
before the Security Council, called upon the various groups in Lebanon to
settle their domestic problems by peaceful and constitutional means in
accordance with letter and spirit of the pact of the League of Arab States and
authorizes the Arab League Council to dispatch a committee to Lebanon to
help to promote peace. The having accepting the resolution by both the
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Lebanese government and the UAR delegation to the meeting , the
government of Lebanon surprise announce her rejection of the resolution on
5 June 1958. This led to a speculation that Chamoun government was not
interested in having the crisis resolved at regional level as it lacks confidence
in the impartiality of a regional organization dominated by very state against
which a charge of unprovoked intervention had been laid, then “Chamoun
government turned to the Security Council to resume consideration of the
complaint”, Akindele (1976:89).
Face with the question of whether the disturbance in Lebanon were
caused by internal antagonism or were provoked by foreign armed support
for the anti-government forces; the Security Council with only the Soviet
Union abstaining adopt a Swedish draft resolution calling for the
establishment of an observer group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure
that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other
material across Lebanese border. Neither Lebanon nor the Egypt objected to
the resolution. The Secretary-General proceeded to set up the United nations
Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) and “the Security Council thus
successfully seized political initiative from the League of Arab States”,
Akindele (1976:91).
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In late 1963, a civil war broke out between the Greek and the Turkish
communities in Cyprus despite protracted efforts to evolve an acceptable
solution under the auspices of the North Atlantic Alliance. There was a British
American proposal for the creation of, a NATO peace-keeping force of ten
thousand men to separate the two warring communities. However, according
to Akindele (1967:9) “Archbishop Makarios prefer the United Nations as an
avenue for the search for settlement did not provoked open challenge from
NATO powers which had hoped to prevent Soviet participation in the
evolution of the settlement through the Security Council”. However despite
the NATO’s moves to prevent the reporting of the Cyprus crisis to the UN
Security Council, the Council did responded in 1963-64 crisis in Cyprus, by
agreeing unanimously to create a UN peace-keeping force to be stationed in
Cyprus with the consent of the Cyprus government, and to appoint a
mediator mandated to promote peaceful settlement of the problem of
coexistence between the two communities.
The Greek-Turkish cleavages over the political future of Cyprus surface
dramatically again in July 1974 when the Greek officers seconded to the
Cypriot National Guard engineered a coup against the government of
Makarios and installed the former EOKA terrorist, Nikos Sampson, as
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president of the Republic. The coup achieved for Athens de facto union
between Greece and Cyprus, but unacceptable to Turkey, thus precipitating
the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish troop in 20 July 1974.
In the ensuing search for peace, no serious consideration was at any
time publicly given to NATO as a venue for the resolution of the crisis. There
was, however, broad support for Security Council initiative, The Council
discussed the threat to peace in the eastern Mediterranean in full awareness
that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which assigned special responsibilities to
Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom and under which Cyprus became
independent, provides a political framework for the resolution of conflicts.
Thus, while calling for an immediate cease-fire, an end to foreign
military intervention, and a prompt withdraw of unauthorized foreign
military personnel from Cyprus, Security Council resolution 353 of 20 July
expressly urged the three guarantors of the 1960 London-Zurich treaty to
enter into negotiation for the restoration of peace and constitutional
government in Cyprus. Pursuant to this resolution and in keeping with the
treaty of Guarantee, negotiation for peaceful settlement proceeded in Geneva,
only to be subsequently interruption by the resumption of fighting in Cyprus.
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The Council’s efforts have since been to arrange resumption of negotiations
in Geneva, to ensure all-party co-operation with UNFICYP in maintaining
peace, and to achieve compliance with the resolution of 20 July. But a “peace
force stationed in Cyprus from 1964 to 1072 was able to intervene
successfully in the conflict between the Greek and Turkish groups of Cyprus”
Deutsch (1988:241).
In 1964-73 fighting broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia, president
Osman of Somalia asked the Security Council to consider his country charge
of armed aggression against Ethiopia. African leaders in general viewed with
disfavor the Somali call for UN intervention and persuaded President Osman
to withdraw his request to the world body. Consequently, Somalia notified
the Security Council that she no longer wished the Ethiopia-Somali dispute
before that body ‘while the problem is in the hands of the OAU. However,
Akindele (1967:96) noted this second note “appeared to have been
interpreted by the Somali government as calling for a suspension of Security
Council action rather than a withdrawal of the original request”.
The United Nation also intervened in the Congo’s crisis of 1960-64 at
the invitation of Patrick Lumumba’s government. Shortly after Belgians
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granted independence to the Congo (Zaire) Republic in June 1960, some
sections of the national army mutinied. Faced with the intervention of
Belgian forces and the secession of Katanga announced by moise Tsombe in
July 1960, the Congolese government requested the United Nations for
military assistance to protect the Congo Republic from the Belgian
aggression. In, response to the request, the United Nation authorized Dag
Hammerskjod, its Secretary-General, to furnish necessary assistance to the
Lumumba government. The word body was able to set up “an international
peace-keeping force within a remarkable short period of time to supervise
the cessation of hostilities and its competence to promote peace in the
Republic was at no time challenged”, Akindele (1967:94). However the
involvement of the United States and Belgium made the involvement of the
United Nations through the Security Council hence:
Intervention by the United States and Belgium in the Congo
provided a good opportunity for a consideration of the Congo
situation by the Security Council in December 1964. The OAU
joined in calling for a meeting of the Security Council specifically
to condemn the foreign military intervention, Akindele
(1967:101).
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According to Joshua and Jon (2008:80) ,the UN peace keepers actually
perform two different functions-observing and peacekeeping. Observers are
unarmed military officers sent to a conflict area in small numbers simply to
watch what happens and report to the UN. The function of peacekeeping is
carried out by highly armed soldiers. However, John and Jon (2008:85),
stated that “Security Council broadened the mandate of UN Peacekeepers in
the ‘Democratic Republic’ of Congo to let them protect civilians”. They
pointed out that in the late 1990s, seven countries –Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Poland, the Netherland, Austria, and Canada formed a 4,000 troop
UN standby high readiness Brigade,the brigade is controlled by the Security
Council. It participated in the UN mission to Ethopia-Eritra in 2000-2001, “in
early 2005, the brigade deployed in Sudan to support a peace agreement
between North and South regions after a long civil war…” John and Jon
(2008:87).
According to Charles (2007:111), “for more than four decades, the UN
was a victim of superpower rivalry. However, the end of cold war removes
many of the impediments to the United Nations ability to lead in preserving
peace. For example, “in 1999, the Security Council swung into action to
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authorize military coercion to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, which it
had invaded” Charles (2007:113).
Regional, Security Organizations, and conflict management, this “non-
UN peace operations were either authorized by the Security Council or had
the consent of the host government, and therefore consistent with article 2 of
the UN charter” Charles (2007:562). The best known regional security
organization is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), others are:
the organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE), The ANZU
pact (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States), the Southeast Asian
Treaty Organization (SEATO). Those with somewhat political mandates
beyond defense include the Organization of American States (OAS), the
League of Arab States, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) now AU, the
Nordic Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Gulf Cooperation Council. “Article 51 of the UN charter encourages the
creation of regional organizations for collective’s self-defense…” Charles
(2007:563). The United Nations Security Council, charged with keeping the
peace, has two attributes that are urgently needed “First, decisions are made
by roughly two third majority votes among its fifteen members. Second, its
decisions are binding on all member states of the United Nations”,
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International Peace Research Newsletter, (1998:39). It has been advocated
that for the UN to ensure effective protection of the rights of the civil
population in the conflict regions; The United Nations needs a permanent
force of volunteers, “recruited as individuals, ready to go immediately to
areas of conflict to prevent killing and to protect innocent people”,
(International Peace Research newsletter,1998:40). The dispatch of such a
force could be in the hands the Secretary-General, General Assembly, or the
Security Council, but should not be subject to veto by the great power on the
Security council. The United Nations is among the many Intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) that strive to prevent international conflict, to limit its
severity, and to restore the peace when violence occurs. This is in line with
some of the purposes of the United Nations which states amongst others
things in chapter 1 Article 1 of the United Nations Charters as:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international
94
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace,
Thomas and Erica (1986:140).
The role of the United Nations is symbolized by the opening words of
the charter. They dedicated the organization to saving succeeding
generations from the scourge of war which… has brought untold sorrow to
mankind. The UN attempt to fulfill this goal by creating norms against
violence, by providing debate as alternative to fighting by intervening
diplomatically to avert the outbreak of warfare or to help restore peace once
violence occurs, by dispatching UN military forces to repel aggression or to
act as a buffer between warring countries, and promoting arms control and
disarmament. The UN system has also had mixed success in the area of
conflict management. Here the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary-
General have all been involved. Many Articles of the UN charter relate to the
management of disputes, how they are to be referred to the Security Council
or the General Assembly and how the United Nations can be used to help
states negotiate instead of fight, “although a number of charter articles (e.g.
43, 45, 46, 47, and 48) were directed toward establishing a military force to
be used by the Security Council to ‘enforce peace’ (Articles 39-42), the United
Nations was involved in peace enforcement starting with the Korean War”,
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Deutsch (1988:530). The charter vested considerable authority in the
Security Council, which was empowered to determine whether a given
situation contain a threat to international peace or a breach of peace, or an
act of aggression and, if it so determined, to require all UN members to take
action against the delinquent. On the other hand, this collective authority was
offset by the procedural obstacles to reaching in the first place a collective
decision and the assent of all its five permanent members. In the absence of
such a decision it was illicit for any member to reach an opposition decision
or take measures of the kind envisaged in the charter; whereas an affirmative
decision of the Council automatically place a members under obligation, a
failure to reach a decision preclude all action under the charter.
Consequently, although the Council was in this field sovereign over members,
each of the permanent members was sovereign over the council. Peter
(2001:52) pointed out that “… UN saw its peace keeping machinery rendered
inoperative early in its existence”. This is because the efficacy of this
machinery depended upon the unanimity of the majority of the major powers
in the Security and the provision by all members of forces adequate the
execution of the Council’s decision. The veto given to the permanent
members of the Security Council was a special feature of the UN, in the
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Council of League every members had a veto. The authors of the UN charter
had to decide how far to depart this unanimity rule. They decided to
introduce majority voting as a general practice but subject to limited
exception, in the Security Council, but not in other organs, special power was
accorded special privileges, with the result that major powers were able to
prevent action against themselves or their friends, although they were not
entitled to prevent discussion and criticism. Currently according to under
secretary of the United Nations on peacekeeping, Alain Leoroy, in the Daily
Sun (2009:12) “we have (the UN) 18 peacekeeping operations in the world
and 115,000 peace keepers spread across crisis zones”. In supporting the
efforts of the UN, the developing nations under the Non-aligned nations have
drowned the curtains on a summit in North Africa with a call for an end to the
nuclear arms race, tougher measures against terrorism… Guardian
(2009:24). It went further to state that:
The developing nations in their 25th, Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) summit of Heads of state and governments…reiterated
their string commitment to the purpose and the principles of the
United Nations Charter and international laws’. Specifically, NAM
said in their summit, in the Egyptian red sea resort of Sharm El
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Sheikh that total and complete nuclear disarmament remains the
only route to establish a world free from nuclear weapons, taking
into consideration related issues of nuclear-non proliferation in
all aspects and the indispensability of peaceful use of nuclear
energy. The Guardian, (2009:24).
IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT STATES ARE OBEYING THE UNTED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL’S RESOLUTIONS
By the virtue of membership of the United Nations organization, and
based on the its charter, principles and purposes, the member states of the
UN should obey and support the UN and its agencies and organs such as the
Security Council and it resolutions. It was in this light that, the Security
Council in 2004 passed a resolution in this direction, according to Leonard:
In April 2004 the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted
Resolution 1540. The resolution requires UN members to
implement effective measures to secure within their borders the
know-how, equipment, and materials that could be used to make
weapons of mass destruction and to adopt effective export
controls. This resolution was passed because of growing concerns
about terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and
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the revelations that a senior Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul
Qadeer Khan, had sold uranium enrichment equipment to Iran,
Libya, and North Korea and a nuclear weapon design to Libya and
possibly the other states. Leonard (2009:para.1).
For example in implementing Resolution 1718, Karin and Julia (2009:34),
noted that in its report for the period ending July 10, 2007, Sanctions
Committee chair Ambassador Marcello Spatarfora said that:
71 countries and the EU had submitted reports regarding their
implementation of 1718. While information about all countries is
not available, according to an April 16, 2007 report from
Ambassador Spatafora, at that point 31 states already had
legislation in place119 to implement Paragraph 8 (a)(ii) of the
resolution regarding preventing the supply, sale of, or transfer to
the DPRK of material and technology that can be used for
chemical, biological, ballistic missile, or nuclear weapons
programs. Twenty-seven countries were putting measures in
place, and ten had referred the matter to the appropriate national
authorities.
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Several of the key countries submitted reports to the Sanctions
Committee in their effort towards the full implementation of the resolution as
follows:
1. Pakistan submitted a report on January 11 attesting to the Federal
Government’s decision to implement 1718,
2. Germany’s November 30 report to the Sanctions Committee asserts that
Exports to DPRK from Germany have been subject to specific
restrictions since 1991,
3. China submitted its report on November 15, 2006, but its report is not
available on the web, perhaps because it has requested that its report be
kept confidential,
4. The Republic of Korea (ROK) has submitted two reports. In the first,
submitted on November 30, 2006, it detailed existing legislation and
stated its intention of strengthening the customs clearance procedure
mandated by North-South trade laws. In its January 15, 2007 report,
the ROK said that it was in the process of compiling a list of luxury
items for exclusion
5. Russia was the last of the five parties to indicate compliance with the
resolution. In its November 30 report, Russia revealed its ambivalence
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by coupling its promise to issue a decree implementing the resolution
with a reminder that the main objective of 1718 is not punishment of
the DPRK but rather a political resolution of the issue of the country’s
nuclear program. On June 1, 2007, Russia informed the committee that
a decree had been signed by President Putin on May 27.
6. Japan, in its comprehensive November 13 report to the Sanctions
Committee, described the existing laws and new measures that would
be used to implement 1718. Several measures had been taken in
response to the July missile test, and immediately after the nuclear test,
before 1718 was adopted. Japan was the first country to list prohibited
luxury items.
7. Initially the United States promised a robust response, as indicated in
U.S. Secretary of State Rice’s comments shortly after the resolution was
passed: As North Korea scorns the international community, we will
collectively isolate North Korea from the benefits of participation in
that community” (Karin and Julia, 2009:16. Marcus.2008:4).
The year 2009 is supposed to be the year to celebrate friendship
between China and North Korea, of their 60th years of diplomatic ties. At a
ceremony to mark this special occasion in Beijing, Chinese Premier Wen
101
Jiabao said that “the two nations had a profound friendship” Daily Sun,
(2009:30). But North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests have shown that these
two socialist countries are not as friendly as they were once were. The Daily
Sun corroborated this when it stated that “Over the last few months, China’s
attitude towards its ally has hardened, shown by its recent support for
sanctions against North Korea” Daily Sun (2009:31). The Daily Sun also noted
that the day Security Council officially condemned the nuclear test. It also
hardened sanctions again the reclusive state, particularly those imposed in
2006 after the North carried out a previous test the. But while China
supported the Security Council’s condemnation of its neighbor, it is still wary
of striking too strident a note, Scott pointed out that:
North Korea's efforts to exploit divisions among members of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in its response to its April
5, 2009, test of a multi-stage rocket has proven to be a slightly
harder political target than some in Pyongyang may have
anticipated. The DPRK utilized preemptive threats in a statement
issued a week before the launch in an attempt to deter UN actions
and exploit differences among UNSC permanent members over
whether to characterize the launch as a missile test or a satellite
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launch. The North's intent to deter passage of a UN Security
Council resolution condemning the North Korean action has
succeeded, but the North has also threatened retaliation even in
response to a presidential statement. In response to the UN
action, North Korea must now make a tough call on whether to
return to six party negotiations, Scott. At (http://sitrep.
globalsecurity.org/articles/090413294-un-security-council-
response-t.htm). Retrieved on 08/07/2009.
President Obama said that following the North Korean (nuclear
weapon) launch that it was a clear violation of a prior UN Security Council
resolution and that ”Rules must be binding, violations must be punished,
words must mean something, Scott at (http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/
articles/090413294-un-security-council-response-t.htm), Retrieved on
8/07/2009. Russia called the test a serious blow to efforts to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons and suspended a Russia-North Korean
intergovernmental trade and economic commission, apparently in response
to the test. The slap on the wrist was a telling indication that Moscow, once a
key backer of North Korea, was unhappy with Pyongyang.
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Seoul reacted to the nuclear test by “signing on to the U.S.-led
Proliferation Security Initiative, joining 94 nations seeking to
intercept ships suspected of carrying nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, materials to make them, or missiles to deliver
them”, Associated Press at, (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/
as_koreas_nuclear) Retrieved on 08/07/2009.
Iran and North Korea has bee persistence in violating the UN, Security
Council’s resolutions in respect to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and
some other countries, the recent violation by North Korea is a case at hand.
Corroborating this, the United Nation’s Security Council stated as follows:
Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 25
May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and
at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty On Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international
efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons Towards the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, and the danger it poses to peace and Stability in the
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region and beyond, Stressing its collective support for the NPT
and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and
global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament, and recalling that the DPRK cannot have the status
of a Nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT in any case.
Deploring the DPRK’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT
and its Pursuit of nuclear weapons, Underlining once again the
importance that the DPRK respond to other Security and
humanitarian concerns of the international community, Security
Council (2006.para1-2) at (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
United_Nations_Security_Council). Retrieved on 18/06/2009.
Iran has been unrelenting on her resolve to carry on with her nuclear
activities undeterred by the pressures from the international community,
especially the Security Council resolutions on the issue, as though as the
diplomatic effort to talk Iran out of enriching uranium and producing
plutonium has proved, the going just got tougher. In a controversial
understanding with Iran, IAEA inspectors agreed to work plan to get answers
about past safeguard violations. These agreements include:
105
1. Experiments with materials potentially of use in bomb making,
2. Unexplained traces of enriched uranium,
3. Black-market purchase of more advanced uranium-spinning centrifuge
machines than are been installed at Iran’s enrichment plant at Natanz,
and
4. Documents, connections and design work that point to a weapons effort.
The Economist, (2007: 57).
Iran is under obligation going by the agreements in which she has entered in
different occasion, which centered on her given up her nuclear weapon
program. The Magazine equally reported that Iran has an obligation, to come
clean about its nuclear past, “yet those same resolutions also required it to
suspend all uranium and plutonium-related activities, until confidence in the
peaceful nature of its nuclear activities is achieved”, the Economist (2007:29).
According to the Tell (2006:52), Iran was in “utter rejection of the United
Nations Security Council’s resolution, which gave Iran an August 31
ultimatum of to hands off every nuclear activity or face economic and political
sanctions”. Al Larijani, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, described the resolution
106
as illegal maintained that the Islamic country would not abide by the deadline,
adding that Tehran would continue to expand its uranium enrichment despite
the threat of sanction, Tell (2006:53). Arguing that Iran was not guilty in any
way concerning its obligations under the United Nations Nuclear-non
proliferation treaty, the negotiator reiterated that “Iran has the right to carry
on with its uranium enrichment program which include all nuclear technology
that comprises the string of centrifuges without being dictated by the United
Nations”, Tell (2006:58).
If Iran were to decide to end its high-wire defiance of the UN Security
Council and open negotiations for according to The Economist (2007:43) “a
diplomatic solution to the stand-off over its nuclear work-telling all about its
nuclear past and suspending production of potentially bomb-useable uranium
and plutonium it would need to find a ladder to climb down on”.
For long, Iran has been trying to convince the United States and the
United Nations in particular that its uranium enrichment was not geared
towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the US accused its of. But
despite the pressure on the United Nations Security Council, and by the US to
sanction Iran, the country has held on to its resolve to continue with the
107
program, arguing that its uranium program was only meant to generate
electricity. The Iranian nuclear negotiator, Mr. Larijani toyed with the idea of a
time-limited suspension of enrichment work-only to be overruled by his
bosses in Tehran, The Economist (2007:45).
The Bush administration argued vigorously for the United Nations
Security Council to impose stiff sanctions on Iran. In December 2006 Russia
and China, two permanent members of the Council, agreed to a compromise
resolution in which the Security Council imposed limited economic sanctions
on Iran. The resolution banned all countries from supplying Iran with
materials or technology that could be used in a nuclear weapons program or
for building missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It also gave Iran 60
days in which to cease enriching uranium or else face further sanctions. Iran
rejected the resolution, saying it was being punished for exercising its right to
develop nuclear energy.
In March 2007 the UN Security Council voted unanimously to tighten
sanctions on Iran after a U.S.-led campaign charged that Iran had failed to
cease uranium enrichment and was supplying weapons to insurgents in Iraq
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and to Hezbollah and Hamas, which the United States regards as terrorist
organizations, the new sanctions:
Prohibited the sale or transfer of Iranian weapons to any nation or
organization, they also froze the overseas assets of a number of
Iranian citizens and organizations suspected of involvement in
Iran’s nuclear program and its Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s
elite military force. Iran again maintained that its nuclear program
was for peaceful purposes. Eric (2009: Para. 6).
And not just stopping there, Iranian parliament dominated by
hardliners “approved a framework for a bill to compel government to develop
fully a nuclear capability-including … a nuclear fuel recycle” The Economist
(2007:51).To show its seriousness:
Tehran, in February, produces a batch of low-enriched uranium. It
has also raveled a plan to install 3,000 centrifuges at its
enrichment plant in Natanz, located at the heart of Iran by the end
of the year. And as Larijani emphasized, we will expand nuclear
activities where required, Tell (2006:52).
109
According to Warren, and Elaine, (2008:6) the Security Council on
Monday (March 14th, 2008) adopted its third resolution imposing sanctions on
Iran for its refusal to cease enriching uranium; an activity that the West
suspects Iran may be using to create fuel for a nuclear weapon”. The
resolution authorizes inspections of cargo to and from Iran that is suspected
of carrying prohibited equipment, tightens the monitoring of Iranian financial
institutions and extends travel bans and asset freezes against persons and
companies involved in the nuclear program.
They noted that, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the United Nations nuclear monitor, Mohamed ElBaradei, said “newly
disclosed intelligence reports that Iran had secretly researched how to make
nuclear weapons were of ‘serious concern’ and would be pursued by his
office” Warren and Elaine (2008:8).
The new sanction on Iran adds 13 names to the existing list of 5
individuals and 12 companies subject to travel and asset restrictions. The new
names include people with direct responsibility for building fast-spinning
centrifuges that enrich uranium ore and a brigadier general engaged in efforts
to get around the sanctions in the two earlier resolutions. Enriched uranium is
110
used to power nuclear reactors for civilian use, but highly enriched uranium
can be used as fuel for a nuclear weapon. The new measure also bans all trade
and supply of so-called dual-use items, materials and technologies that can be
adapted for military as well as civilian ends.
Iran argues that its program is devoted solely to producing fuel for
nuclear reactors that generate electricity. The United States and its European
allies on the Council contend that the real purpose is to make Iran an atomic
power, and they say they are determined to prevent that from happening.
According to Gregory L. Schulte, the American envoy to the agency, in Warren
and Elaine (2008:17) he adds that “between the indications of weapons work,
which would constitute a violation of Iran’s treaty obligations and Iran’s
blatant violations of Security Council resolutions, there is strong reason for
Iran’s file to remain open both in New York and in Vienna”.
The Economist, (2009:8) reported that Iran’s President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinad, stated that “Iran had stepped up uranium enrichment in defiance
of…UN Security Council resolution ordering it to stop” The magazine has it
that this hasn’t been the finest for the effort to curb the nuclear ambitions of
111
the two states (Iran and North Korea) which, along with Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq, this was an offshoot of North Korean nuclear test on October 2006.
In a continued defiance to the persistent United Nation’s Security
Council’s resolutions calling on Iran to cease her nuclear weapons program,
the Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad according to the Economist
(2007:63), “announced … that its technicians could enrich uranium ‘on an
industrial scale’ at its underground plant at Natanz”. Iran already has 3,000
centrifuge machines according to the Economist (2007:64) “…It now claims to
have up and running at Natanz and could eventually produce enough highly-
enriched uranium for about a bomb a year”. It is possible that the two
countries (Iran and North Korea) are collaborating in their nuclear weapons
ambitions. This was supported by the Economist, when it pointed out that “the
two countries collude closely on increasingly far-flying missiles; some suspect
them of doing nuclear work”, Economist (2007:68). The Economist, (2007:70)
stated that, “since December (2006) the UN Security Council has passed two
resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran because of its persistent failure to be
candid about its nuclear program”. This was corroborated by Thiday
(2009:15) Newspaper when it quoted Iranian President as saying that “the
defense minister told me …that we launched a Sejil-2 missile, which is a two-
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stage missile and it has reached the intended target” Thisday (2009:15) Also
states that:
Iran’s quest for uranium enrichment has also attracted three
packages of sanctions from the United Nations Security Council
after it failed to heed successive ultimatum to suspend the process
which make fuel for nuclear power stations but in highly extended
form can also produce the fissile core of an atomic bomb. Western
government also offered Iran a guarantee supply of nuclear fuel if
it gave up its own enrichment, but it turned down the offer,
calming that the international effort to stop its from enriching
uranium is aimed at stifling its technological progress.
Ahmadinejad again insisted … That Iran would not give in to any
pressure (resolutions or sanctions) over its nuclear program.
They (western governments) said if you do not stop, we will adopt
(sanctions) resolutions….They thought we would retreat but that
will not happen…I told them you can adopt 100 sets of sanctions,
but nothing will change.
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Further more, in the case of the Democratic People Republic of North
Korea, it has been stated that, “North Korean negotiator has been refusing to
close down yongbyon (nuclear plant) the first step in a deal agreed…to
implement an earlier vow by North Korea to abandon its weapons program”,
The Economist (2007:63). The next stages of the deal are supposed to see
North Korea given up to and eventually disabling all its nuclear-related
facilities. North Korean officials are said to have “demanded privately that
American instead recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, and treat it like
India which also built nuclear weapons to loud condemnation, but is now
forging a deal with America to gain de facto recognition as a nuclear power”,
The Economist (2007:32).
In 1995 the Security Council established the Oil-for-Food Program to
spare the Iraqi people the worst effects of the economic sanctions which
continued in face of the refusal of the Iraqi Government to cooperate with the
arms inspectors. It was not until two years later that the Iraqi Government
allowed this humanitarian programme to go into effect and to this day the
regime impedes the operation of the programme for the most cynical
propaganda reasons. More Resolutions followed, trying to get Iraq to
cooperate with the arms inspectors. Iraq continued to refuse. In November
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1998, Resolution 1205 condemned Iraq's formal decision no longer to
cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Operation Desert Fox followed in
December with an extensive bombing campaign. One year later, in December
1999, the Council adopted Resolution 1284, a very detailed Resolution which
replaced UNSCOM with a new disarmament agency known as UNMOVIC,
which was also intended to meet some of Iraq's objections and to provide the
opportunity for a new start. Refusing to comply with these decisions of the
Security Council, Iraq embarked upon a campaign of defiance and deception.
Iraq did all it could to conceal its earlier efforts to acquire these arms and
proceeded to maintain the nucleus of a weapons of mass destruction capacity.
Before the arms inspectors were forced to leave Iraq, they discovered a
programme of weapons development which far surpassed the worst
expectations. They destroyed much of Iraq's capacity, but they were unable to
complete their work. When the inspectors came too close to discovering the
secrets of the Iraqi regime, they were blocked and thwarted, and their mission
was made impossible. Four years after the inspectors were compelled to leave
Iraq, Sanctions have cut across the regime's efforts to obtain the means of
manufacturing these weapons, but we will not know for certain how
115
successful the sanctions have been in disrupting this programme until the
arms inspectors return.
This attempted proliferation is an issue that goes far beyond Iraq. These
weapons are a major threat to both regional and international security. The
very attempt by Iraq to obtain such weapons, in violation of its freely accepted
treaty obligations, erodes the international instruments aiming to control the
spread of these weapons and ultimately to eliminate them.
There can be no doubt that Iraq is willing to use these weapons. Iraq has
invested vast sums in the effort to acquire or develop these weapons,
weapons which can only be intended for offensive use. It has deployed
chemical weapons against both Iran and its own people. The “Iraqi
Government has subjected its people to twelve years of economic sanctions,
with all the human suffering that has caused, without remorse or
compunction, this could have been stopped immediately, had Baghdad agreed
to re-admit the arms inspectors and cooperate with them” at, (http://
foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=26194). Retrieved on 08/07/2009.
Mean while, the African Union chairman and Libyan leader, Maommar
Gaddafi has lend his support to the Iranian nuclear program by saying that
116
Iran should be encouraged to pursue its nuclear program as long as it is for
peaceful purposes. He went on to say that “it was unjust to stop Iran from
enriching uranium for peaceful purposes, but that it must not be allowed to
develop nuclear weapons”, The Guardian (2009:51). The United States and
Israel say Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran denies the charge,
saying its program is for generating power. Libya decided in 2003 to
“abandoned its own nuclear and chemical weapons program”, The Guardian
(2009:52). German BND foreign intelligence agency believed Iran is capable of
producing and testing an atomic bomb within six months, much sooner than
most analysts’ estimates. The agency further stated that Iran has mastered the
enrichment technology necessary to make a bomb and has centrifuges to
make weaponized uranium. The United Nations Security Council has imposed
three sets of sanctions on Tehran for defying its demands to suspend uranium
enrichment. The Guardian (2009: 53).
Some other UN member states other than Iran, North Korea and Iraq
have in one time or the other have violated the Security Council’s resolutions
as evidenced in the case of Sudan. Ezirim (2005:103) stated that, in the “18th,
September2004: the Security Council, at its 5040th meeting adopted
Resolution 1564, declaring that, it had ‘grave concern’ that the Sudanese
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government had not fully met the conditions and obligations of the resolution
1556…” The total resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council
on the Sudanese government were nine in number, ranging from 11th June
2004 to 23rd, September 2005. The Ezirim (2005:103) noted that “all these
resolutions did not move the Sudanese government…”
Further evidence of non-observation or the violations of the
United Nations Security Council’s resolutions is the attitude of some
countries towards the Security Council resolutions which according to
Stephen, at (www.vicpeace.org). Retrieved on 25th, December 2009,
when he pointed out that:
In its effort to justify its planned invasion of Iraq, the Bush
administration has emphasized the importance of enforcing
United Nations Security Council resolutions. However, in addition
to the dozen or so resolutions currently being violated by Iraq, a
Conservative estimate reveals that there are an additional 91
Security Council resolutions about countries other than Iraq that
are also currently being violated. This raises serious questions
regarding the Bush administration's insistence that it is
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motivated by a duty to preserve the credibility of the United
Nations, particularly since the vast majority of the governments
violating UN Security Council resolutions are close allies of the
United States.
Stephen, compiled the following partial list of UN resolutions that are
(were) currently being violated by countries other than Iraq. The cases are
listed in order of resolution number, the year in which the resolution was
passed, the country or countries in violation, and a brief description of the
resolution. According to Stephen, the list does not in any way include
resolutions that merely condemn a particular action, he stated that, it is only
those that specifically proscribe a particular ongoing activity or future activity
and/or call upon a particular government to implement a particular action.
Also, the list does not include resolutions where the language is ambiguous
enough to make assertions of noncompliance debatable. It does not include
broad resolutions calling for universal compliance not in reference to a
particular conflict, particularly if there is not a clear definition. For example, in
a resolution that proscribes the harboring of terrorists, there is no clear
definition for what constitutes a terrorist. This list does not include non-state
actors, such as secessionist governments, rebel groups or terrorists, only
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recognized nation-states. Furthermore, this list does not include resolutions
that were also violated for a number of years that are now moot (such as
those dealing with Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, South Africa's
occupation of Namibia, and Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon). If these
were also included, the number of violations would double. Finally, he noted
that, it should be noted that this is only a partial list, since some of the
resolutions involved technical questions I was unable to judge, particularly
when they involved parts of the world with which we were less familiar. Here
are the list of the countries in violations of the Security Council’s resolutions
and the resolutions and the year they are being passed according to Stephen
at (www.vicpeace.org), retrieved on 25th, December 2009. These resolutions
are, resolution:
573 (1985) Calls on Israel to pay compensation for human and
material losses from its attack against Tunisia and to refrain from
all such attacks or threats of attacks against other nations. 592
(1986) Insists Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva Conventions in
East Jerusalem and other occupied territories. 605 (1987)
Security Council Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power,
to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention
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relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, and
to desist forthwith from its policies and practices that are in
violations of the provisions of the Convention. 607 (1986) Security
Council Reiterates calls on Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva
Convention and to cease its practice of deportations from occupied
Arab territories. 608 (1988) Security Council Reiterates call for
Israel to cease its deportations. 636 (1989) Security Council
Reiterates call for Israel to cease its deportations. 641 (1989)
Security Council Reiterates previous resolutions calling on Israel to
desist in its deportations. 658 (1990) Security Council Calls upon
Morocco to "cooperate fully" with the Secretary General of the
United Nations and the chairman of the Organization of African
Unity "in their efforts aimed at an early settlement of the question
of Western Sahara." 672 (1990) Security Council Reiterates calls
for Israel to abide by provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
in the occupied Arab territories. 673 (1990) Security Council
Insists that Israel come into compliance with resolution 672. 681
(1990) Security Council Reiterates call on Israel to abide by Fourth
Geneva Convention in the occupied Arab territories. 690 (1991)
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Security Council Calls upon both parties to cooperate fully with the
Secretary General in implementing a referendum on the fate of the
territory. 694 (1991) Security Council Reiterates that Israel "must
refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilian from the occupied
territories and ensure the safe and immediate return of all those
deported." 716 (1991) Security Council previous resolutions on
Cyprus. 725 (1991) Security Council Calls upon the two parties to
cooperate fully in the settlement plan. 726 (1992) Security Council
Reiterates calls on Israel to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention
and to cease its practice of deportations from occupied Arab
territories. 799 (1992) Security Council Reaffirms applicability of
Fourth Geneva Convention to all Palestinian territories occupied
by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and affirms that
deportation of civilians constitutes a contravention of its
obligations under the Convention. 807 (1993) Security Council
Demands (Croatia) return of heavy weapons seized from UN
storage areas. 809 (1992) Security Council Reiterates call
(Morocco) to cooperate with the peace settlement plan,
particularly regarding voter eligibility for referendum. 815 (1993)
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Security Council Reaffirms (Croatia) UNSC resolution 807. 822
(1993) Security Council Calls for Armenia to implement the
"immediate Withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar
district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan." 853
(1993) Security Council Demands (Armenia) "complete and
unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces" from
Azerbaijani territory. 874 (1993) Security Council Reiterates calls
for (Armenia) withdrawal of occupation forces. 884 (1993)
Security Council Calls on Armenia to use its influence to force
compliance by Armenian militias to previous resolutions and to
withdraw its remaining occupation forces. 896 (1994) Security
Council Calls upon all (Russia) concerned to respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. 904
(1994) Security Council Calls upon Israel, as the occupying power,
"to take and implement measures, inter alia, confiscation of arms,
with the aim of preventing illegal acts of violence by settlers." 973
(1995) Security Council Reiterates the need for Morocco
cooperation with United Nations and expediting referendum on
the fate of Western Sahara. 995 (1995) Security Council Calls for
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"genuine Morocco cooperation" with UN efforts to move forward
with a referendum.1002 (1995). 1009 (1995) Security Council
Demands that Croatia "respect fully the rights of the local Serb
population to remain, leave, or return in safety." 1017 (1995)
Security Council Reiterates the call for "genuine Morocco
cooperation" with UN efforts and to cease "procrastinating actions
which could further delay the referendum." 1033 (1995) Security
Council Reiterates call for "genuine Morocco cooperation" with UN
efforts. 1044 (1996) Security Council Calls upon Sudan to extradite
to Ethiopia for prosecution three suspects in an assassination
attempt of visiting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and to cease
its support for sanctuary and offering of sanctuary to terrorists.
1054 (1996) Security Council Demands that Sudan come into
compliance with UNSC resolution 1044. 1056 (1996) Security
Council Calls for the release of political prisoners from occupied
Western Sahara. 1070 (1996) Security Council Reiterates demands
Sudan to comply with 1044 and 1054. 1073 (1996) Security
Council Calls on the safety and security of Palestinian civilians to
be ensured. 1079 (1996) Security Council Reaffirms right of return
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for Serbian refugees to Croatia. 1092 (1996) Security Council Calls
Turkey/Cyprus for a reduction of foreign troops in Cyprus as the
first step toward a total withdrawal troops as well as a reduction
in military spending. 1117 (1997). 1120 (1997) Security Council
Reaffirms right of return for Serbian refugees to Croatia and calls
on Croatia to change certain policies that obstruct this right, and to
treat its citizens equally regardless of ethnic origin. 1172 (1998)
Security Council Calls upon India and Pakistan to cease their
development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. 1178
(1998) Security Council Reiterates call for a substantial
Turkey/Cyprus reduction of foreign troops and reduction in
military spending. 1185 (1998) Security Council Calls Morocco to
lift restrictions of movement by aircraft of UN peacekeeping force.
1215 (1998) Security Council Morocco Urges Morocco to promptly
sign a "status of forces agreement." 1251 (1999) Security Council
Reiterates call for a substantial reduction of Turkey/Cyprus
foreign troops and reduction in military spending. 1264 (1999)
Security Council Calls on Indonesia to provide safe return for
refugees and punish those for acts of violence during and after the
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referendum campaign. 1272 (1999) Security Council Stresses the
need for Indonesia to provide for the safe return for refugees and
maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps.
1283 (1999) Security Council Reiterates UNSC resolution 1251
(over Turkey/Cyprus). 1303 (2000) Security Council Reiterates
UNSC resolutions 1283 and 1251 over (Turkey/Cyprus). 1319
(2000) Security Council Insists that Indonesia "take immediate
additional steps, in fulfillment of its responsibilities, to disarm and
disband the militia immediately, restore law and order in the
affected areas of West Timor, ensure safety and security in the
refugee camps and for humanitarian workers, and prevent
incursions into East Timor." Stresses that those guilty of attacks on
international personnel be brought to justice and reiterates the
need to provide safe return for refugees who wish to repatriate
and provide resettlement for those wishing to stay in Indonesia.
1322 (2000) Security Council Calls upon Israel to scrupulously
abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the
responsibilities of occupying power. 1331 (2000) Security Council
Reiterates UNSC resolution 1251 and subsequent resolutions (over
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Turkey/Cyprus). 1338 (2001) Security Council Calls for
Indonesian cooperation with the UN and other international
agencies in the fulfillment of UNSC resolution 1319. 1359 (2001)
Security Council Calls on the parties to "abide by their obligations
under international humanitarian law to release without further
delay all those held since the start of the conflict” (Morocco). 1384
(2001) Security Council Reiterates 1251 and all relevant
resolutions on Cyprus. 1402 (2002) Security Council Calls for
Israel to withdraw from Palestinian cities 1403 (2002) Security
Council Demands that Israel go through with "the implementation
of its resolution 1402, without delay." 1405 (2002) Security
Council Calls for UN inspectors to investigate civilian deaths during
an Israeli assault on the Jenin refugee camp. 1416 (2002) Security
Council Reiterates UNSC resolution 1251 and all relevant
resolutions on Cyprus. 1435 (2002) Security Council Calls on Israel
to withdraw to positions of September 2000 and end its military
activities in and around Ramallah, including the destruction of
security and civilian infrastructure. Resolution 252 (1968)
Security Council Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind measures
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that change the legal status of Jerusalem, including the
expropriation of land and properties thereon. 262 (1968) Security
Council Calls upon Israel to pay compensation to Lebanon for
destruction of airliners at Beirut International Airport. 267 (1969)
Security Council Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind measures
seeking to change the legal status of occupied East Jerusalem. 271
(1969) Security Council Reiterates calls to rescind measures
seeking to change the legal status of occupied East Jerusalem and
calls on Israel to scrupulously abide by the Fourth Geneva
Convention regarding the responsibilities of occupying powers.
298 (1971) Security Council Reiterates demand that Israel rescind
measures seeking to change the legal status of occupied East
Jerusalem. 353 (1974) Security Council Calls on nations to respect
the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus
and for the withdrawal without delay of foreign troops from
Cyprus. 354 (1974) Security Council Reiterates provisions of UNSC
resolution 353 (Turkey). 360 (1974) Security Council Reaffirms
the need for compliance with prior resolutions regarding Cyprus
"without delay." 364 (1974) Security Council Reaffirms the need
128
for compliance with prior resolutions regarding Cyprus. 367
(1975) Security Council Reaffirms the need for compliance with
prior resolutions regarding Cyprus. 370 (1975) Security Council
Reaffirms the need for compliance with prior resolutions
regarding Cyprus. 377 (1979) Security Council Calls on countries
to respect the right of self determination for Western Sahara. 379
(1979) Security Council Calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces
from Western Sahara. 380 (1979) Security Council Reiterates the
need for compliance with previous resolutions (Morocco). 391
(1976) Security Council Reaffirms the need for compliance with
prior resolutions regarding Cyprus. 401 (1976) Security Council
Reaffirms the need for compliance with prior resolutions
regarding Cyprus. 414 (1977) Security Council Reaffirms the need
for compliance with prior resolutions regarding Cyprus. 422
(1977) Security Council Reaffirms the need for compliance with
prior resolutions regarding Cyprus. 440 (1978) Security Council
Reaffirms the need for compliance with prior resolutions
regarding Cyprus. 446 (1979) Security Council Calls upon Israel to
scrupulously abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the
129
responsibilities of occupying powers, to rescind previous
measures that violate these relevant provisions, and "in particular,
not to transport parts of its civilian population into the occupied
Arab territories." 452 (1979) Security Council Calls on the
government of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the
establishment, construction, and planning of settlements in the
Arab territories, occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem. 465
(1980) Security Council Reiterates previous resolutions on Israel's
settlements policy. 471 (1980) Security Council Demands
prosecution of those involved in assassination attempts of West
Bank leaders and compensation for damages; reiterates demands
to abide by Fourth Geneva Convention. 484 (1980) Security
Council Reiterates request that Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva
Convention. 487 (1981) Security Council Calls upon Israel to place
its nuclear facilities under the safeguard of the UN's International
Atomic Energy Agency. 497 (1981) Security Council Demands that
Israel rescind its decision to impose its domestic laws in the
occupied Syrian Golan region. 541 (1983) Security Council
Reiterates the need for compliance with prior resolutions and
130
demands that the declaration of an independent Turkish Cypriot
state be withdrawn. 550 (1984) Security Council Reiterates UNSC
resolution 541 and insists that member states (Turkey) may "not
to facilitate or in any way assist" the secessionist entity, Stephen
(www.vicpeace.org), retrieved on 25/12/2009.
HAS RESOLUTION 1718 DETERRED NORTH KOREA FROM AQUIRING
NUCLEAR WEAPON
The enforcement of international law is often difficult because nations
are sovereign (independent) powers that may put their own interests ahead
of those of the international community. In addition, the mechanisms of
enforcement are young and not well developed. Enforcement may be
effectively achieved, however, through the “actions of individual nations,
agencies of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and
international courts”, Howard (2009.para.7).
President Obama said that following the North Korean (rocket) launch
that “it was a clear violation of a prior UN Security Council resolution and that
Rules must be binding, violations must be punished. Words must mean
something”, accessed at, (http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/
090413294-un-security-council-response-t.htm), retrieved on 8/07/2009.
131
This was corroborated by the presidential statement issued by the UN
Security Council; the statement renews sanctions efforts anticipated under UN
Security Council Resolution 1718 that were suspended with North Korea's
return to the six party talks in late 2006, however, “the resumption of a new
international sanctions process may prove equally as ineffective in deterring
or punishing North Korea as those pursued following North Korea's 2006
nuclear test…”, accessed at (http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/
090413294-un-security-council-response-t.htm) retrieved on 08/07/2009.
The recommendations for a strong UN Security Council-led sanctions
approach are understandable “but have proven to be impracticable given
Chinese and Russian unwillingness to back another resolution condemning
the launch”, at, (http://sitrep.globalsecurity.org/articles/ 090413294-un-
security-council-response-t.htm) retrieved on 8/07/2009.
North Korea continued disobedience to the Security Council was made
manifest with her continuous development of her nuclear program. According
to the Associated Press Accessed at. (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006
/09/14/asia/AS_GEN_Japan_NKorea.php), retrieved on 12/06/2009 “North
Korea responded to new U.N. sanctions with more defiance, promising …to
step up its nuclear bomb-making program by enriching uranium and
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threatening war on any country that dares to stop its ships on the high seas”.
The North's threats were the first public acknowledgment that the reclusive
communist nation has been running a secret uranium enrichment program.
Resumption of the nuclear program touched off the latest nuclear crisis in
2002. The country also vowed never to give up its nuclear ambitions as a way
to protect its sovereignty. Despite repeated assurances from Washington,
North Korea has harbored deep-rooted suspicions that the U.S. “…could
invade to topple its regime. It has become an absolutely impossible option for
(North Korea) to even think about giving up its nuclear weapons," the North's
Foreign Ministry said in a statement carried by the country's official Korean
Central News Agency, quoted in Associated Press, Accessed at.
(http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/14/asia/AS_GEN_Japan_NKorea.p
hp), retrieved on 12/06/2009. North Korea also warned that any attempted
blockade by the U.S. and its allies would be regarded as an act of war and met
with a decisive military response. The new threats came in response to tough
new sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council over the North's second
nuclear test on May 25. 2009. The “sanctions are aimed at depriving North
Korea of the financing used to build its rogue nuclear program. The resolution
also authorized searches of North Korean ships suspected of transporting
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illicit ballistic missile and nuclear materials”, Security Council, accessed at,
(http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/ United_Nations_Security_Council), retrieved
on the 18th, June 2009. In a move that could further escalate the nuclear
standoff with the U.S., “North Korea also said it has reprocessed more than a
third of its spent nuclear fuel rods and vowed to weaponize its new
plutonium, a key ingredient of atomic bombs along with enriched uranium”.
Associated Press Accessed at.
(http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/14/asia/AS_GEN_Japan_NKorea.p
hp), retrieved on 12/06/2009.
North Korea is believed to have about 110 pounds (50 kilograms) of
plutonium, enough for a half dozen bombs. The North's announcement
represents a huge setback for an aid-for-disarmament deal aimed at ending its
nuclear ambitions. In a February “2007 deal, North Korea agreed to begin
disabling Yongbyon in return for the equivalent of 1 million tons of fuel oil and
other concessions from the U.S., South Korea, Russia, China and Japan”
Accessed at. (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/14/asia/
AS_GEN_Japan_NKorea.php), retrieved on 12/06/2009). North Korea further
signaled that “she will test a long-range missile and is suspected of preparing
for a third nuclear test”, The Economist (2001:72). According to Punch
134
(2009:35) “tens of thousands of North Koreans shouted slogans to denounce
international sanctions at a rally in central Pyongyang... as the communist
country vowed to enlarge its atomic arsenal and warned of a ‘fire shower of
nuclear retaliation’ in the event of US attack”.
Meanwhile, chief of United States (US) Naval operations has “denounce
North Korea for a volley of …missile tests, as the South Korea said the
launches showed the communist regime has improved its missile accuracy”
Guardian (2009:64). The tests which was “banned under Untied Nations
Resolutions, were Pyongyang’s biggest display of missile firepower in three
years and added fuel to tensions already running high after the North’s May
25th,atomic test blast”, The Guardian (2009:66). In response to the “Nuclear
and missile tests, the UNSC approved a new set of sanctions on the regime
(government of North Korea) last week (26th, of May), which sparked a harsh
response from the Pyongyang regime”, Financial Times in thisday, ( 2009:19).
In retaliation to joining an international efforts to enforce the UNSC
sanction on North Korea, North Korea warned that “dark clouds of war are
gathering over the peninsula and vowed to strengthen its atomic arsenal as it
135
marked the anniversary of the 1950-1953 conflict”, Guardian,(2009: 50). She
also announced that she:
Was scraping the armistice treaty that ended the Korean War 50
years ago, this was the North Korea’s response to South Korea
joining 94 other nations that seek to intercept nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons to nations such as North Korea. South
Korea took the step a day after North Korea tested an under
ground nuclear device and several short-range missiles.
Pyongyang has blame its decision on the US-led initiative to
(enforce UNSC sanctions on North Korea) search ships for nuclear
weapons calling it a declaration of war. Thisday (2009:45).
The Guardian (2009:65) reported that South Korean news network YTN
reported “that a US, Navy destroyer was tailing a North Korean ship the Kang
Nam, suspected of carrying illicit weapons toward Myanmar in what could be
the first test of UN sanctions passed to punish the nation for an underground
nuclear test last month”. Associated Press quoted in The Guardian, (2009:56)
also has it that “a Senior US military official said that a Navy ship, the USS John
McCain, was relatively close to the Korean vessel but had no order to intercept
136
it… the new UNSC resolution requires member states to seek permission to
inspect suspicious cargo”. While North Korea has said it would consider
interception a declaration of war.
2.2. THEORITICAL FRAMWORK.
We shall employ the Realist (Power) theory in analyzing our work. The
Realist theory is also known as Political Realism. The Realist approach looks
at the world as it ‘is’ and not as it ‘ought’ to be. One of the notable proponents
of realism is Machiavelli; Onuoha (2008:33) corroborated this when he
pointed out that:
Machiavelli, in The Prince, written in 1513, offers from the
standpoint of Renaissance politics, a set of prescriptions for rulers
that is plainly based on a general view of the politics of
princedoms, as occurring in an arena in which the strong take
what they can, and the weak give what they must. It is a general
understanding that is derived from Machiavelli’s view of men as
“fickle, lying and deceivers”, by whom it is better to be feared than
loved.
137
Hans, J Morgenthau expounded this theory of Political Realism in his
book; Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fourth
Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1978:4-15). “Political realism, like
society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in
human nature”, Morgenthau in Onuoha (2008:33). Onuoha further indicated
that, to say that human nature is such that the conduct of men bears out the
assumption that, statesmen think and act in terns of interest defined as
‘power’. He stated that the dominant motive in international politics is the
search for power by governments. Butter (1984) in Onuoha (2008:33),
conceived Realism as the “… search, which takes priority over efforts to attain
moral goals”. Indeed, to pursue such goals to the detriment of his state is, for
the realists, an abrogation of the statesman’s moral responsibility to his
citizens. However, it has been noted that:
The most widely accepted approach to understanding
international relations is called realism. Realists believe that
nations act only out of self-interest and that their major goal is to
advance their own positions of power in the world. The ideas of
realism come from the writings of such historical figures as Sun
Tzu of ancient China, Thucydides of ancient Greece, and
138
Renaissance Italy’s Niccolo Machiavelli. All of these thinkers
argued that the leaders of nations use their power to advance the
interests of their own nations with little regard for morality or
friendship. In order to survive, realists believe leaders must build
their power and avoid feelings of friendship or morality that
might make them vulnerable to more ruthless adversaries. They
believe conflict and war are inevitable. For one nation to gain
something, another must lose. This means alliances with other
nations cannot be counted on and cooperation between nations
cannot last. Realists believe nations should always be heavily
armed and ready for war. Friendships, religions, ideologies,
cultures, and economic systems matter little. Nations act selfishly
and do not answer to a higher authority. Smith (2000:101).
Realism was a product of disenchantment with the academic
contribution to the discussion of international politics in the inter-war years,
with its concentration on refining legal and organizational form intended to
strengthen international tradition throughout the cold war. It depicts
international politics as a struggle for power among serf-interested states, and
is generally pessimistic about the prospect for eliminating conflict and war.
139
Realism according to Onuoha (2008:33) “dominated the cold war years
because it provided simple, but powerful explanations for war, alliances,
imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, and other international phenomenon,
and because it emphasized competition, was consistent with the central
features of the American-Soviet rivalry.
The international system according to Kenneth Waltz quoted in Onuoha
(2008:34) “consisted of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive…
this condition would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than
bandwagon with more powerful rivals”.
The choice of the theory is predicated on its ability to explain the
rational behind the North Korea’s quest to acquire nuclear weapon, according
to North Korean government, its nuclear weapons proggramme is for self
defense against existential threat posed by the U.S government. Realistically,
North Korea nuclear weapons proggramme is as a result of the security and
existential threat which it claimed that the U.S nuclear and the powerful
conventional South Korea weapons posed to it. This is, because the North
Korean statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power which in
the conduct of international relations the interest of the state come first. At
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the ends the North Korean statesmen thinks that the best way to guarantee
her independent and existence is to arm itself with nuclear weapon which
gave rise to its nuclear weapon proggramme. The North Korean leaders looks
at the world as it ‘is’ by embarking in such a programme, rather than looking
at the world as it ought to be according to the realist theory.
North Korea has realistically defiled all the efforts by the U.S, E.U, South
Korea, Japan, China, The United Nations and the United Nations Security
Council aimed that stopping its nuclear weapons programme by developing
and carrying out atomic bomb tests both in 2006 and 2009.. This is in line
with the realist theory which seeks to advance one country’s interest without
regards to it moral implications.
2.3. HYPOTHESES
A hypothesis is “a tentative statement which is open to confirmation or
rejection when exposed to empirical: verification Isaac (1999:30). It is “a
provisional but logical answer to a question…” Igwe (2002:30). In line with a
number of issues raised in our statement of problem and theoretical
framework, the study will be predicated on the following hypotheses
1. There is a positive correlation between the unwillingness of the various
parties to abide by the relevant United Nations resolutions and the
lingering difficulties in resolving the Korean nuclear crisis.;
141
2. There is a positive link between legal, economic, diplomatic and other
consequences of United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1718 over
the Korean nuclear dispute; and,
3. There is a positive relationship between relevant United Nations
Resolutions towards the deterrence of North Korea from the acquisition of
nuclear weapons and the amicable settlement of the Korean nuclear
dispute.
2.4. METHODOLOGY
Reliable statistical data is one of the problems been faced researchers
in developing states, Nigeria inclusive, in their quest to get reliable data.
Collections of data are proved difficult because of inadequate documentation,
and the high cost of gathering materials and processing them. This manifested
in the areas such as:
i. The cost of travelling to the sources of materials,
ii. High cost of photocopying of materials,
iii High cost of accommodation in most cities like Lagos, Abuja, and Port
Harcourt etc, Nwaka (2006:23).
142
This study will adopt a dual method of data gathering in efforts to
analyze the consequences of the violation of the Security Council’s resolution.
This method includes the use of secondary data sources and content analysis
of written documents such as books, journals, news reports from electronic
media, electronic software, official publications, magazines, Newspapers and
monographs. Hence, the study will be descriptive in nature.
2.5. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Operational definition has been defined by Igwe (2002:306) as a
“precise explanation of the special signification and scope of a terminology or
idea as concerns the scholar, and as distinct from its other meanings...”
According to Kerlinger in Isaac, (1999:26-27) operational definition “is a
specification of the activities of a researcher in measuring a variable or in
manipulating it”.
Some of the importances of operational definition are as follows:
1. It promotes understanding of a research by simplifying what would
have appeared complex.
2. It gives specific and concrete meaning to concept which would have
appeared abstract and ambiguous;
143
3. It promotes manageability of a research work by limiting an array of
meanings that variables would have assumed;
4. It serve as a link between the theoretical and empirical spheres of
research; and
5. It enables hypothesis to be expressed and tested in specific, clear and
purposeful manner, Isaac (1999:27).
A desired meaning is assigned to a concept or variable in order to define
it. We have two kinds of definitions in research, and they are: 1. Constitutive
definition and 2. Operational definition. According to Asika, (1991:7) “in
constitutive we substitute the concept or constructs we are defining with
another concept or constructs. He further pointed out that in operational
definitions the concept or construct is assigned a type of meaning which we
want it to carry throughout the study. Operational definition in a formal
research report serves as the dictionary of that report.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS USED.
In the course of carrying out this research work we adopted the
following terms in carrying out our work:
144
1. UNO-United Nations Organizations,
2. UN-United Nations,
3. UNSC-United Nations Security Council,
4. United Nations Security Council Resolution,
5. IAEA-International Atomic Energy Agency,
6. OAS-Organization of American States,
7. NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
8. DPRK-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
9. ROK-Republic of Korea,
10. NPT-Non-proliferation Treaty. A global treaty to halt the further spread
of nuclear weapons,
11. US-United States,
12. NAM-Non-aligned Movement,
13. UNFICYP-United Nations Force in Cyprus,
14. EU-European Union, and
15. AU-African Union.
16. privateering (the use of private ships during war)
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CHAPTER THREE
THE KOREAN CONFLICT AND THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: A BRIEF
SUMMARY
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
On his own contribution to the debate as the root of the Korean Nuclear
conflicts Marcus (2008:23) states that, “it originated from the division of
Korea into South Korea and North Korea after the second World War”. The
failure to reach an agreement on the method to be used for giving
independence to Korea by the occupying powers, the USA and the Soviet
Union is another contributing factor to the crisis.
The main aim in temporarily dividing Korea militarily along the 38th
parallel was to co-ordinate the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and
Korea. However, because of the emerging Cold War between the two major
powers, two contrasting political systems were established in the two zones,
with each side refusing to recognize the other and claiming sole jurisdiction
and legitimacy for the whole of Korea.
Each of the Koreas claimed to be the sole representative of the divided
nation. The desire to unify the country was and still is equally strong in both
parts of the country. According to Mark (2000:16) after the total withdrawal,
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of the US and Soviet troops from Korea in 1949, “the North was economically
and militarily much better off than the South, the North Korean leader, Kim Il-
sung, decided to solve the problem of non recognition and of the division by
force”. As the North Korean troops launched a surprise attack against the
South early on the morning of June 25, 1950, President Truman responded
quickly by sending troops from Japan to Korea and mobilized the UN to
undertake its first ever international military action. U.S Department of State
corroborated this fact, when it noted that (2007:2) “the United Nations, in
accordance with the terms of its Charter, engaged in its first collective action
and established the UN Command (UNC), to which 16 member nations sent
troops and assistance. Next to South Korea, the United States contributed the
largest contingent of forces to this international effort”. However, as Mark
(2000:23) posited that “unfortunately for the North, the Soviet Union was not
present at the UN Security Council at that time (of the meeting), as a protest
against the non-recognition of Communist China in the UN, so it was unable to
veto the action against the North”.
With the refusal of North Korea to withdraw from the South, President
Truman decided to help South Korea, and the Security Council on June 27th,
1950 called for members to help South Korea. Marcus (2008:28) averred that
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“the Security Council decided on July 7th to establish a Unified Command for
the UN Forces in Korea and mandated a joint military action to repel the
troops from the North and to restore the status quo in Korea”. The UN military
action in Korea, grouped in the US Eighth Army, was able to accomplish its
mission in Korea by October 7, 1950 by restoring the status quo in Korea. The
war could have ended here after restoring the status quo. However, sensing an
opportunity not only to stop but also to roll back Communist expansion and to
unify the country by force, General MacArthur and President Rhee Syng-man
decided to march forward to the North. President Truman approved orders
for UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and to push the enemy above the Yalu
River, although China had warned repeatedly against such an action. By
October 25 some advance units had reached the Yalu river and victory was
close, but they were confronted with an unexpected enemy, the Chinese
volunteers.
The Chinese began to move into North Korea in massive numbers and
together with North Korean troops started an offensive. They pushed back UN
forces to below the 38th parallel and recaptured Seoul in January 1951. The
conflict had developed into a limited international war involving the United
States and 19 other nations on one side and China and North Korea on the
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other. Marcus (2008:33) reported that “as the military situation developed
unfavourably for the Allied forces, General MacArthur asked President
Truman to authorize the use of nuclear weapons against China and North
Korea. The Chinese and North Korean leaders were aware of this possibility at
the time”.
3.2 U.S. INTERVENTION IN KOREA CRISIS
According to Marcus (2008:35) the southern government was barely
inaugurated before it had to contend with a left-wing guerrilla movement.
Although this movement received support from the North, it had its greatest
strength in the South, particularly in the southernmost provinces and on Jeju
Island off the southern coast. The ROK Army required the better part of 1948
and 1949 to suppress the rebellion, and it did so with the support and often
the direction of a 500-man contingent of American advisers. By early 1950 the
guerrillas appeared to be defeated.
The quick and virtually complete collapse of resistance in the South
energized the United States to enter the war in force. The then U.S Secretary
of State, Acheson dominated the decision making and soon committed
American air and ground forces to the fight. Acheson successfully argued that
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the United States should increase military aid to the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and provide air cover for the evacuation of Americans from Korea.
He also persuaded the president to place the Seventh Fleet of the U.S.
Navy in the Taiwan Strait. This was needed, he argued, to prevent the
Communist Chinese government on the mainland from invading the island of
Taiwan, where the Nationalist Chinese government had retreated after the
mainland fell to the Communists in 1949.
According to Marcus (2008:35) the “following day, Acheson developed
the fundamental strategy, for committing American air and naval power to
the Korean War”. This strategy was approved by then U.S president Truman,
that evening but not yet approved by the United Nations, the Department of
Defense, or the U.S. Congress.
3.3 THE ATOMIC TREAT
According to Marcus (2008:405) as “early as November 30, 1950,
Truman said the United States might use any weapon in its arsenal to hold
back the Chinese, an oblique reference to the atomic bomb”. He states that this
threat apparently deeply worried Stalin. According to a high official who
served at the time in the KGB (the Soviet intelligence agency), Stalin feared
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that global war would result from the American defeat in northern Korea and
favored letting the United States occupy all of Korea. Stalin is reported to have
said “let the United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. … We
are not ready to fight. Marcus (2008:48)” China, however, held a different
view, apparently willing to fight at least to the middle of the Korea Peninsula,
though not further if the consequence might be a third world war. Yoon and
Park (2001:112) noted in their work, that:
The U.S. government seriously considered using nuclear weapons
in Korea in early 1951. The immediate threat was the USSR’s
deployment of 13 air divisions to East Asia, including 200
bombers that could strike not just Korea but also American bases
in Japan; and China’s deployment of massive new forces near the
Korean border. On March 10, 1951, MacArthur asked Truman for
a “D-Day atomic capability” the ability to launch a massive nuclear
assault. Truman complied, ordering the Air Force to refurbish the
atomic bomb loading pits at Okinawa, Japan, which were used
during World War II. Atomic bombs were then carried to Okinawa
unassembled and put together at the base, lacking only the
essential nuclear cores.
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They went further to state that on April 5, the U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff
ordered immediate atomic retaliation against Soviet and Chinese bases in
Manchuria if large numbers of new troops entered the war. Also on April 5,
Gordon Dean, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), arranged for
the transfer of nine nuclear capsules held by the AEC in the United States to
the Air Force bomb group that would carry the weapons. Truman approved
the transfer as well as orders outlining their use the next day Yoon and Park
(2001:119).
On April 11, 1951, Truman asked for MacArthur’s resignation, because
Truman wanted a more subordinate commander. Although this observation
was partly true, U.S. government documents later made clear that Truman
wanted a reliable commander in the field should Washington decide to use
nuclear weapons. Truman, in short, was not sure he could trust MacArthur to
use nuclear weapons as ordered.
Meanwhile, the United States under the administration of President Bill
Clinton reached an important arms control arrangement with North Korea in
1994. Although relations between the United States and North Korea
remained tense, under the arrangement North Korea agreed to freeze all work
on the infrastructure of reactors and reprocessing plants needed to produce
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plutonium for nuclear weapons. In exchange, Japan, South Korea, and the
United States agreed to provide fuel oil and other economic aid to North
Korea.
In 2002, however, this arrangement began to unravel, United States
intelligence agencies reported that while being paid not to produce
plutonium, there was evidence that North Korea might be at work to enrich
uranium or to create the facilities needed to enrich uranium, the other way of
obtaining nuclear weapons. That triggered North Korea’s inclusion in the “axis
of evil” cited by U.S. president George W. Bush in his State of the Union speech
in January 2002. The United States also responded to this intelligence report
by halting supplies of fuel oil to North Korea. In October 2002 a U.S. official
reported that a North Korean official had admitted that North Korea had a
uranium enrichment program. North Korean officials, however, subsequently
denied that North Korea had a covert program to develop nuclear weapons
with enriched uranium. In January 2003 North Korea expelled United Nations
(UN) monitors with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
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In April 2003 North Korea told U.S. officials that it possessed nuclear
weapons, and in October 2003 North Korean officials said they were
extracting plutonium from spent nuclear fuel rods to produce nuclear
weapons. In November 2003 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency repeated its
belief that North Korea possessed at least one and possibly two nuclear
bombs. However, other former and current U.S. intelligence officials said they
were skeptical that North Korea had the technological know-how to produce
nuclear weapons. In February 2004 North Korea entered talks with China,
Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States to discuss an agreement that
would end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In October 2006 North
Korea tested a nuclear weapon. In February 2007 the six-nation talks resulted
in an agreement in which North Korea pledged to shut down its main nuclear
reactor at Yongbyon, which produces plutonium as a byproduct, in exchange
for aid.
That agreement led to a subsequent North Korean pledge in October
2007 to disable its Yongbyon reactor by the end of the year in exchange for
950,000 metric tons of fuel oil or its equivalent in economic aid. North Korea
also agreed to disclose all of its nuclear programs and promised not to
transfer its nuclear materials, technology, or know-how beyond its borders.
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3.4 PROFEFERATION ATTEMPTS OF THE TWO KOREAS
Even though, Koreans, next to the Japanese, suffered the most in the
nuclear holocaust at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the two Koreas have ambivalent
feelings about nuclear weapons and have lived in the past in the constant
danger of a nuclear war. Mark (2000:4) pointed out that “because of the
delicate political situation since the Korean War, the Korean Peninsula has the
highest risk of nuclear proliferation in the world”.
3.5 SOUTH KOREA
After barely surviving the Korean War, according to Mark (2000:3) “in
1953 South Korea entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty with the USA which
established a number of US military bases in Korea”. In addition to the
deployment of nuclear weapons, the US reserved the right of first use of
nuclear weapons, not only to deter but also to repel any attack on South
Korea. As a small country surrounded by hostile neighbours armed with
nuclear weapons, South Korea believed it necessary to have the US nuclear
umbrella to survive. Thus it disregarded North Korea´s allegations that the US
nuclear weapons in South Korea were a constant threat to its existence. Mark
(2000:4) asserted that “after learning of the decision to withdraw the US 7th
Infantry Division of the US from South Korea in 1971, President Park Chung-
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hee decided to start a nuclear weapons program. Although he was forced to
put it on hold by the US, he continued to seek technical aid from France”.
President Park Chung-hee again made it known openly in 1975 that
South Korea would begin with the development of nuclear weapons if the US
removed its nuclear umbrella from the Korean Peninsula. He indicated that
South Korea was only refraining from developing nuclear weapons in
conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Subsequently, South Korea signed a one-billion-dollar contract with
France to purchase a reprocessing plant in conformity with International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. However, Mark (2000:7) pointed
out that, “under the US pressure, President Park had to cancel the deal in early
1976. Nevertheless, he kept the option by continuing independent research by
a secret South Korean nuclear research team”.
As US President Jimmy Carter decided in 1977 to reduce the US ground
forces in South Korea, President Park threatened again that if North Korea
went nuclear and if the USA pulled out its troops from Korea, South Korea
would reconsider its own nuclear option. Undoubtedly, this threat
represented an attempt by President Park to pressure the US government to
remain in South Korea as long as the tension on the Korean peninsula existed.
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President Carter put pressure on South Korea to stop the nuclear program,
and in return cancelled the plan to withdraw US troops from Korea in mid-
1979. President Park, however, maintained a secret nuclear program and it
was only after his assassination that President Chun Doo-hwan, immediately
after taking over the power through a military coup in 1980, stopped the
project and disbanded the nuclear research group. “South Korea was kept
from developing nuclear weapons in the past not by heavy pressure but
mainly by the continued military presence of the US, including the nuclear
umbrella” Mark (007:15) added.
3.6 NORTH KOREA
North Korea was at dangerous situation during the Korean and cold war
era. Mark (2000:5) captures this when he averred that “North Korea was
openly threatened with the use of nuclear weapons by the US during the war
(Korean War) and was barely saved by the Chinese”. It perceived the presence
of the US forces in South Korea as a constant threat to its existence, and only
from 1961 on did it felt secure through the military alliances with the Soviet
Union and China. However, according to Mark (2007:10) following “the
detente between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as China, since the early
1970s, it felt its allies were no longer reliable”.
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According to Jonathan (2007:19) “North Korea started its nuclear
program in the early ‘60s primarily with the help of the Soviet Union”. Since
the 1970s North Korea repeatedly proposed a nuclear weapon-free zone on
the Korean peninsula. These proposals were ignored by the US and South
Korea as an attempt to force the withdrawal of the US tactical nuclear
weapons deployed in South Korea and abandoned of the military strategy of
nuclear deterrence.
North Korea signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, it
refused to conclude a safeguard agreement with the IAEA within the time limit
prescribed by the Treaty, arguing that the US tactical nuclear weapons from
South Korea would have to be withdrawn in return. Nevertheless, because of
its economic weakness, Jonathan (2007:26) averred that outsiders did not
suspect North Korean intention to develop nuclear weapons “until the late
‘80s, beginning in 1989 there was a rumor that North Korea was working on
an ambitious nuclear weapons program. North Korea dismissed the allegation
and stated that it was working on peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. However,
Jonathan stated that:
The two Koreas even signed the Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in January 1992. The
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two sides not only committed themselves not to test,
manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use
nuclear weapons, but also not to possess sensitive enrichment
and reprocessing facilities. They committed themselves to
peaceful uses only of nuclear energy. The stated aim of this
declaration was to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and to
create an environment and conditions favourable for peace and
peaceful unification of the divided country. The declaration
entered into force in February 1992, after the exchange of
instruments signed by the two presidents. To implement the
declaration, a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission was
established, and negotiation of compliance measure was begun. It
was also agreed that each side could conduct inspection of the
objects agreed upon by both sides.
Just as the situation was improving, US intelligence analysts came to suspect
that North Korea had already produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to
make one or two nuclear devices.
The IAEA conducted 6 adhoc inspections of the declared nuclear sites
from June 1992 to February 1993. These inspections did not clear up the
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suspicion, however, but further hardened the claim. To help clear up that
issue, the US and the IAEA demanded that North Korea permit special
inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites in addition to the seven
known nuclear-related facilities. Measurements of radioactivity and other
procedures at the suspected waste sites would help solve how much
plutonium has been produced through the reprocessing of spent fuel in recent
years.
North Korea refused to allow the desired special inspection, claiming
that the two sites were non-nuclear military installations. In response to UN
resolutions and an ultimatum demanding access to the sites, North Korea
stopped further ad hoc inspections and declared that it would withdraw from
the NPT in March 1993. At the same time, North Korea demanded bilateral
and high-level direct negotiations with the US to solve this issue. Direct
dialogue between the two Koreas, including the negotiations of the South-
North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, ceased.
The US government agreed to start low-level negotiations with North
Korea in New York and Geneva in June and July 1993, respectively. North
Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. Subsequently, on
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February 25th, 1994, the US decided to enter into high-level, comprehensive
negotiations with North Korea.
However, North Korea removed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in
May/June and refused to allow the IAEA to take selective samples from the
rods during removal. With international pressure mounting, it then decided to
leave the IAEA.
The crisis escalated further, and a military conflict on the peninsula
seemed unavoidable. Former US president Jimmy Carter made a surprise visit
to North Korea and defused the crisis. North Korea offered to freeze its
nuclear program, and the US agreed to begin the third round of
comprehensive negotiations with North Korea on July 8th, 1994, in Geneva.
Surprisingly, a historical first-ever summit meeting between the
presidents of the two Koreas was even scheduled. Shortly before the summit
meeting, as the delegates of the US and North Korea began to negotiate in
Geneva, North Korean President Kim Il-sung suddenly died. The planned
summit meeting was cancelled, and negotiations in Geneva were postponed.
In August high-level delegations resumed negotiations in Geneva.
Finally, on October 21th, 1994, the US and North Korea signed the Geneva
Framework Agreement in their efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear
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problem, laying the groundwork for the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula. Interim arrangements were negotiated to defuse the immediate
nuclear crisis and to initiate a long-term process to integrate North Korea into
the international community, as well as to deter repetition of a potentially
catastrophic confrontation. In order to induce North Korea to drop its nuclear
weapons program, the US not only committed itself to deliver two light water
nuclear reactors worth $ 5 billion and an interim energy supply, but also to
expand diplomatic and economic ties with North Korea.
The success of the negotiation was possible only because the US made
far-reaching political concessions by dealing with North Korea directly as a
state and by postponing the demand to clarify past activities. Furthermore, the
US promised not to threaten or to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.
In return, North Korea promised to stop the program and to resume dialogue
with South Korea in order to implement the agreed denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula of 1992 and thereby to keep the peninsula nuclear-weapons
free.
The Framework Agreement not only defused the conflict and stopped
the proliferation danger, but also ushered in a new chance of accommodation
between the two Koreas. After some interruptions and delays on the South
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Korean side, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
with the participation of South Korea, Japan, the EU and the US was
established in March 1995 in New York. North Korea closed down research
reactor, and the US started delivering crude oil. KEDO selected the Korean
Electric Power Company (KEPCO), a South Korean company, as the primary
contractor to fulfill its obligations to supply a light water reactor to North
Korea based on the Ulchin-3 and -4 designs in South Korea.
KEDO is not only responsible for ensuring that a South Korean reference
model light water reactor will be built in North Korea but is also a security
building measure.
North Korean and U.S experts finally started canning the used nuclear
fuel rods in April 1996. The submarine incident of September 1996 almost
derailed and further delayed the project for a few months. After the formal
apology for the incident by North Korea in late December 1996, the canning
operation was resumed and finally completed in May 2000.
Despite the continued implementation of the Agreed Framework since
October 1994, suspicions about North Korea´s secret nuclear activities still
exist, and the nuclear impasse is not yet over. North Korea’s long-range
missile launch in summer 1998 aroused additional concerns about peace and
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stability in the region. Once some 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods are shipped to
a third country, the danger of proliferation of North Korea will be greatly
reduced. Therefore, the successful implementation of the Geneva agreement is
crucial for keeping the peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
According to Michael (2007:13) “North Korea‘s October 2006
detonation of a nuclear device marked its first nuclear test and an attempt to
win international recognition as a nuclear state after a decades-long program
to develop these weapons”. Jonathan (2007:2) captured this fact when he
asserted that “North Korea’s weapons are now a fact, not a bargaining chip”.
North Korea could have produced several nuclear weapons from plutonium
produced at its Yongbyon facilities. Major uncertainties surround the
conditions under which the North would entirely abandon its nuclear
weapons capability or the likelihood of the North transferring nuclear
weapons-related technology abroad.
North Korea‘s resources include a biotechnical infrastructure that could
support the production of various biological warfare agents. According to
Michael (2007:19) “DIA believes North Korea has had a longstanding chemical
weapons stockpile of nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents”.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE LEGAL AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISPUTE OVER
RESOLUTION 1718
4.1 WHAT IS RESOLUTION 1718 IS ALL ABOUT?
Resolution 1718 is the United Nations Security Council’s resolution that
imposed economic and other sanctions against North Korea for carrying out
an underground atomic bomb test. Marcus(2008:2), Lin (2006:9), Eric
(2007:14) all have it that “resolution 1718 imposes economic sanctions,
specifically imposing a ban on the exportation of large scale arms-related
goods, technology, and services, and luxury goods, as well as the importation
of North Korean heavy arms”.
This is in line with the Security Council provision when it stated that,
according to the Security Council (2006:para.1) “that the action prevents
provision of nuclear Technology, Large-Scale Weapons, Luxury goods to
country: Permits inspection of Cargo to ensure compliance”.
It also imposes an “asset freeze and travel ban on persons related to the
nuclear-weapon programme” Security Council (2006:para.2). Through its
decision, the Council prohibited the provision of large-scale arms, nuclear
technology and related training to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
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as well as luxury goods, calling upon all States to take cooperative action,
including through inspection of cargo, in accordance with their respective
national laws.
Through its decision, the Council prohibited the provision of large-scale
arms, nuclear technology and related training to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, as well as luxury goods, calling upon all “States to take
cooperative action, including through inspection of cargo, in accordance with
their respective national laws, Security Council (2006:para.2).
The Security Council (2006:para.3) stressed that “such inspections
should aim to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons, as well as their means of delivery and related materials”.
Regarding the freezing of assets, the Council provided specific
exemptions for the transfer of monies to meet various financial obligations
and humanitarian needs, specifying humanitarian exemptions for the travel
ban, as well. The representative of Russian Federation stated thus:
All of us find ourselves in an extraordinary situation, which
requires the adoption of extraordinary measures”. Today’s text
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contained a set of carefully considered and targeted measures,
aimed at resolving the main issue: to make the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea reconsider its dangerous course, come
back to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
and resume, without preconditions, its participation in the six-
party talks. That could be done only through political and
diplomatic means, Security Council (2006:9).
He insisted on the Council’s strong control over the measures against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and noted that the resolution reflected
concern over the humanitarian consequences of strict measures. China’s
representative agreed that:
The Council’s actions should both indicate the international
community’s firm position and help create conditions for the
peaceful solution to the DPRK nuclear issue through
dialogue”….China did not approve of the practice of inspecting
cargo to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and
urged the countries concerned to adopt a responsible attitude in
that regard, refraining from taking any provocative steps that
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could intensify the tension. China still believed that the six-party
talks were the realistic means of handling the issue. It also firmly
opposed the use of force, Security Council (2006:8).
Japan’s representative said that “the combination of ballistic missile
capability and, now, the claim of nuclear capability in the hands of a regime
known for reckless irresponsible behaviour, created nothing less than a grave
threat to peace and security”, Security Council (2006:para.9). He not only
supported the Council’s sanctions, but also outlined a set of national measures
undertaken by his country, including closure of Japanese ports to DPRK
vessels; denial of imports from the DPRK; and prohibition of entry for DPRK
nationals into Japanese territory.
The representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Pak Gil
Yon, however, totally rejected the text, saying that it was:
Gangster-like of the Security Council to adopt such a coercive
resolution against his country, while neglecting the nuclear threat
posed by the United States against the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. It was a clear testament that the Council had
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completely lost its impartiality and was persisting in applying
double standards to its work” Security Council (2006:para.12).
Pak Gil Yon said that his country totally rejected resolution 1718 and
found it unjustifiable. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was
disappointed that the Council was incapable of offering a single word of
concern when the United States threatened to launch nuclear pre-emptive
attacks, reinforced its armed forces and conducted large-scale military
exercises near the Korean peninsula he added.
He said that, on 9 October, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
had successfully conducted underground nuclear tests under secure
conditions, as a way of bolstering the country’s self-defense, he stated further
that:
His country’s nuclear test was entirely attributable to United
States threats, sanctions and pressure, and every possible effort
had been expanded to settle the nuclear issue through dialogue
and negotiation. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
indeed wished to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, he said; yet,
the Bush Administration had responded to his country’s patient
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and sincere efforts with sanctions and blockades. His country
had, therefore, felt compelled to prove its possession of nuclear
weapons to protect itself from the danger of war from the United
States. Also, although his country had conducted a nuclear test --
due to American provocation -- it still remained unchanged in its
will to denuclearize the Korean peninsula through dialogue and
negotiation, as that had been President Kim Il Sung’s last
instruction. He said the test did not contradict the Joint Statement
of the six-party talks to dismantle nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programmes. Rather, it constituted a positive measure for
its implementation. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
had clarified more than once that it would have no need for even a
single nuclear weapon as long as the United States dropped its
hostile policies towards his country, and as long as confidence
was built between the two countries. Instead, the United States
had manipulated the Security Council into adopting a resolution
pressurizing Pyongyang, Security Council (2006:43-47).
He said the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was ready for both
dialogue and confrontation. If the United States persisted in increasing
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pressure upon his country, it would continue to take physical
countermeasures, considering it as a declaration of war” Security Council
(2006:48). CHOI YOUNG-JIN Republic of Korea (South Korea) representative
in his own contribution in the meeting said that:
…Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had announced that it
had conducted a nuclear test, which his Government had warned
it about. That act posed a grave threat to the situation on the
Korean peninsula and the whole of North-East Asia”. North
Korea’s conduct constituted a failure to implement the Joint
Statement of September 2005. It also represented outright
defiance of the Security Council resolution adopted in July 2006
and a breach of the Joint Declaration that the DPRK had signed
with his country in 1991. Such acts should never be condoned, he
said. His Government appreciated the Council’s efforts to address
that common challenge and supported the resolution just
adopted. He urged North Korea to heed the voice of the
international community and refrain from any actions that would
further aggravate the situation. It should return to six-party talks
and abandon its nuclear programmes once and for all. His
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Government would continue its endeavours to achieve those
goals, Security Council (2006: para: 48-49).
4.2 The consequences of the Korean Nuclear Dispute
Jonathan (2007:6) averred that, “the policy consequences of sustained
North Korean nuclear weapons program are hugely worrisome both to the
future of the non-proliferation regime and for regional security”. Stating
further, he said that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the first
state ever to withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a move which
according to him has created a very troubling precedent for other states that
might contemplate such actions. He averred that should North Korea opt to
transfer abroad any of its nuclear technologies, materials, and weapons, the
dangers to international peace and security would be exceedingly grave.
Additionally, the regional consequences are also highly worrisome he added.
Without nuclear weapons, the latent possibilities of a highly destructive
military conflict on the Korean Peninsula remain very high; with nuclear
weapons, the potential consequences of renewed conflict for the Republic of
Korea (ROK), Japan, and for U.S. forces are incalculably greater Jonathan
observed. Jonathan (2007:18) however stressed that “quite apart from the
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potential for armed conflict, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons
seems very likely to prompt major security reassessments on the part of all
the states of Northeast Asia”.
The prospective directions in North Korea’s nuclear development over
the next decade nonetheless remain uncertain. For one, international
observers are uncertain of what value the DPRK leadership attaches to the
possession of such capabilities; an additional factor is the possibility that the
international community might be able to induce North Korea to limit its
programs without definitively foregoing its capabilities. At the same time,
however, Pyongyang also faces major technical and other hurdles in
proceeding to a credible nuclear force.
Chung (2009:15) identified that “one of the dangers of North Korea’s
programs is the likelihood that North Korea is going to proliferate her nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction as witnessed in the past”. Oliver
(2009:1) averred that “the spread of atomic energy increases the risk of
nuclear terrorism”. While non-state actors will probably remain incapable of
building nuclear weapons independently for some time, they might well
acquire the ability to build so-called dirty bombs.
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Sharon (2003:16), pointed out that “there is a danger of North Korea
proliferating its nuclear technology in form of, assisting others in acquiring or
developing nuclear weapons, North Korea shipped Scud missiles to Yemen in
December 2002, and was giving nuclear help to Syria”, he added. According to
Nikitin (2009:14) President Obama stated that:
North Korea… has a track record of proliferation that makes it
unacceptable for them to be accepted as a nuclear power. They
have not shown in the past any restraint in terms of exporting
weapons to not only state actors but also non-state actors. North
Korea is known to have sold ballistic missiles and associated
materials to several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, and,
in our assessment, assisted Syria with the construction of a
nuclear reactor, according to DNI Admiral Dennis Blair’s
testimony to Congress. North Korea appears not to simply export
missile technology, but to collaborate with Iran and perhaps
others in missile development.
Another danger posed by the North Korea’s nuclear dispute, according to Sigal
(2009:6), is that, the nuclear program “… could also trigger a nuclear arms
race in Asia”. This was corroborated by Andrew (2008:89) when he pointed
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out that, “North Korea's nuclear capability, especially the possible transfer of
fissile material to terrorist groups or rogue states, and the effect it may have
in spurring regional neighbours to reassess their non-nuclear status”.
Sharon (2003:11) noted that “North Korea and Pakistan have been
engaged in “conventional arms trade for over thirty years, in the 1980s, as
North Korea began successfully exporting ballistic missiles and ballistic
missile technology, Pakistan began producing highly enriched uranium at the
Khan Research Laboratory”. Chung (2009:15) noted that one of “the most
alarming and troublesome dimension of post-Cold War WMD proliferation is
the phenomenon of networked and symbiotic proliferation. North Korea sent
5 to 12 No Dong missile assembly sets to Pakistan between 1994 and 1997”.
“A nuclear-armed North Korea is determined to foment regional
instability and challenge the strategic status quo in East Asia”, Sharon
(2003:16). Andrew (2008:90) pointed out that “It has also been reported that
at one time or another Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, The United Emirates,
Vietnam and Yemen have been recipients of North Korea’s WMD products”,
Karin and Julia (2008:36).
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Alexei (2009:33) stated that “North Korea and Iran have extensive
collaboration in the development of ballistic missiles; it appears that much of
the $1.5 billion that North Korea reportedly earns annually from missile sales
and collaboration with other countries in developing missiles comes from
Iran”. Chung (2009:26) has it that “CIA released a video that showed that the
Syrian reactor resembled the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon in addition to
the chief North Korean nuclear scientist who was photographed with his
counterpart in Syria”
According to Perry in Chung (2009:31) “a nuclear weapon production
program in North Korea posed unacceptable security risk”. Perry gave four
reasons why the U.S. felt that a nuclearized North Korea was unacceptable,
thus:
(1) its leaders might be misled to believing that the United States would be
unwilling to defend its interests and allies in the region which would
have the effect of weakening U.S. deterrence;
(2) It could trigger a nuclear domino in East Asia that could compel South
Korea, Japan and Taiwan to pursue their own nuclear options in a
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relatively short period of time given their already existing technological
capabilities;
(3) The possibility of fissile materials and products of the nuclear program
could be transferred to third parties including terrorist groups; and,
(4) To prevent the of loose nukes since sooner or later we expected the
regime will collapse and when that happened, we did not want it with a
nation that possessed a nuclear weapon arsenal. Chung (2009:32).
North Korea’s runaway nuclear program could be a direct path to
nuclear terror; William (2005:1) noted that this could be in form of:
A. By sale: North Korea sells missiles and other dangerous technology
worldwide, with no apparent limits or compunction,
B. By criminal diversion: North Korea’s leaders and elite engage in
smuggling, counterfeiting, and other illicit activities. These same people
might traffic in nuclear materials the way A.Q. Khan trafficked in
Pakistan’s nuclear technology, and
C. By collapse: The North Korean regime could implode if it stays on its
current stifling economic path, or suffer a chaotic transition if it
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undertakes needed reform (like the collapse of the Soviet Union). In
either scenario, its nuclear arsenal could break loose. To the risk of
terrorism must, of course, be added the obvious danger of nuclear
weapons in the hands of the North Korean government itself. Nukes in
leader Kim Jong Il’s hands’ Weaken deterrence on the Korean peninsula,
increasing the chance of a horrible war, or Risk a domino effect of
proliferation in East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), and jeopardize
the entire global non-proliferation system, unleashing more nuclear
programs and thereby more sources of potential nuclear terrorism.
According to Pritchard (2007:3) “North Korea's development of nuclear
weapons raises fears of nuclear war on the peninsula and the specter of
terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction”. Corroborating this,
Yong and Beom (2006:3) stated that “one of the key challenges of our time is
the threat posed to the security of Northeast Asia by North Korea's nuclear
proliferation”.
4.3 The Economic consequences
The dispute over North Koreas violation of the nuclear Non-
proliferation treaty which leads to the imposition of economic sanction by the
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Security Council, these developments could have been expected to attenuate
North Korea’s trade with the rest of the world: The sanctions specifically
prohibited the importation and exportation of certain products to North
Korea. According to Marcus (2008:2):
The nuclear tensions might have been expected to raise the risk
premium on economic interaction with the North, suppressing
exchange, especially involving foreign partner private-sector
entities, even with respect to activities not directly covered by the
sanctions. Such reactions could have been motivated both by the
firms’ anticipation of possible restrictive actions or guidance by
their home governments, as well as their own heightened
assessments of risks regarding business with North Korean
counterparties.
In 1988, the South Korean government adopted a series of measures aimed at
opening a new chapter in inter-Korean economic relations. The following
year, official inter-Korean trade began. In August 1990, legislation was
enacted regarding inter cooperation and, exchange, along with the
establishment of the inter-cooperation fund. From this point forward, both the
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South and the North Koreas began building a foundation for economic
cooperation and exchange.
Dae-kyu and Moon-Soo (2005:2) stated that, “despite numerous hitches,
holdups, and hurdles (nuclear issues) inter-Korean economic cooperation did
achieve modest growth”. For instance, since 1992, commodities have been
traded on the processing-on-commission basis. However, Dae-Kyu and moon
(20055) noted in their work that “inter-Korean cooperation is being held back
in recent times, the culprit: the North Korean nuclear issue, which resurfaced
in October 2002”. Efforts of entire international community to resolve the
issue continue to unfold, but resolution does not appear to be on the
immediate horizon. The nuclear issue desperately needs to be resolved, as it
has been gnawing away at South Korea’s policy of reconciliation, which is the
basis for Seoul’s position on inter-Korean economic exchange.
In their contribution to the debate on the economic consequences of the
nuclear dispute on the region, Avery and Sharon (2006:7) indicated that
“Beijing has made clear its overriding goal of preventing the collapse of the
North Korean regime, which it fears would interrupt its surging economic
development and bring thousands of North Korean refugees across the border
into China”. They equally stated that:
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Japan has imposed its own unilateral sanctions more restrictive
than those called for in the UN resolution that ban all North
Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and restrict imports
and most North Korean nationals from entering Japan. In addition,
Japan adopted a list of items that fall under the “luxury goods”
category, including caviar, jewelry, and watches. Officials in Tokyo
have also vowed to assist the U.S. military in stopping North
Korean cargo ships for inspections, despite the country’s pacifist
constitution Avery and Sharon (2006:8).
4.4 Diplomatic and political consequences
According to Chung and Jong (2003:10) the:
United States...sought to apply multilateral pressures to isolate,
contain, and transform North Korea through sanctions and related
measures Bilateral coordination with Japan to cut Pyongyang off
from cash and technology, close cooperation with China to put
additional pressures on North Korea, the Madrid G-10 meeting
and enforcement of the proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and
an American move to penalize North Korea through the UN
Security Council all indicate that Bush administration intends to
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utilize all possible options, including coercive measures, to
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. (Avery and Sharon
(2006:18).
Chung and Jong (2003:14) indicated that “another diplomatic and political
consequence of the Korean nuclear dispute is on the:
Area of the United States not establishing a diplomatic relation
with North Korea, which will further complicate the dispute. In
this regard, former U.S secretary Colin Powell, once state once
noted in 2003, I think eventually we will be taking to North Korea,
but we are not going to simply fall into what is bad practice of
saying the only way you can talk to us is directly.
They also reported that Bush administration is not likely to recognize
North Koreas sovereignty as long as it resorts to weapons of mass destruction.
The United States could under take more radical measures to isolate, contain,
and transform North Korea through aggressive interference that disregards
Westphalian sovereignty. It cannot be ruled out that North Korea might
become another Iraq Chung and Jong (2003:33).
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The Bush Doctrine has led to profound changes in its strategic terms of
engagement with North Korea. They involve major paradigmatic
transformations in perceptions of North Korea and behavioural style in
dealing with it. More importantly, strategic prescriptions for the North Korea
nuclear crisis have been radically altered. The Clintonian soft landing has
gradually sunk into oblivion, while the brave new world of Bush’s moral
absolutism, hegemonic unilateralism, and offensive realism have dictated the
nature and direction of strategic responses to North Korea. Given the trust of
the Bush doctrine, two prescriptions are likely to be drawn. One is military
option; the other is malign or hostile neglect and the resolution of the nuclear
crisis through regime transformation.
Neoconservative hardliners have been alluding to the possibility of
using military options in dealing with North Korea. Rumsfeld once stated that
we are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts. We’re capable of
wining decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the case of the other, and let
there be no doubt about it” Chung and Jong (20003: 34).
The United States might consider three possible military options. First is
a surgical strike on nuclear facilities in Yong-byon, a move that was debated
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during the 1994 nuclear crisis. The second is a combination of surgical strike
and preemptive all-out attack, North Korea’s retaliation, and counterattack on
North Korea. The final option could involve a sequence of surgical attack,
North Korea’s retaliation, and counterattack. Regardless of the options,
military actions are likely to result in a major catastrophe through conflict
escalation. Even a well-plan surgical strike is likely eventually to escalate into
a major conflict, (Chung and Jong: 34).
The political consequence of the Korean nuclear dispute is the regime
change in the country, according to Chung and Jong (2003:6) “another critical
assumption underlying this option is that the North Korea nuclear problem
cannot be solve without toppling the regime. As long as Kim Jong-il stays in
power North Korea will want both dialogue and the bomb simultaneously.
Removing him from power and creating a new regime in North Korea is the
best surest way to solve the North Korean nuclear dilemma. Thus, the United
States and its allies and friends should work together to isolate, contain, and
transform North Korea. If they work together, transformation of North Korea
will materialize faster than emergence as a real nuclear power.
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According to Chung and Jong (2003:20) this personal feeling and
religious emotion have guided American foreign policy on North Korea,
ignoring the country’s politics, culture, and history. To Bush headliners, North
Korea is untouchable; it cannot be treated as a legitimate negotiating partner.
This is all the more so because North Korea is considered a criminal state that
has violated the Geneva Agreed Framework and the Nonproliferation Treaty.
In addition, North Korea continues to export complete ballistic missiles and
production capabilities along with related raw materials, components, and
expertise.
The most urgent task at present is to revive the six-party talks.
However, there is a range of challenging issues, such as the imposed sanctions,
that need to be addressed. In addition to these newer issues, the parties still
face the same differences in perceptions, which caused the talks to stall in
2005.
5.5 Consequences on inter and intra Korean relations
Lin (2006:11) stressed that Inter-Korean economic exchange and
cooperation had been limited to the private sector prior to the June 2000
inter-Korean summit, but has since expanded to include official cooperation
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between Republic of Korea and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
authorizes. According to Dae-kyu and Moon-Soo (2005:6) specifically,
“communication channels between officials have been established…” He
averred that:
Despite temporary interruptions, by and large these lines of
communication still remain open, allowing for continuous
conferencing, which provides South Korea a much better
opportunity to influence official inter-Koran economic
cooperation. For example, the mountain Kumgang tourism and
Kaesong Industrial complex (KIC) projects in the North Korea
basically began as private ventures but largely have been made
possible through the support generated by official discussions
between Seoul and Pyongyang.
The project to reconnect inter-Korean roads and rails, on the other hand, has
been purely government governmental since its inception.
According to Schoff and Elsenberg (2009:1) despite this
acknowledgement of the ultimate importance of establishing a Korean
Peninsula peace regime (KPPR), no KPPR talks have occurred and no one can
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identify a probable start date or even a likely agenda for those negotiations.
North Korea has stepped up its threats against the South, the United States,
and Japan with bellicose statements, missile tests, and border closings.
Pyongyang also stated in April 2009 that nuclear war with South Korea and
the United States was just “a matter of time,” given what it called the “war
chariot” of the U.S.-ROK alliance (Yonhap News Agency 2009a). North Korea
followed this up with its second nuclear weapon test in May 2009, and it
called for “shaping a new diplomatic framework” through bilateral talks with
the United States (Yonhap News Agency 2009b).
Schoff and Elsenberg (2009:vii) At the time of the workshop, inter-
Korean relations were also showing clear signs of deterioration, after years of
incremental progress. The new ROK president, Lee Myung-bak, took a
different approach to North-South relations than had his two predecessors,
emphasizing greater reciprocity in diplomatic relations, and he advocated a
stronger ROK relationship with the United States. North Korea’s response
became increasingly negative as 2008 wore on, refusing to engage the South,
for example, even after a fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist by a North
Korean soldier in the Mt. Kumgang area in July. The situation further
deteriorated after the IFPA workshop, as ROK tour operations in North Korea
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were suspended, and Pyongyang threatened clashes with the South in late
January 2009 and announced that the country was scrapping all inter-Korean
political and military agreements. According to a statement made by the DPRK
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea and carried by the North’s
official Korean Central News Agency, “All the agreed points concerning the
issue of putting an end to the political and military confrontation between the
north and the south will be nullified” (Yonhap News Agency 2009c). North
Korea’s rocket/missile launch in April and its nuclear test in May exacerbated
tensions, and now the last operating North-South venture (the joint industrial
complex at Gaesong) is in danger of being shut down.
The test could also further cooperation among China, he U.S., Japan and
South Korea and maybe bring about a consensus on how to deal with
Pyongyang. Nevertheless, South Korea and China will not back any hard-line
policies unless, and maybe not even then, all diplomatic channels have been
exhausted, Lin (2006:11).
South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun and Prime Minister Abe also put
aside their differences on history and territorial issues and focused their talks
on the nuclear test. At the press conference after his talks with Abe, Roh Moo-
Hyun said: "Now there is no difference between me and Prime Minister Abe.
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We agreed that a North Korean nuclear test is an unpardonable act, and that
we should take a cool-headed, strategic response coordinated with the United
Nations and related countries Lin (2006:39),
And he indicated that South Korea may reconsider its "sunshine policy"
toward North Korea by saying that "Now it has become difficult for us to stick
to our policy of engagement with [the] North. We find it difficult to argue that
such a policy is effective. South Korea has considerably lost ground in insisting
on dialogue with North Korea while the international community is calling for
a tougher approach with sanctions and pressure. Lin (2006:36).
4.6 Consequences on Regional Security
Marcus (2008:2) has it that the Korean nuclear dispute has “establishes
an unwelcome precedent for other countries contemplating emulation”. While
the Security Council states that DPRK has generated increased tension in the
region and beyond, “is a clear threat to international peace and security”,
Security Council (2006:53). Avery and Sharon (2006:2) pointed out that the
medium and long-term implications of the North Korean nuclear test “could
include a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang, a nuclear arms race in
Asia, and the transfer of nuclear weapons or material to states or groups
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hostile to the United States”. There are also strong concerns about the impact
on the global nonproliferation regime, particularly to other states poised to
develop their own nuclear weapon programs”.
Chung and Jong (2003:39-40) pointed out that “a nuclear North Korea is
unthinkable. It would debilitate South Korea and trigger nuclear proliferation
in the region, involving Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and of course China. The
undoing of a North Korea may require military action, causing enormous
collateral damage.”
On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and thereby
became the world's ninth nuclear power, a development that will have wide-
ranging security implications for Northeast Asia and the rest of the
international community, Lin (2006:1). The North Korea nuclear test will have
a number of geo-political and strategic consequences for individual states and
state-to-state relations in Northeast Asia and beyond”.
The test may spur an arms race in Northeast Asia, a scenario that China,
and possibly also the U.S., fears the most. The recent developments have
added new fuel to the bate on Japan's possible development of a nuclear
arsenal. Regardless of Japan’s decision, the nuclear test will most likely result
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in a strengthened U.S.-Japanese security alliance and an acceleration of the
development of a theatre missile defense. Also South Korea will have to
solidify its alliance with the U.S., and thereby enhance its conventional
military capability, to meet the security threats from the North Lin (2006:11).
China has long been seen as the most influential external party in this
crisis. Nevertheless, the test firing of missiles in July and the nuclear test in
October illustrates China's limitations. The situation has turned into a
diplomatic quandary for Beijing and the frustration with the northeasterly
neighbor is mounting. Nevertheless, North Korea’s geographic proximity and
geo-strategic importance, forces China needs to address North Korea's
provocations in a comprehensive and strategic manner that is in line with
China's overall strategic goals of peace and stability. Although it certainly is in
China's interest to rid the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons, regime
change or military measures are not seen as plausible ways of achieving this
since this could undermine China's internal economic development and the
construction of an affluent society. China and the U.S. thus share the
overarching goals vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula, but disagree on the
strategies for achieving them. The situation is further complicated by the two
states' competing geo-strategic interests in Northeast Asia. China's emergence
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as a great power is seen as a threat to the American dominance in the Western
Pacific and China is regarded a strategic competitor by the current U.S.
administration. Against this complex geopolitical background, it is essential
for China to strike a balance between North Korea and the U.S. regarding the
North Korean nuclear issue.
Japan is very much concerned about its security after the North Korean
nuclear test because it feels directly threatened. In the short term, however,
Japan is still unlikely to go nuclear. On the one hand, it still has the credible
"nuclear umbrella" of the U.S. On the other hand, the public opinion in Japan is
still strongly opposed to the idea of going nuclear, due to Japan's historical
experience as a target of nuclear attacks. The prospect of a nuclear Japan
might also meet strong opposition from many other East
Asian countries, where memories still linger on from Japan's wartime
aggression. In the long term, it is still unclear what effects North Korea's
nuclear test will have on Japan's policy or public opinion. In 1998, after the
North fired a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan, public opinion shifted
dramatically in favor of building a stronger defense. In the following years,
Japan began building weapons that just a decade earlier would have been
unthinkable, such as a troop transport ship that could serve as a small
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aircraft carrier, as well as aerial tankers that would allow Japanese fighter jets
to reach North Korea, Lin (2006:34).
The North Korean nuclear test can also push Japan to speed up its
cooperation with the United States in developing the ballistic missile defense
system. After the July 4 missile tests by North Korea, Japan and the United
States agreed to deploy Patriot Advanced Capabilty-3 (PAC-3) interceptor
missiles on American bases in Japan for the first time. The PAC-3 is designed
to intercept ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or aircrafts. It is an important
part of the missile defense system and aimed at complementing the Standard
Missile-3 installed on vessels equipped with the Aegis radar system capable of
tracking missile launches. The U.S. hasalso moved up its planned test of the X-
Band missile-detecting radar system, which had been transferred from a U.S.
base in Japan to the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's Shariki base at Tsugaru,
some 360 miles northeast of Tokyo. Recently, it was reported that the U.S.
also is considering deploying the advanced Patriot missile defense system
around Yokota Air Base in Tokyo's western suburbs and around Yokosuka
Naval Base, south of the capital.58 Taken together, this means that the U.S.-
Japan military alliance is being strengthened as a result of the North Korean
missile and nuclear tests, Lin (2006:34-35).
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The same can be said about the U.S.-South Korea alliance, which has
seen many frictions in the past few years. But North Korea's nuclear test will
serve to solidify the alliance since South Korea has to enhance its conventional
military capability and strengthen the cooperation with the U.S. to ensure its
safety. Since 2004, the U.S. has been making readjustments to its force posture
in South Korea, with troop reductions and base relocations. But the U.S.
emphasized that the adjustments will not weaken the U.S.' security
commitment to South Korea and it will spend 11 billion dollars by 2006 to
equip its forces in South Korea with sophisticated weapons, including high-
speed vessels, AH-64D attack helicopters and Stryker armored vehicles as
well as two Patriot missile batteries. On October 20, 2006, the 38th ROK-U.S.
Security Consultative Meeting was held in Washington. During the meeting,
both the U.S. and the ROK expressed their concern about the North Korean
nuclear test and concurred that the ROK-U.S. alliance remains vital to the
future interests of the two nations. In addition, a solid combined defense
posture should be maintained in order to secure peace and stability on the
Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Although the U.S. agreed to complete
the transition of wartime operational control to the Republic of Korea (ROK)
after October 15, 2009, it offered an assurance that "the transition to a new
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command structure will be carried out while maintaining and enhancing
deterrence on the Korean peninsula and ROK-U.S. combined defense
capabilities", Lin (2006:35).
China is showing more and more frustration over North Korea's
provocative actions, especially after the nuclear test. Some experts say that
North Korea's determination to proceed with its nuclear program has become
a serious diplomatic liability for Beijing. The nuclear test will, according to the
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, certainly have a negative effect on the
bilateral relationship between China and North Korea. China has used the
strongest term brazenly to condemn North Korea's nuclear test and said that
there has to be some punitive actions. China certainly does not want to see a
nuclear North Korea, especially considering that this could result in a
potential arms race in Northeast Asia. China is worried that Japan will take
this opportunity to revise its constitution so as to gain the right to modernize
its military, wage war, or even go nuclear. Such a development would
ultimately affect the balance of power in East Asia, Lin 2006:41).
A war on the Korean peninsula would most likely create a massive wave
of refugees into China's northeastern provinces, which could influence
stability negatively. Another possible consequence of a military confrontation
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would be a collapse of the North Korean regime which would present China
with tremendous uncertainty. So in the short term, there will not be any
dramatic changes in the relationship between China and North Korea, Lin
(2006:42).
4.7 Consequences on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
According to NPT (2007:6) the Iranian and North Korean proliferation
situations demonstrate the grave challenges to the viability of the non-
proliferation regime presented by non-compliance with the Treaty’s core of
non-proliferation obligations.
Vitaly, I. Churkin Russian Federation representative to the Security
Council, said that, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s statement of its
intention to conduct a nuclear test, and that his country “had emphasized that
such actions could complicate the settlement of the nuclear problem on the
Korean peninsula, pose a threat to international peace and security and
undermine the non-proliferation regime”, Security Council (2006:31).
The nuclear test constitutes a severe blow to the global non-
proliferation regime and may be interpreted as a green light by states
nourishing similar nuclear ambitions, especially if North Korea manages to
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escape any serious and wide-ranging repercussions. Moreover, and possibly
even more concerning, is North Korea's proclivity to indiscriminant
proliferation of nuclear technology and fissile material, Lin (2006:1).
The test may spur an arms race in Northeast Asia, a scenario that China,
and possibly also the U.S., fears the most. The recent developments have
added new fuel to the debate on Japan's possible development of a nuclear
arsenal. Regardless of Japan’s decision, the nuclear test will most likely result
in a strengthened U.S.-Japanese security alliance and an acceleration of the
development of a theatre missile defense. Also South Korea will have to
solidify its alliance with the U.S., and thereby enhance its conventional
military capability, to meet the security threats from the North.
Although the power of the North Korean nuclear explosion, according to
some U.S., French and South Korean experts, was equivalent to about 500
metric tons of TNT, which is unusually small for a nuclear blast, and despite
the fact that Pyongyang's ability to weaponize its nuclear materials to place a
bomb on a missile for delivery is still uncertain, the test has important short
and long-term implications for global and regional security. One of the most
serious consequences of the North Korean nuclear test is that it has meant a
severe blow to the global non-proliferation regime. If North Korea can get
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away with its possession of nuclear weapons, it will give a virtual green light
to Iran, which is now watching closely the international response to the North
Korean nuclear test.
After North Korea's nuclear test, Tehran seems to have become tougher
in continuing its own uranium enrichment program. One day after the North
Korean nuclear test, Iranian President Ahmadineijad ‘affirmed that Iran will
continue its nuclear program and the Iranian nation will continue its path of
dignity based on resistance, wisdom and without fear’. The head of the UN
nuclear agency ElBaradei warned recently that besides Iran as many as 30
countries could soon have technology that would let them produce atomic
weapons in a very short time, joining the nine states that have or are
suspected to have such arms. It was just this fear of proliferation that
prompted President Bush to declare in 2003 that the United States would
never ‘tolerate’ a nuclear-armed North Korea. In fact, since September 2001,
the nexus of proliferation of WMD and terrorism has been deemed one of the
greatest threats to U.S. security. And President Bush has repeatedly made it
very clear that the priority concern for the United States is proliferation. That
is why the Bush Administration put forward the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) in May 2003. The U.S. regards North Korea as one of the seven
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state sponsors of terrorism and many within the Bush Administration fear
that North Korea will proliferate nuclear weapons.
There has long been a concern that a nuclear North Korea will unleash a
regional arms race in Northeast Asia, which is an area that is already troubled
by a lot of potential conflicts. And this scenario is what worries China, and
possibly also the U.S., the most. That is why, immediately following the
nuclear test by North Korea, President Bush emphasized the U.S.' commitment
to its allies in the region, including South Korea and Japan, and stressed that
the United States will meet the full range of its deterrent and security
obligations. On her trip to Japan on October 18 2006, U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice echoed President Bush by saying that "the United States has
the will and the capability to meet the full range of its deterrent and security
commitments to Japan.
According to Pollack (2007:3) The DPRK is the first state ever to
withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a move that has created a
very troubling precedent for other states that might contemplate such actions.
Should North Korea opt to transfer abroad any of its nuclear technologies,
materials, and weapons, the dangers to international peace and security
would be exceedingly grave. Additionally, the regional consequences are also
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highly worrisome. Without nuclear weapons, the latent possibilities of a
highly destructive military conflict on the Korean Peninsula remain very high;
with nuclear weapons, the potential consequences of renewed conflict for the
Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and for U.S. forces are incalculably greater.
Quite apart from the potential for armed conflict, North Korea’s possession of
nuclear weapons seems very likely to prompt major security reassessments
on the part of all the states of Northeast Asia Pollack (200713) remarked.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE
KOREAN NUCLEAR DISPUTE
5.1 WAYS TO SUSTAIN A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE KOREA
North and South Korea each resorted to military means to unify the
country. Such attempts, however, only deepened the division and caused
incalculable economic and social damage to the nation as well as to
individuals. Because of the long separation and lack of exchanges, the
undeniable realities that the two Koreas have very little in common. Neither
have any jurisdiction over the other, nor have the two gone to opposite
directions in the past 55 years. However, each still claims to be the sole
representative of the nation which no longer exists.
The two Koreas need to face reality and start normal relations with each
other as good neighbours. Because of their domestic political constraints, they
need international assistance to make this radical but simple political change.
South Korea still fears a North Korean attack, just as North Korea fears a South
Korean attack. These fears have been used and are still being used for
domestic political purposes and as a stabilizing factor for each system.
Unification is put forward as a major government policy, but not as a real
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possibility to reunite people and to reduce human suffering. For the purpose
of saving the system, even contacts between separated families are forbidden.
If the two Koreas change their relations from confrontation to
accommodation, even a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) covering Japan
and the two Koreas might be possible. This would not only enhance peace, but
also stabilize the nuclear status quo in the region. Because of Japan´s large-
scale plutonium stockpiles and its ambitious space program, some countries
in the region are suspicious of Japan´s intentions. A Japanese initiative for
creating a NWFZ covering itself would help to alleviate these concerns.
In addition to supporting these NWFZ initiatives, the United States
should take a more active role in nuclear transparency and confidence-
building measures in the region. The mutual benefit of a cooperative
mechanism for a nuclear-weapons-free Korea may offer opportunities for
shaping a regional political framework to ameliorate distrust among
neighbours. The fundamental interest in non-proliferation of these countries
can function to create a new security system for the region.
To reduce the danger of proliferation and to sustain the nuclear-weapon
free Korea, several steps need to be taken and they are:
202
1. The two Koreas must commit themselves not to use force to settle differences,
and to normalize their relations. To this end, they should sign a basic treaty
recognizing each other as separate systems with sole jurisdiction, and
exchange representatives in each capital. The basic agreement of 1991 could
be the foundation for a formal treaty.
2. Until a formal treaty of mutual recognition is signed and ratified, North and
South Korea should respect the truce agreement and refrain from using the
reunification issue for the purpose of detracting from serious domestic
political problems or from irritating the other side intentionally by increasing
tension. Since both of them are undergoing radical transformation, it is crucial
that each side be free from interference by the other.
3. Once they have normalized relations, they should start negotiations to reduce
their armed forces gradually to the level at which neither could be a military
threat to the other. The US forces in Korea should oversee the reduction on
both sides and guarantee the security of both Koreas.
4. The US should recognize and establish diplomatic relations with North Korea,
as promised in 1994. In return, North Korea should sign and ratify the
Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions as well as the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, and refrain from exporting missiles to other regions.
203
Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are seen by the two
Koreas not only as a tool of war, but also as one of deterrence and coercive
diplomacy, and they are regarded as essential for each state’s survival as well
as for national unification. Unlike most other countries seeking nuclear
capabilities, here political prestige or regional hegemony (big power
ambition) plays no role at all. Therefore, accommodation between the two
Koreas is the key to eliminating the danger of proliferation. Finding the
answer to the Korea question is now not only possible, but also essential, to
reduce the danger of proliferation in the region.
The study examined the consequences of violation of Security Council
Resolutions, with the Resolution 1718 of 2006 (on North Korea) as a case
study. The following research questions were posited in the course of our
work:
1. Does the United Nation’s Security Council’s resolution have a legal
force?
2. Is there evidence that states are obeying the United Nations Security
Council’s resolutions?
204
3. Has resolution 1718 deterred North Korea from acquiring nuclear
weapon?
The above findings validate our hypothesis as stated in chapter two.
5.2. CONCLUSION
From the discussions, it could be adduced that the United Nations
Security Council’ Resolution has a legal force, this is validated from the charter
that established the United Nations and also the various Articles of the United
Nations Charter that gave a legal power to the United Nations Security Council
gotten in the works cited in our review.
Not withstanding the statutory backing of the United Nations
Resolutions, it was evidenced that states are not obeying the United
Nations Security Council’s Resolutions.
Resolution 1718 of 2006 has not deterred North Korea from acquiring
nuclear weapon. This is based on the continued testing of missiles and
Atomic bomb in 2009, after resolution 1718 which seek to stop this
practices, and subsequently attracted more sanctions from the United
205
Nations Security Council in form of Resolution 1874 (2009), and individual
sanctions from some states like The United States of America, Japan etc.
5.3 RECOMMENDATION
The violations of the United Nations Security Council Resolution in did
have great consequences. This comes in the way of setting a bad precedent
for other countries to follow. That is to say that, it will lead to more
proliferation activities by non-nuclear weapon states. A good example is the
fact that, as a result of insignificant impact of Resolution 1718 of 2006 on
North Korea, this has encouraged Iran to continue with her Uranium
enrichment activities in violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
which she is a signatory. With the aim of adopting North Korea’s strategy of
continued defiance to various Security Council’s Resolutions.
Laws are made for betterment of the great majority of people and the
international community. One of the purposes of the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty is to prevent a nuclear accident as has been witnessed in the past. Also,
to prevent nuclear weapons from entering into the hands of terrorist
organizations like Al Quada from acquiring nuclear weapons because it will
206
readily use it against the civilian populations and the American, Western and
non Muslim interest, and also to reduce the risk of nuclear war from occurring.
United Nations Security Council should sanction states that refuse to
enforce its resolutions on states that it is taking enforcement actions on, in
line with the United Nations Charter, which states that states should not
help any country that it is taking an enforcement action on.
The United Nations Security Council should pass a resolution mandating
all the five permanent members to eliminate their nuclear, Biological and
Chemical weapon so that states without these weapons will not be
threaten. And also to serve as an example to the non Security Council
members of whom majority of them do not have weapons of mass
destructions.
If the above recommendations are implemented, the likely nuclear
accident, terrorist attack and nuclear war will be reduced to the minimum.
207
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