nuclear radiation hardening associates,...

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Dr. John C. Dunfield Chief Executive Officer (CEO) [email protected] 1 [email protected] (760) 285-2749 (760) 776 1188 Mr. Rick D. May Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) [email protected] (435) 994-0510 (435) 245-9845 Nuclear Radiation Hardening Associates, LLC www.nucradhard.com

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Dr. John C. Dunfield

Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

[email protected]

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[email protected]

(760) 285-2749 (760) 776 1188

Mr. Rick D. May

Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)

[email protected]

(435) 994-0510 (435) 245-9845

Nuclear Radiation Hardening Associates, LLC

www.nucradhard.com

Ionizing RadiationElectromagnetic Environmental Effects

Nuclear Radiation Hardening Associates, LLC

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Electromagnetic Environmental Effects

www.nucradhard.com

Introduction

Under the professional leadership of Dr. John C. Dunfield and Mr. Rick D. May, NRH Associates offers complete capability for mitigating the deleterious effects of Ionizing Radiation in electronic equipment vital to the National Defense and military capability. NRHA Ionizing Radiation effects experience for man-made Nuclear Natural Space and Radiation environments include nuclear radiation prompt X-rays,

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Natural Space and Radiation environments include nuclear radiation prompt X-rays, gammas, and neutrons, delayed gammas, betas, and neutrons, and Solar Flare and Cosmic Radiation protons and heavy ions. And similar to Dr. Aka G. Finci’s E3

experience, includes System Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP), which is primarily a result of ionizing X-Ray and gamma ray interaction with system structural materials.

NRHA has significant experience in the design, development, and life cycle hardness of nuclear and natural space radiation hardened military systems. Hardness design and development includes radiation planning, requirements interpretation and flow-down, testing, analysis, design trades, effects mitigation and design guidelines, and radiation transport calculations. Life cycle hardness includes the development and implementation of Hardness Assurance, Hardness Maintenance, and Hardness Surveillance Programs. In addition, NRHA personnel have consulted for over a dozen companies for Booster, EKV, and Space Satellites, taught Electrical Engineering at two universities, and have managed radiation test facilities for Boeing and the Air Force.

Ionizing Radiation Environments and Effects

• Sources of Radiation

– Nuclear Weapon Detonation Environments

• prompt X-rays, gammas, and neutrons

• delayed (and persistent) gammas, betas, and neutrons

– Natural Space Environments (Protons and Heavy Ions)

• Cosmos

• Sun

• Effects Caused by Radiation

4

• Effects Caused by Radiation

– Effects of Nuclear Radiation

• Dose Rate (DR) or Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE)

• Total Dose in Electronics (TD)

• Neutron Induced Upset (NIU) and Displacement Damage (NDD)

• Electron Caused Electromagnetic Pulse (ECEMP)

• System Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP)

• Focal Plane Noise

• Thermo-Mechanical Response (TMR)

• Combined Environment Processes

– Effects of Natural Radiation

• Single Event Effects (SEE)

• Total Dose (TD)

• Electron Caused Electromagnetic Pulse (ECEMP)

LIFE CYCLE SURVIVABILITY

Survivability

Program

Plan

REQUIREMENTSDEVELOPMENT

- A-Spec

Analysis &

UpdateDESIGN SUPPORT

Part Selection

HCI Data

Radiation

Design

Guidelines

V/V Test Plan

Survivability Test

Plan & Procedures

Test Results

Reports

Mission

Performance

HAMS Plan

Test Results

Reports

Training

Procedures

Survivability Engineering Functions

55

Update

- B-Spec

Flowdown

- Documentation- Technology

Assessment

- System

Response

Analyses

- Trade Studies

- Data Needs

- Design Reviews

- Design Guidelines

- Part Testing

- Circuit Testing

- Interface

Penetration Tests

- Data Analysis

VALIDATION/VERIFICATION

HARDNESSASSURANCEMAINTENANCESURVEILLANCE

- Technical Performance

Metrics

- Test Facilities

- B-Spec Validation

- A-Spec Verification

- Test Support

Performance

- Technical Performance

Metrics Documents

- HCI Tracking System

- CM Interfaces

- HCI Tracking

- Training Procedures

- Documentation

Nuclear Weapon Environment Hardening

Electronic systems must continue to operate through or survive the exposure to nuclear weapon

detonation environments

• Experience

– GMD Program OBV nuclear radiation hardening design and development, OBV HAMS

program planning

– Overall GMD (Boeing) survivability program support and Survivability Program Plans

– GMD EKV radiation hardening program

– Nuclear radiation hardening program planning – candidate Boeing MKV

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– FCS survivability program, strategic nuclear radiation hardening

– ICBM hardness development and HAMS implementation, Minuteman II, Minuteman III,

Minuteman III GRP, Peacekeeper,

– Hardness planning Small ICBM

– Management of the Air Force LMTA Utah radiation test facility

• Hardening: Radiation effects mitigation through electronic piece-part selection and parts type

count minimization, functional and electromechanical hardening including transient radiation

electronic filtering and circumvention, power dump and recovery, EEE part utilization, radiation

shielding, utilization of Hi-Z and Low-Z materials and filled-cables to minimize SGEMP.

• Testing: LINAC and FXR electron/photon parts testing, High Energy X-Ray FXR (PR958,

PR1150) box and system level testing, FBR neutron parts testing, Low Energy FXR

experiments (MBS, Black Jack, Pithon, Double Eagle), and 60Co gamma immersion sources

and 137Cs gamma ray sources.

• Environments and Testing standards: MDA-STD-001, MIL-STD-1766B, MIL-STD-1547B, MIL-

HDBK-814, MIL-HDBK-815, MIL-STD-750E, MIL-STD-883G, and JESD89-3

Natural Radiation Environment Hardening

Electronic systems must continue to operate through or survive the exposure to natural space

radiation environments

• Experience

– GMD Program OBV natural radiation hardening design and development, OBV

HAMS program planning

• Hardness design and development

• Radiation planning – Radiation Hardness Assurance Plan (RHAP)

• Requirements interpretation and flow-down and radiation transport

calculations (CREME96, MCNPX, ITS)

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calculations (CREME96, MCNPX, ITS)

• Radiation trade studies, Radiation Design Guidelines

• Simulation and Modeling

• Parts testing (Proton and Heavy Ion) and analysis (SEE predictions)

– Overall GMD (Boeing) survivability program support

• Hardening: Radiation effects mitigation through electronic piece-part selection and parts

type count minimization, radiation testing, functional and electromechanical hardening

including EDAC and redundancy, EEE part utilization, and radiation shielding.

• Testing: Parts testing at particle accelerators to perform Cosmic Ray and Solar Flare

proton and heavy ion testing; proton testing at IUCF (Indiana University Cyclotron

Facility) and TRIUMF (TRI-University Meson Facility); heavy ion testing at TAMU (Texas

A&M University) particle accelerator and U.C. Berkeley Accelerator Space Effects (BASE)

Facility particle accelerator.

• Environments and Testing standards: MDA-STD-001, MIL-STD-1547B, MIL-HDBK-814,

MIL-HDBK-815, MIL-STD-750E, MIL-STD-883G, and JESD89-3

-SYS NUC RQMTS

-NATURAL RQMTS

-ASSIST

ENVIRONMENTS

SCENARIO

TRANSPORTED

CAPABILITIES DOCUMENTS

Requirements Development &

Analysis Tools

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B SPECIFICATION

TRANSPORTED

- MCNPx

- BOXIEMP I&II

- CEPXONLD

- ITS SERIES

- CREME96

- Testable Hardware Toolkit (THTk)

- BOXIEMP I&II

- EM Coupling Tools

- EMA3D

- MHarness

- Simulation & Modeling Tools

- radiation circuit analysis (e.g., SPICE, PSPICE)

- CREME96

- Test Data Bank

HW/SW RESPONSE

TOOLS

Natural Space Natural Space

Radiation:Radiation:

Nuclear Radiation; Fission Nuclear Radiation; Fission

and Thermoand Thermo--Nuclear (shown Nuclear (shown

below) Weapon Detonation:below) Weapon Detonation:

Ionizing Radiation Environments

99

• Sources of Radiation– Natural Space Environments

• Cosmos

• Sun

– Nuclear Weapon Detonation Environments

• Effects Caused by Radiation– Effects of Natural Radiation

• Single Event Effects (SEE)

• Total Dose (TD)

Overview of Radiation Environments And Effects

1010

• Total Dose (TD)

• Electron Caused Electromagnetic Pulse (ECEMP)

– Effects of Nuclear Radiation• Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (e.g., Dose Rate)

• Total Dose in Electronics (TD)

• Neutron Displacement Damage

• Neutron Induced Upset (NIU)

• System Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP)

• Electron Caused Electromagnetic Pulse (ECEMP)

• Focal Plane Noise

• Thermo-Mechanical Response (TMR)

• Combined Environment Processes

Natural Radiation

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Natural Radiation

• The Solar Cycle 24 Prediction Panel has reached a consensus decision on the prediction of the next solar cycle (Cycle 24). First, the panel has agreed that solar minimum occurred in December, 2008. This still qualifies as a prediction since the smoothed sunspot number is only valid through September, 2008. The panel has

Solar Cycle Progression Presented by the NOAA/Space Weather Prediction Center: Solar Cycle 24 Prediction Update released

May 8, 2009:Solar Flare Activity Predicted to Increase

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decided that the next solar cycle will be below average in intensity, with a maximum sunspot number of 90. Given the predicted date of solar minimum and the predicted maximum intensity, solar maximum is now expected to occur in May, 2013. Note, this is a consensus opinion, not a unanimous decision. A supermajority of the panel did agree to this prediction

Single Event Effects

Acronym Definition Description

SEU Single Event Upset Change of information stored

SET Single Event Transient Current transient induced by passage of a particle, which

can propagate to cause output error in combinatorial

logic

SEL Single Event Latchup High current regenerative state induced in 4-state device

(latchup)

SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt Corruption of control path by an upset

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SEB Single Event Burnout Part burnout due to particle ionization

SEDR Single Event Dielectric Rupture Essentially anti-fuse rupture

SEGR Single Event Gate Rupture Rupture of gate dielectric by a high current flow

SED Single Event Disturb Momentary disturb of information stored in memory bit

SES Single Event Snapback High current regenerative state induced in NMOS device

(snapback)

MBU Multiple Bit Upset Several memory bits upset by passage of the same

particle

Heavy Ion induced Single Event Latchup (SEL)

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After: Johnston

Heavy Ion Illustrated GCR Single Event Upset (SEU)(Solar Flare can be much larger)

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• Typically observed in power transistors (MOSFET and bipolar)

• Triggered by ion turning on a biased “OFF” N-channel

• Regenerative feedback produces second breakdown

• High current short between source and drain

Power MOSFET,

With Parasitic npn Bipolar Device

Single Event Burnout

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Parasitic Bipolar Device

Bipolar Power Transistor

After: Galloway

SEGR Characteristics

• Ion breaks down gate oxide

Conceptual Model

for Gate Rupture

Single Event Gate Rupture

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• Ion breaks down gate oxide resulting in short between gate and substrate

• Dependent on LET

• Dependent on gate oxide critical field

After: Titus

After: Brews

• Single Event Effects (SEE)

– upsets, damage, and failures that occur mostly in digital

devices, resulting from the ionization created by high-energy

particles traveling through the device X-Rays• Galactic cosmic rays

– Fluence low, solar cycle variation small– Difficult to shield, significant heavy ion component

• Solar Flare Particles

Mitigation of Single Event Effects

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• Solar Flare Particles– Fluence can be very high– Can be shielded, but very weight expensive, highly variable, and

unpredictable

– Nuclear Radiation Neutron Ionization Upset is a similar

effect (discussed in a later section)

• Mitigation– Part Selection and Testing

– Circuit Design

– Error Detection and Correction

– Radiation Shielding (for Solar Flares only)

Nuclear Radiation

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Nuclear Radiation

• Specific outputs depend on weapon design

• Most energy released in 10s of nanoseconds

– “Prompt” radiation + kinetic energy of

weapon materials

• Remainder emitted when fission daughter particles

beta-decay

– “Delayed” radiation

– Continues at decreasing rate

Example Nuclear Weapon Partition - Ionizing Radiation

2020

– Continues at decreasing rate

Prompt Outputs MeV Delayed Outputs MeV

X-rays 126 Gammas 5

KE of fission fragments

42 Betas 6

Gammas 5 Neutrinos 10

Neutrons 5 Others <0.1

Total Prompt 178 Total Delayed ~21

Typical Outputs from Fission of U235

Ref: Physics of High Altitude Nuclear Burst Effects DNA 4501F.

joul1 MeV = 1.6x10-6 erg or 1.6x10-13 joul

Prompt Gamma

Neutrons

Environm

ents

(Rela

tive S

cale

)X-rays

Debris electron

Nuclear Radiation Environments Extend Over Long Time Scales

2121

Hardening must consider both levels and time line

Delayed gamma

Delayed neutron

10-7 10-5 10-3 10-1 101 103 105

NW

E

Environm

ents

(Rela

tive S

cale

)

Debris electron

Normalized Time

Circumvention & Recovery

X-Rays & Gamma Rays

Typical Prompt Dose Rate Latch-up And Burnout

2222

Latch-Up PathSilicon Damage

X-Rays & Gamma Rays

Typical Prompt Dose Rate Photocurrent Upset And Damage

2323

Primary and SecondaryPhotocurrents

Commercial Dose Rate Tolerance

2424Reference: M. Rose, “Updated Bar Charts of Device Radiation

Thresholds," Physitron Corp. San Diego, CA, 1990.

Parts Feature Size and Increased Radiation Sensitivity : Latest SRAM is 65 to 32 nm

2525E. Petersen and P. Marshall, “Single Event Phenomena in the Space and SDI

Arena,”J. Rad. Effects, Res. & Eng., Vol. 6, No. 1, 1988.

Mitigation of Nuclear Radiation Effects

Effect Mitigation

Dose Rate (TREE) and Total

Dose �Part Selection and Testing

�Radiation Shielding (to Bremsstrahlung and/or Gamma Limit, and Self Shielding)

�Circumvention, Power Dump & Recovery

SEE and NIU�Part Selection and Testing

�Circuit Design (e.g., TMR, EDAC)

�Shielding (for Solar Flares only)

�Material Selection

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�Material Selection

ECEMP and external SGEMP�RF Grounding and Shielding

�Conducting Surface &Terminal Protection

�Low-Response Cables (Internal SGEMP)

�Radiation Shielding

Internal SGEMP�Material Selection – low Z coatings

�Circuit Board Design

�Box Enclosure Design – High Z shield coated with Low Z

�Grounding Design

�Radiation Shielding

Thermo-Mechanical Response

(TMR) �Material Selection

• Survivability and Vulnerability Integration Center (SVIC)-Total Dose and

LINAC

• Boeing Radiation Effects Laboratory (BREL)-Linac, FXR, and Total

Dose Sources

• Sandia-Flash X-ray, gamma, short pulse X Radiator

• White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) -Fast Burst Reactor

• Defense of Microelectronic Activity (DMEA)-TID

Some Nuclear Test Facilities:

2727

• Defense of Microelectronic Activity (DMEA)-TID

• Honeywell –TID Sources, LINAC, FRX

• L3 Communications-Pulse Science -ebeam and X-rays

• NAVSEA Crane, IN (TID sources, LINAC)

• Radiation Assured Devices, Inc.:Co-60, Cs-137, Neutron, Flash X-

Ray/Prompt Dose Capabilities

Example of Nuclear Test Facilities:

2828

Example of Heavy Ion Test Facilities:

2929