nssm 209 - future uranium enrichment in the u.s. (2) · enrichment capacity (nssm 209) in response...

The original documents are located in Box 31, folder “NSSM 209 - Future Uranium Enrichment in the U.S. (2)” of the NSC Institutional Files at the Gerald R. Ford

Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL . "' WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

GONFIDEN~IAl:t' September 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT:

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE ~,.~·--"'~

Policy on the Deve.lopmen~<Fi;ture Uranium Enrichment Capacity jl)l8SM 209)

e dum of September 21, Secretary Kissinger ~_..,e you that your representative will be added to the

r~..,.,....oa:;;?~.,.,. the developn1ent of future uranium enrichment Chairman Ray's office v.rill contact your rep-

oeb, directly.

GON:F'IDEHTIAb- GDS ;..:/t2.. I 1:1/1/ tJ tf

Digitized from Box 31 of NSC Institutional Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 30, 1974

MEh10RANDU~1. FOR

SUBJECT:

THE CHAIRMAN UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity (NSSM 209)

-Secretary Kissinger requests that a representative of the Secretary of Commerce be added to your Ad Hoc Group considering the development of future uranium enrichment capacity (NSSM 209). Secretary Dent has indicated that his representative will be Ernest Loeb, Office of Energy Programs, Bureau of Resources and Trade Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, who can be reached at 967-5585.

€0NFIDENT'L\:L - GDS

;.kL 10/7/04

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ~ ,.,.. ~

WASHrNGTO'N, D.C. 20506

GON FID El'l TIA h September 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

SUBJECT: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity (NSSM 209)

In response to your memorandum of September 21, Secretary Kissinger has asked me to advise you that your representative will be added to the Ad Hoc Group studying the development of future uranium enrichment capacity .{NSSM 2091 Chairman Ray's office will contact your representative, Mr. Loeb, directly.

COHFIDE'HTIAt- GDS Nt<_ lt:>/7/0t./



-GeNFIDENTIA b September 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR


SUBJECT: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity {NSSM 209)

Secretary Kissinger requests that a representative of the Secretary of Commerce be added to your Ad Hoc Group considering the development of future uranium enrichment capacity (NSSM 209}. Secretary Dent has indicated that his representative will be Ernest Loeb, Office of Energy Programs, Bureau of Resources and Trade Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, who can be reached at 967-5585. i

CONFIDEt'tTIAL - GDS ~/d/7/(.')4

"'Ar,.n .. ~!.~~ .. .@ a -u ~~l'S~£111\1.) Jeanne W. Davis Staff Secretary

.. d&'

NATIONAl- SECURITY COUNCIL.

Sept. :30, 19T4

/ TO: MR. KENNEDY

For clearance and/ or co and return to me.

c~/ (}/ 'V

MEMORANDUM ACTION - 4432


CON PID E~lTIA: :b

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

September 30, 1 97 4

JEANNE DAVIS

DAVID ELLIOTT ~.· ~


I have checked with AEC and they have no objection to Commerce joining the NSSM 209 study activity. I don't see any disadvantages either. We can handle this expeditiously if you would sign the two memorandums· attached. Co.ncurrence: Col. Kenne~ Attachments - 2 1. Proposed Memo for the

Chairman, AEC 2. Proposed Memo for the

Secretary of Commerce

-cONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFiED

HSC t';EMO, itt:;~ .. ~.,--~~Bl s·~.":T:: L~~:--~' -:-n·:-·:-> !V;"·:

iJ-tL.c / o/7/ o 4

4432 1 rj€_

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE Washington, D.C. 20230

..eeNFIDK~lTII'.t L

SEP 21 1914

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

Subject: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity (NSSM 209)

This is in response to your September 5 memorandum wherein you outlined the President's request for a reexamination of the issues associated with a shift to private ownership of part of our future uranium enrichment capacity.

You suggested that this study should be carried out by an Ad Hoc Group composed of representatives of the addressees of your memorandum and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. We would like to add the Department of Commerce to this list for the following reasons:

Involvement by the private (commercial) sector in this enterprise as a supplier of enriched uranium, foreign and domestic, is clearly in the area of interest to the Department.

Export licensing, balance of trade, patent affairs, energy policies and adequate production resources are of principal concern to the Department.

Accordingly, we would appreciate being represented in this or any such Ad Hoc Group formed to outline the Presidential policy options in this area. My representative would be Ernest Loeb, Office of Energy Programs, Bureau of Resources and Trade Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, ho can be reached at 967-5585.

Secretary of Commerce

CONFIDENTI:L\L

INITIAL ACTION 0

~SC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

z 0 ID.

TO: PRES FROM: ~~'-F ______ _ S/S

REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

UNC LAS LOG IN/OUT

Ill: u "' w Q

' "' "' < ..J u ' w u Ill: ::l 0

"'

1-20

"' "' < z 2 1-u <

~I ' z 0 1-:::l 10

Ill: 1-

"' Q

"' z 2 1-u < ' "' !': 1-:::l 0 Ill:

1-z w ::l a w "' 10 ::l

"'

Ill: 1-

"' z

0..

"' Q

"' I) "' z

KISSINGER __ ...-..c:.::....:""'--SCOWCROFT ______ _

DAVIS

COLBY, W

SCHLESINGER, J

ST EX SEC

OTHER LOU NO FORN NOD IS

(37 EYES ONLY EXDIS

s CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

FOR HAK . .(0,,. FOR PRES

.( _____ _ REPLY FOR------------------

APPROPRIATE ACTION .I _____ _

MEMO•----- TO----.( ____ _

RECOMMENDATIONS .( _____ _

JOINT MEMO. .( ____ _

---------FOR: _______ -------

ANY ACTION NECESSARY?.

CONCURRENCE ...

(NBC-74-21)

533-147

.( _____ _ ,( _____ _

--·~~-~-----~·----~~-·- 4--~·c.~ -p~-~·-·--- ~~

l)'t()3~<:)'t Qti

WASHINGTON, D.C. Z0506


September 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF NSSM 209

SUBJECT: NSSM 209: Addition of Addressee

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, should be added as an addressee of NSSM 209 issued September 5, 1974.

M. Davis Staff Secretary

. I MIS<F;~~ DATA I ! DO I I ; ' ' t

... ~-x

AI r t'l"'\ 'l... 0 '

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 019150

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . . . Form

TITLE

CREATION DATE

VOLUME •

NSC Distribution Requirements: Profile & Record

.. 09/06/1974

. 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 039800389 COLLECTION TITLE •...••. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INSTITUTIONAL RECORDS BOX NUMBER . • • . 31 FOLDER TITLE . . . . • . . • . NSSM 209 - Future Uranium Enrichment in

the U.S. ( 2)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . • • . . 11/09/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

r---------------------------------------------~LOGU: __ ~~~~-----3~~~-NSC DISTHIBUTION REQUIREMENTS: PROFILE & RECORD DATE: 9/6}74

. . CABLE::;-;#-: ---'--~-----MEMO}LtTTER:SUBJLCT:~~-N~S_S_M~2~U~~9~·~:~A~a~'a~·i~.t~o~n~o~f~A~d~d~r~e~s~s=e~e~~~~~~~~~~-~-~------~--

~ \(NO DIS )

CLASSIFICATION: :.s S ,c,,1

LOU,AcABLESONLY: FROM: TO: I C i l t t P ------- ---:-;-~-------

INTERKAL DTSTBIDUTION:

__ SECRETARY KISSINGER __l___ GEN SCOWCROFT

1\.fAJ MCFAR;LANE MR JANKA MR FAZIO

10 MRS DAVIS MR BARNUM __ MISS FARRAR

1 MR LODAL MR HUBERMAN COL BOYERIE === CMDR HIGGINS - -____ ,....::::,__

MR LE.HlvLAN

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: Addresee

V!C:::E-PRFSJm:NT

SECRETARY~ QF STATE

DEPUTY SEC. OF STA':~E

-SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SEC. OF DEFENSE

CHAIRMAN, JCS

DIRECTOR, CIA

Exec. Director, CIEP

oom

1

1

1

1

MR ELLERMAN

MR OBER

MRS NIEHUSS

1 MR KENNEDY COL GRANGER MR_SMITH_

1 DR ELLIOTT

MR MOE __ MR LOW

.:·.·

-- ¥R HORAN-

Time Recipient

Admi1_1istrator, FEA 3400 1 · 12th and PA. Ave __;;::...__

~--MR CLIFT

MR FROEBE MRSOLOMON

--~R QUINN MR STEARMAN

.MR _SMYSER


REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . .

TITLE

CREATION DATE

VOLUME .


. National security restriction

. . Form


.. • 09/06/1974

. 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 039800389 COLLECTION TITLE .•..... U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INSTITUTIONAL RECORDS BOX NUMBER • FOLDER TITLE .

. 31 . . • NSSM 209 - Future Uranium Enrichment in

the U.S. ( 2)

DATE WITHDRAWN . • . . . . • • 11/09/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

~~~.-/~ /J.d. 11/ 'flo'l

,•

'

.. -------.~.: ....----------------------.LOG II: 3 )._

DATE:--~9ri/~6~/~7~4------NSC DISTH!BUTION REQUIREMENTS: PROFILE' & RECORD CABLE /#: ---MFMO/LETTER: SUBJECT: "N3SM 209: Additon of Addressee

fr \(NO DIS ) CLASSIFICATION: ~~:~ t, ~.. ~n>-i'OU_.tcABLFS ONLY: FROM: _______ TO:...:.·--------

INTE'Rr,·.·\L DTSTflinUTION:

SECRETARY KLSSINGE'R _l_ OEN SCOWCR OFT

MAJ MCFARLANE MR JANKA M.H FAZIO

10 MRS DAVIS MR BAR:<!UM . _ MISS FARRAR

- ------- -·

1 MR LODAL ~ MR HUBERMA"i~~ __ ~OL _BOVERIE _ CMDR HIGGINS.~ ..

' -- --·~-- - ·----" --

MR LEHMAN

EXTERNAL DISTRIDUTIO:'-J:

1

MR ELLERMAN

MR OBER

MRS NIEHUSS

MR KENNEDY ·COL GRAI;J'GER

MR SMITH ..

1 DR ELLIOTT

MR MOE __ MR LOW

--' MR HORAN .

Addresee {#Cys · Date Time Recipient

SECRETARY. Q.F STATE

DEPUTY SEC. OF STA":X:E

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


CHAIRMAN, JCS

DIRECTOR, CIA

Director, OMB~_..:_ Exec. Director, ClEF

1

1

1

1

1

1 Sec. of Tr·;;;ury Room

Attn: Gerald Nensel 4330 1 ec.· of Commerce

Rm. 5854 14th 8! Constitution 1

£~o~~~e01~~\~optg11cPre s.Rush I - ----

Chmn. AEC-ROOM 1154

1717HStreet

oom Admi.J:listrator, FEA 3400 1 12th and PA. Ave -----'==---

' I J

I

___ MR CLIFT

__ / MR FROFBE MR SOLOMON MR QUINN -." __ MR STEARMAN

.MR .SMYSER :..._ - .

----------



REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL .. National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . • . Form

3

TITLE NSC Distribution Requirements: Profile & Record

CREATION DATE . 09/06/1974

VOLUME • . 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 039800389 COLLECTION TITLE . • •.• U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

BOX NUMBER •. FOLDER TITLE .

INSTITUTIONAL RECORDS 31

. • . . NSSM 209 - Future Uranium Enrichment in the U.S. ( 2)

DATE WITHDRAWN . • . . • . 11/09/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST • . • . HJR

------------------------. LOG II: ),X.... DATE: -~911/'"f.' 6;'-:;/r-:7.,-;4r---"::...:...-- NSC DIST!:!l\i.JTION REQUIREMENTS: PROFILE & RECORD

MFMO/LE'TT£R: SUBJECT: NSSM 209: Additon of Addressee CABLE#: _____________ __

· /r \(NO DlS ) CLASSIFICAT10N: I~;~ r ,.~ ,• . ~n ~,OU )CABLES ONLY: FROM: _______ TO: ________ _

_ SECRETARY KISSINGER _l_ GEN SGOWCROFT

.MAJ MCFAR;LAN£ MR JA~K.A M.N FAZIO

10 MRS DAVIS __ MR DAR:-:UM _ ..

MISS FARRAR

. ' ~ -·----= __ .-:... .. -~ . 1 MR LODAL == MR HUBERMA"N~ _

COL BOVERIE

- CMDR HlGGINS - - .

-- ---· . -~--~- ...

MR LE!ThtAN

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: Addresee

SECRETARY_ O_F STATE

DEPUTY SEC. OF STA~E

.. SE'CRETAR Y OF DEFENSE .. ~

DEPUTY SEC. OF DEJtENSE

1 .

1

1

MR ELLERMAN

MR OBER ·

MRS NIEHUSS

MR KENNEDY COL GRANGER }.1:R SMITH.

1 DR ELLIOTT

MR MOE __ MR LOW

-·- MR HORAN ~ --- ___ ,.

·Recipient

CHAIRMAN. JCS ..!_

DIRECTOR, CIA 1

.porn Administrator, FEA 3400 1 12th a:nd PA. Ave _.....:::..-.-..

___ MR CLIFT

MR FROEBE MR SOLOMON

--~R QUINN MR STEARMAN

·.MR .SMYSER ·. -


REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . •

TITLE

CREATION DATE

VOLUME •


. . National security restriction

. . Form


... 09/06/1974

. 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 039800389 COLLECTION TITLE ..•...• U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INSTITUTIONAL RECORDS BOX NUMBER .• FOLDER TITLE . .

. 31

. NSSM 209 - Future Uranium Enrichment in the U.s. ( 2)

DATE WITHDRAWN • . . . . • 11/09/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . • • . HJR

,.

/ ~ . tt ·. ----··-------------------.LOG II: 3 / NSC O.:STI:IBUTI0:'-1 REQUIR.EMF.NTS: PROFILE 1.: RECORD DATE:·---,9~ft!?o77"'17.-,4r--...O::..+l;-

// ~~~~~--~~-----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CABLE I:

/~EMO/LETTER:SUUJ£CT:. ____ ~·N~S~S~~~2~0~97:~A~d~d~it~o~n~o~f~A~d~d~r~e~s~s~e~e~·------~----::::::::::::: ; I \( N 0 DIs . ) CLASSIF'ICATI.ON: ~~:~ t

1 ~ •' ;n ~OUttcABLES ONLY: FROM: _______ TO:. _______ _

INTF.Hi\:\i. fH.STn tn UTIO)i:

SECRETARY KISSI:-<GE'R _l_ G.EN SCOWCROFT

MAJ MCFARLANE - MRJANKA . - Ml< FAZIO

10 MRS DAVIS MR BAR:'-!UM . _ MISS FARRAR

- . . ":. -~---- --· ~~ ... -. ·- -- ..... - ...

1 MR LODAL -- MR HUBERMAN-- . ·-

COL BOVERIE === ~MDR HIGGINS._ •. < - ___ ... . ----· -

MR LEHMAN

SECRETARY~ O_F STATE

DEPUTY SEC. OF ST.A'J::E

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


CHAIRMAN. JCS

DIRECTOR, CIA

Director, O~v1B~ . ....:-Exec. Director, CIEP

Ad . . oorn

1

1

1

1

1

1

MR OBER

MRS NIEHUSS

MR KENNEDY ·COL GRA!;l.G~R

MR SMITH. __

DR ELLIOTT

MR MO~

_MR LOW

----.:. MR HORAN

Recipient

' ' I I -----

___ MR CLIFT

~ MR .FROE'BE MRSOLOMON MR QUINN.

-- MR STEARMAN

.. MR .SMYSER . - .... ----... -·.

~-----------------

-fiji ..

~&ill LC::N\

. .-.

tr'i-7¥ 01.~7 9-f.:;ll,l A!J,·.J~.1

mu.ustrator, FEA 3400 1 "'Z[h and PA. Ave -..:=.-

I NATION:4.L SECURITY COUNCIL


(;ONFIDENTI,_A..,:h/GDS September 5, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 209

TO: -

The Secretary of Defense The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Deputy Secretary of State The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Executive Director, Council on International Eco.nomic Folic}

SUBJECT: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity

The President has directed that the issues associated with a shift to private ownership of part of our future uranium enrichment capacity be reexamined. The study should consider but not be limited to the following:

What is the outlook for private sector assumption of the enrichment business with present and prospective technologies?

What are the prospects for adequate production resources being developed to meet the long-term projected increasing demand for uranium enrichment facilities ?

What governmental actions (and associated costs) would be required to facilitate private entry and to ensure future supply?

What would be the implications of private control of enrichment for U.S. foreign policy, trade and energy policies, domestic and international nuclear safeguards, and non-proliferation?

What are the costs and implications of the U.S. governmental commitments to worldwide supply, assurance of timely availability, and nondiscriminatory access? How can it be ensured that the private sector would meet and sustain such commitments, and what would be the foreign policy implications if these commitments were not met?

CONFIDENT lAb I GDS

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS z.

What are the prospects and implications (for example, for trade benefits and proliferation) if private activity were to result in business arrangements abroad through which enriching technology becomes subject to transfer, sale or licensing?

Can satisfactory oversight of private industry be established and adequate mechanisms developed to facilitate the planning and long-range actions necessary to maintain the appropriate U.S. stockpile of enriched uranium?

What are the organizational alternatives to private assumption of enriching services? (Each alternative should include discqssion of its legislative, cost, and budget implications, probable Congressional and utility reaction, and impact on the nuclear industry.)

Based on the above analysis and other relevant factors, the study should outline the policy options open to the President and their advantages and disadvantages.

This study should be carried out by an Ad Hoc Group comprised of representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. The study should be conducted on a close-hold basis. It should be forwarded to the President for his consideration no later than October 1, 1974.

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

-CONFIDENTIAL/GDS



REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL • . • . . Form

TITLE

CREATION DATE

VOLUME •


0 09/05/1974

. • 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID • 039800389 COLLECTION TITLE . . .•. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INSTITUTIONAL RECORDS BOX NUMBER • . • • • • . • 31 FOLDER TITLE . . . . . • . . • NSSM 209 - Future Uranium Enrichment in

the u.s. ( 2)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . • . . . . . 11/09/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

~~~-4U__.>p I~ 11/1/PI./

~--· ....... -.«~• -....:....------------:.:..;._-----------. LOG If: ;;;ru. NSC·DL'iTRU\U'l"ION REQUIREMENTS: PROF'[Lf.' Ft RECORD DATE: 9-5-74 ......., Y]

CABLE # :.,__,,..----,---=----){EMO/LETTER:SUBJECT: __ ~~~~~~~~~~o~rn~e~n~t~o~.~f~F~u~t~u~r~e~U~r~a~n~iu~rn~E~n~r~i~c~h~rn~e~n~t~C~a~~~

CLASSIFICATION: CONFTDENTIA L (CABLES ONLY: FROM: _______ TO: _________ _

INTERNAL D!.'iTfUlHJTfON:

SECRETARY KISSINGER 1 GEN SCOWCROFT

MAJ MCFARLANE MR JANKA MR FAZIO

_!Q_ MRS DAVIS MR BARNUM MISS FARRAR

·-·- ---=--- _.,. ..;.._

1 ·MR LODAL . - MR HUBER.MAN

COL BOVERIE -. j _ CMDR ~IGGL.'<'S :· l MR POWERS l- - .. --t-··--

1-MRLEHMAN

1 EXTERNAL DL'5TRIBUTIO':\':

Addresee

.! -~VICE-PRESIDENT

SECRETARY Q.F STATE

MR COOPER __:__-"MR BUSHNEL~

_MROBER 0 MR SAUNDERS MR QUANDT MR APPLEBAUM

1 MR KENNEDY LTC STUKEL.

- MR SMITH.

1 DR ELLIOTT MR GUHIN MRMOE

_MR LOW

__;__ MR HORAN .

Recipient

DEPUTY SEC. OF ~TA-:J;E 1 (;; s,.t {.. ~ 6'11

~.Es:nETARY OF DEFENSE _ --J,..._ 5 ¥ j.,:j}gt

j DEPUTY SEC. OF DEFENSE

,} CHAIRMAN, JCS

j DmECTOR, CIA

.. ; drninistrator, FEA 'Room 3400-12and PA.

J ______ _ .1

___ MR CLIFT

MR FROEBE MR'SOLOMON MR QUINN MR STEARMAN

_ . .MR SMYSER


Sept. 5, 1974

Col. Kennedy:

For your comments and/or concurrence prior to dispatch.

JWDavis

Jk

THE WHITE HOUSE

GONFIDE:lt~l'IA b/ GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

WASHINGTON

September 3, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER ROY L. ASH

JERRY H.~ Uranium X~ent

Your memoranda to the President on the above subject have been reviewed. Secretary Kissinger's recommendation -- that a study of policy issues relating to private ownership of our future uranium enrichment capacity be conducted in coordination with OMB and other interested agencies and departments --was approved provided the decision can be made within 60 days.

Please follow-up with the appropriate action.

Thank you.

Attachments

cc: Al Haig

. GOl'lFIDENl'I:A L/GDS )dtZ j() 17/0 t/

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE ACTION

GONPIDENTIAI:J/GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

WASHINGTON

X-3704

THE PRESIDENT

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Assumption of Uranium Enrichment by the Private Sector

With regard to Roy Ash's proposal concerning the movement of future enriched uranium production from the government into the private sector, I believe that a number of important questions must be addressed. These questions relate, for example, to the potential security and safeguard problems connected with the multiplication of domestic enrichment facilities outside direct government control, the foreign policy implications of altering our intergovernmental relationships and commitments in the nuclear fuel area, the increased risk of foreign nuclear weapon proliferation if private international trading in enrichment technology develops, the implication of possible radical new enrichment technology, and finally the possible impact on the surety of U.S. energy supply.

The countervailing issues are, of course, the budgetary implications of any new governmental construction and the desire to minimize direct government involvement in commerce. At this point, however, the private commitment is very tentative and there is a strong likelihood that government subsidy may have to be provided, at least during a transition phaseo

In light of the complexity of this issue and the considerable uncertainty that exists on it within the government and private sector, it would seem advisable to examine further the policy issues relating to private ownership of our future uranium enrichment capacity. The study would be very closely held so as not to disturb any discussions now underway.

With your approval, I will issue the study request at Tab A. The study will be conducted in coordination with OMB and other interested agencies and departments and forwarded for your consideration.

APPROVE

GONPIDENTIAI::./GDS Me /6/?/4 4

DISAPPROVE -----------------------

THE WHITE HOUSE.

ACTlO~ ~1E~IOR.t\NDl:M WASUINGTON LOG NO.:

Date: August 26~ 1974 . Time:

FOR ACTION: Brent Scowcroft cc (for information):

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

DUE: Date: Thursday, .August 29~ 1974 Time: 5:00p.m.

SUBJECT:

Zarb/.A sh memo (8/22/74) re: Endorsement of present policy to move responsibility for future uranium enrichment capacity to private industry

ACTION REQUESTED:

-- For Necessary Action X

For Your Recommendations

Prepare Agenda and Brie£ Draft Reply

X For Your Comments - - - Draft Remarks

REMARKS:

PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.

r£ yo!.l have any questions or i£ you anticipate a.

ftol• ... v ir. submitEr.g the :requhed material, please i~dephcno the Staff s~cretary immediately.

Jerry H. Jones Starr Secretary

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRES I DENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET


AUG 2 2 1974

MEl«lRANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

'11liiDUGH: R'oY~L AsH .... ~,- ..

"': FRANK G. ZARB

!7 Endorsement of~present policy to move responsibility

FROM:

SUBJECT: uranium enrichment capacity to private industry

for future

AEC's capacity to enrich uranium fuel for nuclear powerplants is now fully committed, and therefore AEC is no longer taking orders. In anticipation of this, the Government, beginning in 1971, took a strong public position that the enrichment of uranium need no longer be a Governmental function and that the responsibility for providing additional capacity for the 1980's and beyond can and should be undertaken by private industry.

Industry has responded seriously to this challenge (one firm is ready to take orders qs a basis for commitment to a $2.8 billion plant) but is encountering obstacles, as follows:

• Industry's terms and conditions for future supply do not appear to be as attractive as those now provided by AEC because industry must price its product to reflect real costs, and AEC has not been able to do this because of statutory limitations. Therefore the electric utility customers have so far been hesitant to buy the services nmv being offered; they appear to want to force the Government to build additional capacity.

• The utilities' posture is encouraged by the facts that some congressional attitudes on private entry range from apathy to opposition and that Craig Hosmer is advocating a Government corporation to operate the existing AEC plants and build new plants. Such a Government corporation would effectively terminate private interest and would probably perpetuate uranium enrichment as a Government function for decades to come. Such an outcome would have a severely adverse impact on the Federal budget, amounting to billions of dollars in this decade alone.

Despite the difficulties enumerated, AEC and we are persevering in our efforts to bring about private entry within the next 8-10 months. We are proceeding on the assumption that the course which we are now pursuing reflects your own views.

Agree ------ Disagree ------

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE 3704X

CO~lFIDENTII' .. L

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

WASHINGTON

August 29, 1974

JERRY JONES

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Comments on the Ash/Zarb Memo on Uranium Enrichment

Secretary Kissinger believes that important policy questions should be addressed prior to a decision on reaffirming USG policy to move uranium enrichment services to the private sector. He requests that the attached memorandum, proposing an interagency study on the issues involved, be forwarded to the President as a companion to the Ash memorandum.

Attachment

-CONFIDE~tTIAL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12953, SEC. 3.5

W~": f•"E~10. 11124i9S, STME Of:'i'l GIJ!i:lELif; ;;~; _ " .. Jd:tL , !: i /D/iJD!f

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL X-3704

60;p.(FIDENTIAL/ G DS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

August 28, 1974

GENERALSCOWCROFT

/""".,

DAVID ELLIOTT ~.

Raising the Issue of Private Uranium Enrichment

Roy Ash is seeking reconfirmation of Presidential approval to move future uranium enrichment production into the private sector. His memorandum to the President on this subject has been referred to you for comment (Tab B).

Since HAK wants this matter to be the subject of a NSSM, you can use the vehicle of an NSC reaction to this Ash memorandum to seek Presidential approval for such a study.

The memorandum from HAK to the Pr~sident at Tab L, along with the attached note to Jerry Jones, would p~t ~ur case for a study and, by implication, opposition to immediate approval of the Ash memorandum.

Dick Kennedy concurs. (Clint Granger for).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you request HAK' s signature to the Presidential memorandum at Tab 1.

-CONFIBENTIAL/GDS K/7<. /o/7fo~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIA£/GDS

National Security Study Memorandum

TO: The Secretary of Defense The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Deputy Secretary of State The Directci\r of Centra 1 Intelligence The Chairm~n, Atomic Energy Commission The Directot, Council on International Economic Policy

{

i ;

SUBJECT: Policy on th~ Development of Future Uranium Enrichment ~apacity

The President has directed tha~ the issues relating to the policy of private ownership of our future \uranium enrichment capacity be reexamined. The study should review but not be limited to the following questions:

What is the outlook for private sector assumption of the enrichment business with present: and prospective technologies?

What are the prospects for adequate resources being available to meet the long-term projected increasing demand for uranium enrichment facilities?

What governmental actions (~md associated costs) are necessary to facilitate private entry anU to ensure future supply?

~ What would be the implicatio~s of private control of enrichment

\

for U.S. foreign policy, trad~ and energy policies, domestic and international nuclear safelguards, non-proliferation, and other relevant objectives?

What are the costs and impliccitions of the U.S. governmental commitments to worldwide supply, assurance of timely availability, and nondiscriminatory a~cess? How can it be ensured that the private sector would m~et and enforce such commitments, and what would be the foreign p~licy implications if these commit.'-ments were not met? \

-GGNF-I-DENTI:A:t/ G DS Jdn.. It> 17/ o ~

!

CONFIDENTIAL/ G DS 2

What are the prospects and implications (for example, for trade benefits and proliferation problems) if private activity led to busihess deals abroad in which all enriching technology becomes subj t to transfer, sale, or licensing?

Can su ficient insights into private industry be obtained or adequat mechanisms be developed to allow the planning and long-ran e actions necessary to maintaining the appropriate U.S. stoc pile of enriched uranium?

What are th organizational alternatives to private assumption of enriching ervices? (Each alternative should include discussion of its legislat ve, cost, and budget implications, probable congres-sional and util reaction, and impact on the nuclear industry.)

Based on the above an lysis and other relevant factors, the study should outline the broad option open to the President and their advantages and disadvantages.

This study should be carri d out by an Ad Hoc Group comprised of representatives of the addr ssees and chaired by the representative of the Atomic Energy Commiss on. The fact of this study should be closely held. The study should be fo arded to the President for his consideration no later than October 1, 1974.

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce

enry A. Kissinger \

Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CO:NFIDENTIA::b/GDS

MEMORANDUM

G ONFIDENTIA L

FROM:

SUBJECT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

W ASHINGTON

JERRY JONES

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Comments on the Ash/ Zarb Memo on Uranium Enrichment

~~ ~v.J~J.c.l .. ,...,

~ ~1 ·Yus._c.,.! . ~~~

4- ""' ~ JJ .L ~

C OP.W IDENTL'\ L/ G DS * / lJ /7/() y

MEMORANDUM

C O~lFIDENTIAL/ G DS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

X-3704

THE PRESIDENT

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Assumption of Uranium Enrichment by the Private Sector

With regard to Ro Ash's proposal concerning the movement of future uranium enrichme production from the government into the private sector, I believ~ tha a number of important questions must be addressed. These questions relat , for example, to the potential security and safeguard problems conne ed with the multiplication of domestic enrichment facilities outside "res:t .e:overnment control, the foreign policy

I'J ..- r implications of altering r11 ge-v&-l'"nmental relationships and commit-ments in the nuclear fuel rea, the increased risk of foreign nuclear weapon proliferation if pri te international trading in enrichment technology develops, , and fin lly the possible impact on the surety of U.S. energy supply. l. ~ · ' .... ~ ~ ~~(...J...~

......., .... ~·· 1..111~ )

The countervailing issues are, course, et ry implications of any new governmental constru ion and the desire to minimize direct government involvement in comme ce. At this point, however, the private commitment is very tentativ and there is a strong likelihood i:trt.X of haYiAg to pPevide government subs dy at least during a transition phase. ·

In light of the complexity of this issue a~th\, ~!:.!i:i~inty that exists on it within the government an~ private sector, it would seem advisable to examine further the polil;y issues relating to private ownership of our future uranium enrichmene capacity. The study would be,closely held so as not to disturb any discussions now underway.

~ With your approval, I will issue the study request at Tab A. The study will be conducted in coordination with OMB and other interested agencies and departments and forwarded for your consideration.

APPROVE-------

GONFIDENTIA~/GDS

l<h'L /6/'1/ "If

MEMORANDUM

C QNFIDENTI:!d:./ G DS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

X-3704

THE PRESIDENT

HENRY A. KISSINGER

A\umption of Uranium Enrichment by tP.e Private Sector

\

With regard to Roy Ash's propQsal concerning the movement of future uranium enrichment productionfrom the government into the private sector, I believe that a number of important questions must be addressed. These questions relate, for exad;t.ple, to the potential security and safeguard problems connected with the multiplication of domestic enrichment facilities outside direct government control, the foreign policy implications of altering our governmental relationships and commitments in the nuclear fuel area, the. increased risk of foreign nuclear weapon pro life ration if private inte~national trading in enrichment technology develops, and finally the possible impact on the surety of U.S. energy supply. '

The countervailing issues are, of course, the budgetary implications of any new governmental construction and the desire to minimize direct government involvement in commerce.' At this point, however, the private commitment is very tentative al\d there is a strong likelihood of having to provide government subsidy\at least during a transition phase.

'

In light of the complexity of this issue and the considerable uncertainty that exists on it within the government and private sector, it would seem advisable to examine further the policy issues relating to private ownership of our future uranium enrichment capacity. The study would be closely held so as not to disturb any disC'U,ssions now underway.

With your approval, I will issue the study request at Tab A. The study will be conducted in coordination with OMB and other interested agencies and departments and forwarded for your consideration.

APPROVE-------

-GONPIDENTIAL/ G DS ~ /tl/7/t>Lf


--G ONFIDENTIA 1:../ G DS

TO: The Secretary of Defense The Director, Office of Management and Budget The Deputy Secretary of State The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity

O"S"fOC~·~-:~C/' to, t4 0 J~ tc The President has d , r_e0c~ed that the issue~ :ttebtiag te Ule policy of private ownership -b~ ur futuA:._~ium enrichment capacity be reexamined. The . study hould ~~but not be limited to . the following$ 't\1 e ::d:iults-;

What is the outlook r private sector assumption of the enrichsent and prospective technologies?

- tfa, O~t.,Cp I What are the prospects r adequatefll"esources being availa'BM to meet the long-term pr · ected increasing demand for uranium enrichment facilities?

What governmental actions to facilitate private entry and

v lql b e ""r-;,.uo· <

d associated costs) CH"e aeee a:ry ensure future supply?

What would be the implications o private control of enrichment for U.S. foreign policy, trade and ne;gy policies, domestic and international nuclear safeguard . non-proliferation; -i'Ad Maer rel e,'agt obj ecti ''~

What are the costs and implications oft e U.S. governmental commitments to worldwide supply, assu~nce of timely availability, and nondiscriminatory access? Jlo\r can it be ensured that the private sector would meet and 1~Bfo-~:such commitments~ and what would be the foreign policy implicatlpns if these commit;ments were not met?

.CONFIDENTIAI:/GDS

;Jrl_ I f)!?/"~

I

0 ~·

CO~WiDEN~~/GDS 2

I '?

Can s . . -int-e pi ivate-iadE by o6tallied H . adequate mec anisms -6e developed to L-, ' 'the planning and long-range act ns necessary to maintaint&g the appropriate U.S. stockpile enriched uranium?

What are the orga izational alternatives to private assumption of enriching servic s? (Each alternative should include discussion of its legislative, co t, and budget implications, probable congressional and utility rea tion, and impact on the nuclear industry.)

Based on the above ,analysis outline the~ea~pt~ns open disadvantages.

d other relevant factors, the study should o the President and their advantages and

Q

This study should be carried out y an Ad Hoc Group comprised of representatives of the addressees and chaired by the representative of fyrl

c c,..,c:Ft-t( 0 the Atomic Energy Commission. he faet of thte study should be Glose .,

"iteM. The ~ should be forwarde to the President for his consideration no later than October 1, 1974.

cc: . The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce

Henry A. Kissinger

Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAI:::/GDS

2

What ar the prospects and implications (for example, for efits and proliferation) if private activity were to

result in usiness arrangements abroad through which enriching echnology becomes subject to transfer, sale, or licensing?

ry oversight of private industry be established and adequate echanisms developed to facilitate the planning and long-range ctions necessary to maintain the appropriate U.S. stockpile o enriched uranium?

What are the organ zational alternatives to private assumption of enriching service ? (Each alternative should include discussion of its legi ative, cost, and budget implications, probable congressiona and utility reaction, and impact on the nuclear industry. )

Based on the above analysis and ther relevant factors, the study should outline the policy options open to e President and their advantages and disadvantages.

This study should be carried out by a Ad Hoc Group comprised of representatives of the addressees .• and aired by the representative of

/f.

the Atomic Energy Commission. ·. The st dy should be conducted on a close-hold basis. It should be forwarded o the President for his consideration no later than October 1, 1974.

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce Counsellor to the President for Economic Polic The Administrator, Federal Energy Administrati The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL /GDS

\

r ,

INITIAL ACTION 0

~SC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

... ::1! Cl

"' -c(

:z: 2 ... u -c(

"' :z: 2 ... u ~ Cl :=!': ... ::I 0 Ill: ... :z: w ::I a w "' Ill ::I

"'

II.

"' Q

... u ... :z:

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

TO: PRES UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

NO FORN NODIS

EYES ONLY EXDIS

MEMO FOR HAK • .( _____ _

MEMO FOR PRES .( _____ _

REPLy FOR------------------

APPROPRIATE ACTION

'----TO----

RECOMMENDATIONS .( _____ _

JOINT MEMO. .( _____ _

-------FOR: ______ ------

ANY ACTION NECESSARY?. .( _____ _

CONCURRENCE.

COMMENTS~ {INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

DISPATCH ---------------------------::::--======--::-~""------t: C Y RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____________ .._,...L.:.._ ____________ :::...,.....3'r----l

NOT IF Y ----------- & DATE --------,.,-L----

(NBC-74-21)

533-147

HP 0 EP

MEMORANDUM


60NFIDE:~TTIA E./ G DS

NOTE FOR:

FROM:

BUD McFARLANE

MICHAEL GUHIN 'f)

August 12, 1974

I have revised the proposed memorandum to Roy Ash (Tab A) along the lines you suggested. Also, rather than forward to Ash an attachment discussing some of the questions which should be addressed, I have simply extracted a few basic questions from Elliott's attachment and incorporated them into the letter.

Please let me know if you have any further problems.

--CONFIBENTIA I:../ G DS

.I<:ITL /0/7 I 0 'I

>

•

..

•

•

j

\

THE WHITE HousE WA.SHINCITON

Augus t 10, 1974

Jeanne Davis

Could we go back to the boards on this one?

.1,.

hanks

Bud

-· .

' ,

... ·- .

.,

.MEMORANDUM Action


€0~tFIDe?iTIAL August 9, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERALSCOWCROFT

FROM:

SUBJECT:

DAVID ELLIOTT


3349

Attached is a package which has been prepared to facilitate HAK1 s intervention in the question of private assumption of the provision of uranium enrichment services. It lays out the valid reasons for NSC concern. If you can suggest other reasons as well, they should be incorporated.

This approach is consistent with the views Dick Kennedy expressed to you before.

If you wish, this matter can be raised with the OMB staff to help set the stage for rece~pt of the HAK to Ash memorandum.

CONFIDE~JTIAL/GDS

~ /ti/'7/0 ~

l !

I I

i i

MEMORANDUM


60~{ FIDE~~ 'l'IA L

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

August 8, 1974

SECRETARY KISSIN"GER

DAVID D. · ELLIOTT ~ . f.


As you directed, I have developed a proposal for reopening the question of the advisability of moving uranium enrichment into the private sector.

Because this policy relates in larger part to domestic rather than foreign policy, and to the budget, it will be necessary to reach an accommodation with OMB as to the nature and scope of any study. The memorandum to Roy Ash at Tab A would set forth your concerns regarding our present policy and your reasons why a reexamination of this policy is in order.

If OMB is willing to work with us, we should be able jointly to flesh out an appropriate study directive.

Dick Kennedy concurs~ .,

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Roy Ash at Tab A.

JJ. ;:f . /(,

~ CONFID:eiTih-r./GDS Hre- /~/7/6 y

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

60PtFIDEP1'TI~x G DS

\ \

MEMORANDUM F R

E DIRECTOR FICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: mption of Uranium Enrichment e Private Sector

\ There have been serious estions in my mind for some time over the concept of moving uranium enrichment into the private sector. My concerns relate to the secu •ty and safeguard problems associated with the proliferation of dom stic enrichment facilities outside direct government control, the forei n policy implications of altering our governmental relationships an commitments, the increased foreign proliferation risk associated wi private international trading in enrichment technology, and final y the impact on the surety of U.S. energy supply.

The countervailing issues are, of c urse, the budgetary implications of new governmental construction an the desire to minimize direct government involvement in commerc • At this point, however, the private commitment is very tentative nd there is a strong likelihood of having to provide government subsid at least during a transition phase.

In light of the complexity of this issue an the considerable uncertainty that exists on it within the government an private sector, it would seem advisable to me that we jointly seek Presi ntial approval for a study of the issues relating to private ownership of ur uranium enrichment capacity. The study should be closely held as not to disturb any discussions now underway.

Some of the basic questions ddres sed in the study are:

Would U.S. foreign policy, nuclear safegu rds, and non-proliferation objectives be better served by public or pri ate control of enrichment?

How can we ensure that the private sector wo ld meet and enforce the U.S. governmental commitments to world ide supply, assurance

· C ONF IDENTIA I:/ GDS ;.:he 111/t/t:J'f

~8~EN~/GDS 2

of timely avail ility, and nondiscriminatory access? What would be the fore· n policy implications if these commitments were not met by th private sector?

Would private activity evitably lead to business deals abroad in which laser enriching echnology is transferred, sold, or licensed, thereby speedin the advent of a global proliferation problem?

\ Can sufficient insights into pr\va. te industry be obtained to allow the planning and long-range acbf..ons necessary to maintaining the appropriate stockpile of enn\hed uranium?

These and other questions merit further\xamination. With your concurrence, our staffs could develop a statement of th<\terms of reference for a study which is mutually agreeable. \

.,. \ \ \\ ..

Henry A. Kissinger

CONFIDENTIAL/CDS

.. 4+ INITIAL. ACTION 0

SC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

:z 0 ... a.. Ill: u .,. w 0 ;;, .,. < ..I u " 11.1 u Ill: :::)

0 .,.

1-::E Cl .,. < :z ~ ... u <

TO: PRES

KISSINGER------

SCOWC ROFT_....Jf.><=~--DAVIS

FROM: KISSINGER, H

COL.BY, W

SC HL. ESI NG ER, J

ST EX SEC

s/s ______________ __

OTHER---------

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK •

MEMO FOR PRES

CIRCL.E AS APPROPRIATE

UNC L.AS L.OG IN/OUT

L.OU NO FORN NOD IS

~ EYES ONL.Y EX DIS

s CODEWORD

TS SENSITIVE

.( ____ _ ·<---------

REPL. Y FOR-----------------

APPROPRIATE ACTION ·'-------MEMO•---- TO---- ··--------RECOMMENDATIONS

.( ____ _ JOINT MEMO. ·'------REFER TO _________ FOR: ____________ -------

ANY ACTION NECESSARY?.

CONCURRENCE.

DUE DATE:

COMMENIS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

DISPATCH ---------------------------------------------li C Y RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PL. US: -----------------------------------1 NOT I FY ___________ & OAT E ----------- B Y----------------t

.( _____ _

.( ____ _

e; SPECIAL. Q

(NBC-74-21)

533-147

\

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. ZOSOG

-GONFID~i'PIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT:

October 15, 1974

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY


In response to your request, Secretary Kis-singer has asked me to advise you that your representative will be added to the Ad Hoc Group studying the development of future uranium enrichment capacity {NSS!\1 1..09). Cha.;.LnJ.a:n R:::,y' s offi~f'> will contact your representative, Mr. Tosiui, directly.

CON:FIDENTJ.f>s:_:f_, -(GDS) /<h2._ /0/7/ 0~ -

'"n f;nA .~ ~ \J v V b:::JiJ V..). Jeanne W. Da~is Staff Secretary

dispatched 10/15/74 ccd

CONFIDEt'iTIAf:r

MEMORANDUM FOE.

SUBJECT:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D,C. 20506

October 15, 1974


Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity (N.SSM 209)

Secretary Kissinger requests that a representative of the Secretary of Treasury bt: added tc y01.n· Ad Hoc Group considering the development of future ur·anium enrichment capacity (NSSM 209). Secret;.~ ''Y Simon has indicated that his representative will be Peter Tosini, Office of Energy Economics, who can be reached at 964-5808.

dispatched 10/15/74 ccd

CONFIDl!:NTLAb (GDS) )::he_ ./0(7/ 0£/

i ' . '

i ,,

4432

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE Washington, D.C. 20230

·~GONFIDEN'F±Ah-

SE? 2 1 1.971 .

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

Subject: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity (NSSM 209)

This is in response to your September 5 memorandum wherein you outlined the President's request for a reexamination of the issues associated with a shift to private ownership of part of our future uranium enrichment capacity.

You suggested that this study should be carried out by an Ad Hoc Group composed of representatives of the addressees of your memorandum and the National Security Council staff and chaired by the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. We would like to add the Department of Commerce to this list for the following reasons:

Involvement by the private (commercial) sector in this enterprise as a supplier of enriched uranium. foreign and domestic, is clearly in

. the area of interest to the Department.

Export licensing. balance of trade .. patent affairs, energy policies and adequate production resources are of principal concern to the Department.

Accordingly, we would appreciate being represented in this or any such Ad Hoc Group formed to outline the Presidential policy options in this area. My representative would be Ernest Loeb, Office of Energy Programs. Bureau of Hesources and Trade Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, \ho can be reached at 967-5585. • ·

vxj~;,_'f-Secretary of Commerce

.. .()G'NFIDENTJAh

Sc

. MEMORANDUM ACTION - 4432


-ti eN PID E~JTIA b

MEAt10RANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

September 30, 1974

JEANNE DAVIS

DAVID ELLIOTT );). Z:.


I have checked with AEC and they have no objection to Commerce joining the NSSM 209 study activity. I don't see any disadvantages either. We can handle this expeditiously if you would sign the two memorandums attached. /) Ci / ;·· Y. t.' {..:t?L.C~•·'-U ;-.G.i.. )2f..<'(.tc--.· ,£<-'? .... ;-:~'4

Attachments - 2 1. Proposed Memo for the

Chairman, AEC z. Proposed Memo for the

Secretary of· Commerce

· CONFIDENTIAL

(.I )i.i\

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECUB.l'l'Y COUNCIL

/ /

MEMORANDUM F~ JEANNE DAVIS \LUl..AA- 0,._ ~

FROM: / DAVID ELLIOTT <id ~ . lJJ..AJ 1

SUBJECY NSSM 209 Study

Our ~M 209 has proven to be more popular than popped Treasury has asked the AEC if it might participate in the udy. Treasury has an Energy Office and a small but well informed staff. If you have no objections (I don't) perhaps you can direct notes to the Chairman, AEC, and to the Secretary of the Treasury requesting that Treasury be included in the Ad Hoc Group conducting the NSSM 209 study.

J

,C"" . .....,


October 8, 1974

Mrs. Davis:

Mr. Nensel of Treasury called with the name of the Treasury representative to the Ad Hoc Group conducting the NSSM 209 study -- Mr. Peter Tosini.

Also, he wanted to remind you of his request to obtain copies of NSSM 207 and NSDM 270 both regarding Israeli Assistance.

Attachments

eddy

Jp


· ..-SeN FIB Eti'l'IA L September 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR


. SUBJECT: Policy on the Development of Future Uranium

Enrichment Capacity (NSSM 209)

Secretary Kissinger requests that a representative of the Secretary of Commerce be added to your Ad Hoc Group considering the development of future uranium enrichment capacity (NSSM 209). Secretary Dent has indicated that his representative will be Ernest Loeb, Office of Energy Programs, Bureau of Resources and Trade Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic and International Business, who can be reached at 967-5585.

>90PiF:I:SE'H'FIAL - GDS kk_ I t>/7/ () </

JSIGNED) JEANNE W ... DAV\S

Jeanne W. Davis Staff Secretary

I (

_:;g } ~,' ' f l

~l : 'J

I -1

H 1

i f I :J ' ~ ~ t

.(

' ! (

l

j f f ·{ !

t~

:I ·t

I !f ~~ ;5

! ') tt

'i ~:

:J '1

l

l j

l ·~ r

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506

·September 30, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUBJECT:

·THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

Policy on the Development of Future Ur~nium Enrichment Capacity (NSSM 209)

In response to your memorandum of September 21, Secretary Kissinger has asked me to advise you that your representative will be added to the Ad Hoc Group studying the development of future uranium enrichment capacity (NSSM 209). Chairman Ray's office will contact your representative, Mr. Loeb, directly.

~l EJiliH!S:HTIA L - GDS .k),z_ I() /7 I 0 'I

JSIGNED) JEANNE W. DAVIS

Jeanne W. Davis Staff Secretary

--J;

. --DOC RECD LOG NBR INITIAL ACTION 0 ,.

NSC C6RRE~N.D.ENCE PROFILE MOj_DA ~OIDA I~ ,,'~ -IJ'I~

:z !:! .... II. -a: u "' w Q .......

"' "' <( ..J u ....... w u a: :) 0

"'

.... :::E C)

"' <(

:z !:! .... u <(

~I ....... :z !:! .... :)

!!! a: .... "' Q

"' :z !:! .... u <( ....... C)

~ .... :)

0 a: .... :z w :)

0 w "' al :)

"'

a: .... "' ~ II.

"' 0

"' tJ "' :z

·- 1//lri /~/;.( 1/~ --r Dlv1..5 REFERENCE: CIRCLE A" ~elATE

TO;~ -- UNCL~G IN/.;~ FROM: KISSINGER, H S/S

KISSINGER COLBY, W OTHER LOU •v v NOD IS

t(D SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J EYES ONLY EX DIS

~ ktii'E!r ST EX SEC s CODEWORD

SUB.JECT ~~ -zt--d2/ /2~ ~~ 1:.J;;.. SENSITIVE

1'1 M/~..,~-....., ~/ L.f" ..... -

7fJ- # _i-.s .J? ~ ~ d:/ -:.L:rJ //:A. I M(J_ ../ . () , .._

I INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

REC ACTION REQUIRED

:JiiiliNFO CY

ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROF FOP MEMO FOR HAK ••• , , •• , • , , •.• , , , •.• , , , ( )

MEMO FOR PRES •...••.•••••••• , •••. , • ( ) STAFF SECRETARY

FAR EAST REPLY FOR ( )

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA APPROPRIATE ACTION ....•.• , .•.. , . , , , . ( )

MID EAST I NO- AFRICA/ SO. ASIA MEMO TO ............... ( )

EUROPE I CANADA RECOMMENDATIONS ..................•. ( )

LATIN AMERICA JOINT MEMO .......................... ( )

UNITED NATIONS REFER TO FOR: ( )

ECONOMIC / ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ............•.•. ( )

SCIENTIFIC ~ 1/ CONCURRENCE .......•.......... , , ... , ( )

PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE:

NSC PLANNING ]><..., COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

CONGRESSIONAL • OCEANS POLICY

IN 'ELLIGENCE

DATE/ FROM TO s SUBSEQUE~ ACTION RE,'31JIRED (OR TAKEN): ....., CY !;..q

@~~ --- c., /~ AJ~b ~~""";;) ~~ ~J,/t: I u ,..,..

1:./ )

~ ~ 001

~) -c ~

~ ,., "' ~ /~ / /.s./"'7~ 'Jb ~ ~ <A'" ..I UJ#t' DISPATCH

CY RQMTS: SEE ABbVE P(US: 17 -· MICROFILM 8< FILE RQMTS:

NOTIFY 8< DATE BY M/F'D BY

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: I ,.._ ....

::~N IJ 7 19~~ SA0

CROSS REF W/ HP

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X FOLDER: CLOSE fl/1.) WH EP

r~

( N B C-74-21)

533-147

PA DY

-·

-

I.NSC DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS: PROFILE & RECORD I~~~;:· 9-5-74 /_ f' -- CABLE......:z...I#:.:;..;.J...=.-L.::;L_------<1:'1 I.

MEMO/LETTER: SUBJECT:· ~~}Jf ~B9the Deyelopment of Future Uranium Enrichment Capacity L ~C~LAS;;;~S~IF~IC~A~T~IO~N~·~: ~C~O~~NF~T~D~E~N~T~T~A~L~~(~C~A~B~L~~ES~O~N~L~Y~: ~F~R~O~M~:~;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-;-~T~O~:;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;:: f.

INTERNAL DISTRII3UTION:

SECRETARY KISSINGER 1 GEN SCOWCROFT

MAJ MCFAR;LANE MR JANKA M.R FAZIO

_!Q. MRS DAVIS MR BARNUM MISS FARRAR

·--- ----~----~

__j_ · MR LODAL --~MR HUBERMAN

__ COL BOVERIE CMDR HIGGINS _ MR POWERS

MR LEHMAN

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTIO);: Addr.esee

VICE -PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OF STATE

MR COOPER

___:___:·~ BUSHNEL~

_MROBER 0 MR SAUNDERS MR QUANDT MR APPLEBAUM

1 MR KENNEDY LTC STUKEL .. MR SMITH

1 DR ELLIOTT MR GUHIN MR MOE

__ MR LOW

-- MR HORAN

#Cys Date Time Recipient

DEPUTY SEC. OF STA~E 1

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE _ --l-


CHAIRMAN, JCS

DIRECTOR, CIA

OMB

Counsellor to Pres for

Economic Policy Rush

Chairman, AEC

-L-

1

1

1

___ MR CLIFT

MR FROEBE MR SOLOMON MR QUINN MR STEARMAN

.MR SMYSER

1717 H Street, Rm 1154 "' --------~~~------4 __ .h .... ' 4 ! I I ~; "" ___ ._··_. 7_· -----------·-----

dministrator, FEA Room 3400-12and PA, Aye.

:;irector, ACDA

l ~ .

0~

~5~ MEMORANDUM IN"FORMATION- 3001


May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERALSGOWGROFT

FROM: DAVID ELLIOTT

SUBJECT: Uranium Enrichment and UEA

I am told that Jim Lynn may be calling you on the above topic to solicit your support for having ERDA negotiate the government support package with UEA. He will probably indicate that (1) it is OMB' s expectation that this can be done in two to three weeks, and (2) it is important for the President to have this information before making the decision whether or not to propose such a support package to Congress or, alternatively, to seek Congressional authorization for the government to build the next enrichment plant. Below are some talking points you may want to use with Lynn:

This issue has dragged on much longer than it should have and we are costing ourselves in terms of international nuclear leadership as well as nuclear sales.

The State Department believes it would be very valuable for the U.S. to be able to clarify its position vis-a-vis uranium enrichment by the time of the IEA ministerial meeting (May 27).

The time for negotiation might well be months rather than weeks. We could not realistically expect to get a final position from UEA until we have some idea of where the threshold lies for obtaining Administration and Congressional approval. (I. e., what limit is acceptable to us for the Government liability for UEA' s cost overruns, or how far are we willing to go in paying off UEA in case of "economic frustration11 of the project.) It would take weeks for the Administration to establish its own position before meaningful negotiations could start with UEA. If, on the other hand, we simply ask UEA for its bottom line, ERDA says we should expect to get generalities in response.

Bob Seamans has pretty thoroughly evaluated the UEA request and is ready now to propose to the President that we move ahead with a government plant. He does not think it would be useful to try to negotiate the support package with UEA because the basic issues are

,..

2

understood and tuning the matter will not change the fundamentals. He would, of course, conduct such negotiations if directed by the President. However, inasmuch as UEA is not the only company with which we are dealing in this area, trying to accommodate UEA through negotiation will just underscore to Congress the chosen instrument character of this company, and will probably guarantee Congressional disapproval.

Bob Seaman's proposal to build a gaseous diffusion add-on at Portsmouth, while opening the way for private entry using the new centrifuge technology, makes good technical as well as good public policy sense.

The UEA proposition will be next to impossible to sell on the Hill because the deal looks like a risk-free monopoly propped up with Government supports, with no major commitment by the entrepeneur (6% equity investment), and little domestic support (hence the need to get 60% foreign investment).

... 1.6 .. ·~ . .. - - DOC RECD LOG NBR INITIAL ACTION 0 ~

~SC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE .W.ll2A. .M~ I !a..l tjFI, ?S?J:kJ/ I""' ,-...., 1 ........ 1~ 1/~ . ~

,., :z: REFERENCE: CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

0 ~LAS~G IN/OUT TO: PRES FROM: :l:£! ~ 5/S ... 11. KISSINGER COLBY, W OTHER LOU NO FORN NOD IS a: ;c u SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER, J c EYES ONLY EXDIS VI w DAVIS ST EX SEC s CODEWORD Q

' TS SENSITIVE VI

~~4J: £_A_ 4' VI

..,/"-- L..-_ <

VE~ .J u !SUBJECT

' ~ ' w u a: :::> 0 VI

IN"ERNA RC ITING AND DISTRIS IT!ON ACTION REQUIRED Jiiit INFO

REC CY

ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT FOR MEMO FOR HAK .. , , •... , ..••..•• , .. , , . ( )

... STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES .. , , • , •.• , ••••••.•• , •. l ) 2:

C) FAR EAST

REPLY FOR ( ) VI < :z: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA APPROPRIATE ACTION .•••.••••.••...••. l )

2 MID EAST I NO. AFRICA I SO. ASIA MEMO TO ............... ( ) ...

u EUROPE I CANADA RECOMMENDATIONS ..•.......•••...•..• ( ) <

~I LATIN AMERICA JOINT MEMO •••..•.•..••....•.•••.•••. ( )

-~ UNITED NATIONS REFER TO FOR: l )

ECONOMIC ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ••••.••••.•••.•• l )

' :z: SCIENTIFIC CONCURRENCE ..•••.•.•........•.•... ,( ) 2 ... PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE:

:::> !!! NSC PLANNING a: COMMENTS: (INCLUO[NG SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) ... CONGRESSIONAL ~ c OCEANS POLICY

INTEL! IG

DATE FROM TO 5 SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED lOR TAKEN): CY TO

l57'e-- {[J(_ Q..,_L -,; ,_ Lt: L ~ ' - ~~

VI u-zit I}{Jt?-/;} ¥fls4c/ iJ&d l't"'"AA# :z: 2 / (,/ ... u < ' C)

!: ... :::> 0 a: ... :z: w :::> 0 __._ w /;'""TV ~4~\ VI Ill :::> Ill r...,

\; \: . '-;)

' / -a: DISPATCH ~ ... Ill

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: lj !: NOTIFY S. DATE BY M/F'D BY

11. SPECIAL DISPOSITION: - I VI

i5 CRT ID: SA c.;;; VI CROSS REF W/ OPEN HP

ll SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: y-·

FOLDER: CLOSE WH EP

"' :z: /' PA DY ?"

7· { NBC-74-21 ( 533-147 )


September 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECIPIENTS OF NSSM 209

SUBJECT: NSSM 209: Addition of Addressee

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, should be added as an addressee of NSSM 209 issued September 5, 1974.

M. Davis Staff Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506

60NFIDENTI1rl:./GDS Septe~ber 5, 1974

National Security Study Me~orand~ 209 -TO: The Secretary of Defense

The Director, Office of Manage~ent and Budget The Deputy Secretary of State The Director of Central Intelligence The Chair~an, Ato~ic Energy Co~~is sion The Executive Director, Council on International Eco.no~ic Polic

SUBJECT: Policy on the Develop~ent of Future Urani~ Enrichment Capacity

The President has directed that the issues associated with a shift to private ownership of part of our future urani~ enrichment capacity be reexa~ined. The study should consider but not be limited to the following:

What is the outlook for private sector ass~ption of the enrich~ent business with present and prospective technologies?

What are the prospects for adequate production resources being developed to ~eet the long-ter~ projected increasing de~and for urani~ enrichment facilities?

What governmental actions (and associated costs) would be required to facilitate private entry and to ensure future supply?

What would be the implications of private control of enrichment for U.S. foreign policy, trade and energy policies, do~estic and inte--rnational n~clear safeguards, and non-proliferation? ..

~ .

What are the costs and i~plications of the U.S. governmental co~i~ents to worldwide supply, assurance of ti~ely availability, and nondiscri~inatory access? How can it be ensured that the private sector would ~eet and sustain such co~~it~ents, and what would be the foreign policy implications if these co~~it~ents were not ~et?

DECLASSIFIED

GONFIDEN':FIAl::. /GDS AUTHORITY Nsc ~~--&pni; 5~::1._9~ B'v' lk NLF, DATE 1"/z/t~i

l

i ..j ! !

l

I ~ l

-GONFID:S:N'TIA::b/ GDS 2

What are the prospects and implications (for example, for trade benefits and proliferation) if private activity were to result in business arrangements abroad through which enriching technology becomes subject to transfer, sale or licensing?

Can satisfactory oversight of private industry be established and adequate mechanisms developed to facilitate the planning and long-range actions necessary to maintain the appropriate U.S. stockpile of enriched uranium?

What are the organizational alternatives to private assumption of enriching services? (Each alternative should include discussion of its legislative, cost, and budget implications, probable Congressional and utility reaction, and impact on the nuclear industry.)

Based on the above analysis and other relevant factors, the study should outline the policy options open to the President and their advantages and disadvantages.

This study should be carried out by an Ad Hoc Group comprised of representatives of the addressees and the NSC staff and chaired by the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. The study should be conducted on a close-hold basis. It should be forwarded to the President for his consideration no later than October 1, 1974.

cc:

' '

The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce Counsellor to the President for Economic Policy The Administrator, Federal Energy Administration The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASS!FIED

CONFIDE'NT!:AL/ GDS AUTHORITY Nsc.JJA4..~~ .5/.stjJ?

BY ;_Ia__ NLF, DATE /..£L'ZL£:i.

nssm 209 - future uranium enrichment in the u.s. (2) · enrichment capacity (nssm 209) in response...

Documents