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NO. 137

JULY/AUGUST 1999

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementBrigadier A.S. D’Hagé, AM, MC (Chairman)Captain J.V.P. Goldrick, RANLieutenant Colonel N.F. JamesGroup Captain J.M. KennedyMs K. Griffith

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© Commonwealth of Australia 1999ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 1999

No. 137 July/August 1999

Managing EditorMichael P. Tracey

EditorIrene M. Coombes

Printed in Australia by National CapitalPrinting, Fyshwick, ACT 2609

Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the informationcontained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts noresponsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readilygiven by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Anyreproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and should notbe construed as official opinion or policy.

Contents

3. Letters to the Editor

5. Re-Thinking the Psychological Contract BetweenArmy and its PeopleMajor David Schmidtchen, AA PSYCH

9. The Cambodian Genocide: Causes and AftermathMajor M.J. Dugdale, RA Sigs

19. Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADFLieutenant Colonel C.W. Orme, Major J. Thomas and CaptainD. Graham

25. Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of DeterrenceWing Commander Premchand Kainikara, Indian Air Force (Rtd.)

31. Selective Conscientious Objection and the AustralianDefence ForceLieutenant Colonel Ian Wing, Aust Int

41. Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking?Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Victoria Police

47. Enforcement of International Humanitarian LawMajor B. Worswick, AALC

57. Leadership Development: a case of teaching individualsto juggle complexityE.J. Stevenson, Department of Defence

65. Book Reviews

Front CoverTank Exercise

Photograph by Sergeant Bill Guthrie, RAAF

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Letters to the Editor

Allocation and RetentionDear Editor

I was interested to read Major Goyne’ssuggestions (“Allocation and Retention in the ARA”,Issue 134) for addressing the retention problem in theArms Corps. As I have plenty of anecdotal evidenceto support her thesis, from my civilian job as anadviser to military personnel exiting the forces, I maybe able to shed some further light on the discussion.

Goyne suggests that payment of a retention bonuscould be one solution, but also points out that mostmonetary incentive schemes tend not to achieve thedesired result. However, that does not mean to saythat an incentive of some kindis inappropriate.Therefore, before discarding the incentive schemeconcept altogether, it would be appropriate to ask“What incentive (if any) would induce a member tostay?”.

Examining the reasons for people leaving shouldyield some clues. Goyne has already identified thatthe most common complaint of Lieutenant Collins’infantrymen was their lack of qualification for furtheremployment on discharge. More telling, I suspect, isthe explanation an Infantry captain gave me for hisreluctant decision to leave the Army. His desire tocontribute to the intellectual capital of the ADF byfurther study was continually being thwarted byoperational demands. He (and the ADF!) had alreadypaid for and withdrawn from two units because ofwork requirements. He wanted to progress; ADFpolicy indicates that they wanted him to progress, buthis immediate superiors were just not giving him thetime.

Money is not the issue. A more effective incentivethan money could be more time or more opportunitiesfor increasing the knowledge edge that is supposed tobe the hallmark of the ADF in the 21stcentury.

This brings us to Goyne’s third option, to makeinitial service in the Combat Arms compulsory. Thisoption may well be worth considering as a solution tothe problem of our non-Arms Corps personnel beinginadequately prepared for our more likely operationalemployment as UN peace keepers. However, as ameans of improving retention it does have its dangers,as Goyne herself observes of the Canadianexperience.

This third option is based on the assumption thatthe problem lies in recruits not appreciating theexcitement of being a soldier; however, earlier

sections of the article indicate that the problem doesnot lie in the initial experiences of a recruit at all.When lack of excitement and action in a peacetimeArmy is given as the third most likely reason forleaving the RAInf (48 per centcompared to 16 percent for other corps), it is more reasonable to suggestthat the problem is more likely to lie in the Army’sfailure to deliver the excitement– an excitement thatrecruits do, in fact, appreciate.

Excitement does not necessarily mean an increasein operational activities. Field activities do tend tolose their appeal after a SNCO’s 50th visit to the 25mrange. The need for excitement with regard to theneed for combat readiness, for infantry personnel tofeel that they have worthwhile training for civilian lifeand the need to reduce injury risk leads to one of twoscenarios. You have either the recipe for disaster inthe form of poor retention if these needs are notaddressed or the foundation for a fourth option.

A fourth option could be an Arms Corpsvocational/professional development scheme; anannual allocation of time(not necessarily money) forindividual development activities that enables soldiersto develop the second vocational skill set that everyother corps in the Arms is given automatically.Instead of doing a 6th repeat of a particular militaryexercise which requires the support of other units thatare already overworked, a unit’s training programcould be adjusted to allow for a combination ofpersonal development leave and block training forunit personnel each year.

The nature of the training should be largely up tothe individual, but there would be scope for the unit toorganise special training en masseif so desired. Forexample, something like an expanded version of theCO’s hour, or allow individuals to undertake theirown choice of training. I am not suggesting that thistraining should be paid for by any new Defenceentitlement, although SVETS, DFASS or unit fundsshould be applied for when applicable. Apart from thefact that this would be costly, I have alreadyestablished that money is probably not the issue: timeand opportunity is.

This Arms Corps Development Scheme wouldthen not only provide that time and opportunity, (a) itwould also improve morale, (b) reduce staleness(improving combat readiness), (c) reduce there-employability gap between the Arms and othercorps, (d) improve an injured soldier’s ability to corps

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 137 JULY/AUGUST 19994

transfer, reduce the risk of injury (simply by reducingthe numbers of days an infantryman is exposed torisks in the field), (e) reduce the number of costlyfield activities annually, and hence(f) ultimately bothimprove retention and reduce costs.

Although allocation and retention issues arerelevant to the entire Armed Forces, Goyne’s article isparticularly useful in its recognition of the specialneeds of our combat personnel. If we do not have thecourage to accept and address the needs of those whorepresent the very raison d’etreof an Army, thenwhat hope is there for the rest of us? I sincerely hopethat Major Goyne’s article and this response willstimulate debate at a higher level, and I look forwardto learning that something will be done.

Captain C.J. LamontRAAEC

Dear Editor,Thank you for publishing Captain Mark Watson’s

article, “What Has Gone Wrong”. Captain Watsonraises some very important issues and airs somewidely held perceptions about Army’s organisationalhealth. Yes, some things have gone wrong.

Late last year, Chief of Army commissioned theOfficer Professional Effectiveness Reviewfor theArmy, known as Project Opera. It seeks to engageevery full-time and part-time officer in thedevelopment of a coherent strategy to address someof the concerns raised by Captain Watson. Our aim isto build a more effective Army by providing allofficers with meaningful careers and an opportunityto make a difference.

Captain Watson raises a number of important andvalid themes in his article. Unfortunately, the tone ofhis article is akin to those often found in universitystudent newspapers. That is, his “rock-throwing”approach does not provide the basis for rationaldialogue as it places one of the major stakeholders,“the system”, in a “no-win” position.

Army, through Project Opera, is committed tocoming to grips with these issues to develop the wayahead. One of our team members, Major DavidSchmidtchen has produced an article titled “Re-thinking the Psychological Contract between Armyand its People”. This article also challenges thesystem by encouraging debate on some of thefundamental issues raised by Captain Watson.

I strongly recommend all officers consider MajorSchmidtchen’s article and provide their comments toProject Opera on the Internet atwww.army.gov.au/opera.html or by e-mail [email protected].

Mike LovellLTCOL

Dear Editor,What a relief it was to read two articles critical of

Australia’s defence posture, “The Knowledge Edge”and “What Has Gone Wrong” (ADFJMay/Jun 1999).

I was under the impression that I was one of a few,critical of our own micro defence force. I consider it ishalf the size it should be. For years personal questionsto bureaucrats and politicians, in regard to the halfdozen or so trouble areas to Australia’s north-west,north and north-east, “Why couldn’t we dosomething?” would produce looks of contempt and ananswer of pity for asking such an irrelevant question.

I congratulate the writers and look forward toensuing lively discussion

J.D. MacAnshRFD

Dear Editor,Well done Captain Watson, well done!What’s more, unlike an earlier contributor who

dared to criticise the leadership of senior officers, youhave very wisely not mentioned the war.

R.W. EastgateMajor (Ret)

By Major David Schmidtchen, AA PSYCH

The Army recruits some of Australia’s best andbrightest young people. Each of them joins the

Army with his or her own set of expectations. Someof these expectations are spelt out in detail in ourrecruiting material, others are drawn from family andfriends, while many develop during through lifeexperience. The expectations that are drawn fromexperience tend to be less tangible and often difficultfor us to articulate. Yet all of them drive ourbehaviour, especially our commitment to remain inthe Army once we have joined it.

The Army, as a national institution with strongtraditions, also expects certain things from its people.Some of these expectations are enshrined in theDefence Act, the Defence Force Discipline Actand avariety of policy instruments. However, many of itsorganisational expectations are embedded in itsenduring values and traditions. Like many of our lessintangible individual expectations, Army’sexpectations are not always easy to articulate.

When a person joins the Army he or she swearsan oath of allegiance and normally commits to aminimum period of service as part of the enlistmentprocess. In addition to any formal contract, eachindividual sub-consciously establishes a“psychological contract” with the Army. Thisunwritten contract remains unconscious until it isbreached.

The purpose of this article is to describe the“psychological contract” that exists between theArmy and its people. This article seeks to generatedebate on the “health” of the organisation. It definesand describes the key features of the psychologicalcontract and highlights observations and trends thatreflect the current state of the contract.

The psychological contract is a set of mutual,unwritten beliefs or expectations about the obligations

between the Army and its people. The contractprovides a broad explanatory framework forunderstanding the subjective nature of therelationship. The psychological contract accomplishesthree tasks, it: defines the relationship; seeks mutualcommitments; and manages mutual expectations.

The psychological contract is by definitionvoluntary, subjective, dynamic and informal. Thedynamic character of the contract means thatindividual and organisational expectations mutuallyinfluence one another. The Army’s people take stepsto fulfil their obligations and look to the Army tofulfil its obligations within the perceived terms of thecontract.

Rapid changes to the social, organisational andstrategic environment over the last five to ten yearshas led to restructuring, outsourcing, redundancy anda change to the fundamentals of work. As a result, thepsychological contract where the Army offeredsecurity, stability, predicability and advancement inexchange for the member’s commitment and loyaltyhas been fundamentally altered. Indeed, the Army’speople are faced with an environment characterisedby increased uncertainty, the perception of fewerbenefits, increased workloads and responsibility, andfewer resources. As a result, many people feel that thecontract has been broken.

Loyalty and commitment remain central to theethos of the Army and are therefore central to thepsychological contract. The maintenance oforganisational commitment is vital to Army’s role inwarfighting. Organisational commitment is said tohave a continuanceand an affectiveelement.

Continuance commitment is a measure of theindividual’s continuing desire to stay with the Army.Ideally, this form of commitment is associated withthe positive benefits that a member gains bycontinuing to serve. However, it is possible to havenegative continuance commitment,for example, theremay be no satisfactory alternative employmentopportunities available.

Commitment

The Psychological Contract

Introduction

Re-thinking the Psychological Contract Between Army andits People

Affective commitment is a measure of theindividual’s moral involvement in the Army. It is theextent to which a member positively identifies withthe Army’s values and norms.

Clearly, both elements play an important role inshaping the psychological contract. Continuancecommitment is associated with conditions of service,pay and benefits, but also the intangible psychologicalrewards attained through association with theorganisation. Affective commitment is particularlyimportant in the Army as this element contributes tosustaining the individual in times of crisis. This is themeasure of commitment that will lead people toperform “beyond their duty statement” and which,when broken, is more difficult to repair. Whenaffective commitment has been damaged themembers of an organisation continue to serve itsneeds, but in a more limited way. Compliancebehaviour1 is the term used to describe this level ofinvolvement.

A breakdown in the psychological contract willreduce organisational commitment and increasecompliance behaviour. Therefore, maintenance andsustainment of the “contract” is a core concern for anyorganisation that espouses the strategic value of itspeople.

The psychological contract is a relationshipmediated by trust. An outcome of contract violation isa breakdown of institutional trust where soldiers andofficers are likely to feel that something unwritten,but important, has been violated. This disintegrationof the traditional contract may cause the members todemand more explicit terms from the Army. Inparticular, opportunities for development, autonomy,flexibility, and meaningful work experience.Members may also be more likely to distrust thehierarchy to fulfil the contract and consequently wantequal involvement in decisions that affect them. Overtime the relationship adjusts so that commitment andloyalty are offered in situation specific terms andsubject to constant monitoring and re-evaluation.

Violation of the contract by the Army may lead tohigher rates of turnover and lower levels ofinstitutional trust. Job satisfaction, retention andcommitment are also likely to suffer.

Clearly, the psychological contract must changeover time to reflect social and organisationalexpectations. However, in periods of substantialinstitutional and environmental change, it is difficult

to smoothly transition from one form of contract,suited to one era and one Army, to a new contract bestsuited to current and future needs. Some degree ofmember dissatisfaction is likely to result from anysubstantial change in the psychological contract andwill remain until the new contract is fully accepted.The objective in periods of transition is to minimisethe extent of this dissatisfaction. This requires broadrecognition that a psychological contract exists, that itis vital to organisational effectiveness, that it will bestressed in periods of significant change, and that theArmy is committed to measures which will enable assmooth a transition as possible.

Organisations have unique contracts that reflecttheir culture and values, and are not able to betransferred between organisations. In particular, thefundamentals of the psychological contractestablished in the civil sector cannot be readilytransferred to the Army. The Army is an organisationthat relies on attracting and maintaining people whoare willing to serve the organisation because itrepresents a set of values and a role in society that hasa clear and valuable purpose. While the core businessof Services and the Australian Public Service (APS)are, in a general sense similar, it is also true that inmany fundamental areas they are not the same. Inparticular, the nature of the physical and moralcommitment required in battle is different. Hence,they require different “contracts”.

There are many indicators of the “health” of thepsychological contract between Army and its people.The following may indicate a breakdown in thecontract:• High wastage among officers at the rank of

Captain to Lieutenant Colonel;• General dissatisfaction with a work environment

that is risk averse, punitive and demandingwithout reward;

• Overt examples of careerism (as opposed toprofessionalism);

• Career education and training is perceived to lacksubstance and credibility. Members may prefer“credible” civil education;

• Perceptions that junior officers are not beingprovided with a value set appropriate to theprofession;

• Complaints that career expectations are not beingmet;

The Contract between Army and itsOfficers

Contract Decay and Renewal


• The organisation believes that it has lost itsidentity within the community; and

• The general perception that the organisation lacksa sense of purpose and identity.

The new contract that is emerging within theDefence Organisation and Army is one that is moresituational and short term, where the member and theArmy are much less dependent on each other. Onecommentator2 defines it the following way:

There is no job security. The employee will beemployed as long as he or she adds value to theorganisation, and is personally responsible forfinding new ways to add value. In return, theemployee has the right to demand interesting andimportant work, has the freedom and resources toperform it well, receives pay that reflects his orher contribution, and gets experience and trainingneeded to be employable here or elsewhere.

Clearly, under this view of the emerging contract,organisational commitment and loyalty have adifferent meaning than in the past. In the newemployment contract the employees attempt tomaximise personal satisfaction, status and income byselling their talents to the most attractive opportunityprovider. Individual sense of identity is linked toprofession rather than to the Army. They aremembers of their profession first and organisationalcitizens second.

If this is a fair description of the newpsychological contract, then the Army can no longerrely as heavily on traditional methods and techniquesto attract and retain talented individuals. Instead ofcareer paths and job security, new incentives need tobe applied. To meet the requirements of the newcontract, Army must switch incentives away fromcareers, status and promotion and apply them to anenvironment that is sufficiently challenging andinvolving so that it becomes a source of loyalty. Thistranslates into a new type of security known as“employability security”3. The rush of officers to gaincivil qualifications is an example of membersindependently seeking employability security.

The idea of a “new contract” offers a number ofopportunities and challenges for the Army. It appearsto reinforce a “What’s in it for me?” relationship withthe organisation. This relationship may mitigateagainst many of the organisational and personalvalues that have traditionally been seen asfundamental to success in warfighting.

The effect on the Army of the breakdown in thepsychological contract is not yet fully understood andits renewal, in a more suitable form is not yetunderway. More detailed and rigorous study isrequired to fully understand the issues.

It is apparent that a new contract is starting togovern the employment relationship in the widerDefence organisation. This relationship appears to bedriven by expectations within the wider communitythat, in turn, are reflected in recent strategic humanresource policy initiatives within Defence. Whilethese initiatives have been valuable in some areas,there is underlying assumption that the principlesgoverning the psychological contract can be the samefor wider society; the Services and APS alike.

The concern is that the Army has not clearlyidentified or articulated a vision for the Servicerelationship that is consistent with the core business ofwarfighting and is credible within the organisation.Clearly, a tenable contract will evolve over time, willbe based on mutual trust and developed throughconsistency in policy and behaviour. However, itmust also be consistent with the role and purpose ofthe organisation if it is to be useful to warfighting.

There are some factors influencing theemployment relationship that remain within Army’scontrol. Those that can be influenced include: • Providing a clear sense of purpose, focus and

belonging;• Consistently providing and supporting quality

leadership at all levels; • Reinforcing and sustaining organisational and

personal values; and • Offering meaningful employment and

development opportunities.Equally, there is a range of factors beyond the

control of Army and the wider Defence organisation.There has been a dramatic shift in societal values andstructure, and a general expectation that the Armywill conform to the new values. A substantial problemarises when the new values conflict with the Army’sfundamental role.

Army is not immune from the experiences andperceptions of employment being developed andimplemented in wider society. In fact, recent Defencestrategic human resource policy appears to be movingrapidly toward implementing policies that reflect thecentral tenets of the “emerging” civilian contract. Thechallenge is to reconcile the new values with afundamental warfighting requirement that remainsunchanged.

Discussion

Moulding a New Contract

RE-THINKING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT BETWEEN ARMY AND ITS PEOPLE 7


A vision of what the psychological contractbetween Army and its people should deliver is animportant foundation for generating meaningfuldebate that, in turn, it will guide strategic humanresource policy development.

The concepts outlined in this article are continuingto evolve as the Army learns more about its behaviouras an organisation and that of its people. The Army,like each of its people, is somewhat a prisoner of itsown experience and perceptions. Much dialogue isrequired if we are to evolve a clear understanding ofthe psychological contract to the point that we canmanage it effectively during times of great change.

To this end, the staff at Project Opera seeks yourviews on the issues raised in this article. You areinvited to make general comments about the issuesraised in the article or, alternatively, to address one ormore of the following questions:• What should be the key characteristics of Army’s

psychological contract;

• Is the traditional value set and role of the Army nolonger appropriate? If not, what from an“organisational perspective” has changed;

• Can the “emerging” contract reinforce a value setthat is compatible with warfighting;

• Can the organisation meet its obligation in theemerging employment relationship;

• Will the emerging contract serve to attract andretain the level and quality of new employees;

• How can we build an organisational culture andstructure in which soldiers and officers feelsatisfied and challenged; and

• How has the evolution of societal expectationsand trends been incorporated into thedevelopment of the enhanced combat force andthe Army after next?

NOTES1. Compliance behaviour refers to employees who seek to meet

the minimum standards required of the organisation. Thesepeople are less attached to the organisation and consequentlyare less likely to go “beyond their duty statement”.

2. Hilthrop, J.M. (1995). The changing psychological contract:The HR challenge of the 1990s. European ManagementJournal, 13(3), pp. 286-294.

3. Moss Kanter, R. (1994). Change in the global economy: Aninterview with Rosabeth Moss Kanter. European ManagementJournal,12(1), pp. 1-9.

Conclusion

David Schmidtchen was born in western Queensland in 1965. He joined the Australian Army as a military psychologist in 1989, aftercompleting a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree at the University of Newcastle, New South Wales. He subsequently completed aGraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management at the University of Southern Queensland in 1994.In 1996, David was awarded a Defence Fellowship to conduct a research project, examining the human resource development issuesassociated with preparing Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel for peace operations. The findings of this study contributed to theongoing development ADF peace operations policy in a number of human resource development areas. In 1999 he joined the Officer Professional Effectiveness Review for the Army (Project Opera) as the research officer.

Comments should be addressed to the author at [email protected].

By Major M.J.Dugdale, RA Sigs

Cambodia: the word brings to mind images ofsickening violence, social upheaval and the

subjugation of basic human rights to politicalopportunism. Decades of political and social turmoil,much of it instigated by events beyond Cambodia’scontrol, gave rise to an environment that saw arelatively obscure political faction, the Khmer Rouge,seize power in 1975 to establish DemocraticKampuchea. What followed was almost four years ofradical societal transformation based on an ideologyof Maoist Communism implemented throughmarginalisation, ideological indoctrination and brutalatrocities.

The analysis of the events in Cambodianecessarily begins with an overview of the eventsthemselves and determining why the tragedy shouldbe considered genocide. The examination of theKhmer Rouge atrocities is predicted on whether theUnited Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC)1, withthe acknowledged limitations inherent in its definitionof genocide, can be applied. The analysis thenaddresses how the atrocities occurred, thecontributing factors, and the international response forintervention and prevention of human suffering.

The 1954 Geneva agreements arising from theFirst Indo-China War generated Cambodia’sindependence from French colonial domination. Afteryears of ineffectual political agitation followingindependence, a group of young French-educatedcommunists gained control of the pro-VietnamWorkers’ Party of Kampuchea in 1966, changed itsname to the “Communist Party of Kampuchea”(CPK) and began to call for an uprising against thegovernment led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Chinafostered the coalition of the CPK with a group ofradical Khmer nationals, resulting in the Khmer

Rouge (the “Red Khmer”). The Khmer Rougemembers, led by Pol Pot, were primarily educated andmiddle class, and sought the purification of Cambodiafrom “foreign contamination” - defined by them asthe influence of foreign food, music, education, tradeetc...

By this time the US was heavily involved in theSecond Indo-China War in neighbouring SouthVietnam and Sihanouk was unsuccessfully trying toprotect Cambodia as a neutral country. Cambodia’sdestabilisation began when the Khmer Rougeundermined the state economy by smuggling rice toboth North and South Vietnam, thus depriving thestate of tax revenues. This was shortly followed bythe Viet Cong retreat into sanctuaries in Cambodia,drawing Cambodia into a situation where Sihanoukattempted to appease North Vietnam whilst covertlyagreeing to the US conducting a bombing campaignof the Viet Cong enclaves in Cambodia. Thesepolicies and his political naivete led to his downfall;military and political unrest reached a climaxSihanouk was overthrown in a coup by the US-backed Lon Nol in 1970, and the war spilled acrossthe border into Cambodia itself.

After his deposition, Sihanouk unwisely chose tojoin the Khmer Rouge, which had not revealed itscommunist credo to the Cambodian people butinstead launched a propaganda campaign calling forLon Nol to be deposed and Sihanouk returned topower. The Khmer Rouge slowly gained politicalground as the US bombings of Cambodia not onlykilled up to 150 000 Cambodians but also drove theViet Cong further into Cambodia, disrupting rurallife. Up to two million displaced peasants moved tothe cities. Malnutrition, inflation and militarycorruption afflicted the refugees, and none of theseconsequences was recognised or compensated by theUS.

During this time, Lon Nol clung to power on thestrength of US political support and his use of force.Both Lon Nol and the Khmer Rouge were hostile tothe Vietnamese forces and chose to vent this anger onthe local Viet Khmers who were mostly urban clerksand skilled workers in Phnom Penh; up to 30 000were executed or forcibly imprisoned by Lon Nol.However, the majority of violence occurred betweenthe Khmer Rouge and Lon Nol’s forces as theywaged a five year civil war.

Background Events

Introduction

The Cambodian Genocide: Causes and Aftermath

Though they had already resorted to atrocities inorder to force the rural peasantry to launch a“people’s uprising”, the Khmer Rouge did not revealtheir true nature and communist agenda until gainingpower in 1975. Pol Pot then essentially created amilitary dictatorship and instituted a totaltransformation of Cambodian society in an effort toreturn it to a pre-industrial, “purified” model. Thecountry was renamed “Democratic Kampuchea” anddivided into six zones, each governed by a combinedpolitical and military force that took its directionsfrom the “Centre”, the main CPK headquarters inPhnom Penh. Pol Pot’s methods for societaltransformation included the forced evacuation ofurban populations to the countryside, thedisintegration of communities and family units,forced labour, political indoctrination, starvation,corporal punishment, collective punishment, tortureand forced “confessions”, and executions, all on amassive scale. The victims were drawn from variousgroups with seemingly no relationship or commoncharacteristic to set them apart: Buddhist monks,Cham Moslems, Viet Khmers, ethnic Chinese andKhmer nationals from the eastern zone. Estimates ofthe number killed vary greatly due to the lack ofdocumentary evidence, but it is usually accepted thatbetween 1.5 and 2 million Cambodians, about 25 percentof the population based on pre-1975 figures,were killed during the Khmer Rouge’s four year reignof terror.

Responding to the intra-party purges ofVietnamese sympathisers and the escalation of cross-border attacks by the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam invadedCambodia in late 1978 and swept the Khmer Rougefrom power. Many of the hierarchy and central army,including Pol Pot, escaped into the jungle along theThai border and continued to launch attacks,undermining the government installed by Vietnam(led by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen) and taking moreCambodian lives.

Few authors find the UNGC acceptable. Theworks of the leading authors Kuper, Charny, Chalkand Fein contained in Andreopolous (1994) are allhighly critical of the UNGC, emphasising that theomission of political and social groups as victims, thediffering interpretations of “intent”, together with thelack of enforcement mechanisms have created alegacy of lost opportunities for the UN to address

state-sponsored violence. Fein (1993a p. xi) takes theapproach that the UNGC has potential as itaccommodates the important distinction of theperpetrator’s motives. Overall, Fein’s interpretationand modelling of genocide typologies mostappropriately describe the events in Cambodia.

With reference to Cambodia, the majority ofauthors find that the actions of the Khmer Rouge donot constitute genocide under Article II of the UNGC.This stems primarily from the classification of thevictim groups. Most authors, including Fein, arguethat the victims were targeted on the basis of politicaland social characteristics, and therefore the events inCambodia are technically not a genocide. The victimswere drawn from a number of group classifications,making the overall labelling of the Khmer Rougeatrocities difficult. Kiernan (1994 pp. 191-202)identifies four distinct religious and ethnic victimgroups that qualify the Cambodian tragedy asgenocide. Hannum and Hawk (1986 pp. 138-150)state that the atrocities are undoubtedly genocidalsince the UNGC does not proscribe the perpetratorbeing of the same ethnicity as a victim group, and thepersecution of the eastern zone Khmer group wascommitted with the intent to destroy the existingKhmer nation in the name of purification.Nevertheless, the diversity of the victim groups wouldseem to preclude their persecution and deaths beingdefined as genocide under the UNGC.

Fein’s typology of genocide falls within theboundaries of the UNGC but she has attempted toaccommodate previously excluded political and socialgroups. Her typology is described in terms of thecriteria which discriminate between the differenttypes of victims (such as the presence of ideology ororganised threat) rather than describing specificvictim groups2. In the process, she nullifies theadvantage currently held by the perpetrator under theUNGC to set the boundaries and membership of thevictim groups. Her definition and model ofideological genocide is inclusive of victims, coveringall unarmed and non-violent civilians, and is thereforeideally suited to describe the Cambodian tragedy withits complex and seemingly unrelated victim groups.Fein’s model of ideological genocide is described as astate redefining its society by eliminating people inorder to correspond to its political ideology, itsrepresentation of itself, and to legitimate the state: thisincorporates the major goals of the Khmer Rouge inCambodia. Of the various definitions and models ofgenocide, and the numerous interpretations of theUNGC in the context of the Cambodian events,Fein’s model of ideological genocide most

A Model of Genocide for theCambodian Tradgedy


appropriately describes the Khmer Rouge actions asgenocide.

The lack of records kept by the Khmer Rouge hasresulted in the principle scholars of the Cambodiangenocide developing theories to explain its purposeand how it occurred. Some of these theories seemdiametrically opposed and deserve examination.

IntentThere are a number of interpretations of the intent

of the Khmer Rouge regime and its use of genocide.Descriptions vary from Chinese-backed economicreconstruction, to a successful peasant revolution, toideologically based social transformation and others.It can be argued that characteristics of the Cambodiangenocide can be found to support many of theseinterpretations.

Vickery (1984 p.66) views the genocideprincipally as the result of a peasant revolution aimedat overthrowing the educated elite, and not the resultof communist ideology. Additionally he contends thatthis revolution, and presumably the genocide, wasdriven by nationalism and the cult of personalitysurrounding Pol Pot, essentially stating that Pol Potwas “pulled along” by the force of the peasantuprising. He attests that the actions of the KhmerRouge represent “a victorious peasant revolution,perhaps the first real one in modern times” (1984 p.66). Vickery contends that not only was therevolution dominated by the peasantry, but that PolPot and his forces were incapable of conceiving andplanning the atrocities that resulted after their rise topower. He attributes the atrocities to the spontaneousactions of peasants thrust into power-roles andbehaving in a similar manner to that of victoriousrevolutionaries in other peasant uprisings throughouthistory (1984 p. 287). Whilst it is conceivable that thismay explain a high level of violence in the immediateaftermath of a peasant revolution, it does not explainthe rising level of atrocities in 1977 and 1978.

Kiernan (1993 p. 11) argues that Pol Pot’sintention was to re-shape Cambodian society suchthat all foreign influence was cast out, purifying theKhmer nation and redefining society based onagrarian communism. Chalk and Jonassohn (1990 p.29) similarly argue that the genocide was intended toimplement an ideology rather than eliminate a real orpotential threat, acquire economic wealth, or spread

terror amongst real or potential enemies. Fein (1993ap. 47) agrees and notes that ideological genocide isusually not related to pre-existing ethnicdiscrimination or exclusion. This was generally thecase in Cambodia: a relatively homogeneous societywas fractured to induce an ideological genocide forthe purpose of implementing a communist utopia.

Organisation and Methods of GenocideHannum (1989 pp. 86-93) argues that the Khmer

nationals in the eastern zone were targeted as part of aspecific campaign planned by the Party Centre, andtheir persecution did not arise from local KhmerRouge autonomy or occur on the whim of anespecially brutal local commander. He argues that theeastern zone Khmers were identified as a victimgroup due to their demographics. Their proximity tothe Vietnam border together with the high proportionof educated members convinced the Party Centre thatthis group was open to foreign influence and therebyrepresented potential opposition to the Khmer Rougeactions.

Kiernan (1994 p. 201) attributes the genocide to awell coordinated central plan. He argues that theKhmer Rouge leaders with the maximum power andresponsibility for the genocide were centred aroundPol Pot at the Party Centre in Phnom Penh, notlocalised in the rural areas where many of theatrocities actually occurred. This is based on theKhmer Rouge need to maintain control over the socialtransformation, ensuring that those who wereidentified as non-conformist were not permitted tobecome a focus for resistance. Kiernan makes aparticularly strong argument that it was the party eliteand not the peasantry responsible for the planning ofthe eastern zone Khmer massacres. This view issupported by many scholars. However, there arenotable exceptions.

Thion (1993 p. 166) argues that there were threemain causes of the genocide, each with its own aim,organisation and methods. First, a Party Centredecision instigated the elimination of those who wereidentified office holders or supporters of the oustedLon Nol regime, including relatives. This occurredsoon after Pol Pot took power, and between 100 000and 200 000 men, women and children wereexecuted. Thion notes that although this policy maynot have been implemented in the same manner ineach zone, there was nevertheless central planningwith the aim of removing any vestige of the oldregime that may have represented a rallying point forresistance. Second, the Party Centre planned a seriesof purges of the Khmer Rouge itself, progressivelyeliminating larger numbers of suspected or

The Causes of the Genocide

THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE: CAUSES AND AFTERMATH 11

“confessed” traitors. These individuals, group or zonecommands, including relatives and subordinates, weredeemed to have intellectual origins and politicalassociations that made them potentially disloyal.Thion quotes a figure of 200 000 killed, including theexecution of Khmer civilians in the eastern zone in19783. Third, and most controversially, Thionattributes the majority of the killings to the freelanceactions of the local Khmer Rouge cadres in theirattempt to assert their power. He notes that most ofthe zone authorities were drawn from the uneducatedpeasantry and resorted to brutality in order tocompensate for their incompetence, their socialineptitude and to assert their authority. Thion’s stanceattributes the deaths of the majority of the genocidevictims to local planning, or no planning at all, andimplemented with no central coordination or aim.Since most authors agree that genocide is, in part,defined by the purposeful action of the perpetrator toprevent the physical or social continuity of the victimgroup, it is arguable that Thion’s approach excludesthe majority of the killings and persecutions fromclassification as genocide. His defined purpose for thekillings and the ad hoc approach by the perpetrators ismore appropriately described as terrorism. Terrorismrepresents a control method, not an exterminationmethod. Indeed, Thion rejects the application of theterm “genocide” to the Cambodian tragedy overall(1993 pp. 181-186). It is difficult to reconcile thekillings of at least one million people, mostlycivilians, as merely terrorism run rife and notgenocide.

Chandler (1991 p. 3-11) agrees with Thion thatmany of the killings were carried out without centralplanning but instead resulted from local commandersoverstepping their authority to implement their ownlocalised regimes. He also rejects the description ofthe Khmer Rouge actions as genocide. Though heagrees that the Chams and Viet Khmers were“discriminated” by the Khmer Rouge as enemies ofthe revolution, he does not accept that thepersecutions and killings represented attempts toexterminate these groups on the basis of race, religionor ethnicity. In fact, Chandler argues that the KhmerRouge did not intend so many deaths to occur.

These arguments by Thion and Chandler presentseveral problems. It is difficult to accept that so manylocal commanders and their subordinatesindependently instituted similar atrocities on such alarge scale, particularly since most authors emphasisethat the traditional Cambodian approach to authorityis to accept it without question; Thion makes thispoint himself and in the process weakens his owntheory (1993 p. 167). Indeed, it can be argued that the

local commanders were themselves made in the samepsychological mould as their victims, and thereforedid not challenge the authority of the Party Centre. Itis also difficult to accept that such a large number ofunauthorised atrocities would be permitted tocontinue by the Party Centre. Whilst it can beaccepted that a number of them would have beencondoned for the purposes of enforcing power, surelythe Centre would have become concerned at the risingdestruction of the labour force and the misdirection oflocal Khmer Rouge resources. This is particularlyimportant given that the theory of localised planningimplies that the Party Centre had higher priorities,presumably the reshaping of Cambodia’s economy toa pre-industrial state and therefore the need for aworkforce. The inconsistencies in the arguments putforward by Thion and Chandler are too great tooverlook. Kiernan’s approach is the more credible ascentral planning of the genocide more closely satisfiesthe Khmer Rouge agenda of complete societaltransformation.

Culture and Psychology – Perpetrator Motivationand Victim Behaviour

The actions of both the perpetrators and thevictims can to some extent be explained by the cultureand national psychology of the Cambodian people.Briefly, the perpetrators of the atrocities, and thoseresponsible for the planning, excused themselves ofresponsibility for their actions by blaming the victimsfor their situation. Victim groups were judged to becollectively guilty, though for the most part they werenot accused of anything other than being what theywere: guilty by class, religion and ethnic origin. Theywere considered enemies of the state by definition,not by posing any actual threat. Faced with isolationas individuals or small groups, and stripped of thecultural and religious features that defined them andtheir morality, most Cambodians responded to theatrocities by resorting to survival instincts: deferenceto the Khmer Rouge and privately excusing their ownactions and inability to retaliate.

Whittaker (1985 pp. 814-820) states that thereadiness of the Khmer Rouge leaders to kill is relatedto pre-existing national definitions of enemies andcharacteristically tolerated uses of aggression. State-manipulated prejudices and sanctioned violence ledCambodia to vent aggression at foreigners andattribute collective guilt against whole ethnic groups.Cambodia’s ambiguous historical definition ofnational borders was also used to justify aggression;Cambodia has disputed its border with Vietnam forover two centuries and has used this as the basis fornumerous wars and skirmishes. The Khmer Rouge


relied on this to justify hostilities against theVietnamese. Additionally, Cambodian’s had longtolerated periodic pogroms against ethnic VietKhmers, with whom they peacefully coexisted atother times. Thus there was an historical cycle ofpogroms preceded by collective accusations.Whittaker contends that State-authorised aggressiontaught Cambodian society not only to expresscollective punishments but to expect such actions inthe future, and to view this as a normal part of thesocial cycle. The victims of these local pogroms werealways local minorities drawn from the morepowerful neighbouring state of Vietnam, andprovided a model for the later elimination of otherminorities and dissidents. Several other scholars,including Kiernan (1993 p. 13) and Frieson (1993 pp.34-39) refer to a cultural or psychological predilectionfor violence as being seen as a legitimate tool inCambodian politics. There is evidence to support thisin Sihanouk’s widespread use of force prior to 1970,and Lon Nol’s brutal attempts to crush his opposition.Shelton-Woods (1993 pp. 3-6) notes that Sihanouk’srule was not without intolerance. Dissenters weresilenced through force or amalgamation into thesocialist party. Political opposition of any kind wasnot tolerated, and freedom of speech was notsupported.

Staub (1989 p. 23) notes that cultural and personalpreconditions, such as orientation to hierarchicalauthority, lead to a motivational readiness to defendthe self and harm others. He also emphasises thatgroup psychology processes differ from those of theindividual. In the majority of cases individuals willsubordinate their morality and behaviour to those ofthe group, regardless of how basic the group’sstandards may be, in order to gain group credibilityand to become indistinguishable from the masses.This natural human trait was magnified to Pol Pot’sadvantage by social stratification and the dissolutionof family structures. The Khmer Rouge became theonly identifiable group to which individuals couldbelong. Further, those who chose not to identify withthis group were distinguishable and thereforepotential targets. In conjunction with this, the KhmerRouge propaganda stigmatised various religious andethnic groups and encouraged the people to see thesegroups as the cause of Cambodia’s problems, theenemies who had inflicted the civil war andassociated hardships. In this way many ordinaryCambodians were deceived by an unfortunatecombination of policies and human psychology, andwere manipulated into preparedness to harm theirfellow countrymen.

Chandler (1991 p.12) notes that the traditionalCambodian political structure was built on a patron-client system in which political, social and economicinfluence depended primarily on loyalty to aparticular elite, with the royal family inevitablyforming the highest link in the system. Over thegenerations this led to a tendency towards individualsseeing themselves as helpless, reliant on their familyunit and patron-client relationship for their identity,and to accept the extant power relationships. To themajority of Cambodians this political structure madethe concept of revolution unthinkable. Consequently,many were unprepared to respond to the atrocities asthey could not move beyond the ingrainedpsychological conditioning that described theindividual as powerless.

Invasion by Vietnam and the Issue of StateSovereignty

Though the Khmer Rouge downfall at the handsof the invading Vietnamese in 1978 ended thegenocide, it must be emphasised that Vietnam’smotives were not philanthropic but stemmed from theneed to prevent further cross-border attacks by theKhmer Rouge. Vietnam did not claim humanitarianprinciples for its actions, but territorial integrity.

The international reaction to Vietnam’s invasionwas generally negative, despite the reports ofatrocities that had filtered out from Cambodia overthe previous four years. ASEAN and NATO inparticular condemned the action, despite the obviousbenefit to the Cambodian people in the prevention offurther atrocities. The international condemnation wasprincipally based on the premise of state sovereignty;the right of a government to handle its domesticaffairs free from external intervention. Most stateswere unwilling to contest Cambodian sovereigntysince such action would invariably call into questionthe issues of state sovereignty, and especially respectfor developing states. This was a particularly sensitiveissue in South East Asia given the number of post-colonial states and their efforts to establish theirindependence. The debacle of the Second Indo-ChinaWar also served as a warning to the major powers notto become further entangled in the region. The issueof sovereignty represented a convenient diplomaticbarrier to intervention.

There were deeper motivations behind the lack ofinternational action to prevent the genocide. The

Intervention and Prevention


pressures of Cold War politics saw states deliberatelywielding political ideology and military force tomanipulate the rule of international law and to upholdan international system that turned a blind eye tointra-state violence in an attempt to maintain thepower bloc status quo. Shelton-Woods (1993 p. 417)argues that Cambodia was clearly a pawn in a muchlarger game. Its misfortune was to be used to counterregional developments in a proxy superpower contest.The US used Cambodia in waging its war againstNorth Vietnam, and Cambodia was used by China inits contest with Soviet-backed Vietnam.

No foreign power had the will to impose sanctionson the Khmer Rouge regime, and it is difficult to seewhat sanctions could have been implemented giventhe self-imposed political and economic isolation ofthe country. The UN imposed an economic blockadeon Cambodia only after the removal of the KhmerRouge. It remained in place for more than a decade.

PreventionFein has stated in her typology of genocide that

the calculus of genocide is rational, with the killingsexpected to be cost-free because there are nosanctions or checks put in place, and externalcountries continue to support the perpetrator. Thissuggests that a deterrent to genocide lies in reversingthe response of patron states in particular, and theinternational community in general. Factors beyondstrategic and economic imperatives must be broughtinto play to force external states to intervene.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a greaterconvergence of international political ideologies, witha growing focus on intra-state conflict resolution,particularly through humanitarian intervention. Therehas been greater acceptance of controlled interventionsuch that human rights are beginning to impact on thetraditional view of state sovereignty. Ryan (1997 p.87) proposes that intervention should not be viewedin negative terms as a right to meddle in domesticissues, but in positive terms as the collectiveobligation of all states to bring humanitarian relief andredress wrongs.

Under customary international law theinternational community has upheld the principle thatgovernments cannot act with absolute impunitywithin their borders: “under international law theconcept of sovereignty is not absolute”. (Ryan 1997p. 80). Positive law has since added weight to thisthrough commitments to protect human rights.International law has long recognised that there arefundamental principles that supersede the rights ofstates, indeed some customary principles are so basicto existence (such as the right not to be killed) that

they cannot be relegated by any state. Theoretically,this raises the UNGC above the rights of states toaddress internal matters free of interference, thoughthe UNGC has yet to be invoked as the determiningfactor in intervention. The belated UN intervention inRwanda was under the auspices of humanitarianassistance, not the prevention of genocide under theUNGC. Clearly, the UN is not yet ready to test theapplicability of the Convention, especially since itdoes not mandate any enforcement mechanisms.

Regarding Cambodia, Kuper (1985 p. 143) statesthat the prevention of a future genocide requires theunmasking of the perpetrators, the exposure of theregional and global powers’ policies that prolongedthe genocide, the reorienting of these policies, and thepressing of patron states to take responsibility for theiractions. The readiness of the UN Security Council tosanction conditions enabling the Khmer Rouge toreturn to power shows that there is little interest inbringing perpetrators of genocide to justice, andtherefore little regard for the prevention of genocide.

In 1989, Vietnam withdrew its forces and invitedSihanouk and a number of non-communist factions toparticipate in free elections. The UN overruled thisproposal, maintaining diplomatic and economicisolation of Cambodia until the Hun Sen Governmentagreed to UN monitored elections that includedKhmer Rouge participation.

Despite the lack of popular support and theiroverthrow in 1978, the Khmer Rouge werelegitimated by the peace plan negotiated by thepermanent members of the UN Security Councilthanks to their protection of client states and thealliances among them. Indeed, the Khmer Rougesuccessfully lobbied for the abandonment of chargesagainst them, despite a UN investigation in 1985having labelled their actions an “auto genocide”.There was a progressive elimination of diplomaticcriticism of the genocide. It is now even possible forthe Khmer Rouge to return to power through anelectoral coalition, if they do not seek to do so byforce. At the least, the UN has mandated KhmerRouge participation in Cambodia’s political system, asystem that is far from stable and has recently seenthe ousting of Prince Norodom Rannariddh by his co-President and former Khmer Rouge member, HunSen. Thus the international community has thrust the

The Aftermath


responsibility for dealing with the Khmer Rouge ontothe Cambodian people.

The UNGC definition of genocide is viewed asproblematic by the majority of authors due to itsambiguities and omissions. Though it is arguable,many authors hold that under a strict interpretation ofthe UNGC the Cambodian atrocities do not qualify asgenocide. This relegates the deaths of between 1.5and 2 million people, and the suffering of millionsmore, to being less worthy of internationalcondemnation and action. Of the numerousdefinitions and typologies of genocide proposed bynoted authors those of Helen Fein, particularly hermodel of ideological genocide, most appropriatelydescribe the Cambodian genocide.

Cambodia was not seen as a legitimate victim ofthe Second Indo-China War. The economic andmilitary destabilisation brought about by the US,China and regional powers gave rise to the conditionsthat allowed Pol Pot to win power. However, externalforces were not the only influence. Sihanouk’sshort-sighted and opportunistic decisions, hisalignment with Pol Pot, and the brutality andineptitude of Lon Nol hastened the Khmer Rouge riseto power.

External influences continued to influenceCambodia even after the Khmer Rouge institutedwide-ranging persecutions and killings on a massivescale. Regional and global powers used Cambodia asa pawn in a proxy superpower contest, claiming theprinciple of sovereignty to be more important than theprevention of human suffering.

There are various interpretation of the intentions,organisation and methods that led to the genocide. Ofthese, the most credible shows that there was a wellcoordinated central plan with local implementation,aiming to radically transform Cambodian society tointroduce a communist utopia. To achieve this, PolPot introduced brutal measures to subjugate thepopulation, remove real and potential opposition andtear away all vestiges of Cambodian culture,community and family. The pre-existing cultural andpsychological characteristics of Cambodia not onlyemphasised obedience but led the society to acceptthe use of violence as a political tool. Consequently,Cambodians were not equipped to deal with thepolicies of the Khmer Rouge. They were alsopsychologically scarred by the forced breaking down

of their social and individual morals and the necessityto develop a new morality in order to survive. Aroundone quarter of the population was exterminated, butall Cambodians suffered and continue to do so.

Vietnam’s intervention to force the downfall ofthe Khmer Rouge was not motivated by a desire toprevent further genocide. Nor were the subsequentactions by the international community aimed atbringing Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to justice.International mediation of Cambodia’s politicalstructure has resulted in the Cambodian people havingto bear the responsibility for dealing with the KhmerRouge. There has in fact been little internationalaction to prevent genocide and punish perpetrators,despite both customary and positive international lawsupporting the precedence of basic human rights overstate sovereignty. The UN has yet to claim the UNGCas the grounds for humanitarian intervention.

While much of the Cambodian populationcontinues to suffer the physical and psychologicaleffects of the genocide, the underlying cultural andpsychological attributes that permitted genocidalprocesses to be implemented, together with theambiguities in the UNGC and lack of internationalwill to prosecute perpetrators, remain extant. There isa real danger that the ongoing political instability inCambodia will lead full circle to the same politicaland social conditions that the Khmer Rouge exploitedin 1975.

NOTES1. Andreopolous, George J.ed., (1994) Genocide: Conceptual and

Historical Dimensions, University of Pennsylvania Press,Philadelphia, pp. 229-233 Appendix 1: Text of the 1948Genocide Convention. Article II of the Convention states that:“genocide means any of the following acts committed withintent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racialor religious group, as such:a. killing members of the group;b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of

the group;c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life

calculated to bring about its physical destruction in wholeor in part;

d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e. forcibly transferring children of the group to anothergroup.”

2. Fein, Helen (1993) Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, SagePublications, London. Fein defines genocide as “a sustained,purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy acollectivity, directly or indirectly, through interdiction of thebiological and social reproduction of group members, sustainedregardless of the surrender or lack of threat by the victim”. (p. 24). Fein states that genocide can be seen to occur inresponse to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by orimpeded by the victim, and can be either ad hoc orpremeditated. She proposes a four stage genesis of genocidalpolicies (pp. 36-37):

Conclusion


Stage 1. A moral ground for exclusion must be established thatplaces the victim clearly outside the universe of obligation ofthe perpetrator.Stage 2. A pre-existing legitimacy is used to lead to theacceptance of ideologies justifying the domination of one group.Stage 3. A crisis or opportunity emerges which is either causedby or attributed to the victim as inhibiting national or economicimprovement or expansion.Stage 4. A lack of checks and balances by either externalpowers or internal patrons makes genocide appear to be a cost-free, rational calculation in terms of costs and benefits.

3. These first two specific genocidal acts and their aims aregenerally not disputed by the leading authors, though theirestimates of victim numbers vary from those offered by Thion.

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Ryan, Christopher M. (1997) “Sovereignty, Intervention and theLaw: A Tenuous Relationship of Competing Principles”,Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol 26, no. 1, pp.77-100.

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Woods, L. Shelton (1997) “The Myth of Cambodian Recovery”,Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol 18, no. 4, March, pp. 417-29.

Woods, L. Shelton (1993) “Persecution of the Cham Muslims inCambodia: Context for Understanding”, Epoche, vol 18, pp. 1–9.

Major Meg Dugdale graduated WRAAC OCS to RASigs in 1982 and has served in a wide range of Corps and non-Corpsappointments, including instructor, Staff Officer EW/COMSEC HQADF, Adjutant, Officer Commanding 73 EW Sqn, ProjectManager for the SATCOM Phase of Project Parakeet, Contingent Commander EX Long Look 95, and her current position as SeniorAnalyst (Land) in Capability Analysis Branch of ADHQ. She completed the first ATSOC at ADFA in 1992, and graduated ArmyCommand and Staff College in 1996. Major Dugdale holds Masters degrees in Technology Management and Defence Studies, andGraduate Diplomas in Engineering, Management studies, and Human Resource Management. She is currently studying for a Masterof Arts (International Relations) at ANU.

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By Lieutenant Colonel CW Orme, Major J Thomasand Captain D Graham

Sensor to shooter2 links, precision engagement3,joint fires, and dominant manoeuvre are concepts

developed at the strategic and operational levels in theUSA aimed at fighting smarter both now and in thefuture. These concepts have significant potential forthe ADF and it is important that we begin to discusswhat they are and how we can harness their potentialto improve our warfighting capability. One area thatmust be developed is the ability to link our sensorsand shooters across battlespace, services, and time.This article will discuss the concept of sensor andshooter links in order to introduce a concept whichoffers enormous opportunities for the ADF tointegrate our joint capabilities.

Precision Engagement4

The issue of sensors to shooters sits within theconcept of precision engagement. Precisionengagement is the overarching concept which sees theenemy dislocated by being engaged with accurate andprecise fires across the depth and spectrum of hisoperations. It consists of a system of systems thatenables joint forces to locate an objective or target,provide responsive command and control, generatethe desired effect, assess the level of success, andretain the flexibility to reengage with precision whenrequired. The key supporting concepts which the UShave identified to achieve precision engagement aredominating expanded multidimensional battlespace;simultaneity; destroying enemy key capabilities;preserving friendly freedom of action; creatingwindows of capabilities overmatch; and influencingenemy perceptions.

The enablers or capabilities to achieve precisionengagement are dynamic obstacles; sensor to shooterlinks; simultaneous application of joint capabilities;increased lethality at extended ranges; precisionsystems and munitions; demonstrations and feints;psychological operations (PSYOPS); media relations;deception technologies; artificial intelligence (AI)algorithms; signature cataloguing; Combat ID;

onboard sensor processing; and brilliant munitions.As we can see, the discussion of sensors to shootersresides in a much broader context which will bedrawn from the Australian approach to precisionengagement. Indeed it could be argued that before wediscuss sensors to shooters we should first develop anADF concept for precision engagement.

It is when we identify some of the characteristicsof the different levels of war, and the changing natureof battlespace, that we see why the issue of sensorsand shooters is complex. Battlespace is no longerlinear or sequential. Given a digitised battlespaceenvironment with C4ISR, the demarcation betweenland, sea, and air disappears. The joint force conceptis achievable only with heavy reliance on manytechnologies being developed to support other jointcapabilities. By drawing on these capabilities, thecommander will be able to attack and neutraliseenemy forces and capabilities throughout the breadthand depth of the battlespace to break the coherenceand continuity of the enemy’s operations.

The strategic level encompasses all military andmany non military agencies and capabilities whichcontribute to national security and the prosecution ofwar. It is at this level that all military and civilcapabilities are coordinated. In other words, thestrategic level has access to all sensors and allshooters.

The operational level is characterised by asignificant emphasis on military operations orcampaigns, and military capabilities, as the means toachieve strategic ends. Compared to the tactical level,the operational level is defined by a much largerbattlespace and access to sensors, shooters and linkswhich extend beyond that space, in some cases toglobal dimensions. They also extend beyondindividual services, so that one of the definingcharacteristics of the operational level is theintegration of joint assets. Another defining elementof the operational level is that it is the level at whichwe are able to achieve decision.

The tactical level is almost solely focussed onmilitary means to achieve operational or campaignends. The tactical level is characterised by ownership

Strategic, Operational and TacticalLevels

Introduction

Linking Sensors and Shooters in the ADF1

of assets in a relatively clearly defined battlespace forthe achievement of specific missions which contributeto the campaign objective. The capabilities of theseassets have traditionally been those whose effectsremain within the battlespace of the tacticalcommander; indeed the battlespace allocated to acommander has been dictated in the past by thecommander’s capabilities. Although the tactical levelmay be influential, it is unlikely that it will bedecisive.

It was at the strategic and operational levels in theUS that the issue of sensor to shooter links was raisedand this gave birth to the concept of joint fires. Theproblem was that different services and agenciesowned different sensors and shooters which were notlinked, integrated, focussed or optimised to achievetheir maximum potential. The aim of theirdevelopment process was to develop a concept wherethis would occur. In the early stages this was relatedprimarily to the USAF; it has now spread across theservices and is a key plank in their future concepts.This multi-disciplinary approach has led to certaincharacteristics of these operations.

By their nature, joint fires are multi service;highly destructive; relatively precise; operate overextended battlespace; are of limited duration; and maybe responsive to a large number of commanders at thesame time, therefore needing synchronisation inallocation and execution. Joint fires belong principallyin the operational dimension where it is unlikely thatthe sensor and the shooter will be the same platform.However, in Australia we have taken the term jointfires and applied it as a concept in the tacticaldimension. It does not sit comfortably here exceptwhen we agree that the tactical level is fulfilling thewishes of the operational commander’s plan.Although joint fires may be executed in the tacticalcommander’s battlespace, they are no more part of thetactical commander’s plan than the operationalcommander will allow. Therefore, those assets whichare capable of significantly contributing to theachievement of decision will be by definitionoperational level assets and be the executors of jointfires.

At the tactical level the traditional link betweensensors and shooters has been relatively fast and maybe described as the application of tactical fires.Tactical fires are those fires that are responsive to thetactical commander. In general, this will mean theyare the assets which are either organic to the

formation or are allocated under some degree ofcommand. These are guaranteed fires. It is importantto note that these fires will, in the future, be far morecapable than current tactical fires and may includeMLRS, ATACMS, and EFOG-M. However, theywill not be joint fires. There is a tendency in Australiato confuse more capable, longer-range and precisefires with joint fires. Should the weapons systemsidentified above be allocated in the RTA TF then theyare not, by our definition, joint fires; rather they aretactical fires. Also, the effects of these weapons willnot contribute to the operational aims except throughthe more efficient achievement of tactical missions.

Joint fires by our definition will be provided byoperational and strategic assets and will be controlledat the operational level; even when they are beingemployed in short cycle tactical response. This isbecause the type of assets available to the operationallevel commander have the ability to perform a widevariety of missions across an area beyond the tacticalbattlespace. We have seen this in the past when wehave used air assets in particular. An F-111 based inTindal may be able to support a mission for thetactical commander in Top End north in the morningand then support the operational level commander inthe sea air gap that night. It is not appropriate toallocate the asset to the tactical commander, norperhaps even the operational commander. However,both need access to the effects of the weapon system;this concept is at the heart of the sensor to shooterissue.

The big challenges facing sensors and shooters donot occur at the tactical level. They are the domain ofthe operational and strategic level. There is a growingneed for a system of systems framework to defineprecision requirements, as well as a need for anarchitecture which will drive the development ofadvanced technologies and systems applicable toprecision. The ADF must begin to move beyond theservice specific approach to the employment ofprecision and experiment with new organisationalapproaches to employing these systems on futurebattlefields. These systems will likely be theatre widewith no single service able to provide a servicespecific core organisational unit to serve as the basisfor COMAST’s joint task force. This means eithernew units have to be developed or we need toimprove the architecture of the links among units andservices.

The Challenges for Precision in JointOperations

Sensors, Shooters, Joint Fires and theLevels of War


This does not imply that new commands or neworganisations must be created. In fact, we may need toconsider the opposite approach. The power inherentin new information technologies could expand acommander’s span of control, allowing us toeliminate one or more levels of command oramalgamate a number of units, and consequentlyaccelerate the decision making and command andcontrol cycle. It will certainly require decision makingand command and control cycle. It will certainlyrequire us to approach the issue of BattleManagement from a new perspective.

Battle Management includes operations planning,force management and coordination, and direction ofC4ISR during mission execution. It spans currentoperations through future operations to future plans,with the corresponding situation assessment andoperational evaluation at each level. Battlemanagement deals with multiple decision loopsincluding a fast, sensor to shooter decision loop. Italso deals with complex issues like the uncertainty oflarge amounts of information and the aggregation ofmany variables into the assessment of progress inachieving a given objective.5

Executing operations in a joint force environmentpresents two key challenges. The first is theoptimisation and integration of multiple sensors andshooters to achieve the desired effect on the enemy.The second is to establish effective linkages betweensensors and shooters so that there can be a seamlesstransition between the detection of an enemy and hisdestruction. It is important to note that multiplesensors can support multiple shooters in an almostendless mix over time. None of the elements of anyspecific sensor to shooter team are necessarilydedicated to a single mission. On the contrary, formaximum effectiveness in the entire battlespace,sensors in particular will be time shared across manymissions.

When we speak of a sensor to shooter mix we arereally discussing the command and control linkageswhich control the engagement of targets which havebeen detected or cued by sensors. In many cases atarget will be detected by a number of sensors, andmay be engaged by a number of shooters. In thisenvironment, the key operational concept required isone of distributed command and control. The art willlie in the ability of the commander to establish asystem which links the most appropriate sensor with

the most appropriate shooter to engage the particulartarget or targets in an effective manner.

To do this we need to establish a command andcontrol architecture which executes missions using asensor to shooter grid or matrix.6 The C2 for eachsensor to shooter team requires functional capabilitysimilar to that of the commander, but for an increaseddepth of detail spanning a reduced breadth of area ofinterest and having a much stronger focus on thetimeliness of the information versus its completeness.In a traditional sense we can see that the unit or sub-unit headquarters could be employed to perform thistask in the same manner as it performs its manoeuvretask. Indeed, the sensor to shooter team can be seen tobe similar in nature to the offensive support team inconventional operations.

We should not see sensor to shooter operations asdiscrete from manoeuvre operations. Sensor toshooter operations should be planned in the samemanner, as a contributing component, to the overalloperation and will require many of the same functionsas battle management operations, for example sensortasking and information acquisition. This is becausesensor to shooter operations begin when the missionis assigned to the unit or sub-unit. At this point, thesensor to shooter execution team must perform thesame functions in planning how the mission is to beexecuted that the staff performed in planning whatwill be executed.

This would see a more holistic integration ofmanoeuvre with offensive support such that thecommander, as part of deliberate operations, wouldform manoeuvre teams supported and integrated withsensor to shooter teams, to achieve the overallmission. In some cases the manoeuvre team wouldalso contain some of the sensors and shooters whichform part of the sensor shooter team. In this way webegin to approach a situation where we optimise allcapabilities and achieve the maximum value fromevery element on the battlefield. This optimisationwill also have the benefit of reducing the number ofdiscrete systems on the battlefield, assisting us withour aim to empty the battlespace, and employing theconcept of manoeuvring that firing to manoeuvre.

Sensor to shooter operations are basically of twotypes; those that are executing the planned operation;and those that are providing assets for contingency orresponse operations. A key element of integratedsensor to shooter operations is that there will probablybe multiple elements operating simultaneously. This

Types of Sensor to Shooter Operations

Sensor to Shooter Operations

LINKING SENSORS AND SHOOTERS IN THE ADF 21

means the staff may have to plan the synchronisedoperations of multiple missions while being preparedto execute highly responsive missions.

For each mission the information linkages mustbe established between sensors and shooters to enabletimely execution, especially time critical missionsagainst fleeting targets. Ideally, strategic, operationaland tactical sensors can be integrated to cue allshooters. Effective implementation of these linkageswill require the establishment of sensor to targetpairing architecture.

The key characteristics of an effective sensor toshooter system are that they are parallel, fast,dynamic, and linked by reliable communications.This will provide simultaneous access to battlespaceinformation by shooters and execution controllers aswell as by the staff. Future operations will separatethe information flow from the command cycle. This isnecessary to achieve the desired responsiveness.Furthermore, this characteristic is also a major driverin the need for dynamic planning capabilities andparallel operations.

In the proposed system concept, the sensors willcontinuously input new information into battlespaceawareness databases while the executing elementsand the staff will simultaneously be able to retrieveinformation or have it automatically retrieved andformatted into the appropriate displays. In thismanner, today’s conflict of competing sensor taskingwill be resolved using integrated sensor managementtechniques. Although the staff is seeking battlefieldinformation throughout the entire battlespace, theshooters are seeking targeting information. Thismeans that the shooter needs target location andidentification, situational awareness in the target area,and clearance to shoot. Current shooters do not haveadequate situational awareness in the target area. Theconnectivity and access achieved throughimplementation of the grid or matrix will providesituational awareness, thus enabling shooters and themanoeuvre elements to execute the operationsuccessfully.

The capabilities required for the conduct of sensorshooter operations are the ability to coordinatemultiple simultaneous missions and the ability toexecute time critical (response) operations. In bothcases, the need for parallel, fast, and dynamicoperations, supported by instantaneous and reliablecommunications remains a key consideration. Thekey problem is competition for sensor coverage

between the staff and shooters. The key solution isenabling distributed command and control ofavailable sensor coverage.

A key issue in sensor shooter operations is the roleof communications as the means by which the sensorand shooter are linked. High ground has alwaysplayed an important role in effective militarycommunications and communicating with forcesdispersed across the battlefield or deployed over greatdistances has always been a major challenge. Theimportance of communications increases as theADF’s missions become more complex and forcelevels decrease. Combat net radios for very highfrequency (VHF) are limited by line of sight (LOS)and have to rely on radio relays located on highground to overcome terrain restrictions. Satellitecommunications systems are less hampered by LOSrestrictions and can significantly enhancecommunications capabilities by extending ranges andreliability. Satellites offer an effective means ofovercoming the physical limitations of LOS radios,extending the range of terrestrial communicationssystems throughout the area of operations.

Communications satellites will become one of thekey enablers to facilitate effective sensor shooterlinks. They operate in a wide band of radiofrequencies and provide the link between tactical,operational and strategic shooters and sensors. UHFsatellite communications systems in use with the USForces, such as the FLTSAT and AFSATCOMsystems, are used to support battle commandrequirements for high priority users, to include EAMdissemination, force direction, and JCS/CINC netting.SHF communications systems, such as the DSCS,support worldwide, long haul, secure voice and highdata rate communications for battle command, earlywarning, crisis management, and internetting betweenthe NCA/JCS and the combatant commanders.Milstar, the next generation military satellite system,is an EHF system capable of jam resistant secureworldwide communications during all levels ofconflict.

Currently, satellites are used primarily to augmentground-based communications systems, providingcommunications links not only to forces employed inan area of responsibility, but also to deploying forceswhile en route.However, during deployments tocontingency areas having little or no infrastructure tosupport command and control, satellites will becomethe primary means of communications. The

Communications 7 – The Link

System Characteristics


LINKING SENSORS AND SHOOTERS IN THE ADF

characteristics which make satellite communicatesideal for sensor shooter operations are: greaterfreedom from siting restrictions; extended range,capacity, and coverage; real time capabilities; standalone capability and reduced logistical support onthe battlefield; freedom from rigid networkconfigurations; mobility and rapid emplacement; andextremely high circuit reliability.

Military and commercial satellite communicationssystems are invaluable assets that can be used at allechelons of command. In the US case, militarysatellite communications systems are considered jointassets and are controlled by the JCS, who allocate theresources based on need. More often than not,demand exceeds the capabilities of the systems;therefore, access to military satellite channels is at apremium and closely monitored. Learning from thisexperience the ADF must clearly define and articulateits requirements for critical battle commandconnectivity and the development of joint sensorshooter concepts and doctrine. The ADF must alsoconsider the use of commercial satellites, such as theINTELSAT and the INMARSAT terminals, as analternative means of satisfying their communicationsrequirements. Satellite communications will notprovide the answer for all sensor shooter problems;however, it will be a critical enabler for effectivesensor shooter integration.

When we overlay the strategic-operational-tacticalcontinuum to the sensor shooter issue we can see thedifferences between these levels. At the strategic levelit is unlikely that sensors and shooters will be linked.For example, JORN will not be linked to an F111 butthe aircraft may be tasked based on informationgained by the strategic sensor. Again at theoperational level, sensors and shooters may be linkedbut it is more likely that the shooters will be cued bythe sensors. Additional time is added to the process aswe deploy or cue shooters to get within range to hitthe target.

However, at the tactical level the best sensors arealso shooters; or where they are not shooters, aredirectly linked to a designated shooter. In generalterms this will mean tactical sensors deployed tosupport a tactical commander will be directly linkedto weapons systems or task teams in order to respondto an immediate threat or as part of a plannedoffensive mission. As weapon systems become more

sophisticated we can see that the best systems will bethose that can sense and shoot, thereby reducing thedecision cycle and increasing tempo; this accounts forthe high utility of attack helicopter systems such asthe Apache Longbow. The poorest sensors will bethose that having sensed, rely on another system toengage the target. In other words, the weakness, andthe area we must develop as a priority, lies at the linkbetween the sensor and the shooter.

The key to increasing tempo at all levels will befound in improving the links between the sensor andthe shooter. At the tactical level, the emphasis shouldbe on systems which can sense and shoot almostsimultaneously. At the operational and strategic level,the key will be develop systems capable of linkingsensors and shooters in a grid which will enable theADF to optimise the entire force, across battlespace,time and service. When we develop a system whichachieves this we will begin to make major stepstowards achieving a truly joint ADF.

NOTES1. Clear acknowledgement must be given at the outset that many of

these concepts and definitions are taken from developmentalwork being conducted in the US, much of which is availablethrough open sources, especially the internet. The authors in noway claim originality but are attempting to place some of theseissues in an Australian context and stimulate thinking in theADF.

2. For our purposes, sensors will refer generically to any human ortechnology based capability which can detect and report anenemy contact. These systems include individuals and unitsacross the services. Shooters will refer generically to anyweapon system or systems which can engage the enemy withdestructive fires or capabilities and may also include individualsor units, again across the services.

3. Precision Force is the capability to destroy selected high-valueand time-critical targets or inflict damage with precision whilelimiting collateral damage. This capability includes precision-guided munitions, surveillance, and targeting capabilities. Itrequires advances in sensors, C2 interoperability, battlemanagement, and lethality. It also requires precision-guidedmunition enhancements for increased range, accuracy, andweapon effectiveness. Additionally, “sensor-to-shooter” C4Ienhancements are necessary for responsive, timely forceapplication.

4. Definition from Army Vision 2010 Precision Engagement.5. ABIS Task Force Battle Management Working Group Results. 6. The architecture for the battle management system assumes a

shared, dynamic, consistent information base supported by gridcapabilities. Forces would access a network of distributed,interacting servers to implement battle managementcoordination. Key among these services is the sharedunderstanding of the battlespace and of own and enemy optionssupporting the continuous planning process. Distributedprocesses generate, access, and utilise this information forsynchronising joint plans and operations. All planning processesare connected to the central, dynamic representation ofoperations strategy distributed via the grid.

7. Informed by FM 100-18, Chapter 4.

Conclusion

23

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By Wing Commander Premchand Kainikara Indian Air Force (Rtd.)

To fight and conquer in all your battles is notsupreme excellence; supreme excellence consistsin breaking the enemy’s resistance withoutfighting.…This is the method of attacking by stratagem ofusing the sheathed sword.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

National security goals are the cornerstones onwhich a nation’s defence policy and threat

perceptions, and quantification are based. Militaryobjectives are derived directly from the laid downdefence policy and other undertakings necessary toachieve the security goals. The structure of the forceswill flow from the features that are emphasised in thedefence policy and is normally indicative of a nation’ssecurity perspective. Military doctrine evolves from acombined understanding of policy and objectives andis the guiding principle in any war. In recent times,technological innovations have played a veryimportant role in defining doctrine, especially in thedevelopment of an operational air power doctrine. Asopposed to the initial years when operationalrequirements drove technology to find solutions,today tacticians are finding themselves in situationswherein technological advances are pushing the entireair power employment doctrine. This makes itnecessary to combine doctrine and technology in ajudicious manner to optimise the effectiveness of airpower.

The mission of the ADF is to promote the securityof Australia, and to protect its people and its interestsor in plain words to defend Australia and its regionaland global interests.1 Although Australia does notshare a land border with any other nation state, theproblems of defending the island nation are infinitelycomplex.

New Flash Points.Superpower rivalries and theresulting bipolarisation of the world ceased with theend of the Cold War. However, the utopian dreams ofa world living in peace with itself have remained amythical concept. Smaller and more volatile nationshave continued to generate armed clashes across theglobe in their almost nihilistic search for nationalexpression and the need to fulfil their individualaspirations. New democracies also tend to increasefriction with their neighbours by wanting to erasecenturies of deprivation of self-expression with atangible and immediate enhancement of their people’sfuture. These actions often generate politicaluncertainty, economic refugees and forced migrationbecause of human rights violations, thereby reducingthe situation uncontrollably into flash points. Theseflash points are more noticeable in the developingworld of erstwhile colonies, where inherent religiousand cultural disparities also add to the turmoil.

Possible Scenario. In the case of Australia, beingisolated almost completely negates the possibility of amigrant or refugee induced crisis. However, theevents unfolding in its immediate neighbourhood andareas of interest combined with the economictribulations of the region has a salutary effect on theperceived threat that the ADF may have to face. Thepossible threat scenario (without consideringinformation warfare) in the conventional sense, can beany one of the following:a. An amphibious combined attack on the country;b. Covert hindrance of merchant shipping and the

threat to maritime approaches by surface, airborneor sub-surface forces; and

c. Constant belligerence and provocations by one ormore of regional neighbours in an attempt bythem to gauge the nation’s military capability andpreparedness as well as its political resolve toprotect its interests by the use of force. While the first case of hostile forces landing on

Australian mainland, is only a remote possibility inthe near future, the other two are distinctly possible atany given time and at short notice. The constantly

Threat Perceptions

Introduction

Deep Strike Capability – The Cutting Edge of Deterrence

changing geopolitical circumstances in the region andthe rapidity with which these changes are beingeffected in some areas are causes for serious concern.Therefore, a continuous monitoring and review of thepolitical economic perceptions, which directlyinfluence all military action, of all neighbouringnations becomes an imperative necessity.

Military Build Up . The geographical positioningof Australia precludes the intention of any othernation to annex and hold even a part of the Australianmainland. But the waxing and waning of the nation’sinfluence in the region and its capacity to protect itsinternational interests would be under constant andintense scrutiny. Australia has so far been seen as theonly developed country in the region and has alsobeen the most significant military power. The ANZUSTreatyand the assured US military and logisticalbackup in case of necessity have so far succeeded inmaintaining the status quo. However, the militarybuild up in the region in the past decade and thewillingness on the part of even small economies tospend a disproportionate portion of their nationalbudget on defence acquisition has eroded this numerouno position almost irretrievably. Assured militarysupport from an ally is not the same as having one’sown forces to deploy. “The possession of militarypower will always remain of major importance ininternational affairs”.2 The recent developments inIndonesia and the clear change in Australia’s stand onthe East Timor issue would have to be viewed aspotential irritants to national security.

It can be said with a certain amount of assurancethat the threat to Australia’s interests and influencewould be covert, generated partly by the economicthrust and growth of the larger economies in theregion. This would be further fuelled by the alignmentof most of the smaller economies against Australia fora variety of reasons, some of them cultural andhistoric. The threat would be a slow nibbling away atthe sphere of influence and the slow but steadydegradation of the status of the nation leading finallyto increased isolation in the region. Therefore, theADF would have to be in a position to anticipate andbe in readiness to react to subversive and disruptivethreats to the economy and sphere of influence in farranging areas.

Basic Air Power Doctrine: The ImponderablesAir power is the ability to project military force byor from a platform in the third dimension abovethe surface of the earth. The air is used not merelyas a medium that is traversed by a bullet or other

projectile, but as a medium for manoeuvre,deployment, concealment and surprise.

MJ Armitage and RA MasonAir power in the Nuclear Age3

A force develops an operational philosophythrough inward and critical analysis of its past actionsas well as from the understanding of threatperceptions. While it is possible to adapt the alreadydeveloped philosophy of large-power armed forces, itcan never fully cater for the realities that are peculiarto smaller nations. It is therefore necessary to evolve adoctrine and operational philosophy of its own forany force to be optimal in its efficiency. A viabledoctrine should be dynamic and be able tocontinuously support the conditions of the conflictwithout being dogmatic. It should reflect theassumptions that were made regarding the threat andits nature while being able to provide adequateguidance to commanders in war and changingcircumstances while being able to accept some degreeof uncertainty.4

Whatever the threat perception, certain aspectsremain constant in the efficient employment of airpower. Lack of knowledge regarding its uniquecharacteristics and poor understanding of the cardinalprinciples that guide its employment will alwayscompletely invalidate the inherent and intrinsicqualities of air power. However, external influencesand regional security concerns and compulsions tend toimpinge on the effectiveness of air power, especiallywhen employed as an instrument of power projection.

In all cases it is imperative that the air powerdoctrine must form part of the joint doctrine and alsotake into account the limitations, both political andtechnological that are placed on the utilisation of airassets. A number of principles must not be violated atany time in an effort to gain short-term goals.a. Air power is dynamic and must be employed as

such without in the least being tied down at anystage;

b. The entire air assets must be centrally controlledwith only tactical command being delegated asnecessary. This is true of both tactical andstrategic employment, as also of non-lethalcapabilities like airlift, reconnaissance, etc;

c. Even in a defensive situation, air power has to beaudaciously employed in an offensive manner toexploit its full potential. In certain extremesituations this might even involve committing allaircraft to battle without any reserve; and

d. Although it does not guarantee ultimate victory,the prime concern of the air force must remainachieving air superiority and maintaining it


throughout the duration of the conflict. All otherair operations must normally take second place tothis aim.

Air warfare cannot be separated into littlepackets; it knows no boundaries on land and seaother than those imposed by the radius of actionof the aircraft; it is a unity and demands unity ofcommand.

Air Marshal Lord Tedder

Small Force LimitationsWe need to be constantly refining, testing andevaluating our doctrine, especially in relation tojoint and combined operations because doctrineforms the basis for the planning and employmentof air power.

Air Vice Marshal PG Nicholson“Operating the RAAF Beyond 2000”5

Although technologically still the most developedin the region, the RAAF will have to be considered asmall air force for purposes of evaluation anddevelopment of doctrine. Small forces have certainlimitations under which they operate.

Attrition. The main problem faced by smallforces is that of attrition which has an immediate andrapid effect on the impact of air power on anyconflict. The doctrine will have to take this hard factinto account and be modelled to emphatically curtailthe ill effects of attrition on the final outcome of theair war. The problem gets exaggerated in a situationwherein the entire force is committed to battle withoutreserves. The impact of attrition on the operationalefficiency of the force was recognised very early inthe advent of air power. “Adequate means for rapidreplacement of wastage in personnel, as in aeroplanes,is a very important factor in gaining and maintainingair superiority”6. Small forces would also have to becareful regarding training attrition in peacetime sinceit has a disproportionate impact on the force’s warfighting capability and morale. In war the intensityand pace of the conflict will govern attrition and anacceptable attrition rate would depend entirely on thestrategic objectives of the war.

Doctrine. In the current international scenarioonly the USAF would be able to apply their air powerdoctrine fully and without compromise in anyconflict. All other air forces will have to modify theabsolutes of air power doctrine to suit the pragmaticrequirements of the economic, geographic, politicaland cultural situation that are peculiar to the nation.

On the other hand the same limitations also make itimperative that small forces apply their doctrine morevigorously than would a large force. However, smallforces also tend to be vague regarding theemployment of air power without any significantdoctrine of their own. In some cases great powersupport tends to make the smaller force aspire toassimilate and adopt the doctrine of the larger force astheir own. This tends to nullify the entire range ofpotential utilisation of air assets in the context of thatnation. For example, the global engagement doctrineof the USAF cannot be totally (or even partially)adopted by the air forces of any of their allies becauseno other nation today possesses the assets required todo so independently. Lack of doctrinal developmenthas been a major lacuna in many air forces for a longtime. This situation can be remedied only by ensuringthat a time tested doctrinal development process isfirmly in place to nurture and sift ideas, and opinionsas well as to generate free criticism.

Politico-Military Relationship. For a small forceto be effective and credible it is necessary to developand sustain a force capable of exploiting advancedtechnology to generate and maintain an edge overpotential adversaries. But in today’s world ofdwindling defence budgets and constraints imposedby emerging politico-economic situations, this maynot be a possibility for all nations. In some cases(mainly in democracies) the political leadership tendsto ignore or overrule the advice of the military inprofessional areas such as weapon systemsacquisition, force structure development and threatassessment.7 These external factors play an importantrole in the formulation of the military strategy of thenation which indirectly buffets the free developmentof operational doctrine. Resolute political will, as wellas mutual trust and understanding, between politicaland military leadership are also prerequisites for anation to fully exploit the advantages of air superiorityafter it has been achieved.

RAAF: The VanguardA viable air power doctrine does not evolve in

isolation. In fact the individual doctrines of eachservice forms the foundation of a joint doctrine whilenot detracting any of them from effective independentapplication. “Air strategy is governed by theprinciples of war just like any other kind of strategy,but the application of the principles of air warfarecannot be the same as in land warfare because theconditions are so different”8.

The ADF will have to cater for two maineventualities.

DEEP STRIKE CAPABILITY – THE CUTTING EDGE OF DETERRENCE 27

a. To fight as part of a coalition force or as an ally ofthe USA in some far-off distant theatre; and

b. To fight a limited independent action which couldbe a small war or a low intensity conflict in thepursuit of national security goals.The first eventuality is not difficult to comprehend

and the RAAF is fully equipped to operate alongsideglobal allies as part of a coalition or UN force. Thedesired level of interoperability has already beenachieved and is a continuing thrust for the planners.This article confines the discussion to the capabilityand the requirements of the RAAF in facing thesecond eventuality wherein it would have to assumethe mantle of the leading wave in any independentaction of the ADF and to defining possible corecompetencies.

Over the past decade there has been a noticeabledecline in Australia’s capability to undertakeindependent military action not only due to economicconstraints, but also because of the changing politicalperceptions at home and in the region. Thecomparative reduction in size has increased theRAAF’s dependence on technological superiority toensure an edge over potential adversaries and to retainits position as the pre-eminent regional force. Underthe current political situation in the region, theinvolvement of the RAAF in conflicts that are notconnected with the direct defence of Australia cannotbe ruled out. There is a distinct possibility that thecurrent turmoil in the Timor region and the economicnecessity to enforce the Timor Gap Treatymay forceAustralia to take on the role of “local policeman” inthe region. The potential of emerging superpowersbecoming hostile in the face of reduced capabilities isalso a worrisome prospect.

In the situations discussed above, the use of landforces may not be an option available to theGovernment for a variety of reasons. Theinadmissibility of casualties in some far-off place andin a conflict that is perceived by the local public as ofno consequence to the nation almost immediatelyobviates their deployment. It is an axiom of thepolitical leadership in developed countries that landforces would not be placed in harms way for extendedperiods unless the security of the nation is directlythreatened. Under these circumstances it will fall tothe lot of the RAAF to be in the forefront of anyconflict that may arise.

In this scenario the RAAF needs a formidable pre-emptive precision engagement capability. “For thepast half-century offensive air power has been thedecisive expression of military power for the liberaldemocracies, even though many analysts have beenreluctant to recognise or acknowledge that fact”9. The

following core competencies are suggested for theRAAF to be able to be the vanguard and cutting edgeof the ADF when faced with a “stand alone” situation.

I. Deep Penetration Strike.Of all the corecompetencies that the RAAF must have, none is moreimportant than the capability to carry outpremeditated and precision engagement of allintrusions into its air space, sea-lanes or sphere ofinfluence. The capability to carry out surgical deeppenetration strikes at will, acts as a deterrent to allpotential hostile forces. Military action in support of anation’s economic or political interests is not anaccepted norm today and all such actions come underintense international scrutiny almost immediately. It isin this context that the characteristics of flexibility,mobility and range unhindered by geographicalbarriers inherent in air power can be used todemonstrate the political resolve of a nation.10 Aprecision strike bringing to focus all the destructionthat air power is capable of while limiting or totallyavoiding collateral damage is today an acceptedprojection of power solution in the defence of nationalinterests. The successful Israeli raid on the Osiraknuclear reactor, termed by the then Israeli PrimeMinister Begin as a “morally supreme act of nationaldefence”, is a prime example of this capability.Precision strikes are also the most cost effective,demonstrative and time-responsive action that anation can mount.

II. Regional Engagement.In order to safeguardthe interests of the nation it will be necessary toproject power in a variety of ways. Any regionalinitiatives if not backed by visible military power aswell as the forceful political will to use it are bound tofail. In this context, the RAAF is well suited to projectAustralia’s interests by employing combat power orby non-lethal deterrence. Any overt or covertsurveillance or reconnaissance as well as theenforcement of “no-fly” zones could be termed asnon-lethal deterrence. However, the effectiveness ofthis kind of power projection is limited to thewillingness of the nation to back it up with concreteand resolute action if necessary. It must also berealised here that provocative projection of air powermay be detrimental to the cause in an already tensesituation and may trigger off responses far in excessof those anticipated. For the RAAF, the sphere ofinfluence that is required to be protected and the areawhere power projection may be needed is vast vis-à-vis the size of the force. Therefore it is necessary toensure that unity of command is maintained byretaining control of the force at the highest level


DEEP STRIKE CAPABILITY – THE CUTTING EDGE OF DETERRENCE

possible so that prioritisation of missions andconcentration of effort can be easily achieved.

III. Rapid Reaction and Range.By virtue of thelocation of the nation, the air assets cannot beconcentrated close enough to the area of operations.This would entail the need to have a force that canrapidly respond to all emerging situations. The need isto have enough assets that can form the vanguard ofan immediate response with sufficient range andloiter-time to allow unhindered deployment of themain force. Since the force will necessarily be small,it needs to be technologically superior to any possibleadversary and also supported by other critical non-combat assets.

IV. Non-Combat Assets.The last critical corecompetency the RAAF needs is in the field ofsurveillance, reconnaissance, electronic andinformation warfare. Electronic warfare forcescapable of stand-off, stand-in and escort jamming (i.e.non-lethal suppression of enemy air defences[SEAD]): HARM-missile lethal SEAD, activecommunications jamming, and other command andcontrol warfare roles are of vital importance tosanitise the ingress and egress corridors for the strikeforce. They also form an essential part of an airsuperiority force. Optimum and continuousexploitation of the electronic and informationspectrum is needed to generate and maintain an edgeover the adversary. Combat power can be brought tobear on the desired target only with the active aid ofautomated monitoring and guidance systems. Theimportance of information warfare in its widest formdoes not need over emphasis.

The effectiveness of air power combat assetsrapidly declines with technological obsolescence. The improvements being brought about on

countermeasures further degrade the effectiveness offighter aircraft. A small force, which needs tooptimise utilisation to enhance its performancecapabilities, would also have to look for built-intechnological upgrade facilities in all their weaponsystems to counter their degeneration.

It is suggested that the RAAF consciously assumethe lead role of the strike force for the ADF and buildits forces towards maintaining the edge that Australiahas so far enjoyed in the region. A calculated anddemonstrated deep strike capability, backed byemphatic political will, may perhaps be the only truedeterrent in an area of rapidly shifting socio-politicaland economic circumstances. The ADF has tomaintain the potential to conduct swift and warwinning campaigns while also conducting regionalengagement and it is in this context that the RAAFwill have to be in the forefront.

NOTES1. Defence Corporate Plan 1996-2000, p. 3.2. Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, “Australia’s Regional Security”

Ministerial Statement, December 1989, p. 12.3. 2nd Edition, University of Illinois Press, Chicago 1985, p. 2.4. Gordon H. McCormick, “The Dynamics of Doctrinal Change”,

OrbisVol. 27 No.2 Summer 1983, p. 267.5. P.G. Nicholson Air Vice Marshal, “Operating the RAAF

Beyond 2000”, New Era Security – The RAAF in the Next 25years,Alan Stephens (Ed), Air Power Studies Centre, RAAFBase Fairbairn, 1996, p. 255.

6. H.N. Wrigley Air Vice-Marshal, The Decisive Factor: AirPower Doctrine(Ed) Alan Stephens & Brendon O’Loghlin,AGPS Press Publication, Canberra, 1990, p. 62.

7. S.A. Mackenzie Squadron Leader RNZAF, Strategic AirPower Doctrine for Small Air Forces,Air Power StudiesCentre, RAAF Base Fairbairn, 1994.

8. H.N. Wrigley, See Note 5, p. 112.9. P.V. Nicholson Air Vice-Marshal & Alan Stephens, New Era

Security and the RAAFAPSC, Paper No. 43, April 1996, p. 13.10. J.S. Hamwood, “Graduated Response by Air Power: The Art of

Political Dissuasion by Militray Means”, APSC, Paper No. 7,October 1992.

Conclusion

Wing Commander Premchand “Sanu” Kainikara voluntarily retired from the Indian Air Force after 21 years of commissioned serviceas a fighter pilot. During his service he commanded an operational MiG-21 bis squadron and also flew the entire range of MiG fighters(i.e.–21,-23,-25,-27,-29). He is also a QFI (A2) and a graduate and instructor of the Fighter Weapons School. Wing CommanderKainikara is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College and the College of Air Warfare. He obtained his Master of Science inDefence Studies from the University of Madras, India.

29

AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Australian Prisoners of War spans the Boer War to the Korea War and commemoratesthose Australians who suffered as Prisoners of War in all conflicts.

This is the 10th in a series of commemorative books produced by theAustralian Defence Force Journal.

This series of publications was produced with the encouragement of the Chief of theAustralian Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence in

acknowledgement of the contribution made by former members of the Australian Defence Force in times of adversity.

Australian Prisoners of War is available from the office of theAustralian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $29.95.

Australian Defence Force Journal – Mail Order Form

AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WARPlease send order to Australian Defence Force Journal,

B-4-26, Russell Offices, CANBERRA ACT 2600

Name: ____________________________________________________________________________________

Address: __________________________________________________________________________________

I enclose a cheque or money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $_________________being payment for copies of Australian Prisoners of War.

By Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing, Aust Int

The examination of military history shows thatmen have frequently been compelled to serve in

the armed forces and that the beliefs or desires ofthose individual men took second place to theperceived needs of their society. Mankind hasgenerally accepted the need for conscription as ameans of raising forces for national defence, but it hasalso moved to accommodate those citizens who wereunable to participate. As such, ConscientiousObjection (CO), generally for reasons of religiouspacifism, has become legal in many nations asgrounds for avoiding conscription.

What of the citizen who feels no opposition to theconcept of fighting in war in general, but is intenselyopposed to a particular war? The generally accepteddoctrine of CO, which depended upon the objectordemonstrating their complete inability to fight in anywar, does not fit such a citizen. And, moreintriguingly, what of the citizen who is a member ofthe armed forces of his society, and is thuspresumably prepared to fight, who objects to aparticular conflict and refuses to participate. This istermed Selective Conscientious Objection (SCO).

This article examines SCO and its likely effectupon the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Theexamination commences with a summary of thedevelopment of CO and its religious basis in westerncultures. The article uses Australian examples todemonstrate how broadened secular definitions of COare part of an increasingly liberal historical continuumwhich has led to the development of SCO forconscripts. Particular attention is paid to Australianparticipation in the Gulf War of 1991. The evidenceindicates that this continuum will inevitably lead tothe right to SCO being granted to ADF personnel,who are currently all volunteers.1 The articleconcludes with comments on the current Australiansituation and an exploration of the likely significanceof SCO to the ADF.

In order to understand CO and SCO it is useful toreview the historical importance of pacifism. Theadvent and rise of Christianity posed a moralchallenge to philosophers concerned with issues ofindividual rights and responsibilities. This challengewas caused by the apparent incompatibility betweenthe pacifist teachings of Christ and the imperative ofnational survival which often required the waging ofwar.

The teachings of Saint Augustine in the 5thcentury and Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13thcentury provided a resolution to this challenge withthe concept of just war.2 A war was just, and thewaging of war sanctioned by God, if the war wasconducted by a legally constituted nation as a lastrecourse. The teaching “thou shalt not kill” wasreinterpreted as “thou shalt not murder” and thisreinterpretation, combined with the notion of the justwar, became the basis of the acceptability of war tomodern Christians. The reformation of the Christianchurch in the 16th and 17th centuries, however,witnessed the development of Protestant churcheswhich rejected the just war concept. These churches,such as the Anabaptists, Quakers, Mennonites andAmish, adopted the radical stance of pacifism andtheir followers refused to bear arms or to providesubstitute personnel for national armies.3

These developments in religious thoughtconflicted with the increased use of compulsorymilitary service by European nations during the 17thand 18th centuries. Following the French Revolutionof 1789, France instituted the first truly universalsystem of conscription. The Prussian Army refinedthe use of conscription and provided a model for itsemployment by most western nations during the FirstWorld War. During this period, relatively smallnumbers of people refused to participate in militaryservice and some were granted exemption on thegrounds of fervent religious belief.

The doctrine of CO gradually gained acceptancein western nations, requiring the individual to provethat religious conscience made it impossible to beararms. Some objectors received a complete exemption

The Development of CO and SCO

Introduction

Selective Conscientious Objection and the Australian Defence Force

from all military service while others were required toprovide non-combatant service. In all cases, the onusof proof rested with the objector and was generallyrequired to demonstrate a long-term commitment to achurch whose teachings rejected war. This doctrine ofCO provided a satisfactory solution to problems ofreligious conscience in the early years of the 20thcentury.

Two 20th century sociological changes havecomplicated the issue of CO in western nations. Thefirst was the rising number of agnostics and atheistswho claimed to be conscientious objectors but werenot members of churches with a recognised pacifisttradition. This change has led to secular CO. Thesecond was the rise of the notion that the rights andbeliefs of the individual could supersede theobligations imposed by citizenship. This has led tobroadened definitions of CO.

Australia was the first nation to grant totalexemption to military service on the grounds of COwith the Defence Actof 1903.4 The Act placed theburden of proof upon the conscientious objectors andrequired them to demonstrate commitment to apacifist religion. Amendments made to the DefenceAct of 1910 were even more innovative. Theyremoved the religious requirement for CO andprovided for compulsory non-combatant duties forcertain categories of CO.5

In 1911, Australia introduced compulsory militaryregistration for males aged 12 to 26. Those aged 12 to17 were required to undergo “cadet training”, those18 to 20 attended 16 days of “military training” andthose aged over 20 were exempted from formaltraining requirements. The training scheme achievedmixed results. Opponents of the scheme criticised itfor its lack of military utility, the youth of its traineesand the difficulty of gaining conscientious objectorstatus.6

The Australian people rejected proposals forconscription for overseas wartime service in tworeferenda during World War One. In contrast, GreatBritain and New Zealand introduced conscription in1916, and Canada and the United States introduced itin 1917. Each of these countries had to deal with theissues of political resistance to conscription. Forexample, the nationalist Irish and FrancophoneCanadians were generally reluctant to support theconscription policies of the British and Canadiangovernments.7 In Australia, where the government

failed to win support for the introduction ofconscription, the CO debate had much lessprominence than the debate on conscription itself.

At the outbreak of World War Two, theAustralian Government introduced conscription. TheDefence Acthad been amended just prior to the war toenable conscripted “militia” service in the defence ofAustralia and its territories (including Papua-NewGuinea), and to specifically permit CO of a non-religious nature. This recognition of CO derivedsolely from personal moral values was a further stepin the widening acceptance of CO in Australia.8

Conscription for overseas service was not universallypopular in Australia, especially when the Defence Actwas amended to enable conscripts to be deployedoutside Australian territory. By August 1944, 2,721Australians had claimed conscientious objector status9

(approximately one per centof those conscripted) andthis was during a war which threatened the nationalsurvival of Australia.

The social conscience of the Australian LaborParty (ALP) was troubled by the imposition ofwartime conscription. They had supported theamendments to the Defence Actto introduceconscription, but also introduced legislation whichwould exempt certain conscientious objectors fromeven non-combatant duties. Its leader, Prime MinisterJohn Curtin had been an opponent of conscriptionduring World War One, but the Japanese threat toAustralia was generally sufficient to allay the moralqualms of the ALP.10 Nonetheless, there remainedstrong opposition to conscription which involvedAustralian service personnel being deployed overseas.With the end of the war conscription was ended.

In 1951, “National Service” was introduced, withconscripted soldiers, sailors and airmen being requiredto serve for approximately six months. The systemwas uncontroversial because it was directed towardsthe defence of Australia rather than overseas service,and the international climate was hostile due to theCold War. National Service was abolished in 1960 asit was causing a heavy drain on the training resourcesof the Army which was expected to increase itsoperational commitments in South-East Asia.

In 1965, with the deterioration of Australia’sstrategic situation, a new National Service system wasintroduced, with a longer period of service to increasethe size of the Army only. The conscripts werechosen by ballot, a method which had been employedduring the last three years of the previous scheme.The rationale behind the ballot was that it enabledsmaller numbers of conscripts to be trained for alonger period, in this case two years, and in so doing

The Australian Experience of CO and SCO


qualify them to be employed overseas alongsideregular personnel.11

The National Service Act originally grantedexemptions from service to Aborigines, Torres StraitIslanders, members of the armed forces, non-naturalised migrants, ministers of religion, theologicalstudents, the disabled, men who could prove unduehardship, men who had married before they wererequired to register and those who had joined theCitizen Military Forces. Temporary deferments couldalso be granted to university students and apprentices.CO was permitted on the grounds of personal beliefs,but SCO to a particular conflict was not allowed.12

During this period, the Liberal Government waspreparing to send conscripts overseas to South-EastAsia as a reaction to the “domino theory” of Asiancommunist expansion, and concerns about theexpansion of the confrontation with Indonesia. TheALP opposed the deployment of Australian troops toSouth Vietnam in 1966, but the deployment was atfirst generally supported by the Australian public.13

Support for Australian military involvement was toebb as the Vietnam conflict became increasinglyunpopular. This unpopularity was due to a variety ofreasons including the perceptions that the war wasunwinnable or badly directed; that it was a war ofAmerican aggression and not Australia’s war; or thatit was unjust.

Reference to the perceived injustice of theVietnam conflict returns this article to the philosophyof the “just war”. Australia was not faced with a directthreat of Vietnamese invasion. As a result, some men,who were not pacifists in the traditional sense,claimed conscientious objector status on the groundsthat they objected to the specific case of beingcompelled to serve in the Vietnam conflict.

Cases involving these claims of SCO were heardin the Magistrates Courts and before the High Court.Some decisions tended to support the claim to SCO,but the High Court upheld the view that SCO againstparticular wars was not permitted by existinglegislation. The right to SCO was supported by theGeneral Synod of the Anglican Church and theAustralian Council of Churches, both of whichexpressed opposition to the conduct of the conflict inVietnam.14 Of the 63,740 national servicemen selectedby the balloting process, 1,012 sought the status ofconscientious objector15 (1.6 per cent).

Disquiet about conscription manifested itself inseveral ways. The ALP proposed amendments to theNational Service Actwhich would enable CO to aparticular war, but these were defeated. Public opinionpolls indicated that while Australian participation inthe conflict was broadly supported, the sending of

conscripts, generally, was not. Yet, despite the lack ofendorsement for conscript service in South Vietnam,polls indicated that less than a quarter of Australianssupported a right to SCO.16 The election of the ALPGovernment in 1972 enabled the passage of theNational Service Termination Actof 1973, but thebusy agenda of the new government led to the neglectof future planning for conscription and CO.

The United States also examined CO and SCOduring the Vietnam War. Two cases heard before theUS Supreme Court, United States versus Seeger(1965) and United States versus Welsh (1970),removed the requirement for a belief in a supremebeing as an element of CO. This demonstrated thegrowing secularisation of CO which had beenrecognised in Australia since 1939. Large numbers ofdraft resisters in the United States also claimed theright to SCO because of their particular objection tothe Vietnam War. They employed eitherreinterpretations of the relevant existing legislation orchallenges to its constitutionality. The US SupremeCourt rejected the right to SCO in the case of UnitedStates versus Gillette(1971).17

In Australia, 10 years passed with littleparliamentary interest in issues related to conscriptionuntil 1983 when ALP Senator Michael Tateintroduced a private member’s bill. The bill wasintended to enable SCO on the grounds of unjust war,the nature of the conduct of the war, or the use ofparticular weapons of war. Senator Tate aimed to give“... legal sanction to those who evaluate the rightnessof a war by a just war theory”.18

The bill was referred to the Senate StandingCommittee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs and itconsidered the issue of SCO as:

... a clash between the rights of an individualperson and the community in which he lives.19

It pointed out that the individual person hascertain inalienable rights and these must be respected,especially in a democracy. At the same time thecommunity has the right to exist and to defend itselfby legal means and these include the use ofconscription. The bipartisan report recommended thatSCO be recognised:

... so as to grant exemption from participation in aparticular military conflict where to be compelledto do so would violate the individual’s sense ofpersonal integrity.20

It was further recommended that the standard ofproof required from the SCO claimant be “proof onthe balance of probabilities”.21 “Whimsical beliefs”were to be excluded and only “seriously held moralconvictions” accepted.22 It is noteworthy that the

SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE 33

report considered the issue of the right of volunteerpersonnel to claim SCO to be outside its terms ofreference.23

Tate’s bill was not presented to the Parliament andSCO received no political attention until the invasionof Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990. The decision ofthe ALP Government to commit three warships aspart of the multi-national force to liberate Kuwait hadthe support of the Coalition opposition but not of theAustralian Democrats.

The issue of SCO was brought to a head by theactions of an Australian sailor. Leading Seaman TerryJones was a member of the crew of HMAS Adelaidebut he left the ship in Perth prior to its departure forthe Gulf on 23 August 1990. While absent withoutleave (AWOL) he enjoyed a brief period of notorietybecause prior to surrendering to the authorities hepassed a statement to Senator Vallentine of the GreenParty. He stated that:

I am not a coward and I would be prepared tofight for my country, but I am taking a politicalstand because this is not our war, we are justfollowing the Americans. I am prepared to die todefend my country but not to protect United Statesoil lines.24

When questioned about Jones, a Navy spokesmanstated that 11 Navy personnel had been excused fromsailing with the first contingent: one “conscientiousobjector”, two “non-volunteers” and eight others whowere transferred at their “commander’s discretion”.None suffered disciplinary action.25

Jones, who had taken the provocative action ofgoing AWOL and making a public statement, wascourt martialled and convicted of absenting himselfwithout leave on 13 October 1990. He was reduced inrank, forfeited four day’s pay and received a 21 daysuspended sentence. He was discharged at his ownrequest shortly afterwards.26

Three weeks later, while the three Australianwarships were on station in the Persian Gulf, SenatorVallentine introduced a bill which would permit SCOfor conscripts and, significantly, for personnel whohad volunteered for service. Her second readingspeech referred to the work done on the subject bySenator Tate and the Senate Standing Committee butshe said that the earlier bill to amend the Defence Acthad apparently dropped into “a legislative blackhole”. Her speech cited the example of the UnitedStates, where volunteer service personnel are

permitted to claim CO status following enlistment(only for reasons of absolute pacifism). It alsodescribed examples of international SCO beforediscussing the case of Terry Jones. She pointed outthat Senator Ray, the Defence Minister, had statedthat service with the Australian contingent to the Gulfwas voluntary. A weakness in ADF command andcontrol had existed, she claimed, as the ADF hadfailed to advise Jones of the option of a transfer fromhis ship prior to its deployment.27 Senator Vallentine’sbill would later lapse with the end of the 36thParliament on 17 December 1992.

The air phase of Operation Desert Stormhad beenunderway when Senator Powell, of the AustralianDemocrats, introduced a private member’s bill on 22January 1991.28 The bill was intended to amend theDefence Actto ensure that conscription was notemployed while Australia was involved in the GulfWar. At this stage the Government had already statedthat it would not revive the National Service Actandthat conscription was prohibited by the ALP platformunless Australia faced a direct military threat.29 TheDemocrats had introduced the bill to gain attention fortheir opposition to conscription and the moreimmediate issue of the use of force in the Gulf. It wasdefeated.30

During the week prior to the debate on the bill,bogus call-up letters had been received by Australianreserve personnel and this had heightened concernsabout the possible call-out of members of thereserve.31 The Government had sought to reassure thenation with statements that it had no intention ofcalling-out reserves or introducing conscription.32

The World Council of Churches Assembly inCanberra on 13 February 1991 provided aninteresting counter-point to the increasingly seculardebate on SCO. Opening the Assembly, AnglicanBishop Sir Paul Reeves, former New ZealandGovernor-General, stated that the war was “neitherholy nor just”. The Assembly called upon memberchurches to provide sanctuary to CO and “membersof the armed forces who could not obey orders in theGulf War”.33 This pronouncement could claim as anhistorical precedent, the 1971 declaration on CO andSCO by US Catholic bishops, which was issued at theheight of the unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict.34

During the period of active hostilities of the GulfWar, 1,108 ADF personnel served with the Australiancontingent: 947 Navy, 49 Army personnel and 112Air Force personnel.35 Only 12, Jones and the 11revealed by the Navy spokesman, are known to havenot volunteered for the Australian commitment to theGulf War. Of the 12, it is likely that eight (thosereleased at their commander’s discretion) were

The Gulf War and SCO


released for compassionate reasons which wereunrelated to CO. This leaves a figure of four possibleselective conscientious objectors from the totalAustralian contingent, or 0.36 per cent.

Although the sample size is relatively small thepercentage of conscientious objectors is much lowerthan the percentage in previous Australiancommitments to wars. There are several reasons forthis. First, the personnel involved in the Gulf Warwere not conscripts but volunteers who had selectedservice in the armed forces as a means of employment.They had been trained to participate in war and hadpresumably reconciled themselves with the moralissues of war, such as taking human life. Second, themembers of the ADF tend to place high value onoperational service and some would regard theopportunity to serve in the Gulf War as the highlightof their military career. Third, the multi-national forcewhich was deployed to liberate Kuwait had thesupport of the United Nations and the majority of thenations of the world. And fourth, the deployment ofAustralian ships received bipartisan parliamentarysupport, generally favourable media comment and ahigh level of public support.36 In all, the ADFpersonnel were keen to serve, and the operationenjoyed domestic and international approval.

Limited Australian opposition to the war wasdemonstrated by peace marches in capital cities andthe Waterside Workers Federation’s call for a nationalgeneral strike to protest against the war.37 Anyonechoosing to claim the status of selective conscientiousobjector would be unlikely to receive much sympathyfrom other ADF personnel or the general public.From this perspective, even the figure of 0.36 per centis surprisingly high. In a hypothetical situation, inwhich the ADF was committed to a conflict with lessthan bipartisan parliamentary support, or with lowlevels of public and media support, it is reasonable toassume that the percentage would be higher.

The reawakening of interest in SCO caused by theGulf War contributed to the introduction by the ALPgovernment of the Defence Legislation AmendmentActs of 1992 and 1993. The 1992 bill sought toamend the Defence Act by accepting therecommendations of the Senate Standing Committeeconcerning SCO. The bill defined a person’sconscientious belief as one that:

...involves a fundamental conviction of what ismorally right and morally wrong, whether or notbased upon religious convictions; and

is so compelling in character for that person thathe or she is duty bound to espouse it; and

is likely to be of a long standing nature.38

In addition to tacitly accepting SCO to a particularwar, the bill provided for the establishment of specialCO tribunals which would replace the old model ofadversarial proceedings before a magistrate. Theclaimant would continue to bear the onus of proof onthe balance of probabilities as recommended by theSenate Standing Committee. The bill removeddiscriminatory provisions of the Defence Act,widening the power of conscription to females andAboriginals; and also provided for the repeal of theNational Service Actof 1951.39

The Coalition opposition supported most of theprovisions of the bill but disagreed with therequirement for a 90 day notification to be given bythe government prior to the implementation ofconscription, and to the opportunity to claim SCO.Senator Teague argued that as conscription could nowonly conceivably be instituted during a period ofdirect threat to Australia that a period of notice was“unnecessary and redundant” and that no loyalAustralian, who was not an absolute pacifist, couldclaim SCO if Australia was under direct threat.40 MrDowner in his second reading speech referred to theReturned Services League submission to the SenateStanding Committee which argued that SCO was anobjection only of a political nature.41

The Australian Democrats supported the bill butSenator Bourne stated that:

...the Democrats are particularly concerned thatthis bill does not give volunteer service personnelthe right of conscientious objection to service inoverseas conflicts. Many Australians includingsome of the Defence Force have strong moralobjections to such service.42

Senator Chamarette of the Green Party, raised theargument that ADF recruiting promotes the idea of a“glamorous career and alternative to university” anddoes not mention the possibility of being required tokill without recourse to CO.43 But in answer to thesearguments which would grant SCO to volunteerService persons, Senator Ray stated, “I have to say Idraw the line at that. There is no way that thisGovernment can support that proposal”.44 Senator Raywent on to say that...

...when people sign up to go into the AustralianDefence Forces, they do so in the knowledge thatthey could be involved in any number or any typeof conflict.45

The Defence Legislation AmendmentActs of 1992 and 1993


The Coalition proposed an amendment to the billto remove clauses referring to SCO to particular wars.The amendment was defeated. The Democratsproposed an amendment to the bill which would grantthe right to serving ADF personnel to claim SCO. Theamendment received no support from the largerparties and was defeated. The Act, including the rightto SCO for all Australians, except ADF personnel,received assent on 30 June 1992.46

The second bill in 1993 was the subject of far lessdebate. It included amendments to modify the right ofappeal from CO tribunals to reflect more accuratelythe role of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal(AAT) and limit the right of appeal to the FederalCourt to questions of law. The Act received assent on22 December 1993.47

CO and SCO have received occasional attentionsince the passing of the Acts in 1992 and 1993.

In 1995, Senator Meg Lees of the AustralianDemocrats supported the ALP Government’s ANZACDay Bill which enshrined the day as a national day ofrecognition and commemoration. Her speechsupported the concept of ANZAC Day but she re-stated her party’s policy on supporting the rights ofconscientious objectors and opposing war as anelement of national policy. She proposed thatconscientious objectors should be required to performunspecified compulsory “community service”.48

The concept of community service re-emergedtwo years later. In September and November of 1996,Pauline Hanson representing the One Nation Party inthe House of Representatives, asserted that a form ofcivil national service should be created for Australia’syoung people.49 This approach had achieved somesuccess overseas. In the United States, the 1993National and Community Service Trust Acthadcreated the “AmeriCorps USA” program in whichover 100,000 people have provided voluntarycommunity service in return for college grants.50

Hanson’s proposal attracted no parliamentarysupport but it did provide the Democrats with anopportunity to re-raise the issue of conscription.Senator Natasha Stott-Despoja of the AustralianDemocrats, gave notice that she intended to move amotion on the next day of sitting which rejected boththe idea of compulsory community service andconcept of military conscription. She opposed:

... any form of military national service orconscription of young Australians.51

The motion lapsed and no further parliamentarydebate on the matter has occurred to date.

The passage of the 1992 and 1993 Acts, and thelimited debate on the issue of conscription since then,brings us to the current situation which can besummarised as follows:• conscription is very unlikely unless Australia is

under direct threat;• CO and SCO are available to conscripts; and• CO is available to volunteers, but SCO is not.

This final point warrants further explanation. COis available to volunteer personnel during peacetimethrough the routine administrative procedure ofapplying for discharge from the ADF. This couldoccur if a serviceperson joined a pacifist religiousorganisation and became a CO. It is possible that asimilar procedure may operate during a period ofhostilities with a CO tribunal determining the absoluteCO of the serviceperson.

The parliamentary debate on the 1992 bill, andsubsequent mention of the issues, demonstrate thatboth the ALP and the Coalition oppose SCO forvolunteer service personnel. This position will bedifficult to maintain. This article has traced theincreasing availability of the right to CO and discussedhow that right has been expanded in Australia throughlegislation and public opinion. This historicalcontinuum of an expanded right to CO is likely tocontinue and the Australian government during futurehostilities will face increasing pressure to permit SCOwithin the ADF for a number of reasons.

First, the Democrats, minor parties and churchorganisations with a propensity to espouse issues ofconscience, will continue to support SCO for the ADF.

Second, it is reasonable to assume that support forthe rights of the individual will continue to expand inAustralia. Other issues such as the expandedemployment of women in the ADF and theacceptance of homosexuals in the ADF haveencountered opposition but have become inevitabledue to increasingly liberal attitudes within Australiansociety. In the same manner, Australian society mayaccept that ADF personnel have the right to claimSCO. Currently, all Australian citizens have the rightto claim SCO except ADF personnel. It may even bepossible to argue that this constitutes a case ofsystemic discrimination.

Third, the previous point is complicated by thereserve forces, who constitute thirty-three per centof

The Current Australian Situation

The Debate Since 1993


the ADF, and whose responsibilities and rights areuntested. Legislation to enable the Government tocompel reserve personnel to undergo full-time servicein situations less than in time of war or defenceemergencies was passed in 1987. However, it has notbeen “exercised or proven”.52 If a call-out of reserveswere implemented it is likely that the issue of SCOwould be raised by the Democrats. It would be moredifficult to deny the right to SCO to part-time servicepersonnel especially as most reservists have noprevious full-time service. Some reservists currentlyavoid their responsibilities by electing not to attendtraining periods. If called-out, reservists couldexercise SCO by simply not reporting for duty. TheGovernment may have the option of arrestingreservists who avoid their responsibilities; but, wouldGovernment exercise that option? Such a processappears to run contrary to the Australian tradition ofvoluntary service. The reservists may, of course, besubject to conscription but they would thenpresumably have the right to make a claim of SCO. Itis beyond the scope of this article to offer a fullconsideration of the legal implications of reservistSCO. It is sufficient to point out that reservistscomplicate the issue and weaken the argument that itcan be denied to all ADF personnel.

Fourth, some ADF personnel with a foreignethnic heritage may declare themselves unable tofight against personnel of the same ethnic heritage.53

This thinking led to the exclusion of Australians ofGerman origin from Australia’s military forces duringWorld War One. On the other hand, the members ofsome minority groups may seek to demonstrate theirloyalty to Australia by performing military service.Little evidence can be produced to illuminate thisissue but it remains probable that “dual nationals” willclaim SCO for conflicts between Australia and their“homeland”. The increasingly multicultural nature ofthe Australian community, and the ADF, is likely toaccentuate the importance of this factor.

A fifth reason relates to the degree of publicsupport for future conflicts. Approval levels amongthe Australian community for possible future ADFoperations may be lower than the support given to theGulf War and United Nations peacekeepingcommitments. It is possible that ADF personnel maybe committed overseas in a campaign which isopposed by a significant proportion of the Australianpublic. The opposition may be due to the perceivedinjustice of the cause or the conduct of the operationsinvolved. For instance, the operations may be insupport of a nation which employs torture or isdenying human rights to minority groups. Bipartisanparliamentary support for the commitment may not

exist and the opposition may even claim that thecommitment is not in accordance with the doctrine ofjust war. In such circumstances a claim of SCO byserving ADF personnel would be difficult to ignore.The media and peace groups would be likely tosupport the SCO claimant and the Government couldrespond by either:• ordering the claimant to participate in the

commitment, and risk a deterioration in overallmorale and effectiveness;

• taking disciplinary action against the claimant,resulting in further adverse publicity and his orher, discharge;

• permitting the claim of SCO; or• discretely transferring the claimant to a remote

posting in Australia and attempting to “keep thematter under wraps”. This factor may be exacerbated by social changes

within Australian society which have led to a morecynical and questioning attitude towards the decisionstaken by political elites. Unquestioning acceptance ofgovernment policy is now less likely than in pastdecades, particularly in cases where Australia is notunder direct threat of attack.

A sixth reason, why the ADF is likely to facepressure to permit SCO, relates to the nature ofpossible future conflict. All ADF personnel arerequired to obey only those orders which are just andin accordance with the law of armed conflict.54 In fact,they are duty-bound to refuse to obey unlawfulorders. Australia’s ratification of the 1977 ProtocolsAdditional to the Geneva Conventionshas placedgreater restriction upon the use of destructive force inwar by the armed forces of all signatory nations,including the ADF.55 As a result, grounds for SCOmay be based on an apparently unacceptable methodof conducting operations, or by the weaponsemployed. This may lead to the extremely difficultproblem of SCO occurring on the battlefield.56 Thiscould have ramifications for the laws of armedconflict, the responsibilities of personnel who believethat they have received illegal orders, and theoperation of the Defence Force Discipline Act.Forthis reason, any future legislation to extend SCO tovolunteer ADF personnel should make provision forthe punishment of spurious claimants and theprotection of successful claimants.57

A final factor which may contribute to thepressure for the introduction of SCO for ADFpersonnel is the status of UN forces. In cases whereAustralia is committing elements of the ADF to servewith a UN force, the ADF personnel may not havevolunteered for this service. Current and past ADFpractice has been to ascertain the volunteer status of


personnel prior to providing them to the UN. TheArmy, for example, requires officers to record thisstatus on their annual confidential report. ADFpersonnel have no legal protection from UN service ifthey refuse to volunteer; but, Australia’s internationalreputation would suffer if ADF personnel were toappeal to the UN for release from a commitment asselective conscientious objectors.

Another question which warrants consideration iswhether the concepts of CO and SCO will need tochange as the roles of the ADF are increasinglyoriented towards peacekeeping and humanitarianassistance operations.58 After all, it is harder to claim adeep objection to an operation whose objective ishumanitarian aid. On the other hand, it may be easierto disobey an order to use deadly force while servingon a humanitarian mission. This is because theunderlying objective of a humanitarian mission is tosave lives rather than take them.

If SCO is to become available to ADF personnel,and there is evidence to suggest that it will, what arethe implications? Essentially the ADF will be unableto rely on every single one of its personnel in allcircumstances, and this article has demonstrated thatthis situation already exists.

Defence commitments which are unpopular withthe broader Australian community will be likely toresult in claims of SCO. If the number of selectiveconscientious objectors is small they could beemployed in duties unrelated to the particulardeployment and the issue could be managed withrelative ease. If the number is large, or key personnelsuch as officers claim SCO, tribunals will be requiredto make determinations on the cases. It would beappropriate if these tribunals were similar to the COtribunals allowed for by current legislation.

It is important to remember that the right to SCO,as detailed in the 1992 Act, does not specificallypermit political objections to a conflict although itdoes providede factorecognition of such an objection.For this reason, SCO claims within the ADF wouldtend to politicise the ADF. The mere existence of anSCO claim on political grounds, even if rejected by thetribunal, carries the risk of weakening thegovernment’s position. SCO may thus grant politicalpower to some ADF personnel who oppose Australianparticipation in a conflict. This runs contrary to theideal of an apolitical defence force which is isolatedfrom the political process. It also runs contrary to the

requirement for all ADF personnel to act in disciplinedobedience to lawful orders.59

Selective obedience to the law, as enacted by theGovernment, is not permitted in Australian society ingeneral, and it cannot exist in the disciplinedenvironment of the armed forces. The ADF is not anindustrial democracy and it is fanciful to believe that theexercise of SCO by ADF personnel would be toleratedgracefully. However, for any military activity, if thecause is just and the Australian commitment conductedin accordance with its obligations to internationalagreements, it is unlikely that many ADF personnelwould choose to claim SCO.

In reality, ADF personnel who claim SCO willface institutionalised opposition and may find ituntenable to remain in the ADF. The ADF is toosmall to provide such personnel with anonymity andunit commanders may be unwilling to receive suchpersonnel due to the risk to unit esprit d’corps.Potential selective conscientious objectors aregenerally likely to be deterred by the difficult moralquestions they face and harsh criticism from otherADF personnel, as occurred in the Jones case.60 Theymay encounter more opprobrium than traditionalconscientious objectors because they may be seen tohave “let their mates down”, and because theirdecision to object contains an implied criticism of thebeliefs of other service personnel. This factor is likelyto decrease the number of potential selectiveconscientious objectors and only those personnel witha genuine and committed objection would undertakesuch a difficult path.

The ADF may, in fact, benefit from the grantingof SCO as, from a utilitarian point of view, it maydefuse a range of potentially difficult issues in anexpeditious manner.61 Unit morale may bestrengthened if personnel with insurmountableobjections to a conflict are removed. On the otherhand, the removal of respected personnel may resultin the spreading of doubt and a reduction inenthusiasm among other personnel.

If a system is created to enable SCO to be claimedby ADF personnel it is important that it not be createdhastily as a reaction to a particular conflict. Thesystem must be durable,62 and should consider therecommendations made by both the Senate StandingCommittee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs andthe Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade.

Mainstream political theory holds that theGovernment is better placed to make a determinationon the justice of a particular conflict than an individualor opposition group. The Government possesses theexpertise, diplomatic communications and information

The Future of SCO and the ADF


to make such determinations. It should expect that itscitizens will undertake their duties as members of alawful democracy. If the Government allows its citizensto claim SCO, is it not tacitly admitting that it may haveformulated an imperfect policy? An effectivegovernment cannot allow free choice for all, andcertainly cannot allow free choice in issues relating tonational survival. However, even the most loyal citizenretains the right to an individual conscience and theAustralian Government has always tolerated CO.63 Thistolerance has enabled the historical continuum of COand SCO to develop and it has required the ADF toadjust its practices to reflect the changing attitudes ofAustralian society. These attitudes will lead to asituation in the future where ADF personnel are able toreserve the right not to fight, but only if it would violatetheir personal integrity.

The challenge posed by SCO to the ADF can bemet with the formulation of clear government policyand measured legislation. Legislative change willinevitably encounter opposition and public debate onthe subject may be heated. In the words of the 1985Senate Standing Committee Report, if SCO posed areal problem to recruitment the Government should:

... either re-examine the nature of the militaryoperation or at the very least its presentation of itto the community.64

Australians are likely to continue to volunteer formilitary service and to serve as directed bygovernment policy. This is because Australiansgenerally possess a sophisticated understanding thatthe use of force will be justifiable and unavoidable.

The historical continuum which led to religiousCO, secular CO and conscript SCO, is likely towitness the introduction of SCO for ADF personnelas Australia’s post-modern society matures. Thisdevelopment will require legislative amendment andsensitive leadership from within the ADF. Currentindications are that the great majority of ADFpersonnel are very unlikely to become selectiveconscientious objectors, but that they will gain theright to make such a claim.

NOTES1. A small number of ADF personnel who were conscripted prior

to the cessation of National Service in 1973 continue to providevoluntary service. The vast majority of current ADF personnelenlisted as volunteers.

2. Hehir, J.B., “The US Catholic Bishops and SelectiveConscientious Objection: History and Logic of the Position”,Noone Jr, M.F. (Ed), Selective Conscientious Objection:Accommodating Conscience and Security, Westview Press,Boulder, Colorado, 1989, pp. 64-65.

3. Moskos, C.C. and Chambers II, J.W., “The Secularization of Conscience,” Moskos, C.C. and Chambers II, J.W. (Eds), TheNew Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular

Resistance, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 9-12.4. Smith, H., “Conscience Law and the State: Australia’s

Approach to Conscientious Objection Since 1901” AustralianJournal of Politics and History, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1989,pp. 13-14.

5. ibid, p. 16, Smith, H., “Conscientious Objection to ParticularWars: Australia’s Experience During the Vietnam War, 1965-1972”, War and Society, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1990, p. 6.

6. Main, J.M., Conscription: The Australian Debate, 1901-1970,Cassell Australia, Melbourne, 1970, pp. 19-21. Withers, G.A.,Conscription Necessity and Justice: The Case for an AllVolunteer Army, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, pp. 3-4,pp. 4-9.

7. Levi, M., Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 111-115, pp. 134-164.

8. Smith, H., Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars: TheAustralian Approach, Working Paper No. 116, Strategic andDefence Studies Centre, Australian National University,Canberra, August 1986, p. 7.

9. ibid., p. 8. Long, G., Six Years War, Australian War Memorialand Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,1973, p. 296.

10. Withers, op. cit., pp. 12-13, p. 113.11. ibid, pp. 15-17.12. Dennis, P., Grey, J., Morris, E. and Prior, R., The Oxford

Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 1995, pp. 174-180.

13. Albinski, H.S., Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: TheImpact of Vietnam and Conscription, Duke University Press,Durham, NC, 1970, pp. 194-195. Goot, M. and Tiffen, R.,“Public Opinion and the Politics of the Polls”, King, P. (Ed)Australia’s Vietnam, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983,pp. 134-135.

14. Levi, op. cit., pp. 177-185.15.The Australian Encyclopaedia, The Grolier Society of

Australia, Sydney, 1983, Vol. 3, p. 110. Smith, ConscientiousObjection to Particular Wars: The Australian Approach,op. cit., p. 16.

16. Forward, R. “Conscription, 1964-1968”, Forward, R. andReece, B., Conscription in Australia,University of QueenslandPress, St. Lucia, Qld, 1968, pp. 128-129. Goot and Tiffen,op. cit., p. 145.

17. Malament, D., “Selective Conscientious Objection and theGillette Decision”, Cohen, M., Nagel, T. and Scanlon, T. (Eds),War and Moral Responsibility, Princeton University Press,Princeton, New Jersey, 1974, pp. 159-160, pp. 170-177.

18. Collins, P., Law and Peace, Eureka Street, Vol. 3, No. 8,October 1993, p. 39. National Service Amendment Bill 1983.

19. Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and LegalAffairs, Conscientious Objection to Conscripted MilitaryService, AGPS, Canberra 1985, p. 7.

20. Ibid., p. ix.21. Loc. cit.22. Professor P. Singer quoted in ibid., p. 9.23. Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal

Affairs, op. cit., p. 32.24. Jones quoted in “RAN ship jumper attacks Bush”, The Age

(M. Metherell), 29 August 1990, p. 10.25. Commander Paddy Hodgman quoted in “This is not our war

says taskforce deserter”, The Australian(M. Whittaker),29 August 1990, p. 8.

26. “Terry Jones revives the question of conscience”, Sunday Age(D. Stone), 25 November 1990, p. 6.

27. Vallentine, Sen. J., Hansard (Senate), 7 November 1990,pp. 3581-3582. Defence (Conscientious Objection) Bill 1990.

28. The air phase of Operation Desert Stormwas 17 January –



24 February 1991, and the ground phase was 24-28 February1991.

29. “Rule out conscription: Democrats”, Canberra Times (AAP-AFP), 20 January 1991, p. 3. “Fischer backs peacetimeconscription”, The Australian(G. Milne), 30 January 1991,p. 3.

30. Powell, Sen. J., Hansard (Senate), 22 January 1991, pp. 108-109. Defence (Middle East Anti-Conscription Amendment) Bill1991.

31. “Hawke hits out at ‘criminal’ call-up letter”, The Age(M. Grattan), 21 January 1991, p. 3.

32. Tate, Sen. M., Hansard (Senate), 22 January 1991, p. 144.“Ministers expose ‘mischief’ letter – Govt says ‘no’ toconscription”, Canberra Times (J. Thompson), 21 January1991, p. 1. “Ray rules out conscription”, The AustralianK. Harbutt), 21 January 1991, p. 2.

33. “Support war objectors, says US churches”, The Age(M. Brolly), 14 February 1991, p. 7. “A Gulf in Spirit”, Time(R. Callick), 18 February 1991, pp. 42-43.

34. US Catholic Bishops, Declaration on Conscientious Objectionand Selective Conscientious Objection,21 October 1971.

35. Information provided by Directorate Naval Personnel Services-RAN, Directorate General Manning-Army, Directorate GeneralPersonnel Services-RAAF, 9 May 1994.

36. “Most support Gulf role”, The Australian (Newspoll), 22January 1991, p. 1. “Big jump in support for the Navy going towar”, Sydney Morning Herald(I. Hicks), 24 January 1991, p. 4.

37. “Wharfies call for strike”, Courier Mail (J. McCarthy)16 January 1991, p. 2. “Thousands march for peace”, SundayTelegraph, 20 January 1991, p. 9.

38. Evans, Sen. G., Hansard (Senate), 1 April 1992, pp. 1453-1454.

39. loc. cit.40. Teague, Sen. B., Hansard (Senate), 29 April 1992, pp. 1813-

1816.41. Downer, A., Hansard (Representatives), 30 March 1992,

pp. 1402-1403.42. Bourne, Sen. V., Hansard (Senate), 29 April 1992, pp. 1818-

1820.43. Chamarette, Sen. C., Hansard (Senate), 29 April 1992,

pp. 1823-1826.44. Ray, Sen. R., Hansard (Senate),23 June 1992, pp. 4291-4293.45. ibid.46. Newman, Sen. J., Spindler, Sen. S., Hansard (Senate), 23 June

1992, pp. 4342-4346. Defence Legislation Amendment Act1992.

47.Defence Legislation Amendment Act 1993.48. Lees, Sen. M., “Anzac Day Bill 1994 Second Reading”,

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Senate,23 March 1995,pp. 2011–2012.

49. Hanson, P., “Maiden Speech”, Parliamentary Debates(Hansard) House of Representatives,10 September 1996,pp. 3860–3863. Hanson, P., “Civil National Service”,Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives,28 October 1996, p. 5877.

50. See Waldman, S., The Bill: How the Adventures of Clinton’sNational Service Bill Reveal What is Corrupt, Comic, Cynical –and Noble – About Washington,Viking, New York, 1995; and,National Service Programs: AmeriCorps USA – First-YearExperience and Recent Program Initiatives, Statement for theRecord of Cornelia M. Blanchette, Associate Director,Education and Employment Issues, Health, Education,and Human Services Division, Testimony Before the Committeeon Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate,21 May 1996,United States General Accounting Office,Gaithersburg, Maryland, 1996. Transmittal to Congress:National and Community Service Amendment Act,The WhiteHouse, Washington, D.C., 19 March 1998,http://www.nationalservice.org/reauthorization/reauth_trans.htaccessed 18 March 1999.

51. Stott-Despoja, Sen. N., “National Service”, 30 October 1996,Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Senate. p. 4712.

52.Defence Legislation Amendment Act 1987.Army Submission(p. 921) quoted in Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defenceand Trade, The Australian Defence Force Reserves, AGPS,Canberra, November 1991, p. 57.

53. Ramsey, P., The Just War: Force and Moral Responsibility,Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 1968, pp. 117–118.

54. The law of armed conflict includes the 1907 HagueConventions,the 1949 Geneva Conventionsand the 1977Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.

55.Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August1949, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1977.

56. Smith, Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars: TheAustralian Approach, op. cit, p. 4.

57.Noone Jr, M.F., “Legal Aspects of Conscientious Objection: AComparative Analysis”, Moskos and Chambers, op. cit., pp. 191.

58. For further examination of these and related issues see my workin progress The Reconceptualisation of Security and Australia’sDefence (PhD thesis).

59. Smith, “Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars: Australia’sExperience During the Vietnam War, 1965–1972”, op. cit.,p. 130.

60. Walzer, M., Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War andCitizenship, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,Massachussets 1971, p. 130. Daily Telegraph(F. Wingett andN. Wilson), 30 August 1990, p. 4. Canberra Times (J.Thompson), 30 August 1990, p. 1.

61. Smith, “Conscription and Conscience”, op. cit., p. 33.62.Cohen, E.A., Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military

Service,Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1985, p. 188.63. Smith “Conscription and Conscience”, op. cit., p. 34.64. Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal

Affairs, op. cit., p. 29.

Lieutenant Colonel Ian Wing was the 1998 Chief of the Defence Force Scholarship Fellow at the Australian Defence StudiesCentre, Australian Defence Force Academy, in Canberra. His tenure has been extended to enable him to complete his doctoralresearch into the reconceptualisation of security and Australia’s defence. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon,and Command and Staff College, Queenscliff. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with Honours and a Master ofDefence Studies, both awarded by the University of New South Wales. His current research areas are the future of conflict, theroles of post-modern armed forces, open source intelligence, mercenarism and futurism.

By Gaetano Joe Ilardi, Victoria Police

The aim of this article is to assess counterterroristmeasures in the context of deterrence theory. Not

intended as an exhaustive analysis of deterrence andits impact upon counterterrorism, its main objective isto highlight some of the key components ofdeterrence theory and the various shortcomings thatmust be considered when seeking to use it as acomponent of an overall counterterrorist strategy. Inother words, it will be the aim of this article tohighlight much that is unique about terrorism andhow this condition poses particular dilemmas fordeterrence.

The question of whether terrorists can be deterredis a very tempting one. If the answer is yes, it wouldmean that a solution to the terrorist problem isavailable to all governments who fully understand thenature of the terrorist threat and are prepared topursue a sustained deterrence strategy. All outwardappearances would suggest that a policy of deterrenceaimed at terrorists, or potential terrorist acts, istheoretically at least, a logical and feasiblecounterterrorist strategy. At its most basic level,deterrence represents an attempt to influence anactor’s assessment of its own interests by highlightingthe potential benefits or disadvantages in acting, orfailing to act in a certain manner1. The key todeterrence within the context of terrorism, therefore,is to subvert the hostile intention/sof those preparedto engage in terrorism against the state. It can be saidthat intent, under these circumstances, consists of twovital elements – namely, a desireto carry out a certainact, and an expectancythat this act will be successful.If both elements are high, then the intent of theindividual or group can also be said to be high, thusrendering any deterrence-based objectives next touseless. Deterrence strategies aimed at terrorism can

seek to subvert both of these elements. Manyadvocates of deterrence seem to be pre-occupied withthe latter element of intent to the exclusion of theformer. In reality, however, it will be shown that it isnot possible to separate these two elements of intentin any discussion on deterrence. Failure to considerboth elements will only result in a distorted view ofthe benefits of deterrence, a view which will havemore in common with wishful thinking than reality.

One of the most appealing aspects of terrorism asa form of political dissent, is that the benefits that canbe derived from such action frequently heavilyoutweigh the risks involved. In other words, thepotential benefits outweigh the potential costs. Itwould be the aim of a deterrence strategy to radicallyalter this cost/benefit ratio so as to lessen the appeal ofterrorist action. In this way, terrorists will perceivethe cost of commencing or continuing a terroristcampaign to be greater than any gains they mightexpect should they proceed. The reduction in theterrorist’s expectancy of success will therefore serveto dissuade the terrorist from following through withtheir plans.

Deterrence, of course, can be employed againsteither state sponsored (or state supported) terrorism oragainst individual terrorists or groups actingindependently. Certainly, from a theoreticalperspective at least, the difficulty involved indeterring these different types of terrorism will vary.It is generally acknowledged, for example, that it issomewhat easier to deter state sponsors of terrorismbecause of the geographical permanence andstructural complexity of states compared to themobility and relative structural simplicity of terroristgroups. This situation consequently makes statesponsors of terrorism more susceptible to economicsanctions and military reprisals.2 It is also importantatthis stage to distinguish between two forms ofdeterrence – defensive and offensive deterrence.Within the context of terrorism, defensive deterrenceis the most commonly employed of the two. Inessence, it seeks, through the implementation of

Deterrence Theory And Terrorism

Introduction

Summary

Deterring Terrorism: Reality or Wishful Thinking?

defensive or security measures, to prevent the terroristfrom achieving his/her objective. The reasoningbehind this type of deterrence is that even if theterrorists are able to achieve their objective, it will beaccomplished at an unacceptably high cost.Offensive deterrence (also referred to as “the iron fist”approach), on the other hand, is based on retaliatoryaction.3 Again, the reasoning here is that any benefitsthat might be gained from the terrorist act will beoutweighed by the eventualcost. The Israelis,Egyptians, and to a lesser extent the Americans, arethe most well known proponents of this form ofdeterrence/eventually, even offensive deterrencefulfils a defensive role, since its primary objective isto preventthe occurrence of terrorist acts). Indeed,last year’s US attacks against terrorist related sites inAfghanistan and Sudan are generally acknowledgedas having been motivated by the principle of offensivedeterrence.4

Whilst the effectiveness of deterrence theory hasproven to be relatively successful in a number of non-terrorist related cases (the most obvious beingMutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the centralcomponent of the superpowers’ nuclear strategyduring the Cold War), can it also be successfullyemployed against terrorists? Much literature relatingto counterterrorism quite flippantly refer to deterrencein the context of terrorism, as though its effectivenesswas self-evident. However, if deterrence is anattempt to influence the behaviour of another party,then it is the perception of this other party whichshould be paramount. Those seeking to implement asuccessful counterterrorist deterrence strategy,therefore, need to understand the world as it appearsto the terrorist in order to successfully manipulatetheir cost-benefit calculus.5 The central component ofdeterrence theory is that it assumes that acts ofaggression are opportunity based and that where thepotential for gain exists, actors will seize onopportunity. Deterrence theory states, that if thisopportunity can be removed by eliminating thechance of gain (by ensuring that the costs outweighany possible profit), then an adversary will bedeterred from striking. This theory, therefore,assumes that just because the likelihood of successdiminishes, terrorism itself will cease to exist.

Deterrence theory and practice, however, isalmost wholly dependent upon the presumption that

assessments of costs and benefits are based on arational, universal standard. This, however, is clearly not the case, since depending on theindividual/organisation and the cause, varying levelsof risk may be acceptable. It is for this reason thatstatements such as “offensive deterrence is effectiveagainst state sponsors of terrorism” or “defensivedeterrence is effective against independent terroristact ivi ty” can be very misleading6. Thesegeneralisations have no place in discussions ondeterrence, since they fail to realise the importance ofunderstanding the individuality of the sponsors orperpetrators of terrorism. Committing oneself to a lifeof terrorism is a risky business, a fact that is surelyclear to all terrorists, both before and after they makesuch a commitment. Certainly, the levels ofacceptable risk will vary from group to group, but thisis just another reason to judge each organisationindividually, and cater one’s deterrence basedcountermeasures accordingly.

One of the primary flaws with many argumentsadvocating the benefits of deterrence is that bydefinition they assume that terrorists can be dissuadedfrom pursuing a life of terror. In other words, itpresumes the existence of choice. But it is oftenprecisely the absence of choice (embodied in thebelief that political grievances cannot be redressedthrough conventional means) which forces terroriststo adopt the methods they do. Whether, objectivelyspeaking, this is the truth or not, is irrelevant. It isultimately the perception of potential terrorists that isimportant and their belief that they are being forcedinto a life of terrorism. The situation we are thereforeconfronted with is one in which the high cost ofinaction outweighs the potential cost of action. It isthe failure by proponents of deterrence to take intoconsideration the importance of need(or the desireaspect of intent) on the part of the terrorist, that causesthem to paint a distorted and overly optimistic (andsimplistic) view of the potential benefits of deterrencein the fight against terrorism. Any counterterroriststrategy that claims to be deterrence based and fails tofocus on the motivation for terrorism is destined onlyto serve as a partial and temporary solution at best.

One only need look at the situation in Egypt underthe leadership of Hosni Mubarak to see howcounterterrorist strategies that fail to consider theunderlying causes of terrorism can be an exercise in

Potential ProblemsCan Terrorism Be Deterred?


futility. Since becoming president in 1981, Mubarakhas demonstrated an unswerving commitment toneutralising the increasing prevalence of Islamicfundamentalist based terrorism. After Israel, Egyptunder Mubarak is perhaps the world’s best knownproponent of offensive deterrence, although theMubarak regime may not use this precise term todescribe its response to terrorism. Despite its brutalattempts to suppress domestic terrorism, oftenincurring the condemnation of international humanrights groups in the process, terrorism within Egypt ison the increase.7

Terrorists by nature are a highly motivated groupof people who are driven by strong political, socialand cultural forces. Their grievances are oftenhistorical in nature and have come to represent apassionate driving force. Robert Jervis in his bookPsychology and Deterrencehas asserted that “statesdefy clear and credible threats because they are drivenby the belief – or often by the feeling – that thealternatives to confrontation are intolerably bleak.Under these conditions, states can decide to challengethe status quoeven though the chances of success areslight”.8 Whilst this statement refers specifically tostate actors, it is also just as true of terrorists andterrorist organisations. The inevitable failure andresultant suffering and anguish that most terroristsbelieve would result from inaction, in the end, meansthat little choice is left available. There is, therefore, aneed for defenders to understand the pressures (andindeed, desperation) under which terrorists operate.The example of the suicide bomber serves as aconstant reminder of the extent to which someterrorists are prepared to go in the pursuit of theircause and the difficulties inherent in deterrence-basedcountermeasures.9

Some commentators have taken this matter a stepfurther by arguing that defensive deterrence could beemployed successfully if the countermeasures inplace guaranteedthat a terrorist attack would fail.10

The problem with this theory and the use of languagelike success and failure (which are central to anydiscussion on deterrence) is that it is not possible toassess the outcome of terrorist actions in conventionalsuccess/failure terms. When implementing adeterrence strategy, it would be necessary to pose thequestion “How can I maximise the level of damage orharm to a terrorist should he/she attempt to strike atthis target”? In other words “How can I minimisehis/her chances of success”? Since the objective ofmany terrorist groups is publicity based, even thefailure of a terrorist action can be defined as a successif it attracts the desired media attention. This has led

some to argue that deterrence through non-publicity isa viable option.11

Even if it were possible to find a universallyacceptable definition of success and failure, there arestill a number of problems which forces one toquestion the viability of countermeasures whichguarantee failure. Firstly, terrorists must be madeaware of the fact that they are destined to fail. Howcan this be accomplished without also makingterrorists aware of the countermeasures that are inplace? Failure to adequately convey the message toterrorists; that they stand a fair chance of failureshould they attempt to strike against a specific target,leads to the second difficulty. There always exists thepossibility of misjudgment on the part of the terroristin the form of overestimating his/her chances ofsuccess, wishful thinking and a multitude of otherfactors that can lead the terrorist to misread thesituation.

Traditionally, it has always proven difficult tomeasure the effectiveness of counter-measures of anytype, especially those which are deterrence based.The dilemma for deterrence was well put by JamesGolden who stated,

The problem of maintaining public support fora deterrence strategy is complicated by theimpossibility of proving that deterrence hasworked. In the event of an attack, it is obviousthat deterrence failed. The absence of aggression,however, does not prove that deterrence worked.The potential aggressor, critics may argue, neverhad any intention of attacking in the first place.12

Despite these difficulties, proponents ofdeterrence seek to demonstrate its effectiveness byhighlighting the changed behaviour of terrorists in thewake of deterrence based counter-measures. Acommon example which is frequently cited is themanner in which terrorists have altered theirmethods/tactics in the light of improved governmentresponses. The decline in hostage taking situationsand aircraft hijackings is generally attributed to theimplementation of counter-measures, especially theuse of elite hostage rescue units.13 Whilst this is true,can it be used, as it often is, to sing the praises ofdeterrence generally?

The problem with arguments such as thoseadvanced, is that they tend to be target-focused. Inother words, they measure the success of deterrence

How To Measure Success?

DETERRING TERRORISM: REALITY OR WISHFUL THINKING? 43

on the basis of the frequency with which terroristsstrike at certain targets after the implementation ofcounter-measures. This overly focused view ofterrorism frequently fails to look at the overallincidence of terrorism. Rather than witness areduction in the incidence of terrorism, these counter-measures simply result in terrorists shifting their focusto other areas (kidnappings, assassinations andbombings) or change their methods of attackingtraditional targets (from hijacking aircraft to placingbombs on them instead).14 These arguments, therefore,tend to demonstrate the adaptability of terrorists ratherthan highlight the effectiveness of deterrence itself.15

Whilst it is difficult to foresee any circumstanceswhen defensive deterrence would be counter-productive (other than by forcing terrorists to seektargets elsewhere), it is possible for offensivedeterrence to have the opposite effect to that whichwas intended. The US attack against Libya in 1986 inretaliation for its involvement in the bombing of aBerlin discotheque which killed two US citizens is acase in point. This example is frequently used to sellthe merits of offensive deterrence,16 but a closerinspection will reveal that the consequences of thisAmerican action were not so clear-cut. It is true thatthe air strike forced the Libyans to back off for a shorttime, but it ultimately may have led to an escalation ofLibyan-backed terrorism. Among the acts with aLibyan connection that followed were a plot to bomba US military recruiting station in New York on thesecond anniversary of the US air strike, the carbombing on the same day of a USO club in Naples,Italy and the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 inDecember 1988.17 Inquiries conducted by Frenchauthorities in later years would also implicate Libyanintelligence agents with the downing of Flight UTA772 in 1989 which exploded after leaving Ndamenaairport in Chad. Despite the suggestion by some that“… Libya now appears much more constrained in itssupport for international terrorist operations”18 a quickperusal of the US State Department’s annual Patternsof Global Terrorism will reveal that this is not entirelyaccurate. Ten years after the US air strike, the StateDepartment painted anything but a pretty picture ofLibya and its intransigent position on terrorist relatedissues. Among these was Libya’s continued refusalto comply with the demands of UN Security CouncilResolution 731, for the fifth year running, tosurrender to the US or the United Kingdom two

Libyan intelligence agents (or employees of LibyanArab Airlines posted in Malta at the time of thebombing) suspected of being responsible for thebombing of Pan Am Flight 103.19 In addition to this,Libya continued to provide support to Palestinianterrorist groups such as the Abu Nidal organisation(ANO), which maintains its headquarters in Libyaand the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ).20 This list ofLibyan terrorist involvement and defiance, which isby no means exhaustive, can hardly be used to singthe praises of offensive deterrence.

Similarly, it must be borne in mind that one of thepurposes of terrorism is often to induce a reaction onthe part of Governments. In other words,Government responses to terrorism, in the form ofoffensive deterrence, may play directly into the handsof the perpetrators of such acts. The efforts ofterrorists to induce such reactions can serve either ofthe following purposes:(i) enhance the ability of organisations to recruit new

members from among those affected byGovernment reactions. This is true in two ways.Firstly, in the case of international terrorism,military strikes by one country against another(such as the strike by the US against Libya), mayserve to recruit new members to the cause fromamong those affected by the collateral damage.21

Secondly, in the case of domestic terrorism,terrorists often rely upon Governments to react toincidents so as to portray them to locals asrepressive and unsympathetic to the people;22 and

(ii) generate further publicity, which after all, is oneof the primary objectives of terrorist action.

Whilst defensive, and to a lesser extent offensive,deterrence will undoubtedly continue to form a majoraspect of most countries’ counterterrorist strategy, itseffectiveness is constantly being eroded with thepassage of time. This is due to the perception that thebenefits to be gained by employing terrorism are great(potential gain), combined with an increase in theease of committing acts of terror (reduced risk). Thereasons for this include:(i) the costs associated with conventional warfare

will always be greater than the costs incurredthrough the use of terrorism. The attractivenessof terrorism to certain state actors as a tool offoreign policy is therefore likely to stay with usfor the time being;

The Future

Can Deterrence Be Counter-Productive?


(ii) the post-Cold War world has witnessed an era ofunprecedented self-determination. For reasonsof military and economic constraint, many ofthose national/religious/ethnic groups pursingthis course will only be able to do so byemploying the tactics of terrorism;

(iii) most terrorist-related targets will becomeincreasingly vulnerable through the availabilityof technologically advanced weapons which willserve to enhance the low risk nature of manyterrorist acts;

(iv) the multitude of available targets means thatterrorists can strike at just about any target formaximum effect. Last year’s bombings of theUS embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniademonstrate the difficulty involved in andanticipating protecting all potential targets,because of their sheer number, which will benext.23 Indeed, the implementation of deterrence-based strategies may have the effect of creating“hard” targets. But what this often serves to dois draw terrorists to “soft” targets (such as Kenyaand Tanzania). The problems that could stemfrom this re-direction of terror, are potentiallygreat. What countries, for example, are going towant an American embassy if it means that itmay attract terrorists with a grievance against theUS;24 and

(v) the proliferation of terrorist groups and attacksmeans that terrorists, in their efforts to obtain agreater share of the publicity pie are required totake greater risks for the purpose of carrying outmore spectacular acts. Indeed, the increasedlethality of terrorist attacks over recent yearsmay stand as testimony to this.25

So what we have here is the seeminglycontradictory situation of terrorists needing to takegreater risks, compounded by the opposite problem ofthem also needing to take fewer risks. Both,however, will only serve to compound the difficultiesinvolved in seeking to implement a successfuldeterrence based counterterrorist strategy.

My role throughout this article has been that ofdevil’s advocate. Not for a moment do I suggest thatdeterrence within the context of terrorism is anexercise in futility. It would be naïve andirresponsible to suggest that deterrence has no placein the fight against terrorism, for to admit this wouldbe tantamount to saying that the implementation of

security measures at airports and the like is a waste oftime. The point that I have been attempting to makeis that deterrence cannot be seen as a panacea to theterrorist problem. Too often, deterrence within thecontext of the terrorist debate is discussed without anyapparent consideration to its potential limitations, anoversight that may result in a counterterrorist strategywhich is fundamentally flawed.

NOTES1. Paul Stern et al (eds), Perspectives on Deterrence,Oxford

University Press, New York, 1989, p. 25.2. R.M Boyd and J.J.A. Wallace, “Deterrence – an essential

element of preventing terrorism”, Australian Defence ForceJournal, Vol. 116, 1996, provides a valuable comparisonbetween state sponsored and non-state sponsored terrorism andthe relative difficulty involved in deterring each.

3. ibid., pp. 19-29.4. Russell Watson and John Barry, 1998, “Our target was terror”,

The Bulletin, 1 September, pp. 60-5. Aust.Indeed, in the immediate period following the strikes, USofficials were claiming that the American action alreadydeterred other terrorist attacks, a claim also made by Secretaryof State, Madeline Albright. It was claimed that prior to the USraids, attacks were imminent against US embassies in Albaniaand Pakistan, and that the subsequent American action avertedthe Albanian attack. There are some, however, who doubt thisclaim. Former CIA counterterrorism expert, Vince Cannistraro,for example, has stated that if an operation were imminent, thenthe recources to carry it out would already have been deployed.

5. Paul Stern, et al (eds). op. cit., p. 27.6. Boyd and Wallace, op. cit., p. 25.7. Marc David Turetzky, “Egypt, Mubarak, and the rise of Islamic

fundamentalist terrorism: an emperical analysis of the Mubarakregime’s punitive counter-terrorist policy”, Florida StateUniversity, 1981-1994. Clearly, the question of redressingterrorist grievances is a difficult and complex issue. Therepercussions of redressing some of the underlying causes ofterrorism have the potential to cause greater difficulties forgovernments than does the problem of terrorism itself. For thisreason, some, and I would argue most, demands made byterrorists are unrealistic, and for this reason, impossible toaccommodate. But this in no way diminishes the difficulties fordeterrence. Instead, it only serves to aggravate them.

8. Robert Jervis, et al, “Psychology and Deterrence”, The JohnHopkins University Press, Maryland, 1985, p. 3.

9. The suicide bomber who seeks death prevents even greaterproblems for deterrence. The threat of death (as part of adeterrence-based strategy) may therefore serve to encourageprecisely that which it seeks to avoid. As a minimum, however,deterrence will prove futile against this type of terrorist-motivated action.

10. Anat Kurz (ed), Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism,Praeger, New York, 1987, p. 128.

11. ibid., p. 131. Even this may not prove very effective againstcertain types of terrorism, especially that which is religiousbased. Terrorists motivated by religion often do not seek aresponse by governments or anyone else for that matter, so thatthe act frequently becomes an end in itself.

12. James Golden, et al (eds), Conventional Deterrence, LexingtonBooks, USA, 1984, p. 4.

13. Boyd and Wallace, op. cit., p. 27.14. Paul Wilkinson (ed), Technology and Terrorism,Frank Cass,

London, 1993 p. 21.

Conclusion

DETERRING TERRORISM: REALITY OR WISHFUL THINKING? 45


15. I suppose it could be argued that the implementation ofcounter-measures which forced terrorists to alter theirbehaviour could be interpreted as a success for deterrence. Ofcourse, however, it would depend on the objectives of thedeterrence based strategy. If the goal was specifically todissuade terrorists from striking at certain targets in a certainmanner, then this could be described as a success fordeterrence.

16. Boyd and Wallace, op.cit., p. 26.17. Alan Thompson (ed). Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics,

Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1996, p. 26.Bruce Hoffman has indicated that these incidents resulted in thedeath of 286 persons and the injury of 115 others.

18. Boyd and Wallace, loc. cit.19. At the time of writing, the Libyan Government has finally

conceded to these demands and surrendered the two Libyanintelligence agents so that they could stand trial under Scottishlaw before the International Court of Justice in the Netherlands.

20. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996.21. Kurz (ed), loc. cit.22. Hosni Mubarak’s repressive counter-terrorist strategy in Egypt,

for example, may only be serving to win wider support for theperpetraters of terrorism from among the general populace.Marc David Turetzky, op. cit., p. 19.

23.Indeed, in the wake of these attacks, US officials wereanticipating further attacks by bin Laden. One US official wasreported as saying that “The networks are out there. They canchoose their own time and place.” Watson and Barry, op. cit.,p. 60.

24. I would like to thank Lawrence Sulc for this interestingperspective.

25. Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 14-9.

BIBLIOGRAPHYBoyd, R.M. and Wallace, J.J.A. 1996, “Deterrence - An essential

element of preventing terrorism.” Australian Defence ForceJournal,Vol. 116, pp. 19-29, Canberra.

Golden, James et al (eds). 1984 “Conventional Deterrence”,Lexington Books, USA.

Jervis, Robert, et al. 1985. “Psychology and Deterrence”. TheJohn Hopkins University Press, Maryland.

Kurz, Anat (ed), 1987. “Contemporary Trends in WorldTerrorism”, Praeger, New York.

Stern, Paul et al (eds), 1989. “Perspectives on Deterrence”.Oxford University Press, New York.

Thompson, Alan (ed). 1996. “Terrorism and the 2000 Olympics”.Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.

Turetzky, Marc David, “Egypt, Mubarak, and the rise of Islamicfundamentalist terrorism 1981-1994: An empirical analysis ofthe Mubarak regime’s punitive counter-terrorist policy”,Florida State University.

US Department of State, 1996. Patterns of Global Terrorism,Watson, Russell and Barry, John 1998. “Our target wasterror” . The Bulletin, 1 September, pp. 60-5.

Senior Constable Ilardi is an intelligence officer with Victoria Police’s Crime Intelligence Support Centre. He has a Bachelor ofArts (Hons) and a Master of Arts (Politics) and is currently conducting preliminary research for a Ph.D. focusing on the role ofintelligence within terrorist organisations. His main interests are in the areas of counterintelligence, counterterrorism and lowintensity conflict.

The views contained in this paper are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Victoria Police.

The Part-TimersA History of the RAAF Reserve from 1948 to 1998

A hard-cover book with over 100 black and white photographs, The Part-Timers,written by a “Part-Timer”

Group Captain Doug Hurst, tells of the valuable contribution made by reservists over the years.

The Part-Timersis available from:The Office of the Australian Defence Force Journal

R8-LG-004 Russell Offices Canberra ACT 2600.

The Part-TimersA History of the RAAF Reserve from 1948 to 1998

A hard-cover book with over 100 black and white photographs, The Part-Timers,written by a “Part-Timer”

Group Captain Doug Hurst, tells of the valuable contribution made by reservists over the years.

The Part-Timersis available from:The Office of the Australian Defence Force Journal

R8-LG-004 Russell Offices Canberra ACT 2600.

CCoosstt:: $$2255..0000

By Major B. Worswick, AALC

It can be argued that in many respects the absence ofa systematic enforcement regime such as a standing

international tribunal has contributed to the lack ofrespect for the legitimacy of InternationalHumanitarian Law (IHL). Furthermore, thoseenforcement or repression mechanisms which doexist within IHL have a number of weaknesses. Inrecent years the international community hasrecognised these weaknesses and is now stronglysupporting the creation of a permanent internationalcriminal court to improve the effectiveness of IHL.The United Nations General Assembly set the 15 June 1998 as the date for the commencement of aDiplomatic Conference in Rome to create anInternational Criminal Court (ICC). If the proposedICC is to end the cycle of impunity towards violationsof IHL, it must be capable of overcoming a series offormidable obstacles.

This article will critically examine proposals forthe creation of an ICC in light of historical efforts toenforce IHL in order to determine whether an ICC isthe panacea for IHL abuses and violations that itsproponents hope it to be. It will begin by assessingexisting IHL enforcement and repression mechanismsin order to identify weaknesses that an ICC may beable to address. Selected historical precedents andcontemporary examples of international tribunals willthen be discussed in order to highlight strengths andweaknesses in the enforcement of IHL that haveimplications for an ICC. The Draft Statute for theproposed ICC will then be examined including thekey issues involved in defining the proposedjurisdictional ambit of the ICC, in order to determinethe adequacy of attempts to address particularweaknesses in IHL enforcement. Specificconsideration will also be given to the proposedICC’s relationship to both national jurisdictions andthe United Nations. The overall aim is to assess theprospects of enhancing enforcement of IHL throughthe creation of an ICC.

At first glance the body of law referred to as IHL,elaborate and detailed after centuries of growth,seems to be enforceable. The Geneva Conventionsand their additional protocols contain a number ofmechanisms, preventative and reactive, which aredesigned to ensure that breaches of IHL do not occur.These include the obligation on states to ensurerespect, the ability to prosecute breaches undernational legislation, and the ability to take reprisals inthe event of a breach of IHL during conflict.However, closer inspection of these repressionmechanisms reveals that they are inadequate and thishas important ramifications for the proposed ICC.This section will examine these mechanisms in orderto identify areas of weakness that an ICC may be ableto address.

In Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventionsall states have made a commitment to ensure“respect” for the Conventions and their additionalprotocols. This obligation is generally regarded as acommitment on the part of states to ensure respect byother states for the rules of IHL.1 The problem,however, is that Common Article 1 does not identifya specific course of action guiding states as to howthey are to ensure respect for IHL. The obligationpotentially has one state supervising another in orderto ensure respect, but it is unlikely that states wouldbe prepared to accept outside machinery belonging toanother state to supervise respect for the Conventionsand Protocols.2 In accepting and ratifying CommonArticle 1 states have effectively admitted a derogationto the principle of their sovereignty.3 In reality, stateswill engage in diplomatic rhetoric to ensure otherstates respect IHL, but will be reluctant to take othersubstantive forms of action because of considerationsof sovereignty.

Common Articles 49, 50, 129, and 146 of theGeneva Conventions call on states to take allnecessary steps to adapt their national legislation andto provide penal sanctions for persons committing“grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions. Theobligation to punish persons committing gravebreaches is absolute, and the parties cannot relievethemselves of their responsibilities in this respect. Ifthis system was properly implemented and if all states

Existing IHL Enforcement Mechanisms

Introduction

Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law

adequately fulfilled their obligations, it is arguablethat there would be efficient, systematic prosecutionof breaches of IHL. Historically however, there hasbeen a lack of determination on the part of states touphold this obligation.

A significant reason why states can notdomestically implement the Geneva Conventionsstems from the fact that IHL is not necessarily self-executing in national law. Legislation is necessary todefine the offences comprising “grave breaches” forthe purposes of national law and to determine thejurisdiction of the courts to put offenders on trial.4 Todate the international community has been moreconcerned with expanding the content of warcriminality rather than working out the substantiveingredients of those criminal acts.5 States have beenleft to fill in the gaps to make the law effective whenenacting domestic legislation. Hence, even thoughstates are giving effect to the same internationalconvention, the resulting national legislation candiffer dramatically depending on the enacting state.One of the chief criticisms of the war crimes trialsheld by Germany at the end of the First World War isthat by conducting its own war crimes trials, Germanywas alleged to have imposed less severe penaltiesthan would have been the case if the trials had beenconducted by the Allies. Conversely, in April 1997the Rwandan Government shot 22 people convictedin local courts of genocide crimes. Unlike theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),the Rwandan local courts can impose the deathpenalty.6

The obligation imposed on states by CommonArticles 49, 50, 129, and 146 of the GenevaConventions envisage states having to extradite anoffender in certain circumstances. Extradition is apoliticised process which states normally undertakeonly according to the rules of a “cautiously-framed”bilateral extradition treaty.7 States will be reluctant toextradite their own nationals, particularly to anunfriendly state. For example, the GermanConstitution expressly forbids the extradition ofGerman citizens and significant legal restrictionsregarding the extradition of foreigners became evidentwhen Germany attempted to extradite Dusko Tadicfor trial before the International Criminal Tribunal forthe former Yugoslavia (ICTY).8

Public sentiment, political and diplomaticconsiderations can impact upon a decision toprosecute a war criminal. States may be willing tofulfil their obligation to prosecute in situations whereit serves their interests either domestically orinternationally, notwithstanding that the prosecutionmay even contravene basic principles of criminal

law.9 In the Eichman case, Israel kidnapped Eichmanfrom Argentina and transported him to Israel for trial,a move applauded by Israelis. However, Israel did notexist at the time of Eichman’s crimes but Israeli warcrimes legislation granted universal jurisdiction forwar crimes, limited only to a certain group: Nazis.10

Israel justified its action on the basis of the principleof universal jurisdiction embodied in CommonArticles 49, 50, 129, and 146. In the Australian trial ofNazi war criminal Polyukhovich, the Australianlegislation under which he was tried gave jurisdictionto try war criminals regardless of territory ornationality, but included temporal limitations whichconfined its application to the Second World War. Inaddition to variations in prosecution criteria, thesetrials also potentially create problems of proceduralfairness because the capacity of witnesses to testify toacts committed 50 years ago is questionable.

The impact of adverse public and internationalopinion resulted in the decision to prosecuteLieutenant Calley for his involvement in the My Laimassacre during the Vietnam War. Calley’s trialdemonstrates that by incorporating IHL treaties andconventions into military law manuals and reinforcingprohibitions through orders, military disciplinary lawcan be effective as a means of enforcement. However,the delay, avoidance and denial that preceded Calleybeing charged demonstrates a state’s reluctance to tryone of its own except when it is politically expedient.Even after Calley was tried and convicted, politicalinterference resulted in his life sentence beingreduced. Calley’s trial suggests nations will bereluctant to prosecute offenders within their ownranks on occasions where the violations stem fromdecisions taken at the highest military and politicallevel.11

Reprisals, which are lawful in certaincircumstances, are difficult to distinguish fromunlawful acts such as retaliation, retortion, andrevenge, and can easily be manipulated as a cover forthose aims. Their use so far as it might affect non-combatants was banned by Additional Protocol I in1977. In practice, the effect of a reprisal is often toaggravate the situation leading to a vicious spiral ofpurported reprisals and counter-reprisals.12 History hasshown, especially during the Second World War, thatapart from being barbarous, unfair and inequitable asthey invariably victimise the innocent, reprisalsachieve nothing.13 For example, the bombardment ofLondon and other British cities in the early part of theSecond World War resulted only in the totaldestruction of Dresden and Leipzig in 1945. Neitherthe Allies nor the Axis powers were deterred by such


losses and Germany only surrendered when furtherresistance was effectively impossible.14

The Vietnam War, the Cold War, and conflicts forself-determination by former colonies led to arecognition of the need to strengthen IHL, and thisresulted in the additional protocols.15 Yet the politicalclimate that prevailed during the four years ofnegotiations meant that in terms of bolstering theenforcement powers of IHL, the desired results wereimpeded by a series of compromises. There are somefeatures of the protocols which enhanced themonitoring and implementation mechanisms of IHLincluding the provision for meetings of states toconsider problems regarding application of theconventions and protocols,16 and assignment of agreater degree of responsibility to commanders.17 Interms of enforcement mechanisms, the protocolsintroduced the concept of the International Fact-Finding Commission18 and the extension of actswhich qualified as grave breaches or war crimes19.However, states are not bound to accept thecompetence of an International Fact-FindingCommission unless they make a specific declarationindicating consent.20 The difficulty remains that interms of actually enforcing IHL, these extensionsremain reliant on the degree to which states arewilling to enforce IHL and for this reason, added littleto the ability to ensure that breaches of IHL areprosecuted.

IHL is criticised for its lack of muscle when itcomes to mechanisms intended to ensure respect forits rules. An examination of existing enforcementmeasures reveals that they are inadequate becauseadherence to IHL is partly voluntary. IHL can onlyhave the means of implementation and enforcementthat states are willing to give it.21 Where it is notpolitically or diplomatically expedient, states arewilling to pay “lip-service” to their obligation toensure respect for IHL and not fully implement thedomestic legislation that is envisaged by the GenevaConventions. Measures such as reprisals are not aneffective means of enforcement because they have atendency to escalate hostilities and may prolongconflict rather than end it. The additional protocolshighlighted, but did not resolve these deficiencies.Having identified these weaknesses in enforcement anexamination of historical and contemporary warcrimes tribunals is warranted to determine the effectof such weaknesses on the efficacy of these tribunals.

The main argument cited in favour of theestablishment of an ICC is that action or inaction by astate in the face of the obligation imposed by IHL toprosecute alleged perpetrators of grave breaches ismotivated by the self-interest of that particular state.Internationally, the tendency is to cite the Nurembergand Tokyo trials as the prime examples ofprosecutorial efforts on the part of the internationalcommunity, and then dismiss them because theyexemplify “victor’s justice”. The victorious Alliedpowers tried their German and Japanese adversarieswithout even considering the possibility of applyingthe same laws to their own wartime behaviour. In theabsence of a uniform and global approach there is awidespread assumption that trials of war criminalshave previously only occurred where defeat andcriminality coincide.22 However, there are lessons tobe gleaned from Nuremberg and Tokyo which havesignificant implications for the enforcement of IHLand for a proposed ICC.

The conclusion of the Second World War wasmarked by the total surrender of the majorbelligerents, the occupation of their territory, theavailability of evidence, the overwhelming nature ofthe war crimes committed, the fact that the men andwomen who were accused of the crimes were incustody, and the presence of a universal sense ofoutrage that these people had inflicted slaughter andsuffering.23 The chance of recurrence of such a rarecombination of circumstances is remote. The end offuture armed conflicts could be marked by a generalarmistice, a mutual agreement between the parties toreturn prisoners of war and wounded, but a refusal toextradite war criminals.24 Legally, an amnesty for warcrimes is null and void because the obligation onstates to prosecute IHL breaches is a peremptorynorm of international law.25 Even though it may beillegal, states could refuse to extradite alleged warcriminals. The proposed ICC must have theappropriate means to ensure breaches are prosecuteddespite agreements between parties to the conflict.

An important lesson that emerges from theNuremberg trials is “the spectral presence of thosewar crimes left unpunished since”.26 The Nurembergand Tokyo trials were an exercise in “partial justice”to the extent that there have been numerous instancesof armed conflict since the Second World War inwhich the same breaches of IHL have occurred, yetno prosecutorial action has been taken. This includesthe Khmer Rouge leaders in Cambodia or the Iraqi

Historical Precedents and ContemporaryExamples of International Tribunals

ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 49

military elite following the Gulf War.27 Despiteinternational outrage and repeated condemnation bythe United Nations Security Council (UNSC) whenIraq conducted its unlawful annexation of Kuwait,when the time came for decisions about action againstthose responsible there was no consensus and eventhe United States failed to show any form ofsupportive leadership. The selective application ofinternational criminal law completely undermines therule of law.28 An ICC must be able to ensure theuniform and general application of the rule of law toall IHL breaches.

The selective application of the law to theprosecution of war criminals also reveals that IHLmay have served to justify acts of violence as much asto repress them. During the Gulf War there waswidespread acceptance that the Coalition’s airbombardment of Iraq was squarely within the laws ofwar. Coalition efforts focused on a strategic aircampaign against Iraqi political, economic andmilitary centres in the hope it would lead to theoverthrow of Saddam Hussein.29 Arguably much ofthe destruction, particularly the repeated bombings ofpreviously disabled power plants and oil productionfacilities, appears to have been aimed at achievingbroad political and economic objectives rather thanspecific military goals, contrary to the intent of theadditional protocols. The United States was able touse IHL to pursue national political objectives byvirtue of its dominating position both in theinternational community and in the UNSC. Thus, theGulf War was a situation in which IHL served tolegitimise, rather than limit military violence againstcivilians.30 Links between an ICC and the UNSC orany other international authority must ensure there isno possibility of manipulation or domination by aparticular state or group of states. An ICC must notbecome a politicised body.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were asignificant development in international law withrespect to the position of individuals underinternational law. Previously, the concept of a“crime” and individual criminal responsibility wasvirtually unknown in the international states system.31

Nuremberg and Tokyo recognised that states can beremoved from the equation, and that individuals areclearly capable of being subjects of international lawand can face certain international legal obligations.Now there is no question that individuals may, inrespect of IHL, appear as subjects bound by certainlegal obligations directly under international law, andcan be held individually responsible before aninternational forum for their violations of theseobligations. This is confirmed by the ICTY and

ICTR. While the international community has welland truly accepted that individuals can be subjects ofinternational law, the international practice andprocedure of IHL has not yet fully resolved the issueof primacy in the face of concurrent state action.

A key factor in mustering support for an ICC wasthe creation of the ICTY and the ICTR. Theestablishment of these two tribunals has sparked anin-depth dialogue of IHL which has resulted in theincreasing recognition that only a court with universaljurisdiction and a sufficiently broad referralmechanism can have a truly deterrent andpreventative effect.32 Important lessons are emergingfrom the practice and procedure of the two ad hoctribunals particularly in regard to their relationshipwith states and the degree to which states are preparedto cooperate and facilitate their work. Questions aboutthe concurrent competence and complementarynature of an international tribunal and national courts,and the degree of cooperation between them havecontinued to arise. The ad hoctribunals actually haveconcurrent jurisdiction with national courts, butprimacy over them. This preserves the balancebetween the international tribunal and the nationaljurisdiction and ensures prosecutorial action is taken.33

The ICTY and ICTR have encountered numerousproblems in obtaining cooperation of states to conductinvestigations and ensure the protection of witnesses.It is increasingly being recognised that there aredeficiencies in their mandates that pose seriousobstacles to their effective operation.34 Although theRwandan authorities have arrested thousands ofsuspects, persons who have been indicted forgenocide and other crimes against humanity continueto walk the streets of former Yugoslavia withapparent impunity.35 The ICTY and ICTR must relyon states to apprehend criminals within their territory,though there have been arrests by NATO forces. Thelesson that emerges from this issue is that the onlymeans to avoid this situation is to ensure aninternational tribunal not only has primacy overnational courts, but also has powers to compel statecooperation.36

Nuremberg and Tokyo set precedents for theinternational trial of war crimes. At the time it wasthought to be unjustified that the “victor’s justice”criticism could be levelled against the courts, and theparticipants envisaged that the precedent ofNuremberg would be followed in the future.37

Regardless of their flaws, Nuremberg and Tokyo aresignificant because they are the first international warcrimes tribunals. After Nuremberg and Tokyo, despitemany opportunities there were no other internationalwar crimes tribunals until the establishment of the



ICTY and ICTR. As contemporary examples the adhoctribunals are superior in the sense that they are nottainted by the victor’s justice perception, andsignificant because they identify contemporaryweaknesses that must be overcome before theestablishment of an ICC, in order for it to besuccessful.

The move toward the establishment of an ICCbegan shortly after the United Nations wasestablished but has only really gained momentumsince the creation of the ad hoctribunals. On the 15thof June, 1998, negotiations on the Draft Statute of theproposed ICC, developed by the International LawCommission, began. While there is now consensuswithin the international community on the need toestablish an ICC, there are a number of contentiousissues within the Draft Statute that have not beenresolved. In light of the weaknesses in IHLenforcement highlighted in the previous two sections,several of these issues will be examined. In particular,the extent of the proposed ICC’s jurisdiction will beconsidered including its inherent jurisdiction and themeans by which an ICC’s jurisdiction will beinvoked. If an ICC is to end the cycle of impunitytoward breaches of IHL, it must be able to overcomethe de-facto optional character IHL enforcement hasin the eyes of the international community.

There is general agreement that an ICC shouldonly deal with “core crimes”, the exceptionallyserious crimes of major concern to the internationalcommunity.38 However, the issue of whether an ICCshould have an inherent jurisdiction over “corecrimes” is unresolved. The general agreement seemsto be that an ICC will act only in exceptional casesand that national jurisdictions will continue toexercise their authority and discharge theirresponsibilities. The Draft Statute gives inherentjurisdiction for genocide, but not for crimes againsthumanity and war crimes. For the latter twocategories an ICC can only proceed if states consentto the court’s jurisdiction by way of a specialdeclaration.39 Based on the inherent weaknesses in theexisting system of IHL enforcement, it is clear that anICC’s competence should not be dependent on theconsent of states. The inherent jurisdiction of thecourt should cover war crimes, crimes againsthumanity, and genocide. As soon as a state becomes aparty to the Statute of the Court, it should therebyaccept the court’s competence and no longer have to

give its consent for a case to be submitted to thecourt.40 To do otherwise creates the potential for astate to accept an ICC in principle but decline itsjurisdiction, continuing the piecemeal application ofjustice.

The proposed ICC is intended to becomplementary to national criminal justice systems incases where national courts are unable or unwilling todeal with a breach of IHL. The balance between thejurisdiction of an ICC and national jurisdictions is acrucial issue. The Draft Statute provides that a case is“inadmissible” where it is being or has beeninvestigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction,unless there is “inability” or “unwillingness” on thepart of that state to “genuinely” carry out such aninvestigation or prosecution. This provision isintended to preserve the position of national courtswhich have the primary responsibility for justice,however this also sets a very high threshold for anICC’s jurisdiction and makes it very difficult todetermine admissibility. Complementarity allows anICC to take action when a state does not, but statesshould not be able to subvert the court by justifyingdecisions not to cooperate on the basis of a unilateraldetermination of inadmissibility. An ICC must beable to examine the conduct of national investigationsor proceedings to ensure they have been properlycarried out and have the final say in determiningjurisdiction.

The Draft Statute currently limits the Prosecutorto initiating an investigation only when the UNSCrefers a situation to it, or when a state that hasaccepted the jurisdiction of an ICC files a complaint.In view of the historical pattern of prosecutions, thetrigger mechanism cannot be limited to UNSCreferrals or a state complaint mechanism. The efficacyof the proposed ICC in contributing to the preventionof violations of IHL rests substantially on itscredibility as an international judicial institution ableto prosecute breaches when national systems fail to doso. History has shown that the UNSC and states havefailed to take the appropriate action in the past.41 It iscrucial that the choice of situations warrantinginvestigation and prosecution is judicial and notpolitical. Therefore the proposed ICC must includethe ability for the prosecutor to initiate investigationsex-officio.

The Draft Statute currently incorporates arestriction on an ICC’s competence in situationswhere a matter is being “dealt with” by the UNSCunder its power to maintain international peace andsecurity. Although it is essential that the UNSCmaintain its primary authority to determine threats tointernational peace and security, the jurisdiction of an

The Draft Statute of the ICC

ICC should not be contingent upon the manner inwhich the UNSC chooses to deal with a matter. It ispossible that Permanent Members of the UNSC coulduse their veto power to protect potential defendantswhenever it is in their countries’ interests.42 Forexample, some of the crimes within the jurisdiction ofthe ICTR have been committed by those now inpower in Rwanda, however the ICTR is effectivelyprevented from investigating these matters.43 Thejurisdiction of an ICC cannot be subject to thepreliminary approval of the UNSC because thecredibility and independence of an ICC would remainsusceptible to politicisation.

The Draft Statute in its present form does notresolve many of the fundamental problems of IHLenforcement. It does not give the proposed ICCinherent jurisdiction over all serious crimes andcreates the opportunity for a state to avoid the Court’sjurisdiction, after ratification of the Statute if it sochooses. The Draft Statute reinforces the primaryobligations of states which is attractive to those statesconcerned about preserving their interests. Whilst theterm “international” generally connotes impartiality,the proposed ICC is intimately linked to the UNSC,an international political body constituted by the fivepermanent members, who are also dominant worldpowers, where each effectively has the right of vetoover the application of a judicial process. There canbe no impartiality while the dominant world powerscontrol the agenda of an ICC. The proposed ICC musthave the final say over whether those obligations arefulfilled in order to preserve its primacy.

Examining existing enforcement mechanisms isimportant in considering the proposed ICC.Academics, politicians, and NGOs are proclaimingthat the only way to bring war criminals to justice isto create an ICC.44 The issue is whether an ICC canguarantee violators of IHL will be brought to trial andif convicted, punished.45 Surveying existing IHLmeasures suggests that IHL adherence must beinternationally supervised to ensure compliance. AnICC must have jurisdiction in cases where nationalprosecution does not occur, or is likely to besusceptible to national political imperatives. If an ICCdoes not have this capacity, there is no disincentivefor states who choose to ignore their obligation toenforce IHL.

Overall, the international political climate is ripefor an ICC to be established and this must be

capitalised on in order to strengthen enforcementmeasures to increase compliance with IHL. It isinevitable that there will be a need to compromise inorder to search for a consensus on the operation andjurisdictional ambit of the proposed ICC. However,compromise should not mean that proven weaknessesin IHL enforcement are ignored. Realistically, thelevel of compliance with IHL is unlikely to betransformed overnight by a new international criminallaw regime centred on an ICC. If an ICC is endowedwith the mechanisms to internationally supervise andinstil the primary obligation of states to prosecute warcrimes, only then will it serve as a disincentive againstbreaches of IHL. Only then will an ICC fulfilinternational expectations.

NOTES1. Niyungeko, G., “The Implementation of International

Humanitarian Law and the Principle of State Sovereignty”,International Review of the Red Cross, no 281, 1991, pp. 105-33, p. 127.

2. ibid., p. 132 and p. 126.3. Niyyungeko, op. cit., p. 132.4. Address by Professor I. Shearer to the Australian Red Cross

International Humanitarian Law Conference, “StrengtheningInternational Humanitarian Law”, University of Melbourne,9 Jul 97.

5. Draper, G.I.A.D., “The Modern Pattern of War Criminality” inDinstein, Y. and Tabory, M. (eds), War Crimes in InternationalLaw, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1996, p. 158.

6. McKinley, J., “Crowds cheer as 22 pay the price of genocide”,Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Apr 98, p. 16.

7. Best, G., War and Law Since 1945, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1994, p. 397.

8. Marschik, A., “European National Approaches to War Crimes”in McCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J. (eds), The Law ofWar Crimes, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997,p. 74.

9. Best, op. cit., p. 397.10. Simpson, G.J., “War Crimes: A Critical Introduction” in

McCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J. (eds), The Law of WarCrimes, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, p.11.

11. Address by Sandoz, Y. to the Malta Conference on the Law ofArmed Conflict in a New Strategic Environment, “View of theInternational Committee of the Red Cross on the Law of ArmedConflict Today”, 16-17 Oct 96.

12. Best, op. cit., p. 393.13. Obradovic, K., “The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I:

Greater Protection for War Victims”, International Review ofthe Red Cross, no 300, 1 Sep 97, pp. 520-527, p. 522.

14. ibid., p. 521.15. Kosirnik, op. cit., p. 483.16. Article 7 of Additional Protocol I17. Article 87 of Additional Protocol I18. Article 90 of Additional Protocol I19. Articles 11 and 85 of Additional Protocol I20. Kosirnik, op. cit., p. 486.21. ibid., p. 485.22. Simpson, op. cit., p. 5.23. Draper, op. cit., p. 160.24. Broms, B., “The Establishment of an International Criminal

Court” in Dinstein, Y. and Tabory, M. (eds), War Crimes in

Conclusion


International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague,1996, pp. 183-196., pp. 190-194.

25. Domb, F., “War Crimes in Peace Settlements” in Dinstein, Y.and Tabory, M. (eds), War Crimes in International Law,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1996, pp. 305-320,exact page not known.

26. Simpson, op. cit., p. 2.27. Simpson, op. cit., p. 8.28. ibid., p. 11.29. ibid., p. 8.30. Normand, R. and af Jochnick, C., “The Legitimation of

Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War”, HarvardInternational Law Journal, vol 35, no 2, 1994, pp. 387-416, p.389.

31. Simpson, op. cit., p. 16.32. Kama, L., “Foreword by the President of the International

Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”, International Review of theRed Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 603-604.

33. Meron, T., “The International Criminalisation of InternalAtrocities”, 89 American Journal of International Law, 1995,pp. 554-577, p. 576.

34. Peter, C.M., The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:bringing the killers to book “, International Review of the RedCross, no 321, pp. 695-704, p. 699.

35. Ferencz, B.B., “International Criminal Courts: The Legacy ofNuremberg “, 6 Jan 98, Lawyers Committee for Human RightsInternational Criminal Court Campaign Website,gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/ngodocs/prepcom6/ferencz.txt.

36. Dubois, O., “Rwanda’s National Criminal Courts and theInternational Tribunal”, International Review of the Red Cross,no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 717-731, p. 720.

37. Ferencz, B.B., “International Criminal Courts: The Legacy ofNuremberg”, 6 Jan 98, Lawyers Committee for Human RightsInternational Criminal Court Campaign Website,gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/ngodocs/prepcom6/ferencz.txt, p. 6.

38. Ferencz, op. cit., p. 6.39. McCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J., “Achieving the

Promise of Nuremberg: A New International Criminal LawRegime?” in McCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J. (eds), TheLaw of War Crimes, Kluwer Law International, The Hague,1997, pp. 229-254, p. 241.

40. Statement by ICRC before the United Nations GeneralAssembly, 51st Session, Sixth Committee, Agenda items 147,28 Oct 96, ICRC Website, http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews...df53c12563ee002b2d34?

41. For example, Articles 45 and 61 of the American Conventionon Human Rights, Article 47 of the African Charter on Humanand Peoples Rights and Article 21 of the Convention AgainstTorture cited in Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,International Criminal Court Briefing Series, “TheAccountability of an Ex Officio Prosecutor”, vol 1, no 6, Feb 98, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights International Criminal Court Campaign Website,http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap6.htm.

42. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, International CriminalCourt Briefing Series, “Compliance with ICC Decisions”, vol1, no 5, Nov 97, Lawyers Committee for Human RightsInternational Criminal Court Campaign Website,http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap5.htm.

43. Erasmus, G. and Fourie, N., “The International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda: Are all issues addressed? How does itcompare to South Africa’s Truth and ReconciliationCommission?”, International Review of the Red Cross, no 321,1 Nov 97, pp. 705-715, p. 707.

44. Glascott, K., “Part-time body no war-crime remedy”, TheAustralian, 13 May 98.

45. Best, op. cit., p. 393.

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International Humanitarian Law, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, University College Australian Defence Force Academy,Canberra, 1995.

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Review of the Red Cross, no 320, 1 Sep 97,pp. 508–510.

Aptel, C., “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”,International Review of the Red Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97,pp. 675–683.

Arbour, L., “Investigating War Crimes”, Armed Forces JournalInternational, Feb 1998, pp. 46–47.

Bassiouni, C., “International Criminal Law: A Draft InternationalCriminal Code”, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alpen aan den Rijn,1980, p. 73.Bruderlein, C., “Custom in International Humanitarian Law”,International Review of the Red Cross, no 285, 1991,pp. 579–95.

Cassese, A., “Foreword by the former President of the InternationalCriminal for the former Yugoslavia”, International Review ofthe Red Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97,pp. 601–602.

Chowdhuri, S.R. “International Law and Civil Wars”, StrategicAnalysis, vol XVIII, no 7, Oct 95, pp. 993–1004.

Doswald-Beck, L. and Vite, S., “International Humanitarian Lawand Human Rights Law”, International Review of the RedCross,no 293, 1 Mar 93, pp. 94–119.

Dubois, O., “Meeting of experts on committees or other bodies forthe national implementation of international humanitarian law”,Geneva, 23–25 October 1996, International Review of the RedCross,no 293, 1 Mar 93, pp. 94–119.

Dubois, O., “Rwanda’s National Criminal Courts and theInternational Tribunal”, International Review of the Red Cross,no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 717–731.

Erasmus, G. and Fourie, N., “The International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda: Are all issues addressed? How does it compare toSouth Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission?”,International Review of the Red Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp.705–715.

Ferencz, B.B., “An International Criminal Code and Court: WhereThey Stand and Where They’re Going”, Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law, vol 30, no 2, 1992, pp. 375–399.

Ferencz, B.B., “International Criminal Courts: The Legacy ofNuremberg”, 6 Jan 98, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights


International Criminal Court Campaign Website,gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:70/00/orgs/icc/ngodocs/prepcom6/ferencz.txt.

Glascott, K., “Part-time body no war-crime remedy”, TheAustralian, 13 May 98.

Greenwood, C., “The International Tribunal for formerYugoslavia”, International Affairs, vol 69, no 4, 1993, pp. 641-655.

Harhoff, F., “The Rwanda Tribunal: A presentation of some legalaspects”, International Review of the Red Cross, no 321,1 Nov 97, pp. 665–673.

Henning, C., “Guilty of crimes against humanity”, The SydneyMorning Herald, 3 Apr 98, p. 11.

Human Rights Watch, Non-Governmental Organization Action Alert (No. 3), Feb 98, Human Rights Watch InternationalCriminal Court Campaign Website,http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaings/icc/act.alrt.htm.

ICRC, “War Crimes”, Working Paper prepared by the ICRC for theUnited Nations Preparatory Committee for the Establishment ofan International Criminal Court, New York, 14 Feb 97, ICRCWebsite,http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews…47ae411256498004379bd.

ICRC News, “Establishing an International Criminal Court: towardsthe end of impunity”, 1 Feb 98, ICRC Website,http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews.

Kama, L., “Foreword by the President of the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda”, International Review of the Red Cross,no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 603–604.

Kosirnik, R., “The 1977 Protocols: a Landmark in the Developmentof International Humanitarian Law”, International Review of theRed Cross, no 320, 1 Sep 97, pp. 483–505.

Labourmene, L., “Addressing the Psychological Dimension ofConflict Resolution: The contribution of International WarCrimes Trials”, Australian Red Cross International CriminalCourt Update, Edn 2, Apr 98, pp. 15–20.

La Rosa, A., “A tremendous challenge for the International CriminalTribunals: reconciling the requirements of InternationalHumanitarian Law with those of fair trial”, International Reviewof the Red Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 635–650.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, International CriminalCourt Briefing Series, “Establishing and Financing theInternational Criminal Court”, vol 1, no 7, Mar 98, LawyersCommittee for Human Rights International Criminal CourtCampaign Website, http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap7.htm.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, International CriminalCourt Briefing Series, “The Accountability of an Ex OfficioProsecutor”, vol 1, no 6, Feb 98, Lawyers Committee forHuman Rights International Criminal Court Campaign Website,http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap6.htm.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, International CriminalCourt Briefing Series, “Crimes Within the ICC’s Jurisdictionand Essential Elements of Their Definitions”, vol 1, no 3, Feb97, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights InternationalCriminal Court Campaign Website, http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap3.htm.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, International CriminalCourt Briefing Series, “Compliance with ICC Decisions”, vol 1,no 5, Nov 97, Lawyers Committee for Human RightsInternational Criminal Court Campaign Website,http://www.lchr.org/icc/iccpap5.htm.

McCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J., “Achieving the Promise ofNuremberg: A New International Criminal Law Regime?” inMcCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J. (eds), The Law of WarCrimes, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, pp.229–254.

McKinley, J., “Crowds cheer as 22 pay price of genocide”, SydneyMorning Herald, 27 Apr. 98, p. 16.

Marschik, A., “The Politics of Prosecution: European NationalApproaches to War Crimes”, in McCormack, T.L.H. andSimpson, G.J. (eds), The Law of War Crimes, Kluwer LawInternational, The Hague, 1997, pp. 65–101.

Meron, T., “The International Criminalisation of InternalAtrocities”, 89 American Journal of International Law, 1995,pp. 554–577.

Niyungeko, G., “The Implementation of InternationalHumanitarian Law and the Principle of State Sovereignty”,International Review of the Red Cross, no 281, 1991,pp. 105–33.

Normand, R. and af Jochnick, C., “The Legitimation of Violence:A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War”, Harvard InternationalLaw Journal, vol 35, no 2, 1994, pp. 387–416.

Obradovic, K., “The Prohibition of Reprisals in Protocol I: GreaterProtection for War Victims”, International Review of the RedCross, no 300, 1 Sep 97, pp. 520–527.

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Quintana, J.J., “Violations of international humanitarian law andmeasures of repression: The International Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia”, International Review of the Red Cross,no 300, 1994, pp. 223–239.

Roberge. M., “Jurisdiction of the ad hocTribunals for the formerYugoslavia and Rwanda over crimes against humanity andgenocide”, International Review of the Red Cross, no 321, 1Nov 97, pp 651–664.

Rolfe, W., “Implementation of International Humanitarian Law atthe National Level with Special Reference to Developments ofModern Warfare”, The Military Law and Law of War Review,Vol XXVIII (1-2), 1989, pp. 73–81.

Roling, B.V.A., “Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility forViolations of the Laws of War”, in Cassesse, A., (ed), The NewHumanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Editoriale Scientifica,Napoli, pp. 199–231.

Simpson, G.J., “War Crimes: A Critical Introduction”, inMcCormack, T.L.H. and Simpson, G.J. (eds), The Law of WarCrimes, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997, pp. 1–30.

Stroun, J., “International criminal jurisdiction, internationalhumanitarian law and humanitarian action”, InternationalReview of the Red Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 623–633.

Tavernier, P., “The experience of the International CriminalTribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda”,International Review of the Red Cross, no 321, 1 Nov 97,pp. 605–621.

Wembou, D., “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Itsrole in the African context”, International Review of the RedCross, no 321, 1 Nov 97, pp. 685–693.

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AddressesAddress by Air Commodore G. Skillen to the Australian Red Cross

International Humanitarian Law Conference, “Enforcement andPenalties: Developments in International Criminal Law”,University of Melbourne, 9 Jul 97.

Address by Mr P. Bonard to the Australian Red Cross InternationalHumanitarian Law Conference, “Strengthening InternationalHumanitarian Law”, University of Melbourne, 9 Jul 97.

Address by The Hon A. Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs,to the Asia-Pacific Meeting for Government Representativesand International Experts, Canberra, 7 May 98.

Address by Sandoz, Y. to the Malta Conference on the Law ofArmed Conflict in a New Strategic Environment, “View of theInternational Committee of the Red Cross on the Law of ArmedConflict Today”, 16–17 Oct 96.

Address by Professor I. Shearer to the Australian Red CrossInternational Humanitarian Law Conference, “StrengtheningInternational Humanitarian Law”, University of Melbourne, 9Jul 97.

Address by Professor G. Trigg to the Australian Red CrossInternational Humanitarian Law Conference, “NationalProsecutions of War Crimes and the Rule of Law”, Universityof Melbourne, 9 Jul 97.

Statement by Justice L. Arbour to the Preparatory Committee onthe Establishment of an International Criminal Court,Australian Red Cross International Criminal Court Update,Edn 2, Apr 98, pp. 3–9.

Statement by ICRC before the United Nations PreparatoryCommittee for the Establishment of an International CriminalCourt, New York, 14 Feb 97, ICRC Website,http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews…41b3412564950041e69a?

Statement by ICRC before the Preparatory Committee for theEstablishment of an International Criminal Court, New York,4–15 Aug 97, ICRC Website,http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews…2c25412564f7003e6287?

Statement by ICRC before the United Nations General Assembly,51st Session, Sixth Committee, Agenda items 147, 28 Oct 96,ICRC Website,http://www.icrc.ch/unicc/icrcnews…df53c12563ee002b2d34?

Press Briefing by Lawyers Committee for Human RightsInternational Criminal Court Campaign, “Press Briefing of theNGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court: A report onthe final session of the UN Preparatory Committee”, UnitedNations Correspondents Association, New York City, 25 Mar98, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights InternationalCriminal Court Campaign Website,http://www.lchr.org/icc/pressbr.398.htm.

DocumentariesBBC, “War Crimes on Trial”, May 97.

Major Bronwyn Worswick is a member of the Australian Army Legal Corps and is currently serving as the Staff Grade Two – Legal atHeadquarters 2nd Division. She joined the Army in 1994 and was posted as Legal Officer to Base Administration Support Centre –North Queensland. In January 1996 she was posted as the Legal Officer at 1st Recruit Training Battalion. In January 1998 she took upthe appointment of Legal Officer at the Defence Corporate Support Centre – Sydney West/South. In June 1998 Major Worswick took upher present appointment.

Author’s Note:After five weeks of intense negotiations the Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted and

opened for signature in Rome on 17 July 1998. By May 1999, 80 of the 121 countries that supported theestablishment of the ICC had signed the Statute, confirming their intention to ratify. Once the sixtieth ratificationinstrument is deposited at UN Headquarters the Statute will enter into force. In addition, a PreparatoryCommission has been established and tasked with preparing inter alia draft rules of evidence and procedure, arelationship agreement between the ICC and the UN, and administrative proposals for the daily operation of theICC, including funding. The Preparatory Commission is scheduled to complete its work by 30 June 2000.

Despite the seemingly widespread acceptance of the Statute, the results of the Rome Conference should beregarded cautiously, and not necessarily as the milestone in the enforcement of IHL that some have heralded it.Inevitably, the content of the Statute is a product of negotiation and compromise. It does not remedy many of theperceived weaknesses indentified in the earlier draft Statute. There are also some notable exceptions to thecountries who voted in favour of the Statute, including two of the five members of the Security Council (theUnited States and China) who voted against the Statute in Rome. There is still a long way to go before theinternational community can be confident that the ICC will be an effective means of ending the cycle ofimpunity towards IHL.

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By E.J. Stevenson, Department of Defence

In designing effective leadership developmentprograms, it should be remembered that it is not

what leaders do, but how they decide what to do, thatis important. Most leadership programs today seem toconcentrate on two things. Teaching participants thecharacteristics of good leaders, traits such as courage,honesty, selflessness etc, and having them practicecertain skills such as oral communication orteambuilding. While teaching individuals specificknowledge and skills has some merit, there is noguarantee that the learner can apply them effectivelyin a leadership situation, just because they have beenmemorised.

Instead of having people learn a list of measurablecompetencies, leadership programs could helpparticipants learn how to manage complex issues, ineffect, learn how to “juggle complexity”. After all,most leadership decisions involve assessing a numberof conflicting factors and picking an appropriatecourse of behaviour to influence the followers. If youask someone how they decided what to do in aparticular situation, they normally say that theyselected and weighed-up all the pros and cons, andchose the best solution. However, various researcherssince 1990 have found that this is not how mostpeoples’ thought process actually work. In reality, theaverage person enters a leadership situation andimmediately gets an image in their mind of whatoutcomes they desire. On average, they will only testthe validity of their image once or twice, and thenthey will act. The difference between an effective anda less effective leader is that an effective leader ismore likely to have faced similar situations onprevious occasions and can draw on more images,more quickly, to determine an appropriate solution.

This article proposes that leadership programswould be more effective if they concentrated onhelping individuals develop better “frameworks” fortheir thought processes. These frameworks are calledcognitive models and help leaders quickly imagine

what is required in a leadership situation, test their“image” and behaviour. To some extent, currentleadership programs help people develop modelsnow, but it is more a by-product of the learningenvironment the programs create, rather than aconscious aim of the program.

To help understand how cognitive models work,an overview of the nature of learning is required.Curzon defines learning as, “the apparentmodification of a person’s behaviour through hisactivities and experiences, so that his knowledge,skills and attitudes including modes of adjustment,towards his environment are changed more or lesspermanently”.1 Learning is closely linked withintellectual capacity, is multi-dimensional and resultsin cognitive, affective or behavioural changes.2 It isalso context specific and may be learnt from a varietyof sources – military training, study tours andsecondments, not just formal education and training.

Smith et al believes that there are a number ofreinforcement variables associated with learning thatinclude:

1. Practice;2. Non-reinforcement;3. Partial reinforcement;4. Quantity of reinforcement;5. Quality of reinforcement;6. Conditioned reinforcers; and7. Delay of reinforcement.3

These variables need to be considered whendesigning leadership programs because learning tolead is a complex process that occurs throughexperiential learning over time. Based on the work ofKurt Lewin, Kolb et al. presented a model of thislearning process.4 They saw it as a continuous, four-stage cycle that allows individuals to conceptualiseand ultimately extrapolate ideas based on criticalreflection of experiences. They also believed that theprocess was continuous as the individual frequentlyevaluates the learning.

The Nature of Learning

Introduction

Leadership Development: A Case of Teaching Individualsto Juggle Complexity


Figure 1 – The process of learning

In 1979, a young Armoured Corps lieutenant onexercise with his reconnaissance troop in centralVictoria, gave a field signal to his troop sergeant toturn right at a road intersection, which the sergeantdid. The commanding officer’s voice then boomedout over the radio, berating the sergeant for hisstupidity, turning in the wrong direction. The sergeantsaid nothing and instead of the young lieutenantadvising the officer commanding that it was not thesergeant’s decision, the lieutenant also said nothing.The lieutenant regretted his silence for the rest of hiscareer and learnt a critical lesson in leadership; neverlet anyone take the blame for your mistakes. Thisshort anecdote succinctly demonstrates the process oflearning.

When identifying a theoretical basis for moreeffective leadership development programs, it is alsoimportant to identify the difference in the nature of

learning between effective and less effective leaders.This relationship is similar to the one that existsbetween an “expert” and a “novice”.

There is an identifiable difference between anexpert and a novice. Based on earlier studies by Chiand Bjork,5 Ford and Kraiger believe expertise isdefined “as the achievement of consistent, superiorperformance through the development of specialisedmental processes acquired through experience andtraining”.6 They also showed that successfulperformance was a necessary pre-requisite fordemonstrating expertise. Compared to a novice, asystematic cognitive process based on a wellstructured knowledge base was required, for example,an effective cognitive model. Other work by Kraiger,Ford and Salas pursued the importance ofproceduralisation of knowledge, the inculcation ofautomated skills, and the construction and use ofmental models and “meta-cognitive strategies”, ascharacteristics differentiating experts from novices.7

Experts, like effective leaders, have a well-developed capacity to identify, structure and retrievethe information required for deciding on the mostappropriate leadership behaviour in a particularsituation. This process is depicted in Figure 2. Theyhave a clear picture of the context in which they areoperating and an understanding of how their actionsinfluence follower behaviour. They can draw on more

Experts versus NovicesObservation andreflections

Figure 2 – Expert’s versus novice’s thinking

Concreteexperiences

Formation ofabstract conceptsand generalisations

Testing implicationsof concepts innew situations

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: A CASE OF TEACHING INDIVIDUALS TO JUGGLE COMPLEXITY

experiences, more quickly, because they have beenexposed to a wider range of behaviours on which tobase effective decisions.

Furthermore, an expert’s knowledge is highlyproceduralised, and he or she understands when theknowledge is important and, therefore, applicable.8

This is similar to an effective leader, in both peaceand war, who can identify which knowledge isimportant and use it to select appropriate leadershipbehaviours. Ford and Kraiger believe that this occursbecause experts are more adept at relating cause andeffect information that better reflects the nature of theproblem or issue they are facing. Effective leadersalso use proceduralisation to mentally group stepswith tasks by associating them with previouslyobserved procedures (as in Kolb’s model at Figure 1)into more complex constructs and apply them to newsituations.

Based on other work by a number of researchersinto the difference between experts and novices, Fordand Kraiger determined that, compared to novices,experts are more capable of understanding task-relevant information, more likely to cease solutionsthat are not likely to work and more aware of thedegree of difficulty of new problems.10

These characteristics have implications fordeveloping leaders, as the ability to learn fromexperience and “self-monitor” the knowledge andskills being developed, assists in the transition fromnovice to expert – less effective to effective leader.

Ford and Kraiger also highlight that “experts areable to quickly access a solution strategy because thatstrategy is closely linked (in memory) to the identifiedproblem”.11 Experts use cognitive models to createthis linkage and the degree of sophistication of thesemodels also distinguishes experts from novices.12

Cognitive, or mental models, are frameworks fordescribing the inter-relationship between activities,objects and abstract items of knowledge in a person’smind, and can also involve prediction of futureevents.13 They are an important part of an individual’sthought process because they provide structure to theprocess and increase the efficiency of leadershipdecision making. They may also be called “cognitivemaps”, “schemas” or “mental constructs”. It isbelieved that effective leaders have a more efficientthought process and use appropriate cognitive modelsbecause their decision behaviours “contain more

diagnostic clues for detecting meaningful patterns inthe learning or transfer environment”.14

Very few researchers have studied the importanceof helping learners develop appropriate cognitivemodels on leadership development programs. Thosethat have, believe that the models are importantbecause they provide a framework for theinterpretation of ideas and activities, assist inrestructuring existing information and aid in theinculcation of new information.15

Other researchers have identified that learningmental models is more effective if it is contextual.16

They attributed an increase in the learning to thelearner being able to organise domain-specificknowledge better, and inculcate situational, action-learning goal structures into the model.17 Work byCollins supported the findings concerning contextuallearning and highlighted three main reasons forimprovements in the learning: individuals learn andapply models under realistic conditions; learners linkor encode new solutions with problems; andknowledge is stored to make it more easily retrievablewhen later problems arise.18 In the real world, this isseen in the desire by commanding officers to makethe military training as realistic as possible. Theyclaim that the soldiers, sailors and airmen gain morebenefit out of realistic training because it helps theirsubordinates understand and cope with the extremesthey will face in battle.19 The converse is also true. JayConger conducted studies in the United States on theeffectiveness of adventurous or self-developmenttraining in developing leadership knowledge andskills in managers from a variety of industries.20 Hefound that, despite participants “enjoying” abseilingand “becoming one with nature”, there was only a 5 per centtransfer of the learnt behaviours back intothe workplace.

Following on the theme of learning needing to becontextual, Ford and Kraiger proposed that a learner’scognitive model, that links training with his or herexperience, is a better predictor of retention.21 Thisproposal is supported by the work of Bransford et al.,who found that training must also focus on skills andstrategies that generate thinking and the production ofwork based knowledge and skills competencies.22

Later studies by Gick and Holyoak identified fourvariables that influenced the transfer of learning to theworkplace.23 Ford and Kraiger summarised them as:1. The similarity of the structure of training and the

transfer tasks;2. Factors of instruction (e.g. degree of original

learning, the number and variety of examples) that affect the level, specificity and

Cognitive Models

59

interconnectiveness of the tasks that are encodedin memory;

3. The appropriateness of retrieval cues (similarity ofgoals and processing between the training andtransfer of task); and

4. The impact of the learner’s background andexperiences on subsequent learning and transfer.24

While researchers agree on the value of cognitivemodels in generating learning, there has not beenagreement on the most effective instructionaltechniques to develop mental models in novices.25

This may be because evaluation of the effectivenessof training activities in generating learning is oftenbased on a measure of the level of competency or“retention” by the learner.26 This type of evaluationdoes not take into consideration the benefit ofcognitive models being developed by participants.Furthermore, a number of studies have shown thatknowledge retention is not a reliable predictor oflonger-term retention.27 Discussion on the mosteffective instructional techniques for developingmental models will need to wait for a futureAustralian Defence Force Journal article.

Having briefly introduced the nature of learningand the impact of cognitive modelling, the nextsection will highlight the importance of one particularbehavioural theory, social learning theory: learning tojuggle complexity.

Although a number of theorists have beeninvolved in the development and advocation of sociallearning theory for analysing human thought, theideas espoused by Albert Bandura were among themost significant in defining the field. He believed thathuman behaviour could be understood in terms of theinteraction between cognitive, behavioural andenvironmental determinants.28 He proposed that threeimportant processes influence psychologicalfunctioning including:1. Learning complex activities (vicarious learning)

often occurs through observation of other peoples’activities, not just through the personal experienceof undertaking a task or activity;

2. Symbols or images in a person’s thought processrepresent activities, generate reflection on theirexperiences, and extrapolate ideas to newexperiences in innovative ways (symboliclearning);

3. People are reactive to and manipulate the stimulithat surround them (self-regulatory processes).

Bandura therefore believed that anyunderstanding of leadership behaviour needs toconsider self-inducements and consequences.29

To summarise, social learning theory advocatesthat learners observe and extract common attributes,develop rules for generating behaviour, store andstructure the observed input as symbolic images, andlater generate behaviour with similar structuralcharacteristics. Furthermore, social learning theoryprovides a sound theoretical basis for understandinghow leaders learn complex behaviours, but it is stillonly a theory of learning. Cognitive models arerequired to translate social learning theory intoeffective behaviours.

In studies related to social learning theory andleadership, Decker proposed that behaviourmodelling, frequently found in leadershipdevelopment programs, was effective in teachingovert, observable activities such as communicationskills, but of “little” value in teaching covert,cognitive skills.30 He believed that this was because itwas impossible to demonstrate to novices the thoughtprocess occurring to the expert. He advocatedcognitive modelling as a form of learning thatallowed mental processes to be converted into anovert, sequential procedure. In effect, the cognitivemodel helps observers to understand the variablesbeing considered by an expert during the decisioncycle. His main proposition was that:

Just as the instructional designer must select aparticular overt procedure to depict in avideotaped behaviour model, a sequentialcognitive procedure must be identified forcognitive modelling. Once selected, the cognitiveprocedure must be formalised and rendered overtby means of some type of job aid – a work sheet, adecision chart, a checklist, a flow chart, a list ofquestions, or some combination.31

Decker found that 85 per centof leader behaviouris developed through modelling.32 He posited that, ifleadership developers were chosen on the basis thatthey frequently use modelling behaviour, were givenformal education and training in how to model moreeffectively and opportunities to do so, thendevelopment programs would be more effective.

The process used for cognitive modelling entailsthe trainees being exposed to a “job aid” and thetrainer “walks” the trainees through the modelledactivity.33 The overall procedure is based on social

Cognitive Modelling in Social LearningTheory

Social Learning Theory


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Figure 4 – Closing the gap

Courses

SeminarsMentoring

GuidanceWork Experiences

FormalINTERVENTIONS

Informal

Critical Incidents

ExperientialLearning

Life ExperiencesSocial Interactions

61


learning theory and involves cognitive modelling,symbolic coding, rehearsal, and extrapolation to newbehaviours. Unfortunately, there is no evidence in theliterature that Decker either tested his ideas orprogressed with his hypothesis, and there has beenlittle work on behaviour modelling as a technique fortraining and educating leaders. However, he dididentify that,

The research on the efficacy of behaviourmodelling has looked primarily at two skills:manual and social skills. Cognitive skills have notbeen studied as extensively as these, althoughbehaviour modelling may be an effective methodto learn cognitive skills. It is possible to learnabstract material through modelling (cognitivemodelling).34

He also emphasised that, “behaviour modelling inindustrial settings typically is designed to teachcomplex social skills and generalization of responsesto novel contexts”.35 The teaching of leadership wouldfit this description.

Based on Goldstein and Sorcher’s early work tocategorise the retention process into “symboliccoding, cognitive organisation, and symbolicrehearsal”,36 Decker went on to show that symboliccoding enhances behaviour modelling training.37 Hesaw the primary purpose of behaviour modellingtraining was, “to teach new behavioural and/ordecision making skills through the use of modelling,retention aids, behavioural rehearsal, socialreinforcement, and transfer-of-training principles”.38

Goldstein and Sorcher also identified the potentialimportance of behaviour modelling for trainingsupervisors, but did not undertake extensive testing oftheir hypotheses.39 Latham and Sarri undertook moreextensive testing of the benefits of modelling inincreasing supervisors’ interpersonal skills and foundsignificant increase in performance over a controlgroup using normal training techniques.40 Very littlework has been undertaken on the benefits ofmodelling for increasing performance, particularlyregarding leadership development, since this time.That is, until the introduction of the DefenceLeadership Development Project within theAustralian Defence Force.

The above discussion highlights the importance ofcognitive modelling in designing effective leadershipdevelopment training. In May 1999, the JointEducation and Training Group within Headquarters

Australian Defence Force formed a small projectteam to develop a cohesive framework to integrateleadership development, education and training acrossthe Defence Organisation. The framework willarticulate a coherent, through career leadershipeducation and training system that takes account ofthe diverse needs of the Defence organisation and itspersonnel.

The underlying theoretical construct for theframework will be based on cognitive modelling. Thetheory is, Defence leadership development programswill be more effective if they are centred ondeveloping participants’ mental models, rather thangaining specific knowledge and skills. The schematicat Figure 4summarises the process of how leadershiptheory will be translated into reality, a challenge thatmany current leadership development programs fail tomeet effectively. Based on a variety of leadershiptheories, formal and informal interventions willgenerate appropriate cognitive models to helpindividuals make more effective leadership decisions.

It is a relatively revolutionary, let aloneevolutionally, concept for leadership developmentand the author could not find any evidence that it hasbeen undertaken anywhere else in the world. Thepotential to improve leadership development,education and training is high, but the theory has yetto be proven. It will be interesting to see how theProject is accepted in the risk-averse culture withinDefence.

The schema at Figure 4 also shows one exampleof a cognitive model. The Project will use theDynamic Capability Model that has been described indetail by the author in an earlier Australian DefenceForce Journalarticle.41 In summary, the DynamicCapability Model provides a simple framework forhelping leaders choose the most appropriatebehaviour in a given situation. It does this byhighlighting the variables involved in leadershipdecisions and displaying the relationship betweenthem. It is a cognitive aid that can be taught to novicesduring leadership development programs or used byleaders with various degrees of expertise.

At the centre of the model are the essentialcompetencies required of a leader: the knowledge,skills and attitudes, most often taught on leadershipcourses. The competencies are dynamic, constantlydeveloping and maturing with time and experience.Furthermore, they are contextual and therefore subjectto the nuances of a combination of the nature of thetask performed, and the physical environment,organisational culture, and group dynamics withinwhich they operate. The conduit between the twocircles is behaviour. Concentrating on developing this

Future Direction

area is the key to both learning to lead and jugglingcomplexity. A brief description of each of thevariables appears below:

Knowledge – of oneself, profession or trade, andfollowers;Skills – physical, conceptual, communications,interpersonal and decision making;Attitude – a positive or negative frame of mind,values, forms the essence of vision;Behaviour – is the conduit, a dynamic, two-wayflow of actions based on reasoned input;Organisational Context – culture (pattern ofshared beliefs, values and ethos), climatephilosophy and structure;Physical Environment – geography andresources available to the leader; andGroup Dynamics – synergy, power, experience,interdependency and structure.

This article proposed that the key to effectiveleadership development lies in individuals developingeffective cognitive models for managing the complexbehavioural decisions involved in the process ofleadership, rather than simply memorising the isolatedknowledge and skills competencies required of aleader. Cognitive models allow leaders to learncomplex behaviours, organise existing informationand learn new information because they provide aframework for processing abstract concepts and skills,and extrapolating them to new activities. To date,there has been very little research on the impact ofcognitive modelling in leadership developmentprograms.

Effective leaders have a well-developed capacityto identify, structure and retrieve the information

Conclusion

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: A CASE OF TEACHING INDIVIDUALS TO JUGGLE COMPLEXITY

Figure 5 – Dynamic Capability Model ©

63


required for deciding on the most appropriateleadership behaviour in a particular situation. Theyhave a clear picture of the context in which they areacting and an understanding of the implications oftheir actions in influencing follower behaviour. Thishighly individualised picture of the context is basedon efficient cognitive models that they havedeveloped while learning to juggle complexity.

NOTES1. Curzon, L.B. (1990) Teaching in further education: an outline

of principles and practice.4th edn. Oxford: Alden Press, p. 10.See also Fitts, P.M. and Posner, M. (1967) HumanPerformance.Monterey: Cole, p. 8.

2. Kraiger, K., Ford, J. and Salas, E. (1993) “Application ofcognitive, skill-based, and effective theories of learningoutcomes to new methods of training evaluation.” Journal ofApplied Psychology,78, pp. 311–328.

3. Smith, W.I. and Moore, J.W. (1966) Conditioning andinstrumental learning. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 122–128.

4. Kolb, D.A., Osland, J.S. and Rubin, I.M. (1995) Organisationalbehaviour: an experiential approach. Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall, p. 49.

5. Chi, M.T.H. and Bjork, R.A. (1991) “Modeling expertise” inDruckman, D. and Bjork, R.A. (eds) In the mind’s eye:enhancing human performance.Washington, DC: NationalAcademic.

6. Ford, J.K. and Kraiger, K. (1995) “The application of cognitiveconstructs and principles to the instructional systems model oftraining: implications for needs assessment, design, andtransfer.” in Cooper, C.L. and Robertson, I.T. (eds)International review of industrial and organisationalpsychology,Vol 10. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, p. 6.

7. Kraiger et al., loc. cit.8. Ford and Kraiger, op. cit., p.6.9. ibid., p. 7.10. ibid., pp. 8–9.11. ibid., p.7.12. ibid., p. 8.13. loc. cit.14. loc. cit.15. Canon-Bowers, J.A., (1991) “Towards an integration of

training theory and technique.” in Human Factors, 1991, 33(3),p. 285. See also Messik, S. (1984) “Abilities and knowledge ineducational testing: the assessment of dynamic cognitivestructures” in Pake, B.S. (ed) Social and technical issues intesting: implications for test construction and usage. Hillsdale,NJ: Erlbaum.

16. Glaser, R. and Bassok, M. (1989) “Learning theory and thestudy of instruction” Annual Review of Psychology, 40,pp. 631–666.

17. Ford and Kraiger, op cit., p. 25.18. Collins, A. (1991) “Cognitive apprenticeship and instructional

technology” in Idol, L. and Jones, B.F (eds) Educational valuesand cognitive instruction: implications for reform.Hillsdale,NJ: Erlbaum.

19. McManners, H. (1993) The scars of war.London:HarperCollins.

20. Conger, J.A. (1992) Learning to lead.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

21. Ford and Kraiger, op. cit, p. 34.22. Bransford, J.D., Sherwood, R., Vye, N and Reiser, J. (1986)

“Teaching, thinking and problem solving” AmericanPsychologist,41, pp. 1078–1089.

23. Gick, M.L. and Holyoak, K.J. (1987) “The cognitive basis ofknowledge transfer” in Cormier, M. and Hagman, J.D. (eds)Transfer of learning: contemporary research and applications.San Diego: Academic Press.

24. Ford and Kraiger, op. cit., p. 32.25. ibid., p. 25.26. Kraiger et al., loc. cit.27. Farr, M.J. (1987) The long-term retention of knowledge and

skills. New York: Springer-Verlag. See also Fendrich, D.W.,Healy, A.F., Meiskey, L., Crutcher, R.J., Little, W. and Bourne,L.E. (1988) Skill maintenance: literature review and theoreticalanalysis.(AFHRL–TP–87–73), Brooks AFB, TX. See alsoHagman, J.D. and Rose, A.M. (1983) “Retention of militarytasks: a review” Human Factors, Vol. 25, pp. 199–123.

28. Bandura, A. (1977) Social learning theory.Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice Hall, p. vii.

29. ibid.30. Decker, P.J. (1986) “Social learning theory and leadership”

Journal of Management Development, 5,5, p. 52.31. ibid., pp. 52–53.32. ibid., p. 57.33. ibid., p. 54.34. ibid., p. 51.35. Decker, P.J. (1980) “Effects of symbolic coding and rehearsal

in behaviour-modeling training” Journal of AppliedPsychology, Vol. 65, No.6, p. 628.

36. Goldstein, A.P. and Sorcher, M. (1974) Changing supervisorbehaviour. New York: Pergamon.

37. Decker, (1986) op. cit., p. 47.38. ibid., p. 51.39. Goldstein and Sorcher, loc. cit.40. Latham, G.P. and Saari, L.M. (1979) “Application of social-

learning theory to training supervisors through behaviouralmodeling.” Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 64, No. 3,pp. 239–246.

41. Stevenson, E.J. (1998) “Learning to Lead: A Contextual Modelfor Education and Training Leaders” Australian Defence ForceJournal, Mar/Apr.

Eric Stevenson has contributed to the Australian Defence Force Journalon previous occasions. This article is based on the latestresearch for his Doctoral Thesis at the Australian Defence Force Academy, where he is in his fourth year of part-time study. Histhesis entitled, “Learning to Lead is a cognitive model for designing more effective leadership development programs”. Ericspent 24 years in the Australian Army and is now a public servant working in the Joint Education and Training organisationwhere is the Assistant Director Education Policy.

AGAINST THE SUN: THE AIF IN MALAYA1941-42 by Jane Uhr. Published by Allen andUnwin 1998, $29.95.

Reviewed by John Donovan

This book is both interesting and annoying.It is interesting in the deeper perspective that it

gives to the AIF campaign in Malaya in 1941-42 andin the descriptions of many individual members of theAIF, a force now largely forgotten by Australiansociety. Jane Uhr gives more emphasis to theoperations of the AIF on the east coast of Malaya thanthe official history does, and I found these parts of thebook extremely interesting. Although I had previouslyread both the official history and Major General S.Woodburn Kirby’s 1971, Singapore The Chain ofDisaster,I had not previously understood the intensityof the operations carried out there. For this insightalone, I would recommend this book to those with aninterest in Australia’s military history.

To an extent the book falls between two thematicpositions, involving as it does both discussion of thebroader sweep of the campaign and an intimatedescription of the actions of junior participants. Thatsaid, I found the battle descriptions, which switchbetween the perspective of commanding officers andthe “worm’s eye” view of the men on the ground,gave me an understanding of the events of theMalayan Campaign as they were recalled by theparticipants at both levels.

The book is annoying, however, in a number ofessentially minor ways. The writing style does notflow as smoothly as it might, largely because theauthor has a habit of mixing tenses. Quotes fromparticipants describing particular incidents come inthe expected past tense, but descriptions of actions aresometimes given in the present tense and sometimesin the past. While this might be a stylistic artifice ofthe author, I found it distracting.

I also feel that the author missed someopportunities to give an insight into the make up of theAIF (in many ways quite different to the peacetimeforce with which we are more familiar). Many familyrelationships get a mention, with several fathers andsons, including the Varleys (one the CO of the 2/18thBattalion, the other a platoon commander in the 2/19thBattalion, with a second son serving in the MiddleEast). The fate of the senior Varley (lost in the sinkingof the Rakuyo Maruin September 1944) is detailed,

but that of his son (who survived the prison camps toreturn to Australia) is not, while other “characters”such as Ringer Edwards of the 2/26th Battalion, said tohave been the model for the character played by PeterFinch and Bryan Brown in the two film versions ofNeville Shute’s novel A Town Like Alice, pass brieflyacross the pages.

Overall, worth reading, as the insights providedmore than outweigh the stylistic annoyances.

AIRLINES OF ASIA SINCE 1920, R.E.G. Davies,Paladwr Press, through Putnam AeronauticalBooks (Brassey’s), London, 1997, illustrated(black and white), with maps, 572 pages, ISBN 085177 855 0. Distributed by Airlife PublishingLtd., Shrewsbury, U.K. Price U.S.$65.00.

Reviewed by Michael Fogarty

This is the latest R.E.G. Davies book dealing withthe history of the world’s airlines – Airlines of Asia.Paladwr Press publishes it under a specialarrangement with Brassey’s of London, which nowpublishes the Putnam series of aeronautical books.The book contains 250 photographs and 75 maps insupport of 540 pages of text and 28 pages ofcomprehensive index. John Stroud has alsocollaborated on this edition.

All countries are covered, from Afghanistaneastwards. There are seven chapters on Japan(including the then Manchukuo), six on China, 12 onthe Indian sub-continent (of which four are on India),three on the Philippines, etc. This is a completereference book on the history of air transport that hastransformed the economy of the world’s largestcontinent.

“Reg” (aka Ron) Davies is well credentialled towrite such a book. In his working life, he is theCurator of Air Transport, National Air and SpaceMuseum, and the Smithsonian Institution,Washington. Indeed, it is an extension and update ofhis earlier (1964) classic work, “A History of theWorld’s Airlines”, now out of print but considered asa cult book for any serious study on the origins anddevelopment of commercial aviation. His other worksalso cover aviation histories of the United States,Latin America, Saudia, Lufthansa and Aeroflot.

It is clear that much research went into the bookthat is obviously not reflected in the slim two-page

Book Reviews


bibliography. Restraint in writing is to be admired butsimilar coyness in listing complete sources should beavoided. Again, this work is pitched to a dedicatedaudience which explains the lack of scholarlyfootnotes which might be expected in a moreacademic handling of the subject. That treatment doesnot detract from the coverage as a more formalapproach would have deadened the impact the authorintended to achieve. It is written in a racy (oftenflorid, but not lurid) style, which has its own appealover drier works on a similar topic. This veryfreshness is its own strength rather than a comparativeweakness. Reg Davies writes in a fine style – despitethe boyish enthusiasm for his subject.

The author has researched and written in-depth,showing an informed appreciation of the role of airtransport development in modernizing societies. Hisbackgrounding on Far-east Asia included a long flightacross northern Siberia, in an Antonov An-2; about4,000 miles in 300-mile hops, 12 days north of theArctic Circle in a remote and inhospitable area.However, his writing on some of the well-heeledairlines of the region shows that their PR machinesspared no effort in making him comfortable with theprofile, achievements and aspirations of their nationalflag carrier. While some of the material drifts into“info-tainment”, at least he examines some delicatepolitical issues the airlines concerned might notnormally include in annual company reports.

Today, Asian airlines are high in the worldranking and many have outstanding reputations forefficiency and service. They also have some of theyoungest airline fleets. The Pacific Rim is an area,which is now recording the greatest worldwidegrowth in air traffic. Australia too shares in thatbounty in providing high standards of comfort, cabinstaff service and entertainment to its passengers. In asurvey conducted by Inflight research of England,which assessed the standards of the world’s 67international long-haul airlines, Qantas (sixth) andAnsett (second) made it into the top 10 in a survey ofcustomers (SMH, 25 July 1998). All this is re-assuring to the Australian aviation industry.

The Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation noted lastyear that “ … national GDP growth rates, a majortravel determinant, were forecast to fall in manyAsian countries, several into negative growth. Excesscapacity is also plaguing routes, despite orderdeferrals and fire sales of new and used aircraft. Ifaviation is a consistent barometer of economicdevelopment, these signs are clearly ominous for anuncertain world economy” (The Australian, 21December 1998).

Despite the author’s best attempts, the publishersincluded some screamers, which need be mentionedhere. Why are the margins so small? The type couldbe larger. Their need to produce the book by adeadline impacted on the overall quality of the book.Some pictures are distorted for the limitations offormat – appearing as stretched or flattened airplanes.In several cases, reversed images are evident. Onchecking captions, readers will notice that a Caravellepicture was swapped with an Ilyushin 14.Nonetheless, the author triumphs in his book as heputs between the covers of a single volume the resultsof half a century of research – much of it “in thefield”. One expects that another author, with greaterresources and production support, could do acomparable effort but it would not be worth waitinganother 50 years to take that chance. This book willsurvive as the standard industry bible; theauthoritative text on the economic history of Asian airtransport in the 20th century.

Air catastrophes in Asia have also had their effecton the Australian economy. One Australian insurancegiant incurred a loss of $60 million in 1997-98through a series of aviation crashes involving KoreanAir, Air China, Silk Air and Federal Express (see theDaily Telegraph,15 August 1998). Curiously, manyairlines do not advertise solely on their safetystandards: so as not to tempt fate. In short, he remindsus of the narrow margin that always lies betweensafety and disaster. Despite pressures to de-regulateaviation sectors, the disastrous experience of some ofthe baby flots re-inforces the need to keepmaintenance, training, operation, equipment andlicensing standards to their highest levels. As theauthor reminds us, 90% of aviation is on the ground.For example, consider the political framework inwhich international airlines operate: bilateralagreements on traffic rights, etc.

Of particular utility is the author’s comparison ofthe many aircraft he has flown on. For example, onecan only agree, why so few 747 SP series built? TheDC-8 is remembered as an excellent aircraft(something the reviewer can personally attest to for amemorable flight on JAL in 1979 from Tokyo toSydney) for the smoothness of its flight.

There is much more that can be said here but evenless space to do so. Suffice it to say, some of thestronger issues included in this book can besummarized as follows: imperial aviation policies, thepolitics of the Concord, the glamour of flying boattravel, the experience of those obscure pre-warairlines in China, Japanese military and civilianairlines services throughout Asia during the PacificWar and post-war developments to return commercial

air links to normalcy. Airlines of Asia is acomprehensive reference book which is highlyrecommended for enthusiast, scholar or general readeralike. It should find its way into every major libraryfor the intrinsic value it offers. For anyone with aprofessional or amateur interest in aviation history, itis essential for its wide and detailed study of thesubject. In the end, the price will be amortized overmany years for the continued enjoyment and availablereference it will provide to its fortunate owner.

IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPEROR: Essayson the Imperial Japanese Army, Edward J. Drea,1998, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln USA299pp, $80.95.

Reviewed by Major Tim Gellel

Sun Tzu’s famous dictum encouragingcommanders to understand their adversary appliesequally to the study of military history. For anyWestern reader interested in the Pacific War of 1941-45there has been a dearth of reliable and in-depth analysisof the Japanese forces, in particular on the ImperialJapanese Army (IJA). Those references that areavailable are often compiled primarily from Alliedsources as Japanese sources remain largely inaccessibledue to the perceived complexity of the Japaneselanguage. Further, in the case of the Pacific War, thevictors, understandably, were the first to publish theirversion of events. Edward Drea, a proficient Japaneselinguist undaunted by the challenge of the 102-volumeJapanese Official History of the Pacific Warhas, inpart, redressed this imbalance.

In the Service of the Emperoris a compendium oftwelve essays written on or about the IJA from 1939until its dissolution at the end of the second WorldWar. Fittingly, Drea opens with an analysis of theIJA’s disastrous defeat at the hands of the SovietUnion along the Mongolian frontier in the summer of1939. This reminds the reader that the IJA was at warwell before the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)attacked Pearl Harbor. Two schools of thought hadexisted in the Japanese military. Prior to 1941 it wasthe IJA’s ambition to expand further into northernChina, Mongolia and the Soviet Far-east thatprevailed. Instead, the Red Army’s victory at KhalkinGol (or Nomonhan as the Japanese refer to it) was acrushing defeat for the IJA. Materially the two armiessuffered similar casualties, but for the IJA the greatestdefeat was a spiritual one. The IJA’s faith in offensivespirit (seishin) had proved no match for superiorarmoured tactics and the door to the northernexpansion was closed.

Adding insult to injury, the Nomonhan losssupported the IJN’s preference to strike south intoAsia and the concomitant war with the USA. Despitethe apparent strategic swing, the IJA’s tactical focusremained rooted on selected lessons from its past, andthe Nomonhan incident influenced the IJA’spreparation for the forthcoming Pacific War.Accordingly, the IJA had restructured for a land war inChina and along the Soviet border leaving it poorlyorganised and ill-prepared for the string of amphibiousoperations that lay ahead. Contrary to contemporaryWestern belief, Drea affirms that the IJA was neitherbetter equipped nor better trained for its advance intoSouth-east Asia than the Allied armies it vanquished.The IJA maintained only three divisions trained andequipped for amphibious operations, had notconducted jungle warfare training on any scale and, in1941, had held its largest annual manouevres basedupon the need to fight against a fortified Sovietdefence line. The string of early land victories in theopening phases of the Pacific War reinforced the IJA’sfaith in seishinand left it ill-equipped to oppose thesubsequent Allied counter-offensives.

Having thus set the scene, Drea comparesdevelopment of the IJA and Allied doctrinethroughout the war, and the victor’s interpretation ofthe conflict. Another essay examines the harsh life ofthe IJA conscript recruit, and in some part explainsthe IJA soldier’s capacity for cruelty, their rigidadherence to orders, ability to tolerate the harshestconditions and their fatalistic willingness to die fortheir Emperor. Almost as an aside, there follows athumbnail portrait of an important, but to the Westlargely unknown Japanese general officer, AdachiHatazo. Adachi saw service in Manchuria and Chinabefore being given command of the 18th Army inPapua New Guinea, where he led the futile defence ofthe island’s east coast ports against the US andAustralian advance. Despite embracing the qualitiesexpected of a great leader, Adachi, like so many otherJapanese generals, failed to prevent the war crimesfrom being committed by officers under hiscommand. Following the delivery of a guilty verdictagainst him at the Rabaul War Crimes Trials, Adachisuicided in atonement for the loss of so manyJapanese soldiers under his command.

The third section of the book deals primarily withthe application of the signals intelligence war againstJapan, its mechanisms and its results, and in doing soreflects some of the substance of author’s previousworks. One chapter in particular focuses on the effortsof No 55 Australian Wireless Section in Papua NewGuinea.

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However, it is the concluding (and by far thelongest) chapter that provides one of the mostsignificant insights into the IJA. Repeatedly promiseda rapid and decisive victory, Emperor Hirohito, theIJA Commander-in-Chief, is explained as a monarchin search of a chimera-like opportunity to seek aconclusion to the war in which the IJA and IJN hadlong lost the initiative. In seeking to preserve hisnation, the Emperor had to maintain the nationalspirit, or kokutai,of which he was central component.

In the Service of the Emperoris neither light bed-time reading, nor is it a work for the reader seeking asingle volume almanac on the IJA. Rather theindependent chapters help to place much of the singlevolume works of other authors into perspective. Thestand alone nature of Drea’s chapters neverthelessencourages their individual digestion.

A cynic might dismiss In the Service of theEmperoras a mere binding of essays together intoone cover, but to do so would be to underestimate theimportance of Drea’s work. Few works delve into thenature of the IJA, a situation all the more curiouswhen we compare the number of books readilyavailable on its Axis counterpart the GermanWehrmacht.

In the Service of the Emperoris an importantwork and, now that the psychologically significant50th anniversary of the end of the Second World Warhas passed, one that will hopefully encourage otherscholars to assess objectively the IJA’s role in thesecond World War, and not merely outline it as anadjunct to describing the Allied victory in the Pacific.

WARRIOR OF KOKODA: A Biography ofBrigadier Arnold Potts, by Bill Edgar, Allen andUnwin, Sydney, 1999, $29.95, 318pp.

Reviewed by Squadron Leader Mark Quilligan

Command and control have been extensivelycommented upon in a plethora of publications inrecent times. It is refreshing to read a biography thatevaluates the attributes of a warrior who possessed theability to make command decisions that were relevantto battle, and yet was respected by his subordinates, ifnot his superiors.

Arnold Potts, Gallipoli and western-front veteran,holder of the Military Cross and DistinguishedService Order, mentioned in despatches four times,commanding officer of the 2/16 Battalion of the 2ndAIF and brigade commander of the 21st and 23rdbrigades was a soldier’s soldier.

The bravery and leadership shown by BrigadierPotts are attested to from many sources in thebiography. Here was a man who lead from the frontand whose focus was on the battle.

The biography is fairly one sided, although thereare occasional adverse comments, usually by Blameysupporters, and the author takes a number of causeson board.

The strategic command decisions of the NewGuinea Campaign were based on intelligence that wasflawed. Academic and military analysis of thecampaign tends to support this assertion. There seemsto have been little regard for battlefield intelligence.In part this seems to have resulted from thepersonalities of the two main military leaders,Generals MacArthur and Blamey.

Politically motivated military decisions byMacArthur and Blamey are with the benefit ofhindsight seen at best as indifferent to the plight of thesoldiers’ involved, and at worst immoral as therespective commanders’ feared for their personalfutures, and were not averse to sacrificing others toretain their positions.

Brigadier Potts was not a staff man, nor apaperwork specialist, nor as revealed from the textespecially politically aware – he was a soldier.

Brigadier Potts according to some comments inthe biography was one of those leaders who youshould only call upon “by breaking glass in time ofwar”. I feel that there is a substantial weight ofevidence that contradicts this opinion.

Interestingly, Blamey was quickly retired by thegovernment of Prime Minister Chifley. MacArthurheaded into history with his historic clash withPresident Truman, still a controversial event inAmerican history.

Arnold Potts was sacked from command of the21st Brigade and sent to the backwaters by Blamey.He lived to be awarded a civil OBE from a gratefulWest Australian community. He never receivedmilitary accolades from the nation he so faithfullyserved.

Arnold Potts was a citizen soldier, not a memberof any exclusive club, a warrior not a politician, and acommander who held the respect and admiration ofhis subordinates.

Current leaders facing command and careerdecisions could do well to read this biography, andassess what actions they would have taken in similarcircumstances.


LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE 1: TheFundamentals of Land Warfare. Published byDoctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training andDevelopment Centre. 1998.

Reviewed by Dr Alan Ryan, Land Warfare StudiesCentre.1

It must be a new Army when doctrine manuals arepublished in a glossy, user-friendly and almost non-service format. With generally enthusiastic dust-covertestimonials from prominent academics and defencecommentators as well as a scholarly use of referencematerials LWD 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfareappears a significant departure from the axiomatictomes which once determined the principles of howthe Australian Army wages land warfare. In fact, thisvolume is the second in the series of this title to bereleased as a generally available document, the firstbeing a public version of a restricted pamphletpublished in 1993. Although this book offers a morelucid exposition than its predecessor of the global andregional strategic environment in which Army willneed to operate, it is still saddled with the problems oftrying to fulfil a professional educative function withinthe Army whilst advocating land warfare capabilitiesto a wider audience.

Publishing doctrine in an age of uncertainty is arisky enough task in itself, let alone taking on the jobof demonstrating the Army’s mission to an oftendubious public. Consider the changes on theinternational scene that have occurred in the lastdecade, much less since the last edition only six yearsago. Long held expectations of a stable, ifantagonistic, international system vanished overnight,to be replaced with a short-term hope that westernliberal democracy could expect to impose its valueson a grateful world. The “end of history” seemed toherald an era in which future warfare would beessentially asymmetric with conflicts being resolvedby the stand-off delivery of munitions, whilst largescale land warfare became a thing of the past. At thetime of writing, Europe is at war, few of these veritieshave been borne out and the problems of enunciatinga philosophy of national security seem more difficultthan ever. That however, is what LWD1 must do:describe “the way the Army thinks about, andprepares for conflict and war”. It will come as littlesurprise to note that the Army considers this edition tobe a transitional document and is already anticipatingthe next edition to be published in 2001 - no doubt tomeet a considerably different global situation.

This document is clearly more a monograph thana manual and reflects the Chief of Army’s injunction

that it be considered a “work in progress”, a step inthe Army’s intellectual journey into the informationage. Unlike earlier editions, it recognises thatunpredictability characterises not only militaryoperations, but the whole strategic environment inwhich Australian armed forces may be called on toplay a role. Consequently, it is significantly moreambitious than earlier publications in both the timeframe for force development which it anticipates andthe range of operations which the Australian DefenceForce may need to mount. Indeed, it is refreshing tonote that the publication integrates the Army missioninto a joint service vision.

That approach takes Australian strategic thinkingfrom a restrictive philosophy of continental defence toa maritime concept of operations in the littoralenvironment that is our region. It is certainly morerealistic about the types of Land Force tasks which theArmy might be expected to carry out in the nearfuture. This departure from the reactive model ofdefence, (with its contingent limitations on theGovernment’s freedom of action in any givensituation) clearly attempts to implement the thinkingoutlined in the 1997 paper, Australian Strategic Policyby moving the Army to a more pro-active policy ofengagement. The Army is thus the first Service topublish fundamental doctrine revised to meet theGovernment’s requirements. Not surprisingly, thepractical and cost implications of “making a directcontribution to the maintenance or broader regionalstability” have drawn criticisms from media andacademic commentators alike. These reactions aremisconceived. Documents such as The Fundamentalsof Land Warfareoutline responses to realisticcontingencies and are formulated in keeping withhigher level policy. To argue, as some have done, thatthe Army in being does not have the resources to carryout that tasking evades the central point. If Australianforces do not have the capacity to sustain the types ofoperations which are required by their politicalmasters, then that is a budgetary problem, not a failingof the authors of operational doctrine.

One problem with doctrine is that, by its verynature, it is dogmatic and any publication which seeksto define its field thus lays itself open to attack. Byseeking to be all things to all readers, this book fallsinto that category. Viewed as a contemporary essayon the problems of waging land warfare in thecontemporary Australian strategic environment,LWD1 is a success. Thoughtful readers however, willwant to question some of the underlying assumptionsbehind this book. It can be argued that this is a goodthing; that the questioning of institutional truths onlyhones the ability of our information age forces to do

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battle. However, keystone doctrine is generallyexpected to facilitate certainty, curiously, some of thereductionist elements in this book serve only todecrease it.

Of greatest concern is the unqualified status givento The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and thetoo easy expectation that the combination oftechnology, innovation and “the knowledge edge”will “tidy up” combat. More attention to the enduringnature of armed conflict might obviate the impressionthat this book might leave of an antiseptic battlespacedominated by intellectual, almost Olympian warriors.The chapter on modern land warfare commences witha quote from Geoffrey Blainey’s work, The Causes ofWar: “The idea that great advances in the technologyof warfare inevitably led to shorter wars was held bymany generations, but falsified by many wars”.Unfortunately, there is little elaboration of this themeand the reader would be forgiven for thinking that thetraditional battlefield had given way to a rationalenvironment where outcomes will be determined bythe application of reasoned games theory.Undoubtably, advanced information systems, thedigitisation of the battlespace and enhanced weaponssystems have changed the way we wage war, but it isopen to question whether this represents a paradigmshift in the nature of war itself. Although it isimportant to try to predict accurately the changingface of battle, it is necessary to beware of falling intoeasy assumptions that rapid advances in technologywill prove any different from the other major changesin warfighting which have made ours the most lethalcentury ever. It is easy to forget that nuclear strike,blitzkrieg, and before that, attritional warfare were the“revolutions” of their day.

Although the book sets out to create a specificallyindigenous doctrine, many of the ideas reflect currentUS pre-occupations with the idea of the RMA andforce capability being a “system of systems”. TheAmerican authority Donald Kagan has recentlyreminded us that whilst technology is important, thereare no “silver bullets”, a fact which recent events inKosovo should emphasise again. A trap here is thatwhat works for the world’s only superpower mightnot necessarily make a great deal of sense for amiddle level power with a small population. Whilstthe US can maintain unchallenged capabilities acrossa broad spectrum, Australia cannot expect to haveunparalleled technological superiority in everycontingency. The prevailing idiom of this workreflects a strategy of power based on an assumption oftechnological and professional superiority. Therecognition of a prevailing school of thought does notamount to imbibing a philosophy of waging war that

is compatible with all our circumstances. Onewonders whether a book entitled The Fundamentalsof Land Warfareshould be drafted in language betterlikely to age well; the buzzwords of each generationare rarely particularly impressive to the next.

Interestingly, there has been widespread commentthat LWD1 does not go far enough, some punditshave urged that future doctrine might includemodifications to the “Principles of War” toaccommodate the RMA. This approach is based on anargument that war is becoming more complex. At thesame time, an equal body of opinion considers thatwhilst the means of waging war is continuing tochange, the nature of battle is immutable. TheFundamentals of Land Warfare does not address thisissue, and by effectively siding with the RMA modelof future warfighting it leaves the work with a logicalgap. Whilst no resolution of this dispute is to beexpected, some acknowledgement of the dangers oftechnology based planning should be included.Clausewitz pointed out that as war is an act ofviolence it reacts upon the feelings more than theintelligence of the combatants - the extent of thisreaction depends not on the degree of civilisation butupon the importance and duration of the interestsinvolved. Most contemporary conflicts havehighlighted the importance of understanding theirrational - particularly where war is waged betweensubstantially different cultures. Our strategists woulddo well to include these factors in our doctrinalthinking.

Perhaps the most positive aspect of thispublication is that it re-establishes warfighting as thecore business of the Army. To a large extent thisreflects the appreciation that the end of the Cold Warhas introduced a multitude of new threats, what theBritish historian Norman Stone calls “the new DarkAges”. Whatever one thinks of the US derived term“warfighting” (whatever happened to fighting wars?),no text on land warfare should devote its main thrustto low-level operations and peacekeeping, as was thecase in earlier editions. A combat ready Army mightbe able to fulfil those functions but if they become theforce’s raison d’ être, then it is unlikely that the Armywill be able to fulfil its primary obligation toAustralia.

This point raises the purpose of periodicallypublished doctrine. We know we have to have it, butwhy? Should doctrine represent a national philosophyfor the use of armed force, or should it be restricted atservice level to the means by which a force applies itscapabilities to achieve tactical success? The answer isthat it does both and whilst admirably concise andclearly expressed, this short work is perhaps over-


ambitious. As Army keystone doctrine it belongsprimarily to the philosophical dimension of theknowledge hierarchy. Despite this, LWD1 seems toexceed its brief by enumerating various aspects of theknowledge edge that might be better dealt with at theapplication level of doctrine. More “big picturedetail” and less of perceived innovation, mightguarantee this work a longer shelf life and broaderapplicability. However, given its role as transitionaldoctrine, this is not a major problem.

These observations do not detract from the valueof this book as a summary of the Army’s core beliefson the conduct of military operations. LWD1 is themost realistic assessment of the Army’sresponsibilities and functions to emerge in the decadesince the end of the Cold War. Future editions mighttake its lead whilst avoiding the tendency toneologism which appears to confuse the fundamentalsof land warfare with the new tools at thecommander’s disposal.

VIETNAM: A History by Stanley Karnow,Pimlico, An Imprint of Random House, 1991. 768pages including photographs, maps, chronology ofevents and 104 pages of appendixes.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Alistair Pope(Retired)

This is the first time that I have written anunsolicited review, so there has to be somethingspecial about the book. Secondly, any book of over750 pages which is read from cover to cover certainlyhas something going for it! Thirdly, it is rare that ablurb on the cover carries more than a modicum oftruth, but in this case the Boston Globe’sproclamation that this is “the most comprehensive,up-to-date (as at 1991 anyway)and balancedaccount”, is well deserved.

Stanley Karnow has made a most welcomecontribution to the history of the Vietnam War. For ajournalist who spent nearly 30 years covering the wholeseries of Indo-Chinese conflicts in Vietnam, Laos andCambodia, he appears to have retained a remarkablydispassionate detachment from both sides. This is evenmore outstanding because he met and discussed bothcontemporary and historical events with almost all ofthe major leaders and players of all sides. It would beunfair to say “both sides” as the book demonstrates thatVietnam was always an ever-changing kaleidoscope ofvested interests and alliances.

Having recently re-read Bernard Fall’s StreetWithout Joy,and feeling the same sense of dread andforeboding as I did when I first read it 33 years ago, I

felt that Karnow’s account gives a much better insightinto events, and the duplicity and machinations of allthe Government’s involved. The soldier’s of all sidesgenerally did their duty within the limitations of theirtraining, the political and social events surroundingthem and the leadership responsible for them.However, this was truly the television news war andeven front-line soldiers could not escape beinginfluenced by the events portrayed daily at home andrelayed to them by anxious (or often antagonistic)relatives and “friends”. What remains so perniciousfor so many veterans is that in the end (although thewar was ended by military means), the militaryoutcome was not the decisive factor. As ColonelHarry Miller so devastatingly recorded at his firstmeeting with his equivalent in Hanoi on his missionto negotiate the release of American POW’s; “Youknow you never defeated us in a single major battle”.The NVA Colonel pondered for a moment thenreplied “You know, you are right, but it is alsoirrelevant”. For all the killing and dying that went onfor the final 30 years after the end of WWII themilitary effort was but a sideshow to the politicalcentre stage.

Although this is a history of Vietnam, it is heavilyconcentrated on the recent events over the past 30years. Vietnam was founded as an entity around208BC and the first two millennium are recorded in100 pages. Fortunately, there is enough interest toretain readership of those curious enough to buy a700+ page tome! The next 75 pages cover the Frenchphase from their earliest venture in the late 1600s tothe last vestige of the major colonial war from 1946 tothe French defeat and withdrawal in 1954. As usual,there is a multitude of places in the text notrepresented on any map.

In retrospect, that would have been the end of thematter, and north and south Vietnam would have beenunited through some form of democratic election orafter a relatively brief civil war. However, in the latefifties the apparently inexorable rise of internationalSocialism, the developing “Cold War” between theUSA and the USSR, the fall of China to Mao TseTung’s Communists in 1949, the tied Korean War in1953, the defeat of the French in Vietnam, and theglobal rise of insurgencies and terrorism, all conspiredto propel east and west to use Vietnam as their chosenbattleground for a trial of ideological strength.Chapter 7, called “Vietnam is the Place” clearlydescribes the mood of the United States Governmentto this perceived challenge to their power and rivalrywith the eastern bloc.

There are some enlightening gems of historicalfact and analysis. The description of the so-called

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“Tonkin Gulf Incident”, which more than anythingelse eventually propelled the United States intocommitting ground troops to aid a client state, isdemonstrated beyond reasonable doubt to have been afiction. I have yet to see a refutation of the analysis(and doubt that I will). Basically, a couple ofinexperienced and apprehensive radar operators“detected” a swarm of torpedoes coming at theirships, the Turner Joyand the Maddox. Their reactionwas to set off a three hour “battle” which, observedfrom the air by Admiral John Stockdale, saw “noboats, no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boatgunfire, no torpedo wakes; nothing but black sea andAmerican firepower” (page 386). It is little comfort tolearn 35 years after the event that a war many thoughtwas a mistake really was.

The enthusiasm for the war among all Americansin 1964, and their national pride in exerting power forpower’s sake will be a revelation for many. Nineyears later, having split and drained the soul ofAmerica and many of its Allies, the United Statesdesperately sought a way out at any price. Finally,having left south Vietnam to its fate President Fordunilaterally declared in a speech on 23 April 1975 inNew Orleans that “Today, Americans can regain thesense of pride that existed before Vietnam” (page681). As with any good politician he was probablysincere at that moment. President Thieu’s bitterparting words as he fled to Taiwan on Anzac Dayappear to be more fitting as he declared that he wasdeserted by “an inhumane act by an inhumane ally.”

Although the book was first issued in 1983 andrevised in 1991 it ends with the end of the war. Itwould have been well worth-while adding an annexdealing with events such as the invasion of Cambodia,the war with the Chinese in 1979, and the process ofunification and reconstruction. These could havereasonably been included as Karnow interviewedsome of the Vietnamese leaders as late as 1981.However, it may be that they would have been morereticent to discuss such recent events and that Karnowwould have been equally reluctant to jeopardise theinterviews he was granted, which revealed such awealth of information. I look forward to the sequel indue course as Karnow has a very readable style andhas produced a book which is both a good reference,and a good read.

UNCERTAIN FATE: an Australian SAS Patrolin Vietnam, Graham J. Brammer, Allen andUnwin, St Leonards, 1997.

Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr, AustralianIntelligence Corps

This very readable book should appeal to thosewho like a good war story that emphasises realismwithout the exaggerated extremes of the usualRambo-type characters common in much of today’smilitary fiction. Written by a former Australian SASsoldier, the novel is a fictionalised account of the trialsand tribulations of an Australian SAS patrol on areconnaissance/ambush mission in the jungles ofSouth Vietnam. Of course, this is not to be a “normal”patrol – if there ever was such a beast for the SAS inVietnam – and Brammer’s characters are thrown intoall manner of combat encounter before they arefinally extracted under fire.

Clearly drawn from the author’s own first handknowledge, the novel is at its strongest whendescribing the realistic minutae of being part of awartime SAS patrol, particularly in the demandingsetting of South Vietnam. At these moments it is anengrossing novel which reads like a good TomClancy. Brammer writes with a plain and succinctstyle that is very reminiscent of the approach adoptedby many Vietnam-era war correspondents – factualbut with an emotional edge. This allows him toprovide vivid scenes of encounters with the enemythat do not get lost in hyperbole. Brammer has a defttouch when describing combat. The novel alsoprovides an excellent insight into the inner workingsof an SAS patrol wherein each man has a critical roleto play and if anyone fails the whole patrol isthreatened. Brammer shows that there can be noexcess baggage in such demanding and life-threatening situations.

Like Clancy though, the novel is at its weakestwhen trying to deal with the complex emotionalinteractions of individual soldiers within the patrol.Starting out strong, characterisation becomes blurred,personal motivations are not sustained, and nocharacter ever really emerges from the page as aliving entity. Of course, Brammer is not on his ownhere, any review of the vast majority of war-novelswill demonstrate that describing combat is mucheasier than tangling with the inner-workings of whatsustains and motivates men in combat. An example ofthis was the recent movie, Saving Private Ryan,which opened with probably the most realistic warscenes in motion-picture history and thenmetamorphosed into a one-dimensional soap opera. InUncertain Fatethough, this is not a fatal flaw in whatis an otherwise excellent novel. Just read it as anabsorbing story of combat in Vietnam by one who hasbeen there, and not as a psychological examination ofmen under fire.
