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The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il

Sung: The Last Cold Warriors?

Akan Malici

Arizona State University

Johnna Malici

Arizona State University

Although the end of the Cold War brought the transformation of the communist bloc, some

states have resisted the ensuing wave of democratization. This study assumes that impor-

tant mechanisms of continuity and change in communist states are situated in the belief

systems of their leaders and that the years between 1985 and 1991 were a catalytic period.

What did Fidel Castro of Cuba and Kim Il Sung of North Korea learn from the end of the

Cold War? Their belief systems are examined prior to 1985 and after 1991, i.e., before and

after the collapse of other communist regimes. If learning has occurred, it should be

reflected in a comparison of their beliefs for these time periods. Our results from ANOVA

analyses indicate that Fidel Castro engaged in some learning but Kim Il Sung did not. This

finding is complemented by the results of a MANOVA analysis, which indicate that the end

of the Cold War had only a modest impact on Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, independent

of their specific personalities. We conclude by drawing attention to the ensuing debate

between structural- and agent-level theorizing and by giving some suggestions for future

research.KEY WORDS: Cold War, change, learning, operational code, structural adaptation

The end of the Cold War brought with it the demise and transformation of

the communist bloc led by the former Soviet Union. Indeed, after August of 1991

only a handful of communist states remained in the international system and even

fewer maintained their confrontational relationship with the United States. Two

such states, Cuba and North Korea, had depended heavily on support in the form

of economic aid and political backing from the Soviet empire during the Cold

Political Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2005


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War. With the breakdown of the Soviet Union, this support system quickly dried

up: the economies of Cuba and North Korea declined significantly, and the leaders

of these states became politically isolated. Despite these developments, why did

Cuba and North Korea continue to walk on the communist path? Was it simply a

Cold War artifact of geopolitics, due to Cubas location next to the Yankee colos-

sus and the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula?

The way the foregoing question is framed is admittedly somewhat of an exag-

geration as it suggests rigid and strict continuity in Cuban and North Korean

foreign policy behavior. To be sure, some change towards moderation and (selec-

tive) opening did occur in both states. Yet, the magnitude of the events that led

to the end of the Cold War, as well as the fundamentally changed nature of inter-

national politics on both the structural and the dyadic levels, make the nature of

these changes appear rather minor.

Structural approaches call our attention to incentives in the international envi-

ronment for particular types of policies. It is posited that governments respond

in a rational manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of the interna-

tional environment (Tetlock, 1991, p. 24). The rational actor premises underly-

ing structural approaches lead us to expect cooperative foreign policy behavior,

or policies of accommodation in general when cooperation is indeed prudent. It

is the very small degree of change in Cuban and North Korean foreign policy

since the end of the Cold Waran event that had a very pronounced impact on

these statesthat leads us to question the validity of analyses that focus prima-

rily on external conditions when explaining Cuban and North Korean foreign

policy behavior. This suspicion is further strengthened given that an explanation

of foreign policies of small states such as Cuba and North Korea should be an

easy case for approaches that focus on the international environment as an

explanans (Elman, 1995).1

Questioning the validity of structural explanations is, of course, not new to

international relations scholarship. Scholars have convincingly argued that struc-

tural explanations do not sufficiently explain the Soviet dissolution (Breslauer,

1987, 1992; Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991; Evangelista, 1991; Lebow, 1994). Instead,

it is often argued that the new thinking policies were the result of changes made

within the Soviet leadership, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, who has been described

388 Malici & Malici

1 In a comparison of great powers and small states, Rosenau (1966, pp. 4748), for example, arguesthat features of the international environment are more potent regarding a small states foreign policydecisions. This assertion is underlined by Waltzs reasoning that small states are to be moreattentive to external constraints because they operate on narrow margins (Waltz, 1979, p. 195).Similarly Jervis argues that since small states lack the resources of great powers, they also lack amargin of time and error in their responses to occurrences in the international environment. Theinternational environment, therefore, dictates that leaders of small states be closely attuned to it(1978, pp. 172173). In a strikingly similar fashion Jack Snyder (1992, pp. 317318) argues that

ll d d j b i l b ff f h f


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as an uncommitted thinker and motivated learner (Stein, 1994). Reversing this

logic, we offer a learning explanation of the Cuban and North Korean non-

transitions (Deutsch, 1963; Jervis, 1976; Levy, 1994). That is, we contend that

substantive and lasting change in Cuba and North Korea did not occur because

of the absence of learning by the leaders of those states. By learning, we mean a

change in beliefs (or degree of confidence in ones beliefs) or the development of

new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation

of experience (Levy, 1994, p. 283). Thus, the main assumption of this study is

that the mechanisms of continuity are situated in the beliefs of the Cuban and

North Korean leadership.

The great transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, so we contend,

provided plenty of opportunity for the observation and interpretation of experi-

ence: the international structure, Cuba and North Koreas position within it, and

the dyadic relationships between the Soviet Union vis--vis Cuba and North Korea

all changed dramatically. Thus, it is very puzzling that Cuban and North Korean

foreign policy did not undergo sizeable changes following this catalytic period.

Following from this and given our basic assumptions, our primary research ques-

tions are: Did Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung learn from their Cold War experi-

ences, and if so, what did they learn?

There is a large demand to apply theories used within the field of interna-

tional relations to the cases of Cuba and North Korea (e.g., Ahn, 1997; Kim,

1998). The most frequently articulated plea is for individual level theorizing (e.g.,

Gonzalez, 1996; Gonzalez & Ronfeldt, 1986; Planas, 1993; Smith, 1988), and

common sense explains why this is so. While democratic countries are charac-

terized by systems of checks and balances and multiple veto points, hindering the

personalized rule of one individual, authoritarian regimes often lack these features

(Tsebelis, 2002). Leaders in authoritarian regimes are better able to pursue their

subjective will, as they are often considered to be what Hermann and Hermann

(1989) call predominant leaders. Yet, ironically, to the best of our knowledge,

no systematic effort has been undertaken to theorize about the leaders of Cuba

and North Koreaa gap that we intend to fill.

Answering our primary research questions also allows us to shed some light

on an empirical, theoretically uninformed debate found in the literature on Cuba

and North Korea. Traditionally, scholars considered Castro and Kim to be hard-

line communists who rejected liberal ideas and policies on the domestic as well

as the foreign policy level. With regard to foreign policy, Castro and Kim were

characterized as having rather hostile beliefs and attitudes toward the (over-

whelmingly capitalistic) outside world (on Cuba see Domnguez, 1989, pp. 2933;

Erisman, 1985; on North Korea see Buzo, 1999; Eberstadt & Ellings, 2001; Kim,

1998). Throughout the Cold War decades Cuba and North Korea pursued hard-

line policies of confrontation and were particularly antagonistic towards the

The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung 389


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This consensus regarding the beliefs and attitudes of Castro and Kim,

however, largely disappeared upon the Cold Wars end. According to some revi-

sionist interpretations of Cuban and North Korean foreign policy behavior in the

post-Cold War era, the two states appear to depart somewhat from policies of

revolution towards more moderate policies of pragmatism that seem to better

serve the national interest. Scholars now also tend to offer two conflicting inter-

pretations of these leaders. One group of scholars, whom we refer to as the status

quo school, argues that the beliefs of Castro and Kim have not been affected and

therefore remain autonomous from external events such as the end of the Cold

War and the Soviet collapse. Put simply, they argue that Castro and Kims beliefs

have not changed and that any post-Cold War behavior is due to external factors

(on Castro see Centeno, 1997; Dominguez, 1993, 1997; Mesa-Lago, 1993a,

1993b; Pickel, 1998; Ritter, 1994; Suchlicki, 2000; on Castro and Kim see Mazarr,

1991; on Kim see Ho-yol, 1992; Moon-Young, 1994; Youn, 1999). On the other

hand, a second group of scholars, whom we call the reformist school, argue that

the events leading to the end of the Cold War had a significant impact on Castro

and Kim; they argue that Castro and Kim have adjusted their beliefs in response

to changes in the international system, and furthermore, that post-Cold War behav-

ior is due to altered beliefs (on Castro see Erisman, 2000; Fernndez, 1994; Rich-

Kaplowitz, 1993; Smith, 1992; on Kim see Kim, 1994; Oh, 1990; Sang-Woo,

1991, 1992). In short, these two schools disagree over whether the two leaders

have exhibited significant learning.

The debate and disagreement between the status-quo and reformist schools

poses an interesting research puzzle that recurs within the literature on foreign

policy decision making and political psychology (e.g., Breslauer & Tetlock, 1991;

Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994; Tetlock, 1998): Do individuals learn from process and

experience? If so, what do they learn? Furthermore, is learning related to foreign

policy behavior? In order to answer these research questions, we employ opera-

tional code analysis (George, 1969, 1979; Holsti, 1977; Walker, 1977, 1983,

1990).

Operational code analysis allows us to determine Castro and Kims

philosophical beliefs about the nature of the political universewhether it is

cooperative or conflictual, and the nature of political conflictas well as their

instrumental beliefs about the most effective strategies for accomplishing politi-

cal goals. When applied over time, operational code analysis makes it possible to

detect changes in a decision makers belief system as a result of learning (Walker,

Schafer, & Marfleet, 2001; see also Bennett, 1999). Operational code analysis thus

permits us to offer answers regarding our primary research puzzle and thereby to

function as arbitrator between the status quo and reformist schools. While the

explanandum of this study is beliefs, there also appears to be a relationship

between beliefs and behavior (George, 1979; Holsti, 1976; Tetlock, 1991, 1998).

390 Malici & Malici


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Cuban and North Korean post-Cold War behavior. Doing so also allows us to

address an auxiliary puzzle, namely whether in the present cases beliefs are linked

to behavior or whether these are epiphenomenal vis--vis behavioral changes.

The remainder of this paper will proceed in the following manner. First, we

illustrate the dimensions of the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and North Korea in

economic and political terms. We argue that the Soviet abandonment, which led

to economic crisis and political isolation in Cuba and North Korea, was an event

of such magnitude that it provided ample opportunity and incentives for Castro

and Kim to reevaluate their beliefs. Second, arguing for a belief systems approach

to the present research question, we will present operational code analysis as a

method not only for the identification of a leaders beliefs but also for the iden-

tification of learning patterns.

In a subsequent section we will discuss levels of learning and distinguish

these from other mechanisms that may lead to changes in foreign policy behav-

ior. This move allows us to function as an arbiter between the status quo group

and the reformist group. Then we present and discuss the results of our data

analysis. We also assess whether changing circumstances, personalities, or a com-

bination thereof matters more in an explanation of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sungs

beliefs as leaders of rogue states. Finally, we conclude by drawing attention to

a debate between structure and agent-based explanations for foreign policy

behavior.

The Cold War: Soviet Withdrawal from Cuba and North Korea

In structural terms, the Cold War era was marked by bipolaritya condition

in which states are polarized into two opposing coalitions of about equal power

(Wagner, 1993; Waltz, 1979). However, the economic and political problems of

the Soviet Union as the leader of one of these coalitions led to the independence

of Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The ultimate outcome

was the end of the Cold War accompanied by a change in the distribution of power

among states and a structural transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity

(Mastanduno, 1997). Because units within the international system adapt to new

structural configurations, the end of the Cold War also affected the particular sit-

uations of individual states, which in turn affected dyadic relationships between

states (Lebow, 1994). Thus, the disintegration of the Soviet Union as one of the

systemic poles changed the structure of the international system, but it also led to

situational changes within the particular dyadic relationships between the Soviet

Union (later Russia) vis--vis Cuba and North Korea.

For the vast part of the Cold War era both Cuba and North Korea, as

fortresses of communism, were able to rely on the Soviet Union for economic

and military support in the form of aid and subsidized trade. This relationship



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errors of their past policies (Erisman, 2000, pp. 110111).2 Relations that had

formerly been with other communist partners began being replaced by new rela-

tions with Western states, especially the United States (Blacker, 1993, p. 188;

Blasier, 1993, pp. 6870).

Subsequent trade losses at the end of the Cold War would have been less

damaging to the economies of North Korea and Cuba had they been able to com-

pensate for the loss by initiating new partnerships. Yet they could not. During the

time period under consideration, North Korean total trade was virtually cut in half,

and Cuban total trade declined by almost 75% leaving both countries in severe

economic recessions (Erisman, 2000, pp. 148149; Mesa-Lago, 1993b, p. 138).

The magnitude of this ensuing economic recession becomes even clearer

when considering North Korea and Cubas GNP/GDP and the evolution of foreign

debt in the years surrounding these events.3 As shown in Figure 1, before 1990,

real GNP growth rates for North Korea were modest yet steadily positive oscil-

lating between 2.1 and 3.3%. The abrupt downfall came in 1990, when the Soviet

Union undertook concrete measures that curtailed the North Korean economy,

which bottomed out in 1992 with a negative growth rate of 7.6%. Though recov-

ering somewhat in the following years, the North Korean economy was unable to

reach positive growth rates. Similar observations hold for Cuban real GDP growth

392 Malici & Malici

2 Regarding Gorbachevs policy changes, Stein (1994) argues that Gorbachev changed his policiesby trial and error learning, and Wohlforth (1994/95, p. 115) argues that cognitive change wascompelled by mounting negative feedback. See also Kupchan (1994, pp. 495ff).

3 Though we have made extensive efforts at data collection, we have encountered some limits. Wecould not find a consistent measure of macroeconomic growth across the two cases, which is whywe report real GNP growth rates for North Korea and real GDP growth rates for Cuba. Addition-ally, we have been unable to locate real GDP growth rates for Cuba for the years 1986, 1987, and1988 h l G h Oh d i (2000 42) C b l G

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Year

%C

han

ge GNP Growth North

Korea

GDP Growth Cuba

Figure 1. Real GNP/GDP Growth Rates, 19851994Sources: Oh and Hassig (2000, p. 42), Hernndez-Cat (2000, p. 30), United

Nations (1997, p. 47).


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rates. Although we are missing data between 1986 and 1988, it appears as no coin-

cidence that the real GDP growth rate, while still positive in 1989, dropped into

the negative in 1990the same year that the Soviet-Cuban economic agreement,

which provided Cuba with much less favorable terms of trade than it had been

accustomed to receiving, was renegotiated. By 1993, real GDP reached rock

bottom with a negative growth rate of 14.9%. Thereafter it recovered somewhat,

yielding a rate of 0.7% in 1994 (Hernndez-Cat, 2000).

The magnitude of Cuba and North Koreas economic recession is furthermore

illustrated when considering the evolution of their foreign debt. Whereas in 1985

North Koreas foreign debt made for only 19.2% of its GNP, by 1991 North

Korean foreign debt was 40.5% of GNP, and even reached 50.3% in 1994. Again,

a similar pattern developed in Cuba. Whereas in 1985 Cubas foreign debt was

12.1% of its GDP, by 1991 foreign debt accounted for as much as 35.6% of GDP,

and this figure reached 59% in 1993. In both cases the percentage of foreign debt

to GNP/GDP increased significantly afterthe Soviet Union pulled out (on Cuba

see Erisman, 2000, p. 122; on North Korea see Oh & Hassig, 2000). Parallel to

these developments Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung had to witness how their former

communist allies in eastern Europe weresometimes violentlypushed out of

their offices.

But, did Castro and Kim consequentially learn from these events, and if so,

what did they learn? These questions are derived from and motivated by our basic

assumptions: (1) that the late 1980s and early 1990s was a catalytic period for

these countries and (2) that the mechanisms of continuity and change are situated

in the beliefs of Cuban and North Korean leadership.4 Although there is dis-

agreement over whether Castro and Kim learned, what scholars do seem to agree

on is the nature of Cuban and North Korean foreign policy behavior in the Cold

War era as well as in the post-Cold War era, which is marked by a mixture of

change and continuity.5 On the one hand we observe some moderation and prag-

matism of Cuban and North Korean foreign policy behavior in the post-Cold

War era. Instances are Cubas decreased participation in socialist revolutionary


4 Critics might counter and argue that Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung were not entirely free to learnand to change their attitudes as major concessions to the capitalist world would have endangeredtheir political standing at home. A slightly different argument would be that if Castro or Kim wereto make concessions toward the aggressively portrayed capitalist world, they would no longer havethe Yankee imperialists to blame for domestic problems, and anti-Americanism would no longerserve to unify the Cuban and North Korean peoples under the Castro and Kim regimes. However,both counterarguments are mistaken. As cases in Eastern Europe efficiently demonstrated, it is notconcessions that endanger a regime, but rather the continuation of Cold War practices. Regardingthe second argument, the idea that the Cuban and North Korean people were unified behind theirleaders is simply wrongheaded. Indeed, scholars have often commented on the eroding politicallegitimacy of Castro and Kims regimes (Mazarr, 1991; Gonzalez, 1996, pp. 1920, 2832; Oh andHassig, 2000, pp. 127147). Hence, the above assertion remains: the events between 1985 and 1991

id d l i d i i f C d Ki l


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movements, its withdrawal of armed forces in foreign countries, and, in the eco-

nomic realm, the legalization of a small-scale private sector, joint ventures, and

foreign ownership (Pickel, 1998, p. 77). Similarly, North Korea conceded and

signed a 25-article Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges

and Cooperation (the Basic Agreement) with South Korea, signed the Agreed

Framework with the United States, and, in the economic realm, created a free

economic trading zone (FETZ; Cotton, 1998; Lee, 2001, p. 60).

At the same time Cuba and North Korea demonstrated a tendency to resume

practices of the Cold War era. Instances here are Cubas violent crackdown of

political dissidents, thereby violating international human rights, a continuously

harsh denunciation of United States foreign policy, or the rejection of United

States envoys (Fernandez, 1994, pp. 57, 60). North Korea, for its part, demon-

strated continuity as it became delinquent in meeting its IAEA obligations, threat-

ening to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and engaging

in the reprocessing of plutonium (Manning, 1998, p. 145; Snyder, 1997).

Cuba and North Koreas departure from Cold War policies thus appears unsta-

ble at best. Accordingly, the status quo group of scholars questions the sincer-

ity of any changes that did occur in the post-Cold War period. We should also bear

in mind that despite the dramatic changes in Cuba and North Koreas position in

the international system, and unlike other former socialist states, Cuba and North

Korea remained socialist. It is a combination of these aspects that splits the schol-

arly community into a status quo group and a reformist group regarding the

analysis of North Korean and Cuban foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

Operational Code Analysis and Learning Dynamics

The reformist and status quo scholars agree on the importance of Fidel

Castro and Kim Il Sung when examining North Korean and Cuban foreign poli-

cymaking. The literature indicates that Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung are to be

categorized as predominant leaders (Hermann & Hermann, 1989), establishing

them as indispensable actors (Greenstein, 1967). Regarding Castro, for example,

it is argued that,

To understand Cuban foreign policy, one must first understand Fidel

Castro. Even though Cuba has a more institutionalized and complex

political order than before, Castro remains the architect of foreign policy,

the final arbiter of policy disputes, and the ultimate authority whose

backing must be secured by all political subordinates . . . he remains

Cubas undisputed Socialist caudillo and lider maximo. (Gonzalez and

Ronfeldt, 1986, p. 1)

Similarly, regarding Kim Il Sung it is argued that he exhibit[s] the classic char-

394 Malici & Malici


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(Oh and Hassig, 2000, pp. 96, 103). These and similar evaluations feed into

Holstis argument that individual level approaches are particularly promising and

relevant when decisions [are] made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy

by leaders who are relatively free from organizational and other constraintsor

who may at least define their roles in ways that enhance their latitude for choice

(1976, p. 30).

The theoretical and empirical call for an individual-level approach suggests

that operational code analysis provides a satisfying method for examining our

research puzzle. Leites (1951, 1953) initially introduced operational code analy-

sis into the discipline of political science. In A Study of Bolshevism, Leites

attempted to study the spirit of a ruling group . . . [through] . . . the analysis of

[one aspect] of . . . its doctrine . . . what I call the operational code, that is, the

conceptions of political strategy (1953, p. 15), understood as internalized rules

of conductand norms of behaviorthat were shared among the Soviet ruling elite

(George, 1969, p. 194; Walker, 1990, p. 404). In his attempt to systematize and

simplify Leites extraordinarily complex work, George (1969) suggested that a

leaders operational code be conceptualized as a political belief system consist-

ing of two central elements, philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. While

a leaders philosophical beliefs guide the diagnosis of the context for action, their

instrumental counterparts prescribe the most effective strategy and tactics for

achieving political goals.

Taken together, these beliefs act as guides for making political decisions. In

order to discern these beliefs, George formulated the 10 questions below that,

when answered, would capture a leaders fundamental orientation towards the

problem of leadership and action (George, 1969, p. 200). While both George

(1969) and Holsti (1977) originally proposed that individual beliefs formed a

coherent belief system that remained relatively stable over time and across policy

domains, subsequent empirical research supported this proposition for some, but

not all leaders (Walker, 1977, 1995; Walker & Falkowski, 1984; Walker, Schafer,

& Young, 1998). As a consequence of these mixed results a leaders operational

code was reconceptualized as a set of alternative states of mind, which may

contain different answers to Georges questions (Walker, 1983, 1995). This move

allows for compartmentalization of beliefs within the same individual into

schemata that vary by issue or actor domains, . . . [and] learning (defined as

changes in beliefs) over time by a leader (Walker et al., 1998, p. 178).

Georges Ten Questions About Operational Code Beliefs

The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code

P-1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essen-



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P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of ones fundamental

values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic

on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4. How much control or mastery can one have over historical develop-

ment? What is ones role in moving and shaping history in the desired

direction?

P-5. What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political

action?

I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4. What is the best timing of action to advance ones interests?

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing ones interests?

Levels of Learning and Main Hypothesis

The hypothesis that we advance to explain Cuban and North Korean foreign

policy behavior in the post-Cold War era is a learning hypothesis. We follow

Levys (1994) definition of experiential learning to refer to changes in beliefs (see

also Tetlock, 1991; Walker et al., 2001). Conceptualized within an operational

code framework, learning occurs if and when Castro and Kim Il Sungs beliefs

about the nature of the political universe and the most effective means to achieve

political goals are strengthened, weakened, or altered altogether. Operational code

analysis also allows us to distinguish among three levels of experiential learning:

simple, diagnostic, and complex (Deutsch, 1963; Leng, 2000; Levy, 1994; Nye,

1987; Tetlock, 1991; Walker et al., 2001).

Simple learning is defined as changes in instrumental beliefs about the best

means to achieve goals, and diagnostic learning is defined as changes in philo-

sophical beliefs about the political universe. Complex learning occurs when an

actors key philosophical beliefs about political goals and key instrumental beliefs

about the most effective means to achieve them are modified so as to alter a

leaders strategic preferences. Walker et al. (2001) identify the leaders image of

the political universe (P-1), the belief in the ability to control historical develop-

ment (P-4), and the leaders belief regarding the most effective strategy for achiev-

ing political goals (I-1) as key beliefs (see also Walker, Schafer, & Young, 2003,

pp. 231235). Their corresponding indices aggregate the basic elements (attribu-

tions and valences) used to construct the indices of all the remaining operational

396 Malici & Malici


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The answer to our basic research question, Did Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung

learn from their Cold War experiences, and if so, what did they learn? lies in

identifying the learning that the leaders experienced and evaluating what they

learned at each level of learning.

An important distinction is to be drawn between any substantive change and

a statistically significant change of beliefs (Achen, 1982). While any substantive

changes inform us about a shift in a leaders beliefs in the context of a learning

hypothesis, they could have occurred simply through random chance. Applying a

test of statistical significance to evaluate the change lessens this possibility, allow-

ing us to draw conclusions with more confidence. Our yardstick for measuring

learning is thus a change in a leaders beliefs at the p < .05 or p < .10 level of

significance, depending on whether or not it is a directional hypothesis being

tested.

One cautionary note is appropriate here and that is learning means changes

in beliefs and does notautomatically involve behavioral changes.6 The latter,

as Walker, Shafer, and Marfleet (2001) point out, could reflect a leaders adap-

tation to changing circumstances (structural adaptation) or simply a reaction to a

stimulus (social learning) without a corresponding change in important beliefs

(see also Levy, 1994). Such a distinction is important for the assessment of

whether any Cuban or North Korean departure from Cold War practices was

simply structural adaptation due to a fundamental change of the international envi-

ronment and Cuba and North Koreas positions within it after 1991, or just behav-

ioral adjustment due to social learning following the Soviet withdrawal.

If experiential learning is related to the conduct of Cuban and North Korean

post-Cold War foreign policy, then Cuban and North Korean operational code

beliefs should experience a change following the end of the Cold War and the

Soviet withdrawal. This main hypothesis is consistent with the shift of Cuban and

North Korean foreign policy towards some pragmatism for the time period after

1991. It is stated so that it is possible to falsify the empirical interpretations of

either the status quo scholars or reformist scholars. More specifically, if the

hypothesis is confirmed, the interpretations of the reformist school bear more

validity. On the other hand, if the hypothesis is rejected, then the conclusion would

be that Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung did not learn and that the interpretation of

the status quo school bears more validity.

The Operational Codes of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung

In order to assess Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sungs operational code beliefs we

employ the Verbs in Context System (VICS). As a method of content analysis,

VICS draws inferences about a decision makers operational code beliefs from



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public statements such as speeches or interviews made by the decision maker.7

We use an automated content analysis program called Profiler +, which retrieves

the verbs from each decision makers public statements, codes them with the aid

of an operational code dictionary, and then provides the data to index each element

of the decision makers operational code. VICS works by retrieving utterances,

in this case each verb in the statement and the corresponding parts of speech asso-

ciated with the verb.8 VICS provides values for six attributes for each recorded

verb and its surrounding context: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense

of the verb, intended target, and context (see Table 1). These categories become

the basis for calculating the operational code indices, as Table 2 illustrates

(Walker, 2000a, pp. 67; Walker, Schafer, & Young 2003). Our strategy for assess-

ing our research questions is to compare and contrast the VICS scores of each

leaders operational code over time as well as to each other. Thus, the independ-

ent variables for our analysis are time period and leader while the operational code

beliefs serve as the dependent variables.9

We also compare the scores of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung to the mean

scores of a collection of 164 speech acts given by 30 different and diverse world

leadersleaders of poor and rich states and weak and strong stateswhom we

refer to as a norming group. Making this set of comparisons allows us to put the

Cuban and North Korean leaders into a broader perspective, which is instructive

because it permits us to develop a better sense of how the leaders in our study

Third World communist leaders who experienced significant political and eco-

398 Malici & Malici

7 To the extent possible, we followed Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998, p. 182), who set the fol-lowing criteria for foreign policy speeches: (1) the subject and object are international in scope;(2) the focus of interaction is a political issue; (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflict-ual. The sample of speeches for Fidel Castro was randomly drawn from theLexis Nexis AcademicUniverse databank and the University of Texas Latin American Network Information Center(LANIC) Castro Speech Database. Our final sample included 13 speeches for the Cold War period(19811985) and 11 foreign policy speeches for the post-Cold War period (19911994). Due to thescarcity of speeches by Kim Il Sung, random sampling was not possible. Databases, such as Lexis

Nexis and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) served as our main sources for thesample. In addition, some speeches in our sample were taken from Kim Il Sung: For an Indepen-dent World(1986), a collection of his speeches and interviews. From these sources we selected thosespeeches that meet the above criteria best. Despite this effort, the ratio between domestic and foreignpolicy content contained in these speeches is somewhat more balanced than was the case for Castrossample. Our final sample of Kim Il Sungs rhetoric included 13 speeches for the Cold War period(19811985), and eight speeches for the post-Cold War period (19911994).

8 For example, if the verb is transitive, then VICS will record the subject and object of the verb; ifthe verb is intransitive, then VICS records the subject and predicate nominative or adjective.

9 At-a-distance assessment techniques, such as operational code analysis, are sometimes criticizedfor not truly capturing internally held beliefs of leaders (see Schafer, 2000, for a wider discussion).We contend that this critique is often inflated and somewhat beside the point. The operational code

research program does not necessarily claim that it captures the private beliefs of leaders. Instead,it aims to analyze and determinepublicly articulated beliefs that the leader is convinced to be impor-tant at a given moment in time and see if they influence a states behavior (Vertzberger 1990


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Table 1. Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)*

1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS

SELF OR OTHER

2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS

PAST PRESENT FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS

POSITIVE (+) OR NEGATIVE (-)

APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1) OPPOSE, RESIST (-1)

WORDS OR OR

PROMISE BENEFITS (+2) THREATEN COSTS (-2)

DEEDS REWARDS (+3) PUNISHMENTS (-3)

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS

DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT

AN EXAMPLE

A quote taken from President Carters January 4, 1980, address to the nation: Massive Soviet

military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan . . .

1. Subject. The subject is Massive Soviet military forces which is coded as other, that is, the

speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. Tense and Category. The verb phrase have invaded is in the past tense and is a negative deed

coded, therefore, as punish.

3. Domain. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speakers state (the

United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. Target and Context. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as

Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-197988.

The complete data line for this statement is: other -3 foreign past afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-

conflict-197988.

*adapted from Walker et al., 1998.

10 The data for the norming group was obtained from Professor Mark Schafer Department of Politi

nomic crises at the end of the Cold Warcompare to the average leader.10 We

conclude our analysis with a comparison of the two leaders in the post-Cold War

period.

The results from the difference of means test between Castros Cold War

(19801985) operational code and that of the norming group, summarized in

Table 3, suggest that Castros beliefs differed significantly from those of the


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400 Malici & Malici

Table 2. Indices for Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs*

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

Elements Index** Interpretation

P-1. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL %Positive minus %Negative +1.0 friendly to

UNIVERSE (Image of Others) Transitive Other Attributions -1.0 hostile

P-2. REALIZATION OF POLITICAL Mean Intensity of Transitive +1.0 optimistic to

VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism) Other Attributions divided by 3 -1.0 pessimistic

P-3 POLITICAL FUTURE 1 minus Index of Qualitative 1.0 predictable

(Predictability of Others Tactics) Variation*** for Other to 0.0 uncertain

Attributions

P-4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Self Attributions divided by 1.0 high to 0.0

(Locus of Control) [Self plus Other Attributions] low self control

P-5. ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence 1 minus [Political Future x 1.0 high role

of Control) Historical Development Index] to 0.0 low role

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

Elements Index Interpretation

I-1. APPROACH TO GOALS %Positive minus %Negative +1.0 high cooperation

(Direction of Strategy) Transitive Self Attributions to -1.0 high conflict

I-2. PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity Mean Intensity of Transitive +1.0 high cooperation

of Tactics) Self Attributions divided by 3 to -1.0 high conflict

I-3. RISK ORIENTATION 1 minus Index of Qualitative 1.0 risk acceptant

(Predictability of Tactics) Variation for Self Attributions to 0.0 risk-averse

I-4. TIMING OF ACTION 1 minus Absolute Value [%X 1.0 high to 0.0

(Flexibility of Tactics) minus %Y Self Attributions] low shift propensity

a. Coop v. Conf Tactics Where X = Coop and Y = Conf

b. Word v. Deed Tactics Where X = Word and Y = Deed

I-5. UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise Percentages for Exercise of +1.0 very frequent

of Power) Power Categories a through f to 0.0 infrequent

a. Reward as frequency divided by total

b. Promise bs frequency divided by total

c. Appeal/Support cs frequency divided by total

d. Oppose/Resist ds frequency divided by total

e. Threaten es frequency divided by total

f. Punish fs frequency divided by total

*adapted from Walker et al., 2001.

**All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between -1.0

and +1.0.

P-2 and I-2 are divided by three to standardize the range (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998).

***The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in

a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N

[number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications (Watson & McGaw, 1980: 88).


15/27

average leader in a number of ways. All of Castros philosophical beliefs differed

significantly from the norming group such that Castro viewed the political uni-

verse in more conflictual terms (P-1), was more pessimistic about the realization

of political values (P-2), thought the political future was less predictable (P-3),

believed he had less control over historical development (P-4), and thought chance

played a large role in political outcomes. Several of Castros instrumental beliefs

were also significantly different from the norming group. During the Cold War,

Castro had a more conflictual strategic approach to goals (I-1), was less accep-

tant of risk (I-3), had a significantly higher propensity to shift between coopera-

tive and conflictual tactics (I-4a) and between words and deeds (I-4b), and


Table 3. Operational Codes of Two Cold Warriors Compared to Norming Group

Castro Norming Group Kim Il Sung

Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs (n = 13) (n = 164) (n = 13)P-1. Nature of Political Universe 0.081* 0.301 0.321

(Conflict/Cooperation)

P-2. Realization of Political Values -0.001* 0.147 0.239*

(Pessimism/Optimism)

P-3. Political Future 0.101* 0.134 0.123

(Unpredictable/Predictable)

P-4. Historical Development 0.161* 0.224 0.165*

(Low Control/High Control)

P-5. Role of Chance 0.983 0.968 0.980

(Small Role/Large Role)

I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals 0.154* 0.401 0.383(Conflict/Cooperation)

I-2. Intensity of Tactics 0.094 0.178 0.202


I-3. Risk Orientation 0.116* 0.332 0.194*

(Averse/Acceptant)

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation 0.664* 0.503 0.566

b. Words/Deeds 0.694* 0.464 0.659*

I-5. Utility of Means

a. Reward 0.202 0.157 0.261*

b. Promise 0.106 0.075 0.096

c. Appeal/Support 0.269* 0.468 0.335*

d. Oppose/Resist 0.200 0.154 0.084*

e. Threaten 0.066* 0.034 0.054

f. Punish 0.158 0.112 0.171*

*Significant difference between each leader and the norming group at the p .10 level (two-tailed

test).


16/27

The results from the difference of means test between Kim Il Sungs Cold

War (19801985) operational code and that of the norming group displays a some-

what similar pattern. During the Cold War period, Kim Il Sung believed that he

had significantly less control over historical development (P-4), but he was sig-

nificantly more optimistic about the realization of political values (P-2) when

compared to the norming group. Like Castro, Kim was less acceptant of risk and

had a comparatively high propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b)

during the Cold War period. Finally, with respect to the average leader, Kim Il

Sung ascribed significantly less utility toAppeal (I-5c) and Oppose (I-5d) tactics

and significantly more utility toReward(I-5a) and Punish (I-5f) tactics as a means

for attaining political goals during the Cold War period.

In sum, Castro and Kim are distinct from the average world leader. However,

Castros beliefs deviate from the norming group more so than Kims. Castro is

distinct with respect to all of the key operational code beliefs (P-1, P-4, I-1) while

Kim is different with respect to one of them (P-4). Geopolitical reasons are likely

to figure in Castros more intense hostility. Cuba is in close proximity to the U.S.

superpower, while North Korea is located thousands of miles away from the

Western enemy. Nevertheless, both leaders show significant differences on a

number of the remaining operational code beliefs, demonstrating their unique

identities.

Learning Comparisons

Our main concern in this paper is the disagreement between the two con-

tending groups of scholars: did the end of the Cold War lead these leaders to alter

their beliefs as the reformist group of scholars argues? Or do Fidel Castro and

Kim Il Sungs beliefs continue into the post-Cold War period despite their new,

isolated position in the international system as the status quo group of scholars

suggest? Determining whether or not Castro and Kim learned requires us to

compare the leaders Cold War operational codes to their post-Cold War opera-

tional codes. To test the reformist schools learning hypothesis that the two rogue

leaders have shifted their foreign policy orientations in a cooperative direction,

we have conducted a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for each leader

using time period as the independent factor and the operational code indices as

dependent variables.

When comparing Castros Cold War (19801985) operational code to his

post-Cold War (19911994) operational code, a few statistically significant dif-

ferences emerge. The ANOVA results in Table 4 suggest that, compared to the

Cold War period, Castro believed he had significantly more control over histori-

cal development (P-4) in the post-Cold War period. This perception of increased

control is most likely the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union as the center

402 Malici & Malici


17/27

had changed significantly from the Cold War to the post-Cold War periodin the

post-Cold War period Castro was less likely to ascribe utility to Promise tactics

(I-5b) and more likely to ascribe utility to Appeal (I-5c) tactics as a means of

attaining political goals than he was during the Cold War period. Unlike Castro,

Kim Il Sungs Cold War and post-Cold War operational codes in Table 4 show no

significant differences.

Although Castro perceives that he has significantly more control over his-

torical development and shows more inclination to appeal to others in the post-

Cold War period, a consideration of his remaining operational code beliefs

indicates that overall he continues to maintain a conflictual stance. These results

seem to suggest that Castro engaged at best in modest learning, and Kim Il Sung


Table 4. Fidel Castros and Kim Il Sungs Cold War and Post-Cold War Operational Codes

Fidel Castro Kim Il Sung

19801985 19911994 19801985 19911994

Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs (n = 13) (n = 11) (n = 13) (n = 8)

P-1. Nature of Political Universe 0.081 0.183 0.322 0.383


P-2. Realization of Political Values -0.001 0.063 0.239 0.260

(Pessimism/Optimism)

P-3. Political Future 0.101 0.098 0.123 0.147

(Unpredictable/Predictable)

P-4. Historical Development 0.161* 0.205* 0.165 0.196

(Low Control/High Control)

P-5. Role of Chance 0.983 0.980 0.980 0.970

(Small Role/Large Role)

I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals 0.154 0.370 0.383 0.438


I-2. Intensity of Tactics 0.094 0.182 0.202 0.249


I-3. Risk Orientation 0.116 0.167 0.194 0.203

(Averse/Acceptant)

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation 0.664 0.610 0.566 0.562

b. Words/Deeds 0.694 0.632 0.659 0.762

I-5. Utility of Meansa. Reward 0.202 0.213 0.261 0.271

b. Promise 0.106* 0.054* 0.096 0.065

c. Appeal/Support 0.269* 0.418* 0.335 0.384

d. Oppose/Resist 0.200 0.133 0.084 0.092

e. Threaten 0.066 0.059 0.054 0.079

f. Punish 0.158 0.123 0.171 0.110

*Significant difference between indices at the p .05 level (one-tailed test).


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to achieve them were modified from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period,

changes in Kim Il Sungs beliefs were not significant.

These findings lend little support to the reformist group of Cuban scholars and

strong support to the status quo group of North Korean scholars. Only one of

Castros key operational code indices (P-4) changed significantly between the Cold

War and post-Cold War period. For Kim Il Sung the conclusion is straightforward

since he did not engage in any learning. Therefore, we conclude that the changes

in Cuban and North Korean foreign policies following the Cold War were more

likely due to structural adaptation to changing circumstances than to experiential

learning by Castro and Kim. The lack of learning by the two leaders is consistent

with the erratic pattern and the lack of lasting change in their foreign policies

despite radical shocks from their domestic and international environments.

Leader Comparisons

In addition to identifying whether or not Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung learned

from their Cold War experiences, we are also interested in knowing if the two

leaders beliefs differ significantly from each other, and if they do, whether the

variance in beliefs between the two leaders is due (a) primarily to their individ-

ual differences, (b) to the changes in the circumstances they faced at the end of

the Cold War, or (c) a combination thereof. In order to examine this question, we

have conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) using time

period (Cold War or post-Cold War) and leader (Castro or Kim) as the independ-

ent factors and the operational code indices as the dependent variables.

The results of the MANOVA in Table 5 show that there were significant main

effects for both leader and time period; however, there were no significant inter-

action effects. These findings suggest that the changes in the conditions that con-

fronted Cuba and North Korea at the end of the Cold War (measured by the time

period factor) were substantial enough to lead to some belief differences inde-

pendent of the individual leaders identities. Independent of whether the leader

was Kim Il Sung or Fidel Castro, the end of the Cold War led to significant belief

changes such that the leaders thought they had more control over historical devel-

opment (P-4 = 0.201 vs. 0.163), and they were more likely to ascribe utility to

Appeal tactics (I-5c = 0.404 vs. 0.302) as a means for attaining political goals in

the post-Cold War period compared to the Cold War period.

The MANOVA results in Table 5 also reveal that the significant main effects

for leader were more substantial than those for time period, suggesting that there

are several important differences between Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung, inde-

pendent of the global changes accompanying the end of the Cold War. In the realm

of philosophical beliefs, Castro views the nature of the political universe in sig-

nificantly more conflictual terms (P-1 = 0.128 vs. 0.345), is significantly more

404 Malici & Malici


19/27


Table 5. Cuban and North Korean Leaders Beliefs in a Two-Factor Multivariate Analysis ofVariance Design (Leader Time Period)

Main Effects (N = 45)

Independent Factors F (1,41) p Value (two-tailed)

Leader

P-1 9.700 .003*

P-2 15.683 .000*

P-3 5.146 .029*

P-4 .016 .899

P-5 2.426 .127

I-1 2.681 .109

I-2 1.924 .173

I-3 2.609 .114

I-4a 1.339 .254I-4b .409 .526

I-5 Reward 2.419 .128

I-5 Promise .000 .986

I-5 Appeal .095 .759

I-5 Oppose 6.852 .012*

I-5 Threaten .031 .861

I-5 Punish .000 .999

Time Period

P-1 1.330 .255

P-2 .597 .444P-3 .410 .525

P-4 3.750 .060*

P-5 2.294 .138

I-1 2.225 .143

I-2 1.134 .293

I-3 .758 .389

I-4a .211 .649

I-4b .080 .779

I-5 Reward .075 .785

I-5 Promise 2.592 .115

I-5 Appeal 3.868 .056*I-5 Oppose .943 .337


I-5 Punish 1.446 .236

Interaction (Leader by Time Period)

P-1 .087 .771

P-2 .153 .697

P-3 .732 .397

P-4 .105 .747


20/27

than Kim Il Sung. In the realm of instrumental beliefs, the results suggest that

compared to Kim, Castro is significantly more likely to ascribe utility to Oppose

tactics (I-5d = 0.169 vs. 0.087) as a means of accomplishing political goals. The

Strategic Approach to Goals index (I-1) approaches significance (p

.109), andif interpreted as significant, suggests that Castro has a much more conflictual

approach to goals than does Kim Il Sung (I-1 = 0.253 vs. 0.404). It seems that

although the end of the Cold War had an impact on these two leaders, Fidel Castro

and Kim Il Sung have significantly different beliefs about political goals and the

most efficient means to achieve these goals.11

Conclusion

Our analysis leads us to the following conclusions. First, the belief systemsof Kim Il Sung and Fidel Castro differ significantly from the average leaders with

Castro displaying more dramatic deviations in the form of significant differences

for the key beliefs affecting general strategic orientation (I-1), image of others (P-

2), and control over historical development (P-4). Second, while Fidel Castro

shows some evidence of simple and diagnostic learning in the post-Cold War

period, we argue for a cautious interpretation because only a few of his beliefs

changed significantly, and only one of the indices for key beliefs (P-4) shows sig-

nificant learning. Kim Il Sungs beliefs did not change significantly, indicating

406 Malici & Malici

11 A static comparison of just the post-Cold War operational codes of Castro and Kim reveals similardiff di hil hi l b li f b i ifi diff f i l b li f

Table 5.

Interaction (Leader by Time Period) (cont.)

P-5 .644 .427

I-1 .785 .381

I-2 .105 .748

I-3 .346 .560

I-4a .160 .691

I-4b 1.268 .267

I-5 Reward .000 .990

I-5 Promise .170 .682

I-5 Appeal 1.004 .322

I-5 Oppose 1.525 .224


I-5 Punish .105 .748

*Significant effects at the p .10 level (two-tailed test).


21/27

that he did not engage in any learning. Third, the evidence from the MANOVA

presented above also suggests that the end of the Cold War had only a modest

impact on the Cuban and North Korean leadership, independent of the specific

regional circumstances, personalities or identities of Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung.

Instead, when we control for the tumultuous events that have accompanied the

end of the Cold War, there are significant differences between Castro and Kims

belief systems.

These results lead us back to a debate introduced at the beginning of this

paper, namely the debate between structuralists and cognitivists. And it is

within the context of this debate that we want to set forth some more general con-

clusions. When do governments change course, and why? is a question that has

received considerable attention in the international relations literature (Hermann,

1990; Wendt, 1992). Structural approaches focus on changes in the international

environment and predict that they will impact the foreign policies of individual

states. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the configuration of the international

system, Cuba and North Koreas position within it, and the dyadic relationships

between the Soviet Union vis--vis Cuba and North Korea changed profoundly.

Despite forceful arguments made by structuralists (Waltz, 1979; Wolfers,

1962) that these external shocks (Hermann, 1990) should lead to changes in the

foreign policy behavior especially of small states, Cuba and North Korea continue

on the status quo path with rather minor changes in their foreign policies. We

contend, therefore, that changes in foreign policy will be missing in the absence

of change at the individual level. In opposition to structural approaches, we con-

clude that governments and their respective leaders do notnecessarily respond

in a rational manner to the reward and punishment contingencies of the interna-

tional environment (Tetlock, 1991, p. 24). Instead, the mechanisms for continu-

ity and change are located in the belief systems of leaders. We also agree with

Wendt (1992) that a change in leadership may be more potent than an environ-

mental change, as in the case of Mikhail Gorbachevs accession to power in the

USSR and his subsequent initiatives to end the Cold War.

While a change of leadership might be a necessary condition for change in

Cuban and North Korean foreign policy behavior, it may not be a sufficient con-

dition. Although Kim Il Sung was replaced by his son Kim Jong Il in 1994, con-

tinuity rather than change has prevailed in North Koreas foreign policy behavior.

We suspect that Kim Jong Il shares essential beliefs with his predecessor and that

for substantial change to occur, a reformist mindset would have to enter the

pinnacle of North Koreas foreign policy apparatus. However, future research

would have to determine first whether there is indeed continuity between the

beliefs of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

An alternative strategy for foreign policy change may be to alter the Cuban

and North Korean leaderships perceived security context. Both consider the



22/27

the Korean peninsula, the United States could potentially contradict the percep-

tions of the Cuban and North Korean leadership and thereby compel these states

to change their foreign policies with an altercasting strategy. Most famously,

Mikhail Gorbachev adopted such a strategy, changing President Reagan and

President Bushs enemy image perception of the Soviet Union, and was able to

end the enduring rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union (see Cha,

2002; Stein, 1994; Walker, 1992; Walker 2000b; Wendt, 1999).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful sug-

gestions and comments. We also want to thank Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer,Hendrik Spruyt, Colin Elman, Bradley Aldrich, and Michael Young. We alone

remain responsible for the ideas and perspectives presented in this article. An

earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the

International Studies Association. Correspondence concerning this article should

be sent to Akan Malici, Department of Political Science, Arizona State Univer-

sity, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 87287-3902. Email: [email protected].

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