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Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe'sRelative Gains Dilemma

Luis Simón

To cite this article: Luis Simón (2017) Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's RelativeGains Dilemma, Security Studies, 26:2, 185-212

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280297

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Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe’s RelativeGains Dilemma

Luis Sim�on

ABSTRACTMost neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes asystemic incentive for European security cooperation.Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that therelationship between relative decline and European securitycooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First,European calculations about relative decline bear both aglobal and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If aEuropean country is to effectively mitigate relative decline,cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important thatcooperation develops in a way that underscores thatcountry’s comparative strengths and minimizes itsweaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often indirect competition with each other. Secondly, whenEuropeans are thinking about their relative power position,some countries matter more than others: a given Europeancountry may accept to incur a relative loss vis-�a-vis anothercountry (European or otherwise) but not others. Thesecalculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Somecountries may accept relative losses on some issues (forexample, security) in exchange for gains on others(economic). This article examines how intra-Europeanconsiderations of relative gains affect the way in whichEurope’s main powers seek to cope with relative decline andassesses how those considerations affect security cooperationin a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims tounpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline andEuropean security cooperation.

Most neorealists seem to agree that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive forgreater security cooperation amongst European countries.1 The logic underpinningthis narrative is rather straightforward. As the twenty-first century rolls in, the contin-ued economic growth and military expansion of countries like China, India, Russia, or

Luis Sim�on is a research professor for the Institute for European Studies at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, anddirector of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute. He can be reached at luis.simon@vub.ac.be.

1See, for example, Barry Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Stud-ies 15, no. 2 (April–June 2006): 149–86; Seth G. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2007); Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 217–234; Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli “Bandwagoning, Not Balancing:Why Europe Confounds Realism,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 2 (2012): 264–88.

© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

SECURITY STUDIES2017, VOL. 26, NO. 2, 185–212http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280297

Brazil has led some scholars to speak of “the rise of the rest,” as opposed to the West.2

Arguably, serious questions remain as to how solid the economic and geopolitical foun-dations of each of these countries are.What seems clear, though, is that a world charac-terized by the global multiplication of economic centres of activity (that is, beyondEurope and North America), and by the emergence of continental-sized superpowers,is a world that underscores Europe’s relative decline. And that world calls for Europeansecurity cooperation. Such a parsimonious narrative actually transcends neorealism,and enjoys widespread appeal amongst European security scholars and analysts.3

The link between relative decline and cooperation does certainly explain part of theEuropean security puzzle. However, it ignores a key fact: while European countriesmay indeed be subject to common systemic pressures (for example, relative decline),they seem to disagree more often than not about how to cope with them. Commonpressures may well constitute a systemic incentive for European countries to cooperate,but their specific national interests translate into conflicting priorities over how toarrange the terms of cooperation. If a European country is to effectivelymitigate relativedecline andmaximize its own power, cooperation will not suffice. It is just as importantthat cooperation develops in a way that underscores its own specific interests: by reflect-ing its strengths and comparative advantages and minimizing its weaknesses. Here,European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Therefore, the cal-culations of European countries regarding the best way of managing their relativepower position bear both a global and a regional (intra-European) component.

So far, most discussions on relative gains in the international relations (IR) literaturehave sought to determine under which circumstances states prioritize relative overabsolute gains, or vice versa.4 While this is an important question, it tells us rather littleabout how states discriminate amongst relative gains. Indeed, a number of scholarshave shown that states often reject a “dyadic” approach to relative gains and follow amore nuanced and discriminatory approach than has been commonly assumed bymost neorealists.5 There are cases in which, by cooperating, a given state may accept toincur a relative loss vis-�a-vis (an)other state(s) for the sake of a relative gain on (an)

2See, for example, Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Countries(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton & Com-pany, 2008).3See, for example, Jolyon Howorth, “The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain?” Journal ofCommon Market Studies 48, no. 3 (June 2010): 455–74; Giovanni Grevi, “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario,” Occa-sional Paper 79 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2009).4For typical neorealist analyses of relative gains, see Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Real-ist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organisation 42, no. 3 (July 1988): 485–507; JosephM. Grieco, “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’sDilemma Model,” Journal of Politics 50, no. 3 (August 1988): 600–24. For an overview of the neorealist–neoliberaldebate on relative vs. absolute gains, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The ContemporaryDebate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York:Columbia University Press, 1986).5See, for example, Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American Political Sci-ence Review 85, no. 3 (September 1991): 701–726; Duncan Snidal, “International Cooperation among Relative GainsMaximizers,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1991): 387–402; Suzanne Werner, “In Search of Security: Rela-tive Gains and Losses in Dyadic Relations,” Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 3 (August 1997): 289–302; David L. Rous-seau, “Motivations for Choice: The Salience of Relative Gains in International Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution46, no. 3 (June 2002): 394–426.

186 L. SIM�ON

other state(s). This problem is further complicated by “issue linkage.”6 States are typi-cally bargaining on several security and economic issues at the same time, both in bilat-eral as well as multilateral settings. Some of the issues under bargaining may presentcrossover and therefore be functionally linked. Others may be linked for political rea-sons and lead to expectations about issue trading and quid pro quos. Under what cir-cumstances does a certain state accept to incur relative losses to (an)other state(s) on agiven issue in exchange for relative gains vis-�a-vis (an)other state(s) on that or otherissues?

The question of how to discriminate relative gains and losses in the context ofmultiple relationships and issues becomes particularly complicated in an environ-ment like contemporary Europe, owing to the existence of highly mature interna-tional institutions like the European Union (EU) or North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), and the high degree of cooperation (multilateral as well asbilateral) on a wide variety of policy areas and issues, ranging from economics tosecurity. European countries may decide to cooperate in order to mitigate their(common) relative decline in regards to a third party (for example, the UnitedStates or Russia) even if that means some Europeans will gain or lose more thanothers. Conversely, the fear of losing out to fellow Europeans may at times trumpexpectations about relative gains vis-�a-vis a third party. Surely these are problemsthat cut across European lines, in that certain European countries may at timesaccept to lose in relation to other fellow Europeans but not others. This is all com-plicated by the high degree of issue linkage and multiplicity of institutional frame-works in contemporary Europe. Some Europeans may accept relative losses vis-�a-vis other countries on some issues or in some policy areas or frameworks (forexample, bilaterally, in the EU and/or NATO) in exchange for gains against thosesame countries or other countries on other issues, policy areas, or frameworks.This is, in essence, Europe’s relative gains dilemma.

This article examines how intra-European relative gain considerations affect theway in which Europe’s main powers seek to cope with relative decline, and assesseshow those considerations affect security cooperation in an EU framework. Thus,the article aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and Euro-pean security cooperation. To do so, it analyses how British, French, and Germanconsiderations about relative gains have affected one of the most controversialdebates in the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy(CSDP): the question of whether to establish an EU military headquarters, or, forthat matter, what kind of headquarters. The purpose of this case study is not toprovide an exhaustive overview of how each of these three countries has performedvis-�a-vis their many relationships. That would be a herculean research task.Instead, by focusing on Europe’s key players, I aim to show how relative gain

6On the concept of issue linkage, see Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,”World Politics 32, no. 3 (April 1980): 357–405; Michal D. McGinnis, “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of InternationalCooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 1 (March 1986): 141–70.

NEOREALISM, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND EUROPE’S RELATIVE GAINS DILEMMA 187

considerations affect discussions on European security cooperation, as well as toidentify some of the ways in which discussions on a given issue (the establishmentof an EU military headquarters) can relate to other issues, and how these linkagesaffect national calculations about relative gains.

An analysis of the evolving priorities of Europe’s most powerful countries allows usto transcend the rather hollow notion that cooperation is inherently positive for allEuropeans, and focus on the more meaningful question of who benefits more or lessfrom (what kind of) cooperation and under what circumstances. Only by looking athow national priorities play out in the context of specific initiatives or debates can weassess the importance of intra-European relative gains and uncover the contradictorynature of the CSDP, characterised by both cooperation and conflict. Indeed, part of theproblemwith some (neo)realist analyses of European security has beenmethodological.Given the proliferation of new institutions, concepts and capabilities, some scholarsmay have prematurely concluded that the CSDP was largely characterized by strongpatterns of cooperation.7 Critically, by neglecting to look at the actual relevance andreach of those specific initiatives, these scholars may have failed to properly grasp theextent to which concerns about relative gains/losses can result in conflicting views overhow to organize cooperation. Ultimately, whether a given security institution has beencreated in the framework of the EU (for example, the European Defense Agency), newcapability benchmarks have been agreed to (the so-called EU Battlegroups), or certainmissions have been launched tells us very little in itself about the nature of Europeansecurity cooperation. Conflicting national priorities mean EU security initiatives can berather ambiguous, inefficient, or irrelevant, and often are all of those things at the sametime.

The article is structured as follows. The first section provides a critical overview ofthe European studies literature, and takes issue with the notion that there is some formof inevitability about European security cooperation, whether explained by institutionalpath dependence, normative convergence, functional interdependence, or systemic fac-tors. The second section discusses the concept of relative gains, examines its relation-ship with issue linkage, and challenges the assumption that relative gains earned in onerelationship are only relevant in the context of that relationship. It goes on to argue thatmost (neo)realist accounts of European security may have betrayed the very addedvalue of (neo)realism itself. In particular, by concentrating on Europe’s relative positionvis-�a-vis others (chiefly the United States) they have implicitly assigned Europe the sta-tus of an independent analytical unit. This has led them to reduce the problem of rela-tive gains to European calculations about US power, and to dismiss the intra-Europeanside of the relative gains problem altogether. I argue that the existence of multiple play-ers and issues means Europe’s relative gains dilemma is far more complex than hasoften been assumed by some neorealists. Finally, in order to illustrate the mechanics ofsuch dilemma, the third section examines the evolving positions of Britain, France, and

7See, for example, Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ power Europe”; Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation; Posen,“European Union Security and Defence Policy.”

188 L. SIM�ON

Germany towards the question of whether to establish an EUmilitary headquarters. Todo so, it draws on over twenty research interviews with national and EU officials andan analysis of primary documents.8

The Politics of European Security: Between Conflict and Cooperation

The notion that there is some form of inevitability about European security coop-eration is one that transcends (neo)realist arguments about relative decline. Liber-als and constructivists have repeatedly argued that collective institutions andshared norms are likely to bring Europeans together. During the two decades thatfollowed the end of the Cold War, scholars highlighted the importance of institu-tionalization,9 normative factors,10 or “transnational epistemic communities”11 inaccounting for the depth and breadth of European security cooperation. Theappeal of these narratives is hardly surprising. After more than six decades of eco-nomic and political integration, it would seem counterintuitive to try to under-stand European security politics by ignoring the institutions, norms, and epistemiccommunities that mediate them. They have become part of the furniture ofEuropean politics. However, the existence of cooperation tells us rather little initself; any meaningful discussion on European security politics must take heed ofboth cooperation and conflict, as well as the dynamic balance between the two.

Institutions, norms, and epistemic communities are informed by cooperation asmuch as they are animated by conflict. Conflict is hardwired into internationalinstitutions, and any other social institutions for that matter.12 However, the exis-tence of cooperation does not necessarily mean conflict is somehow progressivelyovercome. As argued by Hedley Bull, in international politics conflict and coopera-tion tend to coexist and intermingle in a permanent dialectical fashion.13 Thisinherent tension very much defines the (contested) nature of any social institution,

8All the interviews were conducted in confidentiality. I have conducted 21 semi-structured in-depth interviews withsenior British, French and German foreign and defence policy officials, as well as EU officials in London, Paris, Berlinand Brussels. Using a relatively large sample of officials working on the same issues has allowed me to compare theinformation provided by individual interviewees. In addition to that, the information extracted from the interviewshas been triangulated with data from official government documents and secondary literature.9Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2004); Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” Inter-national Organization 54, no. 4 (October 2000): 705–35.

10Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, andthe Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (July 2002): 575–607; Ian Manners, “NormativePower Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 235–58; Chris-toph O. Meyer, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for ExplainingChanging Norms,” European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 4 (December 2005): 523–49; Thomas Risse, “Col-lective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Culture of National Secu-rity: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press): 357–399.

11Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks Are Transforming the EuropeanUnion (Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011).

12For an analysis of political and social institutions as both instruments of cooperation and arenas in which conflictingpriorities play out, see Chantal Mouffe, On The Political (London: Routledge, 2005).

13Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Fora good analysis of how cooperative and conflicting factors intermingle in the context of the CSDP’s institutions, seeMoritz Weiss, “Transaction Costs and the Establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy,” Security Studies21, no. 4 (October–December 2012): 654–82.

NEOREALISM, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND EUROPE’S RELATIVE GAINS DILEMMA 189

international or otherwise. In other words, institutions are “political animals” char-acterised by a mixed logic of cooperation and conflict.14 Their nature, orientation,and the norms that emanate from them are informed by a constant struggle forpower and influence.15 And insofar as nation-states remain the highest expressionsof political power, they often steer international institutions and the norms thatregulate their existence and development.

Liberals and constructivists may have been right to emphasize the impact thatinternational institutions, norms, or epistemic communities have upon Europeansecurity policy. However, they may have also overlooked the extent to which insti-tutional and social constructs are themselves underpinned by the (interstate) bal-ance of power. It is not institutions or norms, understood in an abstract or “post-political” sense, that change or socialize those countries that participate in them.16

Rather, it is often the more powerful (European) states that socialize the weakerones through common institutions and norms that reflect their interests and aspi-rations, and carry their signature. Indeed, should these states fail to socializeweaker players, cooperation may well break down. Ultimately, it is (powerful)states that filter and regulate the ideas and discourses that underpin Europeansecurity cooperation, either directly or by proxy. They promote and embrace thoseideas and norms that serve their interests and reject, ignore, or water down thosethat do not.

Admittedly, the idea that states ultimately determine the pace and nature of eco-nomic, political, and security cooperation is not rare in the European studies litera-ture. Back in the 1960s, Stanley Hoffmann took issue with the “neofunctionalist”argument that (Western) Europe was irrevocably set on a supranational path.17 Inparticular, he challenged the concept of “spillover,” that is, the idea that integrationin one or more economic sectors (for example, coal and steel) would automaticallylead to integration in other economic sectors or, for that matter, that the creationof a single European market and would force Europeans to institute a commontrade policy, and this would create additional spillovers, thus eventually leading tointegration in foreign and security policy too.18 Hoffmann did not altogether denythat integration created its own pressures for greater integration. However, heargued that the European Community was by and large an intergovernmentalenterprise driven by Europe’s most powerful countries, and that their willingness

14See Thomas C. Schelling, “The Strategy of Conflict. Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” Journal of ConflictResolution 2, no. 3 (September 1958): 203–64.

15See Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,”International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 7–41; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” Interna-tional Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 5–41.

16On the concept of “post-political,” see Mouffe, On the Political.17For a classic formulation of neofunciontalism, see Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and EconomicForces, 1950–1957 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958). For a more recent formulation, see Wayne Sand-holtz and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1998).

18Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus95, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 862–915.

190 L. SIM�ON

to preserve their national sovereignty represented a systemic check against theforces of supranationalism. Alan S. Milward argued in similar terms, describingEuropean integration as ultimately aimed at preserving rather than eroding thepower of European nation-states.19

For his part, Andrew Moravcsik has drawn on Robert D. Putnam’s logic of“two-level” games to put forward a more liberal version of intergovernmentalism.20

Moravcsik agrees that the preferences of Europe’s most powerful countries definethe political parameters of European integration through subsequent “waves” ofintergovernmental negotiations. However, he argues that national preferencestowards European integration are driven primarily by interdependence and expect-ations about economic gains, and not so much by concerns related to sovereigntyand national security. Perhaps most interestingly, Moravcsik explains that nationalpreferences vis-�a-vis European integration are inherently malleable, in that differ-ent domestic actors and groups are immersed in a constant struggle to define whatconstitutes the national interest and to shape their nation’s policies vis-�a-vis Euro-pean integration. According to this logic, domestic factors largely account for thetension between conflict and cooperation that stands at the heart of the Europeanintegration process. Moravcsik argues that the impact of domestic interests onquestions related to foreign and security policy is much lower than on questionsrelated to foreign economic policy, which might help explain why most liberalintergovernmental analyses of European integration have been primarily confinedto the economic realm.

In contrast to liberal intergovernmentalism, neoclassical realists argue thatdomestic interests can have an important impact upon a state’s foreign and secu-rity policy decisions, and focus on how different domestic variables channel, medi-ate, and redirect policy responses to external (“systemic”) pressures andincentives.21 In recent years, a number of European security scholars have drawnon insights from neoclassical realism to shed light on the interplay between coop-eration and conflict in the context of EU foreign and security policy.22 Arguably,one of the main benefits of a neoclassical realist approach is that it alerts us tosome of the inherent obstacles to European security cooperation. While relativedecline may indeed constitute a systemic incentive to European security coopera-tion, domestic factors play a key role in regulating the impact of such externalincentives upon state policy. In this vein, Tom Dyson has argued that “Euroscepti-cism” and “Atlanticism” are values that are deeply entrenched in Britain’s domestic

19Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992).20On the concept of “two-level games” see Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1988): 427–70. On liberal intergovernmentalism, see AndrewMoravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-versity Press, 1998).

21On neoclassical realism, see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no.1 (October 1998), 144–72. See also Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance ofPower (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

22See, for example, Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz, eds., Neoclassical Realism and European Politics: Bringing Power Back In(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2012).

NEOREALISM, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND EUROPE’S RELATIVE GAINS DILEMMA 191

political culture and have constituted typical obstacles to British engagement in theCSDP.23 Those values, he contends, are very difficult to alter given the currentpolitical system, whereby executive autonomy is narrowed by the ability of back-benchers to inflict defeat on the government, as well as by the electoral threat pre-sented by the UK Independence Party.

Neoclassical realists are right to argue that systemic considerations alone cannotpossibly account for the complex interplay between conflict and cooperation thatcharacterizes European security politics. Any comprehensive analysis of Europeansecurity must certainly pay due attention to how domestic factors filter systemic(external) pressures—and even how domestic needs may at times drive foreignpolicy altogether. In this sense, neoclassical realism both encompasses and tran-scends neorealism.24 However, before looking at how domestic-level factors canenrich our understanding of European security cooperation (or lack thereof), wemust first fully exploit the structural component of neorealism itself. In particular,I argue that greater attention should be paid to intra-European relative power con-siderations—a concept that has been largely omitted from contemporary neorealistaccounts of European security.

Relative Gains and European Security Cooperation

For neorealists, states’ concerns about their relative power position constitute thesingle most important obstacle to international security cooperation.25 Accordingto Kenneth N. Waltz, “[w]hen faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutualgain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are com-pelled to ask not ‘[w]ill both of us gain’ but ‘[w]ho will gain more?’”26 Joseph M.Grieco has argued in similar terms. In his view, the fact that states worry aboutboth “absolute” and “relative” gains means that “a state that is satisfied with a part-ner’s compliance in a joint agreement might nevertheless exit from it because thepartner is achieving relatively greater gains.”27 Given that the international systemis anarchic, neorealist logic maintains that states “worry that today’s friends maybe tomorrow’s enemy in war, and fear that achievements or joint gains that advan-tage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in thefuture.”28

Liberals have sought to qualify the neorealist narrative on relative gains by argu-ing that, under certain conditions, a state’s quest for absolute gains might outweighits concerns for relative losses and result in successful cooperation. Charles Lipson

23Tom Dyson, “Balancing Threat, Not Capabilities: European Defence Cooperation as Reformed Bandwagoning,” Con-temporary Security Policy 34, no. 2 (2013): 387–91.

24Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of StructuralRealism,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (April–June 2008): 294–321.

25Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Grieco, “Anarchy andthe Limits of Cooperation”; idem., “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation.”

26Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105.27Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” 487.28Ibid. Italics in original.

192 L. SIM�ON

has argued that states are more likely to overlook relative losses for the sake ofabsolute gains in the economic realm than in the security realm.29 In a similarvein, Robert Powell has linked concerns for relative gains to changes in the con-straints that states face, paying particular attention to whether force is or is not “atissue.”30 In (regional) environments characterized by interstate rivalry, competi-tion, and strategic instability, concerns for relative gains are likely to feature promi-nently. In turn, regions where peace and conflict are the clear prerogative of adominant state tend to be more stable and are more likely to focus on (joint) eco-nomic development and absolute gains. This resonates with David A. Lake’s ideaof a security community.31 Reflecting upon these and other empirical contribu-tions, Robert O. Keohane concluded that what matters is not so much whetherstates worry about relative or absolute gains, but rather to figure out to what extentand under what specific conditions they care about one more than the other.32

Following an intense debate, the neorealist and neoliberal positions on this issuehave somewhat converged: in those cases in which security concerns are high orforce is at issue, considerations about relative gains tend to trump expectationsabout absolute gains, and the prospects for cooperation are dim. In turn, stableenvironments where security is guaranteed by a hegemon, and the focus is on eco-nomic development, are much more conducive to absolute gains and thereforelikely to lead to greater degrees of international cooperation.33 This has been amplyreferred to in the IR literature as the “neo-neo synthesis.”34

Most neorealist reflections on the impact of relative gain considerations uponEuropean security cooperation have revolved around the question of Europe’s rela-tive decline vis-�a-vis the United States.35 Ever since the launch of the CSDP in1999, neorealists have argued about whether European security calculations aredriven by a will to balance against US unipolarity or bandwagon on the UnitedStates.36 For many, a post-9/11, unilateral America represented a clear incentivefor European security cooperation back in the early 2000s. 37 The EU and, more

29Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37, no. 1 (October 1984):1–23.

30Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” American Political Science Review 85,no. 4 (December 1991): 1303–20.

31See David A. Lake, “Regional Hierarchy: Authority and Local International Order,” Review of International Studies 35,no. 1 (February 2009): 35–58.

32Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War,” in Baldwin, ed., Neorealismand Neoliberalism, 269–300.

33For an excellent overview of this discussion see Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism; Keohane, Neorealism andIts Critics.

34Ole Wæver, “The Rise And Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds.International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 163–64.

35See, for example, Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy”; Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe”;Jones, The rise of European Security Cooperation.

36For a comprehensive discussion of the “balancing vs. bandwagoning” debate in IR theory, see Randall L. Schweller,“Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 72–107.

37Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy.” On the broader trend towards soft-balancing in the context ofpost-9/11 US unilateralism, see also Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45; T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1(Summer 2005): 46–71.

NEOREALISM, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND EUROPE’S RELATIVE GAINS DILEMMA 193

particularly, its CSDP, seemed to them to be the best way for Europeans to mitigatethe prospect of excessive US power. However, post-9/11 US unilateralism was arather short-lived phenomenon. As the United States retreated towards a moremultilateral and less interventionist approach to foreign policy from the mid-2000s on, references to European balancing of US power would soon begin to sub-side. 38 In fact, more recent neorealist analyses of European security have turned tothe idea of Europeans “bandwagoning” on US power. That security cooperation inan EU framework has not led to a diminishing European reliance on NATO, asthe bandwagoning thesis goes, leads to the conclusion that the CSDP is primarilyaimed at strengthening Europe’s bargaining power vis-�a-vis the United States, andtherefore poses no direct threat to transatlantic cohesion.39

The United States certainly constitutes a key referent in the security calculationsof all European countries. However, confining the discussion on European securitypolitics to considerations about US power is rather problematic, for Europeans donot think with one mind about the United States, nor is the United States the onlything in their minds. More specifically, by framing the analysis in Europe versusUnited States terms, most neorealists may have fallen into the trap of treatingEurope as a somewhat coherent whole. Indeed, the assumption that systemicdynamics have a somewhat homogeneous impact across Europe is arguably one ofthe main shortcomings of (most) neorealist-inspired analyses of European securitycooperation.

As much as European countries may hold different foreign and security per-spectives, most neorealists have clung to the assumption that a world of continent-sized superpowers is a world that underscores Europe’s relative decline, and that isa world that calls for European security cooperation. Whether that is to balanceagainst excessive US power or to get a better negotiating position at the NATOtable is a question that comes later.40 In any case, most neorealists seem to agreethat relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive to European security coopera-tion. This is not to say that they are unaware of intra-European differences. Posenhas argued that although “[f]our Western European powers … possess significantcapability relative to most other international actors” each of them individually is“much weaker than the United States.”41 The corollary is that their relative weak-ness brings European countries together and trumps any differences they mayhave. In a similar vein, Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli acknowledge the exis-tence of intra-European differences and rivalries but dismiss them as secondary—and effectively superfluous. After all, they contend, Europe’s overwhelming relative

38On the shift towards multilateralism in US foreign policy, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Reshap-ing the World Order: How Washington Should Reform International Institutions,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (March/April 2009): 49–63.

39Cladi and Locatelli, “Bandwagoning, not Balancing”; Dyson, “Balancing Threat, Not Capabilities.”40On balancing, see Jones, The rise of European Security Cooperation; Posen, “European Union Security and DefencePolicy.”

41Ibid., 158.

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weakness vis-�a-vis the US makes bandwagoning with the US a “rational behaviour”for all European countries.42

Adrian Hyde-Price has perhaps addressed the question of intra-European relativegain concerns in a more explicit and comprehensive fashion.43 However, he has alsodone so only to discount their importance, arguing that Europeans do not care abouttheir relative power position vis-�a-vis each other because they inhabit a stable regionalcontext and are therefore “secure.”44 This assumption appears to be somewhat prob-lematic. If all that European states care about is stability and they are indeed secure in anarrow sense of the word (that is, physical integrity and sovereignty), it remains unclearwhy they would want to engage in security cooperation in the first place. After all, most(neo)realist-inspired analyses of the CSDP argue precisely that Europeans cooperate todownplay their relative power decline—and to maximize their influence or power inthe international scene. Thus, we are only left with the implication that Europeans caredeeply about their relative position vis-�a-vis third parties (particularly the UnitedStates) but not so much (or much less so) about their relative position vis-�a-vis otherfellow Europeans. That is indeed what Hyde-Price, Posen, and Seth G. Jones seem to bedriving at,45 and that would explain the tendency of most European countries to see theEU as a “powermultiplier.”46

However, this too appears to be a problematic assumption, in that a Europeanstate can hardly safeguard its relative power position vis-�a-vis third actors withouttaking into account its relative position in relation to its fellow Europeans, that is,in the framework of the “power multiplier.” Surely, both levels must be interdepen-dent: in order for a European state to narrow the (power) gap with a third party(for example, the United States), the thriving of the (EU) power multiplier maynot be enough. It is just as important that the state in question thrives within themultiplier. This means that it is the duty of each state to ensure that cooperation inthe framework of the power multiplier occurs in a way that highlights its own com-parative advantages. In other words, a state’s power depends both on the prosper-ity of the multiplier as well as on its own (relative) position within the multiplier.And the latter is a battle that needs to be fought against fellow Europeans who, byvirtue of their respective strengths and comparative advantages, hold differentpreferences regarding the specific direction(s) the power multiplier ought to take.

While Posen, Hyde-Price, and Jones may indeed be right to point out thatEuropean states are increasingly weak in relative terms, they seem to have down-played the fact that they possess different strengths, that is, military, diplomatic,economic, cultural, etc. Whereas their common weakness represents an incentivetowards cooperation, their specific strengths and comparative advantages translate

42Locatelli and Cladi, “Bandwagoning, Not Balancing.”43Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe,” 229–31.44Ibid., 230.45Hyde-Price, “‘Normative Power Europe’”; Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy”; Jones, The Rise ofEuropean Security Cooperation.

46Adrian Treacher, “Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation,”European Security 10, no. 1 (2001): 22–44.

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into conflicting priorities over how to arrange the terms of cooperation. Insofar astheir preoccupation with the success of the power multiplier cannot be separatedfrom their own ability to affect the development of the multiplier, European stateswill tend to simultaneously observe both their relative position vis-�a-vis third par-ties as well as intra-European relative gain considerations. Thus, and depending onthe circumstances, it might sometimes make sense for a state to forego a (minor)relative loss in regards to a fellow European for the sake of a (greater) relative gainvis-�a-vis an external actor. But not always.

A number of scholars have criticized neorealism’s assumption that gains earnedin one relationship are only relevant to that relationship. Duncan Snidal has linkeda state’s considerations about relative gains to the number of great powers in theinternational system, arguing that concerns for relative gains tend to be moreprominent in bipolar than in multipolar systems.47 Insofar as the latter are con-cerned, Snidal warns that “states are concerned with relative gains compared tospecific other states,” and less so about others.48 In a similar vein, Suzanne Wernerhas sought to move past a dyadic understanding of the relative gains problem. Inher view, “it seems reasonable to assume that if relative gains earned at one pointin a relationship can be turned to advantage at a later point in that same relation-ship, then it is also the case that these gains can be turned to immediate advantagein other relationships.”49 This prospect could lead states to cooperate even at thecosts of incurring (some) relative losses. After all, states cannot possibly expect tomaintain their (relative) position in every dyadic relationship. As long as theymaintain or improve their position in enough of those relationships that mattermost to them, they may choose to cooperate even at the costs of incurring relativeloses in some other relationships. In this regard, David L. Rousseau has shown thatthe salience of relative gains varies with individual beliefs, the nature of the adver-saries, and the context of the situation.50

The works of Snidal, Werner, and Rousseau show that states may follow a morenuanced and discriminatory approach towards relative gains than has been typi-cally assumed by most neorealists. Moreover, the relative gains problem may beeven further complicated by issue linkage.51 In his analysis of international mone-tary collaboration post-Bretton Woods, Ernst B. Haas shows that attempts to treatcurrency fluctuation as a separate item on the agenda of the negotiators failed asthe parties realized that currency fluctuation had to be discussed in conjunctionwith discussions on growth, inflation, or deflation.52 Issue linkage affects virtuallyevery policy area. For instance, any discussion on nuclear cooperation in the

47Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”; Snidal, “International Cooperation among Rela-tive Gains Maximizers.” For a critique of Snidal’s work, see James S. Mosher, “Relative Gain Concerns When the Num-ber of States in the International System Increases,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5 (October 2003): 642–68.

48Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” 716.49Werner, “In Search of Security,” 293. Italics in original.50Rousseau, “Motivations for Choice.”51Haas, “Why Collaborate?”; McGinnis, “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation.”52Haas, “Why Collaborate?,” 364–65.

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framework of an alliance must necessarily take heed of the evolving conventionalmilitary balance.53 In fact, issue linkage is not limited to functional crossover, as itcan also be driven by political considerations. Michael D. McGinnis has shownthat, when bargaining, states can often adopt strategies that “create linkages acrosstime and games, thus opening up new opportunities for cooperative outcomes ingames for which cooperation would not be rational if considered in isolation.”54

Thus, a given country may well accept to trade a relative loss to another countryon a given issue in exchange for a relative gain on a different one.

The question of how to discriminate relative gains and losses in the context ofmultiple relationships and issues becomes particularly complicated in a highlyinstitutionalized and dense policy environment like the EU. That the EU dealswith a wide range of policy areas (from economics to security) means that memberstates can trade within as well as across issues. In such a highly institutionalizedmultilateral context, state A can accept a relative loss vis-�a-vis state B for severalreasons, including (1) for the sake of absolute gains; (2) in exchange for a relativegain vis-�a-vis states C, D and/or E; (3) in exchange for the expectation that suchloss will be compensated by a relative gain vis-�a-vis state B itself, either on thesame issue (later in time), on a different issue within the same policy area, in a dif-ferent policy area, and/or in a different context (for example, a bilateral relation-ship or in another international organization). This makes it seemingly difficult totrace how a given state is doing in relative terms.

The next section examines British, French and German attitudes towards thequestion of whether the EU should develop its own military headquarters, that is,independent from NATO. In doing so, it aims to show how considerations of rela-tive gains affect discussions on European security cooperation, identify some ofthe ways in which discussions on a given issue can affect other issues, and howthese linkages can affect national calculations about relative gains.

Relative Gains and European Security Cooperation: The Case of the EUMilitary Headquarters

The debate over whether to establish an operational headquarters (OHQ) provides oneof the best test cases to observe the extent to which Europeans are committed to cooper-ate on security matters in the framework of the EU, and the limits inherent to suchcooperation. AnOHQwould provide the EUwith an instrument to centralize the plan-ning, command, and control of all its military operations, thus enhancing its situationalawareness and contributing to the development of an EU-wide strategic culture. Assuch, it would seem to constitute an important step for the consolidation of the EU as acoherent strategic actor in the international scene. Ever since the CSDP was created in1999, the question of whether to establish an EU OHQ or, for that matter, what that

53On the interdependence between the nuclear and conventional domains, see Paul K. Huth, “The Extended DeterrentValue of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 2 (June 1990): 270–90.

54McGinnis, “Issue Linkage,” 141.

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OHQ should look like, has been hotly discussed.55 This debate offers a great opportu-nity to observe the evolving balance between cooperation and conflict as it relates tonational interests and considerations of relative gains. Before analysing how the evolv-ing positions of Europe’s most powerful countries have framed the discussion onwhether to establish an EUmilitary headquarters, it is important to get a better sense ofthe strategic and foreign policy priorities of Europe’s most powerful countries, and howthey relate to the CSDP and relative gains considerations.

Britain as a Transatlantic Bridge

Ever since the end of the Second World War and, perhaps more particularly, since the1956 Suez Crisis, the “special relationship” with the United States, both bilaterally andthrough NATO, has become the center of gravity in Britain’s grand strategy.56 Britainsees the special relationship not only as a means to preserve a balance of power inEurope but also as the best framework to multiply its own global influence. In thisregard, Britain hasmade it a priority to develop its bilateral strategic ties with theUnitedStates, which has led to close cooperation between the armed forces, intelligence com-munities, and defence industries of both countries.57 The special relationship hasallowed Britain privileged access to the US defensemarket, and to US defense technolo-gies and capabilities. This has significantly helped Britain to develop state of the artcapabilities in areas such as nuclear weaponry, space-based communications, naviga-tion and positioning, andmilitary aviation and electronics.

Considerations of relative gains played an important part in Britain’s decision toinvest in its special relationship with theUnited States. On the one hand, it allowed Brit-ain to mitigate its own relative decline following the Second World War and punchabove its weight in both European and global politics. This may have partly come at theexpense of political and strategic autonomy, as perhaps best illustrated by Britain’s reli-ance onUS technology for its nuclear deterrent and space communications capabilities.In this regard, some scholars have argued that Britain has sacrificed strategic autonomyfor tactical excellence by avoiding duplication and prioritizing capabilities that wouldadd value to the United States and the broader NATO framework.58 On the otherhand, Britain is aware of the need to mitigate its excessive dependence on the UnitedStates, which may partly explain its ongoing emphasis on NATO.59 The Allianceunderscores Britain’s relative edge in several ways. Ever since its creation, NATO hasbeen the main vehicle through which Britain managed to entrench US power in

55See, for example, Luis Sim�on, “Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations,” Occasional Paper 81(Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2010); Alexander Mattelaer, “The CSDP Mission Planning Process of theEuropean Union: Innovations and Shortfalls,” European Integration Online Papers 14, no. 9 (2010): 1–18; Fiona Schnelland Fabien Terpan, “Member States Resistance to the EU Operations Centre,” European Foreign Affairs Review 20, no.2 (2015): 63–82.

56See, for example, Christopher J. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan,1989); John Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations, 1939–1984: The Special Relationship (London: Macmillan, 1984).

57Ibid. See also, William Wallace and Christopher Philips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” International Affairs 85,no. 2 (March 2009), 263–84.

58See, for example, �Etienne de Durand, “Quel format d’arm�ee pour la France?,” Politique �Etrang�ere 4 (2007): 729–42.59See John Baylis, “Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO,” Journal of Strategic Studies 5, no. 2 (1982): 236–47.

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Europe—thus, the Alliance contributed to casting London as the main transmissionbelt of Europe’s interests and sensitivities inWashington. This highlights Britain’s rela-tive value vis-�a-vis other European countries, and explains its opposition to any initia-tive that may be perceived as contributing to the potential replacement of the existingtransatlantic framework with a European one. In turn, a strong NATO showed thatBritain was able to mobilize European resources and reduce the US burden in Europeand globally. This gives Britain influence in America’s eyes.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union were followed bydoubts about America’s commitment to European security, whilst Europe’s peacedividend and declining capabilities casted shadows on transatlantic cohesion. Thecrises in the Western Balkans constituted a wake-up call for Europeans, who con-sidered the United States to have intervened late and not in the terms they wouldhave wanted. They also evidenced Europe’s lack of capabilities. This partly explainsthe decision by Britain and France to join forces to launch an EU Common Secu-rity and Defense Policy, which came into effect in 1999.60 In advocating for secu-rity cooperation in an EU framework, Britain was recognizing that the UnitedStates might not always be willing to intervene in security crises in and aroundEurope, and that Europeans would have to step up to the plate. However, Britainsaw the CSDP not as a substitute for NATO but rather a way to rescue the Alliance.

For London, the CSDP was an extra lever to strengthen European capabilities,redress the widening transatlantic capability gap, and thus convince the United Statesthat the transatlantic relationship still had value. The CSDP was meant to stimulatecapability development in Europe, but in Britain’s view those capabilities should serveto revitalize NATO and the transatlantic relationship, and not to prop up the EU as anindependent strategic actor. Thus, Britain has tended to promote or support initiativesaimed at capability development that could add value to the Alliance, and has resistedthose aimed at asserting the EU’s independence vis-�a-vis NATO, most notably thedevelopment of an EUOHQor the notion of a protected European defensemarket.61

France and the Promise of European Strategic Autonomy

France has traditionally professed a strong commitment to European political integra-tion and strategic autonomy.62 Such commitment is in no small part explained by rela-tive gains calculations. On the one hand, France has traditionally seen Europeanpolitical integration and strategic autonomy as a way tomitigate excessive US influenceglobally and in Europe and, more generally, as a way to strengthen Europe’s voice inthe world.63 This objective is linked to the need to manage Europe’s relative decline vis-�a-vis third parties, which include (but are not limited to) theUnited States. On the otherhand, there is a belief in Paris that European political integration is the best way to

60Jolyon Howorth, “Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative,” Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 33–55.61Interviews with multiple UK officials, 2009–2012.62See, for example, Pascal Boniface, La France, Est-elle encore une grande puissance? (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998).63Francois de la Serre and Philippe Moreau Defarges, “France: A Penchant for Leadership,” in National Foreign Policiesand European Political Co-operation, ed. Christopher Hill (London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers, 1983), 55–70.

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mitigate the spectre of German influence within Europe.64 Beyond that, France is par-ticularly interested in an EU that is both militarily capable and strategically autono-mous. Such an EU, the logic goes, would have to rely considerably on France’sexcellence in the realm of military-strategic capabilities.65 Its commitment to “strategicand technological autonomy” has led France to devote significant resources to buildand maintain a defense industrial base able to produce indigenously capabilities in allrelevant sectors (nuclear, aviation, space, missiles, land operations, electronics, optics,etc.).66 This contrasts with the approach followed by Britain, who has prioritizeddefense–industrial cooperation with the United States in some key sectors, especiallynuclear weaponry and space-based communications. Thus, in the view of many Frenchforeign and defense policy officials, only France canmake European strategic autonomya reality.67

In contrast to a more Atlantic Europe, one which underscores Britain’s relativeadvantages, or the sort of civilian-power Europe championed by Germany (see below),a militarily capable and strategically autonomous EU would seem to underscore Fran-ce’s comparative advantages and relative edge within Europe. This explains France’sefforts (often in cooperation with Britain) in support of greater European capabilities,but also its unwavering support for initiatives aimed at affirming the EU’s political andstrategic autonomy and its independence fromNATO and the United States. The latterhave led France to champion the establishment of an EU OHQ, and also to advocatefor a European defensemarket and European armaments cooperation.

Germany as the Custodian of the EU’s Civilian Power Identity

Ever since the end of the Second World War, (West) Germany has championedthe idea of an economically and politically united Europe.68 During the Cold War,European integration was seen as a way to overcome superpower tensions andbring security to Europe and Germany. However, the notion that European inte-gration would serve to strengthen Europe’s voice in an increasingly multipolarworld begun progressively to gain traction in Germany, especially after the ColdWar, translating into an increasing commitment to European foreign and securitypolicy cooperation.69 Such commitment was premised on the idea that the EUshould become a “civilian power,” and seek influence through diplomacy, tradeand multilateralism rather than the use of military force.

64See, for example, David J. Howarth, The French Road to European Monetary Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2000); Michael J. Baun, “The Maastrich Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and Euroepan Integration,” PoliticalScience Quarterly 110, no. 4 (Winter 1995–96), 605–24.

65Durand, “Quel format d’arm�ee.”66French Ministry of Defence, 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security, 118.67Interviews with multiple French officials, 2009–2012. See also de Durand, “Quel format d’arm�ee.”68See, for example, Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: RandomHouse, 1993); Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little-field, 2006).

69See for example, Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). See also Alister Miskimmon, Germany and the Common Foreignand Security Policy of the European Union: Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation (London: Routledge,2007).

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To be sure, Germany is not ingenuous about the importance of military powerin contemporary international politics. However, it associates military power withdefense and deterrence, and (unlike Britain or France) rejects the notion thatmilitary force can constitute a regular foreign policy instrument.70 In this regard,Germany sees NATO and the US link as the ultimate guarantee of strategic stabil-ity in Europe, as well as a sort of insurance against risks inherent with its own civil-ian power approach. Thus, a division of labour whereby NATO concentrates ondefense and deterrence and the EU on economic and political integration, trade,and diplomacy is an arrangement that works well for Germany.

Relative gains considerations also play an important part in Germany’s attitudetowards European security cooperation. Its willingness to strengthen Europe’svoice in the world and mitigate its strategic and diplomatic dependence on theUnited States has led Germany to support greater European cooperation in foreignand security policy. This has led Germany to partner with France in buildingstrong institutions for European foreign policy, including in the framework of theCSDP. However, Germany has also made it clear that while it was committed to astronger Europe in foreign and security policy, it was not committed to any kindof Europe. Like France, Germany has tried to make sure that the EU develops onits own terms. In this regard, an EU that concentrates on trade, diplomacy, andcivilian crisis management in its external action is an EU that underscoresGermany’s relative advantages, that is, its economic might. In turn, Germany hasfelt rather uneasy about a militarized EU, for that is a prospect that challenged itsown narrative and identity as a civilian power.71 This had led Germany to insistthat any attempts to build a CSDP should respect the UN and concentrate on civil-ian crisis management and civilian–military integration. These strategic prioritiesare reflected in Germany’s attitude towards the debate on a European OHQ andexplain its support for a small facility concentrating on civilian–military planningand avoiding any duplication of NATO’s emphasis on military planning.

The Long and Winding Road to an EU Military Headquarters

As argued, concerns regarding Washington’s commitment to European security andEurope’s own capability shortfalls led Britain and France to push for the creation of aCSDP back in 1999. London and Paris agreed that a CSDP should focus on the develop-ment of expeditionary military capabilities, but that was pretty much the extent of theiragreement. Britain conceived of a CSDP just as a useful lever to improve Europeanmil-itary capabilities: its ultimate aim was to redress the transatlantic capability gap and

70Interviews with multiple German officials, 2009–2012. For an account of Germany’s efforts to move towards a moreexpeditionary strategic mindset following its participation in the 1999 Kosovo War, see Rainer Baumann and GuntherHellmann, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War,’ the ‘Culture of Restraint’ and the Quest for Normality,”German Politics 10, no. 1 (2001): 61–82; Alister Miskimmon, “Falling into Line? Kosovo and the Course of German For-eign Policy,” International Affairs 85, no. 3 (May 2009): 561–73.

71See Sebastian Harnisch and Hans W. Maull, ed., Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001).

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strengthen NATO, not to empower the EU. The French, for their part, wanted toensure that capability development was at the service of EU political and strategicautonomy. That required going beyond capability development and giving the EUstrong political institutions as well as a number of key strategic assets. On the first ques-tion, the French found inGermany a like-minded partner. Thanks to joint Franco–Ger-man efforts, a number of institutions were set up through the second half of 1999 andthe first half of 2000, most notably the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and theEUMilitary Committee (EUMC).72

However, the French insisted that capability and institutional developmentshould be coupled with the establishment of an OHQ for the planning and conductof EU military operations, and that of an EU armaments agency.73 In particular, anEU OHQ independent from NATO was seen in France as a condition sine qua nonfor European strategic autonomy, as it would help reduce Europe’s operationaldependence on the United States. Such an OHQ would have to draw on France’sexcellence in the realm of strategic assets and therefore serve to strengthen France’scomparative advantages within Europe. Of particular importance in this regard isFrance’s high degree of autonomy from the United States (compared to Britain,Germany, or any other European country) in areas like intelligence, surveillance,reconnaissance, or space-based communications—all critical for military planning,command, and control.

Both Britain and Germany opposed French calls for an EU OHQ, albeit fordifferent reasons. Britain saw France’s proposal of an EU military headquarters asa direct threat to transatlantic cohesion, one that could undermine its own positionas a geostrategic bridge between Europe and North America. Germany, for its part,was concerned that France’s attempts to militarize the EU could corrupt theUnion’s image as a civilian international actor—one that played into Berlin’s ownstrengths. Germany was happy to partner with France to create institutions aimedat strengthening the EU’s political autonomy in the realm of security. However,the purpose of the OHQ was to contribute to the EU’s military and strategic auton-omy from NATO, and that was a step too far for Germany. Berlin was comfortablewith a status quo whereby the Alliance’s emphasis on defense and deterrenceallowed the EU to develop a civilian international profile.

British and German reservations hampered France’s first attempt to establish anEU military headquarters. However, both Britain and Germany had an interest indownplaying France’s frustration on the OHQ question. Keeping a climate ofcooperation with France was important to continue to work together on the oneissue Britain valued: capability development.74 The Germans, for their part, saw

72See, for example, Miskimmon, Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The PSC would monitor theinternational security situation, recommend strategic approaches to the European Council, and ensure the politicalcontrol and strategic direction of all EU operations. The EUMC would provide the PSC with advice on all military-related matters.

73Interview with French official, 26 May 2009.74Interviews with multiple UK officials, 2009–2012.

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France as their main partner in advancing European integration and politicalcooperation. And while they were not ready to see a fully fledged EU military head-quarters, they supported French calls to improve the Union’s planning, command,and control capabilities.75 In the end, the three countries reached a compromise.The first part of that compromise was the setting up of a “loose” international sec-retariat made up of military experts seconded from national capitals.76 The so-called EU Military Staff (EUMS) would be set up in January 2001, and its mainpurpose would be to assist the PSC (and EUMC) with planning at the political–strategic level.

Insofar as operational planning and command and control (C2) were concerned,member states agreed to give the EU two options. The first one, proposed by Britain,was to give the EU the opportunity to lease NATO’s planning and conduct assets andcapabilities through the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreements.77 The second, advocated byFrance, was to have a number of member states (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, andGreece) make their national OHQs available for the operational planning and conductof EU military operations.78 This, however, would always be done on a case-by-casebasis, which means that different EU military operations would be planned and con-ducted from different (national or NATO) headquarters.

The first discussion around the need to establish an EUmilitary headquarters consti-tutes a good example of how relative gains considerations can hamper security coopera-tion in an EU framework—in this case by leading to rathermodest outcomes. One suchoutcomewas the creation of the EUMS, an advisory body with no responsibilities in therealm of operational planning or C2 responsibilities. The other was the decision to denythe EU a permanent capacity for the planning and conduct of its own military opera-tions by dispersing such capacity over various (national and NATO) headquarters. Inthis case, it was British and German concerns about relative losses that hampered Fran-ce’s push for an EUmilitary headquarters.

However, the impact of relative gains considerations upon European securitycooperation is not always negative, and in any case is not unidirectional. Britainand Germany could have simply vetoed France’s plans for an autonomous EUOHQ. Instead, they also accepted to strengthen the EU’s capacities for autonomousoperational planning through the creation of the framework nation track and theEUMS—a body that could provide support to national OHQs. These concessions,however minor, show that both Britain and Germany were interested in preservinga climate of cooperation in the CSDP—a calculation also informed by (other typesof) relative gains considerations. Beyond the general belief that progress on theCSDP can help mitigate Europe’s (common) relative decline vis-�a-vis third actors,Britain and Germany had their own specific reasons to try to find some balancebetween preserving their relative position on the OHQ question and

75Interviews with multiple German officials, 2009–2012.76Interviews with multiple EU officials, 2009–2012.77Sim�on, “Command and Control?,” 15.78Ibid.

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accommodating French concerns. This is partly explained by issue linkage. In Brit-ain’s case, preserving a climate of cooperation with France was key to achievingprogress on another key CSDP-related front: capability development.79 This wouldcontribute to transatlantic cohesion, and thus to the preservation of Britain’s ownrelative power position. For Germany, cooperation with France was key to institu-tional development in the CSDP framework and, more broadly, to progress inEuropean economic and political integration—a process from which Germany issupposed to derive significant relative advantages.80

Towards a European Security and Defense Union?

The French would not give up on their aim to create a permanent EU military head-quarters quite so easily. The transatlantic rift over the US decision to invade Iraq in2003, and Germany’s increasing discomfort with the Bush administration’s unilateral-ism, offered Paris a political opportunity to wave the European autonomy flag. In par-ticular, the French were hoping to capitalize on US unilateralism through progress onthe question of an EUmilitary headquarters.81 Indeed, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’sconcerns about US unilateralism, immortalized by his vociferous opposition to the USinvasion of Iraq, may well partly explain Berlin’s willingness to entertain French callsfor EU strategic autonomy during the post-9/11 years.82

In April 2003—barely a month into the invasion of Iraq—France, Germany,Belgium, and Luxembourg built on the earlier Franco–German proposal to call fora European Security and Defence Union (ESDU). The ESDU would turn aroundPermanent Structured Cooperation among “those member states that are ready togo faster and further in strengthening their defence co-operation,” and lead to theestablishment of an EU OHQ.83 Most officials and analysts agree that the ESDUhas represented the most far-reaching and ambitious proposal for security cooper-ation in the EU framework since the creation of CSDP.84 However, the ESDU faceda number of important obstacles. For one thing, the French remained very muchuncertain as to the extent to which the Germans were committed to pushingEuropean defense cooperation through an exclusive group of willing and ablemember states—let alone to using such exclusive group to establish an EU OHQseparate from NATO.85 For another, the French were themselves interested inkeeping Britain involved in the CSDP, for they thought that was the best insuranceagainst the more “civilian power Europe” Germany had in mind. Thus, French

79Interviews with multiple UK officials, 2009–2012.80Interviews with multiple German officials, 2009–2012.81Interviews with multiple EU and member state officials, 2009–2011.82See Felix Berensktoetter and Bastian Giegerich, “From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist Analysis of German Stra-tegic Adjustment after the End of the Cold War,” Security Studies 19, no. 3 (July–September 2010): 407–52.

83Tervuren communiqu�e, “Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of Germany, France, Luxembourg and Bel-gium,” (Brussels, 29 April 2003).

84Author’s interviews with multiple EU and member state officials, 2009–2012. See also Jolyon Howorth, “The Euro-pean Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility,” Euro-pean Foreign Affairs Review 9, no. 1 (2004): 483–508.

85Interview with French official, 26 May 2009.

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diplomats acknowledged that any progress on the OHQ question would in all like-lihood be modest, but did not want to miss out on the opportunity to make someprogress, and advance towards an outcome that would strengthen their relativepower within Europe.86

Britain’s own position had not changed. London strongly rejected the notion ofan “exclusive group” on European defense, let alone the implication of using Per-manent Structured Cooperation as a back door to establishing an EU OHQ thatwould threaten transatlantic cohesion and thus erode Britain’s relative power posi-tion within Europe.87 However, its own interest in defusing political tensions inthe highly polarized context of the Iraq War led London to accept a debate on Per-manent Structured Cooperation and the OHQ question. It did so, however, underthe condition that the two initiatives be dissociated from each other.88 London wasaware that Franco–German differences would allow it to get away with rathermodest concessions. While they were initially surprised about Germany’s supportfor an initiative that might damage transatlantic solidarity, the British were soonreassured by private hesitations among many decision makers in Berlin.89 Thosehesitations would become public when, in November 2003, German Foreign Min-ister Joshka Fischer explicitly rejected the idea of an EU OHQ.90

After a long trilateral discussion through the summer and autumn of 2003, ameetingbetween Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair and Schroeder in Berlin in December 2003 settledthe debate on the ESDU. Insofar as Permanent Structured Cooperation was concerned,the three countries agreed that any sort of avant-garde on European defense would beinclusive in nature.91 Critically, and largely at Britain’s insistence, it was also agreed thatthe purpose of any such avant-garde would be capability development: under no cir-cumstances would Permanent Structured Cooperation be used to allow a group ofmember states to establish an OHQ under the auspices of the EU.92 Instead, the Britishproposed to set up a small civilian-military cell aimed at improving civilian–militarycoordination in the area of planning and conduct. This proposal was soon embraced byGermany, who saw it as an opportunity to move away from military CSDP and focuson civilian–military coordination.

The French saw in Britain’s proposal of a civilian–military cell an attempt todefuse their pressure to establish a military headquarters. However, they wereaware that British opposition and German hesitation made it seemingly difficult toestablish an EU OHQ. Thus, they accepted the creation of the civilian–military cellunder one condition, that is, the inclusion, within the cell, of a “dormant” Opera-tions Centre that could be activated and turned into a real OHQ for the purposesof a specific operation, should the European Council so decide. The French hoped

86Interview with French official, 19 May 2009.87Interview with UK official, 21 May 2009.88Interview with UK official, 21 May 2009.89Interviews with multiple UK officials, 2009–2012.90Anand Menon, “From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq,” International Affairs 80, no. 4 (July 2004): 631–48.91Howorth, “The European Draft Constitutional Treaty”.92Ibid.

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to build up the resources of the Operations Centre over time and eventually turn itinto a “real standing military headquarters.”93 The British, for their part, were rela-tively satisfied, to the extent that they had managed to defuse earlier pressures toestablish an EU OHQ, thus having preserved transatlantic cohesion and the rela-tive advantages associated with it.94

From Military Planning to Civilian–Military Planning

The agreement on the civilian–military cell represented a shift in the mechanics ofthe OHQ debate, away from the establishment of a purely military headquarterstowards a discussion on how to strengthen civilian–military coordination in theareas of planning and C2.95 This illustrated the increasing importance of the civil-ian aspects of the CSDP, and a broader interest in improving coordination betweencivilian and military instruments in crisis management.96 That was a very signifi-cant political shift away from military CSDP—one largely explained by British andGerman relative gain considerations.

Britain’s change of heart was particularly noteworthy. In the early years, Britainhad conceived of the CSDP as a mechanism for the development of European mili-tary capabilities. However, from late 2003/early 2004, London begun to showincreasing interest in the civilian aspects of CSDP and in the notion of enhancingcivilian–military coordination, both at the level of planning and in theater. In thisregard, Britain’s presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005 served as a spring-board for civilian CSDP, leading to the establishment of a Civilian Planning andConduct Capability and the launch of multiple EU civilian and civilian–militarycrisis management missions throughout the world.

The shift in Britain’s priorities vis-�a-vis the CSDP can be explained at least bytwo reasons. On the one hand, London did indeed see civilian CSDP and theemphasis on civilian–military coordination as a useful way of defusing repeatedFrench calls for EU strategic autonomy, and the question of the military headquar-ters more specifically.97 On the other hand, London had a genuine interest in thenonmilitary elements of crisis management. This interest is explained by the evolu-tion of the US-led missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where Britain was heavilyinvolved operationally. As combat operations wound down in those two countries,there was a shift from a widely spread military campaign to localized warfare andtowards postconflict stabilization and reconstruction.98 In particular, the emphasison postconflict stabilization and reconstruction generated a growing demand forcivilian crisis management and reconstruction instruments (that is, police, judicial,

93Interview with French official, 26 May 2009.94Interviews with multiple UK defence officials, 2009–2012.95Interviews with multiple EU and member state officials, 2009–2012.96Interviews with multiple EU officials, 2009–2012.97Interviews with multiple UK defence officials, 2009–2012.98See Theo Farrell and Stuart Gordon, “COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan,” Orbis 53, no. 4 (2009): 665–83.

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civil administration, etc.) and for better coordination between civilian and militaryinstruments. Britain believed that these were areas in which the EU could addpractical value to broader transatlantic objectives, especially in Afghanistan. 99

Germany welcomed Britain’s increasing interest in civilian crisis managementand civilian–military coordination, not least as it offered a great opportunity tosteer the CSDP process into a direction more favorable to Germany’s specific inter-ests. Berlin had accepted the initial Franco–British proposal to launch the CSDPback in 1999 somewhat reluctantly, given the emphasis on developing expedition-ary military capabilities. Berlin was concerned that an emphasis on military capa-bilities played to Franco–British interests (and strengths) and damaged the EU’scivilian power identity. However, its commitment to advancing EU foreign policycooperation, and the high political costs associated with vetoing a proposal thatwas strongly favoured by France and Britain, seem to have overridden specificGerman concerns about relative losses.100 To be sure, Germany would seek to miti-gate its own losses by insisting that EU military operations should concentrate onlow end peacekeeping tasks (rather than combat-intense tasks) and be availed bythe UN Security Council. These conditions would serve to downplay the EU’smilitarization and emphasize its multilateral character.101 In addition, Berlininsisted that the CSDP should not be just confined to the military realm, and thatgreater efforts should be made to develop civilian capabilities, much needed in cri-sis management and reconstruction endeavours. Only Sweden had expressed aserious interest in this civilian dimension in the early years of the CSDP. ButBritain’s newfound interest opened up new opportunities for Germany, who wasdetermined to work in tandem with Britain to push its civilian power agenda. 102

France remained impassive to the alignment of UK–German priorities from2004–5 onwards, fearing the disproportionate attention being paid in Brussels tocivilian crisis management and civilian–military coordination would come at theexpense of military CSDP and European strategic autonomy.103 This would under-mine France’s comparative advantage—its excellence in the realm of military–stra-tegic assets—and influence within the CSDP. However, the strong support fromBritain and Germany and the enthusiasm shown by other member states towardscivilian CSDP and greater civilian-military cooperation would have made it politi-cally very costly for France to resist that process.104 Not least, French officials real-ized that any such veto would have been very damaging to the CSDP as a whole,thus making it more difficult for France to use that framework for other purposesin the future. 105

99Interviews with multiple UK defence officials, 2009–2012.100Interviews with multiple German officials, 2009–2012.101Ibid.102Interviews with multiple German officials, 2009–2012.103Interview with French official, 26 May 2009.104Interview with EU official, 12 May 2009.105Interviews with multiple French officials, 2009–2012.

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Perhaps partly in an attempt to mitigate its diminishing influence (that is, rela-tive position) within the CSDP, from 2006–7 onwards, France began to devotemore attention to its bilateral strategic ties with the United States and its rolewithin NATO.106 This process would culminate with its decision to return to theAlliance’s integrated military structure—announced by President Nicolas Sarkozyin 2007 and effective as of April 2009. That, however, did not mean France wouldgive up on its ambition of European strategic autonomy or its more specific projectof an EU military headquarters. Indeed, in the run up to its EU presidency in thesecond semester of 2008, France brought up again the question of an EU OHQ.Having decided to return to NATO’s integrated military structure, the Frenchthought they could dispel (British) suspicions that the CSDP threatened transatlan-tic cohesion. In fact, in a speech in Paris on 22 February 2008, US Ambassador toNATO Victoria Nuland called for a greater European defense effort and lent hersupport to the idea of an EU OHQ.107 The French were convinced that Washing-ton’s backing would buy them leverage in London and spent much of the first halfof 2008 lobbying the British. This led to widespread expectations about the even-tual establishment of an EU OHQ during the French EU presidency in the secondsemester of 2008.108

Britain remained as opposed to an EU military headquarters as ever.109 How-ever, it welcomed France’s decision to return to NATO’s military structure andwas aware that maintaining a “positive climate” with France was important for thesake of transatlantic cohesion.110 As a “sign of good faith,” the British suggested tothe French they would be open to further improvements in the EU’s capabilitiesfor (integrated) civilian–military planning at the strategic level.111 Germany wel-comed this move and laid the foundations for another trilateral compromise at theend of 2008, which resulted in the creation of the Crisis Management and PlanningDirectorate (CMPD). The CMPD would be responsible for the politico-strategicaspects of both civilian and military CSDP mission and for ensuring a comprehen-sive approach to EU crisis management.112 It would incorporate within its struc-ture the civilian–military cell as well as the EU Military Staff and the CivilianPlanning and Conduct Capability. It represented yet another imperfect compro-mise, one that defused the discussion on a military headquarters through greater

106See, for example, Fr�ed�eric Bozo and Guillaume Parmentier “France and the United States: Waiting for RegimeChange,” Survival 49, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 181–98; Luis Sim�on, “The Spider in Europe’s Web? French Grand Strategyfrom Iraq to Libya,” Geopolitics 18, no. 2 (2013): 403–34.

107Victoria Nuland, “Ambassador Discusses Strengthening Global Security for Europe,” Speech to Presse Club andAmCham, (Paris, 22 February 2008).

108See, for example Asle Toje, “The EU, NATO and European Defense—A Slow Train Coming,” Occasional Paper 74(Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2008).

109Interview with UK official, 21 May 2009.110Ibid.111Ibid.112See Carmen Gebhard, “The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Conduct and Planning

Capacities,” CFSP Forum 7, no. 4 (2009): 8–14.

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emphasis on civilian–military coordination at the political–strategic level of plan-ning, and not at the operational level.

Britain’s ongoing opposition and Germany’s reluctance to the notion of an EUmilitary OHQ led France to progressively come around to the idea that the onlyway to make additional progress towards an OHQ was to accept that any suchheadquarters would be civilian-military in nature.113 Moreover, the signing of twofar-reaching bilateral security agreements with France in November 2010 ledmany in Paris to expect greater complicity from London. Thus, through the firsthalf of 2011, France devoted considerable time to persuading London for the needfor a permanent “civilian–military” EU OHQ. However, a proposal by France,Germany, and Poland to create such headquarters was vetoed by Britain inmid-2011.114

To be sure, London did not object to improving the EU’s capacities for inte-grated civilian–military planning. However, it insisted that such capacities be con-fined to the politico-strategic level of planning and should under no circumstancesinclude operational planning and command and control. Ultimately, Britainremained skeptical about the idea of building an operational planning capabilitythat could eventually attract more and more military planners and resources andend up competing with NATO. Instead, in a clear gesture towards France, Britainagreed to the activation of the EU Operations Centre, which had been dormantsince its establishment in 2004. Thus, from March 2012 onwards, the OperationsCentre began to act as a liaison hub for all existing operations in the Horn ofAfrica. While the French welcomed that gesture, its significance should not beoverestimated. The functions of the Operations Centre would be merely coordi-native: it would not have any operational planning or conduct responsibilities(those would lie with different OHQs), and its staff would be restricted to twentyofficers.115

All in all, repeated failures to create an EU military headquarters owe much toBritish and German relative gains considerations. Britain has seen the establish-ment of an EU military headquarters as a direct threat to transatlantic cohesion,and to its own role as a geostrategic bridge between Europe and America—onethat underscores its own competitive edge vis-�a-vis other European powers. Thislargely explains its opposition to an EU OHQ over the years. Germany, for its part,is particularly concerned about the militarization of the EU. Such a prospect wouldundermine the EU’s identity as an economic and civilian power, which plays toGermany’s relative strengths and comparative advantages. Thus, Germany insiststhat any efforts to create an EU OHQ should focus on integrated civilian–militaryplanning.

113Interviews with multiple French officials.114Interview with EU official, 21 November 2011.115Interviews with multiple EU officials, March–June 2012.

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France is the only big European country that has demonstrated an unwaveringcommitment to the establishment of an EU military headquarters. However, it hasdone so not only out of concern about Europe’s relative decline, but also because itbelieves that an EU military headquarters provides a solution to European relativedecline that underscores its own relative advantages within Europe. When it comesto intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities, or space-based communi-cations (all critical for military planning and command and control), the Frenchenjoy a greater degree of autonomy from the United States (and NATO) than anyother European country, including Britain. Therefore, they see themselves as criti-cal to the effective operation of an EU military headquarters, and to EU strategicautonomy more broadly.

Although repeated French efforts to set up an EU military headquarters havefailed, some progress has been achieved over the years. And relative gains consider-ations also play an important part in explaining the patterns of reform in the EU’sstructures for the planning and conduct of military operations. At several points intime, Britain, Germany, or France could have simply vetoed initiatives they did notlike. However, there were situations in which they thought the political costs ofvetoing an initiative proposed by the other(s) could outweigh the potential relativelosses associated with that particular initiative. Thus, all three countries have attimes accepted concessions to their partners for the sake of preserving a climate ofcooperation with them, both in the framework of the CSDP and beyond (bilaterallyand in NATO). This may be explained by several reasons. One is certainly the ideathat the CSDP serves to mitigate Europe’s (common) relative decline and contrib-utes to strengthening Europe’s voice in the world. This is an assumption that allEuropean countries share to some extent, and can relate either to expectations ofrelative gains vis-�a-vis third actors (for example, the United States, Russia, China,etc.) or to the prospect of absolute gains, that is, against transnational securitythreats such as terrorism, piracy, or state failure.

A second reason may partly explain why the EU Big Three have sought to pre-serve a climate of cooperation in the context of the CSDP is the expectation of rela-tive gains vis-�a-vis other European countries. After all, by investing in the CSDP(or, for that matter, the EU), the EU Big Three are contributing to the developmentof an institutional framework whose direction they can influence and manage to amuch greater extent than other (medium and small) European countries. Thismay create an additional incentive for a powerful member state to cooperate, evenin the context of initiatives where it may incur losses vis-�a-vis the other two. Athird and final reason relates to issue linkage, in that preserving a climate of coop-eration with key partners can be perceived as instrumental to bring about wins onother issues, whether inside or outside the EU framework. All in all, the analysis ofBritish, French, and German positions towards the OHQ debate shows that theimpact of relative gains considerations upon European security cooperation is notfixed. Admittedly, the fear of losing out in relation to (an)other great Europeanpower(s) does certainly constitute a structural obstacle to greater cooperation.

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However, the prospect of relative gains vis-�a-vis other countries (European or oth-erwise) or on other issues often leads to concessions and compromises, thus result-ing in cooperation where otherwise there may have been none.

Relative Gains, Security Cooperation, and Europe’s Futures

A typical neorealist argument is that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive forEuropean security cooperation in the framework of the EU’s Common Security andDefense Policy (CSDP). There is certainly some truth to this. However, if a givenEuropean country is to mitigate its relative decline, its participation in the CSDP is notsufficient: it is just as important that the CSDP develops in a direction that reflects itsown comparative advantages and specific national interests. Insofar as European coun-tries possess different strengths, they hold conflicting visions over the direction theCSDP ought to take. This means that European calculations about relative gains (andlosses) bear both a global and a regional (intra-European) component. Whether onelevel is prioritized over the other is something that depends on a case-by-case basis. Attimes, a European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-�a-vis a fellow Euro-pean for the sake of a relative gain on a non-European country, while in different cir-cumstances the opposite may be true. There may also be situations in which a givenEuropean country can accept a relative loss in regards to some European countries inexchange for a relative gain on other Europeans. This problem is further complicatedby issue linkage, which may lead different European countries to trade (relative) gainsand losses across different issues and policy areas.

This article has set out to examine how intra-European relative gains considera-tions affect the way in which Europe’s key powers seek to cope with relativedecline, and what that means for security cooperation in an EU framework. To doso, we have analyzed the evolving positions of Britain, France, and Germanytowards a key and controversial question: whether to establish an EU militaryheadquarters. The analysis shows the extent to which national considerationsabout intra-European relative gains can outweigh vague concerns about Europeanrelative decline and frustrate cooperation. In this case, French expectations aboutrelative gains translated into subsequent efforts to establish an EU military head-quarters. Conversely, the failure to establish a headquarters owes much to Britishand German concerns about relative losses. Considerations of relative gains havenot always stood in the way of progress on the OHQ question. In this regard, thedesire on the part of Britain and Germany to maintain a climate of cooperationwith France—and keep the CSDP going—account for some concessions to Frenchdemands in the realm of planning and conduct. Those desires are also affected byrelative gains considerations and issue linkage, in this case the belief that a strongCSDP can bring relative gains vis-�a-vis third actors (non- Europeans as well asother European countries), both within the CSDP and beyond.

This article has aimed to contribute to a more nuanced discussion on relative gains.However, any attempt to draw on Europe’s case to make broader generalizations about

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relative gains should be taken with a pinch of salt. It is particularly important to bear inmind the specific circumstances of contemporary Europe, whereby the (still) predomi-nant position of the United States and the existence of NATO continue to be largelyresponsible for the preservation of peace and stability. Force is not at issue (at leastamongst EU/NATO countries), and the EU Big Three enjoy excellent economic, politi-cal, and security ties with each other. Having said this, further research should help clar-ify to what extent the absence of direct security threats is a precondition for a morenuanced discussion on relative gains. This is a timely question, both conceptually andfrom a policy perspective. As China rises and Russia seeks to reassert its sphere of influ-ence in Eastern Europe, it is legitimate to ask to what extent the United States can affordto treat them both as competitors. Both these countries may indeed represent a directthreat to the security of the United States and its allies, and force may be at issue in bothcases. However, some scholars are arguing that the United States should figure out whois the greater evil and concentrate on it, while accommodating the lesser evil.116 In thissense, further research is needed on how considerations related to relative gains mayhinder or assist future cooperative ventures between Russia and China or, for that mat-ter, between Russia and the United States.

Insofar as Europe is concerned, the prospect of US strategic retrenchment andmounting instability in Eastern Europe and the Middle East could introduce newelements to Europe’s relative gains dilemma.117 In this regard, additional researchon intra-European relative gains could enhance our understanding of some keychallenges Europeans are likely to face over the coming years, including how tocope with the prospect of a British departure from the EU, Germany’s increasinginfluence over the European integration process, the spectrum of a Russian come-back in Eastern Europe, or increasing instability in North Africa and the MiddleEast.

AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to Caterina Carta, Christopher Coker, Daniel Fiott, Jolyon Howorth, Robert Jervis,Alister Miskimmon, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Security Studies for their valu-able comments on previous drafts of this article.

116See, for example, Richard K. Betts, “Realism Is an Attitude, Not a Doctrine,” National Interest (September–October2015); Michael G. Roskin, “The New Cold War,” Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, 44, no. 1 (Spring2014): 5–9.

117See Luis Sim�on, “Understanding US Retrenchment in Europe,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57, no. 2 (April–May 2015): 157–72; idem., “Seapower and US Forward Presence in the Middle East: Retrenchment in Perspective,”Geopolitics, 21, no. 1 (2016): 115–47.

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