Working Papers WP 2015-02 Centre for German and European Studies (CGES)

Aleksandr Zverev

Competing approaches:

Neorealism versus constructivism

On the Ukrainian crisis

WP 2015-02

2015

№ 2

Bielefeld / St. Petersburg

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Bielefeld University

St. Petersburg State University

Centre for German and European Studies (CGES)

CGES Working Papers series includes publication of materials prepared within different activities of the

Center for German and European Studies both in St. Petersburg and in Germany: The CGES supports

educational programmes, research and scientific dialogues. In accordance with the CGES mission, the

Working Papers are dedicated to the interdisciplinary studies of different aspects of German and European

societies.

The paper aims to identify key ideas, terms and assumptions and also to trace the development of two

most cited methodological approaches in international relations theory. In order to make the comparison

profound and clear, the author deploys Ukrainian conflict 2014-2015, where constructivism and neorealism

have faced each other both at analytical (theoretical) and policymaking levels.

Aleksandr Zverev (Ph.D. candidate in political science) research assistant at the

International Laboratory for Non-Profit Sector Studies, NRU Higher School of Economics

(Moscow). Aleksandr is a Ph.D. Fellow at the Center for German and European studies

St.-Petersburg State University – Bielefeld University. His sphere of academic interests

embraces media, intercultural communication, civil society, and urban studies. He has

publications on political PR and corporate social responsibility in contemporary Russia.

Aleksandrs’ Ph.D. thesis investigates modes of communication between heritage

movements and government in Moscow, St.-Petersburg and Berlin.

Contact: alehandrep@gmail.com

ISSN 1860-5680 © Centre for German and European Studies, 2015

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Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………....……….…..3

Introduction……………………………………………………................................................3

Neo and Real.....................................................................................................................3

Constructing a New Reality of IR.......................................................................................4

Diverse, Opposite, Complementary?………………………………………………..…….......6

The Ukrainian Crisis as a Clash of Approaches ……………………………….……………..8

Conclusion........................................................................................................................11

References .......................................................................................................................12

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Abstract

This paper aims to identify the key ideas and basic assumptions of the two most cited methodological approaches in international relations theory and also to trace the history of their development. The author tries to answer whether they are confrontational or not, and what are the implications of both approaches in world politics today? Theoretical thinking is supported by the case of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014-2015 when constructivism and neorealism faced each other both at analytical (theoretical) and policymaking levels.

Introduction

Currently, Neorealism and Constructivism are two leading paradigms in IR theory and therefore they are often used as a guides for policymakers. In other words, neorealism and constructivism combine both normative and analytical components. The article aims to compare approaches and to find out what opportunities and threats they may bring while facing each other in world politics. In terms of structure, this paper consists of four parts. The first chapter is dedicated to neorealism in the theory of international relations. The theoretical perspectives of constructivism are discussed in the second part. The third chapter summarizes theoretical thinking and shows up similarities and distinctions of these two approaches. In the final chapter I elaborate briefly on the Ukrainian crisis. The fatal chain of events that has happened in Ukraine in 2014 – 2015 revealed or provoked (interpretation depends on the analytical approach) conflict between the West (EU, the USA and some other developed countries) and Russia. How can we interpret what happened in Ukraine? What is going on now in Russia-US and Russia-EU bilateral relations? What are the outcomes of this crisis for the bilateral relations between these pairs in the future? Constructivist and neorealist approaches answer these questions in different ways.

Neo and Real

Neorealism derives from one of the oldest ways of thinking in the theory of international relations and has its roots in six principals of political realism proclaimed by H. Morgenthau (Morgenthau, 1978). The idea was to capture a universal law, as in physics, to help both researchers and policymakers understand what is going on in international relations and forecast consequences of external policy.

From the perspective of realism, states pursue their own interests and deploy rational logic of power. Key terms of the given approach are, thus, ‘power' and ‘national interests' that identify the intention of every single state to gain influence. Another crucial point is that hierarchy is not inherent to external relations, which are anarchic and decentralized by nature. Each state threatens the others. (Hertz, 1950) This view on IR is quite similar to Hobbes' view on society, where ‘war against all’ exists. Consequently, each and every state is responsible for its own survival, security and prosperity. Conflicts among states, thus, are the essence of international relations, and researchers of the realist tradition focus on existing and potential conflicts.

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The new incarnation of realism saw the light in 1979 in Kenneth Waltz’s book “Theory of International Politics”. Waltz adjusted the ideas of “old” realism such as ‘state of nature’, rational actors, national interests, and a willingness to posses power, to a new reality in which tension between the West and the Soviet bloc had started to decline and transnational corporations with their own interests, economic, and political resources had appeared.

Neorealism is often called ‘Structural realism’ because Waltz and his adherents pay attention to the structure of international relations and they contributed to the development of the balance of power theory. According to Waltz, IR represents a structure of a certain kind where disposition determines the behavior of any state, and influences the whole system. Formally, all the states are equal: no state has the right to impose on the other states or to be imposed upon. Generally speaking, all the states have the same purposes (primarily survival) and functions. At the same time, countries are not equal in terms of their capabilities – power, economic and military resources, and technologies. The structure of international relations is somehow supposed to resolve this contradiction. The structure embraces many actors but the sate (government) still plays a prime role in neorealist understanding of IR.

Neorealists offered a new term – ‘polarity’ – in order to show a constellation of international relations according to “the distribution of capabilities across units” (Roggers, 1999). A system of international relations might be unipolar, bipolar or multipolar. At this moment, there is no mutually accepted point which type of polarity is more stable. One group of scientists considers the unipolar system has a higher level of stability because a hegemon maintains the status-quo. Other researchers, for instance J. Mearsheimer, suggest that a bipolar system “[has] fostered peace in Europe over the past 45 years” and thus it is the most stable type of polarity. (Mearsheimer, 1990) A third group of scientists emphasize that decentralization and competition between many powers make international relations less confrontational and this is why multipolar system is more stable.

Despite neorealism being quite a logical and consistent approach it is heavily criticized. Critics point out realism's blindness to domestic factors and cultural context. That is why realism could not predict the collapse of the USSR and its implications of the end of bipolarity. Concluding this chapter, I would like to emphasize that currently there are a few versions of neorealism: offensive realism, defensive realism, peripheral realism etc., but all of them operate with the same terms (‘national interests', ‘security' and so on). IR theory is not just a set of assumptions, research tools and ideas, indeed, it affects international politics. Political leaders especially so-called 'hawks' quite often make decisions in accordance with ideas that were exemplified in this chapter. I will show the outcomes of using neorealism in the final chapter.

Constructing a New Reality of IR

After looking through neorealism, it seems reasonable to delve into constructivism, which appeared in the 1990-s and, which is based on entirely different assumptions. The first thing we should keep in mind when discussing

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constructivism is its complexity and comprehensiveness. Constructivism is rather a new ontology than an approach. Therefore, it is a tricky issue to define what constructivism is and is not. I will follow strict logic in order to keep on track. One by one I will call and explain four characteristic features of constructivism so we will have an intelligible foundation to the realm of constructivism.

Alternative to materialism

Constructivism sees international relations as intangible by nature. A. Wendt, one of the founders of constructivism, points out that the “fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt, 1992). According to the given approach, the World is socially constructed, i.e. existing patterns, relations and even states depend on meanings, practices and routines that take place in a society (Kratochwil, 1989). Ideas and practices may change in time, and patterns, which seemed immutable, may radically change in line with cognitive changes. Constructivists often refer to a change of ‘sovereignty’ – the key category for international relations in the past. Two hundred years ago ‘sovereignty’ did not require the acceptance of other states, but nowadays it does.

Construction of state interests

Researchers of the constructivist tradition rather deal with the human mind, beliefs and predispositions than with the ‘Real Politik'. This is because interactions on the global arena are seen as being produced by humans (policymakers, think-tank analysts, opinion leaders etc.) and could not be considered as an independent variable. There is no point in exploring the foreign policy of any sate without a clear understating of the social and historical context the state operates in. Thus, context, beliefs, and ideas are key elements for the given approach. Significantly, constructivist' understanding of ideas is far more comprehensive than it seems at first glance. J. Lergo argues that “ideas are not so much mental as symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in ‘collective memories', government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft” (Lergo, 2005). A. Tsygankov describes the social context “as layered, heterogeneous, and with multiple possibilities for all participants” (Tsygankov, 2013).

Constructivism is an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of materialism. A realist could never answer why “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons”? (Wendt, 1995) While constructivism has a clear answer: the friendship between US and UK makes British missiles less dangerous than Korea's. Constructivists distinguish ‘hardware' (e.g. missiles) and ‘software' (e.g. categories ‘friend', ‘enemy' etc.) in international relations, and emphasize the prime role of ‘software'.

Mutual constitution of structures and agents

It is misleading to think that constructivists operate only on a micro level and their research focus is so narrow. They explore three levels of analysis and raise questions of ‘structure' and ‘agency' (states) as well. Constructivists believe in the interconnectedness of international law and state actions: governments produce

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international norms and then, rules shape the external policy (Hurd, 2008). Hurd exemplified the idea of reciprocity, pointing out that “both the institutions and the actors can be redefined in the process” (ibid.) States affect each other as well as the whole system, therefore international relations are reciprocal. Cultural and economic ties, shared values, and history bring states together. On the contrary, the absence of a common basis makes them distant or even hostile. Another essential outcome is governments' willingness to interpret norms and terms for their own benefits. It becomes evident when you pay attention to how officials define terms such as ‘self-defense’, ‘aggression’, or ‘human rights’. Governments are inclined to justify their own actions (e.g. military interventions) and accuse other states.

Multiple logics of anarchy

In the past, scientists thought that the system of international relations was constituted due to interests of one or more hegemonic powers. Constructivists agreed that international relations are anarchic - the system is being constantly negotiated by actors. Yet, the ‘anarchy' of constructivists has almost nothing common with the neorealist one. Given that, in the constructivist view, beliefs and meanings matter, different versions of ‘anarchy’ exist, e.g. competition, cooperation, enmity etc. “Anarchy of friends differs from one of the enemies”, as A. Wendt fairly notes (Wendt, 1995).

From my point of view, constructivism is an ambiguous and self-contradictory approach. On the one hand, constructivism tries to explain every single phenomenon in international relations, which is an advantage of this paradigm with no doubts. On the other hand, this approach is stuck with empirical analysis due to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish meaning and actions. Constructivism is often criticized for this disadvantage. Additionally, constructivists are accused of subjectivity, especially by neoliberal thinkers. Despite all the criticism, constructivism is indeed a new stage in IR theory insofar as it sheds light on things that have never been in the research focus before.

Diverse, Opposite, Complementary?

At first glance, the distinction between neorealism and constructivism is evident: neorealism deals with material objects while constructivism does not. Once we look more closely, the border between constructivism and neorealism becomes blurred - as the Ukrainian case shows. Neorealists quite often employ constructivist terms such as ‘prestige’, ‘shared values’, ‘understanding’, ‘credibility’ etc. Meanwhile, constructivists sometimes recognize ‘national interests’ and ‘power’. S. Barkin who has attempted to invent mixed approach – ‘realist constructivism’ – demonstrates the extent to which this border is blurred (Barkin, 2010). In order to clarify and specify similarities and dissimilarities, I have put key ideas of both approaches together in Table 1.

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Tab. 1. View of neorealism and constructivism on international relations

Approach

Idea

Neorealism Constructivism

Anarchy International relations are anarchic; formal equality; competition.

Different types of anarchy; relations depend on what policymakers think of each other.

IR Driver Capabilities: militant and economic power.

Meanings, values and beliefs.

Analytical Focus

State capabilities; actions.

Primarily discourses.

Interests Inevitable national interests: survival, security and prosperity.

Depend on values, history, culture, and social context.

International institutions and law

Insufficient; affect behavior of the states; represent hegemon’s interests (in unipolar system); threatened by the law of power.

Reciprocity of states and institutions (“mutually constitute”); negotiated nature; governments interpret norms according to benefits.

States Rational actors; states weigh costs and benefits.

Irrational actors; socially constructed; depend on meanings and values.

The table shows that many of these ideas are incompatible though similarities exist as well. For example, constructivist understanding of the state excludes the basic neorealist assumption on state rationality. At the same time, both approaches capture the insufficiency of international institutions. But the interpretations of the reasons why institutions are lacking differ.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that constructivism and neorealist, indeed, have little in common. This outcome matters when neorealist and constructivist version of foreign policy face each other in the global arena. Because their research lenses are different, researchers and, what is more important,

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policymakers who are keeping to one or other of these approaches cannot see each other and understand the logic of their counterparts. In the final chapter, I will show how these distinctions in meanings cause conflicts with no visible reasons.

The Ukrainian Crisis as a Clash of Approaches

Although Kiev has its stake in this case – integrity, economic growth, power (re)distributing and conflicts within the elite etc. – Ukraine is rather a stage where conflict takes place than an independent side in the conflict. This point is common for both constructivists and neorealists, but the two approaches interpret the origins of the conflict, its logic, and consequences in different ways.

Constructivist Interpretation

Constructivists said Russia and the West have different values and understanding of international relations and speak different languages – the language of power and the language of global integration – which in my view is too loose and does not fully fit the facts. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, commodity turnover between Russian and EU had increased by approximately 2,5 times and the European share in Russian foreign trade was 49 % in 2012 (Rosstat, 2012). If the values of the two states did not correspond at all, why have economic ties been strengthening and growing during the past two decades? If elites could not talk to each other why was ex-Chancellor Schröder appointed as a head of the North European Gas Pipeline Company which is controlled by Gazprom and the Russian government? I. Krastev points out that “Putin of 2014 is not the Putin of 2004 or even the Putin of 2008” and this is the only possible explanation which constructivists can offer (Krastev, 2014). Also, I suppose talking about “the West” as a whole is too general due to the tension within the West, even in Europe, the positions of Great Britain and French–German alliance are often opposing e.g. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. (see Garton Ash, Kegan). Interestingly, Europe and the United State have consolidated their positions during the Ukrainian crisis.

The Russian authorities employ the logic of geopolitics and protection of national interests which is pretty close to (neo)realism. In Tsarist Russia and in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was a frontier of Russia at the Western border and a Russian military base has been located in Ukraine e.g. in Crimea. Thus, Ukraine lies in the sphere of Russian strategic interests (national security) alongside with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and some other countries. Over the past decade, Russian had made an effort to boost cooperation in the neighborhood. Russia has initiated the process of post-soviet space integration under the umbrella of the Eurasian Economic Union. A significant step in this process was made in 2010 when Eurasian Economic Community Customs (EECC) Union including Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was established as a counterbalance to the European Economic Area. Ukraine was supposed to be an EECC member. The following year, a free trade zone within Commonwealth of Independent States including Ukraine was launched as well. Russia has sold gas to Ukraine, Belarus and some other CIS countries with discounts in order to strengthen its influence in the region. Russian foreign policy was aimed at making Russia the core of post-soviet

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space. Cultural and economic ties between Russia and Ukraine are quite strong. The intention of Russian authorities to bring former Soviet countries together was expressed clearly. In order to emphasize the closeness between countries Russian, political circles often used word ‘bratsky’ (nowadays this word is still in use alongside with another frame ‘Ukrainian fascists').

Meantime, Ukraine has an ambiguous identity which varies in different regions. On one hand, it has strong cultural and economic ties with Russia, common language, and religion. Ukraine with no doubt is an essential part of the ‘Russkiy mir’. On the other hand, Ukraine has the intention to be a part of the European (Western) family. Ukrainian authorities, including the overthrown president made an effort to join the EU and become a NATO member-state. Russian foreign policy aimed to push Ukraine in the ‘right direction'. A Pro-European choice was officially made when V. Yanukovich announced that Ukraine would sign an Association Agreement with the EU. ‘Maidan' (‘revolution of dignity') was a reaction by a large part of Ukrainian society to Yanukovich's step away from the pro-EU direction. Hence, Russian authorities saw threats to the political regime and action against Russia as inspired by the US. The “Oranjevaja ugroza” (orange threat) appeared in Russian political discourse in 2004 after the first Maidan to show the risks of protest actions that undermines sovereignty, brings chaos and anarchy to political life. Since then, this term has been used periodically by public officials including V.Putin. Officials called the European choice a betrayal and accused the EU and USA of supporting the rebels, and they also considered NATO as a potential threat to Russia as it was during was Cold War (Voennaya doktrina, 2014). After the Soviet Union collapse, Russian authorities made an effort to build a partnership with the West: Russia-NATO negotiations, free visa regime negotiations with the EU etc. Despite Putin's speech in Munich in 2007, Russia has been developing a policy of partnership with western countries during the last 20 years In 2005, the Russian Broadcasting Service ‘Russia Today' was founded for promotion of the Russian identity worldwide. In 2008 the Russian government established an analog to USAID, called ‘Rossotrudnichestvo'. In 2012, Government spent more than 50 million $ to create a positive image of Russia all around the World. But this effort was not as fruitful as they expected it to be (Myagkaya sila, 2014). The representatives of the European Union and the USA accused the Russian authorities of authoritarian censorship, and human rights violations. In the Ukrainian case, western analysts and governments also see the violation of international law. Russia has undermined the post-war “World Order”. I.Krastev summaries “[Putin] has refused to play by Western rules. He seems not to fear political isolation; he invites it” (Krastev, 2014).

According to constructivism, the conflict has deep roots and cannot be resolved in the near future. The only possible way out is to declare a distinction of values between Russia and the West, and not to set these values against each other.

Neorealist interpretation

Another way to look at the situation is a neorealist interpretation that emphasizes conflict of interests between EU and US from one side and Russia from the other. During the twenty years after the collapse of Soviet Empire, Russia ceased to be a driver in international relations. Domestic problems in the economy and social

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sphere were the issue at stake for the Russian authorities. Consequently, a clear and consistent strategy of foreign policy has not been developed. Although Russia is a member of the UN Security Council and, since 1997, member of G8, its role in the global arena was not as essential as it was in the past. In 2000-s together with economic growth and development, Russian authorities have exhibited the intention to be the other pole in the international relations system (superpower ambitions). Since then, external policy has aimed to show Russian international ambitions. Financial support of Ukraine and Belarus, invasion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia outlined the Russian sphere of interests. Russia nervously reacted to what was going on in neighboring countries, e.g. color revolutions (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan), and negotiations with NATO. The Russian authorities emphasize that US foreign policy – promotion of democratic values etc. – contradicts with the national interests of Russia. The key category is ‘symmetry’ in Russia-West relationships. Russian authorities always tried to make a symmetric response to the ‘western treat’.

At the same time, commodity turnover between US and Russia, as well as commodity turnover between EU and Russia, was constantly increasing. The extent of Russian integration in the world economy has grown as well. Neither EU nor the US recognizes the change in Russian external policy and maintained the status quo – unipolar system of international relations. Alisson and Simes emphasize, “Russia's establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community” (Alisson and Simes, 2015). Accordingly, the expansion of Russia was considered as an act of military aggression and caused sanctions in response. Western politicians emphasize that the annexation of Crimea undermines the World Order as it emerged after the Second World War. Neorealists such as Mearsheimer and others blame the inadequate system for the Ukrainian crises (Mearsheimer, 2014). The existing system does not take into account Russian interests as a superpower (even regional power). Consequently, the way out is reshaping of the international relations system. Essentially, there are many different and sometimes confronting voices and opinions within the EU. For instance, Poland and Baltic countries heavily criticize Russian foreign policy and support radical sanctions. D. Tusk, ex-Prime minister of Poland currently President of the European Council, is a vigorous critic of Russia. Meanwhile, France keeps rather a liberal position as does the head of European diplomacy, F. Mogherini. Also, there is a pro-Russian lobby – huge companies (Total, Siemens etc.). They have publicly expressed concerns about sanctions and negotiated them with Merkel and other officials. In the language of interests, sanctions bring losses to both sides and barely may be understood in a paradigm of neutralism. Thus, neorealist analysis has two focuses: threats and ambitions from one side, and economic interest from the other. In this view, the very conflict and its solution lie in the sphere of political (geopolitics) and economic interests and economic cooperation might be the mechanism to turn off the conflict.

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Conclusion

Neorealism and constructivism are two different ways to approach international relations and they provide specific sets of tools both to researchers (policy analysts) and policy makers. Neorealism pays more attention to national security issues and the balance of power in the system of international relations. According to this interpretation, every single state pursues their interests and competes with others. Meanwhile, constructivism sees external policy as a dependent variable affected by internal factors such as beliefs, attitudes, historic and social context, and, finally, elites' perception of foreign policy.

The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 – 2015 clearly shows the theoretical contradiction between constructivism and neorealism. That was the reason why I choose it for a case study.

According to the neorealist approach, the national interests of Russia were not taken into account or even neglected by western policymakers. This was the reason why Russia tried to rebalance the system of International Relations. Consequently, the only way to resolve the conflict is to renegotiate the system in order to satisfy both Russian and Western interests (to develop a new “world order”). On the flip side, constructivists say the conflict has its roots in fears, mistrust and values. The Russian elite suspected and blamed US and EU politicians for making the revolution in Ukraine, and attempts to undermine the political regime in Russia. In turn US and EU politicians accused the Russian government of lack of democracy. Thus, the conflict could not be resolved, though open dialogue which can bring the trust back in Russia-West relations may decrease its tension.

The paper shows the implication of using the two given approaches in policy analysis and policymaking. I would like to stress neither approach is better: neorealism and constructivism provide useful tools both for researchers and policymakers. A government may employ constructivist or neorealist logic, but public officials should understand (take into account) their counterpart's logic. This is the basic principle for peaceful coexistence. Conflicts become inevitable when policymakers use different logic, and do not have the intention to hear what other side wants and why it behaves this or that way.

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References

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