[nb!! early draft version, june 2017] andreas bøje...
TRANSCRIPT
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[NB!! early draft version, June 2017]
Andreas Bøje Forsby, Danish Institute for International Studies [[email protected]]
“Competing visions of `greatness´: Incompatible identity narratives as drivers of an
emerging Sino-American rivalry in the South China Sea”
Abstract
Against the backdrop of geopolitical tensions between the United States and China in the South
China Sea, this paper claims that we are witnessing the early stages of great power rivalry.
However, whereas most IR scholars turn to realist approaches to explain such rivalry, this paper
investigates a critical, but theoretically under-developed, driver of US-China rivalry, namely
identity dynamics from a social psychological perspective. Specifically, the paper examines two
prominent indicators of the emerging rivalry – the US Freedom of Navigation Operations and
China’s artificial islands construction project – demonstrating how these strategic practices in
the South China Sea are primarily motivated by the dominant narratives of state identity in each
country. Importantly, these narratives, describing the way each country envisions its own
positive distinctiveness or “greatness”, are seen as incompatible in key respects, thus shaping the
co-existence of China and the United States, notably in the South China Sea. That is, the
universalistic American narrative about being “leader of the free world” is increasingly at odds
with the particularistic Chinese narrative about “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.
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Introduction
No bilateral relationship is more critical to international order than that between China and
the United States. By far the two largest economies in the world as well as its two biggest
military spenders, China and the United States seem to be in a league of their own on the
international stage. But rather than forming an axis of stability in the shape of a G2 that jointly
manages international order, Beijing and Washington have in recent years often found
themselves at loggerheads over bilateral trade, human rights issues or the South China Sea.
Indeed, although official US-China relations occasionally may appear warm and friendly, as
witnessed for instance during the first summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in Mar-
a-Lago, the two countries generally seem to view each other as rivals rather than partners.
Not only do ideological differences – even with Donald Trump at the helm– run deep between
the illiberal, authoritarian People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the self-proclaimed standard
bearer of liberal democracy, but China is also the only great power capable of challenging US
geopolitical dominance in the Asia-Pacific region anytime soon. Such observations have
inspired a burgeoning literature on the emerging – some would say unfolding – great power
contest between Beijing and Washington.1
While the scope and intensity of this great power contest remains highly debated among IR
scholars and policy analysts, there is little disagreement that over the past decade the South
China Sea has been the primary arena for conflict between Beijing and Washington.2 On the
surface of it, recurring tensions in the South China Sea concern a set of unresolved territorial
and maritime disputes between the PRC and several of its Southeast Asian neighbor states. On
closer inspection, however, these disputes at the same time serve as the backdrop for an
emerging great power rivalry between China and the United States. Officially, Washington
takes no position on the territorial disputes in the contested waters, but the United States has
nevertheless shored up its strategic presence in the area to stem the tide of what most
observers view as growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.3 In short, this
assertiveness involves a rapid expansion of the power projection capacity of the Chinese navy
and coast guard forces, the construction and semi-militarization of several artificial islands in
the Spratly archipelago and not least Beijing’s willingness to pursue its expansive maritime
and territorial claims in a confrontational manner against rival claimant states.4 To counter
this, the Obama administration – as part of its “Rebalance to Asia” – ramped up US naval
presence in the area and promoted “a network of like-minded partner states that sustains and
1 See e.g. Ross (1999; 2009); Friedberg (2000; 2011); Christensen (2001; 2015); Goldstein (2005); Layne (2009); Yan (2010); Kissinger (2012); Steinberg and O’Hanlon (2015); Zhao (2015). 2 Tellingly, even critics of the otherwise widespread notion that China has become more assertive admit the South China Sea has witnessed a more assertive approach from Beijing (Johnston, 2013: 19; Jerdén, 2014: 69-74). 3 For an introduction to US official strategy in the South China Sea, see Pentagon (2015). 4 Forsby (2016: Chapter 3).
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strengthens a rules-based regional order”.5 China, on the other hand, has repeatedly railed
against what it sees as US militarization of the South China Sea and a larger scheme to contain
the rise of China.6
That the South China Sea has become the primary arena for geopolitical competition between
China and the United States reflects its strategic importance to both countries. Beijing claims
to have historic rights to most of the South China Sea, unabashedly ignoring a ruling to the
contrary in July 2016 by the International Court of Arbitration in the Hague.7 Moreover, PRC
government representatives have, in private talks with their U.S. counterparts, conveyed the
message that they view the South China Sea as a “core interest”, thereby potentially elevating
it to the same status as Taiwan and Tibet, which are regarded as non-negotiable issues
concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC.8 In the face of US opposition,
however, Beijing has so far shied away from announcing it publicly. On their side, US officials
have on numerous occasions pointed to the South China Sea as a critical waterway in terms of
freedom of navigation.9 Hence, Pentagon has conducted a number of Freedom of Navigation
Operations (FONOS) in the South China Sea, which have targeted what the US considers to be
excessive Chinese maritime claims, notably in the vicinity of China’s newly constructed
artificial islands.10 Having received extensive media coverage and drawn stern reactions from
Beijing, these FONOS seem to offer concrete manifestation of a great power rivalry in the
making.
This paper delves into the US-China rivalry in the South China Sea in order to identify its main
underlying drivers. Since the rivalry clearly manifests itself in a geopolitical fashion, most IR
scholars would readily assume that we should turn to realist-inspired IR perspectives in order
to account for the rivalry. When maritime claims clash in a resource-rich strategic waterway,
miniscule reefs are being turned into sizable strongholds replete with military hardware and
both sides build up their naval power projection capacity in the area, surely this will take us
squarely into the realm of power and security dynamics, traditionally the preserve of realism.
Yet, I will contend that power and security dynamics are not the only, perhaps not even the
most important, driver of geopolitical competition between Beijing and Washington in the
South China Sea. While standard realist accounts of power and security dynamics do provide
an overall theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of great power rivalry,
realism seems less useful in explaining the two most prominent and controversial aspects of
the observed geopolitical behavior in the South China Sea, namely China’s construction of
artificial islands and the US Freedom of Navigation Operations. To put it bluntly, central
5 For an official overview of the US Rebalance from the White House, see TWH (2015). 6 See e.g. Xinhua (2016). 7 For an official view from the Chinese foreign ministry, see MFAPRC (2016). 8 See e.g. Wong (2010); Reuters (2015). 9 Carter (2012); Pentagon (2015); Mattis (2017). 10 Etzioni (2016), Rapp-Hooper and Edel (2017).
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aspects of Chinese assertiveness and US countermeasures do not primarily reflect a search for
maritime security or a struggle for strategic control over the South China Sea.
Instead, this paper finds identity-generated dynamics to constitute a key motivational driver
not merely of the observed geopolitical competition in the South China Sea, but also more
broadly of the emerging great power rivalry between China and the United States. I argue that
basic identity dynamics, stemming from the cognitive need of all social groups for positive
distinctiveness, play a pivotal role in generating this rivalry, as the two countries define their
great power roles in terms of seemingly incompatible narratives of greatness. With regard to
the South China Sea, my argument is that Chinese assertiveness – the artificial islands being a
case in point – is deeply shaped by a narrative about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation, promising to restore China to its historic great power position and to regain control
over lost rights and territories, notably in the South China Sea. On the other hand, US efforts to
step up its strategic presence in the South China Sea have been centered on a narrative about
the indispensable role of the US as a liberal hegemon and standard bearer of a rules-based
maritime order, as encapsulated in the Freedom of Navigation Operations. Using a range of
mostly official sources to identify the motivation behind China’s assertiveness and US
countermeasures in the South China Sea, it is demonstrated how conceptions of great power
identity constitute a powerful motivational driver on either side of the emerging great power
rivalry.
Following this introduction, the paper consists of three main sections and a conclusion. In the
first section, I single out two distinct types of explanatory logics that seem most likely to be
the key drivers of a great power rivalry between China and the United States. One of these
drivers is described here as the logic of power (and security), which is informed by the realist
school of IR. The other driver, which I will refer to as the logic of identity, takes its point of
departure in social psychological theories of identity constitution, adapted to a state-centric
IR constructivist framework. Against this theoretical backdrop, it is argued that a great power
rivalry between China and the United States can be generated and sustained by both the logic
of power and identity. In the second section, the paper zooms in on the South China Sea,
examining those patterns of geopolitical behavior that are reflective of an emerging rivalry
between Beijing and Washington. Although they are often attributed to underlying power and
security dynamics, I contend that realism cannot adequately account for the observed
geopolitical patterns, especially in relation to China’s artificial islands construction and the US
FONOS. Accordingly, the third section takes a closer look at how the logic of identity seems to
shape not only Beijing’s assertiveness, but also Washington’s strategic countermeasures,
focusing specifically on China’s artificial islands construction and the US FONOS. The main
part of the section concentrates on US-China relations during the second term of the Obama
administration, since this is when the logic of identity has come to the fore. The last part
extends the analysis to the Trump administration in order to ask if the Trump presidency has
changed the way the logic of identity shapes the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
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Being the primary arena of geopolitical competition between Beijing and Washington, the
South China Sea can be seen as a critical case in assessing the relative explanatory power of
power and security dynamics as set against identity-related dynamics. If the latter approach is
corroborated by the present case study, it has wider implications, drawn out in the
conclusion, for the longstanding IR debate between scholars with realist and constructivist
leanings. Moreover, if conceptions of identity are part and parcel of the their geopolitical
positioning in the South China Sea, the overall rivalry between a rising China and a still
dominant United States is likely to be either fueled or mitigated to the extent that Chinese and
US leaders frame their bilateral relationship in terms of (in)compatible identity conceptions.
The potential policy implications of this insight are suggested in the conclusion.
Explaining the emerging great power rivalry between China and the United States
Are China and the United States bound to be great power rivals in the 21st century? This has
become one of the key questions of the IR discipline, triggering extensive debate already back
in the 1990s, as the wider implications of China’s impressive rise started to manifest
themselves. While optimists, either playing down the risks of great power conflict in a
globalized world of interdependent economies or envisioning the socialization of the PRC into
the Liberal Order, long seemed to have the upper hand in the debate, pessimists became
increasingly vocal in the wake of the global financial crisis, which turned out to further
accelerate the narrowing GDP gap between China and the United States.11 In the current
decade, the combination of growing Chinese assertiveness and the US Rebalance to Asia has
played into the hands of a growing choir of IR scholars and policy analysts who see recent
development trends as part of an emerging (or already unfolding) great power rivalry
between Beijing and Washington. Most of these pundits ground their analysis in a set of more
or less explicitly articulated realist premises centered on power and security dynamics. Yet, I
will argue that we may reach the same conclusion about an emerging great power rivalry
from a very different theoretical point of departure.
This section identifies two distinct explanatory IR logics that may account for the emergence
of great power rivalry between China and the United States: a realist logic of power and a
constructivist-oriented logic of identity. The first part of the section draws on a range of
standard realist arguments to derive the logic power, whereas the second part outlines a new
logic of identity in international relations predicated on Social Identity Theory.
How the logic of power can be a driver of great power rivalry
11 For a useful and still relevant overview of the basic arguments of realist pessimists and optimists, see Friedberg (2005: 17-29). For an updated version of the debate, see Christensen (2015: 1-8).
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Realist scholars tend to be pessimistic about the consequences of China’s rise in the sense that
they see China as a potential challenger to the United States, the dominant power in the
international system.12 In theoretical terms, the pessimism of realist scholars follows from an
understanding of international relations as fundamentally shaped by the anarchical structure
of the international states system, which breeds insecurity and competition, forces states to
rely on self-help behavior and prevents them from transcending power politics and recurring
cycles of great power rivalry.13 As realists like to point out, history is replete with tragic
examples of rivalry and war between rising and falling great powers, and the current systemic
power shift is bound to have some of the same disruptive effects on the existing international
order.14 The relative distribution of power among states thus becomes a key variable in realist
theory, shaping overall relations between great powers and determining the intensity of
security competition in the system.
It is against this backdrop that I will refer to a realist “logic of power” as a basic driver of great
power rivalry in the international system. While framing a realist logic in terms of power, but
not security, dynamics could seem like an overly narrow conceptualization – partially
reflective of a long-standing intra-realist dividing line between offensive and defensive
realists – I will contend that it makes sense to emphasize the power dimension in this context
for. First of all, security concerns do not really seem to be the primary motivational driver of
the geopolitical competition we have witnessed between China and the United States, if by
insecurity we mean a sense of existential urgency and profound uncertainty about the
survival of either country, prompting them to resort to extraordinary measures.15 Even during
the Obama administration’s “Rebalance to Asia” overall balancing dynamics between China
and the United States have been rather indirect and moderate, thus far from resembling the
type of acute security dilemmas that have shaped great power relations in the past.16 In fact,
with the partial exception of US deployment of the THAAD missile defense system to South
Korea (which allegedly erodes China’s nuclear deterrent17), the observed patterns of
militarization and geopolitical behavior do not directly threaten the overall security of Beijing
and certainly not Washington. For these reasons, I will argue here that if we are to employ
realism to account for the emerging great power rivalry between China and the United States,
such a realist approach should be framed primarily as a logic of power.
Turning more specifically to the emerging great power rivalry between Beijing and
Washington, realist scholars have long predicted that the rise of China would bring it on a
12 For an example of a realist optimist, see Glaser (2011). 13 See especially Waltz (1979); see also Mearsheimer (2001). Realists are themselves divided into several camps; for an introduction, see e.g. Brown et al. (1995); Elman & Jensen (2014). 14 On US-China relations as viewed from the prism of realist power transition theory, see Beeson (2009); Allison (2017). 15 Such a reading of what security dynamics are really about draws on securitization theory (Buzan et al., 1998). 16 See e.g. Ikenberry (2014); Jones (2014: Chapter 7). 17 Panda (2017a).
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course of collision with the United States.18 Most prominently, John Mearsheimer has
famously claimed that “China cannot rise peacefully” […] I believe that that China will try to
dominate the Asia-Pacific region much as the United States dominates the Western
hemisphere.”19 As China’s economic, political and military clout grows, Beijing will seek to
expand its zone of influence in the region and to pursue its interests more forcefully. Or in the
words of Wang Jisi, one of China’s leading IR scholars with realist leanings, “Based on the
country’s enhanced position, China’s international behavior has become increasingly
assertive.”20 Drawing on a number of key realist assumptions, Aaron Friedberg in his book A
Contest for Supremacy observes in a similar vein that “Like other rising great powers, it [i.e.
China] will ultimately seek to alter the existing institutional architecture in ways that are more
conducive to its interests.”21In short, growing Chinese power enables Beijing to assume a
larger role in Asia and to pursue its interest more assertively, thereby paving the ground for
an emerging rivalry with the United States.
On its side, the United States perceives the rise of China as a threat to its dominant position in
the region, according to realists. Once again John Mearsheimer has phrased this view in rather
stark terms: “[T]he United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and
ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer a threat to rule the roost in Asia”.22 This is
presumably the kind of reasoning that has guided the Obama administration’s efforts to shore
up its already extensive network of partners and allies in Asia in order to check and contain
China’s rising power. Another realist scholar, Ashley Tellis, has stated that “US interests are
deeply threatened by the prospect that China might integrate the Indo-Pacific periphery through
a network of trading relations that could become the foundation for an impermeable sphere of
influence centered on Chinese economic, geopolitical and cultural primacy in Asia.”23 Hence,
Tellis envisions that the two countries will be locked down in “an open-ended struggle for
strategic dominance in Asia [where] the competition for military advantage is embedded in an
equally significant rivalry over geopolitical positioning”.24 Along the same lines, Yan Xuetong,
probably the single most prominent Chinese realist scholar has argued that “The United States
aims to maintain its global dominance, and China to resume its world leading position. This
structural conflict makes political competition between them inevitable.”
In sum, realist scholars certainly expect China and the United States to engage in great power
rivalry, grounding their predictions in various versions of what I have termed a realist logic of
power.
18 See Friedberg (1993); Layne (1993; 2009); Waltz (1993). 19 Mearsheimer (2010: 382). 20 Wang (2011: 68). 21 Friedberg (2011: 54; see also 37-38). 22 Mearsheimer (2010: 390). 23 Tellis (2012: 91). 24 Ibid.: 89.
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How the logic of identity can be a driver of great power rivalry
The study of social identity dynamics in IR has been spearheaded by mainstream
constructivists, who have drawn on various bodies of mostly sociological and social
psychological literatures.25 Although these literatures conceptualize and theorize social
identity in different ways, they tend to coalesce around some shared propositions about the
basic drivers of social identity constitution: The need for social identification (the collective
`self´, `us´, the `in-group´) and the need for social differentiation (the collective `other´, `them´,
the `out-group´). In this subsection, I employ Social Identity Theory (SIT), a cognitive variant
of social psychology, to briefly outline a logic of social identity dynamics that can explain the
emerging rivalry between China and the United States.26
Originally developed in the late 1970s by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, SIT aimed to
demonstrate that the mobilization of in-group favoritism – if not inter-group conflict in itself –
can be accounted for merely in terms of cognitive biases inherent in all human beings.27 On
the basis of experimental tests, SIT claims that social groups, even groups constructed at
random, invariably engage in social identity dynamics with each other by means of social
categorization, identification and comparisons, thereby creating in-group loyalties and out-
group demarcations. This cognitive predisposition to differentiate between social in-groups
and out-groups constitutes an important motivational driver of social behavior, which helps
human collectivities to order and manage their social world.28 Drawing on these SIT-based
insights, one may identify two fundamental identity needs of all social groups: the need for
social distinctiveness and the need for positive self-esteem.29 While it can be useful to
distinguish between these two social psychological needs in some explanatory contexts, it is
more convenient here to merge them into an “aggregate”, which I will refer to as the need for
positive distinctiveness.30
The incorporation of insights from SIT into IR opens up several avenues for hypothesizing
about the motivational drivers of state behavior. Some of these avenues have already been
explored by IR scholars, as the IR discipline has witnessed a growing interest in SIT as part of
a broader turn towards psychological theories.31 The widespread use of SIT by IR scholars
suggests an unproblematic translation of SIT’s theoretical universe of intra-state social groups
25 See e.g. Wendt (1992); Adler and Barnett (1998); Cronin (1999); Hopf (2002); Hymans (2006); Rousseau (2006); Steele (2008). 26 For a thorough introduction to the logic of social identity, see Forsby (2016). 27 See especially Tajfel (1978); Tajfel & Turner (1979); see also Brewer (1979); Hogg and Abrams (1988). SIT also focuses on non-cognitive psychological (e.g. emotional) dimensions of social identification, but here I concentrate on the cognitive aspect. 28 For some useful introductions to SIT, see Hogg (2004); Hornsey (2008); McDermott (2009); from an IR perspective, see also Larson (2012). 29 Forsby (2016: Chapter 3). 30 Other IR scholars have similarly toned down the distinction between these two SIT-derived psychological needs (see e.g. Larson and Shevchenko, 2010). 31 See e.g. Mercer (1995); Kowert (1998); Cronin (1999); Hymans (2002); Gries (2005); Mercer (2005); Flockhart (2006); Hymans (2006); Greenhill (2008); Lebow (2008); Curley (2009); Wohlforth (2009); Larson (2012).
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to the state-centric realm of international relations. In fact, the incorporation of SIT into IR
does come with some strings attached, but these are largely negligible as long as one employs
SIT in the minimalist version outlined above.32 It is against the theoretical backdrop of SIT
that I will set out the key assumptions of an IR logic of social identity that may help explain
great power rivalry. Firstly, like other social groups the state may be perceived as a social in-
group constituted in relation to other state-based out-groups; secondly, as a social group the
state strives to satisfy its basic need for positive distinctiveness in relation to salient out-
group states; thirdly, in addressing its basic identity needs, the state (i.e. its government
representatives) articulates an official narrative about how the in-group stands in relation to
salient out-group states; fourthly, the dominant identity narrative of the state, describing how
it stands out internationally in a positive sense, plays a critical role in shaping its foreign
relations to salient out-group states. Fifthly, such identity-generated sources of self-perceived
“greatness” are pivotal to the grand strategies of great powers.
If we turn to US-China relations, it almost goes without saying that both countries view each
other as a salient out-group states, being the two most powerful states in the system.
Moreover, both Beijing and Washington strive to satisfy their identity-generated need for
positive distinctiveness by delineating, in a narrative form, the nature of their respective
international greatness. Now, the central question is to what extent these narratives of
greatness are seen as mutually incompatible in a way that leads the two countries to engage in
great power rivalry. I will argue here that central components of the dominant official
narratives of both Chinese and US national identity jar against each other, being a constant
and profound source of conflicting strategic interests and thus an emerging great power
rivalry between Beijing and Washington. To be sure, official statements from US or Chinese
government representatives on bilateral relations tend to downplay these differences of
identity in favor of proclamations along the lines that “the United States welcomes the rise of a
China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous and a responsible player in global affairs”, and “we
want to deepen mutual understanding with the United States on each other’s strategic
orientation and development path.”33
However, if we take a look at how both China and the United States phrase their great power
narratives in terms of the need for positive distinctiveness, the relative incompatibility of
their respective identity conceptions soon becomes clear. In both countries, the dominant
narrative strands of identity revolve around deep-seated notions of exceptionalism, which are
critical to articulating their respective positive distinctiveness as great powers.34 Yet, whereas
the exceptionalist strand of Chinese identity is largely confined to a set of Sino-centric
conceptions, US exceptionalism dovetails with an equally powerful narrative strand of
universalism that embraces all of mankind. More specifically, in the present decade the
dominant narrative of Chinese identity has drawn on the unique characteristics of China’s
historical development, creating a powerful discursive linkage between China’s glorious past
32 On the main differences between the theoretical settings of SIT and IR, see e.g. Wohlforth (2009: 36-38); Forsby (2016: 85-88). 33 See respectively TWH (2015c) and xi (2016). 34 See Feng (2013).
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as “the Middle Kingdom”, its recent humiliations at the hands of Western imperialists and its
present national rejuvenation whereby China reasserts its great power status in the face of
salient out-group states like the United States. US national identity, on the other hand, has
been – at least until the Trump presidency – framed primarily by a narrative of the United
States of America as the historical bedrock and present standard bearer of a set of universal
liberal-democratic values and principles, urging the US to stand up to despotism and illiberal
practices as the leader of the free world.
Based upon the proposed logic of social identity, I argue that the basic need for positive
distinctiveness constitutes an important motivational driver of relations between China and
the United States, setting the scene for an emerging great power rivalry. Insofar as the key
narratives of Chinese and US national identity, describing the way each country envisions its
own greatness, are seen as incompatible in key respects, it will affect the overall co-existence
of the two countries on the international stage. It raises the question to what extent Chinese
and US narratives of greatness are construed as mutually incompatible. This takes us to the
South China Sea as a maritime arena for US-China relations, since the identity-generated
narrative guidance of conflicting strategic interests is most clearly demonstrated here.
The limits to the logic of power in the South China Sea
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Literature
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