big business for small farmers? the sustainable...
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BigBusinessforSmallFarmers?
TheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsandCross-SectorPartnershipsinAsianAgriculture
AnnFloriniandMarkusPauli
Abstract
Partnershipsbetweengovernments,civilsocietyandtheprivatesectorareexpectedtoplaya
key role in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Those ambitious goals,
adoptedbythe leadersofnearlyallcountriesattheUnitedNations in2015,aimtoeliminate
extremepovertyandhunger,whilemakingmajorprogresstowardenvironmentalsustainability
andbroaderhumanwell-being.Theworld’s500millionsmallholderfarmersandtheirfamilies
areakeySDGtargetgroup,astheyconstitutethevastmajorityofpeoplelivinginpovertyand
astheenvironmentalSDGsrequiresignificantchangesinagriculturalpractices.Thismakesthe
recent emergence of a plethora of “market-driven” and ostensibly pro-development cross-
sector partnerships involving major agri-businesses a phenomenon worthy of attention by
development scholars. Such collaborations, which aim to incorporate smallholders into
agribusinessvaluechains,garnerhighpraiseinsomequartersaskeytoprogressonsmallholder
wellbeingandfoodsecurity,butcriticsattackthemasdisguisedexploitationofthepoorinthe
interestsofprofit.Thispaperexaminestheconditionsofinterestalignment,institutionalization,
and process management under which market-driven cross-sector collaborations could
contributetotheachievementoftheSDGs,drawingonseveralcasesinAsia.Thisfocusallows
for theory-building and empirical investigation at the nexus of three arenas of inquiry:
governance,corporatesocialresponsibility(CSR),anddevelopment.Thearticlefindsthatwhile
variations in national political economy and partnership design matter to the likelihood of
contributing to SDG implementation, the relative power of actors within the partnership
mattersmore.
Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals, Agriculture, Smallholder Farmers, Agri-business,
Governance,ValueChains,PPPs,Cross-sectorPartnerships,Vietnam,Indonesia,Asia
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Introduction
ThankstotheUnitedNations´(UN)SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),theworldnowhasa
sharedglobalframeworkofobjectivesthatareintendedtobuildaworldofgreaterwell-being
and resilience. The UN´s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development defines 17 SDGs and
concretizesthemin169targets,tobeachievedbytheyear2030.Theprogresstowardsthemis
measuredthrough304indicators.Forexample,SDG2,“Endhunger,achievefoodsecurityand
improvednutritionandpromotesustainableagriculture”containseightconcretetargets,such
asdoublingtheagriculturalproductivityandincomesofsmall-scalefarmers,and14indicators.
These measurements focus on outputs, such as total flows into agriculture (2.A.2.) and
agricultural export subsidies (2.B.2) as well as outcomes, such as prevalence of
undernourishment (2.1.1.), average income of small-scale farmers (by sex and indigenous
status)(2.3.2)andproportionofagriculturalareaunderproductiveandsustainableagriculture
(2.4.1.).
TheSDGsalsoprovideasharedglobalvisionofhowtheSDGsaretobeachieved.Goal17ofthe
SDGsisastatementofmeans,ratherthanends,focusedon“partnerships”acrosscountriesand
acrossbusiness,government,andcivilsociety.Thecallforsuchmulti-stakeholderpartnerships
growsoutofan increasinglywidespreadviewthatgovernmentsalonecannotmeet thegreat
challengesoftheday,andthatnon-stateactorsmustparticipatewithgovernmentsinaformof
collaborativegovernance(Zadek,2004;Glasbergen,Biermann,&Mol,2007).Thousandsofsuch
partnerships exist, addressing everything from health to energy to security (Selsky & Parker,
2005;Johnston&Finegood,2015;Forsyth,2007;Pinkse&Kolk,2012).Butunderstandingofthe
conditionsunderwhichcross-sectorcollaborationcan,orshould,complementorsubstitutefor
government-drivendevelopmentisstillinearlystages.
Anarrayofsuchcross-sectorcollaborationsisnowunfoldinginSoutheastAsia.Theregionisof
particular interest for a study of the effects of cross-sector collaborations in smallholder
agriculture. It is home to some 100 million of the world’s 500 million smallholder farm
households.ThesehouseholdsarekeytargetsfortheSDGs,assmallholdersrepresentmostof
theworld’s poorest and hungriest. The region is also of considerable interest to global agri-
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businesses,whichseedevelopingAsia(includingSoutheastAsia)asbothakeysourceofinputs
fortheirvaluechainsandasatopmarketforthefuturegivengrowingpopulationsandwealth
in the region. Manyof thecollaborationsare “market-driven”: i.e., theyaim to leverage for-
profitbusinessmodels toachievebothbusinessanddevelopmental goals. It is thesemarket-
drivenpartnershipsthatarethefocusofthisstudy.
Market-drivenagriculturalpartnershipsmayhavegeneralgoalssuchasimprovingnationalfood
securityand/orsmallholderwell-being,orspecificgoalssuchasraisingfarmer incomeby20%
by 2020.Whether the partnership goals are general or specific, they generally fitwell in the
categoryofcross-sectorcollaborationsexpectedtocontributetoachievementofrelevantSDGs,
andthus it is reasonabletoassessthemintermsofwhetherandunderwhatconditionssuch
cross-sectorpartnershipsdomakesuchcontributions.
Allthecollaborationsassessedinthisarticleshareakeycommonality:theirstatedaimistouse
marketmechanisms toachieve social andenvironmental goals that stateshaveaccepted (via
theSDGsorothermechanisms)butthatgovernmentsarenotachievingalone.Moreover,they
oftenoperateinremote,decentralizedarenaswherestatecapacityandauthorityisparticularly
challenged.Inotherwords,thecollaborationsoperateunderconditionsoflimitedstatehood–
wherestatecapacitytocontrolviolence,providepublicgoods,and/ordefine, implement,and
enforcerulesmaybelimitedterritorially,demographically,orincertainissueareas(Risse2011).
Thesecross-sectorcollaborationsalsorespondtoachangingagendaforbusiness.Startinginthe
1980s and gathering speed in recent years, the private sector – particularlywesternMNCs –
havefacedgrowingpressurestointernalizetheirenvironmentalandsocialexternalitiesevenin
the absence of governmental regulation, report publicly on the remaining externalities, and
sometimeprovidepublicgoodsthatgovernmentshavefailedtoprovide.Inotherwords,social
expectationsarerisingforbusinesstocarryout“state”functions.Asbusinessesgenerallylack
the capacity and incentive to do all this on their own, partnerships with civil society and
governmenthaveemergedasawayoffacilitatingsuchaction.
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In short, these collaborations may constitute not just a short-term bridge along the way to
developmentofconsolidatedstatecapacity,butadifferentmodeofgovernancethatneedsto
beassessedforitsabilitytoprovidethefunctionalequivalentof“stateness”inspecificarenas.
That raisesprofoundtheoreticalandpolicyquestionsacrossnumerousdisciplines.Supporters
of the cross-sector partnership approach claim that market-driven collaborations are an
effectivemeansofachievingsocialgoals.Criticsarguethatthepartnershipsaredominatedby
business concernswith profit, constituting exploitation in a new guise. Can, should, andwill
market-drivencross-sectorcollaborationsprovidethefunctionalequivalentofsuchstateroles
as serviceprovision, rule-making, implementation, enforcement, or knowledge transfer? Can
partnershipsbedesignedtoaddress issuesofpowerdistributionamongthecollaboratorsand
otherstakeholders?
Thispaperexplorestheimplicationsofseveraleffortsatcross-sectorcollaborationinagriculture
inSoutheastAsia,assessingwhethercollaborationsarelikelytoprovideameaningfuldegreeof
public goods and improve human well-being and environmental sustainability – functions
normally left to the state. As in other regions, agriculture in Southeast Asia is increasingly
aggregated intoglobalvaluechains thatstretch ‘fromfarmto fork’,creatingpressures to link
smallholder producers into integrated networks. But the fragmented and low-productivity
natureofsmallholderproduction,alongwiththeabsenceofcrucialelementsinthevaluechain,
createsdifficultiesinestablishingsystemsthatbenefitbothsmallholdersandthosewhowantto
buy what the smallholders produce. At the same time, growing environmental pressures
constrain previous resource-intensive practices to improve agricultural productivity, meaning
that agriculture production practices must change dramatically. The FAO estimates that
“feeding a world population of 9.1 billion people in 2050 would require raising overall food
production by some 70 percent between 2005/07 and 2050. Production in the developing
countrieswouldneed toalmostdouble”with some90percentof the increase to come from
higheryields, given thatmostarable land in theworld isalready inuse (FAO2009).Yet such
productivity increase cannot continue the usual path of large greenhouse gas emissions and
fertilizer use (FAO 2016), both of which are pushing the world far beyond the planetary
boundaries for a safely sustainable future (Steffen et al., 2015). Many of the various
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experiments inmarket-driven collaboration involving smallholders in Southeast Asia claim to
address simultaneously address productivity, environment, andpoverty concerns, providing a
usefulwayofexploringwhetherandunderwhatconditionssuchpartnershipscanbeexpected
tocontributetotheachievementoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals.
TheSDGs,SmallholderAgriculture,andPartnership
Therearesome500millionsmallholderfamilyfarmsworldwide,producingaround80percent
ofthefoodsupplyindevelopingcountriesandcultivatingabout80percentoffarmlandinAsia
andAfrica(Gibbon2012).Asmall-holderfarmisdefinedascultivating lessthan10(Kharaset
al.,2015).Themajorityoffarmsworldwideareactuallylessthan1hectare(72%),another12%
arebetween1and2hectares.However,all farmsbelow2hectares togetheroperatemerely
12%ofthefarmlandworldwide(Lowderetal.2016,page23,26).Globally98%ofallfarmsare
familyfarmsandtheyoperate53%ofagriculturalland(Graeubetal.2016).
Major improvements in smallholder agriculture are necessary to achieve many of the
SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).TheSDGsincludetwosweepinggoalsthatarecoming
todefinetheagenda:theeliminationofextremepoverty(SDG1),andtheeliminationofhunger
(SDG2).Thesegoalscannotbeachievedwithoutattentiontosmallholders,whoaregenerally
thepoorestandhungriest,aswellasproducersoffood(Kharasetal.2015).Around2.5billion
people in poor countries depend for their livelihoods directly on the food and agricultural
sector;1.5billionofthemliveinsmallholderhouseholds(FAO2012).Manyofthesesmallholder
households live in extreme poverty: FAO (ibid.) finds that “the highest incidence of workers
livingwiththeirfamiliesbelowthepovertylineisassociatedwithemploymentinagriculture.”
Around 925million peoplewere under-nourished in 2010; 75%of them live in rural areas in
developing countries, depending directly or indirectly on agriculture (Gibbon 2012). Because
manysmallholders,particularlypoorersmallholders,arewomen,theGenderEqualitygoal(SDG
5) is highly relevant.1 And given the water and energy intensity and the climate impacts of
1Women constitute 43 percent of the agricultural labor force in developing countries. The Food andAgriculture Organization (FAO) assets that women in agriculture are “especially disadvantaged, with
fewerendowmentsandentitlementsthanmen,evenmore limitedaccessto informationandservices,
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agriculture, other SDGs with essential links to smallholder farming include CleanWater and
Sanitation(SDG6),AffordableandCleanEnergy(SDG7),andClimateAction(SDG13).Looking
attheconcretetargetsoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoals itbecomesevenmoreapparent
how many of them are directly linked to smallholder farming. (See Table 2 Targets of the
SustainableDevelopmentGoalsLinkedtoSmallholderFarming,intheAppendix.)
Developmentspecialistshavelongrecognizedtheimportanceoftargetingsmallholderfarming
toreducepoverty.Lipton(2005,pageviii)arguesthatsince1700masspovertyreductionalways
started with “sharp rises in employment and self-employment income due to higher
productivity in small family farms”. This initial poverty reduction normally leads to “further
povertyreductionviacash-cropping,ruralnon-farmwork,andshiftstourbanemploymentand
incomegrowth”(ibid.).
Ofcourse,muchoftheimprovementinruralwell-beingmayresultfrompeoplemovingoffthe
farm,withacrucialdeterminantforhouseholdincomeintheruralSouthbeingaccesstoyear-
round work via salaried jobs or self-employment (Desai at al 2010, 11). In the rural South
livelihoodstendtobecome increasinglydelinkedfromagricultureas theprofitabilityofsmall-
holderfarmingdeclines(duetoenvironmentaldegradation,landshortages,andotherfactors)
and as new non-farm opportunities emerge with social and cultural changes like education,
mobilityandmedia-ledconsumerism(Rigg2006188f).
Education and job-creation, not least through industrialization, may indeed be key to
overcoming poverty in the long run (Roodman 2012). However, the hundreds of millions of
peoplestilldependentonagriculturefor–atleastpartoftheir–livelihoodintheruralSouth,
including Southeast Asia, means that making smallholder farming more productive and
profitable,whiledecreasingthenegativeenvironmentalimpact,willremainanurgentnecessity
at least during the SDG timeframe – out to 2030. And as Birner and Resnick (2010, p. 1442)
gender-determined household responsibilities, and increasingly heavy agriculturalworkloads owing to
maleout-migration.”(FAO2016,xii)
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pointout, “implementingpolicies tosupport theeconomicdevelopmentof small farmershas
proventobeaparticularlysuccessfulstrategytoreduceruralpoverty”.
Buthowtochangesmallholderfarming?Manyhavepointedtotheimportanceoflandreforms
inreducingmasspoverty,but,asLipton(2005)notes,landreformispoliticallychallenging.He
referstoVietnamastheonlyexampleinSoutheastAsiaof“egalitarianprivatizationofstateand
collective land” (Lipton 2005). As Lipton’s subtitle, “The Role of Crop Science in Alleviating
Poverty,”suggests,progresscanstillbemadeviaafocusontechnologicalimprovements,higher
yielding crops and farmers´ training to achieve higher productivity and incomes for
smallholders.This insight isalsoreflected intheBillandMelindaGates initiatedAlliancefora
GreenRevolutioninAfrica(AGRA),foundedin2006.2
Butwhobearsresponsibilityforbringingaboutthesechanges?TheWorldBankandothersare
advocating “market-smart” approaches to foster the emergence of a broader private sector
(World Bank 2008). Interestingly, theWorld Bankmeans input subsidies when it talks about
“market-smart” interventions. The rational is to underwrite risks for those early adopters of
new(ornotyetlocallyestablished)technologies,ultimatelytoachieveeconomiesofscaleand
toreduce inputsprices. (ibid.,13,152).Theadvocacyof this“market-smart”approachbythe
World Bank puts the government and (international) donor agencies in charge of fostering
infantindustries.ThisapproachshowsthattheWorldBankin2008doesnotfollowreligiously
the 1989Washington Consensus call for switching public expenditure away from non-merit
subsidiestobasichealthcare,educationandinfrastructure.3
2 See: Gates Foundation, www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Resources/Grantee-
Profiles/Grantee-Profile-Alliance-for-a-Green-Revolution-in-Africa-AGRA3 The Washington Consensus is a term coined by JohnWilliamson in 1989. It describes ten reforms
replacingeconomicpolicies,whichdominatedLatinAmericasincethe1950s.Williamsonperceivedthem
asaconsensusatthetimeintheOECDcountries.Theyinclude:(1)FiscalDiscipline,(2)ReorderingPublic
ExpenditurePriorities, (3)TaxReform, (4)Liberalizing InterestRates, (5)ACompetitiveExchangeRate,
(6) Trade Liberalization, (7) Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, (8) Privatization, (9)
Deregulation, (10) Property Rights.When re-visiting his paper in 2004,Williamson advocates poverty
alleviationthroughaccesstoassets,sothatthepoorcanproduceandsellthingsothersarewillingtopay
for. He focuses on four elements: education, property titles, land reform and micro-credit. See
Williamson(2004).
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Indeed, a reliance on pure market forces would risk running afoul of the variety of market
failuresthatplaguesmallholderagriculture.BirnerandResnick(2010,p.1442)summarizethese
as including “the non-excludability ofmany agricultural technologies, coordination challenges
thatpreventexploitingeconomicsofscale, informationasymmetries,a lackofassetsthatcan
serveascollateral,andthevulnerabilityofsmallholders tothebiological,climaticandmarket
risksinherentinagriculturalproduction.”Andsmallholdersfacesubstantialrisksinattempting
to improve their lot by connectingwith value chains, asotherparticipants in the value chain
may not make the complementary investments that would make smallholder action
worthwhile.
Onestrategyforovercomingthesechallengestoapurelymarket-basedprivatesectorfocusin
agriculture is to bring together a wider range of actors in “market-driven” collaborations
involvingmultinationalcorporations (MNCs),governments,NGOs,andahostofothers.These
collaborationsaimtoincorporatesmallholdersintoglobalagriculturalvaluechainsinwaysthat
aimtoserveprivateandpublicgoalssimultaneously.Thisstrategyhasreceivedaboostwiththe
SDGs,whichhaveprovidedaconsensusnotjustaboutgoals(andtheirassociatedtargets)but
also,somewhatsurprisingly,aboutmeans.Goal17–Partnerships fortheGoals–differs from
therestinfocusingsolelyonmeans,andthedesignatedmeansispartnership.Thus,achieving
theSDGs is explicitlynotexpected tobeaccomplished solely through traditional government
action,butfrequentlybymeansofcross-sectorcollaborationsinvolvingbusiness,government,
andcivilsociety.
This strategy is now at the top of many agendas, given the recent shift to dominance by
agribusiness and global value chains in the global food system (World Bank 2007). They are
increasingly common in agriculture and rural development. Partnerships aremore andmore
“market-driven” – i.e., they are intended to integrate smallholder farmers into larger
agribusinessvaluechains.Agricultureproduction inSoutheastAsia,aselsewhere, increasingly
consists of producers integrated into agribusiness-driven global value chains “from farm to
fork.”Butsmallholders,whotendtobefragmentedandlow-productivityproducers,arerarely
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incorporatedintothesevaluechains,whicharemissingkeyelementsthatwouldbenecessary
tobringinsmallholders.
Relianceonmarket-drivenpartnershipsasa(partial)strategytoimprovesmallholderwellbeing
and achieve the SDGs assumes that such incorporation will improve the productivity of
smallholder farming sufficiently to raise incomes past the poverty threshold, and/or increase
foodproduction sufficiently to contribute tohungeralleviationand improvednutrition,while
simultaneously reducingnegativeenvironmental impacts fromagriculture.Theseassumptions
needtobetestedasrelianceoncross-sectorcollaborationgrows.Littleempiricalresearchhas
beenconductedtodemonstratewhattypesof“market-smart”interventionsworkunderwhat
conditions(BirnerandResnick2010,p.1445).Noristhereconsensusonwhatitmeansforsuch
interventionsto“work.”Dothesevaluechainpartnershipsworktomovesmallholderfarmers
outoflow-levelequilibriumtrapsandthusprovideapowerfulmeansofachievingtheSDGson
poverty and hunger? And do they do so in a way that also achieves the environmental
sustainabilitygoals?Towhatdegreedothepartnershipsshapeinnovativesolutionstocollective
actionproblemsthatcouldnotbereachedintheabsenceofcross-sectorcollaboration?Arethe
goods being provided public, club, or private? Are goods being provided at all or is it
exploitation?Wouldtraditionalgovernmentalagriculturalextensionservicesanddevelopment
processesachievethesamegoals,andifso,whyisthepartnershipapproachbeingused?Are
there structures for collaboration that are necessary and sufficient to overcome the
vulnerabilitiesofsmallholders?
TheoriesofGovernanceandPartnership
Cross-sector collaborations in agriculture are one type of governance carried out through (at
leastpartially)non-statemechanisms.Thus,itishelpfultodrawontheoriesofgovernancethat
increasingly focus beyond the state, considering the roles of non-state actors and non-
hierarchical modes of political steering (Risse 2011, p. 2). The contrast is to the fully
consolidated statehood ideal type, which includes the Weberian monopoly on legitimate
violence within a given territory, the capacity to make, implement, and enforce rules
throughoutthatterritory,andtheprovisionofwelfareservicesexpectedfromamodernstate
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tothepeopleresidinginthatterritory.Suchcapacityisseenasdefining“domesticsovereignty”
(Krasner1999).Sincethedaysofmodernizationtheory,practitionersandscholarshavelargely
assumedthatfullyconsolidatedstatehoodistheachievableendgoalofdevelopment,despite
thenumerousfrustrationsalongtheway.
Somegovernancescholars,however,pointoutthatthereis littlereasontoacceptthatsucha
goal is necessarily achievable, or evennecessary. Limited statehoodmay in fact be thenorm
andheretostay,requiringadifferentapproachtothenotionofgovernance(Risse2011,p.2).
The limits can take various forms– territorial (state capacityonly applies topart of the legal
territory),sectoral(certainpolicyarenasgounmet)ordemographic(someinhabitantsarenot
providedgovernment servicesor arenot included in rules) (Risse2011, 5, 20). Thus,market-
drivencross-sectorcollaborations,however,donoteffectively take intoaccount the limitson
statehood. Their design often reflects standard assumptions about the relative roles and
interestsofstateandprivateactors,arguingthataligningthoseinterestssufficestoensurethat
thepartnershipwillservepublicaswellasprivategoals.
The rapidly growing literature on “collaborative governance”, “multi-stakeholder initiatives
(MSIs)” “partnership”, “polycentricity,” and “complex governance,” to give just some of the
emergingtermsforgovernancebeyondtraditionalgovernment,ismakingincreasingeffortsto
delvedeeperintoquestionsabouttheconditionsunderwhichnon-stateactorsandcross-sector
collaborations can supplement or compensate for the shortcomings of limited statehood.
Emerson et al. (2012), for example, call attention to the system context in which such
partnershipsoperate–fromthepolitical, legalandsocio-economicmeta-leveltotheconcrete
network-level regarding power, resources, conflict/ trust, connectedness and prior failures to
addressthechallenge.Oneweaknessofthisframeworkisthattheimportanceofthedifferent
aspectsisnotclear.Thecoreaspectsofinterestsandpowerareonlypresentwithinthesystem
context.Whereas, Ansell andGash (2008, 550) introduce the key notion of ‘power-resource-
knowledgeasymmetries’. Yet, theyonly regardpartnerships initiatedbypublic institutions as
collaborativegovernance.Wearguethatpartnerships,ifgovernment-initiatedornot,aretaking
ongovernancetasks.
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Broadly speaking, the concept of collaborative governance is a reaction to ‘failures of
downstreamimplementationandtothehighcostandpoliticizationofregulation(…)(and)asan
alternative to adversarialism of interest group pluralism and to the accountability failures of
managerialism’ (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544). But why is the market-driven approach so
dominant inthedesignofpartnerships?First,amongdonorstherehasbeenatrendsincethe
1980stowardsabeliefinmarkets,oftenreferredto(especiallybycritics)asneoliberalthinking,
spearheadedbytheWorldBankandotherinter-governmentalorganizations.Asecondfactoris
thepromotionofmarket-drivenpartnershipsbynon-governmental internationalorganizations
such as theWorld Economic Forum (WEF). As amembership organization,with dues paid by
largemultinationals(MNCs),ithasthenecessaryfinancialmeansaswellasthestandingamong
MNCs to make its agenda heard. The World Economic Forum is long known as the most
influential convener of corporate and government leaders at fora such as Davos. The WEF
becameformallyincorporatedas“theworld’sNGOforpartnership”underSwisslawin2015.
For each partnership for market driven value chains in agriculture, we examine what
combination of the following actors is in place, and what appears to be happening on the
ground regardingwhose interests prevail andwhether progress toward the SDGgoals seems
likely.
Weinvestigateinterestalignmentregardingthefollowingactorsengagedinpartnerships:
a. Government: we assume its interest in achieving the SDG targets, and explore its
capacity (“limited statehood”). The alternative hypotheses is that the government is
interested primarily in keeping key constituencies happy. Hence, we explore which
constituencieshavegovernments’ear–farmers,business,others.(ADD:AnsellandGash
rewhygovernmentsdoingpartnerships.)
b. Business:weassumeitsinterestisprofit,nuancedbyshortvslong-termfocusandbythe
CSR/social licensetooperatepressures thatmayaffectbusinessplanning. (CITErecent
Zadekwork(2017)aboutbusinessandpartnerships.)
c. Donors and NGOs: we assume the interest is in achieving the SDG targets. The
alternative hypotheses is that they are interest in having visible projects, respectively
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securingfundingthroughsuchpartnerships.
d. Farmers´organizations:weassumetheirinterestinmakingthepartnershipsworkforthe
targeted farmers, i.e. increasing their production and incomes. The alternative
hypothesesisthattheyaremainlyinterestedintheirpoliticalinfluence.
e. Platforms: we assume the interest is to achieve the SDG targets and to continue the
existenceofthepartnershipanditsplatform.
ItishighlycontestedwhetherpuremarketprocessescandelivertheSustainableDevelopment
Goals. Given the incentives business faces and the nature of agriculture (Birner and Resnick
2010,1442),itisnotclearthatmarketscanprovidethemultiplepublicgoodsthatareneeded.
Butaconstructivisttakewouldexplorewhetherengagementincross-sectorpartnershipswould
causeprivatesectoractorstoredefinetheirintereststohavealonger-termperspectiveonthe
returnstheycouldreapbyinvestinginnewwaysinsmallholderagriculture,buildingonthekey
constructivist insight that socialization matters. Such socialization – towards more SDG
engagement–couldarguablyhappenindiversefora,suchastheWorldEconomicForumorthe
UnitedNationsGlobalCompact,whichpromotessustainableandsociallyresponsiblebusiness
practicesandreportingonthem.Thus,akey initialquestiontoexplore iswhether,andunder
what conditions, partnership institutionalization and process management compensate for
powerdifferentialsanddifferentinterestsamongthepartners.
AgriculturalPartnershipsinAsia
Multi-stakeholdernetworksintheagri-foodsectorinSoutheastAsiainclude:
Regional
• Better Rice Initiative Asia (BRIA), initiated by the German development agency GIZ
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit); focuses on improving rice
valuechainsandoperatesinIndonesia,thePhilippines,Thailand,andVietnam;
• Global Agri-business Alliance (GAA), CEO-led, private sector alliance, operating sector-wide, initiated by theWorld Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD),
focusesonsustainabilityanddevelopmentchallengesalongthevaluechaininbothfood
andnon-foodcrops;basedinGenève,Switzerland,globaloutlook;
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• Grow Asia, initiated by theWorld Economic Forum (WEF) under its New Vision forAgriculture,focusesonsmallholderagricultureinawiderangeofcropsandoperatesin
Cambodia,Indonesia,Myanmar,thePhilippines,Vietnam.
Countries4
• Agriprofocus,initiatedbyaDutchdonorpartnershipnetwork,operatesinMyanmar;
• Feed the Future and Helping Address Rural Vulnerabilities and Ecosystem StabilityProgram (HARVEST), initiated by the United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment(USAID),operatesinCambodia;
• MEDA–Creatingbusinesssolutionstopoverty,initiatedbyCanadiandonor,operatesinMyanmar;
• PRISMA, initiated by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),operatesinIndonesia;
• VSAT (Vegetable Sector Acceleration Taskforce), initiated by Dutch donor, operates in
Myanmar;
For context,we describe a few of them inmore detail regarding their governance structure,
goalsandapproaches.
GrowAsia:GrowAsiaisamulti-stakeholderpartnershipplatform.Ithassetatargetofreaching
10millionoftheapproximately100millionsmallholderfarmersintheregionbytheyear2020
to incorporate them into agricultural value chains, enabling them to increase their yield and
profits by 20%, using 20% less water and emitting 20% less greenhouse gases per ton of
production.”5GrowAsiapartnerswiththeASEANSecretariatandtheagriculturalministriesof
thecountriesinwhichitoperates.Thenumerousagri-businessmembersarerepresentedonits
Business Council and the NGO members form its Civil Society Council. Donors, farmer
associations and theWorld Economic Forum as well as a small, Singapore-based secretariat
comprise the other elements of Grow Asia´s governance structure. The implementation of
projectsisinthehandsofworkinggroupsthatfocusoncommodities(likecoffee)orsolutions
(likeagri-finance)withinonecountry.GrowAsia’sparentageintheWorldEconomicForumhas
4Therearedozensofotherdonor-fundedprojects focusingonagricultureand/or fisheries in
oneormoreSoutheastAsiancountrieswithmoreorlessinvolvementofthepublic,privateand
civil society sector, some with a focus on small-holder farmers. They include for example:
Agence Française de Développement (AFD), Danish International Development Agency(DANIDA), European Commission (EC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), KoreaInternational Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Netherlands Enterprise Agency, SNV Netherlands,Swisscontact,SwissDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC).5www.growasia.org,accessedFebruary13th,2017.
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fundamentallyshapeditsoutlook.WEF’sNewVisionforAgriculture,formallylaunchedin2010,
describesitselfasaninitiativetosupportnationalandregionalplatformsforpartnershipsthat
are: (i) “Country-led, drivenby local stakeholders inpartnershipwith global organizations; (ii)
Multi-stakeholder, engaging government, private sector, international organizations, civil
society, farmers associations and others; (iii) Market-based, focusing on catalyzing and
expanding sustainable, inclusive investments and market-based activity; (iv) Aligned with
national plans, regional strategies and global goals” (World Economic Forum 2015, emphasis
added).
TheGlobalAgri-businessAlliance(GAA):TheGAA,launchedin2016inSingapore,isaCEO-led,
privatesectoralliance,operatingsector-wide.ItemergedoutoftheWorldBusinessCouncilfor
SustainableDevelopment (WBCSD),whichalsofunctionsas its interimsecretariat. Itsdeclared
aimis“harnessingthecollectivestrengthsoftheglobalagri-businesssector(…)toimprovethe
resilienceoffarmersacrosstheworld”.TheGAAengagesits36membersthroughavaluechain
approachforfoodandnon-foodcrops.Themembersinclude“growersandproducers,traders,
fertilizer and agro-chemicalsmanufacturers, seed suppliers, primary processors and agri-tech
suppliers.”6Itclaimsto“addresssustainability,social,laborandenvironmentalissueswherethe
agriculturalsector isseentohaveasharedresponsibility“.7GAAdeclaresthat it isparticularly
interested in helping to achieve SDG 2 “end hunger, achieve food security and improved
nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”. While its members are all corporates, it
“emphasize(s)thespiritofpartnershipandwillseekopportunitiesforcollaborationwithother
stakeholders in the design, execution and delivery of its activities.”8 GAA aims to achieve its
goals by establishing working groups, creating targets, tools, and measurement/reporting
methods for itsmembers, andby engaging “decision-makers to remove structural andpolicy
barriers that prevent the agri-business sector from fully contributing to achievement of the
SDGs”(ibid.).
6http://globalagribusinessalliance.com/who-we-are/
7http://globalagribusinessalliance.com/our-mission/
8http://globalagribusinessalliance.com/our-mission/
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OtherprojectsfocusedonsmallholdersintheregionaredrivenbyNGOs,industryassociations,
andotheractors.TheFrenchinternationaldevelopmentNGOGRET(GroupedeRechercheand
d’EchangeTechnologique), forexample,whichcountsagricultureasoneof its sevenareasof
expertise, provides financing and technical assistance to support farmer-led Committees in
somesoutheastAsiancountriesthatcanofferaffordableloansandfacilitatemarketlinkages.9
Therearealsoindustryinitiativeswithadhocpartnershipelements.CropLifeAsiaispartofthe
global federationCropLife International (founded in2001),whichrepresentstheplantscience
industrywithsuchmajorcorporatemembersasBASF,BayerCropScience,DowAgroSciences,
DuPont, FMC, Monsanto, Sumitomo Chemical and Syngenta. CropLife Asia focuses on crop
protection biotechnology – promoting genetically modified organisms (GMO), international
trade, stewardship, regulation and fighting counterfeiting.10 Finally, several individual
companies have strategies focused around utilizing cross-sector collaboration. Some major
agricultureandfoodbusinesseshavefullyembracedtheideaofpartnershipsforsustainability.
AgricultureinSoutheastAsia
Southeast Asian countries are insightful case studies for cross-sector partnerships for
agricultural value chain interventions. While fast numbers of smallholders (100 out of 500
million smallholder familiesworldwide)are living in the region, it is sometimesoverlooked in
the shadow of China and India. The six largest Southeast Asian countries by population size
showaclear(andcommon)pattern.ThehighertheGDPpercapitaandthehumandevelopment
indexrank,thelowerthepercentageofruralpopulationandagriculturalemployment.Malaysia
is the richest among the populous countries in Southeast Asia (USD 9,500), has merely 9%
agricultural employment and 25% rural population.On theother endof the spectrum in our
sampleisMyanmarwiththelowestGDPpercapita(USD1,300)andtwoofthreepeopleliving
inruralareasandbeingemployed inagriculture.Yet,also in inthemoreprosperousVietnam
9www.gret.org/2017/03/gret-is-supporting-the-emergence-of-farmers-organisations-in-
myanmar/?lang=en10http://www.croplifeasia.org/about-us/organization/
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twoof threepeopleare living in rural areasandnearlyhalfof thepopulation isemployed in
agriculture.
InsertTable1.
The more agriculture contributes to the GDP, the lower the value added per worker in
agriculture. This is due to smaller parcels of land, less mechanization, less technology, less
efficientinputsandlessknowledgeofbestpractices.Indonesiaisaclearoutlieronemissions.11
This is due to slash-and-burn agricultural practices in Indonesia, which are illegal and are
recentlytackledmoreseriouslybycross-sectorpartnerships,involvingproducers,investors,civil
societyandgovernments–afteryearsofseveresmogintheregion(called“TheHaze”).12
Government expenditure on agriculture is a good indicator for the role of agriculture as
perceivedbytherulingelite.Theclearoutliersare Indonesiawith0.9%ofGDPandMyanmar
with6.3%.Malaysia,ThailandandIndonesiaarethewealthiestpopulouscountriesinSoutheast
Asiaandareallnetfoodexporters.Theyexportmorethandouble(ortriple)thevalueoffood
than they import.ThePhilippinesareanet food importerand thevalueof food importsand
exportsequalsoutinVietnam.WheresocialistVietnamoutdoesIndonesiaandthePhilippinesis
the ease of doing business. Yet, Vietnam´s rank in theWorld Bank index (82) is well behind
11Indonesia´smainemissionsandremovalsfromagriculture,forestsandotherlanduseare:Emissions/
removalsfromforests(629milliontonsin2014),emissionsfromburningbiomass(390),emissionsfrom
net forest conversion (369), emissions from croplands (285) and only then emissions fromagriculture
(166).These166million tonsemissionsonly fromagriculture in2014are thehighestemissions inour
countrysample,comparedto67inMyanmar,63inThailandandVietnam,53inthePhilippinesand14in
Malaysia. Though Indonesia´s population is also the largest in the region,with a distance. (FAO2016,
134)12TheFire-FreeAlliance(FFA)isacross-sectorpartnership,thatincludesthegovernmentofIndonesia,
forestry and agriculture companies and NGOs. It was launched in February 2016 and claims to have
implemented community-based fire prevention initiatives inmore than 200 villages. The Jakarta Post,
“Fire FreeAlliance claims tohavedramatically reduced forest fires in Sumatra since2015”,March16,
2017. URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/16/fire-free-alliance-claims-to-have-dramatically-
reduced-forest-fires-in-sumatra-since-2015.html
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Thailand(46)andMalaysia(23).ForeigndirectinvestmentinagricultureishighestinIndonesia
(344millionUSD),followedbyMalaysia(103)andVietNam(99).
CaseSelection
Regardingthepoliticaleconomyofstates,SoutheastAsiaoffersawealthfromwhichtoselect
cases forempirical investigation.Becausethepurposeof thisarticle is theory-building for the
emergingphenomenonofmarket-drivencollaborationfordevelopment,ratherthanthetesting
ofafully-fledgedtheoreticalframework,itisusefultoselectcasesfromsuchdiversity.Vietnam
is highly centralized with a ruling communist party that aims to make the country the next
China. It has an agriculture sector that is achieving high yields, attracting substantial foreign
direct investments and is more business-oriented than other Southeast Asian countries.
IndonesiaandthePhilippinesareboth largelycontrolledby influential familieswhoseholding
companiesspantheeconomy,includingtheagriculturesector.Myanmarisintransitionfroma
military dictatorship, with foreign investors eager to get in early to invest in the country’s
naturalresourcewealth.
ThisstudyfocusesprimarilyonVietnamandIndonesiaforthreereasons.First,theiragricultural
sector is more representative for Asian developing countries than the economic outliers
MalaysiaandMyanmar.Also,regardingstatecapacityandgovernance,VietnamandIndonesia
aremorerepresentativethan,again, theoutliersamongthepopulousSoutheastAsianstates,
MalaysiaandMyanmar.Second, theyattract farmore foreigndirect investment thanthenet-
food-importer Philippines and Thailand. This is relevant as many of the market-driven
partnerships under investigation are initiated and dominated by Western multinational
corporations (MNCs). Third, Vietnam and Indonesia achieve the highest cereal yields in the
regionwithlevelsoffertilizerusein-betweenthoseofMyanmar(verylow)andMalaysia(very
high). This is important as some of the major players in these agricultural cross-sector
partnershipsarethemajorcropscienceinputproviders.
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The selectionof Indonesia andVietnamwasdone toensure adegreeof economic similarity.
Bothcountries,classifiedasLowerMiddleIncomebytheWorldBank(2016),areinthemedium
GDPpercapitarangeofSoutheastAsiancountries–incontrasttoThailandandMalaysiawith
farhigherGDPpercapita,andMyanmar, farbehind (seeTable2).Outof thethreecountries
withasimilarpercapitaGDP,namelyPhilippines,IndonesiaandVietnam,wedecidedtofocus
on the latter two. This was because of two reasons: (1) the longer-established partnerships
operating in IndonesiaandVietnamand, (2) there is, toacertainextent,anexistentbasis for
collaborative initiatives due to the comparatively advanced efficiency of agriculture as
evidencedbythehighercerealyieldoutputsinthesetwocases(seeTable2).Inaddition,there
oughttobebetterprospectsformarket-drivenapproachesnotleastbecausethetwocountries
donotlackbasicinfrastructureandcapacityassomeoftheirSoutheastAsianpeers.Thus,they
provideahardcaseforthepropositionthatmarket-driveninterventionsareunlikelytobenefit
farmerssustainably.Inaddition,bothcountrieshavelargeruralpopulations,rankinginthetop
tenof rural population shares globally (Kharas et al., box 3.4, p. 51).We investigate towhat
extentthevaryingstatecapacityintheagriculturalsectorinIndonesiaandVietnamexplainsthe
differing outcomes regarding the partnerships and explore how best to measure this state
capacity.
Method
We conducted eleven semi-structured interviews with core public, private and civil society
stakeholders involved in cross-sector agricultural partnerships in Vietnam and Indonesia. The
audio-recordedinterviewsweretranscribedandcodedinthequalitativedataanalysissoftware,
maxqda. The coding was done both inductive and deductive – based on a theoretical and
empirical literature review. A comparative case study design was implemented, focusing on
VietnamandIndonesia,countriesinwhichmajorpartnershipsforagriculturalchangeoperate.
Additionally, we had dozens of exploratory, follow-up and off-the-record conversations with
people involved in cross-sector partnerships as well as experts. Most of these additional
conversationstookplaceinVietnam,Indonesia,Singapore,Malaysia,Thailand,theNetherlands
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andtheUSA.Whilewedrawonthisbackgroundinformationweonlycitethetranscribedsemi-
structuredinterviews.
ResearchQuestions
The central question driving the research is whether the ostensible shared benefits for
agribusiness, smallholders, and the environment are likely to materialize from cross-sector
partnershipsdrivenbyagribusiness invaluechain interventions.Arangeofperspectives from
the literature suggests quite different expectations about the likely impacts of such
interventions.Thoseinsupportclaimthatmarket-ledinterventionsarenecessaryforreaching
small-holder farmers on a large scale. Critics argue that such schemes mainly benefit the
corporations and cement the status quo without targeting underlying issues of rights-based
empowermentor addressing suchnegative externalities as environmental degradation (Grain
2016). We draw from the theories outlined below to elucidate theoretically and practically
importantquestionsabouttheconditionsunderwhichmarket-drivencross-sectorpartnership
mightmeaningfullycontributetothosegoals.
1.TheState
Akeysetofquestionsrelatestotheroleofthestate,statecapacity,andthespecificnatureof
state-market policy economy relations in the polity where the partnership operates. The
“limited statehood” framework (Risse2010) suggests that attention to state capacitymatters
notonly in statesusuallydeemed fragile,but inmoststatesbecause limitedstatehood is the
norm.Weoperationalizestatecapacityandgovernanceusingtwoindices.(SeeTable2.)First,
the IndexofStateWeakness in theDevelopingWorldby theBrookings Institution. It assesses
thecapacityofstatestofulfillcoregovernmentresponsibilitiessuchas(i)Economic–„fostering
an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth“; (ii) Political –
„establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions“;
(iii)Security–„securingtheirpopulations fromviolentconflictandcontrollingtheir territory“;
(iv) Social welfare – „meeting the basic human needs of their population“. (Rice and Patrick
2008,3)
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Second, the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank.13 Governance, in their
definition, „consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is
exercised.“ The indicators cover the dimensions:(i) Voice & Accountability (participation in
selection of government, freedom of expression, association, media);(ii) Political Stability &
Absence of Violence (including terrorism); (iii) Government Effectiveness (quality of public
services, civil service, policy formulation and implementation);(iv) Regulatory Quality
(government´sability„toformulateandimplementsoundpoliciesandregulationsthatpermit
and promote private sector development“);(v) Rule of Law (confidence in and abidance by
society´s rules, quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, courts; likelihood of
crimeandviolence);(vi)ControlofCorruption („extent towhichpublicpower isexercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, aswell as "capture" of the
statebyelitesandprivateinterests“).(WorldBank2016.)
TheoutliersinbothindicesregardingSoutheastAsiaareclear.AtthebottomMyanmar,which
after the 2010 general election transformed from a military junta to a (formally) civilian
governmentandamoreopeneconomy.AtthetopMalaysia,whichoutperformsitsneighbors
economically (GNI of USD 5500) and in all governance indicators. Except for voice and
accountability,whereIndonesiaandthePhilippinesareahead.14Vietnamwithlessthanhalfthe
GNIpercapitacomparedtoIndonesiaandthePhilippinescomesinsecond–afterMalaysia–in
theStateWeakness Index. This ismainlydue to its farbetterperformance regarding security
compared to itspeers. Its laggingbehind in thepolitical sphere isalso reflected in theWorld
Bank´sgovernanceindicators.Regardingvoiceandaccountability itperformsevenworsethan
Myanmar.And its regulatoryquality is regardedaswell behind its regionalneighbors, expect
Myanmar.Ourin-depthcasestudycasesofVietnamandIndonesiamainlydifferongovernance
regarding (i) political freedom (far lower in Vietnam), (ii) political stability and security
13 It reports indicators formore than200countries (and territories) for theperiod1996–2015. (World
Bank2016.)14 The data refer to 2015. Hence, before the election of Rodrigo Duterte as new President of the
PhilippinesinMay2016.
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(substantially lower in Indonesia), (iii) economic level (substantially lower in Vietnam), (iv)
regulatoryquality(lowerinVietnam).(SeeTable2.)
Onehypothesisisthatpartnershipsaremostlikelytosucceedincountrieswithwell-functioning
states,wheretheoverallcapacityforcollectiveactionismuchhigherandwherethestatehas
implicitcapacitytocoercecompliancewithrulesortomandatecontributionstotheprovisionof
public goods –what is sometimes referred to as the “shadowof hierarchy,”which creates a
credible threat of coercive state action such as regulation if non-state actors fail to act
“voluntarily.”
2.ReplacingtheShadowofHierarchy
Analternativehypothesisisthatthepartnershipapproachismostlikelytosucceedinareasof
“limited statehood”, where the government has demonstrated a lack of capacity to achieve
collective action goals, leaving space for private sector or donor driven alternatives. The
literaturesuggeststhatalignedinterestscansufficeinsomecases.Onehypothesisisthatinthe
absence of the shadow of (state) hierarchy, collaborative forms of governance can act as a
substituteandinvolvemarginalizedgroupsinameaningfulway.AsAnsellandGash2008(551)
contend:“If therearesignificantpower/resource imbalancesbetweenstakeholders,suchthat
important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative
governancerequiresacommitmenttoapositivestrategyofempowermentandrepresentation
ofweakerordisadvantagedstakeholders.”Wherethatstrategycancomefromandhowitisto
be executed is an open question.Many collaborations have a central secretariat intended to
serveasaneutralplatform.Insuchcases,isthesecretariatadequatelyresourced?Doesithave
the capacity, authority and mandate to spend resources appropriately and ensure that the
collaborationmeetstheinterestsofallparticipants?Whodeterminestheresourceallocation?
Many partnerships depend on the involvement of NGOs that have substantial experience in
sustainable rural development – are they engaged andwhose interests do they serve?What
capacitydothesmall-holderfarmersthemselvesmustrepresenttheirinterests?
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Togaininsightintothesesweepingquestions,welookforevidenceintheformofpartnerships’
institutionalstructuresandprocessesinthespecificcasesweinvestigate.Arecompaniessimply
promoting their products or finding new suppliers in the interests of short-termprofits,with
only rhetorical commitment to smallholder farmer empowerment and well-being and to
environmental sustainability goals? Or does the collaborative governance structure, with
representation from business, government, NGOs, and farmers’ associations, along with the
partnershipsecretariat,overcomethe inertiaofstandardcorporateoperatingproceduresand
enablelong-termcommonintereststogaintraction.
EMPIRICALFINDINGS
Our researchexplored twodistinctaspectsofpartnership to investigate theconditionsunder
which market-driven cross-sector collaborations in agriculture are likely to achieve progress
towardpovertyreduction,environmentalsustainability,andfoodsecurity. Thefirstisagency:
how individual actors and organizations shape partner interests and identities to align very
diverse actors around a shared, operational agenda. The second is structure: both the broad
political institutions within a country, and the institutional arrangements and processes of a
givenpartnership.
AGENCY
AgencyofDonors,Governments,Businesses,Partnerships
Drawinguponaconstructivistapproach,theimportanceofindividualagencybecomesclearfor
understandingunderwhichconditionspartnershipswork.Agentsmustbecommittedbecause
theyenduppayingthetransactionscoststhatbenefitthewholepartnership–inotherwords
theyprovidepublicgoodstothepartnership.Wearguethatagencycancomefromanysector
orfromplatformssupportingthepartnership.Empirically,wehaveinvestigatedtheconditions
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under which this happens, and we find that it can happen because of 1) donor funding; 2)
government involvement;3)corporate internalizationofaredefinedself-interest.Anexample
of corporate internalization of redefined self-interest include the case of a major European
chemical company, whose leadership transformed the business model from a fertilizer
manufacturertoafarmer-centriccompany.(i9:48)Infactweseetheimpetuscomingfromall
three sectors in our cases, but we also find that there is a key role to be played by a
coordinatingorganizationorplatform.
PartnershipPlatforms
Thecoreroles foroverarchingpartnershipplatformsare to (i) co-createacommonvision, (ii)
brokernewpartnerships,(iii)coordinate,guideanddirect,(iv)shareknowledgeand(v)report
onprogress.Suchpartnershipplatformsoftenmeldexistingprojectsoftheirmembersundera
commonumbrella.InoneSoutheastAsianvaluechainplatformtwothirdofitscurrentprojects
pre-existeditsformation.(i9)Thestrengthofsuchplatformsliesintheabilitytobringtogether
actorsfromallthreesectorsandthecross-fertilizationthatthisfacilitates.Inourcasestudies,
this led to a more “holistic or balanced group of stakeholders” participating in pre-existing
projects,onceitbecameapparentwhatnewactorscouldcontribute.
In value chain interventions, this ideally leads to an involvement of actors along the whole
chain.Forexample, incross-sectorprojects in Indonesiathebrokeringofnewpartnershipsby
the platform Secretariat brought in a NGO for measurement and evaluation and a bank for
farmer financing solutions – in addition to the pre-existing interventions in the input and
growingstage(i9:64.)Partnershipplatformscanfunctionasasafespaceforpublic,privateand
civil society actors to engage with each other, most importantly with clearly defined goals,
structuredforexamplearoundasmall-holderfarmerfocus.
AgencywithinPartnershipOrganizations
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The respondents highlighted leadership onmultiple levels as themost important element of
successful partnering. (i1, 5, 6, 9) We distinguish between senior buy-in and individual
operational leadership in the daily work of partnerships. Multinational corporations were
perceived as best toworkwith in a partnership if the senior leadership team is “driving the
agenda”and ifCEOshavemadecommitmentspublicly (i1:22).Partnershipconvenors insisted
thatthisseniorbuy-inmustthentranslateintoamandateandcreateroomtomaneuverforthe
individual leadactors inthedailyoperations.Thosecoordinatingpartnershipsreportedthat it
wasveryapparent,whichcompaniesandNGOshadaclearmandateandwhichdidnot–evenif
thatwasnevermadeexplicit(i9:46).
Members of partnership convening platforms identified “wavering commitment from
leadership” – especially from CEOs andMinisters – as themost severe challenge formaking
partnershipswork (i9:43.) Securingpersonal commitmentmainlydependson soft skills anda
constanteffort,theconvenorsstated(i9:56),addingthatitisverydifficulttopersuadeactorsto
participate on a one to one basis, that one must be “in meetings to sense the energy and
enthusiasm”(i9:143).
A continuous disruption for partnership convenors is political change – less regarding
subsequentmajorpolicychangesbutregardingtheneedtosecurethepersonalcommitmentof
the new senior leaders (i9:44). Regular leadership changes are common in theMinistries of
Agriculture in the ASEAN countries. For example, there were four consecutive Coordinating
MinistersforEconomicAffairsinIndonesiasince2009.15ThatMinister´sportfolioincludesinter
alia the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment & Forestry. Similarly, the
leadershipchangedthreetimessince2009 in theMalaysianMinistryofAgricultureandAgro-
basedIndustryandfourtimesinthePhilippineDepartmentofAgriculture.16
15TheofficeofCoordinatingMinisterforEconomicAffairswasfilledinrecentyearsbyHattaRajasa(22
Oct2009–13May2014),ChairulTanjung(19May2014–20Oct2014),SofyanDjalil(27Oct2014–12
August2015)andDarminNasution(12August2015–today).16TherecentMinistersofAgricultureandAgro-basedIndustryinMalaysiawereNohOmar(10Apr2009
–15May2013),IsmailSabriYaakob(16May2013–29Jul2015)andAhmadShaberyCheek(29Jul2015
– today). Their counterparts in the Philippines, the Secretary of Agriculture in the Department ofAgriculture,wereArthurC.Yap(25Oct2006–February24,2010),BernieFondevilla,(8Mar2010–30
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Partnerships´ContributionstoActor’sCoreInterests
A danger facing cross-sector partnerships is capture by vested interests or being steered by
individualactorsintoadirectionnotreflectingtheagreed-onmission.Partnershipplatformscan
play a core role in ensuring that this does not happen. The danger can arise from all three
sectors.Forexample,aNGOinthesampleredefiningitselfasaprofitorientedconsultancyand
trying to shape the partnership along these lines. (i9:52) In one value chain partnership in
Indonesia, for example, interviewees pointed to the importance of the regional partnership
platforminmovingthecollaboration inoneproject fromamarketingopportunity forasingle
corporationtoabroaderengagementbetweenfarmersandmultiplecorporatesuppliersabout
early flowering technologies. (i9:92-93)While a government extension service can provide a
neutral channel for farmers training, the company-led approach is “completely biased” as a
partnershipconvenorpointedout.(i9:93)Thisexampleofacompanyattemptingtomakeuseof
a partnership project for its own commercial interest points to the importance of having an
overarchingorganizationorplatformthatcanprovidesomeneutrality.
Businesses
Oneofourkeyfindingisthatparticipationinpartnershipscanpartiallyshapehowcorporations
and others see their self-interest.More andmore companies realize thatwhen it is a public
goodtoimprovetheirsector,itwilleventuallybenefitthemasaprivateorganization.(i9:99)
The only way a value chain works is if the commercial aspect of it works – with the ideal
scenariobeinganoff-takerthatcommitstobuyingallthecropsproducedinthatvaluechain,as
apartnershipconvenorunderlined. (i9:123)A functioningvaluechainalso reduces the riskof
lending to the involved farmersand ishenceattractive tobanksandmicro-financeproviders.
June2010),ProcesoAlcala(30Jun2010–30Jun2016),EmmanuelPiñol(30Jun2016–today).
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(i9:129)Therespondentinourinterviewwasconvincedthatthosevaluechainprojectsthatdid
nothaveagoodoff-take–agoodpull–wouldsimplyneverwork.(i9:127)
A real challenge is convincing for example an off-taker company to involve another off-taker
company(i9:64).Givenhowcost-andtime-intensiveitistobuildupasustainablevaluechain,
thisreluctanceto“share”avaluechainwithadirectcompetitorisnotsurprising.Butthefact
thatmostvaluechainprojectsarecontingentonaspecificoff-takingcompanymakesthemvery
vulnerable(i9:127).Projectsthatdonotfocusonaspecificcropbutoncross-cuttingissueslike
finance,agrochemicalsortelecommunicationforsmall-holderfarmingaremainlydonorfunded
astheself-interestofspecificcompaniesislessclear(i9:127).
Partnerships can attract free-riders and rogues with little interest in the goals of the
partnership. In a case reported by a partnership convenor, small domestic businesses with
problematicbusinesspractices trying togain legitimacy throughthepartnershipsbrandname
soonstoodisolatedandleftthepartnershipafterawhile.(i9:51)Atthesametime,ithighlights
theimportanceofmembershipmanagementaroundaco-createdvisionandhowdifficultthisis
whentryingtomaintainaninclusiveapproach.
Governments
Governmentsinoursamplehaddifferentvestedinterestinengagingincross-sectorvaluechain
partnerships. Several governments in our sample are very keen on attracting private sector
investmentinagriculture,notleastfrommultinationals.Whileitmightbebeyondthemandate
ofapartnershipplatformtoengageinthedetailsofpurchasingagreements,regardingpricing,
volumes, etc., part of their attractiveness for governments lies in their ability to “bring in”
companies.Therealizationbygovernmentsintheregionthataparticularpartnershipplatform
wasnotanotherdonor initiative,butactuallybroughtprivate sector investmentwaskeyand
changed a lot of behavior. (i9:66) One government saw the partnership platform as a good
frameworkforfacilitatingadialoguewiththeagri-businessesonwhatgoodagriculturalpolicy
wouldlooklikeforthem.(i9:67)
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CivilSociety
NGOs are often dependent on the cooperation or endorsement of the government in the
countrytheyareoperatingin.Thisisespeciallytrueforcountrieswithstrongstatecapacityand
strong government-involvement in development, like inVietnam.Hence,NGOs recognize the
strategicbenefitofbeingpartofagovernment-endorsedpartnershipinitiativeandjoinoutof
their core self-interest. (i9:51) While such partnerships would focus on socio-economic and
environmental challenges, it would be clear that “the NGOs were not there as activists”,
ensuringaconstructivenothostiledialogue(i9:70).
Farmers organizations is not a useful collective term, as a partnership convenor pointed out.
(i9:76)First, farmers´organizationscanbetradeorganizations,farmers´cooperatives,political
organizations, activist groups mobilizing around land rights, et cetera. Second, talking about
“farmers´ organizations” is misrepresentative of the complexity of this section of society in
countrieswherehalfof thepopulationdependsonagriculture.Somemajor regional farmers´
associationswereperceivedaslobbygroupswithlittleinterestinengagingwiththepublicand
privatesectoragentsonthequestionofprivatesectorinvestment.(i9:77)
Theoutlookof farmers differs substantially between countries. The farmers inVietnamwere
perceived by partners in value chain projects as far more commercially oriented than their
Indonesiancounterparts.(i9:81)ManyVietnamesefarmers inhighvaluecropssuchaspepper
andcoffee,earnreasonableincomes,notleastduetogoodextensionservicesandthegenerous
useofchemicals.WithproductivityandoutputbeingtheclearfocusofVietnamesefarmersthe
overuseofchemicalsisawidespreadissue.(i9:83)Thisleadstothechallengeof(i)foodsecurity
on the domestic market and (ii) fulfilling the stricter regulations on residuals for the export
market. In addition to the overuse of chemicals in Vietnam, comes the issue of illegal or
questionablesourcesofagrochemicalsaswellasofanimalfeedanddrugsforanimalbreeding.
(i3:63) This focusonproductivity andoutputmakes inspections and traceability a corepolicy
concern not only in Vietnam but across Southeast Asia. (i2,3,4) A international organization
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employeepointedtotheneedofovercomingthelackoftrustregardingdomesticfoodandits
safetybyfocusingmorestandardization,lawsandregulationtobuildup“trustchains”.(i3:122)
Partnerships–ConditionsforInterestAlignment&ChangeofInterestDefinition
Interestalignmentandinfluencingapartnertochangethewaytheydobusinessortochangea
policyisalong-termproject(i1:8).Whilepolicychangesinanarrowsensewerenotreportedby
partnership stakeholders, change in business or government thinking were reported. A
prominent example for a change in business thinking relates to the Agri-Agra Law in the
Philippines.Itrequiresbankstolend25%oftheirloanportfoliotoagricultureandfisheries,beit
toagriculturalcompaniesor farmers. Itoriginatesfromthemid70sandwasamendedbythe
Agri-Agra Reform Credit Act of 2009. Yet, the 25 percent allocation was retained. The
comparatively low fines (of 0.5 percent) did notmotivate the banks to comply.17 The banks
lobbied for revisionsof theAgri-Agra Law.However, starting fromwithin the foundationofa
major bank and then developed in a cross-sector, small-holder focused consortium several
banks started to change their compliance behavior by trying to developmeaningful ways of
workingwith farmers. In themedium term the thinkingwithinbanksand theirwillingness to
engagechanged,arguablyduetoaleadactorchangingitsbehaviorandengagingthesectorin
discussionsandeffortstomakethebestofthisregulation.
A good example for change in government thinking and behavior due to cross-sector
partnerships activities is the case of a government-launchedmicrofinance law for farmers in
Myanmar.Inthebeginning,itwasaone-sizefitsallschemes–withoneloanproductwiththe
same amount and payback period for all farmers, nomatterwhat crops theywere growing.
Whenabroadindustryvoiceemergedfromtheexistingcross-sector,crop-specificpartnerships,
17 For example, the combined allocation of loanable funds for agriculture was 14.5 percent
(comparedtothe25percentmandatedbylaw)inthefirstquarter2016.Source:ThePhilippineStar, Banks push Agri-Agra Law revisions, by Lawrence Agcaoili. Last updated 21 September
2016.www.philstar.com/business/2016/09/21/1625700/banks-push-agri-agra-law-revisions
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
29
the government considered their recommendations for adopting it per crop, per region, per
farmertype(i9:133).
There are examples of how value chain projects grow into an organization,which comprises
mostactorspertainingtoaparticularcommodity, includingallkindofdirectcompetitors.The
Vietnamese Coffee Coordination Board is such an example, where a government endorsed
commodityboardcomprisingadozenstakeholders.
STRUCTURE
Inthispaper,weinvestigatedtowhatextentdifferentstructuresalsomatterorwhetheragency
issufficienttoexplainwhencollaborationsachievetheirgoalsandarelikelytohelpimplement
the SDGs. Structure includes both the broad political institutions within a country, and the
institutionalarrangementsofagivenpartnership.
InstitutionalVariationinVietnamversusIndonesia
We find that in general, cross-sector partnerships in Indonesia are predominantly led by the
privatesector.TheIndonesianstateplaysanimportantrole–howevermoresoattheregional
anddistrictlevels(i9).InVietnam,cross-sectorpartnershipsaremoststronglyinfluencedbythe
central government. This is also true for the implementation on the ground, due to the
Communistparty´sstrong localpresence.Farmersorganizations inVietnamaregenerallypart
of the Communist political system. Hence, they appeared to be an efficient channel for
partnerships to communicate, for example, the responsible use of chemicals. (i9:84) Yet, in
decentralized Indonesia – being the fourth most populous country in the World – farmers´
organizationsandextensionservicesarecomparativelylessefficient.Whilesomeactorsmight
seethearmyasanefficientinstitutiontocommunicatewithIndonesianfarmers,thisideawas
quicklydismissedforobviouspoliticalandhistoricalreasons.(i9:84)
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
30
Askedabout the trust levels of farmers, vis-a-vis the three sectors active in thepartnerships,
partnershipconvenorsperceivedthatfarmersinVietnamtrustthegovernment,donottrustthe
companiesand trustcivil societyvery little. (i9:112)Unsurprisingly,aNGOworker inVietnam
perceivedahightrustgapbetweenfarmersandcompaniesaswellasthegovernment,which
wasfilledbyNGOs.(i1:58)
InIndonesia,farmerswouldtrustNGOsthemost,intheperceptionofapartnershipconvenor
we interviewed. Generally, the respondents perceived a low trust of farmers towards the
governmentandcompaniesandastrongvariationintrustdependingonthecrop,withpalmoil
small-holders highly distrusting the palm oil companies (i9:112) and similarly so with rubber
companies(i10:67).TheCSRspokespersonofaninternationalcompanypointedtothehanding
out of tools, seedling material and gifts to farmers by the Indonesian state, which in his
perception,hadlittleimpactontheirincome(i10:66).ANGOworkerinIndonesiaperceivedthe
trust levels of farmers as being generally low, with farmers not trusting the companies, not
trusting the government and not trusting each other, making it evenmore difficult to bring
themtogetheringroups(i7:49).
Institutionalization–TheArtofFormingPartnerships&Measuringitseffects
The self-reported biggest achievement of a Southeast Asian value chain platform was the
formationandformalizationofsecretariatsineachofthecountrieswheretheirpartnershipsare
operating.(i9)Developingaformalgovernancemodel,includingaprocessofrevenuecollection
and membership management, is a critical, time-consuming and delicate challenge. As the
governancemodelmustconsiderthecountry´spolitical,legalandadministrativeframeworkthe
solutionsdiffer substantially. For example, inMyanmarone such governancemodel took the
formofaregisterednot-for-profit,whichhadaBoardwithrepresentativesfromeachstate in
Myanmar.(i9)
Thecoreconcernfortheformalizationofapartnershipandthedefinitionofapre-competitive
spacearethenecessarychecksandbalancesandgrievancemechanismsthatpartnerscanuse
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
31
toreportbadbehavior(i9:148).Furthermore,themisallocationoffundsisapotentialdangerin
manycountries.Hencetheeminentneedfortransparentaccounting, thirdpartyauditingand
financialreporting.
Measuringtangibleoutputsregardingtheformationofpartnershipswasidentifiedasoneofthe
mostdifficultaspectsbyexperiencedpartnershipconvenors(i9:56). Inanswertothequestion
of, when do you know that you have formed a functioning partnership, the long timeframe
needed to build and nourish a partnership, was repeatedly mentioned (i1,4,7,9,12).
Respondentspointedoutthat“failed”partnershipscanoftenbere-adjustedtolearnfromtheir
mistakes(i7:28).
Whilemeasuringtheoutputsandeffectsofpartnershipsisessential,itcantakealongtimeto
convince the core stakeholders of its value. NGOs and civil society are generally very
comfortableininvestingtimetogathersuchdata,asapartnershipconvenorobserved(i9:58).
Thisisnotsurprisingasithasbecomeastandardpracticetoreportdataonoutputs,outcomes
andideallyimpactsofdevelopmentprojects–notleastduetothedemandofdonoragencies.
Ontheotherhand,companiesare,intheperceptionofstakeholders,notusedtomeasuringor
disclosing data on greenhouse gas emissions or the returns on investment in development
projects.Partnershipparticipantsreportedthatprivatesectoractorsmaynothaveseenmuch
valueinhavingsuchdatabutchangedtheirattitudeandcommitmentovertime,realizingthe
communicativepowerofconcretenumbers (i9:58).However, theywereonlywillingtotakea
first step, reporting on outputs such as the number of farmers´ trainings conducted and
financialdataonaggregatedinvestmentofallcompaniesintegratedintovaluechainprojects.
Conclusion
Thanks to theSustainableDevelopmentGoals, theworldnowhasacommonvocabulary that
business,government,civilsociety,andotheractorscanusetoframeeffortstowardadvancing
humanwell-being. Tomakeanalysiscomparableacrossdifferentpartnerships, it ishelpful to
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
32
use the SDGs as the benchmark, in addition to referencing the stated goals of some of the
partnerships. The SDGs provide a globally legitimized benchmark with clear metrics for pro-
poor, sustainable development. And given that the SDGs explicitly call for cross-sector
collaborationtoachievethosetargets(SDG17),itseemsparticularlyappropriatetoapplythem
toananalysisofsuchpartnerships.
The call in the SDGs and other global accords, such as the Paris climate agreement, for
collaborationacrossthesectorsandastrongrolefornon-stateactors,bothreflectsandislikely
toaccelerateanever-growingemphasisoncross-sectorcollaborationasakeymechanismfor
achievingglobalgoals.Thus,understanding theconditionsunderwhich suchpartnershipsare
morelikelytoachievegoalsisanimportantareaofresearch.
This paper has shown that collaborations can bring progress and may offer at least partial
solutionstotheendemicshortcomingsoflimitedstatehood–butonlyundercertainconditions.
First istheneedforapartnershipentrepreneur,acentraldrivingforcethathelpstoalignand
reshape how the various actors define their own interests and identities. Second is the
importance of a process of management and institutionalization to ensure that the
collaborationgoesbeyondshort-termeffortsdrivenbyahandfulofpersonalrelationships.
Beyondtheseimmediatefindings,theresearchtodatesuggeststhatattentiontothegrowing
roleof cross-sectorpartnershipsopensawealthof important researchquestions, farbeyond
thescopeofanysinglepaper,andcrossingnumerousscholarlydisciplines.Thepotentialtopics
rangefromtherelativelynarrowlyfocusedtobroadandsweepingissues.Onthemorefocused
side,forexample,akeyquestionisthedegreetowhichcollaborationscanprovidepublicgoods
across the full range of crops and agricultural support services such as finance. This kind of
government-producerinteractionvariessubstantiallybycommodity(seeMcMillanandMasters
2000,citedinBirnerandResnick2010).Researchisneededtoinvestigatewhattheintroduction
of external non-state actors in the form of big agri-business does to these relationships in
different value chains Does it empower existing elites, create new elites, or succeed in
empowering poor smallholders? Similarly, to what degree does variation in the nature of
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
33
smallholders, includingtheireducation levels,culture,collectiveactioncapacityandthesocial
capitalavailable,affecttheoutcomes?
Formanagementscholars,researchcouldfocusonthenatureoftheparticipatingfirm.Thecore
firmsthatdrivespecificpartnershipsmayvaryregardinghowtheydefinetheir incentivesand
goals in ways that may affect the outcomes of the collaboration. Firms may choose to
participateinthepartnershipsinsearchofanyorallofthefollowinggoals:(i)shorttermprofit;
(ii) developing a long term secure supply chain; (iii) pleasing the government to continue
operating in country (which then requires attention to what firms believes will please the
government;(iv)marketdevelopmentincountry(especiallyforinputproviders);and(v)global
PR, especially for firms serving international rather than purely domesticmarkets (Pope and
Meyer2015).Firmsalsovaryregardingtheirlevelsofparticipationincross-bordervoluntarybut
quasi-regulatoryprocesses such as codesof conduct and certifications,whichmay serve as a
proxy indicator forthedegreetowhichfirmsaresocialized intoabroadersenseofcorporate
responsibilityandlong-termenlightenedself-interestasopposedtoshortertermprofitseeking
The hypothesis to be tested here could be: Variations in political institutions and political
economy do not cause changes in partnership structure or outcomes (i.e., agribusiness and
partnershipmodelaretheimportantindependentvariables).
Alargersetofquestionsforfurtherresearchwouldaddresstheeffectsofvariationsinpolitical
institutions and political economy on partnership structure or outcomes. We have seen
tantalizinghintsintheresearchtodatethatpre-existingstate-marketrelationshipsleadtoquite
differentpartnershippractices,asthispaperhasshownregardingtheoutcomesinVietnamand
Indonesia. But does that subsequently lead to significant differences in the impacts that
partnerships have regarding farmer incomes, environmental sustainability, or food security?
Doesagreaterroleofthegovernmentleadtobetteroutcomesforthefarmers?Doesagreater
role of the multinational corporations (MNCs) leads to more farmer income but less
environmentalimprovement?
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
34
TheSDGsareonly twoyearsold,butalready theyarebecominga shared frameworkaround
whichactorexpectationsandpracticesarebeginningtoconverge.Theexistenceofsuchfocal
points,incombinationwiththelackofprogresstowardfullyconsolidatedstatehoodinmuchof
theworld,isreinforcingtheturntocross-sectorpartnershipsasakeymechanismforachieving
developmentgoals.Thus,scholarsofdevelopment,governance,collectiveaction,andbusiness
strategy all have a stake in contributing to greater understanding of such collaborations and
theirimplications.
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
35
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AppendixTable1AgricultureinSoutheastAsia
18InternationalMonetaryFund,WorldEconomicOutlookDatabase,Datafor2016,October2016.19UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI),Datafor2014,http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506.20WorldBank,Data,Ruralpopulation(%oftotalpopulation),Datafor2015,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?view=chart.21FAO,http://fenixservices.fao.org/faostat/static/syb/syb_101.pdf;Myanmar:Datafor2000;Allotherdatafor2014.22FAO,http://fenixservices.fao.org/faostat/static/syb/syb_101.pdf.23WorldBank,Data,Fertilizerconsumption(kilogramsperhectareofarableland),Datafor2014,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.CON.FERT.ZS.24WorldBank,Data,Easeofdoingbusinessindex,Datafor2016,http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ?view=chart.25IncludingForestry,Fishing;DataforIndonesiaandThailand:2011;Allotherdata:2012.
Myanmar VietNam Philippines Indonesia Thailand MalaysiaSOCIO-ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT Population(inmillion)18 52 93 103 259 69 31GDPpercapita,USD1 $1,307 $2,164 $2,991 $3,636 $5,662 $9,546HumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)Rank19 148 116 115 110 93 62Ruralpopulation(%oftotalpopulation)20 66% 66% 56% 46% 50% 25%Employmentinagr.(%)21 63% 47% 32% 35% 40% 9%AGRICULTURE
Valueaddedas%ofGDPbyagr.22 28% 18% 11% 13% 10% 9%ValueaddedperWorkerinagr.(const.US$) NA $489 $1,152 $1,079 $1,195 $10,127Fertilizeruse(kgperhectarearableland)23 20.5 397.4 183.1 211.8 152.3 2,063.9Emissions(NetGHG)fromAFOLU(CO2eq,Mt) 153 46 50 1,383 70 160POLITICALECONOMY
Governmentexpenditureonagr.(%total) 6.3 2.5 3.7 0.9 NA 2.6Foodexports(inmillionUS$) 1,584 7,147 3,280 24,711 18,764 21,754Foodimports(inmillionUS$) 898 7,062 4,745 11,598 6,443 12,373EaseofDoingBusiness24(1=mostbusiness-friendly) 170 82 99 91 46 23ForeignDirectInvestmentinagr.(mill.US$)25 NA 99 1 344 21 103
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Table2:StateCapacity&GovernanceIndicators
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Figure1:MotivationofCorporationstoEngageinPartnerships
Table3TargetsoftheSustainableDevelopmentGoalsLinkedtoSmallholderFarming
SustainableDevelopment
Goal Target
1NOPOVERTYEndpovertyinall
itsforms
everywhere
1.1
By 2030, eradicate extremepoverty for all people everywhere, currently
measuredaspeoplelivingonlessthan$1.25aday
1.2
By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and
children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to
nationaldefinitions
1.4
By2030,ensure thatallmenandwomen, inparticular thepoorand the
vulnerable,haveequalrightstoeconomicresources,aswellasaccessto
basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of
DRAFT2017June12–Notforciting.
41
property,inheritance,naturalresources,appropriatenewtechnologyand
financialservices,includingmicrofinance
1.5
By2030,buildtheresilienceofthepoorandthoseinvulnerablesituations
and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme
eventsandothereconomic,socialandenvironmentalshocksanddisasters
1.A
Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources,
includingthroughenhanceddevelopmentcooperation,inordertoprovide
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular
leastdevelopedcountries,toimplementprogrammesandpoliciestoend
povertyinallitsdimensions
1.B
Createsoundpolicyframeworksatthenational,regionalandinternational
levels,basedonpro-poorandgender-sensitivedevelopmentstrategies,to
supportacceleratedinvestmentinpovertyeradicationactions
2ZEROHUNGEREndhunger,
achievefood
securityand
improved
nutritionand
promote
sustainable
agriculture
2.1
By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the
poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe,
nutritiousandsufficientfoodallyearround
2.2
By2030, endall formsofmalnutrition, includingachieving,by2025, the
internationallyagreedtargetsonstuntingandwastinginchildrenunder5
years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls,
pregnantandlactatingwomenandolderpersons
2.3
By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale
foodproducers, inparticularwomen,indigenouspeoples,familyfarmers,
pastoralistsandfishers,includingthroughsecureandequalaccesstoland,
other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services,
marketsandopportunitiesforvalueadditionandnon-farmemployment
2.4
By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement
resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production,
thathelpmaintainecosystems,thatstrengthencapacityforadaptationto
climate change, extremeweather, drought, flooding and other disasters
andthatprogressivelyimprovelandandsoilquality
2.5
By 2020, maintain the genetic diversity of seeds, cultivated plants and
farmedanddomesticatedanimalsandtheirrelatedwildspecies,including
through soundly managed and diversified seed and plant banks at the
national,regionalandinternationallevels,andpromoteaccesstoandfair
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42
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic
resourcesandassociatedtraditionalknowledge,asinternationallyagreed
2.A
Increase investment, including through enhanced international
cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension
services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in
ordertoenhanceagriculturalproductivecapacityindevelopingcountries,
inparticularleastdevelopedcountries
2.B
Correctandpreventtraderestrictionsanddistortionsinworldagricultural
markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of
agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent
effect,inaccordancewiththemandateoftheDohaDevelopmentRound
2.C
Adopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity
markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market
information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme
foodpricevolatility
12RESPONSIBLECONSUMPTIONANDPRODUCTIONEnsuresustainable
consumptionand
production
patterns
12.3
By 2030, halve per capita global foodwaste at the retail and consumer
levels and reduce food losses along production and supply chains,
includingpost-harvestlosses
12.4
By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals
and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with agreed
international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air,
waterandsoilinordertominimizetheiradverseimpactsonhumanhealth
andtheenvironment
12.6
Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to
adoptsustainablepracticesandtointegratesustainabilityinformationinto
theirreportingcycle
12.A
Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and
technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of
consumptionandproduction
12.C
Rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful
consumptionbyremovingmarketdistortions,inaccordancewithnational
circumstances, includingby restructuring taxation andphasingout those
harmful subsidies, where they exist, to reflect their environmental
impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of
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43
developingcountriesandminimizingthepossibleadverseimpactsontheir
development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected
communities
15LIFEONLANDProtect,restore
andpromote
sustainableuseof
terrestrial
ecosystems,
sustainably
manageforests,
combat
desertification,
andhaltand
reverseland
degradationand
haltbiodiversity
loss
15.1
By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of
terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in
particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with
obligationsunderinternationalagreements
15.2
By2020, promote the implementationof sustainablemanagementof all
types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and
substantiallyincreaseafforestationandreforestationglobally
15.3
By2030,combatdesertification,restoredegradedlandandsoil,including
landaffectedbydesertification,droughtandfloods,andstrivetoachievea
landdegradation-neutralworld
15.5
Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural
habitats,haltthelossofbiodiversityand,by2020,protectandpreventthe
extinctionofthreatenedspecies
15.9
By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and
local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and
accounts
15.A
Mobilizeandsignificantly increase financial resources fromall sources to
conserveandsustainablyusebiodiversityandecosystems
15.B
Mobilizesignificantresourcesfromallsourcesandatall levelstofinance
sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to
developing countries to advance such management, including for
conservationandreforestation
Source:UnitedNations,SustainableDevelopmentKnowledgePlatform,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs,Lastviewed:14March2017.