nato strategy documents 1949-1969 the end of the cold war as symbolised by the opening of the berlin...

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 I

NATOSTRATEGYDOCUMENTS1949-1969

Edited by

Dr. Gregory W. PedlowChief, Historical OfficeSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

in collaboration with NATO International Staff Central Archives

Contents

1. FOREWORD p.VII

Dr. Javier SolanaSecretary GeneralNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization

2. THE EVOLUTION OF NATO STRATEGY, 1949-1969 p.IX

Dr. Gregory PedlowChief, Historical OfficeSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

3. DOCUMENTS:

MC 3 19.10.1949 p.1The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 3/1 19.11.1949 p.9The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 3/2 28.11.1949 p.41The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

DC 6 29.11.1949 p.49The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

DC 6/1 1.12.1949 p.57The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

DC 6/2 16.1.1950 p.65The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 3/3 28.3.1950 p.71Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1)

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 III

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969IV

MC 3/4 28.3.1950 p.75French proposal to amend D.C. 6/1 regarding certain lines of communication

MC 14 28.3.1950 p.85Strategic Guidance for the North Atlantic Regional Planning

DC 13 28.3.1950 (and decision 1.4.1950) p.107North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan

DC 6/3 1.4.1950 p.179Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1)

DC 6/4 24.5.1950 p.183Portuguese objection to paragraph 8g of the Strategic Concept (D.C. 6/1)

MC 3/5(Final) 3.12.1952 p.185The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area

MC 14/1(Final) 9.12.1952 p.193Strategic Guidance [supersedes DC 13 and MC 14]

MC 48(Final) 22.11.1954 p.231The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years

MC 48/1(Final) 9.12.1955 p.251The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years - Report N° 2

C-M(56)138(Final) 13.12.1956 p.269Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council

MC 14/2(Rev)(Final Decision) 23.5.1957 p.277Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area

MC 48/2(Final Decision) 23.5.1957 p.315Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept

DPC/D(67)23 11.5.1967 p.333Decisions of Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session

MC 14/3(Final) 16.1.1968 p.345Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area

MC 48/3(Final) 8.12.1969 p.371Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 V

Foreword

The end of the Cold War as symbolised by the opening of the Berlin Wall in November1989, and the many changes in NATO that soon followed, led in 1991 to a major revisionof NATO strategy, taking it away from its previous Cold War focus. One of the key aspectsof the new, post-Cold War NATO has been transparency.This new policy was most clear-ly demonstrated when the new NATO Strategic Concept of 1991 was issued as an unclas-sified document and released to the public.

NATO's new openness, combined with growing historical interest in the history of NATOduring the Cold War, led a number of historians and political scientists to ask in 1992 whe-ther NATO could declassify and release a number of its important strategy documentsfrom the 1950s and 1960s. The North Atlantic Council therefore began to consider theserequests while at the same time working on the development of policies and proceduresfor the declassification and public disclosure of older NATO documents in general, not justthose related to NATO's strategy.

Although steps were soon underway to begin the process of identifying and reviewing NATOdocuments for declassification and release, the North Atlantic Council recognized that consi-derable time would be required before all of the NATO strategy documents that had beenrequested by researchers would become available through this process, so in 1995 theCouncil decided to declassify NATO's older strategy documents as a complete package.

Aware that these strategy documents had been developed under greatly different interna-tional circumstances, the Council also decided that the publication should include an intro-ductory essay describing the evolution of NATO strategy during the 1950s and 1960s, sothat the strategy documents may be seen in their proper historical context. The essay byDr. Gregory W. Pedlow that follows, describes these historical circumstances.

Publication of the enclosed NATO strategy documents clearly demonstrates the Alliance’scommitment to transparency and openness in the new Euro-Atlantic security environment.It is my hope that all who read these documents will be enlightened about the foundationupon which the success of NATO has been built since its inception in 1949.

October 1997

Javier SOLANA

Secretary GeneralThe North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 VII

THE EVOLUTION OF NATO STRATEGY1949-1969

by Dr. Gregory W. PedlowChief, Historical OfficeSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 IX

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XI

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty inWashington on 4 April 1949 was the firststep in the development of a comprehensi-ve strategy for the new Alliance. Article 3of the treaty called for the signatories to“maintain and develop their individual andcollective capacity to resist armed attack”,while Article 5 stated that “the Partiesagree that an armed attack against one ormore of them in Europe or America shallbe considered an attack against them all”and in such an event, each of them wouldexercise the right of individual or collectiveself-defence. Article 9 then began the pro-cess of giving the Alliance an organisationalstructure by establishing the North AtlanticCouncil (NAC) and calling for it to “set upsuch subsidiary bodies as may be necessa-ry; in particular it shall establish immediate-ly a defence committee which shall recom-mend measures for the implementation ofArticles 3 and 5.”

Once the process of ratifying the Treatywas completed in August 1949, the NorthAtlantic Council (at that time composedsolely of the Foreign Ministers of the mem-ber nations) set about creating the structu-re that would be needed to carry out theprocess of planning for collective selfdefen-ce, a key aspect of which would be thedevelopment of an overall strategicconcept for the Alliance. In September1949 the Council created the DefenceCommittee (DC), which was composed ofthe Defence Ministers of the membernations; the Defence Committee was tas-ked with drawing up unified defence plansfor the North Atlantic area. The Councilalso created the Military Committee (MC),made up of the Chiefs of Staff of the mem-ber nations, along with a three-nation exe-cutive body known as the Standing Group(SG) tasked to oversee the military plan-ning process while the Military Committeewas not in session (1). The Alliance did notyet have an integrated military commandstructure; instead there was a looser com-mittee system with five Regional PlanningGroups composed of representatives fromthe member nations. Chart 1 shows the

NATO structure that had come into exis-tence by the end of 1949(2).

The new NATO bodies immediately setabout developing an overall strategy for theAlliance. One of the key factors that wouldbe considered in this process was the useof nuclear weapons to defend the NorthAtlantic area. At this time most Westernmilitary planners believed that NATO wasgreatly inferior in conventional militarystrength to the Soviet Union and its EasternEuropean satellites. This perception, alongwith the United States’ preeminence in thenuclear field, therefore profoundly influen-ced the development of NATO strategy.

Initial Strategic Planning,19491950

The first NATO strategy document wasknown as “The Strategic Concept for theDefense of the North Atlantic Area”. Aninitial draft bearing this title was preparedby the Standing Group on 10 October1949 as document SG 1 and then circula-ted to their Chiefs of Staff for comments.After incorporating a few minor editorialchanges into the document, the StandingGroup submitted the Strategic Concept tothe Military Committee as MC 3 on 19October 1949 (3). As the Standing Group’stransmittal letter noted, MC 3 was “drawnup in broad terms which take into accountboth political and strategic considerations”.The Standing Group added that in the futu-re it would issue “more detailed strategicguidance of a purely military nature” for useby the Regional Planning Groups.

MC 3’s main objective was “adequate mili-tary strength accompanied by economy ofeffort, resources and manpower”. It isimportant to note that even the earliestdrafts of NATO’s strategic concept alreadymentioned nuclear weapons. Thus MC 3’ssection on “Military Measures to ImplementDefense Concept” called for the Alliance to“insure the ability to deliver the atomicbomb promptly. This is primarily a US res-ponsibility assisted as practicable by thenations”. In addition to this proposed use

A At that time there was noMilitary Committee in Per-manent Session, and theMilitary Committee (Chiefsof Staff) met very infre-quently. As a result, theStanding Group (whichwas composed of seniormilitary representativesfrom France, the UnitedKingdom and the UnitedStates) enjoyed consider-able power. The othermembers of the Alliancecould send Military Repre-sentatives Accredited to theStanding Group to Wash-ington, but these represen-tatives had little real pow-er. In December 1950 thestatus of these representa-tives increased with theformation of the MilitaryRepresentatives Committeemeeting on a permanentbasis, but this committeeshould not be seen as theequivalent of a permanentsession of the MilitaryCommittee, so the Stand-ing Group remained thedominant body in oversee-ing military strategy andplans during the early1950s. For an analysis ofthe Alliance’s militarystructures during the1950s see Douglas L.Bland, The Military Com-mittee of the North AtlanticAlliance: A Study of Struc-ture and Strategy (NewYork, 1991), pp. 135-155.

2 Doris M. Condit, The Testof War, 1950-1953, Historyof the Office of the Secretaryof Defense, vol. 2 (Washing-ton, 1988). p. 313.

3 Documents submitted toand approved by theMilitary Committee are allnumbered in the MCseries, but not all suchdocuments relate to strate-gic issues. MC 3 is therefo-re the first MC documentto set forth the NATOStrategic Concept.Defence Committee docu-ments bear DC numbers,while documents issued bythe Standing Group are inthe SG series. The initialdraft of the StrategicConcept, SG 1, is notincluded in the presentcollection because it is vir-tually identical to MC 3.

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969XII

of nuclear weapons to defend the NorthAtlantic area, MC 3 called for the membernations to “arrest and counter as soon aspracticable the enemy offensives againstNorth Atlantic Treaty powers by all meansavailable, including air, naval, land and psy-chological operations”, noting that initiallythe “hard core” of ground power wouldhave to come from the European nationswhile the others were mobilising. Othermilitary measures included neutralisingenemy air operations, securing and control-ling the sea and air lines of communication,defending the main support areas andbases that would be essential to the defen-ce of the Alliance, and mobilising andexpanding the overall power of the Alliednations for “later offensive operations desi-gned to maintain the security of the NorthAtlantic Treaty area”.

Comments by the Military Committee andsome of the national delegations led to

minor revisions in the document, which wasissued under the same title as MC 3/1 on19 November 1949 and MC 3/2 on 28November 1949. MC 3/2’s revised sectionon military measures strengthened thewording of the statement on nuclear wea-pons by stating that the Alliance should“insure the ability to carry out strategicbombing including the prompt delivery ofthe atomic bomb”. At this point, however,MC 3/2 was not yet an approved NATOstrategy document, for it lacked the finalstep-Ministerial approval.

On 29 November 1949 the Militar yCommittee transmitted its strategicconcept to the Defence Committee asdocument DC 6, still with the title of“Strategic Concept for the Defense of theNorth Atlantic Area”. The statement onthe “prompt delivery of the atomic bomb”remained unchanged from MC 3/2, andwhen the Defence Committee met to dis-

CHART 1

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969

4 Minutes of the DefenceCommittee, 2ndMeeting, 1 December1949, Item 8.

5 Lord Ismay, NATO:The First Five Years,1949-1954 (Paris,1954), p. 27. In 1951the NAC absorbed theDefence Committee;thereafter theCouncil’s membershipwas not limited solelyto Foreign Ministers.

6 SG 13/16 has not beenreprinted separately inthe present volumebecause the entiredocument is includedas the Enclosure to MC14.

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cuss DC 6 on 1 December 1949, theDanish Defence Minister expressed hisgovernment’s concerns about the strategicconcept containing such an explicit state-ment on the use of the atomic bomb.Other defence ministers wished to retainthe statement, and the Defence Committeefinally accepted a compromise offered bythe Chairman, U.S. Secretary of DefenseLouis Johnson - to strike out reference tothe atomic bomb “with the understandingthat the striking out recognizes no changeof position”. The agreed wording was thatthe Alliance should “insure the ability tocarry out strategic bombing promptly by allmeans possible with all types of weapons,without exception”(4).

The new wording on strategic bombingwas the only major change to DC 6, and arevised version incorporating the changesmade by the Defence Committee wasissued as DC 6/1 on 1 December 1949.DC 6/1 was thus the first NATO strategydocument to receive ministerial approval,since the Defence Committee was compo-sed of the NATO Defence Ministers andwas preparing the Alliance’s strategy at thebehest of the North Atlantic Council. On6 January 1950 the NAC gave its approvalto the new strategic concept at the thirdCouncil meeting in Washington(5).

Like the MC 3 series documents fromwhich it was derived, DC 6/1 emphasisedthat each nation’s contribution to defenceshould be in proportion to its geographicalposition, industrial capacity, population andmilitary capabilities. The document alsonoted that in developing their militarystrength consistent with overall plans, theallies “should bear in mind that economicrecovery and the attainment of economicstability constitute important elements oftheir security”; thus the goal of NATOdefence planning was to be a “successfuldefence of the Nor th Atlantic Treatynations through maximum efficiency oftheir armed forces with the minimumnecessary expenditures of manpower,money and materials”.

DC 6/1 provided an overall strategicconcept for the Alliance, but much moredetailed strategic guidance was needed foruse by the Regional Planning Groups indeveloping their regional defence plans, soat its second meeting on 29 November1949, the Military Committee directed theStanding Group to prepare detailed“Strategic Guidance for North AtlanticRegional Planning” and then submit a draftto the Military Representatives Accreditedto the Standing Group so that commentscould be solicited from the nations andincorporated into the Strategic Guidancepaper. Once this process of incorporatingnational comments was completed, theStrategic Guidance paper (SG 13/16) wassent to the Regional Planning Groups on 6January 1950. Formal approval of the“Strategic Guidance for North AtlanticRegional Planning” came at the third mee-ting of the Military Committee on 28March 1950, at which SG 13/16 was appro-ved as MC 14(6).

MC 14 provided additional strategic gui-dance to permit regional planning groups todevelop detailed defence plans to meetcontingencies up to July 1954. The StandingGroup’s introductory directive to theRegional Planning Groups warned that “theNorth Atlantic Treaty nations should not bemisled into planning in the frame of mindprevailing at the end of World War II, whichwas largely based on the enormous milita-ry power available to the Allies at thattime.” Noting that NATO nations wouldrequire many years to raise similar forceswhile the USSR had “maintained, if notincreased, her technical, military and econo-mic capabilities”, the Standing Group statedthat “special emphasis must be laid on thenecessity for developing methods to com-pensate for numerical inferiority”.

The key objectives of NATO’s defence poli-cy as set forth in MC 14 were “to convincethe USSR that war does not pay, and shouldwar occur, to ensure a successful defence”of the NATO area. MC 14 assumed that inthe event of war, the Soviet Union wouldattempt to defeat NATO forces and reach

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969XIV

the Atlantic coast, the Mediterranean andthe Middle East. Another key assumptionwas that “all types of weapons, withoutexception, might be used by either side”.MC 14 instructed military planners in theRegional Planning Groups to develop plansaimed at holding the enemy as far to theeast as possible in Germany, as far to theeast and north as possible in Italy, and “out-side a defensible area” in Northern Europe.MC 14 also included detailed intelligenceguidance for regional planning, including anassessment of Soviet strategic intentions.

Even before MC 14 was officially adopted, itssource document - SG 13/16 - was servingas the basis for the defence plans being pre-pared by the Regional Planning Groupsduring the early months of 1950. TheStanding Group then consolidated theseplans into the “North Atlantic TreatyOrganization Medium Term Plan”, which wasapproved by the Military Committee on 28March 1950 and forwarded to the DefenceCommittee as DC 13. Defence Committeeapproval followed on 1 April 1950.

As the most detailed strategy-related docu-ment produced heretofore by NATO, DC13 bore a cover sheet stating, “Because ofthe secrecy of the contents of this docu-ment, it is being given a specially limited dis-tribution.” Although titled simply a “MediumTerm Plan”, DC 13 included considerablestrategic guidance; in fact, a subsequent stra-tegy document, MC 14/1, stated that DC 13had “provided the basis for all NATO strate-gic planning”. In its section on DefencePolicy, DC 13 incorporated the strategicconcepts of DC 6/1 and the strategic gui-dance of MC 14. DC 13 stated that the ove-rall strategic aim of NATO, should war breakout, would be “to destroy by a strategicoffensive in Western Eurasia the will andcapabilities of the USSR and her satellites towage war”. The document envisaged fourphases for the operations that would occurafter the outbreak of hostilities:

PHASE I - D-Day to the stabilization of ini-tial Soviet offensive, to include the initiationof the Allied air offensive.

PHASE 2 - Stabilization of initial Soviet of-fensive to allied initiation of major offensiveoperations.

PHASE 3 - Allied initiation of major offensi-ve operations until Soviet capitulation isobtained.

PHASE 4 - Final Achievement of Allied WarObjectives.

DC 13 also set forth a concept of opera-tions for Phase 1 operations. The threeEuropean Regions of NATO were conside-red to constitute the “couverture” facingeast of the North Atlantic Treaty Area. Theirprimary task was thus to “delay and arrestthe enemy advance” and they were to dothis “as far to the East as possible” while“making full use of mobility and offensiveaction whenever opportunity offers”.Sabotage and subversive action were seenas means of providing some additional delay,and “maximum support” was to be given to“such psychological measures as might betaken against the enemy”. Through all thesemeans the forces constituting the major ele-ment of the “couverture” of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Area would “gain time forreinforcements to arrive and for cumulativeeffect of the strategic air offensive to be felt”.As for the North American Area, its “initialbasic undertaking is to initiate the strategicair offensive against the enemy at the outsetof hostilities”.

DC 13 also contained an estimate of theforce requirements considered necessaryfor the implementation of these plans bythe target year of 1954. In addition to2,324 warships of varying sizes from battle-ships down to minesweepers and 3,264naval aircraft, DC 13 called for 90 divisionsin NATO’s land forces and 8,004 combataircraft in NATO’s air forces.

The adoption of DC 13 on 1 April 1950,almost exactly one year after the signing ofthe North Atlantic Treaty, marked the endof the initial formulation of NATO’s strate-gy. This strategy was contained in threebasic documents: DC 6/1, which set forththe overall strategic concept; MC 14, which


7 Condit, Test of War,pp. 344-347. For theevolution of NATO’smilitary commandstructure during the1950s and the politi-cal disputes that hadto be overcome in thisprocess, see GregoryW. Pedlow, ”ThePolitics of NATOCommand, 1950-1962“ in U.S. MilitaryForces in Europe: TheEarly Years, ed. bySimon W. Duke andWolfgang Krieger(Boulder, 1993), pp.15-42.

8 The revised documentwas not called DC 6/2because the DefenceCommittee no longerexisted, having beenabsorbed by the NACin 1951. All militarystrategy documentswould henceforth bearMC numbers.

9 Although listed as”superseded“ by MC3/5(Final), SG 1/7had never been a stra-tegy document in itsown right but simply aproposal for modifica-tions to DC 6/1.

XV

provided more specific strategic guidancefor use in defence planning; and DC 13,which included both of these aspects aswell as considerable detailed regional plan-ning. It is important to note that the keyelements of NATO strategy, including theuse of atomic weapons to defend Europe,were thus already in place before the out-break of the Korean War.

Evolution of NATO, 1950-1952

When North Korean forces launched theirinvasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950,starting a conflict that soon saw troops ofthe United States and other NATO mem-bers fighting there on behalf of the UnitedNations, fear quickly grew that WesternEurope, which also contained onehalf of acountry divided along ideological lines,might be the next target of Soviet-sponsored aggression. Recognising that theexisting loose NATO structure of planninggroups would not prove adequate in such aconflict, the North Atlantic Council on 26September 1950 approved the establish-ment of an integrated military force undercentralised command. Then on 19 Decem-ber 1950 the Council requested the nomi-nation of General Dwight D. Eisenhower asthe first Supreme Allied CommanderEurope (SACEUR), and he soon arrived inEurope to supervise the work of the plan-ning group preparing for the creation of hisnew headquarters, the Supreme Head-quarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).On 2 April 1951 General Eisenhower’scommand - Allied Command Europe (ACE) -and its new headquarters SHAPE were acti-vated, and the new headquarters took overthe work of the three European RegionalPlanning Groups, which were abolished. TheNorth Atlantic Ocean Regional PlanningGroup was replaced in 1952 by AlliedCommand Atlantic (headed by a secondSupreme Commander known as SACLANT -Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic), lea-ving only the Canada-US Regional PlanningGroup still in existence out of the originalfive. That same year a third major NATOcommand area was established to deal with

the English Channel and adjoining coastalwaters - a Channel Committee overseeingnaval and air commands for the Channelarea. On 18 February 1952 Greece andTurkey joined the Alliance. Shortly after-ward, at the North Atlantic Council meetingin Lisbon on 20-25 February 1952, theAlliance improved its organisational structu-re, creating the post of Secretary Generaland establishing a permanent session of theCouncil. Chart 2 shows the Alliance’s orga-nisational structure after the changes of1952(7).

While these structural changes were occur-ring, the Alliance continued to refine itsstrategy documents. On March 1950Portugal and France proposed some smallchanges (MC 3/3 and 3/4 respectively) tothe Strategic Concept; these were appro-ved by the Defence Committee as DC 6/3and DC 6/4 on 1 April and 24 May 1950respectively. By the autumn of 1952 theStanding Group believed that a more com-prehensive review of the Strategic Concept(DC 6/1 of 1 December 1949) was neededin order to reflect the addition of the twonew member nations and the Alliance’ssubstantial organizational changes since late1950. The result was SG 1/7 (“TheStrategic Concept for the Defense of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Area”) on 6November 1952. SG 1/7 proposed a num-ber of “minor factual amendments” to DC6/1 but stated that “no substantive modifi-cation” was required.

The proposed amendments to DC 6/1were accepted by the Military Represen-tatives Committee as MC 3/5 and thenapproved by the NAC on 3 December1952(8). MC 3/5 (Final), “The StrategicConcept for the Defense of the NorthAtlantic Area”, was now the official strategicconcept for NATO, superseding DC 6/1and SG 1/7(9). Overall the wording of MC3/5 was quite similar to DC 6/1. Thus thesection on Military Measures still called forNATO defence plans to “insure the abilityto carry out strategic bombing promptly byall means possible with all types of wea-pons, without exception”.

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969XVI

Just as the Strategic Concept required revi-sion to reflect new Alliance members andorganisational structures, so did theStrategic Guidance. In addition there hadbeen changes in intelligence estimates, andthe planning period had been extended to1956. The Standing Group therefore deci-ded to carry out a major revision of MC 14while at the same time incorporating mostof the information that had previously beencontained in DC 13. On 9 December 1952the Military Committee approved MC 14/1,“Strategic Guidance”, which supersededboth MC 14 and DC 13. Approval by theNAC followed at the Ministerial Meeting inParis on 15-18 December 1952.

MC 14/1 was far more detailed than MC 14because the new document included manysubjects previously covered by DC 13, inclu-ding assumptions, estimated enemy capabili-ties, and courses of action. MC 14/1 statedthat the Alliance’s overall strategic aim was“to ensure the defense of the NATO area

and to destroy the will and capability of theSoviet Union and her satellites to wage war,initially by means of an air offensive, while atthe same time conducting air, ground and seaoperations”. Allied strategic air attacks woulduse “all types of weapons”. MC 14/1 alsoconsidered the possible impact of “weaponsof mass destruction” upon NATO force goalsand concluded that because “the conventio-nal NATO forces at present in being fall farshort of requirements, no relaxation can beallowed in their planned expansion” duringthe period 1953-54. However, “greater availa-bility of such weapons and increased deliverycapability during the period 1954-56 maythen necessitate reevaluation of the require-ments for a successful defense of the NAT[North Atlantic Treaty] area”.

The New Look/New Approach,1953-1954

The Lisbon NAC meeting in February 1952had set very ambitious Force Goals by

CHART 2


J NSC 162/2, Basic Natio-nal Security Policy, 30October 1953, in ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates [hereafter cited asFRUS], 1952-1954, vol. 2,National Security Affairs,pp. 585-586, 593. For theevolution of U.S. nuclearpolicy during theEisenhower Administra-tion see David AlanRosenberg, ”The Originsof Overkill: NuclearWeapons and AmericanStrategy, 1945-1960,“International Security, vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring1983), pp. 3-71.

K Robert Wampler, NATOStrategic Planning andNuclear Weapons,Nuclear History ProgramOccasional Paper 6(College Park, Maryland,1990), p. 9; Lawrence S.Kaplan, NATO and theUnited States: The Enduring Alliance(Boston, 1988), p. 60.

L North Atlantic Council,C-M(53)166(Final),Resolution on the 1954Annual Review andRelated Problems, 15December 1953.

M Statement by the Secre-tary of State to the NorthAtlantic Council ClosedMinisterial Session, Paris,23 April 1954, in FRUS,1952-1953, vol. 5,Western EuropeanSecurity, pp. 511-512.

N Robert J. Watson, TheJoint Chiefs of Staff andNational Policy, 1953-1954, History of the JointChiefs of Staff 5(Washington, 1986), pp.304-306, 311-313, 316-317; Wampler, NATOStrategic Planning, pp.11-16; John S. Duffield,Power Rules: TheEvolution of NATO’sConventional ForcePosture (Stanford, 1995),pp. 85-87.

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1954 a total of 96 NATO divisions after 90days of mobilisation, with almost half of thedivisions to be ready at the star t of hostili-ties - but fulfilling these goals proved finan-cially and politically impossible for themembers of the Alliance. Even the UnitedStates under the new administration ofPresident Eisenhower began to look forways to gain greater military effectivenessfrom a military budget that was no longerlikely to increase substantially, and the gro-wing availability of nuclear weapons see-med to offer ”more bang for the buck“. Asa result, U.S. defence policy shifted in 1953to the “New Look”, which placed greateremphasis on the use of nuclear weapons.The new policy was set forth in NSC 162/2of 30 October 1953, which stated: “In theevent of hostilities, the United States willconsider nuclear weapons to be as availablefor use as other weapons”. NSC 162/2 alsopointed out the importance of nuclearweapons to the defence of Europe: “Themajor deterrent to aggression againstWestern Europe is the manifest determina-tion of the United States to use its atomiccapability and massive retaliatory power ifthe area is attacked.”(10)

Meanwhile the NATO Military Authoritieswere grappling with the question of how tointegrate nuclear weapons into NATO stra-tegy. On 10 July 1953 SACEUR Matthew B.Ridgway submitted to the Standing Groupa report on estimated force requirementsfor 1956; this was the first extensive exami-nation of NATO strategy to include nuclearweapons. Ridgway’s report proved contro-versial because it concluded that the use ofnuclear weapons would necessitateincreases, not decreases, in force levels, dueto expected high casualty rates(11).

Soon after issuing the report, Ridgway wasreplaced as SACEUR by General AlfredGruenther, who called for a fresh look atthe integration of nuclear weapons intoNATO strategy. Gruenther therefore esta-blished a “New Approach Group” atSHAPE in August 1953 to study this issue.While the “New Approach” studies were

still in progress, the NAC asked the NATOMilitary Authorities on 10 December 1953to provide a reassessment of the militarystrength needed by the Alliance in themidto late 1950s(12).

At this time the United States - with thesupport of a number of European allies -was calling for the complete integration ofnuclear weapons into NATO strategy. On23 April 1954 U.S. Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles made a special address to theNAC in which he stressed the great nume-rical disparity between the conventionalforces of NATO and the forces of theSoviet bloc and called for NATO’s agreedpolicy to be “to use atomic weapons asconventional weapons against the militaryassets of the enemy whenever and where-ver it would be of advantage to do so”(13).

By the summer of 1954 SHAPE had com-pleted its work on the “New Approach” andsubmitted two major studies to the StandingGroup: SACEUR’s Capabilities Study for1957 and a paper on The Most EffectivePattern of NATO Military Strength for theNext Few Years. The Standing Group com-bined the latter study with submissions fromthe other NATO military commanders toproduce a draft Standing Group report thatultimately became a major new NATO stra-tegy document, MC 48(14).

Temporarily distracted in the autumn of1954 by the collapse of the proposedEuropean Defence Community and thesubsequent negotiations that led to theadmission of the Federal Republic ofGermany into the Alliance, the MilitaryCommittee approved MC 48, “The MostEffective Pattern of NATO Military Strengthfor the Next Few Years”, on 22 November1954. This document was much broaderthan its title indicates, for MC 48 actuallyprovided interim strategic guidance pendinga review of MC 14/1 and therefore contai-ned many concepts and assumptions thatwould later be included in MC 14/2. Incontrast to previous strategy documents,which made only veiled references to


O For an evaluation of themajor shift in NATOstrategy that came withthe approval of MC 48,see Marc Trachtenberg,”La formation du systè-me de défense occiden-tale: les Etats-Unis, laFrance, et MC 48“ inFrance et l’OTAN,1949-1996, ed. byMaurice Vaisse (Paris,1996), pp. 115-126.

P NATO InformationService, Texts of FinalCommuniques 1949-1974, Issued byMinisterial Session ofthe North AtlanticCouncil, the DefencePlanning Committeeand the NuclearPlanning Group(Brussels, no date), p. 87.

Q North AtlanticCouncil, C-M(54)118(Final),Resolution on the1955 Annual Reviewand Related Problems,17 December 1954.

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nuclear weapons by using the phrase “alltypes of weapons without exception”, MC48 explicitly discussed the use of nuclearweapons. The new document stated that“the advent of atomic weapons systems willdrastically change the conditions of modernwar”.As a result,“superiority in atomic wea-pons and the capability to deliver them willbe the most important factor in a majorwar in the foreseeable future”.

MC 48 concluded that “essential NATOforces must first of all be forces-in-being”equipped with an “integrated atomic capa-bility”. While expecting that a future majorwar in Europe would start with a surpriseSoviet attack and would involve massivenuclear exchanges, MC 48 did not limitNATO use of nuclear weapons to a retalia-tory strike after Soviet first use. Thus MC48 called for the NATO Military Authoritiesto be authorized to “plan and make prepa-rations on the assumption that atomic andthermo-nuclear weapons will be used indefense from the outset“. In the event ofthe ”remote possibility that the Sovietsmight attempt to take advantage of theirpreponderance in land and tactical air forcesto overrun Europe without employing ato-mic weapons,“ MC 48 argued that ”NATOwould be unable to prevent the rapid over-running of Europe unless NATO immedia-tely employed these weapons both strategi-cally and tactically.“ The concept of ”MassiveRetaliation“ that is normally associated witha later NATO strategy document, MC 14/2,can thus be more appropriately associatedwith MC 48 and its call for the massive useof nuclear weapons to defend Europeagainst aggression(15).

On 17 December 1954 the NAC Ministe-rial Session approved MC 48 and therebygave political approval for planning thedefence of the NATO area using nuclearweapons. However, the ministers pointedout in the final communiqué that “thisapproval did not involve the delegation ofthe responsibility of governments to makedecisions for putting plans into action in theevent of hostilities”(16).

Discussions on Strategy, 1955-57

With military technology and planningchanging so rapidly, the Council asked theMilitary Committee in December 1954 to“continue to examine, in conformity withthe agreed strategic concept and within theresources which it is anticipated may bemade available, the most effective patternof military strength for the next few years”and also to indicate to the member govern-ments “how the reassessment in MC 48 ofthe pattern of military strength shouldaffect national defense programs” (17). Thisrequest led the Military Committee to issueMC 48/1, “The Most Effective Pattern ofNATO Military Strength for the Next FewYears - Report No. 2”, on 26 September1955. The Military Representatives Com-mittee, acting on behalf of the MilitaryCommittee, approved the report on 14November 1955, and final approval by theMilitary Committee itself, following incor-poration of one amendment, came on 9December 1955.

As the subtitle “Report No. 2” indicates,MC 48/1 did not supersede MC 48 butsimply provided additional information.Thus MC 48/1 confirmed the forwarddefence strategy outlined in MC 48 butnoted that because of delays in the Germanmilitary contribution, effective implementa-tion of the forward strategy would notoccur before mid-1959 at the earliest. MC48/1 described the status of NATO militaryplanning and preparations for the conceptscontained in MC 48 and called for additio-nal priority improvements such as the pro-vision of adequate early warning, modernalert systems and air defence.

Although the key decision to move towardsubstantial use of nuclear weapons todefend the NATO area had already beentaken with the approval of MC 48 and MC48/1, there was still a need to reconcile thenew documents with the older strategydocuments still in effect (MC 3/5 and MC14/1, both dating from 1952). Thus in thesummer of 1956, the Standing Group andthe Military Committee began to work on


R Wampler, NATOStrategic Planning, pp.35-38; Duffield, PowerRules, pp. 121-128.

S North AtlanticCouncil, C-M(55)113(Revised),NATO DefencePlanning: Note by theSecretary General, 8 December 1955.

T Wampler, NATOStrategic Planning, pp.36-37.

During this periodNATO’s forwarddeployed militaryforces were known asthe ”Shield“, while theU.S. strategic bomberforce was consideredNATO’s ”Sword“.

XIX

two new documents (draft MC 14/2 anddraft MC 48/2) to create a coherent set ofstrategy documents.

At first the intent was simply to edit theolder papers to bring them into line withthe concepts in MC 48 and MC 48/1, butnew ideas soon began to enter into theprocess, including France’s request for MC14/2 to include sections dealing with theeffects upon NATO of Soviet political andeconomic activities outside the NATO area.The importance of events outside theNATO area took on even greater signifi-cance in the autumn of 1956, when theUnited Kingdom and France attempted toregain control of the Suez Canal fromEgypt, a move which met with strong oppo-sition from the United States. The SovietUnion then took advantage of Westerndisunity and preoccupation with the MiddleEast by sending troops and tanks to sup-press the attempt by Hungary to movetoward a more democratic form of socia-lism, thus crushing Western hopes for bet-ter relations with the Soviets(18).

While the NATO Military Authorities wereworking on a new strategy documents, themember nations were warning that “thesafety of the Alliance cannot be secured bymilitary means alone”. This concern wasnoted by Secretary General Lord Ismay in aCouncil Memorandum on 8 December1955, along with “a widespread feeling that itwill become increasingly difficult to sustainpopular support for defence expendituresas now planned unless governments canexplain more clearly why the money is nee-ded”. Lord Ismay’s memorandum alsoexpressed governments’ concerns that“considerable expenditure will be needed toachieve the basic objectives of our strategy”,and he therefore called for a “more detailedappraisal of the implications of the NewLook than has hitherto been possible”(19).

The strongest advocate of the need forsavings in defence expenditures was theUnited Kingdom, which began pushing forthe North Atlantic Council to issue politicalguidance that would cause the NATO mili-

tary authorities to reduce force require-ments by relying almost completely onnuclear weapons to defend Europe(20).Other nations were not willing to go this far,however, and the resulting “political directi-ve” of 13 December 1956 contained aconsiderable degree of flexibility.CM(56)138, “Directive to the NATOMilitary Authorities from the North AtlanticCouncil” called for a review of NATOdefence planning “to determine how, withinthe resources likely to be available, thedefence effort of the Alliance and of eachindividual member can best achieve themost effective pattern of forces”. The docu-ment contained two parts, an analysis ofSoviet intentions and the directive itself,which stated that the Alliance should main-tain forces sufficient “to keep confidence inthe military effectiveness of the NATOdefence organization, and thereby to contri-bute to the deterrent to aggression” andalso able to deal with armed aggression “inaccordance with the concept of ‘forwardstrategy’, counting on the use of nuclearweapons at the outset”. Despite this state-ment, however, the Political Directive didnot support the idea of a ”trip-wire“ strate-gy for NATO. Thus the Political Directivestated that allied “Shield”(21) forces shouldhave the ability to deal with infiltrations,incursions or hostile local actions “withoutnecessarily having recourse to nuclear wea-pons”. The importance of out-of-areaevents was reflected in the statement:“Although NATO defence planning is limi-ted to the defence of the Treaty area, it isnecessary to take account of the dangerswhich may arise for NATO because ofdevelopments outside that area.”

The issuance of C-M(56)138 marked thefirst time that the North Atlantic Councilhad given such detailed political guidance tothe NATO military authorities, and theStanding Group immediately took the newpolitical directive into account in its ongoingrevision of NATO strategy. The result wastwo new strategy documents - MC 14/2(the new “Strategic Concept”) and MC48/2 (“Measures to Implement the


This considerabledegree of flexibility inMC 14/2 and MC 48/2has led one recentstudy of NATO strategyto characterise thenew strategy as one of”DifferentiatedResponses“ or ”FlexibleResponse I“. BeatriceHeuser, NATO, Britain,France and the FRG:Nuclear Strategies andForces for Europe,1949-2000 (London,1997). p. 40.

North AtlanticCouncil, C-R(57)30, II,9 May 1957.

XX

Strategic Concept”) - which were approvedby the Military Committee in April 1957 forsubmission to the Council.

MC 14/2, “Overall Strategic Concept forthe Defence of the NATO Area”, placedheavy emphasis placed upon the use ofnuclear weapons in the defence of theNATO area. MC 14/2’s section on theStrategic Concept stated:

Our chief objective is to prevent war bycreating an effective deterrent to aggres-sion. The principal elements of the deter-rent are adequate nuclear and other readyforces and the manifest determination toretaliate against any aggressor with all theforces at our disposal, including nuclearweapons, which the defense of NATOwould require.

In preparation for a general war, should onebe forced upon us:

a. We must first ensure the ability to carryout an instant and devastating nuclearcounteroffensive by all available meansand develop the capability to absorband survive the enemy’s onslaught.

b. Concurrently and closely related to theattainment of this aim, we must developour ability to use our land, sea and airforces for defense of their territoriesand sea areas of NATO as far forward aspossible to maintain the integrity of theNATO area, counting on the use ofnuclear weapons from the outset.

Although MC 14/2 is often characterised asa strategy of “massive retaliation” in whichNATO conventional forces served merelyas a “trip wire” for the launching of NATO’snuclear retaliatory forces, the actual docu-ment provided for some flexibility in dealingwith “infiltration, incursions, or hostile localactions”. In keeping with the PoliticalDirective, MC 14/2 called for conventionalforces to be able to deal with such lessercontingencies “without necessarily havingrecourse to nuclear weapons”(22).

The companion document to MC 14/2 wasMC 48/2 (“Measures to Implement the

Strategic Concept”), which set forth themilitary measures needed to implement thenew strategy. MC 48/2 stated that therewere two types of NATO forces, NuclearRetaliatory Forces and Shield Forces, whichwould “defend the sea areas and NATOterritories as far forward as possible inorder to maintain the integrity of theNATO area, counting on the use of theirnuclear weapons at the outset”.

Although MC 48/2 focused primarily onnuclear warfare, the new document - likeMC 14/2 - did contain an element of flexibi-lity in its call for NATO to be able to dealwith “a limited military situation in theNATO area which an aggressor might crea-te in the belief that gains could be achievedwithout provoking NATO to general war”.To deal with such an eventuality, NATOforces should be capable of acting “prompt-ly to restore and maintain the security of theNATO area without necessarily havingrecourse to nuclear weapons”. Such flexibi-lity did not, however, include the idea of alimited war, for MC 48/2 repeated a state-ment contained in MC 14/2: “If the Sovietswere involved in a hostile local action andsought to broaden the scope of such an inci-dent or prolong it, the situation would callfor the utilization of all weapons and forcesat NATO’s disposal, since in no case is therea concept of limited war with the Soviets.”

The two new strategy documents receivedCouncil approval on 9 May 1957 afterconsiderable discussion. The most contro-versial issue was the documentsí declara-tion that “in no case is there a NATOconcept of limited war with the Soviets”,which the Netherlands PermanentRepresentative felt was too restrictive. Hefinally gave his approval to the documentafter stating that the NetherlandsDelegation considered this statement “toocategorical” and reserved the right to askfor a revision of the document if studiescurrently underway by SACEUR showedthis to be necessary (23). As part of thiscompromise, the Council agreed that “incommunicating Council approval of thetwo documents to the military authorities,


J. Michael Legge,Theater NuclearWeapons and theNATO Strategy ofFlexible Response(Santa Monica, 1983),p. 9.

Although the records ofthe LIVE OAK organisa-tion remain classifieduntil the year 2005 byagreement of the fourpowers [the FederalRepublic of Germanyjoined LIVE OAK in1961], considerabledetail about Alliedplanning for theSecond Berlin Crisiscan be found in declas-sified national docu-ments, in particularfrom the UnitedKingdom and UnitedStates. See Gregory W.Pedlow, “Allied CrisisManagement forBerlin: the LIVE OAKOrganization, 1959-1963” in InternationalCold War MilitaryRecords and History:Proceedings of theInternationalConference on ColdWar Military Recordsand History Held inWashington D.C. 2126March 1994, ed. byWilliam W. Epley(Washington, 1996),pp. 87-116.

Policy Directive, NATOand the AtlanticNations, 20 April 1961,in FRUS, 1961-1963,vol. 13, West Europeand Canada, p. 285.For a comprehensivereview of the develop-ment of KennedyAdministration policieson nuclear strategy seeJane E. Stromseth, TheOrigins of FlexibleResponse: NATO’sDebate over Strategy inthe 1960s (London,1988), pp. 26-41;Johannes Steinhoff andReiner Pommerin,Strategiewechsel:Bundesrepublik undNuklearstrategie in derÁra Adenauer-Kennedy(BadenBaden, 1992),pp. 72-81.

XXI

the latter should be given copies of therecord of the present discussion”. MC 14/2and MC 48/2 together superseded the fourstrategic document that had until thenbeen in effect: MC 3/5, MC 14/1, MC 48and MC 48/1 [Chart 3 traces the evolutionof NATO’s strategy documents]. The twonew strategy documents were issued infinal form on 23 May 1957.

Growing Disenchantment with “Massive Retaliation”,1957-1962

When NATO first began to rely upon U.S.strategic nuclear weapons for the defence ofEurope, the territory of the United Stateswas not threatened by nuclear weaponsbecause the Soviet Union did not possessdelivery systems with sufficient range toreach the United States. However, theUnited States’ feeling of invulnerability beganto diminish as the result of the deployment ofSoviet longrange jet bombers in the mid-1950s and was then completely destroyedby the Soviet Union’s successful launch of thefirst ar tificial earth satellite, Sputnik, inOctober 1957. If a rocket could boost asatellite into space, it could also be used tohurl nuclear weapons at the United States.Additional Soviet space successes during thenext two years were accompanied by boastsof comparable progress in the developmentof an intercontinental ballistic missile, andsoon there were fears that the Soviet Unionwas leading in this field (the socalled “missilegap” of 1960).

The perceived growth in the Soviet nuclearthreat raised fears among the European alliesthat the United States might not be willing touse its nuclear weapons to defend Europeunder all circumstances. All over Europe lea-ders were beginning to secretly fear thatFrench President Charles de Gaulle might beright in his belief that “No U.S. President willexchange Chicago for Lyon.”(24)

Concerns about the effectiveness ofNATO’s nuclear-based strategy began toincrease in late 1958, when Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchev launched the Second

Berlin Crisis by demanding that theWestern Allies give up their position inWest Berlin. This crisis, which continued offand on until late 1962, raised the questionof how the West should respond to Sovietthreats below the level of an allout attack.General thermonuclear war did not seemto be the most appropriate response to alimited Soviet move such as blocking accessroutes to West Berlin, so in early 1959France, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates set up a tripartite planning staffunder the code name “LIVE OAK” to deve-lop a series of contingency plans involvingincreasing levels of force to deal with pos-sible Soviet moves(25).

Mid-way through the Second Berlin Crisis,in January 1961, the new administration ofPresident John F. Kennedy arrived inWashington. Kennedy was much moreconcerned about the possibility of limitedwarfare than an all-out Soviet nuclearattack, and he also worried that war mightstart by accident or by miscalculation, so hedirected his cabinet officials to reappraiseU.S. defence strategy. On 20 April 1961 theNational Security Council issued a secretpolicy directive known as National SecurityAction Memorandum (NSAM) 40, whichset forth U.S. policy toward NATO. In itsmilitary section, NSAM 40 stated that theU.S. should urge that “first priority be given,in NATO programs for the European area,to preparing for the more likely contingen-cies, i.e., those short of nuclear or massivenonnuclear attack”. Thus while the Allianceshould continue to prepare to meet suchan allout threat, these preparations shouldnot “divert needed resources from nonnu-clear theater programs to meet lesserthreats”. NSAM 40 called for the UnitedStates to try to implement this new policywithin NATO “by a constructive interpreta-tion of existing doctrine”; thus a new doc-trine should only be prepared if that wouldbe the only way to mobilise Europeanenergies and resources and if agreement ona revision could be reached(26).

A few months later, tension over Berlinincreased substantially, particularly after the

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969XXII

Pedlow, “LIVE OAK”,pp. 102-103; Sean M.Maloney,“Notfallplanung fürBerlin: Vorläufer derFlexible Response,19581963,”Militärgeschichte,Jahrgang 7, Heft 1(1992), pp. 913.

Address by Secretaryof Defense McNamaraat the MinisterialMeeting of the NorthAtlantic Council,Paris, 14 December1962, in FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 8, NationalSecurity Policy, pp.440, 445-446.

building of the Berlin Wall in August.Recognising that the tripartite LIVE OAKcontingency plans might not be sufficient todeal with a serious escalation of the crisisresulting from a Soviet blockade of WestBerlin, NATO also developed a series ofBerlin Contingency Plans (BERCONs) thatemployed even greater levels of force thanthe tripartite plans, with land operationsranging from one to four divisions. TheNATO BERCONs also contained nuclearoptions such as the use of a small numberof low-yield nuclear weapons to demons-trate the West’s determination. For theBerlin Crisis, at least,“flexible response” wasalready a reality by 1962(27).

Just as the Berlin Crisis was beginning tofade away, a new international crisis, - thistime over the introduction of Sovietmediumrange ballistic missiles into Cuba -occurred in October 1962. Two monthslater, while addressing the North Atlantic

Council in Paris, U.S. Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara stated that during theCuban Missile Crisis “the forces that wereon the cutting edge of action were the non-nuclear ones. Nuclear force was not irrele-vant but it was in the background. Non-nuclear forces were our sword, our nuclearforces were our shield.” Noting that in thefuture, Soviet “probes, tests, exploitation ofweak spots and efforts to divide” were farmore likely than a nuclear attack or even anall-out conventional attack on WesternEurope, McNamara argued for a “strongernon-nuclear posture” for NATO(28).

Initial NATO Discussion of a Change in Strategy

Reacting to the growing U.S. pressure for amodification of NATO’s military strategy, theNATO Ministers meeting at Oslo on 8-10May 1961 “invited the Council in PermanentSession, in close co-operation with the mili-

CHART 3


NATO InformationService, NATO FinalCommuniques, 1949-1974, p. 138.

Steinhoff andPommerin,Strategiewechsel, pp. 92-93.

Address by Secretaryof Defense McNamaraat the MinisterialMeeting of the NorthAtlantic Council,Athens, 5 May 1962,in FRUS, 1961-1963,vol. 8, NationalSecurity Policy, pp.278, 280281.

Paul Buteux, ThePolitics of NuclearConsultation in NATO,1965-1980(Cambridge, 1983),pp. 102-103; Steinhoffand Pommerin,Strategiewechsel, pp.100-102; CircularTelegram from theDepartment of State, 9 May 1962, in FRUS,1961-1963, WestEurope and Canada,pp. 389-393

United KingdomPublic Record Office,DEFE 4/147, COS(62),Chiefs of StaffCommittee, 60thMeeting, 2 October1962, Minute 2, withattached paperJP(62)114(F), NATODefence Policy - TheStikker Paper, 28 September 1962.

Steinhoff andPommerin,Strategiewechsel, p. 174.

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tary authorities, to continue its studies of allaspects of the military posture of theAlliance, with a view to improving its deter-rent and defensive strength”(29). Discussion ofnuclear strategy continued at the nextMinisterial Session of the North AtlanticCouncil in December 1961, when USSecretary of Defense McNamara spoke infavor of the need for a strategy of “flexibleresponse”, but no consensus was reached(30).

Nuclear strategy was also on the agenda ofthe Ministerial Session at Athens in May1962, and Secretary of Defense McNamaraonce again spoke out on the need for moreflexibility in NATO nuclear strategy, warningthat “our great nuclear superiority for gene-ral war does not solve all our problems ofdeterring and dealing with less than alloutdirect assault.” He noted that NATO’s tac-tical weapons help to deter the Sovietsfrom initiating the use of such weapons, but“NATO can no longer expect to avoidnuclear retaliation in the event that it ini-tiates their use. Even a local nuclearexchange could have consequences forEurope that are most painful to contempla-te.” Noting that “recent events concerningBerlin may provide relevant evidence of theutility of limited but decisive action”.McNamara again called for strong nonnu-clear forces deployed “where the popula-tions and territories begin”(31).

During the Athens meeting SecretaryGeneral Stikker presented his specialrepor t on NATO Defence Policy[CM(62)48, 17 April 1962], which focusedon the issue of political control of nuclearweapons. The report concluded withrecommendations for consultation on theuse of nuclear weapons under varying cir-cumstances, with such use being vir tuallyautomatic in the event of a Soviet nuclearattack but subject to consultation - if timepermitted - in the case of a full-scale Sovietconventional attack. In both cases theNATO nuclear response would be “on thescale appropriate to the circumstances”. Allof the nations except France, which did notwish to see NATO take any steps awayfrom the policy of massive retaliation,

agreed with the report, which became the“Athens Guidelines” after the SecretaryGeneral found compromise wording on theapplicability of these Guidelines that wasacceptable to France(32).

In September 1962 Secretary General DirkStikker circulated a paper on NATODefense Policy [NDP/62/10, 3 September1962] calling for an early resumption of theCouncil’s discussion on NATO defenceissues, including the deployment of MediumRange Ballistic Missiles in NATO, the possi-bility of developing a NATO nuclear forceand the U.S. proposals for more flexibility inNATO nuclear strategy. The Stikker paperexpressed concern that “because the inevi-tability of escalation of nuclear warfare isoften assumed, the idea is being encoura-ged that no choice is open betweenconventional defence and al-lout nuclearwarfare.”(33) This call for more flexibility wasnot supported by several NATO nations,and the issue was temporarily set aside dueto the pressure of events in the CubanMissile Crisis.

Soon afterward, at the start of 1963,Secretary General Stikker began a majorNATO Force Planning Exercise designed torelate strategy, force requirements and theresources that the member nations wereable to provide. To provide Strategic gui-dance for this process, the NAC directedthe Military Committee to prepare an“Appreciation of the Military Situation as ItAffects NATO up to 1970”.When comple-ted in September 1963, this documentknown as MC 100/1 (Draft) called for amuch greater degree of flexibility in Alliancestrategy. The document envisioned threestages of defence: an attempt to containaggression with conventional weapons, arapid escalation to the use of tacticalnuclear weapons under certain circum-stances, and a gradual strategic use ofnuclear weapons(34).

MC 100/1 (Draft)’s criticism of a trip-wirestrategy and its calls for flexibility in NATO’sresponses to aggression (including the pos-sibility of limited tactical nuclear warfare)


Duffield, Power Rules,p. 171; Stromseth,Origins of FlexibleResponse, pp. 53-54.

For a recent examina-tion of France’s rela-tions with NATOduring this period, seeFrederic Bozo, LaFrance et l’OTAN: Dela guerre froide aunouvel ordre européen(Paris, 1991), pp. 65-91. See alsoMichael M. Harrison,The Reluctant Ally:France and AtlanticSecurity (Baltimore,1981).

In her recent exami-nation of NATO strate-gy, Beatrice Heusercharacterises MC 14/3as being a strategy of”Flexible Escalation“,because the morecommonly used termof ”Flexible Response“applies equally well toearlier strategic thin-king, including MC14/2. Heuser, NuclearStrategies and Forces,p. 53.

XXIV

were so far removed from the strategy ofmassive retaliation that there was no possi-bility of France accepting it, even with reser-vations, and several other nations were alsouncomfortable with some of its radicalconcepts, so work on the document and onthe entire NATO Force Planning Exercise -ceased in the autumn of 1963 (35). At thispoint the issue of revising NATO strategyfaded into the background; there seemedno hope of overcoming French oppositionto a change in strategy. Furthermore, U.S.President Kennedy was assassinated inNovember 1963, and the administration ofhis successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, soon beca-me increasingly preoccupied with the gro-wing U.S. military involvement in SoutheastAsia. There would be no further progresson revising NATO strategy until after theFrench government announced its withdra-wal from the NATO integrated militarystructure in March 1966(36).

Rapid Progress on a New Strategy, 1966-1967

The French withdrawal from the integratedmilitary command structure led to a num-ber of organisational changes within NATO.Of primary importance for the furtherdevelopment of NATO strategy was thedecision to give responsibility for all defen-ce matters in which France did not partici-pate to the Defence Planning Committee(DPC), which had originally been establi-shed in 1963 to oversee NATO force plan-ning. The DPC was simply the NAC whenit was meeting without France on defenceissues (thus at Fourteen instead of atFifteen). With the main opponent of amore flexible strategy no longer present,the process of drafting a new strategymoved forward quickly. On 7 October1966 an informal session of the MilitaryCommittee reassessed the threat facingNATO and re-examined allied strategicobjectives region by region. The MilitaryCommittee then called for allied flexibilityof choice to meet varying contingencies.This recommendation was then discussedat the 12-13 December 1966 meeting of

the Military Committee in Chiefs of StaffSession, which called for the preparation ofa new draft document to replace MC 14/2.

Political approval for a new strategy came on9 May 1967, when the DPC in MinisterialSession issued its Guidance to the NATOMilitar y Author ities. This document(DPC/D(67)23, Decisions of the DefencePlanning Committee in Ministerial Session,11 May 1967) stated that “the overall stra-tegic concept for NATO should be revisedto allow NATO a greater flexibility and toprovide for the employment as appropriateof one or more of direct defence, deliberateescalation and general nuclear response,thus confronting the enemy with a crediblethreat of escalation in response to anyaggression below the level of a majornuclear attack”. Thus the key feature of thenew NATO strategy that was evolving in1967 was not just flexibility, which had alrea-dy been a feature of earlier NATO strategydocuments to some degree, but the idea ofescalation, which would be further develo-ped in the new strategy documents, MC14/3 and MC 48/3(37).

The new draft Strategic Concept, MC 14/3,stressed the need for flexibility: “The deter-rent concept of the Alliance is based on aflexibility which will prevent the potentialaggressor from predicting with confidenceNATO’s specific response to aggression andwhich will lead him to conclude that anunacceptable degree of risk would be invol-ved regardless of the nature of his attack”.MC 14/3 then spelled out three types ofmilitary responses to aggression againstNATO. Direct Defence would attempt to”defeat the aggression on the level at whichthe enemy chooses to fight“. DeliberateEscalation added a series of possible steps”to defeat aggression by raising but wherepossible controlling, the scope and intensityof combat“ with the ”threat of nuclear res-ponse progressively more imminent.Among the examples given were ”broade-ning or intensifying a non-nuclear engage-ment, possibly by opening another front orinitiating action at sea in response to low-intensity aggression“, ”demonstrative use of

NATO Strategy documents 1949-1969 XXV

nuclear weapons“, and ”selective nuclearstrikes on interdiction targets“. The ”ulti-mate military response“ foreseen by MC14/3 was General Nuclear Response, whichwas also seen as the ”ultimate deterrent“.

On 16 September 1967 the MilitaryCommittee in Chiefs of Staff Session appro-ved MC 14/3 (“Overall Strategic Conceptfor the Defence of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization Area”) and issued it as aMilitary Decision on 22 September 1967.On 12 December 1967 the DPC inMinisterial Session adopted MC 14/3, andthe Final version was issued on 16 January1968. The DPC noted that the new strate-gy was intended to reflect the substance andintent of the ministerial guidance of 9 May1967, and in questions of interpretation, theministerial guidance must prevail.

The companion document to MC 14/3 wasMC 48/3, “Measures to Implement theStrategic Concept for the Defence of theNATO Area”. After summarising the essen-tial features of MC 14/3, MC 48/3 descri-bed the measures required for defendingNATO, including improved intelligence andearly warning, prompt coordinated actionduring the period of warning time, increa-sed readiness, flexibility, offensive capability,improved air defence, immediate reactionand reinforcement forces, mobilization andforce expansion and logistics. MC 48/3then provided an analysis of strategic consi-derations in the different geographic areasof NATO. On 6 May 1969 the MilitaryCommittee approved MC 48/3 as a MilitaryDecision and forwarded it to the SecretaryGeneral for submission to the DPC.Approval by the DPC in Ministerial Sessionfollowed on 4 December 1969, and MC48/3 was issued in final form on 8December 1969.

As a result of the inherent flexibility (bothof strategy and of interpretation) in thenew doctrine of ”Flexible Response“, itstwo basic documents - MC 14/3 and MC48/3 - remained in effect far longer thanany previous NATO strategy documents. Itwas not until the end of the Cold War

completely changed both the face ofEurope and the overall military situationthat these two documents were replaced atthe end of 1991 by the new NATO strate-gy, whose far less confrontational naturewas symbolised by the fact that the newStrategic Concept for the Alliance waspublished as an unclassified document.


DOCUMENTS