nato, european security, - dtic · it was the floor on which the first structures of european unity...

J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y

A P R O F E S S I O N A L M I L I T A R Y J O U R N A L

RMA Essay Contest

Interservice Competition

Military Support to The Nation

The Son Tay Raid

97S p r i n g

NATO, EUROPEANSECURITY,AND BEYOND

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Victory smiles upon those whoanticipate the changes in thecharacter of war, not upon thosewho wait to adapt themselvesafter the changes occur.

—Guilio Douhet

0215Cover2 8/5/97 7:49 AM Page C2

Spring 1997 / JFQ 1

E ight years ago, as the Berlin Wall crum-bled and the Cold War began to fade,two themes dominated media reportsabout Europe. First, many pundits ar-

gued that while our hearts might remain in Eu-rope our central strategic and economic interestswould lie elsewhere in the future. For some, ourfocus would be primarily on the Middle East, forothers on Latin America, and for still others onthe Asia-Pacific region. But most agreed that Eu-rope’s criticality had waned.

Second, other observers predicted that theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ab-sent a new overwhelming threat, would witheraway or disappear. Their reasoning was simple: nothreat, no alliance; no Warsaw Pact, no NATO.

But three Presidents knew better. While rec-ognizing the growing importance of other regions,the United States chose not to turn its back on Eu-rope or the Alliance. Indeed, as this issue of JFQgoes to press, heads of state of Alliance nations areabout to meet to determine which of the manycandidates will become new members of NATO.

The future value of the Alliance has to becalculated in light of its past accomplishments. Intestament to its influence, Secretary of StateMadeleine Albright has said:

NATO has always been more than a defensiveshield. It was the roof over our heads when we rebuiltpostwar Europe. It was the floor on which the firststructures of European unity were laid. It was the doorthrough which one time adversaries were welcomedinto our family of democracies. And because of itsstrength and the courage of its members, it has been amighty deterrent to aggression.

For nearly fifty years NATO’s successes havebeen phenomenal; and they constitute a majorreason why it remains a powerful force for peaceand security:

■ NATO has been essential to maintaining thetransatlantic link, the mechanism which was so vital todeterrence during four decades and which today keepsthe West united on security issues

■ NATO’s consultative mechanisms have been apositive force for stability on the Continent and werecentral to the solution of bilateral problems among itsmembers

■ NATO forces, policies, and procedures proved tobe an essential and irreplaceable foundation for thecoalition’s success in Operation Desert Storm

■ NATO forces from 15 allied nations—backed by22 other countries, including Russia—are keeping orderin Bosnia-Herzegovina today, a peace brought about bythe force of NATO arms.

In the future, Europe will remain a center ofwealth, democracy, and power. For the UnitedStates, it will remain a region of vital interest. Ac-cording to our national security strategy, “Our ob-jective in Europe is to complete the constructionof a truly integrated, democratic, and secure Eu-

rope with a democratic Russia as a full partici-pant.” This, of course, is what we started out toaccomplish fifty years ago when we launched theMarshall Plan and created NATO.

The new strategic environment in Europehas caused the United States to change its orien-tation from deterrence of war to shaping the en-vironment to work against instability and theconditions that cause war. While we withdrewtwo-thirds of our Cold War force, we remain com-mitted to the continuing deployment of some100,000 troops in theater. Trade with Europe, ofcourse, has taken care of itself, doubling in valueover the past decade.

JFQ

(continued on page 4)

AWord from theChairman

During a break in the international meeting on Bosnia in July 1995,General George A. Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe,reviews draft U.S. position statement with the Chairman.

DO

D (R

.D. W

ard

)

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1 A Word from the Chairmanby John M. Shalikashvili

■

6 The 1996 RMA Essay ContestIntroduced by Williamson Murray

8 The Second Revolutionby James Stavridis

14 The Profession of Arms in theInformation Ageby Arsenio T. Gumahad II

21 Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promiseof Information Warfareby James J. Schneider

29 Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality:A Revolution in MilitaryTheoryby Antulio J. Echevarria II

37 Technologies, Doctrine, andOrganization for RMAby James K. Morningstar

44 General Tzu’s Army: OPFORof the Futureby Michael R. Lwin

■ O U T O F J O I N T

50 Interservice Competition: TheSolution, Not the Problemby Harvey M. Sapolsky

■ J F Q F O R U M

55 NATO, European Security,and BeyondIntroduced by Hans Binnendijk

57 The New SHAPE of the Atlantic Allianceby George A. Joulwan

62 Creating A European Securityand Defense Identityby Charles L. Barry

70 WEU Operational Developmentby Graham Messervy-Whiting

75 After SFOR—Planning a European-Led Force by John Hillen

80 The Looming Alliance Debateover Nuclear Weaponsby Jacquelyn K. Davis, Charles M. Perry,and Andrew C. Winner

87 Ukraine as a Post-Cold WarMilitary Powerby Stephen D. Olynyk

95 French Military Reform andNATO Restructuringby Ronald Tiersky

103 EUCOM and Sub-SaharanAfricaby Nancy J. Walker and Larry Hanauer

■ C O N T E N T S

2 JFQ / Spring 1997

The cover shows marines conducting sensor emplace-ment mission during Advance Warfighting Experimentat 29 Palms (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher S. Cline).The front inside features Russian cruiser Pilkiy off theport beam of USS America in the Mediterranean (U.S.Navy/David Carter), American marines and Moldovansoldiers maneuvering, Cooperative Osprey ’96 (982d Sig-nal Company/M.A. Jones), Turkish officer using groundvehicular laser locator designator at Camp Dobol, Bosnia(55th Signal Company, Combat Camera/Angel Clemons),and closeup of B–2 bomber (U.S. Air Force). The table ofcontents shows USS Mitscher in the North Atlantic (U.S.

Navy/Jacob L. Hollingsworth). The back inside cover captures F–16C at Azaraqair base in Jordan (U.S. Air Force/Paul R. Caron). The back cover displays USSScranton surfacing with USS George Washington in background to support South-ern Watch (U.S. Navy/Jim Vidrine), marines arriving in Thailand for Cobra Gold’97 (Joint Combat Camera Center/Jacqueline Richardson), AH–64D during Ad-vanced Warfighting Experiment at Fort Irwin (28th Public Affairs Detachment/William Cronk), and C–17 (U.S. Air Force/Ken Hackman).

P H O T O C R E D I T S

JFQ

0315Prelims 8/4/97 1:28 PM Page 2

Joint Force Quarterly

S P R I N G 1 9 9 7 / N U M B E R 1 5

Spring 1997 / JFQ 3

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108 Forgotten Mission: MilitarySupport to the Nationby David L. Grange and Rodney L. Johnson

116 The Force-on-Force Model: An Anachronism in the Information Ageby Maggie Belknap

120 Operation Kingpin—Success or Failure?by William C. Thomas

125 In Search of Focused Logisticsby John J. Cusick and Donald C. Pipp

128 Review Criteria for theLogistic Planby Kevin R. Wheelock

■ O F C H I E F S A N D C H A I R M E N

134 George Scratchley Brown

■ T H E J O I N T W O R L D

135 Doctrine, Education, and History

■ O F F T H E S H E L F

137 Jointness in Defence of the Realm: A Review Essayby Jeremy R. Stocker

140 Joint Training for MOOTW: A Book Reviewby Shawn C. Whetstone

141 Riding the Toffler Wave: A Book Reviewby M.E. Ahrari

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by theInstitute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land,sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuseson joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combatoperations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed orimplied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency

of the Federal Government. Copyrighted portions of this journal maynot be reproduced or extracted without permission of copyright pro-prietors. An acknowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly should bemade whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents.

This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

The editors invite articles and other contributions on jointwarfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and topicsof common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 144 for details).

Please direct all editorial communications to:

Editor, Joint Force QuarterlyATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)Fort Lesley J. McNairWashington, D.C. 20319–5066

Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219e-mail: [email protected]

Hans BinnendijkDirector

Institute for National Strategic StudiesEditor-in-Chief

Martin J. Peters, Jr.Production Coordinator

Robert A. SilanoEditor

William A. RawleyTypography and Design DivisionU.S. Government Printing Office

Art Director

Patrick M. CroninDirector for Strategy and Policy AnalysisInstitute for National Strategic Studies

Consulting Editor

Calvin B. KelleyCopy Editor

ISSN 1070–0692 June 1997 Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

0315Prelims 8/4/97 1:28 PM Page 3

NATO has also adapted to meet new condi-tions. It changed its mission, altered its organiza-tion, and will soon expand its membership. Atthe same time, not wishing to redivide Europe,NATO has improved its relations with Russia.With the Founding Act, signed earlier this year,the Alliance has created a solid basis for future re-lations with Russia. NATO has also widened itsinfluence through the Partnership for Peace (PFP)program, which includes 27 nations. In turn, PFPhas created the groundwork for better interoper-ability and more effective peacekeeping.

I recently visited Cooperative Nugget ’97, thethird U.S.-hosted training exercise oriented onenhancing interoperability and peacekeeping.Conducted under the auspices of U.S. AtlanticCommand, this impressive exercise at the JointReadiness Training Center put platoons from 22partner and NATO nations through a rigorous 37-task training experience. The gain in interoper-ability and peacekeeping skills was significant, aswas the tangible increase in good will and under-standing of how the armed forces of democraticnations operate in the gray area of military opera-tions other than war. In all, Cooperative Nuggetwas a visible reminder of NATO’s contribution topeace and security from Western Europe to cen-tral Asia and beyond.

The JFQ Forum on NATO and European af-fairs in this issue is most timely. As we refine Joint Vision 2010 and implement the QuadrennialDefense Review, we must examine where we havebeen and where we are headed in each of our ge-ographic areas of responsibility. Thus these arti-cles offer an excellent primer on the problemsNATO will face in the future: the pace of Allianceenlargement, the management of NATO-Russianrelations, the future of SFOR in the Balkans, theshape of Alliance command and control architec-ture, and the maturation of a European securityand defense identity.

In all, we will have our work cut out for us inEurope; but our vital interests there, the impor-tance of the transatlantic link, and NATO’s con-tribution to peace and security throughout theworld will more than justify our efforts.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

■ A W O R D F R O M T H E C H A I R M A N

4 JFQ / Spring 1997


GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USAPublisher

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense UniversityChairman

BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman

VADM Dennis C. Blair, USN ■ The Joint Staff

MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College

Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College

MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

BG Robert F. Dees, USA ■ The Joint Staff

Col Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College

BG Joseph R. Inge, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College

Brig Gen William R. Looney III, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College

RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College

Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF ■ Air War College

RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College

EDITORIAL BOARD

Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense UniversityChairman

Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University

COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University

COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy

Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University

Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College

Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF ■ Naval War College

Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation

William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College

CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College

John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago

LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute

Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College

James H. Toner ■ Air War College

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University

COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College

COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

(continued from page 1)

0315Prelims 8/4/97 1:28 PM Page 4

Spring 1997 / JFQ 5

T H E W I N N E R S O F T H E 1 9 9 6

Joint Force Quarterly “Essay Contest on the

Revolution in Military Affairs”sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc.

F I R S T P R I Z E

“The Second Revolution”by Captain James Stavridis, USN

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5), Joint Staff

S E C O N D P R I Z E

“The Profession of Arms in the Information Age”by Lieutenant Colonel Arsenio T. Gumahad II, USAF

Office of Space and Technology, Headquarters, Department of the Air Force

T H I R D P R I Z E

“Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information Warfare”

by Professor James J. SchneiderSchool of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

J U N I O R O F F I C E R P R I Z E

“A Revolution in Military Theory: Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality”by Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA

Future Battle Directorate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 were presented to the first, second, and third place winners,respectively, and a prize of $500 was awarded for the best entry by a junior officer (major/ lieutenantcommander or below). The winning essays plus two other contributions on the revolution in militaryaffairs appear on the following pages of this issue.

0315Prelims 8/4/97 1:28 PM Page 5

The following articles representthe best of the 1996 JFQ “EssayContest on the Revolution inMilitary Affairs” which wassponsored by the National De-fense University Foundation.

The six contributions—four prize winnersplus two additional essays “short listed” by

the judges as worthy of publication—suggest that enormous technolog-

ical changes are underwayand will continue for the

foreseeable future. At thesame time, it is difficultto understand exactlyhow such change willplay out on the bat-tlefield. That is truein part because we donot know either when

or where our soldiers,sailors, marines, and air-

men will be called uponto fight and kill, nor can

we possibly know the condi-tions under which the next war

will take place, nor even the simplestelement of the equation: who will be theenemy. Will the next major war occur tenyears from now or twenty years as was thecase for our military after World War I, oreven ninety-nine years like the British expe-rienced after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815?

What is clear is that there is a loomingdebate both within and among the serviceson what the revolution in military affairs

(RMA) represents and what its implicationsare. This suggests that no one has a handleon what the face of battle will look like inthe next century. Consequently, the worstpath that the Armed Forces could take wouldbe to believe that they know what is meantby RMA and embark on tailoring forces andacquiring weapons without experimentationand serious public debate on the future ofnational defense. Publication of a range ofviews such as those advanced by the authorsof the articles found in this issue of JFQ,each singing from a different sheet of music,will stimulate that debate. We need more ex-change of ideas, not less. There is no schoolsolution on RMA, and those who think theypossess the answers constitute a danger to re-alizing its actual as opposed to its imaginedpotential.

The very disparities raised by this debatesuggest several other points. First, they un-derscore that we may not be reaching clo-sure on what RMA epitomizes. There may ineffect be a number of emerging RMAs. Noneof this is clear. My own prediction—from anhistorian’s perspective—is that we will con-front multiple RMAs over the comingdecades, a state of affairs somewhat analo-gous to events during the last significant interwar period: the 1920s and 1930s. Atthat time various RMAs evolved from theconceptual to reality: combined arms, ex-ploitation warfare, strategic bombing, carrieroperations, and submarine warfare. Thesedevelopments greatly changed the way warwas waged in the first major conflict of thiscentury. Thus to conclude that RMA comesfrom one source may deny other equally im-portant possibilities. Moreover, as Andrew

■

6 JFQ / Spring 1997

Williamson Murray, professor of history emeritus at The Ohio State University, will contribute an article entitled “Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs” in the next issue of JFQ.

The 1996 RMA Essay ContestIntroduced by W I L L I A M S O N M U R R A Y

0415Murray 8/4/97 1:38 PM Page 6

Spring 1997 / JFQ 7

Marshall, director of net assessment withinthe Office of the Secretary of Defense—andthe motivating force behind the JFQ RMAessay contest—has suggested, we might con-

sider our current situation as being approxi-mately what the military of the interwaryears faced in 1923. In other words, there isa long way to go to work out the real possi-bilities and potential of coming RMAs.

We should not forget that the future iscapable of throwing us curve balls. We are atthe beginning of an interwar period of inde-terminate length. It may last another decade;it is just as likely to last fifty years. And if wehave forty-five years of sustained peace, theArmed Forces will face the most difficult ofmilitary problems: keeping prepared for theharsh Clausewitzian world of friction, ambi-guity, and fog in a time of peace. The longerthe peace the more unrealistic our conceptsmay become. Above all, we may well forgetthe fundamental nature of war.

That Clausewitzian world, which has en-dured for three thousand years of recordedmilitary history, will also hold sway in thenext century. It is not that the entire weightof the past says so: everything we knowabout the nonlinear, incalculable world indi-cates that we will not ever achieve pre-dictability given natural phenomena. AsBarry Watts suggested in a recent essay, to be-lieve we will achieve predictability, “one

would need to overthrow nonlinear dynam-ics, the second law of thermodynamics, thefundamental tenets of neo-Darwinian evolu-tionary biology, and all the limiting metathe-orems of mathematical logic. . . . No smalltask indeed!”

It is likely that in the next century ourenemies—both large and small—will studyus carefully. They will think long and hardabout developing asymmetrical approachesto thwart our capabilities on the strategic,operational, and tactical levels. As we con-gratulate ourselves on the extraordinary pos-sibilities of technology, we must not forgetthe lessons of Vietnam, when enormous ad-vantages counted for very little in the finalanalysis. Above all it was hubris that led tothat catastrophe; and since we will always beup against human beings, we cannot assumethat they will act as we expect. “Big Blue”may have beaten a chess master, but thatcomputer would have gone down to defeat ifKasporov had announced that he was goingto play checkers instead.

Finally, remember that we live in ademocracy based on individual liberties andthe pursuit of happiness. Accordingly, it isextremely doubtful whether the Americanpeople will continue to fund the ArmedForces at present levels. Some believe thatmilitary spending has bottomed out. Butconsidering the pressure exerted by an agingpopulation and the indeterminate nature ofthreats on the international scene, we maywell see defense budgets fall to the level ofthe late 1920s. With less money we mustthink strategically; and we are not doingenough of that today. JFQ

we might consider our current situation as beingapproximately what the military faced in 1923

M u r r a y

0415Murray 8/4/97 1:38 PM Page 7

8 JFQ / Spring 1997

Aparadox is emerging as the revolutionin military affairs (RMA) movesahead: the larger the magnitude ofthe revolution, the greater the possi-

ble long-term advantage to a potential enemy.Why? The answer lies in the second revolution.

The system of systems—a complete architec-ture of detection, selection, display, targeting, andattack—will revolutionize war. Related advances ininformation warfare will complement and en-hance the progress made in the first revolution.We will adjust and integrate these developmentswith new organizations, doctrine, and tactics,techniques, and procedures, many of which willbe integrated into the Armed Forces by early inthe next century, and other industrialized nationswill gradually follow suit. Indeed, some compo-nents are already entering service, and others arebeing aggressively purchased, programmed, and

Captain James Stavridis, USN, is a member of the Strategy and Plans Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff, and previously commanded USS Barry.

The Second REVOLUTIONBy J A M E S S T A V R I D I S

9696

FIRSTPRIZE

FIRSTPRIZE

U.S. Air Force (Jeffrey Allen)

0515Stavridis 8/11/97 1:16 PM Page 8

S t a v r i d i s

Spring 1997 / JFQ 9

researched. Both doctrine and operational con-cepts are undergoing study and change. Joint Vi-sion 2010 makes it clear that we are on the leadingedge of this first revolution, evolving the military

for a “challenging and uncertain future.” We aremoving into the first revolution.

But throughout military history—in fact, allof human history—for every action there has beena reaction, often stronger and usually more impor-tant. In military science this is translated into of-fensive and defensive weapons, tactics, and systemsof war. At other times it is manifested in a revolu-tion brought about by a sudden technological ad-vance. Stone was superseded by iron and bronzeas the materials of offensive weaponry; and fortifi-cations were improved in response. Then camethe rise of organized armies and the warrior onhorseback as a weapons system until the cannonand gunpowder changed everything. Firepowerimproved, with revolutionary jumps such as therifle, machine gun, and tank. The great defensivebarriers of the early 20th century were counteredby Blitzkrieg, the massive armored battleship wasovertaken by carrier airpower, and one day thelethal ballistic missile may be rendered ineffectiveby a new defensive system.

While this analogy is not precise, it is possi-ble to think of the journey of RMA from now tothe early part of the next century as consisting oftwo distinct revolutions. The tide of the first isrising today and will crest shortly after the turn ofthe century. It is characterized by the system ofsystems, information warfare, dominant knowl-edge, precision weapons, sophisticated process-ing, display capabilities, low observables, smallerdispersed forces, and massed weapons effects.

The second revolution will likely be differ-ent. By watching the first revolution, an enemymay be in a position to “skim the cream” of itsadvancements while simultaneously moving intothe second revolution. It may thus obtain muchof the technology at substantially lower cost afterthe expensive researching, prototyping, and field-ing are complete. That is the essence of the para-dox: if the current revolution really is a radicalprocess requiring major investment and an ex-pensive and extensive force restructuring, we maybe left with fewer resources to pursue a secondrevolution. The result may be a very expensive,highly capable, but distinctly first revolutionforce structure.

An enemy may have more efficiently movedon to a second revolution, taking advantage ofour efforts to develop and field the first set of sys-tems—because much of the technology involvedin the first revolution is commercially applicable,dual use in character, and widely available—fromthe Internet to the classroom. We must nevercompletely base our strategy on something thatwe cannot control; and the lesson to be drawnfrom interaction with technology is that the ex-perience is far from controllable. We must recog-nize that actions today will drive participation in,and actually permit the execution of, the first rev-olution. But even as we pursue the first series ofadvances, we must consider and plan for the in-evitable reaction—the second revolution.

The First RevolutionIt is generally accepted that the first RMA

proffers three key instruments of national power.The first is the system of systems, shorthand forthe vast collective synergy achieved by meldingformerly disparate means to establish battlespaceawareness, command and control, and precisionforce.1 Second and equally important is extendedinformation dominance, the means to control bit-streams in the increasingly interdependent globalinformation network. The third instrument—acorollary of the first—is known as informationwarfare, which can be defined as the capability todisrupt or override enemy information systemswhile defending one’s own.2

The system of systems has received most ofthe attention in the RMA debate. It is marked bytechnologies, tactics, and organizations thatallow for accurate wide-area scouting (unmannedaerial and undersea vehicles, overhead sensors,Aegis radars, JSTARS aircraft, acoustic sensors); es-sentially instantaneous data fusion (global com-mand and control system, C4I for the warrior,linked combat centers); and precision massedfires (precision guided munitions, long-rangestrike, enhanced effect weapons). Combiningthese systems, the first revolution will providedominant battlespace knowledge and the abilityto take full advantage of it—dissipating if noteliminating the fog of war.3

Applying extended information dominancethrough “bitstreams” is a second characteristicthat many associate with the first RMA. Providinginformation—instead of military capital stocksand troops—could enable us to better execute al-liance obligations, undertake stand-off operations,and realize greater combat efficiencies. For in-stance, we could furnish both target informationand surveillance through bitstreams to allies, whocould then leverage their systems far more effec-tively in a region, such as by launching precision

throughout military history for every action therehas been a reaction, often stronger


■ R M A E S S A Y C O N T E S T

10 JFQ / Spring 1997

strikes or conducting peace op-erations based on distant sur-veillance systems.

Information warfare, alsoreferred to as hacker warfare orcyber warfare (or commerciallyas information assurance), is thethird emerging instrument. Asnational systems—from bank-ing to electric power and com-munication—become increas-

ingly dependent on computer networks, a hugevulnerability arises. “Digi-criminals are alreadyhaving a great time . . . the outlook for protectionis bleak.” 4 By using advanced software to attackenemy information systems, great advantages canaccrue to the state or transnational actor best posi-tioned for cyber warfare. Access may directly comefrom satellite broadcast via integrated computernetworks, or the Internet itself. This could becomethe guerrilla warfare of the future.

Combined, these technologies comprise thefirst RMA: “a new paradigm of warfare, basednot on attrition, but on the ability to paralyze

and shock.” 5 These approaches and technologieswill indeed revolutionize warfare by early in thenext century.

Adversarial ReactionWhile initially costly to research, develop,

and field, many of the technologies of the firstrevolution will quickly become accessible. This isdue to the extensive applicability of commercialtechnology inherent in the revolution. A poten-tial enemy could recognize this fact and be able—with relative ease—to incorporate these rapidlydisseminating elements of the first RMA into itsforce structure. “The low cost of many informa-tion age technologies will help potential adver-saries improve their military capabilities as theylearn to leverage these technologies effectively.”6

Both extended information dominance andinformation warfare will stem from computers.The knowledge that drives their implementationwill be widely available on the Internet, throughcommercial publications, and by study at Ameri-can and other Western institutions. Of particularsignificance will be access to display systems tofuse and organize information for easy access insmaller units—essentially the function of commer-cial information systems. Accelerating diffusion of

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Spring 1997 / JFQ 11

these technologies will be a prime element in thestrategic construct early in the 21st century.

Likewise the system of systems, althoughlarge and complex, is intelligible and applicableto an enemy through its component parts: “The

larger the system,the smaller andmore powerful theimportant individ-ual parts.”7 But anenemy would be

left with the problem of countering these por-tions of the first RMA that are too expensive forthem to acquire. This could lead to an endlesscycle in warfare: an enemy discovers ways to fusewhat it can afford from the first revolution withnew ideas, technologies, and concepts—thus cre-ating a second revolution in military affairs.

The Second RevolutionAlthough it is difficult to identify all the sys-

tems that will survive and become central to thefirst RMA, it is evident that precision weapons, ad-vanced sensors, low observables, sophisticatednetworks, and information systems will predomi-nate. The challenge is to determine what might becentral to a second revolution. One approach tothis problem is to examine the broad categories oftechnology and military-science application in thefirst revolution and then seek counters to them. Itis also important to identify areas of study thatmay be under-represented in the first revolution.Looking at counters to the first RMA is particu-larly instructive and will probably provide the bestpoint of departure (see the accompanying figurewhich lists points and counterpoints).

First, an enemy would seek to place manykey command and control nodes underground.They would be joined through hardened orburied connectivity links. Other nodes wouldprobably be located at sites that are politically dif-ficult to attack such as hospitals, schools, andmarketplaces. Their nodes would also be smalland highly dispersed across large areas, perhapsin kiosks located in urban centers and townsaround the country. Mobility and inexpensiveforms of stealth would be incorporated in theirdesign and placement.

Second, many enemies would explore bio-logical advances that have warfare applicability.Chemical and biological weapons are the mostobvious threats; but beyond such essentially sim-ple weapons general advances in this field overthe mid to long term may dwarf the importanceof first revolution systems. Human performanceenhancers—particularly those that provide theability to process enormous levels of data andrapidly make coherent decisions—may be themost significant advances. Stimulants, narcotics,

anabolic agents, glycoprotein hormones, and betablockers have battle potential. Moreover, themedical literature states that “three areas of ge-netics hold particular promise: gene identifica-tion, disease susceptibility, and gene therapy.”8

The fusion of enhanced human abilities with newtechnologies may be a central element of a sec-ond revolution.

Third, a second revolution enemy couldskim the cream from the advancements of thefirst. Then it would have highly precise self-navi-gation units, reasonable levels of computationalpower, and somewhat sophisticated capabilitiesto undertake regional information dominance.This enemy would likely have some ability to de-liver precise weapons, although it would probablynot have extensive military capital stocks of theseassets. It would have developed operational con-cepts that optimize the use of a few expensiveand highly precise systems by mixing them witharea strikes by far less expensive weapons. In ad-dition, this enemy might have antisatellite sys-tems, dazzlers to use against our optics, and effec-tive jamming and counterjamming devices.

A fourth category that must not be over-looked is the capability of an enemy to use sim-ple, cheap intelligence systems—and lots ofthem—to counter first revolution systems. For ex-ample, hundreds of fishing boats with only a fewcarrying intelligence and navigation suites couldoperate in the littorals acting as markers. Civilian

the system of systems is intelligible and applicable to anenemy through its component parts

The Second Revolution

COUNTERSFirst Revolution Second Revolutionprecision strike hardening

buryingdispersingmultiplying

information warfare primitizingisolatingcounterattacking

dominant maneuver responsive maneuveradvanced sensors blinding

dispersingmultiplying

quality quantitymass

centralized display diffused display

NEW ELEMENTS OF THE SECOND REVOLUTIONbiologics, advanced materials, and nonlinear

scientific advances

S t a v r i d i s



aircraft, both rotary and fixed wing, could operatein and among high-tech aircraft. In certain situa-tions such primitive systems can be extremely ef-fective, particularly in conflicts fought at athreshold below full regional war.

A fifth concern is the massive use of cheap,crude, but potentially effective cruise missiles andmines (at sea and on land). Even an Aegis systemor Patriot battery can be quickly depleted of anti-cruise missiles. Mines are a challenge. Floodinglanding zones or littoral seas with them can be aneffective denial strategy. Bases for forward forcescan be closed by placing large numbers of crudebut relatively inexpensive explosives at keypoints. Destroying or denying something goes along way toward controlling it.

Weapons of mass destruction, from low-yieldtactical nuclear devices to the next generation ofchemical and biological weapons, are a possiblesixth area of concern. We must not assume thatan enemy will be constrained from using suchweapons because of our superior nuclear arsenal.It may think we would not respond with nuclearstrategic strikes against limited first use of chemi-cal, biological, or tactical nuclear warheads—andit would probably be right. For example, anenemy could indicate that it would employ tacti-cal nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons onlyat sea, perhaps constraining our ability to re-spond with strikes on their population centersand effectively limiting our use of similarweapons to the same area.

Seventh, second RMA advancements inarmor and materials may eventually counter firstrevolution systems and pose a significant chal-lenge. Advances in ceramics, steel alloys, polymer

composites, and thermoplastic resins hold extra-ordinary promise. Such scientific innovations willbe shared over the Internet and openly taught atAmerican universities. Pre-lubricated surfaces,nylon composites superimposed on steel, dia-mond coated bearings, and other materials mayplay in the second wave of RMA technology. Allthe precision and display capability in the worldwill not be of use if targets are hardened beyondthe ability of such systems to destroy them.

There will also be new operational conceptsassociated with the second RMA, constituting aneighth area of interest. Clearly, if the central orga-nizing tenet of the first revolution is maneuverwarfare, tactics will be developed to counter thatapproach. What could be called “responsive ma-neuver” may evolve, which could combine staticdefenses and rapid counterattacks that seek to

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flank, isolate, encircle, and kill maneuveringunits. Entrapment and wide-area ambush tacticsmay develop beyond current levels of expecta-tion. Although today we are enamored with pre-cision and maneuver, the endless competition in

warfare of precision versus mass—often mani-fested in new tactics—tells us that more changelies ahead. The second revolution like the firstwill generate new doctrine and new tactics, tech-niques, and procedures.

Finally, we must not overlook longer term re-search that goes beyond a second revolution for atruly nonlinear discovery that utterly and in-stantly changes the calculus of warfare. Given theacceleration of technological advance, it may bepossible to leap ahead to ideas that are only dimlyglimpsed today—concepts that bend the laws ofphysics beyond the horizon of common thought.Hyperpropulsion, optics, biologics, control of theelectromagnetic spectrum—the possibilities areendless. This may be an area for hedging throughresearch and highly limited prototyping.

In a general sense, the essence of a secondRMA is the application of asymmetrical warfareagainst the United States, which is the leader infirst revolution technologies and systems. This isa reverse of the competitive strategic approachthat was pursued in the mid-1980s during the cli-max of the Cold War. While such actions are un-likely to endanger our existence, they canthreaten our critical national interests in an in-creasingly interdependent world. The second rev-olution may thus provide an enemy with a greatdeal of asymmetric leverage—that is, influenceout of proportion to political, economic, and mil-itary strength.

In sum, we must continue our progressthrough the first revolution. This course of actionprovides the best hedge against a range of chal-lenges that may confront us in the next century.At the same time we must consider the coursesenemies may pursue to achieve a second revolu-tion as they search for asymmetric leverage. Ac-cordingly, we should:

■ Set up analysis cells to explore possible decisionsby enemies with regard to first and second RMA sys-tems. This should be done independently by the ser-vices, Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, CentralIntelligence Agency, etc. The results then need to becompared, fused, and incorporated in upcoming strate-gic and procurement activities, including those stem-ming from the quadrennial defense review.

■ Evaluate potential second revolution systems forresearch, development, and fielding. These technologiesmight include biologics and advanced materials. Non-linear accelerations in technology and science shouldbe considered.

■ Develop operational concepts to overcome po-tential enemy responses, such as the cycle of maneuvercountered by responsive maneuver, responding to prim-itive systems and tactics, and exploring anti-mass/quan-tity strikes against fewer though more precise and om-niscient systems.

■ Recognize that the first revolution will includesome costly mistakes, miscues, and maldeployments.Patience will be required in fielding first wave systems,then adapting them to the second revolution.

■ Develop a hedging strategy to react as the sec-ond revolution accelerates.

During the early debate over the revolutionin military affairs, Admiral William A. Owens, theformer Vice Chairman, indicated that “the prob-lem with deep, fast, and rampant innovation isnot getting people to accept the new but to sur-render the old.” 9 Ironically, that same sentimentcan be applied to our preoccupation with the firstrevolution as a second looms on the horizon. JFQ

N O T E S

1 William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Sys-tems,” Military Review, vol. 75, no. 3 (May–June 1995),pp. 15–19.

2 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic As-sessment 1996 (Washington: National Defense Univer-sity, 1996), pp. 185–90.

3 William A. Owens, “The American Revolution inMilitary Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter1995–96), p. 37.

4 Arjen Lenstra, “Communication,” Spectrum (January1996), p. 32.

5 Thomas G. Mahnken, “War in the InformationAge,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 10 (Winter 1995–96), p. 40.

6 David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of In-formation Age Technologies (Washington: National De-fense University, 1996), p. 10.

7 John Naisbitt, Global Paradox (New York: Morrowand Company, 1994), p. 12.

8 Ed McCabe, “Medical Genetics,” Journal of theAmerican Medical Association, vol. 274, no. 23 (June 19,1996), p. 1819.

9 Owens, “Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 37.

This article is an edited and abridged version of an entrythat received first prize in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Conteston the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by theNational Defense University Foundation.

the second revolution like the first will generatenew doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures



Many believe information is a potentinstrument in war. The militarysubscribes to this idea and calls itinformation warfare, defined as any

actions that deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroyenemy information and its functions; protect usfrom such actions; and exploit friendly militaryinformation functions. To some, informationwarfare simply means using information to

achieve national objectives—a form of war aboutwho knows what, when, where, and why and justhow well we know both ourselves and our enemy.Its target seems to be the human mind. Informa-tion dominance has thus become a prerequisitefor fighting future wars.

The use of information in war has been abasic warfighting requirement throughout his-tory. Technology has made information moreavailable, and now it may become the weapon ofchoice. Furthermore, a revolution in military af-fairs (RMA) involving information may be on thehorizon. Some view information warfare only ina supporting role—enhancing traditional combatmissions. Others regard it as a powerful capabilityon the strategic level, at a point on the conflictspectrum before general escalation and deploy-ment of combat forces for action.

In addition, some hold that informationwarfare can be conducted prior to conflict break-ing out. Modern strategy often perceives anenemy state as a system of concentric rings repre-senting fielded armies, the population, infrastruc-ture, organic essentials, and leadership with infor-mation binding them together. Disrupting theinformation flow by attacking internal infrastruc-ture hinders the ability of an enemy to conductoffensive operations. However, some caution that

Lieutenant Colonel Arsenio T. Gumahad II, USAF, serves as a projectdirector within the Office of Space and Technology at Headquarters,Department of the Air Force.

9696

SECONDPRIZE

SECONDPRIZE

The Profession of Arms in the Information AgeBy A R S E N I O T. G U M A H A D I I

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adaptthemselves after the changes occur.

—Guilio Douhet

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advocates of information warfare ignore its unan-ticipated and perhaps counterproductive effects.

Information is increasingly becoming impor-tant to the power and wealth of modern society.Nations once fought for control of territory and

resources; but the new battleground also involvesthe information domain. As one characterizationof this phenomenon has it:

Evolving technologies may result in a transition frominformation in warfare—information as a supportingfunction of the traditional attrition/maneuver opera-tions—to information as warfare—in which attritionand maneuver become supporting elements of mili-tary, political, and economic leverage through infor-mation control.1

Advanced societies depend on an infrastruc-ture that includes subways, airports, telephonenetworks, and electric power grids. Terrorists,knowledgeable of these vulnerabilities, need onlytarget them to wreak havoc. The Internet is now apopular and convenient vehicle for terrorists androgue nations to exchange techniques for produc-ing crude but effective weapons.

Two forms of sabotage or terrorism are possi-ble. The first is the traditional disruption of orderusing violence. The second and more sophisti-cated is either electronic or information-based.

The United States relies upon technology and in-formation systems to conduct its affairs. Targetingthem creates widespread confusion and terror. Ingovernment and industry the threat of intrusionis all too real. According to the National Com-puter Security Association, 69 percent of thosefirms surveyed in 1993 were infected with a mali-cious virus, a problem which costs American busi-ness an estimated $3 billion annually.

The government is not immune to such tam-pering. An attack on the Internet by a graduatestudent in 1990 disrupted computer installationsnationwide. In the same year Australian hackerswere charged with damaging data on U.S. govern-ment computers. The pool of potentially hostileinformation warriors is huge and includes former

Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence operatives,mercenaries, unemployed technical experts, et al.Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria, is said to bethe leading exporter of viruses today.

Law and MoralityThe Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald

Fogleman, suggests that “because exploiting [in-formation systems] will readily cross interna-tional borders, we must be cognizant of what thelaws allow and will not allow.” Information war-fare raises questions that are difficult to address.When does war begin in an electronic environ-ment? How does one measure damage and definevictory? Does a malicious probe of a computersystem warrant response in kind or a more vio-lent response? Who decides to deploy offensiveinformation weapons? Would a systems attack bythe United States require congressional approval?

The vulnerabilities of traditional nonmilitarytargets are heightened in information warfare.Since enemy civilian infrastructure is a potentialtarget,

. . . infowar may only refine the way modern warfarehas shifted toward civilian targets. Taking down acountry’s air traffic control or phone systems might bedone cleanly with computers—but it still representsan attack on civilians.2

As in the case of nuclear weapons, Clause-witz’s notion of absolute war appears real in con-ducting information warfare. While the attack isclean the resulting suffering may be morally un-justifiable. Consideration of moral and legal is-sues raised by information warfare has not ad-vanced as quickly as technology and doctrine.They span the legal spectrum and include issuesof intelligence, space, use of force, and neutrality.

the pool of potentially hostile information warriors is huge

What is Information?

Information begins as derived data from observable facts or events. In-terpreting data leads to the development of information. The ultimateinterpreter is the person receiving the data. At times, though, an ob-

served event is too complex for the human mind to dissect. Machines arethus used to reduce data into a manageable and comprehensible set. Theyare information systems and come in both hardware and software forms.The draft of Joint Pub 3-13, Information Warfare, refers to information asany communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, data, oropinions in any medium or form. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of DefenseDictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines it as the meaning thata human assigns to data by means of the known convention used in theirrepresentation. Others conceive of it as a physical property—like mass andenergy, inherent in all matter. Under this concept military systems are seenas being based on, if not composed of, information. The role of informa-tion warfare therefore becomes apparent: “If information is a veritablyphysical property, then in the information age winning wars may dependon being able to hurl the most information at the enemy, while safeguard-ing against retaliation” (John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Information,Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena’s Camp,” in The Information Revolu-tion and National Security: Dimensions and Directions.)

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Although our military justice system provides alimited foundation on which to base new lawsand regulations in this area, the only recourse isto extend the provisions of current laws to coverinformation warfare. Without a definitive legalbasis, however, the limits of this new form ofwarfare remain vague and controversial.

Cyber WarriorsEquipment for the cyber warrior is not sci-

ence fiction. Development is underway—partly asadvanced demonstrations found in the Army sci-ence and technology master plan—and includesmultisensor-aided technology, digital battlefieldcommunications, intelligent minefields, precisionmunitions, night imaging, and integrated multi-media information transport. It is only a matterof time before these systems move from the labo-ratory to the battlefield. The cyber warrior is al-most completely autonomous with tools config-ured to provide maximum information about thecombat environment. As an integrated capability,the gear allows for collecting, processing, analy-sis, and interpreting information critical to a mis-sion. When Sun Tzu stated that “If you knowyour enemy and know yourself, you need not fear

the result of a hundred battles” he was referringto what is known today as situational awareness.

Hierarchical organizations were a hallmark ofthe industrial age. The need to respond to the in-novations of the industrial revolution produced ahierarchical society. This strong structure was nec-essary to attain strict organizational harmony anddiscipline. The military more than any other insti-tution needed strong command structure to prose-cute its unique mission of organized violence. It isevident that order and discipline characterize theprofessional military, especially in combat.

Futurists predict a notable shift in societalbehavior in the information age. Some envisionconditions in which the individual is the center-piece—personal autonomy as the common ele-ment of future social interaction—a world whichbecomes “multi-centered and multi-functional.”3

Here “we will socialize in digital neighborhoodsin which physical space will be irrelevant andtime will play a different role.”4 In an address be-fore the Association of the United States Army in1994 General Frederick Franks stated that “as in-formation proliferates at faster speeds and isavailable to a wider array of individuals, hierar-chical organizations evolve into networks andpower is shifted more to individuals and groups.”

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The challenge to military leaders will be inte-grating disparate interests and varied emotionallevels of individuals. The traditional collective andcorporate nature of armed forces is affected by atrend toward individualism. For armies to succeedin war they must have a cohesive, integrated, andcommon objective. The military is built around a“team concept” wherein the well-being of the unitsupersedes that of the individual. Members func-tioning strictly as individuals undermine unit in-tegrity and threaten mission success.

With the stroke of a key and access to an e-mail address, one can easily bypass the normalchain. Democratic principles of free speech coulddamage the effectiveness of established channelsif taken to the extreme. (The President has an In-ternet address so that anyone, anywhere, anytime

can send a message to him,unfiltered and unedited.) Butis the chain of commandnecessary in the informationage? Hierarchical organiza-tion must endure for the mil-

itary to succeed in battle. But it is questionablewhether the structure of the military will surviveif central bureaucracies disappear, and some fore-see a day when traditional command and controlarrangements will become obsolete. But unity ofcommand— one precept which has remained un-altered in every successful war—must not be com-promised. Thus greater discipline is required topreserve command unity and control.

Training and DoctrineInformation technology shapes training.

State-of-the-art technology promises to make itmore cost-effective without sacrificing perfor-mance and perhaps even improving it. Simulatorsare more realistic and offset the high operationalprice of real-world training.

U.S. tank commanders of the 21st century will train ina virtual world more than in the real one. The resultwill be soldiers who are better prepared—by computersimulators integrated into their vehicles that will en-able them to practice just hours before combat.5

The Army is experimenting with battle labo-ratories using advanced technology and systemsto simulate the complex interaction of diverse ele-ments on the future battlefield. An Army exerciseconducted in autumn 1994, Atlantic Resolve, em-ployed live, virtual, and constructive simulationsfor training and experimentation. The methodwas positive and since then the battle laboratoryhas paid dividends by conditioning decisions inresource allocation and weapons acquisition.

The high-tech military of the future will besmaller but more sophisticated and specialized. Intwo to three decades the organizational structure

will favor direct lines of command with mid-levelgrades eliminated. The military will be comprisedof well trained, skilled warrior-technicians whoare comfortable operating with advanced elec-tronic gadgetry.

Conflicts in the information age will not beless common or less violent. On the contrary, thetransition period between the industrial and in-formation ages is likely to be even more chaotic.6

If committed to war, cyber warriors will fight asferociously as their predecessors. Information willenhance the way they operate on the battlefield.These future warriors will quickly outflank andoutmaneuver an enemy with knowledge of its po-sition and combat situation. With informationage weapons at their disposal they will engage anenemy precisely and decisively.

For information to be a catalyst for a newRMA, doctrinal and organizational changes mustoccur. Technology enables the application of revo-lutionary innovations to warfare. But to sustaintheir power and confirm their worth as strategicand operational weapons requires modification oforganizational structures supported by doctrine ar-ticulating the efficient and proper employment oftechnological innovations on each level of war.Past conflicts yield insights into how technologyhelps ensure victory. One aspect seems constant—formulating doctrine to exploit the full potentialof technological innovation was a tedious process.Yet devising doctrine early is important to the ex-pert use of information capabilities. An organiza-tional structure grounded in doctrine guaranteesthe orderly development and effective employ-ment of information age weapons.

On the strategic level the United States seeksto acquire, exploit, and protect information to sup-port national objectives. Sectors for exploitationand protection include the economic, political,and military. Cultural as well as social informationmay also be required to support U.S. interests andstrategic goals. On the operational level informa-tion warfare consists of attacking or defending in-formation as well as exploiting it. Since informa-tion is critical to friend and foe alike, the object isthe denial, deception, destruction, and attack ofenemy information-critical systems.

Military doctrine codifies the belief about thebest way to conduct military affairs. Doctrine isdrawn most of all from experience. But past eventsmay not be relevant in the information age. Cur-rent efforts to develop Air Force doctrine tend totreat information warfare as merely a new tool toenhance missions. It is not generally viewed as aweapon on its own merits. Since experience in in-formation warfare is limited, doctrine for its use is

conflicts in the informationage will not be less commonor less violent

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not easily derived. Develop-ing information warfaredoctrine results from ananalysis of all the likely usesof information on all levelsof war. In other words, anexamination of how it isused as a national strategymechanism is critical in ad-dition to how it is employedon the lower levels of opera-tional art and tactics. In allcases, both the offensiveand defensive nature of in-formation warfare requiresdetailed examination.

Clausewitz said thatwar “is a continuation ofpolitical intercourse, car-ried on with other means.”Wars commence when con-

flicting nations can no longer conduct politicaldialogue. It is the last resort if diplomats fail toproduce an agreement. But are ideas promoted byClausewitz still valid in the information age? Hestressed the relationship between industrial agestates in politics and war. An enemy in the 21st

century may be as ambiguous as Clausewitz’s de-piction of the fog of war. When nation-states giveway to transnational interest groups, who will themilitary fight? Over the next twenty to thirty

years the Armed Forces will confront diversethreats from advanced states to non-state actorssuch as terrorists. Knowing one’s enemy is a time-less imperative in war. Therefore future doctrinemust stress flexibility in strategy above all else. InVietnam, strategic bombardment did little tochange the course of the events. The lesson hereis important: the love of technology must notdeter the search for more effective and properstrategic alternatives.

Doctrine and strategy must account for thediverse mix of adversaries the Nation could facein the future. The threats range from a sophisti-cated enemy employing information technolo-gies to the same extent as the United States to arival totally devoid of high-tech capabilities.

A Sophisticated EnemyThe Persian Gulf War revealed the effective-

ness and power of information age technologiesand weaponry. Some regional powers are lookingfor ways to counter precision guided weapons,computers, and space-based assets. An informa-tion warfare attack on any information-advancedstate may devastate its national infrastructure.Targeting financial, communications, electrical,and transportation nerve centers seriously im-pedes an enemy’s ability to conduct war. Theoret-ically, victory is achieved without firing a singleshot—at least a psychological victory demonstrat-ing the will and resources of the attacker. Amongadvocates of information war this is the most dis-cussed scenario. Sun Tzu instructs us, “to fight

Top Ten Information Warfare Targets

1. Culpeper (Virginia) electronic switchwhich handles all Federal funds andtransactions

2. Alaska pipeline which carries 10 percent of all U.S. domestic oil

3. Electronic switching system which man-ages all telephony

4. Internet

5. Time distribution system

6. Panama Canal

7. Worldwide military command and controlsystem (WMCSS)

8. Air Force satellite control network

9. Strait of Malacca, the major maritime linkbetween Europe-Arabian Peninsula andthe Western Pacific and East Asia

10. National Photographic Interpretation Cen-ter (Washington)

—Published in Wired magazine (July/August 1993)

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and conquer in all your battles is not supreme ex-cellence; supreme excellence consists in breakingthe enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

On the operational level information warfareseeks to distort and control the “adversary’s per-ception of the battlespace by controlling or cor-rupting the information he uses, while providingthe friendly commander with an unambiguouspicture of his battlespace.” 7 Techniques are usedto defeat enemy information capabilities withinbattlespace constraints, including attacks on com-mand and control network—the ability to main-tain situational awareness and decisionmaking inthe face of uncertainty—and the intelligence ap-paratus—the capacity to predict and anticipatethe intentions and actions of friendly forces. De-stroying these key elements at first opportunity ismandatory.

Space-based systems provide significant com-mand, control, and intelligence capabilities to anenemy, perhaps equal to those of the UnitedStates. Thus a top priority of information warfare is

enemy space systems. Tak-ing out such assets quicklyand precisely is paramount.Technology and weaponsdevelopment in the near

term must focus on neutralizing enemy eyes andears in both air and space. Potential hardware andsoftware weapons include anti-satellite munitions,precision bombs to strike ground stations, andsoftware attacks against computers and networks.Tactically, this kind of warfare consists of elec-tronic measures and physical destruction of infor-mation nodes.

Force EnhancementAdvanced systems can enhance our warfight-

ing capability with superior command, control,communications, and intelligence networks. Theircontribution during Desert Storm stimulated ourappetite for high-tech systems. Current systemsare routinely used in operations such as jammingradars, monitoring communications, and trackingmovements. Future technology could enable us toimpose electronic embargoes and detect vehiclesor identify individuals on the battlefield.

Real-time or near real-time information onenemy locations, dispositions, capabilities, andindicators of intentions from surveillance and re-connaissance assets gives commanders situationalawareness. Wide bandwidth digital communica-tion systems afford real-time command and con-trol links among commanders and units and be-tween the National Command Authorities andglobally-dispersed forces. Precision navigation sys-tems, like the 24-satellite constellation that com-prises the global positioning system, enhanceweapons and delivery systems. Accurate weather

data enables direction of forces at the right timein support of tactical, operational, and strategicoperations.

Information as WeaponA successful information warfare offensive

targeted at America would be a major disaster.Today an element of information dominance en-sures that U.S. and allied systems are safe fromany attack. The government, military, and indus-try must remain alert to attempts aimed at inter-rupting our activities. Enemy software penetra-tion of the U.S. intelligence network or thecommunications infrastructure of a military com-mander could be fatal in war. Nations withemerging capabilities are known to target our sys-tems. Terrorist groups and multinational organi-zations—to include the private business sector—also have keen interests in information sabotage.

The Internet attack in 1990 was perpetratedby an amateur. Professional computer hackerssponsored by hostile states or groups can do muchmore damage. And, as mentioned earlier, there aremany computer specialists willing to offer theirexpertise to the highest bidder. Since the arena forhackers is the global network of computers andcommunications, information attackers may be asfar away from their objectives as possible, unliketerrorists planting bombs. The covert nature ofthis endeavor is especially threatening.

Another trend hindering U.S. informationdominance in war is the proliferation of military-relevant technologies outside the United States.According to one recent analysis,

. . . precise navigation and imagery in the wronghands can imperil U.S. forces. Space-based communi-cations reduce the U.S. advantage in military com-mand and control. Cryptologic capabilities could per-mit terrorists to plan havoc undetected.8

Economically strong nations or groups freelypurchase advanced technologies on the openmarket. Controlling the flow of such technologyoutside the United States or to radical actors isdifficult. Most advanced systems have legitimatecivilian applications. The military is increasinglyturning to commercial products because of de-clining budgets. Dual use or sharing of commer-cial systems to support military operations, par-ticularly communications satellites, may be thewave of the future. The fear lies in their vulnera-bility to attack and exploitation. Military systemsare usually designed for security and survivabilitywhereas civilian systems are not because of thecosts involved.

information attackers may be far away from their objectives

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“All warfare is based on de-ception,” Sun Tzu once declared.“Hence when able to attack, wemust seem unable; when usingour forces, we must seem inac-tive; when we are near, we mustmake the enemy believe we arefar away; when far away, we mustmake him believe we are near.”Deception is a feature of war-fare—in the 21st century decep-tion will be information manipu-lation. Targeting informationinfrastructure to create misinfor-mation, confusion, and panic isan objective. The results can be

disruption of society, economic collapse, elimina-tion of decisionmaking ability, and reduced mili-tary effectiveness. Information warfare is useful inbattle and a promising weapon of choice. Clause-witz’s dictum that war is simply an extension ofpolitics by other means is also applicable tocovert actions.

Far removed from physical harm, informa-tion warriors using the global network can attackinformation systems worldwide. Their strategicgoals might include theft (stealing strategic plans),modification (inserting errors in databases), de-struction (wiping out economic intelligence data),

and annihilation of infrastructure (introducing asoftware virus). With such tools the informationwarrior could change the course of an action by apotential enemy to favor U.S. policy.

The Gulf War demonstrated the decisivenessof information technologies. A new RMA isemerging with these capabilities at the center. Aneffective information warfare campaign dependson developing the doctrine and organizations tofully exploit its potential. At national level, covertinformation warfare against an enemy can helpachieve policy objectives before committingforces. On the operational and tactical levels, itincapacitates enemy information-based systems,leaving its military confused while giving U.S.forces an overwhelming advantage in the field.

However potent such warfare is against atechnologically advanced enemy, it must be usedin a judicious and calculated way. Informationwarfare is not a panacea for all conflicts and can-not replace arms in combat. As in the past, know-ing one’s enemy and how best to defeat it are cru-cial. History reveals the futility of employingadvanced technology against an ill-defined enemycenter of gravity. Recourse to information warfaremust be objective and highly selective. JFQ

N O T E S

1 James R. FitzSimonds, “Intelligence and the Revolu-tion in Military Affairs,” in U.S. Intelligence at the Cross-roads, edited by Roy Godson et al. (Washington:Brassey’s, 1995), p. 375.

2 Douglas Waller, “Onward Cyber Soldiers,” Time,vol. 146, no. 8 (August 21, 1995), p. 44.

3 Yoneji Masuda, “Computopia,” in The InformationTechnology Revolution, edited by Tom Forester (Cam-bridge: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 623.

4 Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York: Vin-tage Books, 1995), p. 7.

5 Judith Gunther, Suzanne Kantra, and Robert Lan-greth, “Digital Warrior,” Popular Science (September 1994),p. 63.

6 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democrati-zation and War,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79–97.

7 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Con-cepts for Information Operations, pamphlet 525-6 (August1995), p. 9.

8 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic As-sessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Wash-ington: National Defense University, 1995), p. 155.

This article is an edited and abridged version of an entrythat received second prize in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Conteston the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by theNational Defense University Foundation.

Testing DismountedSoldier System.

Cyber Warriorintegrated headgear—collects

information for analysis and funnelslatest intelligence to soldier in the field

lightweight helmet—provides greaterprotection with mounted display fornight-vision sensors, miniature flatvideo panel, and voice activation forcomputer

body armor—allows room for computerwhile protecting soldier against nuclearand chemical hazards

thermal sight—sends multiple still-frames back to the high command,providing battlefield intelligence anddamage assessment

computer—runs technology and givessoldier friend-or-foe identification,detects mines and chemicals, and tellsexact location (embedded in lumbarregion of body armor)

wireless connection—links weapon tomonitor in helmet allowing soldier totake aim without exposing body

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A rthur Clarke, a science fiction writer,stated that any sufficiently advancedtechnology is indistinguishable frommagic. Although his point may be

quaint it bears directly on the debate over therevolution in military affairs (RMA), which islong on description and short on explanation offuture military technology. This is most evidentin the promised wizardry of information warfare.

The magical quality of information warfarestems from a vague understanding of the natureof information itself. Since rational discussion ispredicated on the explanatory power of carefullychosen conceptual terminology, the RMA debatecan be furthered only to the extent that the issuesare viewed from a common framework. Such acritical perspective allows one to see the true lim-its and powers of information warfare. At the

James J. Schneider is professor of military theoryin the School of Advanced Military Studies at theU.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

9696

THIRDPRIZE

THIRDPRIZE

BLACK LIGHTS: Chaos, Complexity, and the Promise of Information WarfareBy J A M E S J. S C H N E I D E R

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same time a closer look at information helps clar-ify two questions central to this debate: How doinformation technologies create a revolution inthe means and methods of waging war? What ob-jective criteria can help measure such revolution-ary change?

Information and ControlInformation and control represent two sides

of the same coin. However, the discussion of in-formation invariably neglects the control rela-tionship. Control is regulating influence directedat some predetermined goal. It thus consists oftwo elements: the regulating influence of oneagent or actor over another in that the formercauses change in the behavior of the latter; andpurpose in that influence is guided toward a priorobjective set by the controlling agent. Since lead-ership provides purpose, direction, and motiva-tion it is easy to see the important role that themilitary leader plays in the control and regulationof forces.

The notion of control exists on all levels ofhuman activity and forms the basis of society.The primordial urge to dominate and regulateboth nature and the environment puts control at

the center of the evolution-ary spiral. Domination overnature was realized throughtechnology that put man ona path from the stone axe tothe supercomputer. Theability to produce and use

tools such as the axe changed human thought. Asdescribed by Burke and Ornstein, the “axe-mak-ing ability to do things in the proper order is oneof the brain’s many natural talents.” Indeed, theydescribe it as the whole foundation of planningand problemsolving:

. . . the axemaker talent for performing the precise, se-quential process that shaped axes would later give riseto the precise, sequential thought that would eventu-ally generate language and logic and rules whichwould formalize and discipline thinking itself. Thenewly dominant sequential talent of the mind wasable to use the “cut-up-nature-and-control-it” capabil-ity to extract more knowledge from the world and thenuse that knowledge to cause further change. Thanks tothe axemakers’ talents and their gifts, things literallywould never, at any time, be the same.1

The domination of nature through all as-pects of technology brought change and differ-ence to the forefront of control. The idea that twothings are recognizably different or that thingschange over time is key to the theory of control—cybernetics—and the etymology of control, a termwhich comes from the Latin contrarotulare, mean-ing to mark similarities and differences. That

changes and differences can be determinedthrough comparison creates an inseparable linkbetween control and information. Control devel-ops information in two reciprocal ways. First, be-cause control is goal-directed there must be a con-tinuous comparison between the current andintended state. This ongoing comparison gener-ates feedback to the controlling agent. Second,the controller engenders information in the formof adjustment instructions that feed forward tothe controlled agent.

In warfare armies ultimately seek to domi-nate and control enemies by destroying their will.This struggle for control creates feedback infor-mation, as the status of armies is in constant flux.Staffs continuously process information and as-sess situations vis-à-vis overall mission objectives.Commanders feed forward information as “fra-gos” or other forms of instruction. The feedbackof information as intelligence about self andenemy and the feedforward of information as in-struction completes the reciprocal cycle of con-trol. It is only through the process of control thatinformation has meaning or indeed objective ex-istence. Fundamentally, then, the object of infor-mation warfare is to destroy the ability of anenemy to control while protecting one’s own.

Crisis and RevolutionRecognizing the relationship between con-

trol and information provides a perspective fromwhich to regard RMA. The present revolution is amilitary expression of the latest information revo-lution. James Beniger has argued that this currentupheaval is the fourth to occur. According to hisview the natural evolution of living systems likearmies creates a crisis in control. That crisis is re-solved only after a sudden transformation in in-formation processing and communication—aninformation revolution. The first crisis occurredfour billion years ago as the issue of controllingreproduction arose. DNA—a complex macromole-cule deoxyribonuchic acid with programming,decision, and control apparatus—became the firstinformation revolution and resolved the crisis. It“organizes matter and energy at the most funda-mental level of control [and is] not only the mostbasic of all control technologies . . . but also onewhose capabilities are unlikely to be rivaled bytechnologies of our own making for many gener-ations to come.”2 DNA is the basic building blockof all genetic material. A one-inch strand holds asmuch information as 12,000 typed pages ortwenty 500-page books. The nucleus of a singlehuman cell contains five feet of genetic code,equivalent to 2,000 such books. DNA information



the present revolution is a military expression of the latest information revolution


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is structured to provide feedforward executivecontrol over human life by shaping and organiz-ing it. Soldiers constitute the basic genetic mater-ial in a combat organization. Education, training,and doctrine are military DNA that forms war-riors and thus shapes the Armed Forces.

The second control crisis emerged 600 mil-lion years ago when living things began to movethrough space and time. It was resolved by an in-formation revolution that resulted in the brainand central nervous system. Chemistry domi-nated life processes for four billion years until

primitive electronics became important whencreatures began to stir. “The first electronic sys-tems possessed by primitive animals were essen-tially guidance systems, analogous logically tosonar or radar.”3 The brain and nervous systemhad two advantages. First, the brain provided ex-ecutive control that feedforwarded informationin a dynamic lethal environment. It also lent astaff control function that rapidly assessed infor-mation feedback from the outside world. Second,the electronic-based nervous system provided an

entire feedforward-feedback cybernetic loop thatwas swift, clear, and reliable. Command and staffprocesses are basically poor models of the brainand nervous system. Evolution of the brain led tomodern war and human society, thus creating athird control crisis.

Genetic control via DNA programming doeshave one shortcoming: the genetic blueprint isvirtually fixed forever. The encoded informationcannot be reprogrammed, but roughly 120,000years ago humans began to reprogram themselvesthrough the use of technology. Beginning withthe rapid development of simple tools they wereable to extend natural capabilities and circum-vent their hardwired genetic code. By 10,000 B.C.the swift development of tools led to a crisis inthe control of new technology and induced athird information upheaval, the agricultural revo-lution. In addition to the five basic mechanicaltools—lever, wheel, pulley, screw, and wedge—cultural tools such as alphabets, numbers, laws,money, organized armies, towns, and statesemerged to extend and enhance natural capabili-ties. The agricultural revolution culminated withthe rise of civilization which was, in effect, a con-trol system that sought to regulate four tasks.First, governance by a central government—nor-mally headed by a king—integrated societythrough a feedforward system of laws. A primitivebureaucracy afforded feedback control. Second,security provided by armed force protected thestate and its interests. The first RMA arose out ofthis development. Third, logistics through aneconomic system ensured relative efficiency inthe extraction, processing, and distribution ofscarce resources. Fourth, science—embodied ini-tially in priests—ultimately sought to understandthe world and extend human fitness beyond na-ture by new advances in technology. At the basisof this revolution was an increasingly homoge-neous society bound together by verbal and writ-ten flow of information. At the same time writingand simple arithmetic provided requisite infor-mation processing capabilities to guide civiliza-tion to its next control crisis.

Lightning in the WiresFor over 10,000 years civilization moved

along at the pace of a walking man. Informationtravelled at the same speed. During this period theextension of human natural fitness had reachedits limit inherent in existing technology. The con-straint was that tools and toolmaking relied uponmuscle power. However, technological advancesduring the Enlightenment replaced simple toolswith complex machines which were characterizedby the use of inanimate sources of power.

The steam engine was the first child of the in-dustrial revolution. That advance, rather than

Black Light

T his term refers to the invisible or “black” portion of theelectromagnetic spectrum which is the domain of x-raysand radio waves. “Black lights” is used in another sense,

however. In boxing a fighter may receive a hard shot to the headthat causes a knockout. Some boxers report seeing “black lights”before they sink into oblivion: they see and become surrounded bya shimmering, glowing aura of darkness that is referred to in med-ical terminology as a “visual scotoma.” The boxers are experiencingthe paradox of being conscious of their unconsciousness. The rea-son for this phenomenon is that when the higher cognitive centersof the brain shut down, the lower areas, called the limbic system,kick in and preserve a primitive sense of awareness. Thus a kind ofself-organization occurs among human systems in the same waysarmies undergo self-organization after the initial clash of arms. Airtheorists such as John A. Warden III and David A. Deptula developan argument for “parallel warfare” that is based on a fundamentaldisregard of the ability of a military system to self-organize atlower echelons of command. The ability for self-organizationgreatly limits the practical utility of so-called parallel warfare. SeeJohn A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal,vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 41–55; David A. Deptula, “Firing forEffect,” Defense and Airpower Series (Arlington, Va.: AEF, August24, 1995); and Michael E. Ruane, “Wisdom of ‘Smart’ Bombs StillDebated,” Philadelphia Inquirer, August 14, 1996, pp. 1, 3.


being a revolution in its own right, was really a cri-sis of control. Since machines did not require mus-cle power, they were no longer controlled directlyby a human hand. As a consequence whole elabo-rate control systems had to be developed to mastermachines, and thus cybernetics was born. “Grittysteam engines, not teeny chips, hauled the worldinto the information age.”4 Machines like thesteam engine were quickly integrated into complexsystems such as railroads. Because of their distrib-uted nature and speed they had to be controlled innew ways. Just as nature resolved its second con-trol crisis with an electronic-based nervous system,civilization resolved this new crisis with a similarelectronic innovation—the telegraph.

The influence of the telegraph was profound.In one stroke it dealt with the problem of distrib-uted control—mastering segmented cellularagents and activities separated by vast distances inspace and time. For billions of years this problemprevented single-cell organisms from being net-worked into multifunctional distributed organ-isms. As with the nervous system electricity heldthe key. In the human body nerve tissue can sus-tain an information signal at 260 miles per hour,fast enough to regulate and control distributedagents like arms and legs and activities like diges-tion and reproduction.5 Degrade this flow of infor-mation appreciably and death follows inevitably.Similarly the telegraph was able to network soci-ety, economic markets, government bureaucracies,and distributed military formations because infor-mation was able to move unambiguously, reliably,

and swiftly. Of these, speed was the most impor-tant factor and established a quantitative mile-stone for the magnitude of the current informa-tion revolution.

Equating Information and EnergyIn 1905 Albert Einstein formulated his the-

ory on the relationship between mass and energy.We can postulate a similar relation between en-ergy and information beginning with the seem-ingly trivial observation that no two objects canoccupy the same space at the same time, a funda-mental characteristic of mass. Similarly no twobits of information can occupy the same space atthe same time; thus information has the physicaldimension of mass.6 This relationship suggeststwo basic and revolutionary implications for anyrigorous theory of information warfare. First, as aform of mass, information flows. Second, thespeed of its transmission marks a revolutionary



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break with all forms of regulation and controlprior to the middle of the 19th century.

The emergence of electricity as the primarymeans of regulation and control radically alteredthe physical characteristics of living organismsand human organizations. Before electricity thesesystems were characterized by their solidity:

dense, segmented, cellu-lar, and monolithic. Adense, solid system wascontrolled by informationcollected, processed, anddistributed in a sequentialand linear manner. In the

military sphere armies behaved in a way de-scribed by the laws of solid mechanics. The so-called Lanchester equations, for example, aremathematical analogs for torque and linear force,

key elements of solid mechanics.7 Dense mono-lithic armies were controlled and regulated by thediscrete and sequential movement of the writtenand verbal word. Armies fought in a manner de-scribed by Soviet military theorist G.S. Isserson asthe “strategy of a single point.”8 They collidedlike huge bowlingballs on small point-like battle-fields. Electronic-based control and regulationgave rise to parallel distributed information net-works which could provide a continuous flow ofinformation. Coincident with the developmentof black light (electromagnetic) technology, bat-tlefield lethality grew markedly and led to a phe-nomenon known as the “empty battlefield”—themassive dispersal of troops across an ever expand-ing area.9

The use of railroads in preparing and mobiliz-ing for war followed a distributed pattern that co-incided with the parallel configuration of rail net-works and urban grids. As warfare became total itbecame protracted. Militaries had to defend—andconquer—resource, agricultural, and industrialareas distributed throughout the depth of warringnations. The dense, solid pre-industrial militaryforces began to disaggregate and be distributed toaccommodate physical characteristics of modernnation-states. Fundamentally, armies began to liq-uefy and flow to give rise to a basic characteristicof operational art: distributed deep maneuver. Inthis the continuous and fluid nature of electroniccommunications made operational art possible.Indeed the emergence of operational art is the firstessential stage in the current RMA.

The last few paragraphs discussed the materialcharacter—the statics—of information and thearmies it regulated. The continuous distributed na-ture of information supplanted the discrete, con-centrated form. Information and armies coevolved,which imparted to military art a much more fluidquality ultimately revolutionizing the dynamics ofwar. In a fundamental way the physics of fluidityoverturned the physics of solidity.

Another feature of mass is its ability to movethrough space and time. The most significant as-pect of the control crisis and information revolu-tion is the speed with which information wasable to move. Only through the near-light speedof networked information can continuous controland regulation of distributed forces be main-tained. Imagine, for example, the brain control-ling limbs and life processes like digestion at thespeed of a traveling horse: distributed control andregulation would be impossible and life wouldcease. Today, for instance, the continuous fluidand wavelike nature of lightning-fast informationcan control and regulate all aspects of full spec-trum dominance as outlined in Joint Vision 2010.

dense monolithic armies were controlled by the discrete movement of the written word

The Telegraph

A lthough it may strike us as obviousnow, it took a long while for theworld’s best inventors to transpose

even the simplest automatic circuit such as afeedback loop into the realm of electronics.The reason for the long delay was that fromthe moment of discovery electricity was seenprimarily as power and not as communica-tion. The dawning distinction of the two-faced nature of the spark was acknowledgedamong leading German electrical engineers

of the last century as thesplit between the tech-niques of strong currentand the techniques ofweak current. The amountof energy needed to send asignal is so astoundinglysmall that electricity had tobe reimagined as some-thing altogether differentfrom power. In the camp ofthe wild-eyed German sig-nalists, electricity was a sib-

ling to the speaking mouth and the writinghand. The inventors (we would call themhackers now) of weak current technologybrought forth the most unprecedented in-vention of all time—the telegraph. With thisdevice human communication rode on invisi-ble particles of lightning. Our entire societywas reimagined because of this wondrousmiracle’s [wireless] descendants.

—Kevin Kelly, Out of Control

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The new fluid quality of information in sup-port of operational art, expressed vividly in thecontrol and regulation of distributed deep ma-neuver, fundamentally changed the physicalcharacter of warfare. The movement and flow ofdistributed mass armies and networked informa-tion often manifested a state of turbulence, ed-dies of disorganization and disorder that for thefirst time in the history of the art of war trans-formed the simple dense monolithic tacticalstructures into distributed complex operationalorganizations fighting at the edge of chaos.

Control at the EdgeThe current RMA, which began in the last

century, has led to the emergence of complexityas the defining characteristic of modern militaryorganizations and operations. While complexitytheory developed—especially over the last ten

years—theorists have yet to recognize the exquis-ite complexity of modern military systems. Com-plexity is:

a characteristic of systems made up of more than twoelements, suggesting intricacy of structure andprocess, but not randomness, sometimes with a highdegree of regularity in their dynamics up to a point oftransition; usually implying a reasonable degree ofpredictability and controllability, which may quicklypass through a state-change into what is or seems tobe chaos, such as the effect of a single accident onrush-hour traffic, the outbreak of a riot in a crowd orprison, or the political upheaval in Eastern Europe in1989 flowing out of long maintained stable states.10

In a complex system:

a great many independent agents are interacting witheach other in a great many ways. . . . The very rich-ness of these interactions allows the system as awhole to undergo spontaneous self-organization. . . .These complex, self-organizing systems are adaptive,in that they . . . actively try to turn whatever happensto their advantage. . . . Every one of these complex,self-organizing adaptive systems possesses a kind ofdynamism that makes them qualitatively differentfrom static objects. . . . Complex systems are morespontaneous, more disorderly, more alive. . . . Each ofthese systems is a network of many “agents” acting inparallel. . . . The control of a complex adaptive systemtends to be highly dispersed. . . . A complex adaptivesystem has many levels of organization. . . . [They]are constantly revising and rearranging their buildingblocks as they gain experience. . . . All complex adap-tive systems anticipate the future. . . . They are ac-tive. . . . It’s essentially meaningless to talk about acomplex adaptive system being in equilibrium: thesystem can never get there. It is always unfolding, al-ways in transition.11

Complexity is a spontaneous consequence ofimposing regulation and control on a highly dis-tributed, fluid, chaotic state. Remove control inthe military—the flow of information—and theforce loses its cohesion and disintegrates. Becauseof its energy equivalence information performs acontrol function directly analogous to the effectof a magnetic field on a pile of metal filings. Themagnetic field shapes the filings the way informa-tion shapes an organization. The velocity of themagnetic flux approaches the same speed of lightas information moving through a communica-tion network. The density and velocity of infor-mation flow objectively measures the complexityof an organization.

From the foregoing discussion it appears thatcomplexity has a number of dimensions, but allof them ultimately turn on the way a complex



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dynamic system uses information. A military sys-tem uses information five ways. The first is theway it describes itself and its enemy. The more in-formation required the more complex the de-scription. Second, a complex military system usesinformation to organize itself. Indeed, it is the en-ergy aspect of information that forces and shapesan organization into a particular structure. Third,after the industrial revolution armies became al-gorithimically complex: the number of tasks orsteps necessary to defeat an enemy grew dramati-cally. There is evidence of this in the rapid in-crease in the size of planning staffs beginningwith the American Civil War and the increasinglyprotracted nature of modern war. The emergenceof operational art in this period is another conse-quence of the algorithmic complexity of conflict.Wars could no longer be won with a few battles.Instead, commanders and staffs had to programand execute a whole mosaic of deep and pro-tracted operations to defeat an adversary. Fourth,the logistics of information—acquisition, process-ing, and distribution—became complex. It was nolonger possible for commanders to sit on horse-

back and gaze at battle-fields. They and their staffshad to actively seek out in-formation widely distrib-uted across countless bat-tles in deep theaters ofoperations. Since informa-

tion has the physical dimension of mass it mustbe extracted, processed, and distributed like othermaterial resources. In this regard it is like fuel forthe mind with a kind of energy or octane rating:the greater the visual content the higher the oc-tane level. The electronic battlefield seeks to pro-vide the same total visual awareness. Because ofthe refining capacity of the computer, informa-tion can be processed to attain the highest levelpossible in the form of images.

Finally, military technology makes modernforces complex in two ways. In the first place,since machines of the industrial revolution, unlikemuscle-driven tools, relied on inanimate forms ofenergy like coal, steam, oil, and electricity themovement and sustainment of armies in the fielddrew increasingly on a complex network of dis-tributed continuous logistics. The regulation ofthis form of logistics drove the information andcontrol needs of modern forces. Second, technol-ogy itself is embedded with information. Not onlydo the new machines become more complex touse and produce, technology carries within itselfan increasingly dense and complex pattern of itsown evolution. Since technology extends the nat-ural capabilities of humans, it gives them the po-tential for self-evolution and self-revolution by ar-tificially changing their genetic code. Give a mana rifle and you have extended his natural lethalcapability. Through technology humans becomethe editor and author of their genetic character.Emerging technologies contain all the informa-tion of newer, more advanced drafts of previousprograms of instruction, which shapes human na-ture. The self-revolution of black light technologymarks the beginning of a new book of evolutionthat cannot be comprehended with pre-industrialthinking: the grammar, language, syntax, andlogic have become too complex. Similarly, warscan no longer be understood, discussed, andwaged successfully in terms of this old paradigm.Complex armies inexorably lead to a revolution inthe art of war.

CybershockModern armies are complex systems that

flow in a sea of information. They rush togetherlike great rivers along wide, turbulent fronts. De-stroy that fluid medium and an enemy is frozenand effectively paralyzed. This cybernetic paraly-sis is the essence of cybershock, the third form ofwarfare. Until the information revolution the artof war consisted of attrition and maneuver with

attrition leading to annihilation andmaneuver to exhaustion. Both formsof warfare were typically applied si-multaneously, with attrition -> anni-hilation favoring the stronger sideand maneuver -> exhaustion favor-ing the weaker. The rise of complexarmies created a new array of vulner-abilities that information warfarenow seeks to exploit.

Cybershock creates paralysis infive ways. First, through operationssecurity, deception operations, andpsychological operations an enemy

since information has the dimension of mass it must beprocessed like other resources

Attrition, Maneuver, and Cybershock

Pattern EffectDomain of

Action

Attrition Annihilation Physical

LogisticalManeuver Exhaustion

Cybershock Paralysis Cybernetic

Final Outcome

Disintegration


is denied complete information of its adversaryand itself. Second, electronic warfare destroysenemy coherence and cohesion, basically freezingits nervous system. Third, active and intense re-connaissance and counterreconnaissance onevery level blinds an enemy. Fourth, the shock ofsurprise places a tremendous burden on anenemy’s nervous system by creating a generalstate of panic. Finally, the intensity and rapidityof friendly operations inflicts a kind of cyberneticstupor on an enemy. Ideally paralysis reduces anenemy to its component parts. It would be a seri-ous error, however, to believe that one can defeatan enemy by paralysis alone. Patterns of war arecomplementary and mutually reinforcing. Theirsynergism develops an integrated posture of at-tack and defense meant to destroy complex mili-tary systems by attrition, maneuver, and cyber-shock (see figure). The outcome occurs in themoral domain with the disintegration and de-struction of the will to fight. Failure to considermodern patterns of war in their totality onlyleads to defeat. The fact is that military systemsare rarely destroyed exclusively by paralysis. Asseen earlier one remarkable attribute of complexmilitary systems is that they are spontaneouslyself-organizing.

A complex system like an army has its intel-ligence spread throughout itself. In war “eachmember reacts individually according to internalrules [training and doctrine] and the state of itslocal environment.”12 Armies in battle have a dis-tributed mind or being that has a swarm or hive-like quality. Sun Tzu, the ancient philosopher ofwar, noted a similar phenomenon: “In the tumultand uproar the battle seems chaotic, but there isno disorder; the troops appear to be milling aboutin circles but cannot be defeated. . . . Apparentconfusion is a product of good order.”

Such ideas highlight an essential quality ofmodern forces—that overall systemic paralysisand disorganization can be offset to a point byself-organization and reorganization on lower lev-els of command. Thus militaries have the fractalquality of a holograph, a photo taken with laser-light that when shattered into pieces still retainsthe image of the whole in each fragment. There isthus a distinction between self-organizing mili-tary systems and biological systems. For an organ-ism like the human body paralysis is total in thesense that a person with a broken neck does notexperience sudden self-organization and sponta-neous control of limbs. A joint force, on the otherhand, may suffer complete cybernetic collapse—the analog to a broken neck—but spontaneouslyreorganize at lower echelons and continue withits mission. The efficacy of the German idea ofauftragstaktik is based on the self-organizing abil-ity of subordinate leaders and units.

The significance of self-organization for in-formation warfare should be evident: destroying adisorganized enemy may depend ultimately onits physical—perhaps protracted—defeat in detail.If an enemy still has the will to fight, its fate willhave to be decided with a simple bullet ratherthan a complicated piece of hardware. Iwo Jimaand Okinawa remind us how rare and sweet vic-tories like the Gulf War are. Sleight of hand intechnology and information warfare should notconjure up false hopes or visions of future war. Atthe same time the Armed Forces must unshacklethe limits—and challenge the promise—of infor-mation war. In the end wars are won by soldiers,not by magicians. JFQ

N O T E S

1 James Burke and Robert Ornstein, The Axemaker’sGift (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1995), p. xvi.

2 James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution (Cam-bridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 54.

3 Fred Hoyle, Man in the Universe (New York: Colum-bia University Press, 1964), pp. 24–25.

4 Kevin Kelly, Out of Control (New York: Addison-Wesley, March 1995), p. 115.

5 William F. Ganong, Review of Medical Physiology, 8th

ed. (Los Altos, Calif.: Lange Medical Publications, 1977),p. 29. I am indebted to Leah J. Stevens for this key insight.

6 James Clerk-Maxwell, “Remarks on the Mathemati-cal Classification of Physical Quantities,” Proceedings ofthe London Mathematical Society, March 1871, pp. 224–33;D.C. Ipsen, Units, Dimensions and Dimensionless Numbers(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 61–63, 131–52;Henry L. Langhaar, Dimensional Analysis and Theory ofModels (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 1–11,60–78; and Robert A. Carman, Dimensional Analysis (NewYork; John Wiley and Sons, 1969), pp. 179–215.

7 James J. Schneider, “The Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle,” Theoretical Paper No. 1 (Fort Leav-enworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, April 23, 1985).

8 James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolu-tion (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), pp. 11–12.

9 James J. Schneider, “The Theory of the Empty Battlefield,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute(September 1987), pp. 37–42.

10 Roger A. Beaumont, War, Chaos, and History (West-port, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), p. xiv.

11 M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Sci-ence at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York; Simonand Schuster, 1992), pp. 11–12, 145–47.

12 Kelly, Out of Control, p. 22.

This article is an edited and abridged version of an entrythat received third prize in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Conteston the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by theNational Defense University Foundation.





The debate over the revolution in mili-tary affairs (RMA) has become one ofwhither rather than whether. Mostcommentators agree that profound and

inescapable changes are taking place in warfare.The discussion now focuses on defining this revo-lution more precisely, determining the extent andtype of changes that it will effect in the near andlong term, and what if anything should be doneabout them. Much effort has gone into determin-ing how technology will alter the conduct of warin the information age from the National Com-mand Authorities to the individual soldier. Yet noone has addressed the central issue of how thisrevolution will affect military theory—the founda-tion of doctrine. The exploitation of new technol-ogy demands a corresponding revolution in mili-tary theory that explains war as a broad-based,

Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is assigned to the Future Battle Directorate, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and formerlytaught history at the U.S. Military Academy.

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Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: A Revolution in Military TheoryBy A N T U L I O J. E C H E V A R R I A I I

Tandem Thrust ’97,Queensland, Australia.

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dynamically interactive continuum. It must pro-vide a holistic view of war that represents its var-ied dimensions and accommodates new oneswhich emerge; and, similar to the paradigmaticshift that is occurring in science, it must depictthe normal state of war as vigorous interactionand continuous change rather than static equilib-rium. This approach must in turn form the con-ceptual framework for future military doctrine.

Before proceeding, the terms military thought,theory, and doctrine should be defined. For our pur-poses, military thought consists of the aggregate ofdevelopments, theories, approaches, perceptions,patterns, and frameworks (paradigms) that belongto a particular era, community, or person. It re-sponds to and borrows from values and assump-tions in its socio-cultural milieu and represents thesolution or analysis of military problems in the ab-

stract. Military the-ory involves the his-torical observationand the systematicstudy of organiza-tions, strategies, tac-

tics, techniques, and procedures from antiquity tothe present. It educates warfighters and policymak-ers alike and also provides a basis for developingdoctrine that in turn creates a common philoso-phy and practice for solving problems in the phys-ical world, either through fighting or other means.Doctrine, in sum, is the accepted canon: it repre-sents what the institution teaches officially andtacitly. It remains authoritative in nature but re-quires judgment when applied. Doctrine alsoshapes dialogue, defines capabilities, accommo-dates threats, and influences force disposition andresource allocation.

Professional publications such as Field Man-ual 100-5, Operations, Field Manual 100-6, Infor-mation Operations, U.S. Army Training and Doc-trine Command Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXIOperations, Fleet Marine Force Manual-1, Warfight-ing, Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrineof the U.S. Air Force, and Joint Publication 3-0,Doctrine for Joint Operations reflect commonwarfighting philosophies for specific services orforces, functions, and levels of warfare. They thusdraw from accepted or newly developed theoriesor concepts to describe official practice relating tocurrent or potential problems. This theory in turnreflects concerns in military thought, such ashow to incorporate expanding capabilities of in-formation-age technology into all types and lev-els of warfare. This article considers the impact ofnew theory on FM 100-5.

Dimensions of WarRMA has introduced a number of new condi-

tions into the conduct of war. For one thing, theability to strike simultaneously throughout anever-expending battlespace has made sequentialoperations all but obsolete. This simultaneity willcontinue to blur the already tenuous distinctionsamong tactical, operational, and strategic levelsof war. Moreover, future operations will involvean indefinite extension of the battlespace—thedepth, breadth, and height of a battlefield—brought about by increases in the range, accuracy,and lethality of new weapons systems. This ex-pansion reflects an evolutionary tactical trend ac-celerated by rapid technological advances. Itthreatens to remove safe areas from the battle-field, intensifying danger and uncertainty. Futureconflicts might well consist of a single, continu-ous strike lasting hours, days, or even monthsrather than a series of battles or campaigns. Oper-ations in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait hint atwhat simultaneous or near-simultaneous strikescan achieve.

Digitization is transforming command andcontrol on the tactical, operational, and strategiclevels. Digital systems are rendering battle com-mand nonhierarchical. Organizations process anddisseminate information in nontraditional pat-terns so that others can exploit it in a timelymanner. Situational awareness will soon becomeautomatic and the transmission of the comman-der’s intent instantaneous. Digital displays willsoon depict individual vehicles and weapons sys-tems with precise logistic and geographical infor-mation, all constantly and automatically updatedand shared with other systems. The goose egg willbecome obsolete and unit boundaries, combatformations, and battlefield graphics unnecessary.

In addition, information-age technology ismaking the environment in which future militaryoperations occur more dynamic and unpre-dictable. It renders national economies more sen-sitive to global developments, heightens culturaland political awareness on the part of world popu-lations, and fuels radical movements that promoteworld-wide political fragmentation and destabi-lization. Information-age technology can deliverthe effects of military actions, large and small, to aglobal audience almost immediately. Images ofwar and peace—either real or contrived—can deci-sively influence national will or public opinionbefore authorities confirm or repudiate their au-thenticity. Paradoxically, a flood of real or near-real time information puts greater demands on in-telligence gatherers and decisionmakers alike,forcing them to rely more on their intuition andClausewitzian coup d’oeil than ever before.



the ability to strike simultaneouslywill continue to blur distinctionsamong levels of war

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Since the classical age enemies have wagedwar in five overarching dimensions—political, so-cial, technological, operational, and logistical—which approximate the four elements of nationalpower—political, socio-psychological, military, andeconomic—and indeed serve as conduits for direct-ing that power. Neglecting one can lead to cata-strophic defeat as in the case of the infamousSchlieffen Plan, which dismissed the German polit-ical situation as irrelevant, or Hitler’s war with theSoviet Union, which egregiously underestimatedeconomic and socio-psychological elements.

The political dimension consists of politicalaims and politics as a process. Political aims,whether manifested in terms of protecting na-tional security interests, an aggressive policy foreconomic expansion, a commitment to worldwidereligious or ideological conversion, a desire for re-taliatory assassination, the promotion of state-sponsored terrorism, or mere entertainment, havealways directed war, though not always coher-ently. In addition, politics as a process influencedby culture, geography, and personality has alwaysaffected the direction of war, though not alwaysconstructively. While the decisionmaking thatTartar bands used to formulate policy might ap-pear less sophisticated than those of modernstates (which is debatable), they proved no less ef-fective in developing strategies and direction formilitary force in pursuit of political goals. Theseobjectives emerged as a product of resources avail-able to the Tartars, their geopolitical position as acomposite of Turkish and Mongol nations locatedin Central Asia, their nomadic culture and tradi-tions, and the influence of Islam. FM 100-5 recog-nizes the role of the political dimension in direct-ing force to achieve strategic goals but does not

discuss the influence of politics as a process on theplanning or execution of military operations.

The social dimension—the attitude and thecommitment of people—also remains essential towarfighting. The Peloponesian and Punic Warsdemonstrate the importance of popular supporteven when only limited segments of society ac-tively participate in combat. The significance ofthe social dimension receded to a certain extentin the medieval era when knights assumed theprincipal roll as warfighters. It emerged again inthe 17th century as armies grew larger, levelled inthe 18th century “cabinet wars” which reliedsomewhat less on popular support, and grewonce again in the 19th century as states moved to-ward the concept of a nation in arms. Indeed, theincrease in army size combined with the emer-gence of mass politics has made the cultivation, ifnot manipulation, of public opinion essential inwarfighting. FM 100-5 recognizes the “attitudeand commitment of the populace” as the human(physiological, psychological, and ethical) dimen-sion of war.

Technology affects every dimension and alllevels of warfare. It interacts with culture andphysical events in time and space to influence theduration, nature, shape, and outcome of conflict.Technological advances, while always important,take on greater significance when a “gap” existsbetween one force and another, as the Battle ofOmdurman demonstrated in 1898. Such advancesalso produce military technical revolutions thatcan lead to larger, more inclusive RMAs such asthe one launched by Gustavus Adolphus in theearly 1600s. Gustavus actually capitalized on theeffort by Maurice of Nassau to effect military re-form in the 1590s. Maurice developed a systemwith linear formations, discipline, drill, and volleyfire based on the Roman model to which Gus-tavus added pike and musket, the perfection ofthe salvo, lighter and more maneuverable field ar-tillery, and smoke and direct-fire suppression inthe attack. This led the Swedish king to many vic-tories and the title Father of Modern Warfare. Italso affected the strategic, organizational, andsocio-political realms of warfighting, resulting inan early modern European RMA. FM 100-5 ad-dresses the role of technology in warfare and doc-trinal development, but not as a warfighting di-mension; and it confuses the roles of doctrine andtheory in the exploitation of technology. Doctrinenever truly initiates or drives change per se but at-tempts to channel or focus it through the identifi-cation of appropriate warfighting tasks. The rela-tionship between doctrine and technology is

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subsumed in the reciprocity between military the-ory or concept and desire for—or emergence of—enhanced or increased capabilities.

The operational dimension refers to the con-duct of war. It consists primarily of attempts todominate the physical space of the battlefield withcombat power and to destroy an enemy’s will tofight. From antiquity to the modern age, comman-ders and staffs have conceptualized the battlefieldprimarily in physical terms. Great captains fromAlexander to Napoleon generally had to consideronly two dimensions—breadth and depth—in de-ploying forces. But with the 20th century aircrafthad extended battlespace to three dimensions, andsubmarines arguably added a fourth. Spacecraftnow make it five. In addition, FM 100-5 recognizesthe operational dimensions of tempo, depth, andsynchronicity. It must go one step further, how-ever, and acknowledge information and force aswarfighting dimensions as well.

The logistical dimension has evolved from lit-erally living off the land and ad hoc foraging to in-tricate if cumbersome depot/supply and push and

pull systems. Subsistence, ac-couterment, ammunition,fuel, and transport providethe stuff of war, the lifebloodof armies. These essentialshave affected the size, range,and potency of forcesthroughout history. Con-

sumption rates for fuel, ammunition, and waterhave increased more than ten-fold since 1945. Adivision consumes as much today as a field armyduring World War II. The successful projection offorce across the globe also depends on logistic andsupport infrastructures such as airfields, seaports,and ground transportation networks. Had Iraq es-tablished even a modicum of control over South-west Asian sea and airports through alliances orother means, coalition forces would have found itmuch more difficult to execute Desert Storm. Untilalternatively powered vehicles and weapons are de-veloped, logistics will remain the decisive problemfor Force XXI operations. FM 100-5 recognizes thatlogistics operations are a critical element ofwarfighting, devoting an entire chapter to the sub-ject. It does not, however, address logistics as aninteractive dimension.

New TrendsAlthough the nature and significance of each

of these dimensions has varied from era to era,each has clearly remained essential to the con-duct of war. Commanders have deliberately,though not absolutely, influenced activitieswithin these dimensions to impact their own andthe enemy’s combat power. However, due to limi-tations imposed by human beings trained—and

thus constrained—to think in terms of static,two-dimensional maps and symbols, full integra-tion of these dimensions into a comprehensivetheoretical framework has not yet occurred. Accu-mulating dimensions one upon another has onlymade visualization of the battlefield more com-plex instead of more sophisticated or complete.In short, theoretical frameworks have remainedlinear—closed, balanced systems oriented on se-quential events.

RMA has also made it possible—and thusnecessary—to view military operations throughtwo newly emerging dimensions for which cur-rent theory does not account. We can now effectaction across a broad spectrum of options withinthe domains of information and force (lethalityand violence). While armies have traditionallyconducted military operations within theserealms, the dynamic and fluid conditions of 21st

century warfare have made deliberate considera-tion and doctrinal recognition of them essential.

Obviously, the increased speed and precisionof modern weaponry make information—theheart of RMA—an essential dimension of warfare.Commanders must win the information war tosucceed today. Domination of the electro-mag-netic spectrum will play a critical part in war aswill position cloaking and deception. However,we must not treat information as a physical di-mension like land, sea, or air. Information superi-ority does not function like air superiority.

Additionally, non-lethal weapons includingsticky foam, antitraction materials, infrasound,anesthetics, and microwave transmitters provide arange of options under force application. Withincertain limitations, commanders can now decidewhat level of lethality to introduce in an opera-tion as well as how and when. However, recentobservations indicate that there are numerousglitches to be worked out before such weaponsprove truly useful. Nonetheless, by deliberatelyraising levels of violence and tempo we can attackthe “state of being” of an enemy, ultimately push-ing it into chaos where its rate of tactical, opera-tional, and strategic errors increases decisively.

The fact that linear forms of conceptualiza-tion have dominated military thinking through-out history should not surprise us. Our educa-tional institutions have taught us to convey andprocess information in a rigidly structured, step-by-step, left-to-right, or top-to-bottom sequencein which input remains proportional to output.We study major disciplines like economics, soci-ology, and psychology separately, as closed sys-tems, as if knowledge and developments relatedto one have no bearing on the others. Each fieldpresupposes equilibrium as its norm and flux asan aberration.



theoretical frameworks have remained linear—closed, balanced systems oriented on sequential events


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Likewise, warfighting schools have taughtcommanders to view battle as sequential, as a rela-tively closed system with identifiable start andendpoints and comprised of forces that produceproportional effects. For example, to facilitate com-mand and control, military missions began with aspecific not-later-than (NLT) start date and time, aset of clearly delineated phases or phase lines, anda presumably attainable goal or objective, also gen-erally associated with a NLT date and time for itsaccomplishment. Moreover, the desired outcomeor endstate of a mission drove the amount of forcerequired; that is, successful attacks usually requirea 3:1 force ratio of attacker to defender. Althoughwe recognized such measures as artificial, until theadvent of information-age technology few reason-able alternatives for exercising command and con-trol and calculating force disposition existed. Untilrecently, the wherewithal to calculate the myriadoutcomes of nonlinear systems simply was notavailable. A small change in a nonlinear systemcan produce an exponential number of new out-come possibilities, each of which might branchinto any number of additional likelihoods. Eachsubsequent path and combination would then re-quire thorough mathematical investigation thatmight literally take a lifetime to calculate. Conse-quently, we embraced linear analytical systems notonly because our intellectual conditioning led usin that direction, but for practical reasons as well.Thus military thought, like its civilian counterpart,became inseparable from closed, well-ordered sys-tems, from structure and sequence, from balanceand equilibrium.

Unfortunately, the nature of war doesn’t fitin the limits of a linear system. As Clausewitz ex-plained, war has a “dual” nature consisting, inthe first place, of several internal constants—fog,friction, chance, uncertainty, physical exertion,danger—that render it unavailable to mathemati-cal calculation. Such imponderables result fromthe interplay of opposing forces, nearly simulta-neous and continuous action, and propensity to-ward escalation. The second nature of war, achameleon-like character according to Clause-witz, consists of a capacity to assume variousforms over time as enemies introduce newweapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures.Thus warfighting remains in a constant state offlux. A successful approach in one era may yieldlittle in another. Combined, the internal and ex-ternal characteristics of war make it a complex ofindependent and dependent variables that inter-act in unexpected ways to produce multiple out-comes in a range of dimensions.

Inter-DimensionalityTo grasp this interplay, military theory must

assume an inter-dimensional approach. Inter-di-mensionality is more than adding one dimensionto another: it requires rotating, translocating, andtransforming axes in multiple ways to examinethe effects of various combinations of events atdifferent times (figure 1). This sort of thoughtprocess stretches intellectual capacities to thelimit. However, advances in information-agetechnology can assist in multidimensional con-ceptualization by allowing us to construct com-puterized models to simulate the battlefield (forexample, JANUS) and rapidly wargame scenariosfrom as many perspectives as can be built intothe system. On the other hand, such simulationswill probably never accurately replicate Clause-witz’s imponderables which by definition defyquantification. Multidimensionality must thusinclude the commander’s intuition and coupd’oeil. Finally, we must never use it to predict,only to problematize.

Hitherto, theory has not addressed the inter-dimensional nature of warfighting or war itself asa broad-based, interactive, and dynamic contin-uum. Military theorists have always viewed warin a segmented and compartmentalized fashion.They have analyzed warfare by breaking it into itsessential parts and classifying it. Such analyseshave addressed issues ranging from the complexrelationships between politics and strategy to thepractical conduct of war—whether conventional,nuclear, or some other variety. Overall, theseanalyses have contributed immensely to the waywe see war. However, with the notable exceptionof Clausewitz’s On War which remains incom-plete, these contributions either left their subject

Figure 1. Optimizing Force

Lethality / Violence

Chaos

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in a disassembled state or never approached waras an interactive whole in the first place.

A brief and by no means conclusive review oftheir efforts will serve to illustrate the majortrends of military theory. Vegetius, like others, ap-proached war to reform its methods of conduct.His classical work, On Military Affairs, enjoyedmore influence a millennium after it was written,but suffered from numerous misunderstandingsand impracticalities concerning weapons systemsof the period. Machiavelli, too, advocated militaryreform; he developed principles derived from theancient Roman model and insisted on applyingthem to Renaissance warfare. Montecuccoli con-cerned himself with reducing military expertise tofundamental rules and incorporating them in atheory of war. Clausewitz, perhaps the most pro-found military thinker, came nearest to actually

developing such a theoryof war, one that reflectedthe multidimensional anddynamic character of con-flict. Due to an untimelydeath, his work went un-

finished and remains largely misunderstood. BasilLiddell Hart, deeply affected by the catastrophicloss of life in World War I, also sought to reformthe conduct of war. He developed an indirect ap-proach to strategy which he argued would bemore effective and less costly than head-on coun-terparts. Edward Luttwak’s historical studies pro-vide thorough and painstaking analyses of theway that governments from Rome to the SovietUnion developed and executed strategy; however,his work amounts to a theory of strategy as aprocess rather than of war as a phenomenon. Notsurprisingly, the views of each of these thinkers re-flect one or more of the intellectual undercurrentsof their own day as well as their experiences. Ourefforts to place war within a theoretical frameworkrarely transcend their socio-cultural milieu. Onthe contrary, it is that very milieu which providesthe substance and context of meanings for devel-oping and communicating ideas. Paradigm shiftsand intellectual revolutions within the larger mi-lieu will often, in one way or another, inform mil-itary theory.

The scientific community is on the verge ofa paradigm shift. Information-age technology inthe form of computer simulations and math co-processors makes nonlinear calculations a matterof routine. Scientists in every field have begun tore-examine or in some cases jettison traditionallinear models in favor of more dynamic, open-ended, nonlinear ones. Consequently, informa-tion-age technology has launched a scientific rev-olution equal to that which brought 16th and 17th

century Europe from a theologically to a mathe-matically described universe. This revolution

shatters the paradigm of a “clockwork universe”expressed in Newton’s laws of motion wherebyequilibrium formed the natural state of the physi-cal world.

This new paradigm assumes that continuouschange and dynamic interaction, rather thanequilibrium, represent the normal state of theuniverse. It employs an interdisciplinary ratherthan segregated approach to science, borrowingfrom disparate disciplines to explain the dynamicnature of physical phenomena. The fundamentalprinciples of this new paradigm maintain that:

■ every system component, no matter how smallor insignificant, plays a part in deciding the outcome;thus we must treat systems holistically rather than fo-cusing only on key players

■ predictable and nonpredictable phenomena co-exist and interact in the physical world to produce com-plex networks with too many variables or relations toconsistently calculate outcomes

■ a small change in the input to a system can re-sult in disproportionate effects

■ systems—individuals, armies, bureaucracies—tend to evolve toward greater complexity

■ complex adaptive systems spontaneously reorga-nize themselves when confronted with challenges; atsuch moments systems are generally found at theirmost innovative and creative.

This paradigm shift offers unique opportuni-ties to theorists. We now possess the tools and in-tellectual framework to construct a theory of war-fare that more accurately reflects the dynamicand inter-dimensional nature of conflict. A newtheory in turn will lead to a better understandingof war and a more realistic representation of war-fare in professional study and instruction. Ofcourse, as Clausewitz warned, no theory can pre-dict the outcome of a conflict.

Historical PerspectivesNew military theory contributes three addi-

tional characteristics to an understanding of war.First, it proceeds with the assumption that war op-erates as a continuum. In other words, war as astate of being exists before the first clash of armsor official declaration of war and may continuebeyond the final treaty or cease fire. We identifySeptember 1, 1939 and August 15, 1945 as thestart and the conclusion of World War II; yet thesedates omit a great deal. They do not account forGermany’s military build-up in violation of theVersailles Treaty, the invasion of the Rhineland,the annexation of the Sudentenland and Czecho-slovakia, or the so-called Anschluß with Austria.They also exclude Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia andJapan’s invasion of Manchuria. In fact, to fully un-derstand the conditions that gave rise to World



intellectual revolutions withinthe larger milieu will often inform military theory


E c h e v a r r i a


War II one must go back at least to the end ofWorld War I, to the provisions of the peace treaty,the issue of war guilt and reparations, the globaldepression of the 1930s, and the ultimate failureof the Weimar Republic. Moreover, the strugglesbetween the Soviet Union and the West whichushered in the Cold War period had their originsin World War II. Key players changed rolesslightly, but a new state of war began to emergebefore, and continued well after, 1945. Thus wemight extend Clausewitz’s definition of war as a“contest between opposing wills” to include theidea of war as a contest between opposing wills

expressed violently via aggressive channeling ofnational power (see figure 2). Indeed, war be-comes nothing more than a deliberate focusing ofnational power to achieve an objective.

Second, the multiple dimensions of war in-teract dynamically. Events from one flow intoothers. Decisions made in the political domaincan impact events in the operational dimensionand vice versa. Bismarck’s decision to storm thefortress of Düppel in the Schleswig-Holstein Warof 1864 emerged purely from a desire to acquirepolitical clout by demonstrating Prussian resolve.Political circumstances in early 1916 dictated theexecution of the Somme offensive at a time andplace—one of the strongest points in the Germanline—that neither Douglas Haig nor FerdinandFoch wanted. In each case, decisions made in thepolitical domain directly affected events in the

Figure 2. Multi-dimensionality

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operational dimension. On the other hand, thebattle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) in 1862 is a caseof operational events affecting other dimensions.Antietam ended in a tactical draw when McClel-lan failed to take advantage of several opportuni-ties to annihilate Lee’s army; but clever manipula-tion of the outcome by Lincoln yielded astrategic, political, and moral victory for theNorth. Antietam resulted in the continued isola-tion of the South from Europe, prevented Mary-land’s secession from the Union, and gave rise toa moral victory with the Emancipation Proclama-tion a few days later. Thus an essentially indeci-sive event in the operational dimension producedconspicuous effects in the logistical, political, andsocial dimensions of war.

Third, all events in war have weight; eventhe least can have disproportionate effects. Forexample, the personality of a commander loomsas large as the size and preparedness of an army.Prussofilia on the part of Czar Peter III saved Fred-erick the Great from probable defeat in 1763.Peter, a prince of Schleswig-Holstein, an honorarygeneral in the Prussian army and a long-time ad-mirer of Frederick, assumed the throne on thedeath of Empress Elizabeth and reversed Russia’spolitical course away from participation in theSeven Years’ War, an endeavor which many in hiscourt considered little more than a near-ruinousexpedition to further the glory of an ally, Austria.The fortuitous discovery of Lee’s “lost order” (spe-cial order 191) by Union troops before the battleof Antietam gave McClellan the information heneeded to attack and destroy the Army of North-ern Virginia. Nonetheless McClellan’s dilatory na-ture saved Lee from utter defeat. Likewise, anevent as simple as an undelivered message can becatastrophic. Soldiers of the Royal NewfoundlandRegiment failed to get word that their attack onthe afternoon of July 1, 1916, the first day of theSomme offensive, had been canceled. Conse-quently, they advanced unsupported and in sin-gle-file through narrow gaps in their own wirethat were covered by German machine guns. Theregiment suffered 85 percent casualties launchingan attack that should not have occurred.

A dynamic, inter-dimensional approach tomilitary theory requires corresponding changes indoctrine. Specifically, doctrinal vehicles such asFM 100-5 must stress the interconnectedness ofthe dimensions of war. Doctrine forms the basisof the Army’s warfighting philosophy and in-structs, guides, and educates military profession-

als of all services. Accordingly, it must clearlyconvey the nonlinear nature of war and recom-mend suitable tactics, techniques, and proce-dures. It must encourage a multidimensional ap-proach to military problems and emphasize thatwars do not occur in a vacuum.

The changes wrought by RMA will likelymake warfighting more rather than less difficult.The means, environment, and dimensions of fu-ture war continue to transform it. To keep abreastof such changes, we need an integrative, multidi-mensional approach to military theory—one thatremains relevant to developing practical warfight-ing doctrine. Thus theory must approach warfareas a phenomenon comprised of continuouschange and dynamic, interactive dimensionsrather than as a closed system predicated on thenotion that balance and equilibrium represent thenatural state of the universe. Thanks to revolution-ary developments in computer-age technology anda shift in scientific thinking, we have the means todevelop, sustain, and use an inter-dimensional ap-proach to war. Doing so amounts to nothing lessthan a revolution in military theory. JFQ

This article is an edited and abridged version of an entrythat received the prize for the best submission by a junior officer in the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest on the Revo-lution in Military Affairs” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation.





To fully realize the revolutionary poten-tial of new military technology wemust develop doctrine that incorpo-rates innovative operational concepts

as well as organizational structures that are joint,deployable, and informationally smart. Techno-logical upheaval is already reverberating through-out many critical military functions. As a resultdoctrine must reflect changes in time and spacerelationships on the battlefield, the balance be-tween capability and manpower, and the natureof command and control. This article examinesthese changes and organizational structures capa-ble of integrating new technologies and maximiz-ing their warfighting potential.

To understand the need for change, we mustfirst grasp its causes. New technologies are recon-structing the world. Just as military institutionsreflect society, they also experience change. Com-puters, digital technology, and improved perfor-mance of equipment are creating enhancementsin many areas. Tomorrow we will shoot, move,and communicate differently than we do today.

Increasing the TempoPerhaps the most visible effect of modern

mechanics is firepower. The Gulf War left us withimages of smart missiles flying thousands of milesbefore destroying selected targets. But the lastingimportance may be their impact on operational

Major James K. Morningstar, USA, has served in avariety of armor and cavalry assignments and is a Second Fleet plans officer (J-51) on board USS Mount Whitney.

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tempo rather than their destructiveness. To ap-preciate the potency of precision munitions, onehas only to compare the amount of ordnance em-ployed to destroy targets in past wars. While ittook several hundred bombs to destroy a bridgeduring World War II it takes only one guidedbomb today. This simple fact has tremendousrepercussions for speed in combat. In World WarII it took an extensive air campaign to destroyseveral bridges; a few aircraft can do it in hoursnow. Commanders must be ready to move to thenext phase of operations much faster than theydid fifty, thirty, or even ten years ago. Increasedaccuracy has robbed planners of the time to ad-just to evolving conditions.

During Desert Storm we attacked Iraqi de-fenses with a preparatory bombardment of high-explosive artillery rounds followed by concentra-tions of conventional rounds from Abrams tanksand Bradley fighting vehicles. Physically the at-tack was a refined version of the sort conducted

in the fields of France overseventy years earlier. In theapplication of weapons,only the addition of attackhelicopters would have dis-tinguished it from Blitzkriegin 1939. Allied forces were

overrun by the Germans because their leaderswere accustomed to a horse cavalry and foot sol-dier pace of combat. In the future, anyone whoseoperational tempo is at the dumb bullet speed ofbattle will fall behind in a combat parade whereprecision munitions call the cadence.

Precision munitions must lead us to reviseour doctrinal definitions of battlespace. Groundforces have always been responsible for the ter-rain that they effectively covered with fire. In thepast the range of weapons, the probability of killper weapon, and the number of systems availablelimited that effectiveness over space. A tank com-pany commander in the defense would positionhis vehicles to mass fires within range on a partic-ular piece of ground where an enemy was likelyto cluster. He would have to rely on terrain or ob-stacles to force enemy forces into a kill sack anduse mass fires to increase the likelihood of de-stroying targets. The more bullets fired at a point,the better the chances of a hit. This meant thatthe area beyond his focus would have to be ad-dressed by artillery, air support, or other means.Likewise each artillery piece would wait until for-ward observers spotted enemy forces on one tar-geted area so they all could fire together and in-crease the probability of hitting targets.Battlespace has been a slave of weapon precision.

Guided tactical munitions will emancipateour use of the battlespace. Smart projectiles willenable tanks and artillery to fire in the direction

of an enemy and allow the round to spot its owntarget. These systems will eventually achieve anexpected performance level of one kill per round.Target areas will no longer depend on terrain;they will encompass the entire battlespace. Accu-rate fire-and-forget systems such as the anti-tankJavelin will enable commanders to deploy skir-mishers far beyond the main line of defense, thusincreasing their coverage of terrain. Former delin-eations of area responsibilities by weapon systemswill become indistinguishable.

Guided munitions will bring other players tothe tactical battlefield. Because of difficulties incoordinating accurate application near friendlytroops, only the far reaches of battlefields haveexperienced many powerful long-range systems.This will change as new, highly accurate cruisemissiles begin to support commanders. Somedaya Ranger unit pinned down by a machine gunfrom a nearby highrise may call upon supportfrom a GPS-guided tactical cruise missilelaunched from a ship. Elsewhere, a corps may firemissiles at strategic objectives which other ser-vices or the National Command Authorities(NCA) want destroyed. As the military learns todo more with less, interservice support will becommon on lower levels of command.

When the Navy and Air Force adopted guidedmissiles they learned to incorporate defensesagainst such weapons. Systems such as rapidblooming on board chaff and anti-missile elec-tronic jamming equipment are present on all Navyships. In the future special vehicles will carry suchdevices to protect against enemy missiles. Armor,infantry, air defense artillery, and the Signal Corpswill compete for the control of such systems.

A second radical change in perceptions ofbattlespace results from robotic reconnaissance.As units apply combat power at greater ranges,they must see at greater ranges. In many casesthese distances exceed the supportable limits ofscouts. Already unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)can provide reconnaissance imagery down tounits in the field. Digital links will provide realtime pictures from airborne platforms such asNavy UAVs and Army and Air Force joint surveil-lance target attack radar system (JSTARS) capabili-ties to ground headquarters as they maneuveragainst an enemy. Soldiers will one day carrysmall screens displaying symbolic representationsbeamed from satellites showing what lies over thehorizon. Accurate intelligence pictures thathigher headquarters could once only dream ofwill be available to front line troops.



precision munitions must lead us to revise our doctrinaldefinitions of battlespace


M o r n i n g s t a r


New Possibilities Technology has also altered combat by in-

creasing potential rates of movement. Vehicleslike M–1 Abrams tanks are fully 33 percent fasterthan their predecessors. The effect on maneuveris obvious, yet the effect on command and con-trol is perhaps more subtle but decisive. GeneralSchwarzkopf’s maneuver known as the “HailMary” displayed the unprecedented ability oflarge forces to displace over great distances atspeeds that outpaced the enemy’s ability to react.Field headquarters must not only plan and con-duct these rapid operations but also physicallymove with them. Modern rates of speed can havea similar concrete impact on other operations.Since C–17s fly as much as 50 percent faster thanC–130s, planners must ensure that cargo does notpile up at airheads. Greater speeds allow widermaneuvers that, in turn, require more bulk fuel.Increased speed of action intensifies the planningand coordination burden carried by staffs.

Traditional ideas for employing forces giveway to new possibilities introduced by technicaladvancements. The V–22 Osprey and similar air-craft may make it routine for infantry companiesto move five hundred miles per day. Remotely pi-loted aircraft firing guided munitions may betheir primary source for reconnaissance and firesupport at such ranges. Headquarters for suchunits will need specialized abilities to commandand control these operations.

Enhancements in command and control arealready upon us. Digital and computerized com-munication systems now exist but only as a pre-view of what lies ahead. Voice encryption isevolving into burst transmissions of pre-format-

ted reports. Comput-ers on vehicles willallow crew membersto key in or selectfrom menus itemsthat software will in-

corporate into report formats and send at a touchof a button to headquarters. Future versions willallow headquarters to extract information fromsensors on the vehicle without bothering crewmembers with extraneous reports. Position loca-tion devices on supply trucks, for example, willroutinely report to a headquarters where a com-puter screen display will enable commanders tosee where their assets are at any given time.Adapting existing technology will allow trucks tocarry digital maps that can help drivers see theirlocation, select routes in unfamiliar areas, andkeep track of units around them. Beyond that dri-vers will be able to update screens by noting ob-stacles, report enemy positions, or even depictthe delivery of supplies and transmit that infor-mation via computer net to other screens. One

day such systems will have voice synthesizers thatverbally draw attention to informational changesso that drivers need not constantly watch screens.Combat and peacekeeping units will wonder howthey ever got along without such systems formaintaining common situational awareness.

Digital communications will change manyaspects of military operations. Because they willaugment rather than completely replace radio sys-tems, technical and logistical support to fieldunits will necessarily increase. Most importantlythe information flow between communicationnodes will become a torrent in all directions, plac-ing greater strain on decisionmakers. Considerthat there currently exist technologies by whichmedics at accident sites can hook up by TV to ex-perienced doctors at hospitals to receive guidanceand prepare hospitals for incoming casualties. Themedics can pass vital signs digitally to emergencyrooms, saving critical time. Imagine that type ofsystem with SEAL teams on patrol, F/A–18 cock-pits on a bombing run, or fire support teams atoutposts, talking directly to headquarters as NCAmonitors from around the world. Picture the sheervolume of information pouring into a brigadeheadquarters from above and below as automateddigital reports arrive at light speed. It is easy to en-vision brigade commanders having to fight theurge to bypass less experienced battalion andcompany commanders to guide platoon leaders atobjectives via direct digital links. The increasingvolume and velocity of information raises theneed for more understanding on the part of re-ceivers. For decisionmakers to understand the va-riety of incoming data, they must have peoplewith specialized knowledge available to translatethat data into usable information. This requiresinnovation in the way we operate.

Time, Space, and the BattlefieldEmerging technologies are driving doctrinal

changes in battlefield time-space relationships,the balance between combat power and man-power, and the nature of command and control.Yet perhaps the greatest change is occurring inour concepts of time-space relationships on thebattlefield. We have built our warfighting struc-ture on doctrine composed of tactical, opera-tional, and strategic layers. Recent publicationssuch as the universal joint task list define war onthree levels: strategic, national security objectives;operational, campaigns and major operations;and tactical, battles and engagements. These lev-els evolved over centuries and involved largearmies with limited weapon ranges and ponder-ous rates of movement. Advancements todayhave cracked such doctrines.

emerging technologies are drivingdoctrinal changes in battlefieldtime-space relationships


Modern range, speed, and method renderolder notions of battlefield spatial responsibilitiesno longer meaningful. A Marine expeditionaryunit is only a tactical level unit of battalion size;yet we can introduce it on foreign shores to se-cure an embassy on what is essentially a strategiclevel operation. In recent joint exercises we havedeployed tactical level single airborne battalionsand small groups of attack helicopters on opera-tional level deep attacks. Future commanders inground fights on the tactical level will have theability to receive fire support from new Navy arse-nal ships firing operational level munitions suchas cruise missiles.

Drawing tactical-strategic distinctions fromtired ideas about maneuvering within or beyondweapon ranges is no longer practical. The doctri-nal battlespace responsibilities allotted to differ-ent levels of command are based on the ability tosee and affect an enemy. In large measure they re-sult from an outdated concept of strategy and tac-tics. FM 100-5, Operations, defines strategy as,“The art and science of employing the ArmedForces and other elements of national power dur-ing peace, conflict, and war to secure national ob-jectives.” It also defines tactics as, “The art andscience of employing means to win battles andengagements.” The difference between the two islargely in the scale of operations. One can seehow in war strategy can beget tactics—that is, na-tional authorities position forces that fight thebattles. To fill the gap between them we adopteda convoluted idea of operational art contained inFM 100-5: “The employment of military forces toattain strategic goals, through the design, organi-zation, integration, and execution of battles andengagements into major campaigns and majoroperations. In war operational art determineswhen, where, and for what purpose major forceswill fight over time.”

To understand these concepts requires re-search into their origins. Having done that, let’scut straight to the chase. In his seminal 1835manual, Infantry Tactics, General Winfield Scottopened these definitions from von Bulow:

I call strategy the hostile movements of twoarmies made beyond the view of each other; or—if itbe preferred—beyond the effect of cannon. Tactics Icall the science of movements which are made in thepresence of the enemy, that is, within his view andwithin the reach of his artillery.

The contemporary division of doctrine intothree levels of war, with its appropriate segrega-tion of responsibilities, is a logical extension ofScott’s ideas.

We can start to create a new foundation byunderstanding that strategy and tactics exist onall levels of war. Strategy is the positioning ofcombat power to influence the will of a competi-tor. Tactics is the application of fire power to de-feat enemy force. A company commander em-ploys strategy by sending a platoon around anenemy’s flank. A coalition commander appliestactics by destroying airfields with cruise missiles.Regardless of the level of combat, the principlesare the same. The attempt to categorize units aslevels on the battlefield prevents developing in-teroperable organizations. The Marine expedi-tionary unit can never be organized to conduct a



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national mission if the unit is not considered tobe on the proper level even though future tech-nology may give it the tools and reduced forcelevels may give it the mission.

Adjusting organization to technology mustbegin with compensating for tempo. Just as welearn from physics, time as defined in terms ofrate of movement and distance grows smaller asrate increases. We have seen that technology hasexpanded the rate of battlefield events, decreasedthe resultant time, and accelerated the potentialtempo of operations. The speed of decisionmak-ing is fairly constant though dependent on infor-mation. If there is less time we tend to makefewer good decisions and more hasty ones. Wecan compensate by anticipating events. In effectwe think at greater distances to compensate forthe pace of events. The increased range inweaponry, reconnaissance, and communicationhave enabled us to keep this balance so far. It isonly a matter of time until we surmount the lim-its of small unit commanders to effectively com-mand and control the space over which theymake decisions. Only refinement in organizationcan ensure that decisionmaking keeps pace withthe tempo of operations.

More with LessIt is commonly claimed that the Armed

Forces are required to do more with less. That isnot good if you are a commander with less. Forcereductions have altered the routine at the Na-

tional Training Centerwhere brigades now rou-tinely bring two battalionsrather than three. In jointtask force exercises wecommonly have battalion-sized elements conducting

forcible entry operations which doctrine saysthey are not large enough to do on their own. Inthese exercises it is normal for marines to experi-ence a lack of air cover at times because we trainwith one carrier wing instead of two and it re-quires flight deck down time. Reduction instrengths and budgets causes alterations in train-ing, forcing small units to take on larger missions.While our stated goal is always to train as wefight, we must face the more likely reality that wemust fight as we train.

Technology has always enabled units to domore with less. The number of men required permile of a line dropped dramatically when rifles re-placed smooth bore muskets. The number of air-craft required to destroy a target fell when missilesand later smart munitions replaced bombs. What

once was the task of lines of battleships is now ac-complished by one aircraft carrier. In each case thenew unit needed fewer men, aircraft, or ships be-cause it had control of rifles, missiles, or planes.Missions formerly reserved for divisions will be ac-complished by smaller units if those units cancontrol the sources of modern combat power.

As technical advances increase the ratio offirepower per man, the capability to apply thatfirepower effectively must stay abreast. Increasedcommunications will enable the command andcontrol required to manage the sources of combatpower. When it becomes necessary to conductforcible entry operations with battalion-sizedunits, the troops can coordinate combat powerfrom multiple sources provided that they knowwhere to look and what they need. Imagine anairborne battalion seizing a vital location as anAegis cruiser provides air defense, Air Force JSTARS relays information on nearby troop move-ments to the commander on the ground, and anairborne joint targeting cell coordinates longrange air and missile fire support to isolate thearea of operations. Forcible entry with smallerunits is possible provided unit commanders havejoint combat power support at their fingertips.

Today the sources of joint combat power arecollocated at the highest levels of command. Ma-rine battalions cannot conduct forcible entry op-erations without adequate combat power. In a typ-ical scenario, a battalion commander ashore needsto coordinate pre-planned air support through thestaff of an amphibious task force afloat in the am-phibious readiness group. They in turn pass therequest through the joint force air componentcommander, usually located with the staff of theJTF commander aboard another ship. They wouldapportion support through an air tasking ordersome 72 hours in advance. The order is then sentto the carrier battle group whose air wing wouldfly the mission. Future communications maymake it easier to coordinate such support, but thechain of control must change to facilitate the bat-talion commander at the front.

Futurists Hiedi and Alvin Toffler note thatthe “de-massification” of production systems is atrademark of effective third wave societies. As weembrace technologies we must also adapt to usethem. One of the most important military adap-tations will be the de-massification of the produc-tion of combat power. Smaller units must be ableto use modern means to produce more combatpower by applying joint sources. This translatesinto the need to reconstruct command organiza-tions to provide the small unit commander withthe expertise to use this combat power and stillnot suffer paralysis from information overflow.

New command and control organizationscan provide maximum battlefield effectiveness by

sources of joint combat powerare collocated at the highestlevels of command


integrating new technology. Current structures arenot well suited to efficiently utilize the firepower,maneuver speed, and communication abilities ofthe future battlefield. Army brigade headquarters,for example, are stretched to their limits by thehigh tempo environment of the National TrainingCenter where commanders and staffs are overbur-dened. They must simultaneously fight deep withfew reconnaissance assets, coordinate maneuverbattalions, integrate sources of fire support, andoversee a range of logistics. The brigade commandstructure manages more diverse decisions withfewer people than other levels of command. Yettechnological advances and manpower decreaseswill make such units the type deployed to accom-plish future independent missions. The dilemmaof new technologies is that they push combat po-tential beyond decisionmaking abilities.

The solution to this dilemma lies in organi-zation. We must “de-massify” the production of

combat power while decentralizing decisionmak-ing. Added levels of command and control withspecified responsibilities and specialized func-tions will enable the combat brain to keep pacewith the growing strength of the combat body.An examination of a possible command and con-trol structure for an Army brigade provides an ex-ample of incorporating new technologies anddoctrine to fully realize the promise of RMA.

Redistributing Responsibilities To ease the burden of decisionmaking on

brigades it must be reorganized. This is not new:in Europe during World War II, the Army scrappedbrigades in favor of combined arms formationsknown as combat commands. As the flow of bat-tlefield information increases and combat powerbecomes more specialized, we must equitably re-distribute responsibilities. Adding a headquartersto the chain of command would increase flexibil-ity and responsiveness. Returning regiments tothe chain, for example, would free brigades fromcoordinating maneuver battalions and allow them



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to concentrate on applying combat power frommultiple joint sources. Planning two levels downin accordance with doctrine, brigade headquarterswould position battalions against enemy forceswhile regiments applied the combat power ofcompanies. Brigades would predominantly con-duct battlefield strategy while regiments wouldfocus on battlefield tactics.

Under this organization brigade headquartersbecomes the focal point for reconnaissance. Astechnology brings satellite and airborne intelli-gence to the brigade, increased staff specializationwill be needed to translate data into usable infor-mation. This intelligence will drive the direction ofground reconnaissance assets. If JSTARS reports amass of vehicles moving on an unexpected avenueof advance, a brigade commander will want ob-servers to cover that route. This necessitates col-lecting scout platoons from battalions to form ascout company brigade control. Such a unit willalso have platoons for UAVs and robotic reconnais-sance assets which illustrates “de-massification” atbattalion level and creation of specialized units.Adding fire-and-forget anti-tank missiles will allowbattalions to adopt skirmish units to conduct mis-sions normally done by scout platoons.

Brigade staffs will require greater specializa-tion. Force XXI concepts rely on modules of unitsfrom which to quickly tailor forces to suit a mis-sion. Staffs can do the same. If an airbornebrigade were jumping to seize an airfield near acoast and then conducting operations with a Ma-rine expeditionary unit assaulting from the sea,that brigade staff should receive augmentation toenable command and control. Imagine augmen-tation staff liaison modules assigned to divisionthat are chopped to brigade for such missions.These would include Air Force liaisons, air andnaval gunfire liaisons, theater ballistic missile de-fense representatives to coordinate with offshoreAegis missile cruisers, liaisons for national intelli-gence assets, and other specialists as required. Di-visions would maintain working relationships be-tween such specialists and brigade staffs ingarrison training. Once deployed, digital commu-nications would link liaisons to nodes of exper-tise and authority supporting brigade. Similar or-ganizations would conduct tailored logisticalsupport. The deployed regimental commandermaneuvers battalions as brigade integrates com-bat power support. Until larger forces arrive onthe scene, a brigade commander could act as ajoint force land component commander.

Decisions are effectively distributed among alarger number of skilled people increasing theoverall speed of action. The increased tempo from

this reorganization has a hidden benefit. Beingfaster than an enemy in any phase provides anedge in decisionmaking. Making faster decisions,the true aim of increased information, enables usto act faster than an enemy and decreases its abil-ity to influence our operations. Force protectionis thereby enhanced.

A digitally smart, joint, and deployable orga-nizational structure and doctrinal innovations areonly some examples of fully realizing the revolu-tionary potential of technologies. Changes are un-derway in how we shoot, move, and communi-cate. Resultant changes in relationships betweenbattlefield time and space, combat power, andmanpower, and command and control have notbeen completely appreciated. To capture the po-tential of technology we must establish a betterdoctrinal basis in areas such as strategy and tacticsand then organize to fight accordingly. Redefinedlevels of battlefield headquarters will increase theinformation flow and maintain cohesive directionwhile enhancing freedom of action. In an era ofsmaller forces, we must enable commanders todraw on joint resources to compensate for a lossof manpower. By de-massifying the production ofcombat power and decentralizing command andcontrol we can increase specialization and thespeed of the decision cycle and force protectionthrough action. Force reductions will impose largemissions on small units and technology will givesuch units the potential to accomplish missions.Only changes in doctrine and organization willgive them the ability to succeed. JFQ

This article is an edited and abridged version of an entryin the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” that was recommended for publicationby the judges.




Great expectations surround the revolu-tion in military affairs (RMA). TheChairman has stated that taking advan-tage of it means providing “America

with the capability to dominate an opponentacross the range of military operations.” Al-though we may seek to acquire such dominancepotential enemies will also be busy. How mightan opposing force (OPFOR) attempt to defeat theArmed Forces of the 21st century? This article pro-vides a scenario for examining the strategies offuture OPFOR and concludes by analyzing enemystrategy in relation to maneuver warfare theoryand looking at its implications for future defenseplanning.1

Setting the SceneFor the commanding general of the Ameri-

can division, the battle had not really begun. Hismobile strike force had been deployed to a faraway theater to deter an aggressor from the

Captain Michael R. Lwin, USA, an infantry officer with OPFOR experienceat the National Training Center, is a student in the SO/LIC program at theNaval Postgraduate School.

General Tzu’s Army:

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north, or to fight and repel it if necessary.2 De-spite a few teams of OPFOR reconnaissance sol-diers crossing the border, hostile mechanizedforces were still posturing on their territory. Toprovide maximum time to pursue deterrence anddiplomacy, U.S. forces could not begin combatoperations until a credible offensive threat (forinstance tanks) crossed the border.

The commander reviewed his intelligenceand options with Battle Staff Bravo. Indeed, theenemy appeared to be operating pretty muchas its doctrine indicated. Although thick cloudcover prevented real-time visual and infrareddownlink from satellites, the feed from thejoint surveillance and target attack radar sys-tem (JSTARS) II showed a long procession ofarmored fighting vehicles moving out fromtheir assembly areas. Despite attempts by theenemy to destroy or deceive them, the divi-sion’s long range unmanned aerial vehicleshad already spotted most of the OPFOR tanks.The video images of moving tanks on displaytwo of his multifunctional command displaytold the commander exactly what he thoughthe needed to know.

The general reviewed the concept withhis staff. The wide valley corridor which canal-ized the approaching enemy division wouldsoon become a virtual valley of death. The di-vision cavalry squadron would delay leadOPFOR elements long enough to set them upfor the kill. At H-hour, an attack helicopter battal-ion would hit from the west to destroy the sec-ond regiment. A rocket strike with precisionguided submunitions would attrit another. AtH+2, the ground brigade with two armored taskforces would launch a flank attack from the eastto complete the destruction of OPFOR mecha-nized forces.

What Tzu KnewThe OPFOR army, under General Tzu, had the

mission of defeating our forces to end U.S. involve-ment on the peninsula, allowing follow-on forcesto subdue overrun territory. The general wanted togive Americans everything they expected andmore. From his study of the recent war in south-west Asia, he knew U.S. capabilities provided anear perfect view of the entire battlefield—or atleast its mounted battlespace. Tanks and artillerycould not hide. With those facts in mind, Tzu hadspent years preparing for this battle.

In the past, the doctrine of Tzu’s nation hadstressed that dismounted infantry forces were pri-marily used to defend the rugged terrain of thehomeland while mechanized forces would slice

into enemy territory. Secretly, Tzu had turned thisdoctrine on its head. Two divisions of infantryhad undergone training deep in the homeland tolearn the art of infiltration, raids, and ambushes.

Tzu’s plan was simple: create enough casu-alties to crush American will to keep their forcesin the theater. Unknown to his opponents, Tzuhad already committed two light infantry divi-sions across the border. Although the enemyhad captured a few squads and platoons, Tzu

knew that the Americans would not considerthem more than reconnaissance elements for amechanized force that he was massing across theborder. Tzu’s tanks and artillery would drawAmerican attention.

In the three days since his soldiers had infil-trated Tzu had no contact with them. He knewthat to communicate would expose their position.His mission-type orders were simple and did notrequire constant control. On Tzu’s side of the bor-der, however, radio traffic maintained a steadycrescendo. Although his mechanized forces usedsome cursory encryption and frequency-hoppingmeasures, he wanted it clearly known that he waspreparing to attack. Other deception measures por-trayed an entire mechanized corps ready to move.3

As lead OPFOR tanks began crossing the bor-der, the U.S. commander received warning of anincoming ballistic missile attack. He was certainof the protection of his air defense umbrella. Fiveyears ago an enemy in another theater of warused similar archaic modified Scud missiles in fu-tile efforts to strike our forces. Unlike DesertStorm there was no debate about the effectivenessof the missile defense; not a single warhead deto-nated on, over, or near any American soldier.

The division air defense officer was surprisedwhen a incoming missile did not begin to arc

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down into the air defense coverage sector. Hisfirst impression that his display was incorrect waserased as he saw the missile detonate in thestratosphere above the division sector. OPFORhad launched the first of many low-yield nuclearweapons to generate an electromagnetic pulse(EMP) to jam or degrade C4I systems.

The day started well for Comanche 34, a pilotin the attack helicopter battalion. Looking at thedisplay in his cockpit before take off, he saw acomputer generated map depicting every enemyair defense radar and missile system in his area ofoperations. Significantly, the digital download intohis system revealed that each one was destroyed,jammed, or forced off the air. From his experiencein the second Gulf War, he knew that any radarwhich was turned on would receive an unhealthy

dose of 155-mm orm u l t i p l e - l a u n c hrockets. A few hourslater reality shatteredhis faith. Hoveringon the reverse slope

of a wooded ridge to provide cover to a search andrescue mission, he struggled to understand whytheir losses were so high. A few years earlier in theGreat Desert War not a single aircraft was lost tothe enemy. Now his battalion’s main task hadswitched from attack to protecting search and res-cue efforts for downed air crews.

General Tzu had adopted a decidedly lowtech air defense concept. His plan called for 40dismounted platoons, each with a man-portablemissile system, heavy machine gun, and blindinglaser system to screen likely air avenues of ap-proach. Acquisition was by sight or sound. Lateranalysis would show that of 120 missiles firedonly three found their mark. Three other aircraftwere shot down by machine gun fire, and twocrashed after their crews were blinded by lasers.Many other aircraft were damaged. Unfortunatelythe U.S. commander’s high resolution computerwargaming model totally discounted this mix of“obsolete” and high tech weapon systems.

The Digital Link Was DownAbrams tanks could count on kills at 3,500

meters and kills in excess of 4,000 meters werenot uncommon. But the local terrain limitedmost shots to 2,000–2,500 meters. And hereenemy tanks were not the major threat. As Cap-tain Johnson and the lead company team ap-proached the defile before their main objective, abarrage of anti-tank missiles literally fell on them.After losing three tanks, Johnson ordered a haltand dismounted his infantry. Thirty-four menwith the world’s most advanced infantry equip-ment moved out to clear the ridges on either sideof the defile.

The OPFOR infantry battalion commanderfacing Johnson was satisfied. The Americans hadbeen halted without any losses to his troops, whowere armed with advanced anti-tank missiles firedfrom cover and guided to the target via fiber-op-tics. The OPFOR colonel noticed the platoon mov-ing forward and, having inspected every fightingposition, knew his men were ready.4

Lieutenant Smith, carrying a thirty-poundradio/digital control pack on his back and leadingthe platoon, began climbing the ridge. As his leadsquad took fire, he knew what was happening asa small arms fire locator automatically sent a re-port back to him via digital link. In turn, Smithused the information to digitally request artilleryfires. By then the platoon leader and his first twosquads were in dense woods. Next a mortar bar-rage fell on the trail squad still in the open. Smithquickly ordered them into the woodline andbegan executing a maneuver to flank the enemy.

As they moved, Smith wondered where hisartillery fires were. For some reason the digitallink was down. Whether it was EMP from the nu-clear skyburst overhead, the mountains maskingthe communication links, or simple equipmentfailure, he would never know. He received a fran-tic report: the flanking squads had run into aminefield. Now he really needed artillery. Fum-bling for a map, Smith estimated his position andthat of the target and called for immediate sup-pression fires by voice over the radio.

The colonel observed the Americans below.He expected to lose his forward line of fighting po-sitions. American sensors and small arms were toopowerful. But he knew that the difficulty of fight-ing through an entrenched enemy, climbing asteep slope, and breaching the minefield would ex-haust and ultimately stop the heavily-laden Ameri-cans. This gave him time to adjust his mortars theold-fashioned way. Then the artillery and mortarscame into play. The mortars fell on the Americans,American counterbattery fires destroyed theOPFOR mortars, and a barrage of American im-proved conventional munitions fell on everyone.The grid location Smith had called in was incor-rect—he was dead, the platoon was depleted tocombat ineffectiveness, and tankers would have towait for more infantry to clear the ridge.

Specialist Jones drove her high mobility re-supply truck in support of the ground attack.Trailing the combat battalions in a convoy of tentrucks, she was apprehensive but felt relatively se-cure with two battalions of tanks and Bradleysclearing the road. But as she rounded a corner,the sound of gunfire told her they might not

his battalion’s main task hadswitched from attack to protectingsearch and rescue efforts

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have finished the job. Three battalions of OPFORinfantry had infiltrated to positions astride themain supply routes. Tzu’s template and instruc-tions were well rewarded. The OPFOR companycommander initiated an assault with ten enemytrucks in the kill zone. Targeting antitank missileson security vehicles, he had stripped the Ameri-cans of the capability to respond in under thirtyseconds. Well-placed machine gun fire broughtthe trucks to a halt. As he blew his whistle, hiscompany assaulted into the kill zone.

The division public affairs officer was in aHMMWV behind Specialist Jones. Her missionwas to escort the media forward to record theAmerican victory. As the firing started, her driver

was wounded and veeredoff the road. The firingslacked, and the enemybegan to assault throughthe decimated convoy.Without any means to

resist, she chose to surrender. As she got out ofthe vehicle, arms raised, an OPFOR soldier shother dead where she stood.

The enemy infantryman next turned to theTV crew sitting in the back of the HMMWV. As hewas about to squeeze the trigger, the OPFOR com-mander knocked the weapon out of his hands.“Fool,” he shouted, “move out and clear the truckover there!” The soldier, not understanding his al-most fatal mistake, ran off to execute the neworder. The OPFOR commander, however, knew

the value of the media. Because of his actions thescenes of exploding supply trucks and fuelers anddead American soldiers, men and women, werebroadcast on television in the United States twohours later. The commander later received hiscountry’s second highest award for this act.

The outcome of this hypothetical battle isleft to the reader’s imagination. It is presented toillustrate potential vulnerabilities in the digitalforce and possible enemy actions to exploit them.

Functional DislocationManeuver warfare theory holds that one

method to defeat an enemy is through disloca-tion, “the art of rendering the enemy’s strengthirrelevant.” 5 Dislocation itself comes in differentforms: temporal, positional, functional, andmoral.6 Surprise is key to each; without it anenemy can react to avoid dislocation. In this sce-nario the OPFOR commander uses all four typesof dislocation to fight the Americans.

The fictional enemy has the initiative be-cause of American emphasis on pursuing diplo-matic initiatives to the end and a reluctance touse preemptive strategies. With the initiative,General Tzu renders U.S. forces temporally irrele-vant by infiltrating main attack forces early. Histroops gain surprise through stealth and Ameri-can failure to recognize them as the main attack.

maneuver warfare theory holds that one method to defeat an enemy is through dislocation

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By introducing only dismounted forces across theborder Tzu postpones the outbreak of hostilitiesand gains time to infiltrate farther into our terri-tory. By the time combat commences, the enemyvirus is already deep in our system.

Tzu achieves positional dislocation by the na-ture of his forces. Using armored elements to at-tract attention and engage from the front, his in-fantry maneuvers deep on the battlefield to strikerelatively soft targets in mechanized units: logisti-cal centers, command posts, and communicationnodes. Tzu’s force uses weapons that bypass tanksand armored vehicles by venturing into terrainwhere vehicles cannot go—infantrymen.7

Functional dislocation is achieved by makingour forces work improperly. This is done withboth low- and high-tech weapons. A recent exam-ple was the Army’s experience in Somalia. Theuse of low-tech rocket propelled grenades, an un-guided, man-portable weapon designed to killtanks, allowed poorly trained Somalis to shootdown dislocated special operations helicopters.8

In the foregoing fictional battle, General Tzudirectly and indirectly functionally dislocates ourforces. By launching multiple EMP weapons, hedegrades our sensors, computers, and digital linksand plays on our dependence on these systems.The young American officer, dependent on theglobal positioning system and digital links, loseshis ability to navigate by map and compass andto call in fires by voice.

The use of nuclear weapons in a non-casualtyproducing role further dislocates our forces. Thedeterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear arsenal hasfailed; Tzu gambles that America will not use aweapon of mass destruction to retaliate for aweapon that has not directly killed a single soldieror civilian. Is there another form of deterrence thatcould prevent this type of nuclear attack? What isthe response to the use of nuclear weapons as EMPgenerators rather than mass destruction?

Indirectly, Tzu dislocates opposing troops byattacking with forces and weapons that they arenot fully prepared to fight. JSTARS and unmannedaerial vehicles may see tanks miles away, but howfar off can they see soldiers walking under triple

Marines landing atKauai, Rimpac ’96.

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canopy jungle? Tzu’s use of a purely man-portableair defense concept is unpredicted by the staff andits computers. He also uses blinding laser andmine weapons assumed banned by internationalconvention. Finally, he uses an infantry heavyforce in close terrain, a situation in which the mo-bile strike force is not optimized to fight.

The question today is whether we are func-tionally dislocating ourselves in designing futureforces. Force XXI technologies appear to addtremendous capability to fight a mounted enemyin open terrain like that at the National TrainingCenter or in Kuwait and Iraq. But what is beingdone to counter dismounted soldiers in close ter-rain, the type of enemy who confounded U.S.forces in the hills of Korea and the rain forests ofsoutheast Asia?

Moreover some observers think future ene-mies will choose forces that inherently dislocateus.9 Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists use a dif-ferent form of combat, one which the so-calledRMA and Force XXI have very little to say about.As we gain dominant capabilities in one type ofbattlespace, it only makes sense for an enemy tochoose an alternative battlespace.

The last form of dislocation is moral, break-ing enemy will to continue the fight. Whetherbecause of a failure to create and sustain nationalwill, an increasingly strong reluctance to riskingAmerican lives for any but our most vital inter-ests, or the faster transmission of news and im-ages, the United States appears to be highly vul-nerable to moral dislocation. We have set theconditions for wars to be short and have few ca-sualties. Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia bearthis out.10 And Saddam’s strategy in the Gulf indi-cates that these lessons were not lost on others.11

The future holds variables that will exercisean undetermined effect on our will. We have nearinstantaneous media coverage already. As thistrend approaches its limits and news permeatesevery corner of the Nation, how will the publicreact in a crisis? Will information warfare involvean enemy that puts harrowing images on our TVscreens? The integration of women into all areasof the military adds another variable. What willbe the public reaction when both men andwomen suffer mass casualties on some far awaybattlefield? If the images relayed from Somalia inOctober 1993 had included dead American fe-male soldiers would it have made any difference?

Many questions raised in this article indicatethat there is still an area of uncertainty about thefuture despite the promise of RMA. In dislocation,there are variables that could put dominance atrisk. A perceptive enemy will take advantage ofthem. Friction and the fog of war will provideample opportunities to do so. Maintaining a lead

in technology will not ensure dominance. Undersome conditions it may be achievable withoutthe latest computers, communications, andweapons. Like General Tzu, we will have to findthe proper mix of organization, doctrine, andtechnology. Only with a thorough understandingof the enemy, well configured and trained forces,and unified action can the Armed Forces be dom-inant over OPFOR of the future. JFQ

N O T E S

1 This hypothetical scenario abstracts the use ofnaval, air, and allied forces. Moreover, OPFOR organiza-tions and characteristics are not meant to represent thefuture forces of a particular nation. The author wouldlike to thank Paul Stockton of the Naval PostgraduateSchool for help in bringing this article to fruition andChris Layne and John Arquilla for their comments.

2 For the latest information, see Prairie Warrior ‘96(on-line at the U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege web site).

3 For deception tactics against an experimental digi-tal force, see Richard A. Jodoin, “Opposing Force Decep-tion Operations during Rotation 94–07,” Red Thrust Star(January 1995), pp. 11–14. (Red Thrust Star is the ArmyOPFOR magazine at the National Training Center.)

4 This passage owes its inspiration to John A. Eng-lish and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Infantry, revisededition (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), pp. 176–77.Chapter 10 contains insights on the importance of in-fantry on the future battlefield.

5 Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver (Novato,Calif.: Presidio, 1991), p. 66.

6 The subdivisions and definitions of dislocation arefrom Robert R. Leonhard, “Force XXI and the Theory ofWinning Outnumbered,” Army, vol. 46, no. 6 (June1996), pp. 60–62.

7 For a similar scenario and details on this form ofmaneuver see Charles S. DeVore, “Countering U.S.Heavy Forces in Rough Terrain,” Red Thrust Star (July1991), pp. 10–14.

8 See Rick Atkinson, “Night of a Thousand Casual-ties,” The Washington Post, January 31, 1994, pp.A10–11. During the October 3, 1993 raid in Mogadishu,two MH–60 helicopters were shot down and two wereseriously damaged by rocker propelled grenades.

9 For commentary on irregular warfare see Martinvan Crevald, The Transformation of War (New York: TheFree Press, 1991).

10 See Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, “Ca-sualties, Technology, and America’s Future Wars,” Para-meters, vol. 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 119–27.

11 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, “HowKuwait Was Won,” International Security, vol. 16, no.2(Fall 1991), p. 15.

This article is an edited and abridged version of an entryin the 1996 JFQ “Essay Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” that was recommended for publicationby the judges.

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W e do not know what the futureholds. Although our Nation isvastly stronger today than at anytime in the past, we are likely to

face major challenges. But we do not know how orwhen. To deter such challenges and respond effec-tively if aggression does occur, the Armed Forcesneed a policy planning system to identify and cor-rect weaknesses in our security as they develop.

Intuitively we know the sort of planning todo. Americans prefer a free market system to con-trolled markets, competition to monopoly. Webelieve in competitive elections rather than one-party rule. And when an international securitycrisis befalls us, we never have the will to sup-press competitive urges among the services—thesame urges usually labelled wasteful duplicationwhen the threat is not so obvious. Recall that

Harvey M. Sapolsky directs the Defense and ArmsControl Studies Program at the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology.

Interservice Competition:

The Solution, Notthe ProblemBy H A R V E Y M. S A P O L S K Y

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three commands fought independently and suc-cessfully in the Pacific during World War II. Andbecause three services developed ballistic missiles,we were able to meet the Soviet challenge of the1950s rapidly and effectively.

Interservice competition offers civilians sev-eral major advantages. First, it helps generate vitalinformation. What the Navy won’t tell us aboutits vulnerabilities, the Army and Air Force might.Are aircraft carriers easy to attack? Should an up-graded Aegis system form the heart of our theaterballistic missile defense? Can naval forces sta-tioned off a coast exert significant influence in anevolving crisis? Ask the Navy; but ask the Armyand Air Force as well.

Second, it gives civilians leverage in their ef-fort to control defense policy. It is extremely diffi-cult to face down a unified military. Ranks of gen-

erals and admirals whoare in agreement on thesame issue position are aformidable force to out-maneuver in any Wash-

ington policy debate. Interservice competitiongives civilians the possibility of informed andpowerful military allies in defense strategy andbudget discussions. It allows them to play oneservice against another when particular policiesare preferred. If the Army begins to complainabout peace operations which the Clinton admin-istration appears to favor, perhaps the MarineCorps will sign up to conduct them.

Third, competition spurs innovation. Whenthere is expectation of significant reward or loss,the services may offer up not only informationabout their bureaucratic rivals but new ideas, waysof both improving their military capabilities andprotecting their roles and missions. It was theNavy’s fear of losing the nuclear deterrent missionentirely to the Air Force in the 1950s that gave usthe Polaris submarine that in turn reduced theneed to deploy hundreds of vulnerable and costlystrategic bombers and most of the liquid fueledmissiles that the Air Force was developing.

The benefits of competition are not alwaysgrasped. As one recent analysis of innovation the-ories points out, the Navy chose not to challengeAir Force plans to field either new bombers orhighly accurate—but difficult to base—MX ballis-tic missiles in the early 1980s even though it wasdeveloping an equally capable missile system forits submarine force. Similarly, the Marine Corpsdecided after a brief fight not to oppose Armyplans for prepositioned ships laden with equip-ment for mid-level contingencies even thoughthis fleet largely duplicates capabilities the

Marines already have and intend to expand. Bil-lions could have been saved in each instance ifthe public had been made aware of the overlapand advantages of one alternative over the other.

The problem, of course, is that competitorsdon’t like to compete. They prefer to collude, towork together for mutual benefit. Antitrust lawsonly protect us from collusion among businessfirms to the extent they are enforced. There is,however, no similar shield against collusionamong nonprofit organizations and governmentagencies. “Give the United Way” really means“Give the Charity Cartel Way” as charities colludeto prevent performance comparisons and any ex-pression of donor choice. The Armed Forces, whichbecame sensitive to being manipulated at thehands of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,have now become the champion of jointness, theirshield against being played off against one anotherby civilians. Joint approval means all the tradeoffsare made on the friendliest possible terms underwhich each service threatens retaliation if its mostimportant needs are not considered.

But the Armed Forces may overestimate thewillingness of civilians to foment competition. In-terservice friction produces a lot of political heatbecause it usually involves appeals to Congressand recruitment of partisan supporters amongmilitary retirees, contractors, and friendly re-porters. The resulting turmoil often reflects badlyon civilian officials, leaving a public impressionthat they fail to manage effectively. This is partic-ularly true when accusations are made over theduplication of capabilities, which adds to the gen-eral perception of waste in government; but it alsoextends to criticism by one service of another. Toomany inside and outside of government confuseaudible debate over policy alternatives with inde-cisiveness when it should be seen as the necessaryprelude to informed political judgment.

Our four air forces, three armies, two strate-gic missile forces, and one and a half navies areindeed wasteful luxuries if they are not harnessedto generate policy options and comparisons. Inan uncertain world it is better to have multipleperspectives on defense issues, but how can thisbe achieved short of a major crisis? Congress wasonce thought to be the champion of the competi-tive approach but instead enacted the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, the 1986 blueprint for jointnessnow so warmly endorsed by defense officials andsenior officers as their shield against publicscrutiny. Apparently, the potential for seriousoversight that a competitive structure might re-quire was too exhausting for Congress to contem-plate, absorbed as most members have become byideology and the quest for reelection, and itsought to stamp it out. How then can a competi-tive defense system be maintained?

the problem is that competitorsprefer to work together

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Fiscal austerity fortunately works in favor ofincreased competition. The social entitlementbattle in the face of the deficit reduction effort isbound to draw attention to the fact that defense

expenditures in realterms have yet to fallbelow their Cold Warlows despite the factthat neither the So-viet Union nor the

Warsaw Pact still exist. Collusion functions bestwhen hard choices can be evaded. Logrolling willstop when one of the services discovers that itsvital interests are being jeopardized by the needfor further reductions.

Luckily, the services have not entirely losttheir identities although some promoters of joint-ness wish they had. Relatively simple and inex-pensive features such as separate academies, dis-tinctive uniforms, and unique military traditionsmaintain public support for the Armed Forces.More important, each has a service staff, an affili-ated civilian secretariat within its department,and continuing attachments to particular

weapons that provide a power base from which todevelop and promote alternatives.

The services potentially offer us the condi-tions that Sanford Weiner has identified as crucialfor effective competition—a set of relatively se-cure organizations that can be made to feel un-certain about their future—“constrained auton-omy.” Organizations threatened by immediatedemise cannot function. Their strength to plan isdiminished by the need of their employees tofind jobs. Conversely, totally secure organizationsare subject to the lethargy of tenure where thecreative idea is a rarity and the urge to action isdifficult to arouse. Pushed to worry about theirfutures but not slated for quick disbandment, theservices would have the resources, time, and needto think hard about their special talents and con-tributions to national security.

Competition is not its own reward. The ser-vices will be reluctant to provoke one anothereven on the promise of specific benefits such asbudgetary increases or the preservation of favoredassets. The risks of significant losses are high forall once the war among them resumes. And theservices are not alone in fearing competition. De-fense civilians have not shown interest in forcing

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a competitive search for savings or new insights.Witness their recent recommendation to pur-chase the full complement of C–17 transportswhen a buy of off-the-shelf Boeing 747s would donearly as well at $6 to $8 billion less. Congressalso seems uninterested, believing that the opera-tional unity mandated by Goldwater-Nicholsgave us victory in the Persian Gulf despite thecontradictory strategies which the services actu-ally pursued. Moreover members of Congress,deficit reduction pledges notwithstanding, areseeking increases in defense spending to keep theorders flowing for their favorite weapons or con-tractors. President Clinton is not likely to pushthe issue, having worked hard to gain the supportof the military after early missteps.

The unintentional initiator of the next waveof interservice competition may well be averagemiddle class citizens, who we know from opinionsurveys want taxes cut, their parents’ Medicareand Social Security benefits preserved, their po-lice, schools, environment, and recreational areasmaintained, and welfare—foreign and domestic—drastically cut. To get their vote, politicians may

have to forfeit defense. Ships may have to be tiedup, troops called home, and planes grounded.

But this sacrifice in military readiness willnot be totally in vain. With fewer dollars andmore friction, the services will have to thinkharder about the threat and how the ArmedForces can meet it. There is no better incentive tocandor, error correction, and creativity in defenseplanning than a tight budget and a few smart ri-vals competing for a share of the pie. JFQ

This piece was adapted by the author from an earlier article entitled “The Interservice Competition Solution”which appeared in Breakthroughs, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1–3.

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SFOR honor guard,Tuzla.1st Combat Camera Squadron(David W. Richards)

NATOEuropean Security

and Beyond

JFQ Forum

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L ong-discussed change in Euro-pean security architecture isunderway. While it may lackelegance and simplicity, this

“new order” should prove useful inmeeting security problems that faceEurope. Its strengths are inclusivenessand a NATO core, and its potentialweaknesses are dissatisfaction by lesserincluded nations and lack of politicalcohesion to deal with new threats.This JFQ Forum examines a range ofsecurity considerations that have beenclarified in the wake of summit meet-ings over the last few months.

The new architecture can be seenas five concentric circles, with NATOcommand structure and military capa-

bilities at the center,surrounded in turn by aNATO-based Europeansecurity and defenseidentity, NATO enlarge-ment to include newmembers, an enhancedPartnership for Peaceprogram, and NATO agreements withRussia and Ukraine. Most of thesearrangements have been formalizedthrough various institutional relation-ships between the nations of Europeand the NATO core. They reflect the

realities of Europe and have beentested by the NATO experience inBosnia. With adroit diplomacy and po-litical cohesion, this architecture canprovide agile responses and can evolveinto an even more inclusive system.

Despite a reduction of more thantwo-thirds in the number of U.S. troopsbased in Europe, NATO is the most ca-pable military organization in theworld. The United States is committedto the continuing deployment of about100,000 troops. And while NATO re-tains some of its Cold War structure—including large armor and mechanizedformations—it is adjusting to a new erawith emphasis on mobility, rapid reac-tion, and peace enforcement.

NATO is being both streamlinedand Europeanized. Headquarters staffshave been cut by a third and the num-ber of commands has similarly de-clined. Even with downsizing, 75 per-cent of senior military positions arenow held by European officers. TheDeputy Supreme Allied Commander Eu-rope, who has responsibility for strate-gic planning and European-led opera-tions, is British and the chief of staff at

Supreme Headquarters Allied PowersEurope is German. Mechanisms havebeen established to strengthen politicalcontrol over military operations. More-over, as General Joulwan notes in his ar-ticle, a new array of concepts such asthe combined joint task force, Partner-ship Coordination Cell, and ACE Mobil-ity Coordination Center were put inplace to deal with new partners andnew missions.

Closely related to the NATO coreis the process of making the relation-ships among Alliance members moreequitable. While Europe continues tostruggle with monetary union and acommon security policy, articles on Eu-ropean security and identity and theWestern European Union (WEU) in thisissue note that progress has been madein creating a “separate but not separa-ble force” based on a revived WEU.Now that the future rests squarely onNATO, analysts on both sides of the At-lantic applaud enhancing Eurocorpsand efforts like the Italian-led opera-tion in Albania. But some transatlanticproblems remain, as highlighted by theFranco-American dispute over whocommands at Allied Forces Southern

Europe. Theater com-mands are much moreimportant today thanduring the Cold War,and relinquishing theonly theater commandin Europe under Ameri-can leadership could

undercut public support for NATO inthe United States.

Enlargement forms the next con-centric circle. Poland, Hungary, and theCzech Republic are seen as consensuscandidates for early membership in theAlliance at the Madrid summit whileRomania and Slovenia have garneredstrong support within Europe. SomeHans Binnendijk is director of the

Institute for National Strategic Studies and editor-in-chief of JFQ.

NATO, European Security, and BeyondIntroduced by H A N S B I N N E N D I J K


■ J F Q F O R U M


critics argue that en-largement is unneces-sary for central Europeand dangerous for rela-tions with Russia, buttime has proven themwrong. The process ofqualifying for membership in the Al-liance has solidified democracy as wellas civilian control of the military incandidate countries. In addition, it haseased ethnic and border tensionsamong candidates as they realize thatEuropeanization is more critical thanlocal politics. And Russia, though stilluneasy about enlargement, has ac-quired a number of security advantagesunder the Founding Act that it mightnot have gained otherwise. But the de-bate about enlargement is far from overas legislators on both sides of the At-lantic determine what price they mustpay for ratification. The cost is esti-mated to be about $30 billion over thenext 12 years, of which the UnitedStates would pay less than 10 percent.The debate will probably start in theSenate, and Europeans will wait to see ifPresident Clinton gets the required two-thirds vote. In the end, the Senate willprobably support enlargement, but thedebate could start a new transatlanticburden-sharing dispute that the rapidlychanging Alliance ought to be spared.

Most central and east Europeannations will be left out of the firstround of enlargement, and measuresmust be taken to promote reform andsecurity enhancement in the region.Although the process will remainopen, many countries will take littlecomfort from this promise since theyfear that some time must pass beforethe Alliance adjusts to the firsttranche. Future candidates can be di-vided into four groups. First, Romaniaand Slovenia were strong contendersin the first round of expansion, buttheir membership is expected to be de-layed. They need a clear perspective for

further membership. Second, formerneutrals such as Austria, Sweden, andFinland will be admitted when theybecome convinced that neutralitywithin the new Europe is an anachro-nism. Third, the Baltic States havemade significant economic and politi-cal progress, but their status as formerrepublics of the Soviet Union couldcreate such a negative reaction in Rus-sia that overall security might not behelped by their membership. Andfourth, Balkan nations such as Bul-garia, the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, and Albania may need adecade or longer to prepare for mem-bership. To help maintain securityamong these groups, NATO will de-pend on enhancing the Partnership forPeace. With enlargement, however,this program could be weakened as itskey members join NATO. So a larger-than-planned effort—including signifi-cant funding—may be required toshore up security for countries thatface a long period of preparation. Thenew Euro-Atlantic Partnership Councilwill help if it does not become mori-bund as did its predecessor, the NorthAtlantic Cooperation Council.

Finally, NATO has established anew relationship with Russia, formal-ized by the signing of the Founding Actin Paris. The act builds on NATO’s ear-lier 16-plus-1 consultative arrangementwith Russia and on close NATO-Russianmilitary cooperation in Bosnia. Al-though NATO made no concession thatallows a veto of non-article V opera-tions, Russia will have a voice throughthe Joint Council. Those critics of theFounding Act who generally supportenlargement, such as Henry Kissinger,fear that once Russia is formally amember of NATO-related councils, it

may use the consensus process to itsadvantage by convincing other nationsto oppose proposals that it does notfavor. NATO must make it clear to Rus-sia that any abuse of the new councilwill not be tolerated. Ukraine too hasnegotiated a new agreement withNATO and with Russia as well.

The major test of the emergingEuropean security architecture will beBosnia. Differences of opinion exist onboth sides of the Atlantic on when Sta-bilization Force should be terminatedand what to do in the interim. ManyAmericans want the mission to end onschedule next summer and be replacedby a European-led force. But it ishighly unlikely that many Europeanswill revise their “in-together, out-to-gether” stance, so an all Europeanforce for Bosnia may be stillborn. Acomplete withdrawal is likely toreignite conflict among Bosnia’s ethnicgroups. Meanwhile, we must avoid thepitfalls of Somalia—taking sides andexpanding the mission as force struc-ture declines.

This JFQ Forum also examines issues that are likely to confront theAtlantic Alliance in the future includ-ing the continued presence of U.S.dual-capable aircraft and nuclearweapons in Europe and instability inSub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, thearticles that follow cover both the highand low ends of future NATO securityproblems. The new security architec-ture will need to deal with a broadarray of threats in order to succeed. JFQ


T he new streamlined militarystructure that has emergedunder the Supreme Head-quarters Allied Powers Eu-

rope (SHAPE) is a worthy successor tothe organization which kept the peacefor more than four decades. Today ithas both a crisis response center and ajoint operations center and providesoversight and guidance to componentsof Allied Command Europe (ACE), in-cluding Stabilization Force (SFOR) inBosnia. In addition, SHAPE has devel-oped a strong European security and

defense identity (ESDI) within abroader transatlantic framework. Thistransformation did not occur overnightbut has been underway over the lastthree years. Because of these changesSHAPE and ACE now can respond tocrisis or conflict across a full range ofcontingencies—from humanitarian orpeace operations to collective defense.SHAPE will ensure that the Alliance isnot soft anywhere or anytime it is com-mitted—from peace operations to col-lective defense. This article detailschanges in this dynamic headquartersand the role which it is now playing forthe Alliance, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO).


General George A. Joulwan, USA, isSupreme Allied Commander, Europe,and commander in chief, U.S. EuropeanCommand.

TheNew SHAPE of the Atlantic Alliance By G E O R G E A. J O U L W A N

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The Brussels SummitBased on political guidance which

emanated from the January 1994NATO summit meeting held in Brus-sels, SHAPE developed an operationalconcept to link the Partnership for

Peace (PFP) program and combinedjoint task force (CJTF) initiative. Theguidance called for evolving PFP to en-able missions to be executed by PFPmembers and NATO forces. The ratio-nale underpinning this operationalconcept was to exercise with our newpartners by training to common stan-dards, doctrine, and procedures. Estab-lishing this solid foundation wouldprepare our partners to operate under aNATO or non-NATO led CJTF. The op-portunity to put theory into practicecame just over two years later whenNATO led an implementation force tobring peace to Bosnia.

Under this concept, SHAPE mustquickly translate political and militaryinstructions from NATO headquartersinto guidance and operation plans forits subordinate commanders to exe-cute. This is essential to the success ofall NATO missions—from article 5 op-erations to less traditional missionssuch as peacekeeping, humanitarianassistance, and disaster relief. NATOheadquarters and SHAPE have adjustedto the post-Cold War environment.Far-sighted diplomats, strategists, anddefense planners have kept abreast ofchanging security requirements. It isclear that the threat of attack againstmembers of the Alliance is low. Butcollective defense and force projectionmust continue to buttress a strong andstable Europe. The need for a robustand flexible NATO remains because ofuncertainty and instability. SHAPE hasadapted to meet these challenges andhas taken advantage of the proven se-curity architecture that NATO has pro-vided over so many years.

In brief, SHAPE must identify, bal-ance, generate, and move NATO andnon-NATO forces to arrive at the right

place and right time as needed bymajor subordinate commands (MSCs)which are responsible for the training-to-mission of NATO forces and certifi-cation of non-NATO forces. MSCs alsomount key headquarters, such as theACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and assistin movement control of earmarkedunits. In addition, the headquartersprovides the flexibility to augment thestaffs of committed headquarters withhundreds of officers and non-commis-sioned officers. SHAPE and ACE didthat for Implementation Force (IFOR)headquarters and now SFOR. Opera-tions Joint Endeavor and Joint Guardhave proven that our post-Cold Warorganization theory is sound. This isSHAPE: dynamic, flexible, and relevantto the challenges of a new NATO and anew Europe. Indeed we have put the-ory into practice.

From Theory to PracticeSHAPE has responded well to

planning and support for operations inBosnia. When the Supreme AlliedCommander Europe (SACEUR) wasgiven overall responsibility for theBosnian mission, SHAPE rapidly devel-oped a concept of operations and oper-ation plan that was approved by the

Military Committee and North At-lantic Council. The quick response re-sulted from several innovations inSHAPE methods of operation. Of par-ticular interest was the increased use ofthe Deputy SACEUR (a British four-star) and chief of staff (a German four-star). First, a revitalized ACE ReactionForce planning staff (ARFPS) under theDeputy SACEUR was directly responsi-ble for strategic planning. Second, theSHAPE Crisis Response Center was acti-vated in winter 1993–94 to monitorthe worsening crisis in the former Yu-goslavia.

The Crisis Management Organiza-tion (CMO)—which has existed onpaper since SHAPE was established—was activated late in 1995 to coordi-nate Joint Endeavor for SHAPE. It con-sists of cells from the peacetime SHAPEorganization with operations, intelli-gence, logistics, mobility, resources,public information, communications,and systems divisions, plus IFOR liai-son teams, making up most of CMO. Itnot only coordinates the IFOR effortbut advises both SACEUR and NATOheadquarters on significant events orany change in the situation. The chiefof staff and the assistant chief of stafffor operations and logistics at SHAPEdirect the CMO effort.

■ J F Q F O R U M


Figure 1. NATO Military Command Structure in Europe

CINCSOUTH

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SHAPE

SHAPE developed an operational concept to linkthe PFP program and theCJTF initiative

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In the key area of force generationand movement, the ACE Mobility Co-ordination Center (AMCC) is an exam-ple of the new SHAPE; it is effectiveand efficient in its operational mission.Since December 1995 the center hasworked closely with participatingNATO nations to ensure that all de-ployment plans and force movementsmatch the priorities set by the IFORcommander. It has also deconflictedmovement problems, such as toomany ships in a limited port, throughnegotiated solutions with both the na-tions involved and the Joint Move-ment Control Center in theater. AMCCalso coordinated with non-NATO na-tions—Russia, for example—to matchtheir deployment plans with the over-all flow of forces. The Deputy SACEUR

led in this criticalarea and, withAMCC, he has re-sponsibility forgenerating, bal-ancing, and de-ploying the force.

The AMCCm u l t i n a t i o n a lstaff relies upon

the allied deployment and movementsystem to coordinate force deploy-ment. This state-of-the-art software,operated by the NATO C3 Agency (for-merly the SHAPE Technical Center) atThe Hague in the Netherlands, fur-nishes NATO nations with a commondeployment planning tool. The systemreduces deployment time and permitsusers to control and deconflict deploy-ment plans. It is installed in the capi-tals of most member nations and al-lows AMCC to accurately trackmovements of troops, equipment, andlogistical support into theater. This sys-tem has been invaluable to the simul-taneous movement of multinationalforces into the IFOR area of operations.The results have been truly impressive.

NATO, together with many of itspartners and friends, deployed 50,000troops to Bosnia to help establish theconditions for a just and lasting peace.IFOR, under the strategic direction ofSHAPE and with proven NATO proce-dures, deployed and closed the forcewithin 60 days. Well over 2,000 flights,50 ships, and nearly 400 trains movedmore than 200,000 tons of cargo and50,000 troops into very difficult terrainunder severe winter weather condi-tions. IFOR engineers skillfully andcourageously spanned the swollenSava River. Under the watchful eye ofSHAPE, troops poured into Bosnia andCroatia—simultaneously and safely—via land, sea, and air. Many non-NATOnations also have joined the effort in-cluding 17 troop-contributing coun-tries. Counting NATO members, morethan thirty nations have committedforces, making Joint Endeavor a trulyinternational effort.

Due in large part to the profes-sional deployment and robust responseby IFOR troops when NATO assumed

J o u l w a n


Danish Stinger missileradar tracking team.

U.S

. Air

Forc

e (R

ober

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F–15s over Denmark,Tactical Weaponry ’95.

1stC

omba

t Cam

era

Squ

adro

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)

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the mission on December 20, 1995,the former warring parties immediatelybegan to comply with provisions of

the Dayton accords. And since our ini-tial deployment the operation hasbeen an overwhelming military suc-cess. The warring factions were sepa-rated by 4 kilometers in 30 days, landtransferred in 90 days, and heavyweapons moved to storage sites in 120days. In addition, illegal checkpointswere eliminated and freedom of move-ment improved by the reopening ofSarajevo airport plus the reconstruc-tion and repair of many railways,roads, and bridges. The cooperationbetween military forces and civilianagencies responsible for rebuilding thenation was truly significant. Togetherwe began the process for ensuring alasting peace in Bosnia.

Specifically, NATO forces have as-sisted the civilian agencies with eco-nomic development, reconstruction,police, and other activities essential formission success. The military hashelped the United Nations and othernon-governmental organizations to es-tablish the best conditions for success.

Working with these agencies we brokethe cycle of war to provide a secure en-vironment. The civilian agencies con-

tinue to implement their plansand take advantage of the mo-mentum for peace in Bosnia. TheSeptember 1996 elections, an inte-gral part of the Dayton agreement,were a significant milestone and

validated our efforts in that war-torncountry.

The 12-month IFOR missionended in December 1996. To maintainthe peace momentum, the North At-lantic Council authorized a follow-onforce to ensure a secure environmentfor civilian agencies to complete themission. Today some 31,000 troops,

still under the strategic guidance ofSHAPE, continue this NATO peace-keeping effort.

New Partners and Friends It was encouraging to see the

readiness of so many non-NATO coun-tries to contribute forces, provide logis-tics support, and allow transit of IFORcontingents. The contributions by ourpartners demonstrated the validity ofPFP as a firm basis for planning andcoordinating with them. Our new part-ners—including former adversaries—provide units and personnel to meetvital SFOR requirements. It is nolonger “us versus them”—but oneteam working to bring peace to Bosnia.

International support has beencritical to IFOR and SFOR, but perhapsno factor is more historically significantthan the NATO-Russian cooperationthat developed with Joint Endeavor andcontinues in Joint Guard. This relation-ship has fostered trust and understand-ing between Russian officers and theirAlliance counterparts at all levels ofplanning and execution. With ColonelGeneral Shevtsov as my deputy forRussian forces at SHAPE, we have forgedcommand and control arrangements topreserve unity of command and effort. Iexercise operational control over the in-dependent Russian brigade and assignmissions to it through GeneralShevtsov. In theater this Russian unit isunder the tactical control of Multina-tional Division North.

This arrangement proves that twoformer adversaries can work togetherto achieve peaceful goals through mili-tary cooperation. This mutual trust is adirect—and natural—result of a gen-uine partnership in a common mis-sion. Moreover, this shared missionhas increased contacts between NATOand Russia. Dealings that once tookplace only every 18 months have be-come everyday occurrences as theSFOR mission continues. GeneralShevtsov meets routinely with me andthe SHAPE staff, which provides uswith a forum to address issues of mu-tual interest. In addition, he visitsNATO member nations as well as part-ner countries. Clearly this relationshipis a giant step toward building trust

■ J F Q F O R U M


NATO forces have assisted civilian agencies with economic development and other activities

Mine detection training along Route Arizona, Bosnia.

55th

Sig

nal C

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USCG Gallatin in German port,Baltops ’96.

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1315Joulwan 8/5/97 11:04 AM Page 60

and confidence between former adver-saries and a significant indication ofSHAPE’s adaptation to the realities of anew Europe.

The FutureThe Partnership Coordination

Cell displays 43 flags, 16 from NATOmembers and 27 from countries whichhave joined the PFP program, arrangedalphabetically from Albania to Uzbek-istan. Twenty of these nations have li-aison officers in the cell who underpina new European security structure—one based on mutual trust and confi-dence from working together for com-mon goals and missions. This securityrelationship is replacing decades ofmistrust in Europe and is grounded incooperation rather than confrontation.

This new spirit of NATO is thriv-ing at SHAPE. Such multinational mili-tary cooperation, together with politi-cal guidance and control, provides thebest approach to crisis managementand preventing narrow nationalistic

concerns from dominating Europeansecurity and defense thinking.

One clear objective of the newSHAPE has been the development ofESDI within a strong transatlantic al-liance. As mentioned earlier, both theDeputy SACEUR and SHAPE chief ofstaff are Europeans who have substan-tive terms of reference. From 1951 to1993 the chief of staff was an Americanfour-star; now the post is held by a Eu-ropean officer (see figure 2). The chiefof staff of ARFPS and the CombinedJoint Planning Staff is a Europeanthree-star and the PFP CoordinationCell is headed by a European two-star.Both have played critical roles in thesuccess of Joint Endeavor. Likewisethese officers would bring a distinct Eu-ropean identity to the planning and ex-ecution of any future Western Euro-pean Union (WEU) operation.

Moreover, the Deputy SACEURserves as the official contact betweenSHAPE and WEU, a relationship that isbeing institutionalized. The respective

staffs meet and discuss procedures andtechniques. I have addressed the WEUAssembly in Paris and WEU Council inBrussels. In fact, the latter body hasbeen briefed at SHAPE, and more ro-

bust terms of reference arebeing drafted for the DeputySACEUR consistent with theprinciple of unity of command.Most important, SHAPE is eagerto continue its adaptation toenhance ESDI while improving

the Alliance’s ability to execute mis-sions across the entire contingencyspectrum.

It is apparent that the Alliance isflexible and has adapted to the securityrealities of our day. We have shownthat given clear political guidanceNATO’s operational military arm canperform new missions and accomplishany tasks assigned by its political lead-ership. SHAPE is a dynamic headquar-ters attuned to new requirements andorganized to meet the challenges ofthe next century.

As I have pointed out many times,NATO, ACE, and SHAPE are as relevantfor security today as they were duringthe height of the Cold War. Our newmissions will take us well beyond thecollapse of the Berlin Wall, the fall ofthe Iron Curtain, and the defeat of anideology. SHAPE and ACE have stream-lined their operations and commandstructure to meet future challenges.

With new friends and the experi-ence of the mission in Bosnia, we havean opportunity to revamp our securityarrangements in Europe—based on avibrant transatlantic alliance andstrong ESDI. While we adapt andmaintain flexibility in force structure,SHAPE will continue to build on afoundation of over 45 years of militarycooperation based on continuedshared values, ideals, and respect forthe worth and dignity of the individ-ual. This is a relationship that we areprepared and eager to develop withour new partners and friends in Eu-rope. For NATO is more than a groupof allies—we are friends united in acommon vision with a common pur-pose and objective. SHAPE is approach-ing the 21st century with confidence,optimism, and commitment to a su-perb alliance. We are truly creating oneteam with one mission—and the NATOmission continues. JFQ

This is an updated version of an article thatwas originally published in Dawn of a NewEurope (November 1996).

J o u l w a n


Figure 2. SHAPE Command Group

NATO, ACE, and SHAPE are as relevant today as they were duringthe height of the Cold War

SACEUR

Resources

DSACEUR

Chief of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff

Communications andInformation Systems

Chief of Staff, ACE Reaction Force Planning Staff

Budget and FinanceOperations andLogistics

Intelligence

EACOS COOP

EACOS NMR

Policy and Requirements

(Civilian)

1315Joulwan 8/5/97 11:04 AM Page 61

The notion of a unified Euro-pean military is nothingnew. It was raised afterWorld War II as a means of

ridding the Continent of its legacy ofinternal warfare and nearly succeededbefore falling victim to fears of lostsovereignty. Forgotten but not com-pletely abandoned, it was revived in1987 under more favorable conditionsafter the awakening of a long-dormantdefense institution, the Western Euro-pean Union (WEU).

The born again WEU called forgreater cooperation on security and de-fense (including arms production) not-ing that, “Europe’s integration willnever be complete so long as it doesnot include security and defense.” Theeffort moved slowly at first but thengained momentum with the end of theCold War. With the final outcome stilluncertain, however, the idea of por-traying Europe as a more or less free-standing pillar of NATO assumed theawkward rubric of European security

and defense identity (ESDI). Now tenyears old ESDI seems here to stay.

Initial American reactions to ESDIwere polite but proscriptive, emphasiz-ing that it should be transparent andcomplement NATO. Moreover, theUnited States saw it as an internal Eu-ropean matter unlikely to have majorimplications for the Alliance. ButFrance, always an advocate of greaterindependence from the United States,saw ESDI as a means of reducing Amer-ican influence after the demise of theSoviet Union. Future U.S. force levelsin Europe were unpredictable, andFrance pointed to the possibility of acomplete American pullout, raising thefear among Europeans that they mightbe left to fend for themselves and thusneed their own defense capability.

Simultaneously, American politi-cal interest in Europe appeared towane. Key U.S. posts at NATO wentunfilled for long periods in 1993 andWashington was focused on the Asia-Pacific region and domestic affairs. Po-litical interest in Europe seemed rele-gated to central and eastern Europeand Russia. America’s limited participa-tion in Bosnia and differences with itsallies were taken as more evidence that

■


Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Barry, USA (Ret.), is a visitingresearch fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studiesat the National Defense University.

CREATING A

EuropeanSECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITYBy C H A R L E S L. B A R R Y

1415Barry 8/5/97 11:11 AM Page 62

Europe would need its own resourcesin the new era.

ESDI was not based exclusively onan American-related rationale. Euro-peans worry more than Americansabout a resurgent Russia, and ESDImay be a hedge against Russian intimi-dation in regional affairs. Last but notleast, securing Germany’s emergingrole in collective security is regardedby most Europeans—including theGermans—as essential.

At the NATO summit in January1994 the United States joined its alliesin endorsing ESDI. However, this was

less a shift in the American or Euro-pean position than it appeared. Therefollowed a two-and-a-half year struggleto agree on the means to fulfill thesummit pledge that NATO assetswould be provided to WEU as neces-sary to field an ESDI force under thecombined joint task force (CJTF) con-cept. A definitive endorsement of ESDIwas finally reached at the June 1996NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin,and the way was cleared to provide aEuropean defense capability withoutthe cost of duplicative military struc-tures. Since then there has been a dis-play of transatlantic unanimity on

ESDI, although many outstanding is-sues remain. Washington is at last tak-ing serious note of the ESDI phenome-non on both the strategic andoperational levels.

Defining ESDIWhy can’t Europeans move be-

yond the ungainly acronym ESDI indescribing their search for mili-tary cohesion? The answer is thatthe intended endstate remainsuncertain. Many nations in Eu-rope still adhere to the concept ofindependent action even as na-tional militaries become less and

less tenable within the transatlanticframework.

To many people ESDI is only avague theory on the periphery of seri-ous military activities. A consistentcaution heard on both sides of the At-lantic is not to make too much of ittoo soon. However, three realities mustbe understood in assessing its potentialor even its survival. First, there aremany obstacles to creating one forcefrom many. The most salient remainssovereignty. Yet Europeans reject rena-tionalization of defense and havesteadily surrendered sovereignty sinceintegration began in 1951. Second, the

decade-old ESDI initiative, while seem-ingly at a standstill on occasion, showsno sign of vanishing. In fact, the oppo-site is true, with our most stalwart ally,Britain, backing ESDI. Third, the origi-nal motives for creating ESDI endure:to counterbalance the United Statesand Russia in European affairs, providean option when American and Euro-pean interests diverge, and pursue thelogic of bringing integration to thefields of security and defense.

Another rationale has emerged oflate. Economic strains have left somecountries in Europe with no alternativeto consolidating declining military es-tablishments and defense industries.Some national forces are all but unsus-tainable. Defense industries can no

B a r r y


to many people ESDI is only avague theory on the periphery ofserious military activities

Figure 1. European Military Formations

■ headquarters: Strasbourg, France■ operational since October 1995■ strength: 50,800 personnel

Eurocorps

10th GermanArmoredDivision

1st BelgianMechanized

Division

LuxembourgMotorizedCompany

1st FrenchArmoredDivision

SpanishMechanized

Brigade

Franco-GermanBrigade

HeadquartersSupportBattalion

42nd FrenchSignal

Regiment

10th FrenchEngineerRegiment

6th FrenchMaintenance

Regiment

(Composite)

European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR)

■ France, Italy, Portugal, Spain

■ operational since late 1995

■ maritime reaction force

■ headquarters: Toulon, France (rotational)■ typical task force:

— aircraft carrier— 4–6 escort ships— landing force— amphibious force— supply ship

European Force(EUROFOR)

■ France, Italy, Portugal, Spain

■ operational since November 1996

■ division-size reaction force

■ headquarters: Florence, Italy

■ strength: 10–15,000 personnel

■ earmarked light forces:— infantry— armor— artillery— special operations

1415Barry 8/5/97 11:11 AM Page 63

longer operate independently, nor cannew systems be fielded by a single na-tion. For the United States, whichneeds a stronger partner in Europe,ESDI is an initiative to encourage.

Hard EvidenceThe value of ESDI will ultimately

be measured by the forces that Europeactually deploys. As military analystsknow, however, forces are embeddedin institutions and capabilities. Infact, ESDI is manifest in severalvenues of security and defense, politi-cal and military. The evidence isfound in at least five broad areas: Eu-ropean Union (EU) political actions

under the commonforeign and securitypolicy (CFSP), a widerWEU role visibility inside NATO, ar-maments cooperation, multinationalformations, and military operations.The place to begin a description ofESDI is with common EU securitypolicies where political agreementsare embodied.

Common Foreign and Security Policy.This pillar is the most visible evidenceof collective political will to create arecognizable European identity inbroader security terms. Thus far CFSP

has been limited to lightweight activi-ties such as aligning EU political influ-ence around the world through finan-cial contributions. Its most significantactions have been to establish a frame-work for EU relations with Burundi,Rwanda, and Ukraine. Under CFSP, EUhas arranged humanitarian aid toBosnia-Herzegovina, administered thetown of Mostar (with WEU), and sentobservers to elections in Russia, SouthAfrica, and the Middle East. But this isthin gruel in terms of security affairs,even for a mechanism not yet fouryears old. The diverse cultures, historyof war among EU members, and differ-ing concepts of integration dictate thatCFSP initiatives will remain small, es-pecially in peacetime when nationalpriorities come to the fore.

An effort aimed at strengtheningCFSP decisionmaking was sought atthe 1996–97 EU intergovernmentalconference. But the agreement to bereached at the Amsterdam summit inJune 1997 had very little import forCFSP. One shortcoming addressed inAmsterdam was the planning staff. Asmall group will be formed by dual-hatted council secretariat personneland civilian and military national rep-resentatives. Advances in other areasmay also strengthen CFSP. Procedureswere accepted for qualified majority

voting on minor decisions, and “con-structive abstention,” whereby unwill-ing members would agree to not blockactions by willing members, might beagreed upon.

Western European Union. Responsi-bility for developing ESDI opera-tionally inside NATO and as a separa-ble but not separate capability restswith WEU. Since moving to Brussels in1993, a new WEU has steadily evolved,though its main effort has been inter-nal: institutional structures, staff pro-cedures, data collection, and military

■ J F Q F O R U M


Figure 2. European Arms Cooperation Activities

Western European Armaments Group(WEAG)

• 11 sub-groups• 8 current projects

EquipmentPrograms

• Euclid program• 55 current projects• Eurofinder initiative

Research andTechnology

• European defense equipment market• technology transfer

Procedures andEconomic Matters

• European Armaments Agency initiative

National ArmamentsDirectors

(coordination)

Defense Ministers(guidance)

Panel I Panel II Panel III Ad Hoc Study Group

Western European Armaments Organization(WEAO)

Board of Directors Research Cell (initial executive body)

Joint ArmamentsCooperation Structure

(November 1996)

• Britain• Germany

• France• Italy

WEAO(13 countries)

Major European Joint Ventures

■ Tiger attack helicopter

■ NH–90 utility helicopter

■ future large aircraft

■ Eurofighter 2000

■ Horizon frigate

■ family of wheeled armored vehicle

■ Tornado fighter

■ Euromissile

1415Barry 8/5/97 11:11 AM Page 64

planning. Externally, WEU has builtties to EU and NATO and has createdseveral types of WEU-related standingfor the non-union members of both,along with central and east Europeancountries (including Russia andUkraine) and some southern Mediter-ranean nations. The union meets rou-tinely with non-WEU states and in-cludes them when developingpositions on European security, thusadding to the weight of those views.More than twenty countries havepledged forces to WEU to conduct Eu-ropean-led crisis response operations.

Since 1988 the union has con-ducted several military operations. Butoverall decisions to engage militarilyhave been marked by political cautionrather than a desire to further ESDI.While the reasons for caution are com-plex, two predominate. One is a reluc-tance to undercut American engage-ment by signalling a substantialcapability for Europe to act alone. TheUnited States might then use ESDI as apretext for further reducing its pres-ence in Europe. The other is an aver-sion to risking action where success isnot guaranteed. To field ESDI both

cautions must be overcome. Exercises,defense investments, and workingclosely with the United States are re-quired. WEU has completed its first se-ries of crisis management exerciseswith satisfactory results. Given fiscalconstraints and the need to maintainmomentum toward the first real “Pe-tersberg” operation, WEU will have torely on simulations. As NATO and theUnited States learned, simulations notonly enhance staff skills butstrengthen political-military decision-making and organizational confidence.

Armaments Cooperation. Until thefunctions of the Independent Euro-pean Program Group (IEPG) weretransferred to WEU in 1992, coopera-tion in armaments existed only as aforum for information sharing for 16years. With the ultimate aim of creat-ing a strong European ArmamentsAgency, the Western European Arma-ments Group (WEAG) seeks to coordi-nate not only research and technologybut cooperative equipment programsand common economic policies (seefigure 1). WEAG coordinates with armsindustries through the European De-fense Industries Group. Recent reformshave increased the number of pro-grams implemented and cut delays. In

November 1996, the Western EuropeanArmaments Organization became asubsidiary activity. These structures, aswell as WEU itself—which has interestsin space intelligence initiatives becauseof investment in the Torrejón SatelliteCenter—represent the state of ESDI indefense industrial base cooperation.

More than any other area of de-fense, arms production cuts close tothe bone of sovereignty. The majorarms-producing nations—Britain,France, Germany, and Italy—defendless efficient capacities on political, se-curity, and economic grounds. Jeal-ously over taxes and jobs and the lackof common business law have pre-cluded mergers to rationalize Europeandefense industries. While cooperationexists it comes via costly and time-con-suming joint ventures. Industrial con-solidation in America is well ahead ofthat in Europe because it is not saddledby pluralistic political structures.

Multinational Military Forces. Thekey indicators of ESDI are multina-tional, particularly Eurocorps, EuropeanForce (EUROFOR), and European Mar-itime Force (EUROMARFOR), and thereare also other units, including NATOcorps. Except for NATO Allied Com-mand Europe Rapid Reaction Corps—which has potential as an ESDI forceunder NATO—no other formation hasrepresentation from more than fivecountries and several are bilateral.1

Some have specific headquarters whileothers are simply planning and coordi-nating arrangements which allow forcombined training and operations.

Eurocorps, EUROFOR, and EURO-MARFOR are salient in assessing ESDIbecause they were established outsideof NATO; and although available tothe Alliance, their priority is to WEU.Of course, including Euro in a title isanother indication of a desire for Euro-pean identity even in loose bilateralarrangements like the Franco-BritishEuro Air Group. One common charac-teristic of Euro formations is that theyare open to other nations that maywant to join later. The five-nation Eu-rocorps, along with EUROMARFORand EUROFOR and other effortsdemonstrate a desire to move beyondagreement and field real capabilities.

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Italian guided missiledestroyer Impavido.

U.S

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Military Operations. In the finalanalysis the forces which Europe actu-ally deploys are the measure of its col-lective defense. WEU has launched anumber of operational initiatives to“show the WEU flag.” In the 1988Iran-Iraq war it sent minesweepers tothe Persian Gulf. In the Persian GulfWar, it deployed a modest flotilla to as-sist the American-led task force. Subse-quently, WEU showed the flag in theKurdish rescue operation in northernIraq. In the Balkans, WEU took part inthe maritime arms embargo. It also as-sisted EU in the Danube River armsembargo operation and policed Mostarwith EU. Although not under WEU,the Italian-led humanitarian operationin Albania can be seen as a collabora-tive effort by some European nationsto act together.

A Common IdentityThe evidence demonstrates that

there is a nascent European identity insecurity and defense. How strong ESDIwill become in a federalized Europe ora Europe of nation-states—or a Europesomewhere in between—is impossibleto foresee. What is crucial is that theindependent defense establishmentsof European states are fast becomingunsustainable on any useful scale,

even for the major powers. In that re-spect alone, Europeans have few alter-natives to some form of ESDI. In thelong run, that bodes well for Europe

and the United States. Nonetheless,there are significant obstacles to over-come before a capable and dependableESDI becomes a reality.

The first problem is the strugglebetween supranationalism and sover-eignty. What kind of political-militarydecisionmaking is possible within EUor WEU? The acceptable solution overthe next decade or so appears to bestrict intergovernmental political rela-tions in EU and almost totally ad hocoperational military commands underWEU for crisis response. Though sucharrangements will work in some crises,they fall far short of the homogenousU.S. model or the fully integrated mili-tary structure of NATO.

The second concern is resources.Falling European force levels and de-fense budgets may soon bottom out,

but there are few signs of growth, espe-cially in modernization and research.Contributing factors are slow recoveryfrom recession and the struggle toachieve monetary union in 1999. Be-sides new capabilities, ESDI calls for in-vesting in a deployable logistics sys-tem, training and exercises, and a hostof related costs, not least for the pend-ing shift of some European countriesto a professional force. The more costlypart of ESDI lies in strategic assets—ca-pabilities such as command and con-trol structures, strategic lift, space-based intelligence, communications,and automation-information process-ing systems. There are European pro-posals to procure at least some capabil-ities. But decisions thus far tend onlyto pool meager resources to achieveoptimum output from current assets.Little is being invested to acquireadded capabilities.

Yet it is a misperception that Eu-rope is militarily impotent today. Itsactive forces are well equipped andhighly trained, and both France andthe United Kingdom maintain rapid

deployment capabilities. Asdemonstrated in Albania, bythe U.N. Protection Force (UN-PROFOR) mission in 1993–96,and with the rapid deploy-ment force sent to Bosnia in1995, Europe can cobble to-

gether its national forces for limitedcrisis response.

A third challenge is nuclearweapons. In ESDI developments thusfar there has been scant mention ofthese arms. Can Europe’s common de-fense identity be complete withoutarrangements that address a commonnuclear umbrella? Indeed, article 5 ofthe 1948 Brussels Treaty, on whichWEU is established, calls for all mem-bers to “afford the party . . . attacked allthe military . . . assistance in theirpower.” France and Britain, both nu-clear powers, have only the barest bi-lateral collaboration on nuclear arms.Would a European military not haveaccess to the most powerful weaponsof two member states? If so, wouldnon-nuclear states effectively have aveto over nuclear employment? Thereis much to do in this area before ESDIbecomes whole.

■ J F Q F O R U M


Norwegian Leopardtank, Strong Resolve.

U.S

. Nav

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ark

Ther

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)

there are significant obstacles toovercome before a capable and dependable ESDI becomes a reality

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There are issues external to ESDIas well. The first is the potential forcompetition between NATO and WEU.With special emphasis on planning, re-source allocation, and political militaryconcepts, which security issues areseen as transatlantic and which as Eu-ropean? Another external issue, of par-ticular concern in dealing with Con-gress, is the danger of overselling ESDIas a stand-alone European capability.The effect of such a perception is pre-dictable: increased pressure or legisla-tion on the withdrawal of forward de-ployed forces.

These concerns weigh heavily onthe U.S. attitude toward ESDI. Wash-ington is wary of any initiative thatcompetes with NATO for the shrunkendefense resources available in Euro-pean capitals. Any investment in forcesor capabilities outside the Alliance willlikely translate into fewer resources forNATO. Solutions to the challenges fac-ing ESDI are not readily apparent.They will require time and compro-mise to resolve.

CJTF PotentialThe primary aim of the NATO

CJTF concept is to adapt the integratedmilitary structure for new missions bygiving it a crisis response capability.2 Asecond aim is that it helps WEU realizea European-led capability under ESDI.Soon after the concept was approvedtwo opposing camps emerged, one fo-cused on the primary role of CJTF andthe other intent on its secondary role.As the camps worked to thwart eachother, CJTF languished in indecisionfor two and a half years and was occa-sionally pronounced dead. It had be-come mired in the larger debate overESDI and the future of NATO—purelycollective defense, or both collectivedefense and crisis management.

Fortunately, the great potential ofCJTF for NATO and WEU was salvagedin June 1996. At a meeting in Berlin,France agreed to the creation of ESDIinside NATO and the United Statesagreed to both afford it adequate visi-bility within the Alliance and establishprocedures for realizing a capability forWEU use in the near term. At present,CJTF is progressing toward implemen-tation through planning, exercises,

and trials under three NATO com-mands. But like collective defense dur-ing the Cold War, embedding the doc-trinal concept of CJTF within theAlliance is a long-term effort. CJTF willserve as the basis for military activitiesand resources within NATO indefi-nitely. With the Berlin agreement, thesame will now be true for WEU.

For ESDI, deploying CJTF repre-sents its operational ability to imple-ment WEU political decisions. A WEU-controlled operation, and hence thecomposition of the CJTF headquartersand forces deployed, is expected to besmaller than a NATO-led mission. Butassuming that the crisis is largeenough to concern all its members(not just Europeans), NATO would di-rect the operation. A related factor inallocating operations to WEU is that itis only in the initial stage of adaptingto its new role and has no operationalmilitary C2 structure similar to NATO.

An Alliance StrategyWith a NATO-Russian charter in

place and enlargement in train, themajor unfinished business of NATO isto clarify the future U.S.-European bal-ance within the Alliance. That suggestsa bipolar relationship, one that is equalin terms of capabilities, responsibili-ties, burden sharing, and notably influ-ence in European security affairs. This

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German MiG–29s andAmerican F–16s.

U.S

. Air

Forc

e (S

ean

Wor

rell)

NATO CJTF

■ a military doctrinal conceptadopted by NATO that will bewedded to the existing, proven—though much smaller—IntegratedMilitary Structure

■ primary purpose—to providethe Alliance with a more mobile,flexible military to conduct contingency operations beyondNATO borders

■ secondary purpose—withagreement by the Alliance, to pro-vide NATO resources in support ofWEU operations for crisis response

■ concept agreed upon in Jan-uary 1994 and implementationapproved in June 1996

■ three NATO commands initially involved in CJTF testing—AFCENT, AFSOUTH, and STRIKFLTLANT

■ doctrinal and procedural development of CJTF concept andmodalities for providing assets toWEU will be continuous

■ current status—implementa-tion proceeding under NATO andWEU collaboration; trials and exercises commencing for NATO in 1997 and WEU at a later date.

1415Barry 8/5/97 11:11 AM Page 67

new balance must be achieved to-gether with an extension of the West-ern security systems eastward over thenext 18 months. NATO will find itmuch more difficult to bring in newmembers and then recast the transat-lantic relationship. At present the alliesfind it easier to focus on the East,where hopeful states are eager to jointhe club. Yet as cooperation partnersreach the threshold, NATO, WEU, andEU may still be reorganizing and un-ready for new arrivals. Both tasksshould proceed simultaneously.

The central elements of a newtransatlantic security partnership willbe a greater role for Europe in Alliancedecisions, responsibilities, and burdensand a continuing senior partner rolefor the United States wherever its in-terests are at stake. The agent for amore unified and independent Europewill be EU. There is no way of predict-ing when European integration mayplateau, but the surrender of nationalsovereignty in defense will take a longtime if it happens at all.

While EU will be the central secu-rity-identity organization, WEU willbe the principal actor for crisis re-sponse and collective defense in mat-ters from former Yugoslavia to securityrelations with central and eastern Eu-rope. WEU has gained momentum byoperationalizing its headquarters inBrussels, absorbing armaments cooper-

ation, and actively engaging in WEU-NATO relations. It will be the expres-sion of European security anddecisions to act militarily.

These developments notwith-standing, political Europe—slowly coa-lescing toward political union—willnot be distinguishable for some time.It will need a senior partner in the se-curity field and not just as a cata-strophic insurer. The United Stateswants Europe to begin by taking oncrisis prevention and making initialmilitary responses to crises. In turn,Europe needs assurance that theUnited States remains fully committed

to European security and defensethrough NATO. Until Europe can ac-quire capabilities in such areas as intel-ligence, information warfare, andstrategic lift, its military reactions willbe largely tethered to U.S. commit-ments of support in these functions.

In principle, when a crisis is smallin scale, European-led diplomatic andmilitary initiatives could end apredicament before it reaches either re-gional or global proportions. Europeassumes greater responsibility for re-gional stability, with an engaged, col-laborative United States in a close sup-porting role. When article 5 of theNATO treaty is invoked—or a fast-building crisis takes on global implica-tions—the United States would engageas the logical leading partner. When acrisis recedes to a level where regionalmanagement is possible, the UnitedStates should disengage.

An ESDI Force in Bosnia?Could ESDI send a European-led

force to Bosnia in June 1998? With thetermination of the 18-month Stabiliza-tion Force (SFOR) mission under a yearaway, the question is being asked. Bothmilitary and political factors are atplay. The military issues can be ad-dressed successfully if a concertedplanning effort begins soon. Politicalissues are more problematic.

Militarily there is little questionthat an ESDI force could be deployedunder WEU, NATO, or even a lead na-

tion such as Italy in Al-bania. UNPROFOR wasoverwhelmingly Euro-pean, and both the60,000-strong Imple-

mentation Force (IFOR) and 33,000-strong SFOR are predominantly Euro-pean in terms of forces on the ground.All EU countries, NATO members (ex-cept the United States), and ten centraland east European countries haveagreed in principle to provide assets forWEU-led operations. In addition,NATO (including the United States)has stated that if approved in theNorth Atlantic Council its resourceswill be used to support a WEU-ledCJTF. WEU often refers to the “low endof the Petersberg tasks” as a desiredCJTF capability, which means roughlya division-size land force component.

■ J F Q F O R U M


the United States wants Europe to beginmaking military responses to crises

British marine,CJTF Exercise ’96.

U.S

. Mar

ine

Cor

ps (

R.L

. Kug

ler,

Jr.)

1415Barry 8/5/97 11:11 AM Page 68

A post-SFOR force might be as large asSFOR overall; however, actual combatforces could be significantly smaller,depending on the situation and risk-as-sessment as June 1998 nears. For theanticipated peace enforcement missionof a post-SFOR force, there is littledoubt that Europe could provide therequired combat forces. The UnitedStates would have to augment a Euro-pean-led force with C4I, strategic logis-tics, intelligence, and lift, and also leadan over-the-horizon rapid reinforce-ment force, which is within currentNATO abilities.

Notwithstanding military capabil-ities, there are significant political ob-stacles to a European-led CJTF forBosnia. The firm European “in-to-gether/out-together” position reflectsthe deep scars of past disagreementsover UNPROFOR. But the United Stateswants a crisis response strategy whereregional capabilities are tapped firstand U.S. forces are committed only toensure that regional capabilities arenot at risk of being overwhelmed.Once a crisis recedes to a point whereregional capabilities are adequate, theUnited States wants the flexibility todisengage and go on to other tasks. Forthat to work in post-SFOR Bosnia, itwill be necessary to shift from a U.S.-led to a U.S.-supported (European-led)force without rekindling the conflict.3

As senior partner, the UnitedStates must take the initiative in post-SFOR planning. It should present its al-lies with a workable transition plan, anassurance of robust U.S. support, and acredible commitment to allow Europeto take the lead. Military commandersrecognize that developing leadersmeans giving them the tools to succeedas well as the freedom to fail. Congres-sional ultimatums and intra-NATOconfrontations will not build ESDI. Ifthe United States wants to leave Bosniain June 1998 it will have to work withits allies toward the first bona fide ESDIoperation and accept the risk that post-SFOR Bosnia is likely to evolve some-what differently without U.S. leader-ship—a risk worth taking.

In the rarely mentioned but everpresent contest between the UnitedStates and France for influence in Eu-ropean affairs, ESDI is a bellwether.

While there is currently no alternativeto U.S. leadership, if ESDI succeeds—especially on the volatile subject of thesouthern flank—Europe will be able tomanage crises or mount initial collec-tive defense. Ideally, it will also assumean active role with America in meetingcrises outside Europe. When that dayarrives, the French perspective willbegin to be realized. Today the chal-lenge is harmonizing transatlanticviews and furnishing capabilities thatthe United States and its allies can pro-vide under ESDI to protect their inter-ests. However, with more missions andlower force levels we must not miscal-culate by depending on ESDI eithertoo soon or too late. The first test mayarise in post-SFOR Bosnia when ESDIbecomes a reality and the transatlanticbalance is decisively recast forever. JFQ

N O T E S

1 This corps can draw upon ten divisionsto form a reaction force with contributionsfrom every NATO member save for Icelandand Luxembourg.

2 For assessments by the author, see“NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces inTheory and Practice,” in Survival, vol. 38,no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81–97, and“NATO’s CJTF Command and Control Con-cept,” in Command in NATO after the ColdWar: Alliance, National, and MultinationalConsiderations, edited by Thomas-DurellYoung (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: StrategicStudies Institute, U.S. Army War College,June 1997), pp. 29–52.

3 For a discussion of the options afterU.S. disengagement, see the author’s “AfterIFOR: Maintaining a Fragile Peace in theBalkans,” Strategic Forum, no. 62 (Washing-ton: Institute for National Strategic Studies,National Defense University, February1996).

B a r r y


INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIESNATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The 1997 Topical Symposium

“Strategy and the Formulation of National

Security Policy”October 7–8, 1997

National Defense UniversityWashington, D.C.

For details on future symposia or registration material on the above events,please contact:

National Defense UniversityATTN: NDU–NSS–SY

300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066Telephone: (202) 685–3857 / DSN 325–3857

Fax: (202) 685–3866 / DSN 325–3866Internet: [email protected]

Information on symposia is available via the National Defense University WorldWide Web server. Access by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. Symposia programsand registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days prior to events.

1415Barry 8/5/97 11:11 AM Page 69


One aspect of European secu-rity and defense identity isthe evolution of a strongWestern European Union

(WEU) to provide the political controland strategic direction for Petersberg-type operations as foreseen in theMaastricht Treaty. Such operations in-clude humanitarian and rescue (evacu-ation and disaster relief), peacekeeping,and crisis management. To execute

them, WEU has developed a politico-military decisionmaking process in thePermanent Council, supported by botha politico-military and a military dele-gates group; strengthened the planningcell under the Permanent Council; andestablished a situation center (SITCEN)responsible to the Secretary-General viathe planning cell director and a satellitecenter (SATCEN) at Torrejón in Spain(figure 1).

WEU has ten full members whoalso belong to both the EuropeanUnion (EU) and NATO (see figure 2).Only these EU and NATO members

Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting is a British army officer who currently serves as deputy director/chief of staffof the planning cell at headquarters, Western EuropeanUnion, in Brussels.

WEUOperational DevelopmentBy G R A H A M M E S S E R V Y - W H I T I N G

Royal Netherlands Air Force F–16.

Com

bat

Cam

era

Imag

ery

(H.H

. Def

fner

)

HMS Bridportlifting anchor.

U.S

. Nav

y (E

lizab

eth

S. S

tew

ard)

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M e s s e r v y - W h i t i n g


have the right to make or veto deci-sions in the Permanent Council. How-ever, although EU membership ismandatory for WEU admission underthe Brussels Treaty, NATO membershipis a firm albeit unwritten rule. Thereare three associate members who are

NATO but not EU members and fiveobservers who are in EU but not inNATO (except for Denmark). In addi-tion there are 10 associate partners,making a total of 28 WEU nations.

Command and ControlOne key difference between NATO

and WEU is that no permanent mili-tary structures exist within the latterexcept for the planning cell. This is be-cause no forces or command and con-trol assets are permanently assigned.However, this offers a degree of flexi-bility since WEU has three means ofachieving its tasks:

■ national Forces Answerable to WEU(FAWEU) which are potentially available forplanning purposes and would be employedon a case-by-case basis

■ one of five multinational FAWEU—namely EUROCORPS, Multinational Divi-sion Central (MND–C), United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Force, EuropeanMaritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and Euro-pean Force (EUROFOR)

■ since the Berlin ministerial meetingin 1996, NATO assets and capabilities, in-cluding the combined joint task force (CJTF)initiative.

Once the WEU Permanent Coun-cil has decided to conduct a particularoperation, national, multinational, oralliance assets would provide a militarycommand and control chain whichwould consist of the out-of-theater op-erational commander (OPCDR) and hisheadquarters with a point of contactwho provides the personal link be-tween OPCDR and the PermanentCouncil; the in-theater force comman-der (FORCDR) and his headquarters;and assigned national forces (figure 3).

Figure 2. Interlocking European Organizations

Figure 1. WEU Organization

Verification Group

Space Group

Open Skies Group

Council of Ministers

Permanent Council

Secretariat GeneralWEU HeadquartersSituation CENTRF

Satellite Center(Torrejón, Spain)

Planning CellWEU Headquarters

CouncilWorkingGroup

(CWG)Politico-MilitaryWorkingGroup

(PMWG)

MilitaryDelegatesWorkingGroup

(MDWG)

MediterraneanGroup

SecurityCommittee

Politico-MilitaryGroup(PMG)

MilitaryDelegates

Group(MDG)

SpecialWorkingGroup

DefenseRepresentatives

Group(DRG)

1 WEU Associate Member2 WEU Observer3 WEU Associate Partner

4 EAPC Observer5 Suspended Member

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Partnership for Peace

Western European Union

European Union

Poland3 Slovakia3

Slovenia3,4

United StatesCanada

Malta

AlbaniaArmeniaAzerbaijanBelarusGeorgiaKazakhstanKyrgyzstanMoldovaRussiaTurkmenistanUzbekistanUkraine

San MarinoSwitzerland

Ireland2

Sweden2,4

LuxembourgPortugalUnited Kingdom

Iceland1

NetherlandsSpainFranceGreece

Denmark2

BelgiumGermanyItaly

Czech Republic3

Estonia3

Latvia3

Bulgaria3

Hungary3

Lithuania3

Romania3

Norway1 Turkey1

Finland2,4Austria2,4

Bosnia-HerzegovinaCroatia

CyprusHoly See

LiechtensteinMonaco

F.R. Yugoslavia5

Tajikistan

Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe

the planning cell is the onlymilitary element of WEU thatoperates in normal times


■ J F Q F O R U M


Planning Cell OrganizationThe four-year-old planning cell is

the only military element of WEU thatoperates in normal times. It providesadvice on the strategic level to the Per-manent Council and has a joint com-bined staff of 55 members, of whom 40are military officers (O5s or above) orcivilians of equivalent rank including aNorwegian police superintendent and aFrench coast guard officer. It is impor-tant to note that this cell works “at13”—that is, it only includes Europeanmembers of NATO (full or associateWEU members). It has six functionalsections (see figure 4) making it fullycompatible with the nearby NATOheadquarters and can be reinforced byadditional experts when required.

Communications and InformationSystems Section. WEU is linked to secureand insecure NATO voice and data net-works under the terms of a memo ofunderstanding (MOU) which becameeffective in December 1996, immedi-ately prior to phase 3 of the first WEUcrisis management exercise (CRISEX).A secure video-conference link was es-tablished between WEU headquartersin Brussels and an operational com-mander with headquarters at Metz-Guise during the exercise. The Perma-nent Council has approved acomprehensive five-year plan for WEUcommunications and informationtechnology development.

Coordination Section. This elementof the cell is responsible for WEU rela-tionships with other international or-ganizations. Last year a long-awaitedagreement was signed with NATO thatallowed for the release of documentsbetween the two organizations. Initialexchanges took place between theNATO International Military Staff andWEU planning cell in September 1996.This was followed by an explosion ofworking-level contacts between WEUfunctional cells and relevant sectionsin both NATO headquarters andSupreme Headquarters Allied PowersEurope (SHAPE), as well as a number ofoutreach programs. WEU moduleshave been incorporated in the syllabusof the NATO school at Oberammergauand there have been extensive bilateralsessions with the NATO CombinedJoint Planning Staff at Mons. The in-formal monthly coordination meetings

which have been held for years wereformalized in January 1997 and arenow co-chaired at the one-star level.

Intelligence Section. Established in1995 and staffed in autumn 1996, thissection receives intelligence from sev-eral WEU nations and issues weeklyclassified intelligence summaries. Ithas been tasked by the PermanentCouncil to monitor Albania, the for-mer Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes regionof Africa, and Somalia. It also main-tains close working relationships withboth SITCEN and SATCEN.

Logistics and Movements Section.With increased activity among mem-bers, partners, and associates in strategicmobility, this section is developing doc-trine, expanding medical expertise, andcreating a network of logistics experts inboth international organizations andnational capitals. It has gotten access tothe NATO deployment and movementsystem in cooperation with SHAPE andthe new NATO communicationsagency. A mobility working group wasformed for the 3000-kilometer airmovement of elements of a force head-quarters during CRISEX. Important

Figure 3. WEU Command and Control—Operations

Figure 4. Planning Cell, WEU Headquarters

Politico-Military /Grand Strategic

Military Strategic /Operational

Operational / Tactical

Land / Sea / Air Units

WEU HeadquartersCouncil

Operational Commander

(OHQ)

Force Commander

(FHQ)

National

Pointof

Contact

NationalForces

Answerable

MultinationalForces

AnswerableNATO

CJTF

personnel 55nations 12

DirectorSpanish Navy

Deputy Director/Chief of Staff

British Army

Executive OfficerColonel/Belgian Army

+ 4

Administration5

Communications and Information Systems

Colonel/Portuguese Air Force + 5

CoordinationColonel/ Italian Air Force

+ 5

IntelligenceColonel/Greek Army

+ 5

Logistics andMovements

Colonel/French Air Force + 7

Operations andExercises

Colonel/German Air Force + 7

PlansColonel/Dutch Army

+ 8


M e s s e r v y - W h i t i n g


links have been forged with interna-tional agencies including the U.N. De-partment of Humanitarian Affairs andthe European Community Humanitar-ian Office.

Operations and Exercises Section. Inanticipation of a possible interventionin the Great Lakes region of Africa, thissection conducted hot planning on thepolitico-military level at the end of lastyear and provided military advice to thePermanent Council on possible options.This advice was developed by liaison of-ficers who visited U.N. headquarters inNew York, the Multinational Force(MNF) planning team in Stuttgart, andMNF headquarters in Kampala. Lessonsalso have been developed from threesmall WEU operations in the former Yu-goslavia concluded last year: theDanube sanctions operation with Bul-garia, Hungary, and Romania; the jointAdriatic sanctions operation withNATO; and the Mostar police operationin support of the local EU commis-

March 17, 1948. Foreign ministers from the United Kingdom, France, the Nether-lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg sign a treaty to last a minimum of fifty years inBrussels “for collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for col-lective self-defense” thus creating the Western European Union.

December 20, 1950. WEU defense functions are transferred to NATO command, butit is decided that the reorganization should not affect the right of defense minis-ters and chiefs of staff to meet to consider matters of mutual concern to BrusselsTreaty powers.

October 20–23, 1954. At a conference of WEU ministers in Paris four protocolswhich modify the Brussels Treaty are adopted: the Federal Republic of Germanyand Italy will accede to the Brussels Treaty, the occupation of West Germany willend, West Germany will be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty; and pro-visions concerning arms control and British military presence in Europe. Thesecome into force on May 6, 1955.

October 26–27, 1984. WEU ministers adopt the Rome Declaration and also a docu-ment on institutional reform. Members support reactivation of the organization tostrengthen Europe’s contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance and improve de-fense cooperation among the countries of Western Europe.

October 27, 1987. WEU adopts the “Hague Platform on European Security Interests”which defines conditions and criteria for European security and responsibilities ofWEU members.

June 1992. Ministers adopt the Petersberg Declaration agreeing that WEU shouldhave a military capability in order to take part in peace and humanitarian opera-tions at the request of other international organizations.

FGS Schleswig-Holstein in the Baltic.

U.S

. Nav

y (M

icha

el G

alla

gher

)

Western European Union (WEU)

Source: The Statesman’s Year-Book, 1996–1997 (133d edition), edited by Brian Hunter.


■ J F Q F O R U M


sioner. The section also has monitoredboth Implementation Force (IFOR) andStabilization Force (SFOR) operations.

This section of the cell conducteda politico-military fact-finding missionto Africa last year, visiting the Organi-zation of African Unity and four coun-tries to determine ways that Europecan help enhance the peacekeeping ca-pability of key troop-contributing na-tions in Africa. A database was createdto identify available training in Eu-rope. Other databases also have beenset up, for instance on joint use oftraining facilities by WEU nations and

training in land mine clearance. Acouncil-approved exercise policy hasbeen developed in consultation withNATO planners and is based on athree-year rolling program.

CRISEX, the first major WEU exer-cise, tested crisis management on thepolitico-military level. The first phasein December 1995 created exercise in-terplay between the Permanent Coun-cil, its subsidiary bodies, and the capi-tals of the participating nations. PhaseII in June 1996 involved a similar exer-cise but added an operational comman-der and headquarters. The third wasthe same but with a force commander,

Eurocorps headquarters at Strasbourg.Thus by the end of the year all levels ofWEU had been tested in a combinedcrisis management, command post,and live exercise. In March 1997 a post-exercise seminar in Brussels examinedlessons from CRISEX.

Plans Section. Over the past 18months generic plans for all Petersbergtasks have been completed. These plansinclude evacuation, humanitarian anddisaster relief, peacekeeping, and crisismanagement operations. Phase 1 ofCRISEX practiced the transition of ageneric plan into a contingency plan

for a specific scenario utilized bythe Permanent Council to preparedirectives for selected operationalcommanders. Under the WEU sys-tem, operational commanders andstaffs, not the planning cell, carry

out detailed planning. This occurredduring phase 2 of CRISEX when thecommander presented an outline planto the Permanent Council for approval.In August 1996, generic plans were de-veloped in some 20 illustrative profiles,with an evaluation of each in order todetermine what NATO assets and capa-bilities might be required. The Perma-nent Council selected six to be submit-ted to the NATO Joint Planning Stafffor assessment.

With regard to defense planning,the cell has been analyzing the returnssubmitted in 1996 by WEU nations ofheadquarters and units available forPetersberg-type operations. The data-base currently lists some 2,000 suchunits from 24 nations, including asso-ciate partners and observers. These aremainly national assets, but the fivemultinational formations are includedand MOUs have been signed with eachof them. The potential joint operationheadquarters are being assessed anddiscussions are under way with NATOon how WEU requirements can be in-cluded in its defense planning processfor non-article 5 tasks at the higherend of the Petersberg spectrum.

The military aspects of WEU op-erational development are progressingwell and will contribute to a strongerEuropean capability to undertake Pe-tersberg tasks. The WEU role as abridge between the Alliance and theEuropean Union is strengthening.After all, WEU is the only institutionin which Europeans can discuss thefull range of security and defense is-sues among themselves. However, theorganization is still small and must de-velop much further before it can takeon more substantive tasks such as thereplacement of SFOR in Bosnia. In par-ticular it must test the viability ofusing NATO assets in a major exercise.To send it into an enforcement-typeaction prematurely would clearly be abold and risky decision. JFQover the past 18 months generic

plans for all Petersberg tasks have been completed

French marines.

U.S

. Mar

ine

Com

bat C

amer

a (S

.M. A

ndre

ws)


The decision by the Presidentto commit over 35,000 U.S.troops to backstop the Day-ton peace agreement in au-

tumn 1995 was remarkable given thedomestic controversy over the missionand the sad history of intervention inthe Balkans in the past. Nonetheless,American leadership of the NATO Im-plementation Force (IFOR) was key toboth the deployment during 1996 andkeeping a tight lid on further militaryaction by the various factions in Bosnia.

However, eighteen months on,NATO is still firmly mired in Bosniawith no end in sight. Moreover, de-spite numerous pronouncements fromSecretary of Defense William Cohenabout an imminent U.S. exit in 1998,there are no plans, political or military,for making the transition from theU.S.-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to aEuropean-led peacekeeping force(EFOR). Although a conversion to apredominantly European force isbroadly supported by both parties inCongress, American allies in Europehave clearly communicated their reluc-tance to take the lead.

The need for the United States toplan for a hand-off to a European-led


John Hillen is a fellow for national security at the Council onForeign Relations and author of Blue Helmets: The Strategyof U.N. Military Operations (forthcoming).

Planning a European-Led ForceBy J O H N H I L L E N

After SFOR—

U.S. satellite link forJoint Endeavor.

U.S

. Air

Forc

e (L

isa

Zuna

nyik

a-C

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nter

)

WEU poll watcher inMostar town center.

55th Signal Company, Combat Camera (Brian Gavin)

1615Hillen 8/5/97 12:56 PM Page 75

force is manifested on two levels. Onthe micro level, the situation in Bosniaunderscores the fact that while a gen-eral peace has been maintained underboth IFOR and SFOR, there is little evi-dence that it is sustainable without thecontinued presence of a robust interna-tional force. On the macro level, thestrain on an ever shrinking and glob-ally engaged U.S. military demands asmaller commitment by Washington toa regional security mission such as con-tinued peacekeeping in Bosnia. More-

over, the growing differences in secu-rity interests and military capabilitiesbetween the United States and its Euro-pean allies suggest a better division oflabor between a global superpower andits partners.

If, as Secretary Cohen said duringhis confirmation hearing, Americashould send “a signal and strong mes-sage to our European friends [that] weare not going to be there . . . that it’stime for them to assume responsibility[in Bosnia] . . . and that we are notgoing to make an unlimited commit-ment to that region,” then EFOR plan-ning should begin now. It is certainlyin the realm of the possible, and devel-opments such as the NATO combinedjoint task force (CJTF) were intendedprecisely for this sort of contingency.To not undertake planning on the po-litical and military level not only de-nies the realities of Bosnia but flies inthe face of several geopolitical and se-curity trends that make changing thebalance of responsibility in all futureBosnias a U.S. strategic necessity.

Bosnia 1997IFOR was a military success in

that it prevented the resumption of adestructive conflict but a political fail-ure in that it did not pave the way forthe multi-ethnic Bosnia envisaged bythe Dayton accords. This is rooted inthe fact that the political and militaryprovisions of the agreement alwaysworked at cross purposes. The IFORmission was to separate Serb, Croat,and Muslim forces while the political

goal of Dayton was to unify Bosniainto a multi-ethnic state with sharedpolitical, economic, and judiciary in-stitutions. These goals were irreconcil-able unless IFOR acted to forcibly pro-mote unification—such as stringentlyenforcing the right of refugees to re-turn to their homes.

Instead IFOR, mindful of the“mission creep” that beset operationsin Somalia, sensibly stuck to an achiev-able military goal—keeping variousfactions apart by imposing a zone of

separation. In addition, un-dertaking a controversial mis-sion in an election year meantthat self-preservation and ca-sualty-avoidance were of con-cern to U.S. strategists. This

resulted in a passive and risk-aversestrategy that earned U.S. forces in IFORthe nickname of “the turtles” for theiremphasis on force protection and un-willingness to take chances.

U.S. forces suffered only onedeath from hostile incidents, but theiroperations left IFOR well short of thepolitical conditions that could bringabout the administration’s oft-statedgoal of a December 20, 1996 exit date.Indeed, the elections of September1996, in which over 80 percent ofBosnians voted in solid ethnic blocsand few refugees crossed lines to castvotes in their pre-war districts, merelyconfirmed the de facto victory of sepa-ration over unification. By claimingwith ballots what they had fought forwith bullets, Bosnians effectively killedthe Dayton accords, or at best kickedthe can down the road for the SFORpolitical component to resolve in 1997or 1998.

Under these circumstances, it wasself-evident that the internationalcommunity would have to maintain apresence in some strength in Bosnia.SFOR was envisaged as a smaller IFORwith the same basic mission: to keepthe sides from renewed fighting whilefostering a climate of peace and stabil-ity conducive to reunification. Giventhe elusiveness of that goal, whichseemingly has far more support fromoutsiders than Bosnians, it is more

likely that SFOR and succeeding forceswill settle into a Cyprus-type peace-keeping mission. By the end of theSFOR mission in 1998, the outsideworld may decide that it is worth aninternational effort to keep peace inBosnia for years to come even if thismeans supporting de facto separation.If that is the outcome, the unique anddecisive role played by the UnitedStates over the last few years mustcome to an end. If Bosnia is to be award of the international community,then Secretary Cohen’s statementabout who should take responsibilityfor heavy lifting in a protracted peaceoperation should be put into action.

The U.S. RoleOn the macro level, there are even

more compelling reasons for rethink-ing U.S. leadership in Bosnia over thepast two years. In particular, the con-fluence of several geopolitical and se-curity trends demands a reappraisal ofthe role of the United States in re-gional alliances and the “one-size-fits-all” approach to calling on NATO asthe solution to every European securitydilemma.

The first trend, the strategic strainon the Armed Forces, was stressed bySecretary Cohen during his first weekat the Pentagon when he indicatedthat the demand for American involve-ment far exceeds our resources. In fact,in attempts to close the supply-de-mand gap, the military—almost 40percent smaller than in 1991—is oper-ating at its most frenetic pace sinceVietnam. The services routinely exceedtargeted and budgeted operationaltempos, especially in frequently de-ployed units. As a result, exercises havebeen scaled back, combat readiness hassuffered in many units, and problemswith morale, quality of life, recruit-ment, and retention are on the rise.

The procurement account, downsome 70 percent the past decade, hasyet to rebound from what the Congres-sional Budget Office terms a “procure-ment holiday.” The FY98 budgetshows, despite a long-promised in-crease, a decline in procurement dol-lars for the fourth consecutive year.Operations in Bosnia, originally esti-mated to cost $1–2 billion in autumn

■ J F Q F O R U M


it is likely that SFOR and succeeding forces will settle into a Cyprus-type peacekeeping mission

1615Hillen 8/5/97 12:56 PM Page 76

1995, are now forecast to exceed $6billion through FY98, forcing the Pen-tagon to defer maintenance, change orcut training, and fleece the budget foroperations and maintenance funds.Meantime, assets like quarter-centuryold C–130s fly in and out of Bosnia attwice their normal rate while replace-ments are pushed farther back in theprocurement pipeline. Protracted oper-ations such as Bosnia prevent the ser-vices from recapitalizing for eventuali-ties that may have greater defenseconsequences than peacekeeping.

The second trend that militates infavor of reduced commitment to a pro-longed operation in Bosnia is theevolving divergence in military compe-tencies between America and Europe.

For the most part, the United States isbecoming the only allied power thatcan organize or lead significant combatoperations. This predominance hascome about principally because of thestringent fiscal standards that Euro-pean Union nations must meet to beeligible for monetary integration. Sinceonly Ireland and Luxembourg cur-rently meet those standards, our chiefNATO allies have been busy cutting de-fense since the Cold War by an averageof 35 percent. European R&D accountsare half the percentage of that in theU.S. defense budget; and even procure-ment funds are more scarce in Europethan the starved recapitalization dol-lars in the U.S. budget. More impor-tantly, European cuts are most keenlyfelt in critical areas such as power pro-jection and sustainable combat power.

This pattern of European defensespending over the last six years has left

the United States the only NATO mem-ber with such capabilities as large air-craft carriers, long-range strike aircraft,fielded stealth technology, space-basedC4I satellites and sensors, advancedaerial surveillance and reconnaissancesystems, global lift, strategic logisticsassets, and advanced weaponry basedon the nascent revolution in militaryaffairs. In Bosnia, 46 of 48 satelliteswhich have been used by IFOR andSFOR for C4I functions belonged to theUnited States.

Moreover, doctrinal and organiza-tional shifts in emphasis among alliesare profound—from larger forces forterritorial defense and combat opera-tions to much smaller forces for peace-keeping and military operations otherthan war (MOOTW). As the Canadiandefense minister recently said, “I am apeacekeeper, not a warrior” (Canada

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Italian army Leopard 1 tanks.

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has only 21,500 active members in itsland forces). This new military realityleaves the United States increasinglyalone in the ability to form and directa Desert Storm type operation—awarfighting enterprise in which it pro-vided 70 percent of ground troops, 76percent of combat aircraft, two out ofthree warships, all six aircraft carriers,and over 90 percent of the advancedC4I and support systems. Despite talkof a growing European defense iden-tity, this imbalance seems likely to be-come even more tilted in America’sfavor.

Instead of bemoaning divergencein military competencies between itselfand its European allies, the UnitedStates should take advantage of thisevolution. If the overall effect of an al-

liance is intended to be more than thesum of its parts, then it makes sensethat the roles and responsibilities ofdiffering members should be matchedto their capabilities and interests. Thusrendering to the peacekeepers what istheirs and to the warfighters what istheirs not only reflects a shift in mili-tary capabilities but a third geopoliticaltrend. National interests today areachieved very differently even amongclose allies and thus inspire very differ-ent levels of will and sacrifice. Unlikethe Soviet threat that provided a cen-tripetal force to hold NATO together,Bosnia never inspired an “all for oneand one for all” call for action frommembers.

Lesser security threats like aBosnia affect the interests of alliancepartners very differently. While Sad-dam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwaitproved threatening enough to tem-porarily unify a disparate 31-membercoalition, his September 1996 actionsagainst the Kurds did not. In fact, theU.S. cruise missile response of last yearonly found support from Britain andGermany and was condemned or notsupported by Turkey, France, and SaudiArabia. This is natural in a world of di-verse threats and should be exploitedby encouraging those with the greatest

interest to assume the lion’s share ofintervention burdens. To pretend thata heavily enforced peace in Bosnia forten or twenty years is as much in theinterest of America as Europe is fatu-ous. The United States is involved inEuropean security as the leader ofNATO to protect its immutable vitalinterests on that continent—to preventEurope from being dominated by ahostile power or bloc. America shouldserve as a balancer and defender of lastresort in Europe—not a gendarme forits ethnic squabbles.

However, the United States be-came indefinitely committed to Bosniathrough a circuitous logic that exposedthe lack of flexibility in NATO and Eu-ropean security architecture: Bosnia isa European security problem, NATO is

Europe’s only credible militaryorgan, the United States is theleader of NATO, thus it must leadthe Bosnian mission. This ap-proach makes no distinction be-tween threats large or small, inter-

ests vital or non-essential, or strategicresponsibilities local or global. Despiteprofound changes in Europe’s eco-nomic, political, and military circum-stances, its security architecture seemsstuck on Cold War autopilot. For in-stance, at the onset of the recent Al-banian crisis, the Italian press com-mented little on what Italy and otherG-7 European powers should do. In-stead, editorial writers chastised theUnited States and Russia for failing toshow any initiative. One-size-fits-allstrategies may have worked for Europeover the last fifty years, but the manycalls for a reappraisal of the U.S. role inBosnia point to the need for a moreflexible approach—what British racingenthusiasts might call “horses forcourses”—in the post-Cold War era.

Exit Strategy—CJTF and EFORIf America is to alleviate strategic

strain, concentrate on the global secu-rity tasks only its forces can accom-plish, and ensure that its European sac-rifices reflect national interests andmilitary capabilities in the post-ColdWar era, then it must press for a newbargain in Bosnia. Specifically, the

United States must begin planning fora transition to EFOR in 1998, a Euro-pean-led force that could operate withlimited but critical U.S. support. Giventhe unlikely prospect of a short-termsolution in Bosnia and finite U.S. pa-tience for an extended American pres-ence, handing off Bosnia to a credibleEuropean force with the forbearanceand resolve to see the task throughwould be the most sustainable andachievable goal for a superpower.

The vehicle for this transition canbe found in the NATO combined jointtask force (CJTF). A U.S. initiative, theconcept was conceived in 1993 andafter much negotiation was approvedin June 1996. CJTF will allow for a mixand match of “separable but not sepa-rate” NATO units that can be led by ei-ther an American or European com-mander, a force structure dominatedby either the United States or Europe,or even a smaller CJTF put togetherunder the auspices of a reinforcedWestern European Union (WEU) or Or-ganization for Security and Coopera-tion in Europe (OSCE). The U.S. am-bassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, hascalled CJTF “the first significantchange in the way the Alliance doesbusiness since 1966.” This is becausethe concept introduces the sort of op-erational flexibility NATO will need toaddress a range of post-Cold War secu-rity problems in Europe—a flexibilitythat can accurately reflect both na-tional interest and military capabilityin each member country’s strategic re-sponsibilities. Moreover, a functioningCJTF will have the practical effect ofstiffening the political resolve of Euro-peans in their ability to handle smallcrisis management, humanitarian re-lief, and peace operations in the region(such as the Albanian mission).

To create EFOR, CJTF must betaken off the drawing board and putinto practice instead of atrophying in aplanning cell at Mons (EFOR evolutionis represented in the accompanyingfigure). IFOR and SFOR have beenCJTFs in all but name. The move toEFOR will require a change in theAmerican role from leader and domi-nant partner to supporting player withunique and decisive capabilities. EFORmight well be much smaller than SFORand backstopped by the United States

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lesser threats like a Bosnia affectthe interests of alliance partnersvery differently

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in areas such as Civil Affairs, intelli-gence, logistics, air and sea support,communications, and transport. Giventhe embryonic state of European secu-rity and defense identity and the con-dition of organizations like WEU andOSCE, the first iteration of EFOR will

have to be “stood-up” under the aegisof NATO. However, it is possible thatOSCE and WEU could mature to apoint at which they could field a small

Bosnian peacekeeping mission in thefuture, thereby releasing NATO from aburden that should have only beentemporary duty for a U.S.-led allianceof collective defense.

Bosnia has shown that post-ColdWar Europe needs a variety of institu-

tional alternatives for arange of security issues.The imperatives are thatinstitutions should com-plement each other, over-

lap in responsibility, and above all ac-curately reflect the different interestsand capabilities of each member. Forthe United States this means an endur-ing interest in ensuring that Europe isnot dominated by a hostile power orbloc—even if the threat is not immedi-ate. A U.S.-led NATO focused on collec-tive defense and deterrence is the bestinsurance against such a threat. At-tempting to turn the American role inNATO into a long-term commitmentto peace operations in Bosnia has ex-posed the foible of trying to insert asquare peg in a round hole.

Instead, the United States must,through mechanisms like CJTF, en-courage development of round pegslike WEU and OSCE through whichprosperous partners can take the leadin smaller collective security missions.If the United States does not offerstrong leadership in this enterprise,

then Europeans will be content to de-pend on a U.S.-led NATO response forevery security issue that arises on thecontinent. Eventually the Americanpeople will become disillusioned witha security role that does not accuratelyreflect post-Cold War interests and ca-pabilities of the United States or itspartners. Already, many voices on boththe left and right have called for a totalend to the American commitment toEuropean security.

Reappraisals of the U.S. role in Eu-ropean security often evoke panickyresponses at home and abroad. How-ever, this reaction tends to make Amer-ican leadership not a means but anend. If the situation in Europe is so in-flexible that it precludes developmentof a supporting security system—andholds America permanently responsi-ble for peacekeeping in Europe—thenthis proposition should be reexam-ined. Supporting efforts by regional al-lies can free those farther up the secu-rity hierarchy for problems that onlythey have the power to solve.1

European allies cannot replace theUnited States in the larger tasks of re-gional or global security. Moreover,these allies are allowing their capabili-ties to support such endeavors to de-crease. It therefore is incumbent on theUnited States and its partners to builda credible supporting system for anyfuture Bosnias. Planning for a transi-tion to EFOR should start taking ad-vantage of divergent interests and ca-pabilities and foster a wider sense ofresponsibility for security affairs. Sucha system would not be built to shirkinternational responsibilities but createmeans to complement the unique anddemanding U.S. role of deterring majorconflicts in Europe and other parts ofthe globe. JFQ

N O T E S

1 See John Hillen, “Superpowers Don’tDo Windows,” Orbis, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring1997), pp. 241–57.

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Evolution of Bosnia Force

IFOR (1996)53,000 troop U.S.-led NATO task force

16,000 U.S. troops in Bosnia

15–18,000 U.S. troops supporting in Hungary/

Croatia/Italy/Adriatic Sea

SFOR (1997–98)31,000 troop U.S.-led NATO task force

8,500 U.S. troops in Bosnia

10–15,000 U.S. troops supporting

EFOR (1998–?)12,000 troop European-led CJTF

<1,000 U.S. troops in Bosnia

<4,000 U.S. troops supporting

the first iteration of EFOR will have tobe “stood-up” under the aegis of NATO

Spanish navy AV–8SMatador.

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Jacquelyn K. Davis is executive vice president, Charles M. Perry is vice president and director of studies, and Andrew C. Winner is a senior staff member with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

The Looming Alliance Debate over Nuclear WeaponsBy J A C Q U E L Y N K. D A V I S,

C H A R L E S M. P E R R Y, and A N D R E W C. W I N N E R

USS Arkansas.

U.S. Navy (David Blencoe)

In talks with Russia on the expan-sion of the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) and in Al-liance debates on restructuring,

members have endeavored to keep thequestion of nuclear weapons off thetable. Thus far they have done that bydevising a “three no’s” policy, stipulat-ing that NATO has no intention, noplan, and no reason to deploy suchweapons on the territory of any newmember either now or in the future.1

Based on an American initiative, theAllies adopted this policy for a number

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of fairly sensible but largely tacticalmotives. For one, the United Statesand some of its European NATO alliesdid not want the politically volatilequestion of the forward stationing ofnuclear weapons or delivery systems tobog down the expansion initiative. Inaddition, with under 500 U.S. nuclearweapons in Europe and Russian effortsto either limit or eliminate NATO nu-clear forces during previous negotia-tions, Alliance officials probably fearedthat formal negotiations on tacticalnuclear systems in the context ofNATO enlargement could lead to a“third zero” in Europe2—eliminationof Alliance dual-capable aircraft (DCA)and stocks of their nuclear bombs inNATO vaults in several member coun-tries. Moreover, given the vast differ-ence in the sizes of Russian and NATO

stockpiles, the Alliance would be at adistinct disadvantage in the bargainingthat any substrategic negotiationswould likely entail.

With the demise of the SovietUnion and dissolution of the WarsawPact, the utility of the remaining NATOforward-based tactical nuclear weaponscould be challenged by a disparategroup of anti-nuclear, pacifist, and en-vironmental activists and exploited byMoscow in the debate over NATO ex-pansion—or so many Alliance officialsthought. In an attempt to eliminateany prospect of debate, which promisesto be contentious, Alliance officials de-vised the three no’s policy while hold-ing to the line that the peacetime roleof nuclear weapons in NATO planningremains essential for Alliance cohesion.From this perspective, if the size orcomposition of the NATO nuclear forceis going to be changed it should onlybe in the context of adopting a new orrevised strategic concept or, if pressed,through far-ranging discussions withRussia to address more than nuclear is-sues. If the Alliance re-opened the sub-strategic issue in the midst of discus-sions on expansion and internaladaptation, the process might be debili-tating for both Alliance cohesion and

institutional credibility. The last “newstrategic concept” was debated byNATO for nearly two years.

Yet while the decision to skirt theissue of nuclear weapons was tacticallyastute, the reality is that many factorsmake it unlikely that Alliance mem-bers can avoid a more explicit discus-sion of the fundamental question ofnuclear deterrence and its place inNATO strategy for much longer. Atsome point, moreover, this should in-clude developing a mechanism forpreparing new members to participateeffectively in the Alliance nuclear plan-ning process.

START and Tactical SystemsThere is every indication that the

United States and Russia are accelerat-ing the arms control process by devel-

oping a framework forSTART III reductions, mea-sures to induce the RussianDuma to ratify START II,and agreement on demarca-tion issues related to missile

defense research, development, and de-ployment. Expedited discussions on sig-nificantly reducing strategic nuclearstockpiles under a START III rubric islikely to pressure NATO to think moreconcisely about how nuclear weaponsfit into its plans for the next century.On March 21, 1997, at the Helsinkisummit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsinagreed that after START II enters intoforce the United States and Russia willbegin negotiations on a START III agree-ment to lower the ceilings of strategicnuclear inventories to somewhere be-tween 2,000–2,500 warheads. They alsoagreed to enhance the transparency oftheir nuclear inventories and, for thefirst time, to include a provision on theactual destruction of strategic nuclearwarheads to promote irreversibility inthe cuts. Perhaps most important interms of extended deterrence, or theU.S. nuclear guarantee to protect NATOEurope, was the agreement that, in thecontext of START III, Washington andMoscow would explore as separate is-sues the possibility of added controls onnuclear long-range sea-launched cruise

missiles and tactical nuclear systems, toinclude confidence-building and trans-parency measures.3 Although the exactnature of such measures was not stated,some have suggested that prospectivetransparency measures might involvebroader exposure by Russia to NATOvault safety and security procedures aswell as mutual visits to stockpile sites inthe hope of bringing the Russians closerto meeting NATO standards.

In any event, the Helsinki agree-ments clearly reflect the intentions ofboth Presidents to put START III on thefast track, and this could have pro-found implications for nuclear forcestructure in NATO, particularly forU.S.-provided weapons stockpiled inEurope. The wording of the joint state-ment on these issues is ambiguous inplaces and, as usual, covers over somekey differences of approach betweenthe sides. On the one hand, the UnitedStates wants any measures relating tonuclear long-range sea-launched cruisemissiles and tactical nuclear systemslimited to confidence-building andtransparency measures. Russia, just asclearly, wanted the statement to allowfor the exploration of possible reduc-tions or operational constraints onthese systems; for example, limits ondeployment locations or range capabil-ities. Which side succeeds at the bar-gaining table has yet to be determined,but it is possible that limitations onnumbers or deployment modalities oftactical nuclear weapons in Europecould be negotiated in the near futurewith obvious implications for theNATO strategic concept and nuclearrisk-sharing in the Alliance. Hence,while maintaining a low-profile policywith regard to substrategic forces, theAlliance nevertheless needs to quietlyconsider its options lest it be caughtoff guard.

The probability of an agreementon deployment limits for tactical sys-tems is considerable, in part since it isnot only Russia that is interested in ap-plying some sort of arms control mea-sures to NATO tactical nuclear weapons.The United States and its partners havean obvious stake in seeing the largestock of Russian tactical nuclearweapons—by some estimates over

the probability of an agreement on deployment limits for tactical systemsis considerable

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10,000—reduced or put under stricttransparency and control regimes fortwo reasons.4 First, it is generallythought that central Russian govern-ment control over these weapons ismuch more tenuous than over strategicsystems. The United States and its allieswould like to increase that control and,at the same time, enhance their infor-mation on these systems to decreasechances of nuclear materials beingstolen by or diverted to pariah states orused by some rogue actor.

Second, NATO members are awarethat stability in Russia is tenuous, withthe military less and less satisfied bytheir status in the country’s fragile de-mocratic development. In this context,and against the disastrous outcome ofthe Russian foray into Chechnya,NATO officials are all the more con-cerned over Moscow’s apparent adop-tion of the old NATO doctrine of flexi-ble response. Many Europeans believethat renewed Russian interest in re-liance upon nuclear weapons to offsetconventional inferiorities, with mod-ernization programs to match, must beredirected if stability is to be main-tained on the Continent.

Thirdly, since it is the 10,000-oddRussian tactical nuclear weapons thatpose a special threat to NATO Europeanstates—given the ranges associatedwith their likely delivery systems—itstands to reason that U.S. allies wouldseek other avenues to reduce the Russ-ian inventory of substrategic warheads

and render those that remain more safeand secure. The Netherlands, for exam-ple, has proposed initiating some sortof Nunn-Lugar program targeted specif-ically on assisting Russia in the securecontainment and dismantling of war-heads on theater and intermediate-range missiles.

But precisely how efforts to redi-rect Moscow’s increasing reliance onnuclear weapons ought to proceed—under the rubric of a START III agree-ment, perhaps in conjunction with re-vision of the Conventional Forces inEurope Treaty or as part of less formaltransparency talks—is open to debate.Equally uncertain is how the Europeanmembers of NATO would view trade-offs that would increase the trans-parency of Russian tactical nuclearforces or cut their number versus a re-quirement for the Alliance to reducefurther or restrict the deployment of itsown greatly diminished nuclear capa-bility. Nevertheless, pressure does existto support just this type of arms con-trol initiative toward Russia, and it islikely to grow. Such pressure, more-over, could prove irresistible to Al-liance members when presented aspart of a package of incentives to easeRussian objections to NATO expansionand/or reconfigure the Alliance—bothstructurally and with regard to coremissions—in ways that Moscow wouldfind less threatening.

Waning Asset?The European view of these trade-

offs may well depend on whether gov-ernment officials are wearing theirstrategic hats or green eyeshades. Bud-get cuts and force restructuring in vir-tually every allied nation raise thequestion of whether a continuing nu-clear role is feasible for countries withdual-capable certified squadrons, par-ticularly Belgium, Italy, and Greece.Each faces difficult military modern-ization choices with little stomach forincreased defense spending as itattempts to meet stringent monetarycriteria for entry into the EuropeanMonetary Union. Converting nuclear-tasked squadrons into truly effectiveconventional assets (for example,based on stand-off missiles) mightprove more costly than maintainingcurrent nuclear assignments. However,this fact is not likely to dampen incen-tives to shed the nuclear role in an ef-fort to reduce military expenditures.Even in more prosperous DCA-deploy-ing countries, including Germany,anti-nuclear sentiments combinedwith a desire to assuage Russian con-cerns over NATO expansion coulderode government support for contin-ued participation in this aspect of Al-liance defense cooperation.

Most European NATO members re-gard DCA as a necessary evil, perceiv-ing that deterrence is existential andthus rather immune to the number ofsystems or specific deployment modali-ties. Yet even with sizable anti-nuclearminorities in their countries, govern-ments tend to accept Alliance sub-strategic capabilities as crucial to thetheory of deterrence and, more impor-tantly, to the political cohesion of theAlliance. Viewed from this position, thesense of shared risks and responsibili-ties embodied in NATO planning, bothin the conventional and nuclearrealms, is basic to maintaining consen-sus on many strategic issues. That said,for many in Europe the deployment ofAlliance nuclear weapons is not sacro-sanct, as attested by the British decisionto dismantle DCA assets in favor of de-ploying a substrategic Trident—a deci-sion based on both the longer rangeand enhanced precision of submarine-launched ballistic missile platformsthat give them the capability to target a

Bombers destroyedunder START I.

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wider array of aimpoints in any num-ber of potential adversary countries.

However, this decision by theUnited Kingdom to opt out of DCAtaskings—a transition that should becomplete by the end of 1998—mayreignite similar debates in other DCA-deploying countries, particularly thosein which air force structures are prov-ing unable to cope with the general de-cline in defense budgets. Of courseonly the British have the option of sub-stituting one mode of platform deploy-ment for another. A decision by anyother member for a submarine-launched capability would requiretransferring sensitive technology fromthe United States, Great Britain, orFrance and would be more expensivefor the DCA-deploying nations. Butapart from platform changes thesecountries might choose to keep feweraircraft—perhaps one rather than twosquadrons—at a high state of readinessfor a nuclear mission. Alternatively,support may grow for a consolidatedmultinational DCA wing, though this

option might re-quire basing indi-vidual national con-tributions at a singlesite, thus increasingvulnerability and re-stricting flexibility.

And yet, withno decision to mod-ernize the NATOnuclear arsenal on the horizon, Al-liance DCA platforms will become wan-ing assets over time by sheer obsoles-cence. Meanwhile, barring anynegotiation that would reduce the cur-rent stockpile, more than one DCA-de-ploying nation can be expected to doeverything possible to retain this mis-sion (albeit at a reduced level of readi-ness) since it justifies force structurewhich otherwise would be cut from ac-tive inventories. For this reason alone,there will be mixed feelings on a debateover the future of NATO substrategicforces, even though there are powerfulrationales for doing so.

The Promise of RMAAside from arms control and Al-

liance cohesion, there are doctrinal andtechnological issues that may persuadeNATO to take a new look at nuclearweapons and how they fit into its de-terrence posture. Some advocates of theso-called revolution in military affairs(RMA) argue, for example, that the rele-vance of nuclear systems and tradi-tional concepts of deterrence more gen-erally has been eroded in the wake ofqualitative advances in conventionalcapabilities. These new generation non-nuclear technologies may, when

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weaponized, provide a more crediblebasis for deterrence against regional ad-versaries than using the nuclear threatas a crisis management instrument.Proponents of this view claim that thecentral issue is nuclear credibility in aworld in which public sensitivity to ca-sualties is high and compellance and/ordenial can be accomplished for themost part by non-nuclear means. Fromthis perspective, it is not so much theconcept of deterrence that needs to beoverhauled as its one-dimensional asso-ciation with nuclear weapons, which isseen as destabilizing and, in the case of

Russian deployments, subject to ques-tionable command and control proce-dures and technology. Those who holdthis position will argue that NATO canafford to shrink its nuclear force struc-ture even further and should readjustits strategic concept to allow for abroader view of deterrence which in-cludes advanced conventional weaponsand new operational concepts.

Notwithstanding their growingawareness that new and emerging non-nuclear technologies offer great poten-tial for deterrence and defense plan-ning, European elites also believe thatnuclear weapons still count in tacklingcertain prospective risks, from the pro-liferation of weapons of mass destruc-tion (WMD) to the revival of a coher-ent Russian threat. The ambiguity of aresponse related to nuclear deterrencein an existential mode, which is partlyrooted in the Alliance’s refusal toadopt a sweeping “no first use” pledgeand in support for a declaratory policyon nuclear weapons use in extreme cir-cumstances, gives non-nuclear NATOmembers a sense of security that is un-attainable from conventional weaponsalone. And even if advanced conven-tional weapons were woven into theNATO deterrence concept, key issuesabout their availability in crisis—andby extension their credibility as deter-rence assets—might remain unre-solved, as it may be only the United

States that chooses to spend themoney to field advanced non-nuclearsystems.

France and NATOOf course one Alliance member,

France, would argue vehementlyagainst any minimization of the role ofnuclear weapons in deterrence. At pre-sent France’s view of Alliance nuclearpolicy is more academic, given the lim-ited status of its membership. However,with its leading role in Europe and itsclose partnership with Germany in par-ticular, France entertains ideas which

cannot be dismissed out of hand. Ifanything, French perspectives onnuclear weapons and concepts ofdeterrence are being more widelyheeded since the strategic situationon the Continent has changed and

continuing U.S. engagement is per-ceived to be more tenuous than duringthe height of Cold War tensions—atime, it is worth remembering, whenmany Europeans feared the UnitedStates would never really “trade NewYork for Hamburg.”

Notable in this regard is theFrench initiative to engage the Britishmore intensively in talks on coopera-tive deterrence and President Chirac’sefforts to include Germany in his na-tion’s concerted deterrence concept. Attheir Nuremberg summit in December1996, Chirac and Chancellor Kohl ofGermany signed a “common strategicconcept” which includes provisions forreassessing the role of nuclear deter-rence in European security planning.5

Playing on European fears of an ero-sion in the transatlantic security link,particularly if Alliance expansion di-lutes the capacity for concerted actionby NATO as expected by some, theFrench are promoting the notion of a“concerted deterrence” as central to anindependent European security anddefense identity (ESDI)—one thatcould become more directly tied to theEuropean Union than to NATO.

Counterproliferation PolicyA final factor that may cause

NATO to reexamine how nuclearweapons fit into its security strategy isthe growing WMD threat, particularlyfrom states on the southern and east-ern littorals of the Mediterranean.

Libya, Syria, and other states are up-grading the range of their missiles andwill soon be able to strike Europe, per-haps even with chemical and biologi-cal weapons. NATO has consideredcounterproliferation and nonprolifera-tion for years—mostly prompted bythe United States but also with supportfrom the southern tier, notably France,Italy, and Spain. But recent discus-sions—largely through the Senior De-fense Group on Proliferation—have fo-cused on passive and active defenses,with the adoption of a military opera-tional requirements document circu-lated by Supreme Headquarters AlliedPowers Europe (SHAPE) on counterpro-liferation that has since become miredin national politics, budgetary issues,and most recently the debate overNATO expansion.

Preliminary reviews by the NATONuclear Planning Group notwithstand-ing, the issue of how nuclear weaponsfit into the Alliance counterprolifera-tion calculus has not been fully ad-dressed. SHAPE has included nucleardeterrence assets as one leg of its newcounterproliferation triad—the othertwo being theater missile defense andconventional attack—but there hasbeen little talk of their relative value invarious WMD settings or of new opera-tional concepts to render the deterrentleg credible in the future. Moreover,whatever SHAPE and NATO headquar-ters think, countries such as Italy—which is key to Southern Region per-spectives—may be of two minds. Onthe one hand, the presence of U.S. nu-clear weapons and bases on Italian soilcould proffer targets for possible attacksby an adversary like Libya.6 On theother, the continuing presence of theseweapons as part of the NATO Euro-pean-based force structure could pro-vide a degree of security that would bedifficult to replicate otherwise, giventhe uncertainty surrounding conditionsunder which such weapons would beused. Beyond security-minded anxi-eties, Italy, like other smaller countries,sees participation in the DCA postureof NATO as essential to retaining itsseat at the table in important Alliancedeliberations. To forfeit a role in DCAplanning and execution could relegateRome to second-tier status in NATO cir-cles according to this view.

France would argue vehementlyagainst any minimization of nuclear deterrence

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Indeed, in the wake of substrategic-level consultations in Helsinki andamong larger NATO powers (for exam-ple, France, Britain, and Germany),smaller DCA-deploying countries arelikely to increasingly press for a voice asoccurred when the infamous “quad”—the United States, Britain, Germany,and SHAPE—was said to be exertingundue sway over NATO nuclear poli-cies. Dutch officials have argued, for ex-ample, that there is little value in work-ing hard to retain the “special weight”that DCA participation is presumed toconfer if it only comes to bear in theunlikely instance of consultation on ac-tual nuclear use. Instead, it is peacetimedeliberation on substrategic forces—in-cluding deterring a potential use ofWMD against NATO’s Southern Regionand the contours of future arms controland transparency talks—that mattersmost, many argue, now that theprospect of a nuclear exchange at thetheater level has receded. If such senti-ments are not fully appreciated by thelarger NATO states, holding the lineagainst a future “third zero” will be-come all the more difficult.

NATO Nuclear PostureThe above factors point to a need

for NATO to reconsider its nuclear de-terrence posture and strategy. How-ever, as noted the Alliance is currently

overwhelmed by the politics of bothinternal adaptation and expansion,and NATO as an organization is veryadept at avoiding discussions on issuesthat appear logically necessary to out-siders. It may be able to hold off thisdiscussion for two to three years, de-pending on whether the U.S.-Russianarms control agenda moves forward orif the United States undertakes any sig-nificant unilateral initiatives related toits national nuclear deterrence strategyor its force structure—either conven-tional or nuclear—in Europe.

The prospect that the United Statesmight make some sort of largely unilat-eral adjustment in its European forceposture that could have an impact onNATO deterrence thinking cannot beruled out. Both deterrence and nuclearforces were examined in the Quadren-nial Defense Review (QDR) and will beassessed by the National Defense Panel(NDP), which follows an earlier nuclearposture review that was conducted par-allel to the Bottom-Up Review and leftuntouched DCA deployments in Eu-rope. In terms of conventional capabili-ties, the QDR report contains modestcuts in end strength and infrastructurein order to adequately fund readinessand modernization. Depending on the

outcome of the NDP report and con-gressional deliberations, other cuts suchas reductions in dual-capable air assetsor infrastructure to support the nuclearmission remain a possibility. However,changes in tactical nuclear forces maynot drive a broad-based Alliance reviewof its deterrence posture.

So too, U.S. changes in nuclearstrategy cannot be ruled out as the Na-tion contemplates its deterrent forceunder a START III regime of 2,000–2,500 strategic nuclear warheads thatmay also limit certain delivery plat-forms or deployment modalities. What-ever path we choose with regard to ournuclear arsenal and strategy, we mustrecognize that there will be conse-quences for European security, directlyover NATO nuclear planning or indi-rectly in the context of broader movestoward a notion of ESDI that standsapart from NATO. In fact, the emer-gence of an independent European se-curity identity centered around Britishand French national nuclear forcescould be accelerated if there is a percep-tion of significant erosion in the U.S.commitment. There is already growingconcern in Europe that as Americadraws down its active force structureforward-based deployments will be fur-ther trimmed or eliminated, lendingsupport to Allied concerns over U.S.disengagement.

Worse still from a European per-spective is the likelihood that theUnited States, in efforts to develop anoff-shore-based power projection forceposture, would unilaterally withdrawits land-based air systems from Europe,forcing the Alliance to rely on off-shore assets for deterrence. The effec-tive dismantling of the NATO land-based substrategic force structure inthis manner would create a situationin which deterrence in Europe wouldthereafter be based essentially onAmerican and British off-shore plat-forms and French nuclear forces,whose nuclear-tasked aircraft would bethe only land-based nuclear assets inNATO Europe. Neither the substancenor symbolism of this new realitywould be lost on NATO’s non-nuclearpartners—one or two of which mightbe moved to reconsider their own nu-clear options—nor on potential globaladversaries, more than one or two of

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whom are known to be involved inconcerted efforts to develop nationalWMD postures.

The psychology and politics of de-terrence rest on extremely subjectivefactors, and there is little solid data onthe precise role of nuclear weapons indeterring chemical or biologicalweapons use or affecting strategic cal-culations by non-Western leaders.Apart from a limited understanding ofwhat occurred behind the scenes inDesert Storm with regard to deterrence

calculus and intuitive efforts to de-velop a correlation between U.S.-SovietCold War experiences and hypotheti-cal contingencies centered around 21st

century threats, empirical data that ei-ther supports or contradicts various de-terrence paradigms is inadequate toguide anything except the most gen-eral projections of deterrence plan-ning. Yet there is to date no credible al-ternative to retaining effective nuclear

assets. While there is certainly great at-traction in embracing the conven-tional deterrence concept, for the Al-liance this is really a nonstarter giventhe extent to which national forces arebeing reduced and the fact that re-sources are lacking to implement re-search and development programsneeded to field non-nuclear technolo-gies to influence national perceptions,particularly in crisis situations.

If NATO is to remain an effectivealliance with a strategy that embraces a

nuclear deterrent, it must ad-dress the various issues dis-cussed above in a coherentmanner before events in indi-vidual countries or negotia-tions which do not directlyconcern the Alliance dictate

outcomes. At the end of the day, ittakes the political will to tackle toughissues and reach a consensus—no mat-ter how fragile—that has greater im-portance than any given weapons de-ployment or defense concept. Thecapacity of a group of sovereign demo-cratic nations to come together to en-sure stability, manage crises, and pre-vent crisis escalation is the corerequirement of the new NATO. Hencethe maturation process will require

adoption of a new deterrence conceptthat embraces nuclear and non-nuclearoptions for deterrence and crisis man-agement. When and how that discus-sion and evolution will take place hasyet to be determined, but severaltrends suggest it should be soonerrather than later, lest we risk havingsome options foreclosed. More impor-tantly, we also risk the effects thatavoiding a timely debate could haveon an enlarged Alliance. It will be im-portant to show new members thatNATO can step up to the plate andhandle difficult questions such as nu-clear deterrence in a way that preservesAlliance cohesion as well as the secu-rity of individual members. JFQ

N O T E S

1 North Atlantic Council communiqué,December 10, 1996.

2 The first two zeros resulted from the In-termediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (which en-tered into effect in 1988) that eliminatedlong-range (1,000–55,500 kilometers) andshort-range (500–1,000 kilometers) interme-diate nuclear forces from U.S. and Soviet in-ventories. Subsequently, President Bush tac-itly agreed to a third zero of sorts—formissile systems under 500 kilometers inrange—when he decided to forego modern-ization of the Lance missile system.

3 President of the United States, “JointStatement on Parameters of Future Reduc-tions in Nuclear Forces” (Helsinki, Finland:Office of the Press Secretary, The WhiteHouse, March 2, 1997).

4 Robert S. Norris and William Arkin,“Estimated Russian Nuclear Stockpile, Sep-tember 1994,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-tists, vol. 50, no. 5 (September/October1994), p. 61. More recent sources put thenumber of deployed tactical weapons atmuch lower levels—approximately 3,200—but the number of nondeployed but not yetdismantled weapons is unclear. See RobertS. Norris and William Arkin, “EstimatedRussian Stockpile, September 1996,” Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5 (Sep-tember/October 1996), pp. 23–28.

5 The text of this agreement was reprintedin Le Monde, January 30, 1997, pp. 12–13.

6 This was brought home in 1986 whenLibya fired two Scud missiles at the Italianisland of Lampedusa, in apparent retaliationfor American raids on Tripoli in the wake ofthe bombing of La Belle Disco in Berlin.

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Fifteen new independent enti-ties were propelled by na-tional security imperatives tocreate their own armed forces

once the Soviet Union was dissolved.That process varied from state to statebecause of differences in interests andresources—ends and means. An in-structive example is Ukraine, perhapsthe most important of the emergentstates after Russia. A country of 52 mil-lion people, the size of France, andrich in natural resources, it could bedestined to play a central role in the

new geopolitical environment of east-ern and central Europe.

The speed of the Soviet Union’sbreakup left its forces practically in-tact where they were deployed. WhileRussia proper retained the second-rateforces that were previously part of thecentral strategic reserve, the formerrepublics on the western frontier, es-pecially Ukraine and Belarus, inher-ited first-class force packages whichwere part of the second strategic eche-lon of the former western and south-western theaters of operation of theWarsaw Pact.

Each of the newly independentstates has dealt differently with its mili-tary inheritance. On one extreme, the


Colonel Stephen D. Olynyk, USAR (Ret.), served on both the Army and Joint Staffs and has been a consultant on nationalsecurity to the Ukrainian government.

Ukraineas a Post-Cold War Military PowerBy S T E P H E N D. O L Y N Y K

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New Ukrainian Military Districts

Baltic states insisted that all former So-viet forces leave their territory as theybuilt their own from scratch. Russia andthe central Asian states were slower toform national forces, with some of thelatter still not having accomplished thatthus far. At the other extreme, Ukrainedecided to nationalize former Sovietforces stationed on its territory exceptfor strategic forces. Over 700,000ground, air, and air defense forces alongwith 500,000 paramilitary troops werebased in Ukraine. Motivated by na-tional (regional) patriotism and eco-nomic considerations, most remainedand swore allegiance to the new state.Only 20,000 officers departed to Russiaor other former republics.

Legal BasisHaving declared complete inde-

pendence on August 24, 1991, two daysafter the collapse of the putsch inMoscow, the Supreme Rada (parlia-ment) realized that there was no mili-tary to protect the new nation. With a

brief decree Ukraine nationalized allconventional forces on its territory, thefirst former Soviet republic to do so. Inthe months that followed legislativeacts provided a legal basis for the armedforces and created a rudimentary na-tional security structure—with a min-istry of defense, defense council, andnational security council (the latter twowere combined in 1995); the generalstaff of the armed forces of Ukraine; andthree services. The laws also outlined abasic Ukrainian defense policy and thedefense responsibilities and functions ofvarious agencies and officials.

As approved by the Rada, themajor tenets of military doctrine arepreventing war, building the armedforces, and repelling aggression.Ukrainian security policy is defensiveand based on nonintervention, respectfor the national borders and indepen-dence of other states, and rejection ofthe use of force as an instrument of

policy. This is in stark contrast to Russ-ian doctrine, which anticipates inter-vention outside its borders under con-ditions of a peripheral conflict orprotection of Russian minorities inneighboring states. Because of politicalsensitivity, military doctrine—likeUkrainian security policy—avoids iden-tifying a specific threat. Rather it refersto a “state whose consistent policy pre-sents a military threat . . . [or] leads tointerference in the internal affairs ofUkraine, or encroaches on its territorialintegrity and its national interests.”

Military doctrine reemphasizes astatutory and political commitment toa non-nuclear status. It stresses theprinciple of “reasonable defense suffi-ciency” in determining the numberand types of forces as well as the quan-tity and quality of conventionalweapons. It puts a priority on develop-ing modern, well-trained, and highlymobile forces with emphasis on preci-sion weaponry, intelligence and elec-tronic warfare, air and space defense,and airpower and seapower. To accom-plish these objectives, this doctrinecalls for a modern and economicallyrational defense industrial base.

In January 1997 the Rada adopted“The Concept of National Security ofUkraine,” a policy and strategy thatcontains principles, national interests,unspecified threats, objectives, organi-zation and functions, and the roles ofgovernment agencies in security policyformulation. This document is verygeneral in tone and reflects the contin-uing ambiguities present in definingUkraine’s security interests, threats,and policy objectives.

The Soviet LegacyUkraine inherited only two ser-

vices from the Soviet Union—an armyand air force. Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as-sets remained under the de facto con-trol of Moscow. On the ground,Ukraine gained control over fivearmies, one army corps, eighteen divi-sions (twelve motorized, four tank, andtwo airborne), three airborne brigades,three artillery divisions, and a host ofcombat support and combat servicesupport units. It also inherited four airarmies with assets that gave Ukrainethe third largest air force in the world,including an inventory of long range

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Yalta

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Nikopol’Kryvyy Rih

SimferoplFeodosiya

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POLAND

LITHUANIA

Melitopol’

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Ternopil’Kremenchuk

PoltavaL’viv

RUSSIA Vilnius

Warsaw

Minsk

Smolensk

Chornobyl’Sumy

Kiev

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Donets’kPervomays’k

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CRIMEANPENINSULA

B l a c k S e a

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Khmel’nyts’kyyVinnytsya

Bucharest

Zhytomyr

CherkasySLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

Chisinau ´

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Mykolayiv

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MOLDOVA

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0 100 200 Miles

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bombers, transports, strike aircraft, re-connaissance and electronic warfareplanes, tactical and air defense fighters,and training aircraft. The air defensecontingent consisted of one air defensearmy and three air corps. It was part ofthe air force but since has been madeinto a fourth service branch.

In autumn 1991 there was aUkraine navy in name only, with thecommand and control structure beingformed and negotiations just startingover the division of the Black Sea Fleet.But the new nation did inherit and getcontrol of a substantial part of Sovietshipbuilding capacity as well as BlackSea shore naval facilities.

As for strategic forces, Ukraine be-came by default the world’s thirdlargest nuclear power, with 176 land-based ICBMs (1,240 warheads), 41strategic nuclear bombers (460 war-heads on bombs and cruise missiles),and tactical nuclear weapons; the latterwere transferred to Russia in 1993.

After intensive negotiations byUkraine, Russia, and the United States,and with the U.S. and Russian acces-sion to three key Ukrainian demands(security guarantees after Ukraine be-comes non-nuclear, financial assis-tance to dismantle missiles, and com-pensation for the missile material), atripartite agreement was signed in Jan-uary 1994 that provided for Ukraine tode-nuclearize itself within seven years.One month later parliament ratifiedthe START I treaty and in November

1994 a new parliament overwhelm-ingly approved the Non-proliferationTreaty thereby underscoring the intentto become a non-nuclear state. By June1996 Ukraine had transferred all strate-gic nuclear warheads to Russia, aheadof schedule. The bombers went to Rus-sia in payment for outstanding debts.But the expensive destruction of mis-siles and silos and environmentalcleanup (especially of liquid rocketpropellants) had just begun. With theremoval of the weapons, strategic

forces were gradually reduced and re-settled in housing provided with U.S.and German financial assistance.

The State of ReformThere have been several attempts

at military reform since the armedforces were organized. The first threeministers of defense have had a masterplan, but each failed to have it imple-mented before leaving office becauseof a lack of funds and indecisivenesson the part of the defense leadership.What these plans had in common was

a call for force reduction, de-fense industrial conversion,and force modernization. Eachreform package proposed reor-ganizing administration andcommand, redeploying forces

to adapt them to new military andgeopolitical realities, reconfiguring theforce structure, and reducing man-power and equipment to maintain“reasonable defense sufficiency” andmeet the ceilings imposed by theTreaty on Conventional Armed Forcesin Europe (CFE).

The services. The only truly suc-cessful reform so far has been in thearea of force reduction. In October1993 the Rada approved an endstrength of 450,000. This strength iscurrently 371,000—down from 726,000in 1992. By July 1995 Ukraine met CFE

limits in personnel and selected con-ventional weapons. Reformers reconfig-ured the old Soviet “army” structure ofthe ground forces into army corps asthe highest echelon of command andcontrol, and personnel have been re-duced to 161,000—down from 245,000in 1992. Plans are also underway to fur-ther shrink these ground forces to95,000 by 2005.

The four Soviet air armies havebeen restructured into two aviationcorps and one naval aviation group.Air force personnel are being reducedto 78,000 this year. Combat planes willbe cut from 1,090 to 590 by 2005. Theair defense forces, which have becomea separate service, have been reorga-nized into three air defense corps withan anticipated strength of 36,000 by2005—down from 67,000 in 1992.

Building a navy has been plaguedfor years by a tug of war betweenUkraine and Russia over their shares ofBSF and basing rights. Early on, theRussian command surreptitiously trans-ferred some of the better ships to itsNorthern Fleet. After several summitmeetings and agreements that werenever implemented, Presidents BorisYeltsin and Leonid Kuchma agreed at

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Sochi in June 1995 to divide BSF inhalf; then Ukraine would give Russia 32percent of its share as payment fordebts and use the remainder either torefurbish its own nascent navy or sell itfor scrap.

This agreement was solidified bythe two presidents in a comprehensivetreaty of cooperation between Russiaand Ukraine signed on May 31, 1997 inKiev. Under the terms of the treaty Rus-sia formally recognized Sevastopol asan integral part of Ukrainian territoryand Ukraine agreed to lease three baysat Sevastopol naval base to Russia forBSF use over the next twenty years.Ukraine will also have basing rights at aseparate bay in the port for its navy.This development may have resolvedwhat was a highly charged politicalissue in both countries.

The nucleus of an independentnavy is being formed primarily aroundcoastal defense ships built in Ukraine’sshipyards and the BSF craft alreadyunder its operational command andcontrol. Meantime, some of its newships have been taking part in regionalnaval exercises with neighbors and se-lected NATO naval exercises under thePartnership for Peace (PFP) program.Finally, while Ukraine has taken overmost BSF shore-based facilities, it is un-able for the time being to allocate theresources necessary to sustain a sub-stantial shipbuilding capability.

At the direction of the president, aplan known as the “State Program forthe Building and Development of theUkrainian Armed Forces for the Year2005” was adopted in December 1996.It is the most serious reform to be at-tempted so far and covers roles andmissions, force structure, budgeting,modernization, and the organizationof the ministry of defense and generalstaff. Initial emphasis for 1997 is onupgrading the air force and navy anddeveloping a “rapid reaction force” asthe nucleus of Ukrainian defense pos-ture—a fully manned, equipped, andready contingent. Details of the pro-gram have not as yet been released.

Military districts. In 1992 the threeformer Soviet military districts inUkraine (Carpathian, Odessa, andKiev) were reorganized into two opera-tional districts (Carpathian and

Odessa) and one administrative (Cen-tral Command in Kiev). Odessa was ex-tended to cover the southeasternlength of the Ukrainian-Russian bor-der, but for reasons of political sensi-tivity no separate district was estab-lished in eastern Ukraine to cover thelength of its border with Russia. How-ever, a limited number of restructuredoperational forces were deployed toeastern regions.

In autumn 1996 a new experi-mental type of military district was es-tablished in the northeast, centered inChernihiv and designated as theNorthern Operational/Territorial Com-mand (OTC), with an army corps-levelheadquarters. This was an apparentlymakeshift way of filling the void inthis critical defense perimeter. The cur-rent reform program envisions con-verting the present districts into threeOTCs (Western, Southern, and Central)by 2005.

Military education. Ukraine inher-ited 34 military schools and faculties at78 institutions of higher learning, fartoo many for its needs. Many reformshave been attempted and Kuchma hascriticized the excessive turbulence inthe military education system. By theend of 1996, after false starts andsquandered resources, these institu-tions were reduced. Survivors includethe Academy of the Armed Forces ofUkraine (Kiev), Military University(Kharkiv), and Medical Academy; threejoint (interdisciplinary) military col-leges; and five service branch colleges.In addition, there are six lyceums (mid-level military schools) and military fac-ulties (departments) at 48 institutionsof higher learning. Research centersalso will be maintained in space andmilitary meteorology, C3 and electronicwarfare, air defense, air combat, navaloperations, procurement, and educa-tion and socio-psychological service.

In June 1996 the new Academy ofthe Armed Forces of Ukraine graduatedits first class of 178 officers who willassume senior positions in the armedforces and ministry. At the same time15 universities and institutes graduated4,700 junior lieutenants in 150 mili-tary specialties.

Sociological ConcernsThe military leadership must con-

front some serious issues before theycan claim success in making reforms.When the armed forces were national-ized, they inherited a number of prob-lems related to morale, discipline,readiness, and combat sustainability.

Force conversion and quality of life.While equipment reductions man-dated by CFE were carried out quicklyand smoothly, reducing personnel hasbeen a daunting task. It is complicatedby a commitment to generous entitle-ments which provide quarters, retrain-ing and job placement, or social secu-rity for thousands of commissionedand noncommissioned officers re-leased since 1992 in downsizing. Moresignificantly, it has made officers stillon active duty unsure of the futureand has eroded their morale and inter-est in a military career.

The military shares the economichardship of the entire population.They get comparatively low salarieswhich often have been delayed since1995, in many cases for months. Theyline up to rent apartments like otherprospective tenants. Some officers haveorganized illegal associations to lobbyfor their personal welfare. There havebeen demonstrations by officers andtheir families. In recent years the betterqualified officers, especially in theground forces, have left the service insearch of opportunities in the privatesector. This has especially been true ofnew officers, a native product, whoafter receiving a good education be-come disenchanted with economicconditions and leave on completingtheir short-term military obligation.President Kuchma recently called forthe extension and enforcement of offi-cer obligations.

All members of the armed forceshave sworn allegiance to the Ukrainianstate. But how many did so out of loy-alty rather than because of economicor opportunistic motives is difficult todetermine. The downturn in the econ-omy has harmed morale and opera-tional readiness, strained civil-militaryrelations, and called into question theloyalty of the military in a crisis. It hasalso led to declining discipline. Therate of no-shows among recruits hasgone up as has absenteeism without

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leave and outright desertion. Crimecommitted by servicemen also hasrisen. Exacerbating low morale in theenlisted ranks is the continuation ofan often brutal barrack hazing wide-spread in the former Soviet forces andpassed on to post-Soviet armies.

Ethnic relations. In the early yearsof independence there was a serious

ethnic imbalance within the armedforces resulting from a deliberate So-viet policy of intermixing officers ofvarious nationalities following WorldWar II. Non-Russians were assigned tothe Russian Republic and Russian offi-cers, especially generals, were over-whelmingly assigned to non-Russianrepublics. In January 1992 ethnic Rus-sians reportedly comprised 90 percentof general officers, 60 percent of field

grade officers, and 50 percent of gen-eral staff officers in the Ukrainianarmed forces. The situation graduallybecame more favorable to ethnicUkrainians of company grade, espe-cially as schools graduated cohorts ofnative Ukrainian commissioned andwarrant officers. But the ministry ofdefense estimates there are still more

than 150,000 ethnic officersserving outside Ukraine,mostly in the Russian Feder-ation, many of whom wantto come home. The situation

has improved in the enlisted ranks,which since independence have beendrawn from within the country, mak-ing them a better ethnic reflection ofoverall society, which is 73 percentethnic Ukrainian.

The Ukrainization of the officercorps has shown great improvement.

By September 1995 military schoolshad graduated 27,000 new officers, themajority of Ukrainian nationality. Dur-ing this period 33,000 Ukrainian offi-cers were brought in from other Com-monwealth of Independent States(CIS) countries, mostly from Russia. Asof July 1995, ethnic Ukrainian officersaccounted for 63 percent of regimentalcommanders, 72 percent of divisioncommanders, 69 percent of corps com-manders (seven corps), all directors ofmain directorates of the ministry, andall deputies to the minister of defense.Moreover, 67 percent of all generalsand admirals were Ukrainian, 26 per-cent Russian, and 6 percent other na-tionalities.

Language of command. Closely re-lated to ethnic composition is the lan-guage of command and communica-tion. Russian was always the languageof the Soviet armed forces which madeit a powerful tool of Russification. Thatwas abetted by an intensive Russifica-tion program in society at large, espe-cially during the 1960s and 1970s. Itnot only hindered development ofnon-Russian military and technical ter-minology but also the use of non-Russ-ian languages in the armed forces. Itwill be some time before Ukrainian be-comes institutionalized as the lan-guage of command and communica-tion. Until then it will remain a sourceof dissonance within the military.

Reeducation program. All senior offi-cers were brought up in a closeted envi-ronment and indoctrinated with com-munist ideology and a Soviet world

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outlook. They were taught to think ofthemselves as part of an elite socialclass in Soviet (not national) societyand imbued with Russian military tra-ditions and history. This was a socio-psychological view in which there wasno room for any reference to Ukrainianmilitary tradition or history prior to1917. After August 1991 many of theseofficers, largely disoriented by the rapidcollapse of the Soviet Union, foundthemselves in the Ukrainian nationalarmed forces and asked to swear alle-giance to a new state that could hardlyhave been imagined only a few monthsearlier. Thus the military leadership ofUkraine has been faced with a giantand sensitive task—the political reedu-cation of its inherited officer corps.

The Rada abolished the former So-viet political officer structure andadopted the Educational and Socio-Psychological Service (ESPS), a struc-ture organized down to company levelor its equivalent. It was designed toimpart the basic tenets of Ukrainianhistory, language, and military tradi-tion and promote democratization ofthe armed forces. The university-levelKiev Institute of Humanities was estab-lished to train officers for ESPS duty inunits and commands.

Reeducation efforts, especially at-tempts to strengthen national identityand promote the use of the Ukrainianlanguage, has understandably created

tension within the armed forces,largely due to an ambitious initial pro-gram under the first minister of de-fense. It has been toned down undersubsequent ministers to make it moremarketable (particularly to old-timeformer Soviet officers). The fourthminister, General-Colonel OleksandrKuzmuk, has pledged to reinvigoratesuch efforts; but the languid economyand social privations of the militarytemper any enthusiasm for them.

Civil-Military RelationsDuring five years of independence

civil-military relations have generallybeen normal. The armed forces havenot been politicized although the con-ditions for politization exist. Membersof the armed forces, for example, areelected to parliament while on activeduty although unassigned. The largeand influential Association of UkrainianOfficers, with its active, reserve, and re-tired members, has been involved inelectoral politics. There are also signs ofa wider destabilization in civil-militaryrelations because of the inadequate de-fense budget, pay problems, alienationin the officer corps, dissension amongthe top leadership, rumors of corrup-tion, and squandering of resources.

Civilian control over the militaryis not fully institutionalized. Tradi-tional control—through the presidentand parliament—needs to be extendedto the level of the defense establish-ment as it is in all democratic states.From 1991 until 1994, all the ministersof defense and their deputies were mili-tary officers in the Soviet mold. In Au-gust 1994 Kuchma named a civilian,Valeriy Shmarov, as minister of defense,making Ukraine the first CIS country totake that step. Shortly thereafter, twoother high-level defense posts—for themilitary-industrial complex and foreignrelations—also were occupied by civil-ians. But the responsibilities of boththe minister of defense and chief of thegeneral staff were not legally delin-eated, and the ministry became riddenwith internal civil-military conflict. Fi-nally in July 1996, as a result of contro-versy over proposed military reformsand the public outcry over alleged mis-management, corruption, and retreatfrom the “Ukrainization” of the armedforces, Shmarov was replaced by Gen-eral Kuzmuk. This was viewed in manyquarters both at home and abroad as aregressive step in democratization ofthe armed forces and the enhancementof civilian control of the military.

Since independence the armedforces have been held in relativelyhigh esteem by society at large, thoughthis feeling has not extended to youngmen of draft age. The recent increasein desertions and voluntary departuresby junior officers is mostly due to eco-nomic hardships and not the prestigeof the army. There are examples ofcivilian support of the economicallystruggling military: regional adminis-trations agreeing to build one shipeach for the nascent Ukrainian navy;private enterprises donating funds tobuild quarters, schools, and otheramenities; and cultural groups touringbases at their own expense to entertainthe troops.

Force StructureBy the end of 1996 the Ukrainian

armed forces consisted of the followingstrengths (declared strengths for 1992are shown in parentheses): personnel,395,000 (726,00), not including para-military formations such as national

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guard or various internal, border, rail-road, or construction troops; tanks,4,026 (6,300); air cushioned vehicles,5,050 (6,170); artillery, 3,727 (3,080);anti-tank weapons, 6,000; surface-to-airmissile sites, 934; aircraft, 1,090(1,380); combat helicopters, 240 (240);and ships, 73. It is the largest force inEurope after that of Russia. But it hasdeficiencies. Ukraine, like Russia, cloaksits defense budget in secrecy. Informa-tion is only made public when theministry or its supporters complainabout inadequate appropriations. Thebudget for 1996 was 1.9 percent ofGNP and estimates for 1997 were 1.3percent. This was a quarter of the ac-tual amount requested and left nothingfor modernization after military pay.

Speaking to senior officers in De-cember 1996, President Kuchmapainted a bleak picture of the currentmilitary posture. He addressed fourmajor areas—force structure and orga-nization, modernization, readiness,and sustainability—and judged each asunsatisfactory.

Force structure and organization. Inthe five years since the formation ofthe armed forces, planners have notsucceeded in developing tables of orga-nization for various levels of militaryunits and staffs to reflect new roles andmissions, a point on which the presi-dent was highly critical. Many units

are not properly manned under exist-ing tables, which impacts on readiness.Similarly, reformers have failed toagree upon a new force structure in theground army, which is still in part So-viet-vintage and does not meet na-tional defense requirements.

On a more positive note, emphasishas been placed on developing a quickreaction force with emphasis on mobil-ity and maneuverability. By abolishingthe operational armies, establishing thecorps as the primary command andcontrol maneuver organization, and in-creasing the number of independentbrigades, planners have favoredsmaller, lighter units that can form

force packages to meet specific opera-tional requirements. In contrast to So-viet force structure, Ukrainian plans donot include either cadre or partiallymanned units. By reducing the numberof tank divisions and converting ar-tillery divisions to artillery brigades andairborne units to air mobile forces,planners have stressed defensive in-stead of offensive combat or force pro-jection capability in ground forces. Theongoing albeit fiscally constrained con-version of motorized rifle divisions andbrigades into mechanized divisions andbrigades will afford them greater mobil-ity and maneuverability.

There is an adequate force recon-stitution capability. The Soviet mobi-lization structure with its commissari-ats is still basically intact. Ukraine hasa pool of a million men who haveserved in the military within the lastfive years, which would permit thegeneration of new forces.

Modernization. Ukraine inherited avast military-industrial complex—roughly one third of the Soviet total. Italso contains some 15 percent of for-mer Soviet defense industrial and mili-tary research and development facili-ties and ranks as the second-largestproducer of arms and military equip-ment after Russia among the successorstates. It can assemble all major cate-gories of military hardware, and some

facilities have uniquecapabilities such asshipbuilding andmissile production.Ukraine has sold

main battle tanks (T–72 and T–83) tothe Third World (for instance, 300T–83s to Pakistan in 1996) and is ac-tive in the foreign arms market (14th inthe volume of its arms trade).

On the down side, the breakup ofthe Soviet Union and economic reformcaused a hiatus in modernization as theindustrial base endured disruptions inresearch, development, production,and fielding systems. A major short-coming is that only a very small per-centage of military production was “aclosed cycle.” As a result of deliberatemanufacturing interdependence in theformer Soviet Union, Ukraine still de-pends on Russia for many componentsand subassemblies. Its military-indus-trial complex has been reduced from

700 enterprises during the Soviet pe-riod to 400 in 1996, and productionhas fallen to 10 percent of 1991 levels.Research, development, and evaluationis largely underfunded, especially inareas such as anti-tank weapons, air de-fense systems, support of airborne andair mobile operations, and C3I. Withimprovements in the national econ-omy and an increased budget, the de-fense sector has the potential for reme-dying these shortfalls. It has theproduction capability, material re-sources, and trained manpower. But asthe president indicated in his speech tothe military collegium, defense leadershave failed to develop a master plan toreform the military-industrial complexand its capacity to generate new tech-nology. As a result he ordered that sucha plan be completed by mid-1997.

Readiness. The Ukrainian militaryinherited sufficiently equipped andqualified personnel. It has excellenttraining facilities and more thanenough professional schools. Butforces have been downsizing and re-structuring under the deterioratingeconomy, which affects near-termreadiness. Primarily for budgetary rea-sons the army has had trouble holdingscheduled field training exercises tomaintain its combat proficiency andconduct operational testing of majorequipment. Although Ukraine is sec-ond to Russia in military fuel storagecapacity and has large strategic fuel re-serves, current operational fuel short-age has constrained normal training inthe ground army and air force, restrict-ing military vehicular and airplanetraffic to the bare minimum. Pilotshave not been able to log sufficienthours. The ground army and air forcehave weak logistical infrastructuresthat have not been fully reconfiguredto meet specific defense needs.

Kuchma revealed in a December1996 speech that as many as 191mechanized infantry and tank battal-ions were rated not ready, adding,“This is especially dangerous in theforward-based units securing the na-tion’s borders.” In the last two or threeyears the air force lost 2,500 air crewmembers via voluntary departures; in

O l y n y k


Ukraine inherited a vast military-industrialcomplex—one third of the Soviet total

1815Olynyk 8/5/97 1:21 PM Page 93

the bomber units only every third crewis rated ready; in the combat air unitsonly three are combat ready while 25are rated barely ready and 17 notready. Air defense forces have con-ducted their first exercise since 1991;and since independence the leaders ofthe armed forces have failed to estab-lish a single air defense system cover-ing Ukrainian air space.

Semi-annual call ups have beenbarely adequate, primarily due to de-ferments (for example, in autumn1993 two-thirds of all eligible men re-ceived some form of reprieve). In addi-tion, both no-shows and desertionshave been on the rise. The short post-commission obligation has resulted inmassive departure of junior officers,creating a serious shortfall in secondand first lieutenants. As Kuchma said,“In general, I judge the state of combatand mobilization capabilities of thearmy as unacceptably low.” He as-cribed this not only to the economybut lack of initiative, imagination, anddecisiveness as well as “dilettantism”on the part of high-level staff officers,commanders, and the top echelons ofthe ministry of defense (which he hasordered cut by 1,000 officers).

Nonetheless, Ukraine should beable to forge a ready force. Manytroops have had combat experience inAfghanistan, including some 3,000generals and other officers on activeduty. In the last four years, over 7,000have performed U.N. peacekeepingmissions worldwide, especially inBosnia and Africa, at times under com-bat conditions. Ukraine has con-tributed support helicopters and is thethird largest provider of strategic airtransport to such operations.

Ukraine joined the PFP programin February 1994. Since then it hastaken part in various exercises withcentral and eastern European andNATO forces. This year a special battal-ion-size unit was organized to providemission-oriented training for peace op-erations. Bilaterally, Ukraine andPoland have organized a combinedmechanized infantry battalion underrotational command. These activitiesare giving the military added albeit

limited experience in the field and atsea as well as an introduction to NATOmilitary organization and operations.

Sustainability. Given the weak-nesses indicated above, sustainability—the ability to deploy sufficient forcesand conduct sustained combat opera-tions—can be rated as fair to poor. Thiswill persist until adequate numbers ofoperational maneuver units and com-bat service support elements are reor-ganized, equipped, and trained. Boththe army and the air force must re-build their logistic infrastructures inorder to field and sustain forces for ahigh-intensity conflict. The currentforce could conduct short-term combatoperations but not a long war. Never-theless, Ukraine is a serious regionalmilitary power even in its present situ-ation. It can defend its western bordersand provide a credible near-term deter-rent on its eastern borders. This capa-bility will be improved by reforms andother components of military power—force structure, readiness, and modern-ization—as they achieve normal levels.

The U.S. ConnectionDefense and military contacts be-

tween the United States and Ukrainehave been substantial since a memo ofunderstanding and cooperation wassigned by Washington and Kiev in July1993. These contacts have included vis-its by the senior leadership and highlevel staff exchanges; service and com-batant command visits and staff ex-changes; major combined exercisessuch as Sea Breeze ’96, Peace Shield ’95and ’96, and Cooperative Nugget ’97which is currently underway; unit levelvisits and exchanges; port calls andship visits; student exchanges; and vari-ous relationships involving members ofthe national guard, civil defense, andborder guard units from Ukraine andthe Army National Guard from theUnited States.

One new initiative is planning foran NCO development and educationprogram to upgrade the UkrainianNCO corps. Senior officers have at-tended courses at the George C. Mar-shall European Center for SecurityStudies in Germany since it opened itsdoors in 1994. A seminar program isbeing developed by the John F.Kennedy School of Government at

Harvard for defense officials and seniorofficers. Finally, Ukraine has been ac-tive in PFP with U.S. assistance.

The armed forces which Ukraineinherited from the former SovietUnion have provided the nation withmilitary leaders, manpower, andmatériel to qualify as a major regionalactor. Unless the national economyimproves very soon, however, thisforce will lack the foundation to re-form, maintain readiness, and modern-ize. In fact, as weapons and militaryequipment age modernization will be aburden on the frail national economyand will stifle recovery.

The Ukrainian military constitutesan important arm of the state structureand has played a major role in nation-building. The armed forces ensure na-tional defense in a region sufferingfrom a security vacuum since the col-lapse of Soviet power and provide thegovernment and society with a largepool of educated and trained profes-sionals. As in most new states, the mil-itary is a symbol of national pride, pro-fessing strong patriotism and settingan example of unselfish support to thecommon good. It serves as a school foracculturation and socialization by pro-viding its soldiers, sailors, and airmenwith a shared national and social mi-lieu. In a weakly-defined nation, thearmed forces are a positive integratinginfluence. At the same time, unlikesome former Soviet republics, espe-cially Russia, they have not been sig-nificantly politicized and in manyways are a stabilizing factor. In accept-ing a civilian minister of defense, themilitary consented to another level ofcontrol and paved the way for furtherdemocratization. In general, Ukrainehas enjoyed normal and sound civil-military relations with good prospectsfor the future unless its security is ei-ther destabilized or its economy fails toimprove. JFQ

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Downsizing and restructuringare part of a NATO-widetrend. In France, all compo-nents of the armed forces are

affected, including the nuclear force defrappe. Three factors are shaping Euro-pean militaries: the demise of the Soviet Union; budgetary constraints,especially in the realm of Euro-integra-tion versus security (to meet Maas-tricht “convergence criteria”); and newmissions which are replacing the old.

The issue is: will revamped, profes-sional, quick-reaction forces be up tonew missions or will budget cuts resultin a hollow military organization? Suc-cess will depend on relaunching strongeconomic growth and the govern-ment’s determination to withstandcurrent tensions until a single Euro-pean currency is introduced and lessconstrained budgets return.


Ronald Tiersky is Eastman professor of politics at Amherst College.

French Military Reform and

NATO RestructuringBy R O N A L D T I E R S K Y

F/A–18 and Mirage2000s being refueled,Southern Watch.

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Economics and DefenseWhen Jacques Chirac succeeded

socialist François Mitterrand in May1995 questions were raised over thebalance of continuity and change inFrench foreign and defense policy aswell as over European integration. Sim-ilarities and differences between neo-Gaullist and socialist policies some-times do not conform to stereotypes.On the one hand, European integration

and security policies under Mitterrandwere quite realistic from the beginning,leading to unexpected continuity. Onthe other, since Gaullism has alwaysbeen more a disposition than a policy,the neo-Gaullist policy of Chirac, likede Gaulle’s own stance, is a remarkablyflexible pragmatism based on a fewprinciples, above all the pursuit of na-tional interests.

These aspects of integration areconnected with Chirac’s military reformand turn toward the NATO commandin European security policy. His down-sizing and restructuring of the armedforces and return to an integrated com-mand—long recommended by militaryleaders (who realized how much tech-nology and training the French militarywere missing)—was provoked by theneed to finance Maastricht commit-ments. It was also a reaction to inade-quate military performance in the GulfWar and in Bosnia, where French tech-nology, weapons, interoperability, andthe constraints of a conscript army allcaused difficulties. Chirac has launcheda wholesale recasting of security, de-fense, and military policies that Mitter-rand had only begun. Examples of Mit-terrand’s intentions were Europeanagreements to build advanced satelliteintelligence capabilities and a largetransport aircraft—both designed to re-duce the Continent’s dependence onAmerican products.

Only weeks after taking officeChirac, determined to revive Frenchdefense efforts, broke with Mitterrand’smoratorium on nuclear testing. A se-ries of six underground tests metworldwide protests against French “ar-rogance.” This included much-resented

criticism from most members of theEuropean Union (EU), though publiclyBritain and Germany kept silent. Thetests, conducted in the isolation ofFrench Polynesia, had been conceivedfrom the start—yet badly explained—as the last. The objective was to perfectsoftware for simulations as was doneby the United States which would helpensure the long-term reliability of theforce de frappe without future testing.

These tests were completed intime for Chirac’s state visit to Wash-ington in January 1996, which allowedhim to tell a joint session of Congressthat his nation was ready—togetherwith the United States—to lead thediplomatic campaign for a comprehen-sive test ban treaty. France, given cer-tain guarantees by the United States,also accepted a provision prohibitingeven very low-yield testing under theso-called “zero-yield option.” TheFrench also worked to get the Russiansand Chinese to accept this provision.

In the U.N. General Assembly, 158countries voted in favor of a resolutionon the test ban treaty while threevoted against (India, Libya, andBhutan) and five abstained (includingSyria, Lebanon, and Cuba). Chirac an-nounced that France would join theother declared nuclear powers (four inall) by signing the treaty on September24, the earliest possible date.

DownsizingDuring his last few years, Mitter-

rand’s attention to military reform hadbeen piecemeal and the cohabitationgovernment led by Eduoard Balladur(1993–95), despite issuing a whitepaper, did not make widespread re-form an immediate issue. Militaryadaptation to post-Cold War condi-tions lagged behind Britain and Ger-many. By contrast, the reforms an-nounced in February 1996 were ageneral plan that affects all servicesand every type of weapons system.The size, capabilities, and budget ofthe military, including the force defrappe, are being significantly stream-lined (figure 1). Though the govern-ment is taking the same actions asmost EU and NATO members (includ-ing the United States), France’s exces-sive unemployment rate (over 12 per-cent) and slow increase in GDP

■ J F Q F O R U M


Figure 1. Defense Expenditures, 1990–1997 (in constant 1997 francs)

downsizing and return tothe integrated commandwas provoked by the Maastricht commitments

(minus pensions)

Billions

1990

120

100

80

60

40

20

01991

Army: 7 percent reduction to 19.5 billion francs

Air Force: 3.7 percent reduction to 21.6 billion francs

Navy: 0.8 percent reduction to 22.3 billion francs

Procurement and Infrastructure Payroll and Operations

1992 1993 1994

Service Procurement Cuts

1995 1996 1997

1915Tiersky 8/11/97 8:54 AM Page 96

(around 2 percent) for over a decadehave exhausted popular patience, withthe result that strikes and demonstra-tions against downsizing have con-tributed to the general debate on theeconomy.

Reform was not an easy politicaldecision. Downsizing represented evenmore job losses for an economy inwhich successive levels of unaccept-able unemployment (2 million, 2.5,then 3) have been reached. Further-more, because the military is based do-mestically near towns that have be-come economically dependent onthem, especially in France’s “rust belt”of the north and east, more localities

will be distressed by installation clo-sures than in other countries.

The French and other Europeansincreasingly see Maastricht as thecause of unemployment and austerity.The single currency project (the Euroscheduled to appear in 1999) is threat-ened by growing popular resistance.Moreover, weak economic growth andsmaller tax receipts mean that military

reductions, especially joint projects,have had to go further than in prosper-ous economies. For France, Germany,and other European members of NATOthis vicious cycle must be broken. Theproblem is relaunching strong growthwhile sticking to Maastricht.

Chirac’s plan of February 1996 fordownsizing and modernization, com-bined with similar British and German

T i e r s k y


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efforts, outlines the European militaryof the future. His model is the Britishmilitary, which he has publiclypraised. The gap between British andFrench performance during DesertStorm was not lost on the new Frenchpresident, not to say the high com-mand. The reform plan calls for mov-ing from a Cold War, central front, de-fensive force to a rapid-reactionmilitary that can be combined withthe British and a German quick reac-tion conventional force that is also inthe works. This fundamental reconfig-uration plus the declaration thatFrance is prepared to discuss all mat-ters within NATO, even nuclear deter-rence, indicates that in principleChirac is serious about returning to anintegrated command. Some organiza-tional reforms proposed by France,however, such as European commandof Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), are problematic. As a re-sult, despite Chirac’s NATO-friendlygoal, serious disagreements appear tobe locked in negotiation.

The Chirac reform shrinks themilitary from about 500,000 to350,000, or—excluding the gen-darmerie—from 400,000 (about halfbeing 10-month conscripts) to250,000. This constitutes a manpowercut of one-third and budget cut of one-fifth, though some analysts think thenew army will be more expensive. Thissmaller force is to be built around fourelite units with a capacity for rapid de-ployment to face ad hoc crisis situa-tions which planners see as the mostlikely missions.

Chirac is also abandoning thelongstanding Gaullist goal of main-taining self-sufficiency in all categoriesof weapons, especially in those areaswhere French manufacture has beenparticularly weak or nonexistent: satel-lite intelligence; command, control,and communications equipment; andstrategic lift. There are also projectssuch as satellite intelligence (Helios)that the French want to share onlywith Europeans, thereby creating a ca-pability independent of U.S. assets.

This in turn drives restructuring ofthe defense industrial base, with severalstate-sponsored mergers of nationalizedand private-sector companies. However,

■ J F Q F O R U M


Key Elements of the

AFSOUTH Debate

Progress on NATO internal adap-tation has slowed. After extremelypromising efforts to strengthen theNATO military structure, progress hasbeen slowed by demands to convertAFSOUTH at Naples from a U.S.-led toa European-led command.

Theater commands are key. Therole of NATO regional commanders hasbeen enhanced significantly since theend of the Cold War. As NATO broad-ens its focus, adding crisis manage-ment operations to its core mission ofcollective defense, it is the theatercommander who has been called uponto deal with conflict at the regionallevel. The United States has but onemajor subordinate commander in Europe, at AFSOUTH. Therefore theproposal to make AFSOUTH a Euro-pean-led command would weaken theAlliance by weakening the U.S. leader-ship role in regional affairs at a timewhen that command is becoming in-creasingly important.

Negotiations have been difficult.The AFSOUTH issue has become diffi-cult to manage for at least three reasons. As a result, a high level effortmay be required to break the dead-lock. The reasons are:

■ The United States believes thechanges it accepted in strengthening therole of the Deputy SACEUR (who is a Euro-pean), adding other Europeans in commandpositions, and empowering the Western European Union (WEU) were importantenough by themselves to warrant Frenchreintegration into the unified command.

■ Some Europeans interpreted articles5, 7, and 8 of the June 1996 Berlin commu-nique, which call on the parties to identifyheadquarters to support the European security and defense identity (ESDI), as a de facto pledge to transform AFSOUTH intoa European command. The United Statesconsiders that interpretation a misreadingof those articles.

■ The issue was elevated in the au-tumn of 1996 by an exchange of correspon-dence between Presidents Clinton and

Chirac, with Chirac calling for two regionalNATO commands that would be “entrustedto Europeans” and Clinton responding thatthe United States should retain commandof AFSOUTH. The exchange of Presidentialcorrespondence has made subsequentlower level negotiations very difficult.

Progress in adaptation. Settingaside the AFSOUTH issue, there hasbeen significant progress in the areaof NATO adaptation—that is, strength-ening of ESDI in NATO. For example:

■ Three-fourths of the most seniorNATO general officer positions in Europeare now held by Europeans.

■ NATO-designated positions at allNATO headquarters in Europe were re-duced from 18,354 in 1990 to 12,919 in1996. This has resulted in a correspondingbudget reduction from U.S. $621.6M (1990)to U.S. $482M (1996).

■ WEU has been empowered to leadcombined joint task forces in cases whenthe North Atlantic Council so decides.

■ The European Deputy SACEURcould command such WEU-led operations.

■ Mechanisms have been establishedto strengthen political control over militaryoperations, something long sought by theFrench.

U.S. military strength remains crucial. The military assets and capabil-ities that the United States makesavailable to AFSOUTH warrant a U.S.-led command:

■ The Sixth Fleet—which includes acarrier battle group, an amphibious readygroup, and several submarines, all backedby U.S. Atlantic Fleet—is the single most important asset of AFSOUTH. The seamlessconnections created by dual hatting theU.S. commander of Naval Forces Europeand CINCSOUTH can be critical in time of crisis.

■ U.S. air assets in Italy and Turkeyhave been critical to operations such asDeny Flight, during which in a typical weekthe United States flew 43 percent of the air missions.

■ The importance of U.S. leadershipand expertise in managing modern C4I systems was demonstrated in the Bosnia operation.

■ The growing need for advanced sys-tems to counter ballistic missile prolifera-tion targeted primarily at the AFSOUTH re-gion will require continued Americanleadership and capabilities.

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T i e r s k y


Given its strategic importance, AFSOUTH will remain a strong symbolof trans-Atlantic resolve. U.S. leader-ship will be essential at least untilthere is evidence that European lead-ership would be backed by Europeancapabilities and resources commensu-rate with the importance of the re-gion. With the recent and projectedtrends in European defense invest-ments, it cannot be foreseen when ad-equate capabilities and commitment of resources would become a reality.

U.S. leadership is indispensable.A review of the recent history in theBalkans, Aegean, Persian Gulf, andMiddle East indicates the indispensablenature of U.S. diplomacy and militaryengagement in key regions surround-ing the AFSOUTH area of operation. In the case of Bosnia, for example, European powers in NATO were un-willing to undertake the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) without sig-nificant U.S. participation. In DesertStorm AFSOUTH played a critical sup-porting role which was enhanced bythe U.S. command.

The region is vital and volatile.An assessment of future prospects forthese same areas suggests that theyare both highly unstable and vital toboth U.S. and European interests. In command of AFSOUTH, the UnitedStates is positioned to strengthen its

diplomacy with military capability, anda U.S. commander at AFSOUTH will be one demonstration of that militarycapability. It will be in the interest ofNATO for the United States to havethis combination of diplomatic andmilitary clout. The U.S. command atAFSOUTH enhances the ability ofNATO to stabilize crises in the Mediter-ranean basin.

Because of the volatility of the re-gion and the historical importance ofAFSOUTH, there is a strong conver-gence of interests in maintaining aneffective U.S.-led command. By its na-ture, the NATO command structure isintended to respond to risks thatthreaten the shared interests of allNATO members.

U.S. public is concerned. There re-mains considerable support for NATOamong the U.S. public, the Congressand the academic community. There isalso support for a U.S. leadership roleand for increased burden-sharing.Given the increasingly operational na-ture of AFSOUTH, and the military andpolitical requirement to have Americanforces engaged as a key part of futureoperations, loss of the commandwould probably be seen by the U.S.public as loss of U.S. leadership. As aresult, U.S. public support for opera-tions in this critical region would

decline, along with support for NATOin general.

Simple command arrangementsare best. The U.N. operation in Bosniareinforces the lesson that complexcommand arrangements can con-tribute to failed operations. The thrustof NATO’s command structure reviewhas been to simplify lines of command.The solution to the AFSOUTH politicalproblem should not result in complexcommand arrangements that could failin time of crisis.

Summation of arguments. The ar-guments for retaining a U.S. comman-der at AFSOUTH are:

■ AFSOUTH has emerged as a very im-portant region in NATO and must remain astrong symbol of trans-Atlantic resolve andcapabilities.

■ By its nature the NATO commandstructure is intended to respond to risksthat threaten the shared interests of allNATO members.

■ This is the only U.S.-led regionalcommand in Europe and losing it willweaken U.S. operational and political sup-port for NATO.

■ Significant measures have alreadybeen taken to enhance ESDI within NATO.

■ Removing the command link between AFSOUTH and Sixth Fleet will in-crease reaction time in crises.

■ IFOR/SFOR demonstrates the contin-ued need for U.S. leadership in the area.

■ Successful U.S. diplomacy in thisvital region has been strengthened by theU.S. command at AFSOUTH.

■ U.S. command at AFSOUTH can helpstabilize tensions throughout the Mediter-ranean.

■ NATO responses to new ballistic missile proliferation threats against the AFSOUTH area will benefit from a U.S. command.

■ U.S. command facilitates participa-tion by partner countries, including Russia.

■ U.S. command maximizes the effec-tiveness of modern C4I assets.

■ Complicated command arrange-ments, such as a bifurcated regional andfunctional command at AFSOUTH, can harmNATO responsiveness in crisis. JFQ

—From Allied Command Structures in the New NATO (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 1997)

AMX–30 tanks outsideAl-Salman duringDesert Storm.

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government repositionings, some bud-get driven, have created serious Franco-German friction in joint projects.French arms exports will likely suffer,adding to unemployment and balanceof trade difficulties.

Military reform stretches from sol-diers to the nuclear deterrent. Profes-sionalization meant, first of all, aban-doning conscription. This decision didnot raise as much controversy as onemight expect, especially given histori-

cal, social, and ideological commit-ments to conscription as patriotic, re-publican, and egalitarian on the partof the right and the left. Opinion polls,however, found that almost 70 percentfavored ending conscription—anothercase of waning ideological attachmentin a “normalized” France. An all-vol-unteer army is planned by 2002.

Changing Adversaries andStructures

Conventional military strategy isbeing reoriented from defense of thecentral front within a divided Europeto general security problems, includingterrorism. For example, the much-de-rided Eurocorps, theoretically opera-tional since 1995 as a force whose pur-pose is strategic defense, may after aninauspicious beginning become thecore of an after-implementation force

body. The Chirac plan is not a mereshrinkage of numbers and budgets butpart and parcel of a cooperative alliedrestructuring of major EU military ca-pabilities in which national force lev-els, capabilities, and strategies are intheory being harmonized—and mademore Europeanized.

The less lustrous causes of down-sizing are also clear: France, like otherEuropean powers, simply cannotmount full-blown military operations;and in the Gulf War it learned somedifficult lessons. France had trouble de-ploying 12,000 troops during DesertShield/Desert Storm, whereas Britaindeployed double that number quicklydespite having an overall smaller army.The French were also a less effectiveforce (for example, they were unable tofly fighter-bomber raids at night forlack of radar). French units wereobliged to rely on American logisticsand intelligence.

By 2002 a French force of some50–60,000 troops is scheduled to bedeployable—quickly and at great dis-tances. No longer will typical opera-tions consist of a few hundred soldiersjerry-dispatched to former FrenchAfrica to put down a coup or replace afailing president. Germany, as alreadynoted, is also developing a crisis reac-tion force of 55,000 to be in place by1999. With the British and other EUforces, a European rapid reaction forceof 250,000 is foreseeable.

■ J F Q F O R U M


by 2002 a French force of50–60,000 troops is scheduled to be deployable—quickly and at great distances

Figure 2. Military and Civilian Personnel: 1995 and 2015 (projected)

1995 2015

Army military . . . . . . . . . . . . 239,100 military . . . . . . . . . . . . 136,000civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,400 civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,000

271,500 170,000

9 divisions, 129 regiments 85 regiments in 4 forces927 heavy tanks 420 heavy tanks350 light tanks 350 light tanks340 helicopters 180 helicopters

Navy military . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,800 military . . . . . . . . . . . . 45,500civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,600 civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,000

70,400 56,500

101 vessels (-SNLE) with 2 aircraft 81 vessels (-SNLE) with1 or 2 carriers and air group aircraft carriers and air group

6 nuclear-fueled and 7 diesel-powered (+3 Hawkeyes)submarines, 15 first-rate frigates 6 nuclear-fueled submarines,

displacement: 314,000 tons 12 first-rate frigates33 sea patrol aircraft displacement: 234,000 tons

22 sea patrol aircraft

Air Force military . . . . . . . . . . . . 89,200 military . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,000civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,900 civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,000

94,100 70,000

405 combat aircraft 300 modern Rafale aircraft86 transports 52 modern transports11 C–135 tankers 16 tankers101 helicopters 84 helicopters

Gendarmerie military . . . . . . . . . . . . 92,230 military . . . . . . . . . . . . 95,600(paramilitary) civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,220 civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,300

93,450 97,900

with over 300 armored cars and APCs,plus patrol boats, helicopters, etc.

Common military . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,130 military . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,600Services civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 29,780 civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,000

47,910 39,600

Totals military . . . . . . . . . . . . 502,460 military . . . . . . . . . . . . 352,700civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 74,900 civilian . . . . . . . . . . . . 81,300

577,360 434,000

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Even the once sacrosanct force defrappe has not been spared. The 18land-based Albion Plateau (Provence)missiles stood down last summer. Oneleg of the nuclear triad, albeit the leastuseful, was dropped along with a doc-trine that France would not renounceany weapon possessed by other states.Both air-launched missiles and, impor-tantly, nuclear submarines remain—afleet of four submarines will be opera-tional early in the next century. Chiracalso decided to dismantle the short-range Hadès missiles as a gesture toGerman sensibilities.

Playing the NATO CardThe Franco-American dispute over

AFSOUTH—the NATO command withheadquarters in Naples—has led to arancorous diplomatic exchange. Thisdispute is much larger than the issue ofthe nationality of one commander.The fact is that long-term issues are atstake. AFSOUTH is not an isolated casein creating a new NATO. In itself, thereis no reason why it should be a stick-ing point in NATO reform, or whetherFrance finally returns to the integratedcommand structure.

Seen in proper context, AFSOUTHis just the latest episode in a broaderattempt—French though also Euro-pean—to develop a “more visible” Eu-ropean security and defense identity(ESDI) within the Alliance. Thus thisdebate resulted from the larger June1996 NATO Council European agree-ment with Washington to build ESDIinside NATO rather than the earlier Eu-ropean plan for a free standing West-ern European Union (WEU) force thatwould be a military arm of the Euro-pean Union (EU)—WEU working withNATO but outside it.

The French have tried, with frus-tration, to make the case in politico-military negotiations with the UnitedStates for greater European leadershipbalance inside a NATO structure whichwill include ESDI. But this new balanceis also a French code word for limitingAmerican participation in the inte-grated command and especially whatthey see as “American unilateralism” inthe way NATO functions. The Frenchcampaign over AFSOUTH has been

largely a struggle inside NATO for theEuropeanization of security and de-fense matters in Europe after the aban-donment of plans for a free-standingWEU–ESDI because events in Bosniaprove, even to the French, that therewas a continued need for Americanleadership in European security affairs.

But the French stand on AFSOUTHhas received only half-hearted supportfrom its main politico-military part-ners, Britain and Germany. This is be-cause, while London and Bonn also canfind Washington overbearing, they be-lieve that American leadership is moreimportant than playing dare-devildiplomacy to counterbalance Washing-ton’s influence in NATO. Bosnia provedthat the United States is, in PresidentClinton’s words, the “indispensable na-tion” for European security.

The French demand on AFSOUTHarose from three security policy eventsduring Chirac’s first twelve months inoffice. The first was his unexpectedsuccess—applauded all around—inprodding Clinton to lead the two daysof air strikes needed to bring an end tofighting in Bosnia, thus intimidatingthe Bosnian Serbs into a truce and aneventual peace agreement. The secondwas the announcement of a plan forwholesale military reform. Paris waslagging behind other nations in over-hauling its forces and Chirac’s bold de-sign aimed at organizing a rapid-reac-tion, downsized, leaner-but-meanermilitary within five years. The thirdwas a seemingly un-Gaullist decisionto bring France back into the inte-grated command structure that Chiracannounced in the wake of the Daytonaccords during a February 1996 speechto a joint session of Congress that re-ferred to the “necessary” leadershiprole played by the United States.“NATO,” he proclaimed on CapitolHill, “simply doesn’t work withoutAmerican leadership.”

Integrated CommandChirac accepted that Europe’s in-

adequacy in political coordination, de-termination, logistics, intelligence, andcommunications meant that any Euro-pean defense identity must be createdinside NATO. The French then had toinsure that a European dimension ofNATO—ESDI—would be as genuine

and visible as possible. Franco-Ameri-can antagonism was thus inevitable inthat Chirac was determined to advanceESDI in NATO just as he had con-vinced Washington to take the lead inBosnia. Many changes occurred beforethe clash over the French proposal toturn AFSOUTH into a rotating Euro-pean command. This was in fact thelast serious issue and most observersassumed that France would compro-mise prior to the NATO summit insummer 1997.

AFSOUTH became a test of wills.Washington thought the French pro-posal unacceptable: too much toosoon. In Paris U.S. unwillingness to ne-gotiate—President Clinton’s flat no—was seen as a lack of reciprocity for theAtlanticist policy and attitude changesthat Chirac had initiated. In June thenew cohabitation government formedwith Lionel Jospin’s Socialists—whohave never been accused of being pro-NATO—contributed to speculationthat a deal on reorienting the inte-grated command structure would notbe immanent. Ultimately, Paris willwant to see European leadership posi-tions in NATO regardless of the AF-SOUTH debate. And France wants toachieve this shift in equilibrium andbe seen by the United States and espe-cially by Europe as having achieved it.

Thus the ambivalent support ofhis tactics and plans by Europeansworries Chirac. Britain and Germany,like other nations, clearly recognizeFrance’s military and economic weak-nesses as well as perceive the domesticpolitical fragility of Chirac’s presidencyand parliamentary coalition. Theymust doubt whether France could ac-tually deliver on its grasp for greaterleadership, whether vis-à-vis Americaor inside the European Council. ForEurope as well as the United States, theChirac gambit on AFSOUTH may in-deed be over-reaching and asking fortoo much too soon.

As for Franco-American diplo-macy, misunderstandings over whatFrance wants as well as the precipitousescalation of the issue by Chirac to thepresidential level in an exchange ofletters that became public created a cri-sis atmosphere. For example, contrary

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to first impressions made last August,Paris never asked for the AFSOUTHcommand for themselves alone. Theyproposed a rotating European com-mand. The French say, furthermore,that they never envisaged Europeancontrol of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, but thattheir proposals always assumed mecha-nisms to hive off the fleet in such away that it would remain under U.S.command. And France also conceded

that American doubts about Europeancommand experience, competence,and credibility were relevant and de-manded answers. The Europeans, theyassert, could get up to speed in two orthree years. Therefore they asked foragreement in principle with imple-mentation over time and thought thatthis was a quite reasonable request.

U.S. policy, for its part, has threeprinciples: military optimization musttake precedence over any politically-motivated award of extra positions,which is an honored NATO tradition;there must be an unbroken U.S. chainof command over the Sixth Fleet sta-tioned in the Mediterranean and themost important asset in AFSOUTH;and there must be no politico-militaryconstraints on American action inextra-NATO security responsibilities,missions that only the United Statescan take on, in the Middle East andthe Persian Gulf.

NATO LeadershipAmerican officials willingly accept

the idea of a new NATO leadership con-figuration which comports with a morevisible ESDI. In fact, although often ig-nored by the focus on AFSOUTH, Euro-peanization has already occurred asdemonstrated by the appointment of apowerful European deputy commanderat Supreme Headquarters Allied PowersEurope (SHAPE). But AFSOUTH hastaken on greater importance since theCold War. Some specialists agree that in

an operational sense this command isprobably more significant than SHAPEbecause the Mediterranean and adja-cent areas have become a region of po-tentially more serious security problemsthan central Europe.

Thus a more visible ESDI insideNATO is not only institutionally possi-ble and politically desirable, it has toan extent already happened. The prob-lem is the “extra” French proposal

about AFSOUTH which cameafter the initial negotiationswere concluded. Washingtonfelt wronged by this added de-mand while Paris argued thatsuccessful conclusion of theinitial talks did not preclude

further proposals. America criticizedFrance by stressing that command re-sponsibilities ought to reflect nationalcapacities and genuine contributionsto NATO. This throws French commit-ments into doubt and indirectly assertsthat only the United States can carryout the AFSOUTH mission. Americanspoint out that the French, althoughthey started to rejoin integrated com-mand institutions over the last year,have not yet shown their commitmentby formally earmarking forces forNATO. The United States, in otherwords, was wary of stated intentionsthat may or may not be fulfilled.

French proposals for NATO re-structuring might seem set in a sort oftraditional geopolitical thinking thatde Gaulle summed up with the apho-rism: “A nation has neither permanentenemies nor friends, only permanentinterests.” Whether that was true inthe 1960s, it may be less pertinenttoday in a world where major conflictsseem unlikely and economic competi-tion has replaced force as the primaryinstrument of achieving nationalpower. As for the absence of a Gaullistpedigree, even Chirac does not mindbeing seen as an Americanophile. Nev-ertheless, the defense of French na-tional interests and European integra-tion may yet require taking on one’sfriends.

France tends to stereotype U.S.foreign policy as sometimes neo-Wilsonian and other times RealpolitikWashington-style. However European-derived American realism is paradoxi-cally less in favor among our allies

than American idealism because the“objective factors” approach—powerand the capacity to use it for policyends—nearly always results in U.S.dominance. “Gaullism for everybody”is an intrinsically dangerous maxim forweaker powers.

The history of this century favorsAmerican reluctance in the face of en-thusiastic European demands to bemore visible and in control of securityon the Continent. Through two worldwars, the Cold War, the Gulf War, andBosnia, Europe has needed U.S. mili-tary power and guarantees. Not sur-prisingly French negotiators in the AF-SOUTH dispute want to talk less aboutthe past than the future. Seen fromthat perspective, Franco-American fric-tion over this command can be, if notresolved, at least understood. SomeFrench officials have admitted thattheir AFSOUTH proposal was too muchtoo soon. But for Paris it is not un-thinkable, let alone wrong, to adopt aconflictual attitude even with a mostimportant ally, to re-open negotiationsfor a good purpose. The problem isthat Chirac perceived restructuring,particularly of AFSOUTH, against thebackdrop of Bosnia. He forced his luckand lost, at least for now. He eithermiscalculated or just chose badly, per-haps because he was poorly informedby his advisors on the U.S. commit-ment in this matter. JFQ

■ J F Q F O R U M


a more visible ESDI inside NATO isnot only possible and desirable, ithas to an extent already happened

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Sub-Saharan Africa is a regionmarked by both great promiseand great peril. While somecountries on the continent

have begun to embrace democracy,move toward a market economy, andresolve long-standing conflicts, otherssuffer from ethnic tension, corruption,economic collapse, and waves ofrefugees. Both these prospects and dif-ficulties pose challenges for the United

States. The task of containing or pre-venting conflict while supporting suc-cesses requires a skillful balance ofdiplomacy, military resources, and hu-manitarian assistance.

The Armed Forces are uniquelypositioned to play an important role inU.S. engagement in Sub-SaharanAfrica. Since the end of the Cold War,we have deployed forces to Africa toevacuate Americans, provide humani-tarian assistance, and assist the UnitedNations and other organizations inmultinational peace operations. In ad-dition to efforts on the ground, theU.S. military can help African statesand regional organizations develop thepolitical maturity, military profession-alism, and economic growth necessaryto solve their own problems and attainlong-term stability.


Nancy J. Walker is director and Larry Hanauer serves as policyanalyst in the Africa Region Office within the Office of theSecretary of Defense.

EUCOMand Sub-Saharan AfricaBy N A N C Y J. W A L K E R and L A R R Y H A N A U E R

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As U.S. Government agenciesmake tough decisions on mission pri-orities, the Department of Defense(DOD) has become, in the eyes ofmany in both Africa and America, theagency with the deepest pockets andhighest-profile activities on the conti-nent. In this age of declining budgetsand scarce resources, however, it is im-portant that DOD assets intended forAfrica be strategically and carefully al-located to further U.S. priorities.

The proactive role performed byU.S. European Command (EUCOM)—which has an area of responsibility(AOR) that includes 37 of the 48 coun-tries in Sub-Saharan Africa—is centralto U.S. strategy in the region. Its over-all commitment to robust and forward-looking engagement on the continentand willingness to dedicate resourcesto it helps shape U.S. policy there.

Unique ChallengesWhile the United States has lim-

ited strategic interests in Africa, eventsthere might require significant Ameri-can involvement and resources. Prob-lems in this region are political, eco-nomic, social, and military in nature

and stem from both external sourcesand internal instability. Future prob-lems could come from failed statesand the fragility of apparent successesin nation-building. Specific difficultiesinclude:

■ the collapse of Zaire, Angola, Nige-ria, Sudan, and other countries which couldset off civil wars, halt the flow of oil, createwaves of refugees, and threaten residentAmerican citizens

■ ongoing politico-military conflictsand resulting humanitarian crises in theformer Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola,Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic,Sudan, and Uganda

■ unprofessional, overstrength, andunderpaid militaries with the potential forpromoting coups d’état, human rightsabuses, and political instability

■ the increasing influence of Libya,Iran, and other pariah states, particularly in

countries such as The Gambia where ac-tions deemed unacceptable by the interna-tional community (like rigging elections)have resulted in the receipt of few resourcesfrom abroad

■ ethnic tension, weak economies,narcotics smuggling, unequal income distri-bution, poor infrastructures, dysfunctionalgovernments, and various other factorswhich have negative impacts on the stabil-ity of governments and the health andprosperity of indigenous societies

■ the opposite situation in countriessuch as Senegal and Botswana where the mil-itaries are professional and contribute to po-litical development and long-term stability

■ the emergence of democratic insti-tutions in Mali, Zambia, and Benin as wellas the corruption of “free” elections in TheGambia, Niger, and Nigeria

■ support for and proactive partner-ship with the defense establishment inpost-apartheid South Africa, which plays an

extremely important role in stabilizing thesituation across Sub-Saharan Africa.

A range of political, economic, andmilitary assets are required to addressthese challenges and achieve primaryU.S. objectives. The United States SecurityStrategy for Sub-Saharan Africa issued bythe Secretary of Defense in 1995 out-lines three policy goals that invite sub-stantial and direct involvement: pro-moting peace by preventing, managing,or resolving conflicts; providing hu-manitarian assistance to alleviate suffer-ing and hunger; and fostering democ-racy and respect for human rights.

The objectives of the EUCOM the-ater strategy, as found in the Strategy ofEngagement and Preparedness, include

■ J F Q F O R U M


EUCOM Area of Responsibility in Sub-Saharan Africa

Niger

Mauritania

Mali

Nigeria

Namibia

Chad

South Africa

Tanzania

DemocraticRepublic of Congo

Angola

Mozambique

Botswana

Zambia

Gabon

Cabinda

Central African Republic

Uganda

Swaziland

Lesotho

Malawi

Burundi

Rwanda

TogoBenin

GhanaIvory Coast

Liberia

Sierra Leone

GuineaBurkina

The Gambia

Cameroon

Zimbabwe

CongoEquatorial

Guinea

Senegal

Guinea Bissau

S o u t h A t l a n t i c O c e a n

I n d i a n O c e a n

17ϒE

ACOM

PACOM

CENTCOM

EUCOM

E Q U A T O R

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assisting democratization, respondingto humanitarian crises, and playing arole in pursuing vital U.S. interests, es-pecially protecting American citizens.

Many assets for attaining these ob-jectives come from the arsenals of thefour geographical commands with as-signed responsibilities for Sub-SaharanAfrica—EUCOM in the vast majority ofthe region, U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM) in the Horn of Africa, U.S.Pacific Command (PACOM) in Mada-gascar and island states along the coastof the Indian Ocean, and U.S. AtlanticCommand (ACOM) in the nations ofCape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe(see map).

EUCOM ActivitiesBecause EUCOM has focused its

resources and attention on addressingU.S. interests in Europe both during theCold War and in the post-Cold War pe-riod of NATO expansion as well aspeace operations in Bosnia, Africa hasnot been a major priority. Under the

commander in chief, U.S. EuropeanCommand (CINCEUR), General GeorgeJoulwan, the command has dramati-cally increased its activities there. Gen-eral James Jamerson, the deputy com-mander in chief, has spent more timeon the ground in Africa than his imme-diate predecessors, building relation-ships with and improving access to

civilian defense officials and senior mil-itary officers. His visits to Angola andactive role in the peace process, for ex-ample, helped further rapprochementin that country’s long-standing civilwar. The contacts he cultivated duringa trip to Uganda in 1996 facilitated theswift approval by that country of theU.S. request to utilize Entebbe airportduring Operation Guardian Assistance,a multinational humanitarian relief

W a l k e r a n d H a n a u e r


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mission mounted in eastern Zaire dur-ing November 1996. These efforts havebeen assisted by the EUCOM politicaladviser, Ambassador Joe Wilson, a for-eign service officer who has spentmuch of his career in Africa.

EUCOM activities from joint exer-cises to chaplain exchanges are crucialto U.S. objectives in Africa. The com-mand’s strategic vision states that“port visits, combined exercises, andvisits by general officers play an impor-tant role in maintaining our relation-ships and influence. Security assistancein all its forms is often the prime formof our interaction with the nations ofthis region.” Its activities include:

■ promoting peace by preventing,managing, or resolving conflicts

■ supporting development of anAfrican crisis response initiative (assess-ments by EUCOM teams in several Africannations as an effort to enhance the capabili-ties of regional militaries for timely and effi-cient participation in international peaceand humanitarian operations)

■ establishing a military liaison officein Monrovia where EUCOM is evaluatingthe needs of the West African peacekeepingforce in Liberia, supervising delivery of U.S.-provided equipment, and furnishing mili-tary advice to the U.S. ambassador

■ helping the Organization of AfricanUnity (OAU) develop a conflict manage-ment center and, in particular, a conflictmanagement exercise.

Fostering DemocracyEfforts to professionalize African

militaries are crucial tools in promot-ing democratic values and institutions.Joint combined exchange and trainingexercises (JCETs) are integral toEUCOM engagement in Africa. De-signed to provide training for U.S.troops, these exercises have the addedbenefit of training African forces. Theapproximately 25 exercises conductedeach year—on light infantry tactics,leadership, and the role of apoliticalmilitary institutions in a democraticsystem—have been cited by seniorcivilian and military leaders as criticalin professionalizing African militaries.

EUCOM conducts two multina-tional regional exercises each yearwhich provide training in commandand control and give Africans experi-ence in operating in a multinationalenvironment and with U.S. forces,which will greatly facilitate their par-ticipation in future international con-tingency operations. FY97 will featureexercises in Mali and Namibia. In addi-tion, medical exercises are conductedtwice each year to provide training inpreventative medicine as well as im-prove overall health services. An exer-cise was held in Mali in September1996, and Benin and Sierra Leone willreceive training during FY97.

Finally, in an effort to establish acourse for African civilian officials andmilitary officers on defense planningand management in democratic soci-eties, EUCOM is working with the Of-fice of the Secretary of Defense to ex-plore the establishment of an Africansecurity studies center.

Humanitarian AssistanceEUCOM is helping Mozambique,

Rwanda, and Namibia develop sustain-able humanitarian de-mining efforts toreduce civilian suffering and economichardship. U.S. forces employ a train-the-trainer approach which enableshost countries to continue these pro-grams after their departure.

Americans were pre-deployed forGuardian Assistance to Uganda,Rwanda, and Kenya in support of amultinational force organized to assisthundreds of thousands of Rwandanrefugees in eastern Zaire. The mainbody of the force was never deployedsince more than 100,000 refugees re-turned to Rwanda on their own.

In the wake of a Hutu-led genocidethat claimed hundreds of thousands ofRwandan lives, several hundred Rwan-dan refugees faced death from choleraeach day in overcrowded camps onboth sides of the Rwanda-Zaire border.EUCOM deployed water purificationunits to the area for three monthswhich ended the health crisis and en-abled nongovernmental agencies toagain provide relief services during Op-eration Support Hope in July 1994.

EUCOM also is key to accomplish-ing the unstated but perhaps most cru-cial U.S. objective, ensuring the safetyof Americans and third-country nation-als by evacuating U.S. Mission andother personnel from danger spots.Most noncombatant evacuations andembassy departures have arisen inAfrica, including the Central AfricanRepublic (1996), Liberia (1996), Sudan(1996), and Zaire (1991, 1993, and1997). Excellent and proactive contin-gency planning—sometimes conductedin conjunction with allies such asFrance in the Central African Repub-lic—help to guarantee that these opera-tions go smoothly. EUCOM teams also

■ J F Q F O R U M


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travel to the region to work with ourembassy staffs to ensure emergencyplans are thorough and up to date.

Resource AllocationEUCOM is only one of many

DOD components active in Sub-Saha-ran Africa. In addition, a dozen agen-cies administer various programs.Training and assistance programs areconducted by the Office of the Secre-tary of Defense, the military services(including the Reserve components),and U.S. Special Operations Com-mand; Departments of State, Com-merce, Agriculture, Justice, Labor,Transportation, Treasury, and Health

and Human Services; and Agency forInternational Development, PeaceCorps, and U.S. Information Agency.Overlap and lack of coordination andcollaboration often mean that differ-ent agencies may duplicate efforts oreven work at cross-purposes. In a pe-riod of diminishing resources, intera-gency communication must improveto increase the effectiveness of U.S.programs on the continent.

The Office of the Secretary of De-fense, working in concert with otherDOD components, is developing a

comprehensive strategy for engage-ment in Africa. It will identify U.S. in-terests and provide a blueprint for allo-cating resources to pursue them. It willalso identify countries in which an in-fusion of resources could either save astate from disaster or help a capablemilitary enhance its skills to become avaluable partner in international oper-ations. A central element of this strat-egy is thus prioritizing U.S. interests sothat resources can be allocated tocountries where we have the greateststakes and can make the largest im-pact. This is a crucial step since theCold War tactic of providing resourcesto virtually every country in Africa to

keep the Soviet Union fromgaining a stronghold can nolonger apply. The EUCOMstrategy echoes the need forprioritization by pointingout that engagement re-

quires us “to systematically focus ourefforts where we feel that they canmake a difference.” JCETs, interna-tional military education and training,and other resources thus should go to-ward professional development.Prospective partners such as Senegal,Ghana, and Ethiopia—which have of-fered to contribute forces to an Africancrisis response initiative and share theburden of conducting peace operationsin the future—should receive priorityassistance.

EUCOM and other U.S. Govern-ment agencies operating in the regionmust better prioritize the allocation ofresources. All too often an ambassador

or a zealous desk officer in Washingtoninfluence the military and others whoallocate resources to support programsin countries in which there are fewU.S. interests and only limited securityconcerns. As available resources de-cline and many agencies continue toreduce their presence overseas, DOD isoften perceived as the only U.S. Gov-ernment agency with available assets.On balance we must resist pressure toallocate scarce defense resources tocountries in which the United Stateshas limited interests.

U.S. interests in Sub-SaharanAfrica have changed greatly since theend of the Cold War, yet our securitystrategy for the region has only begunto respond to new challenges. Ratherthan simply distributing resources topro-Western or anti-Soviet clients, theUnited States has started to construc-tively address Africa’s security problemsand has thus worked to minimize newchallenges to U.S. security. Programsthat professionalize African militaries,encourage democracy, alleviate suffer-ing, mitigate humanitarian disasters,and allow governments to solve theirown problems have had a tremendousimpact on the effectiveness of U.S. pol-icy in the region. The major role playedby EUCOM and other regional com-mands in Sub-Saharan Africa has madethese efforts possible.

As the United States continues todevelop partnerships with the defenseestablishments of this region, EUCOMand other DOD components must im-prove their process of setting prioritiesand allocating resources. A continuedhigh-level commitment to Africa by ge-ographical commands and Washingtonis instrumental to furthering U.S. en-gagement and achieving objectives. JFQ

W a l k e r a n d H a n a u e r


interagency communication must improve to increase the effectivenessof U.S. programs on the continent

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Forgotten Mission:Military Support to the NationBy D A V I D L. G R A N G E and R O D N E Y L. J O H N S O N

Throughout U.S. history the military hasbeen used to suppress insurrection andrebellion, enforce the law, and performvarious other roles at the request of

Federal, state, and local officials. The role of theArmed Forces in crises is mandated under theConstitution and has been exercised since theShay Debtor Rebellion in 1786.

While support to the Nation is often over-shadowed by the high-profile role of defending it,military support is a critical, long-standing mis-sion that continues to grow. This is revealed bythe number and variety of domestic disasters andevents to which the Department of Defense

(DOD) has responded in recent years. Extensivesupport by the services and defense agencies isimportant to minimizing loss of life and propertyin a range of operations which frequently go un-publicized. This article outlines responsibilitiesfor Federal support, the system which facilitatesthat support, and the extent of DOD assistance inselected domestic operations.

Federal ResponsibilitiesArticle I, section 8 of the Constitution states,

“Congress shall have power . . . to provide for call-ing forth the militia to execute laws of the Union,suppress insurrection, and repel invasions.” Arti-cle IV, section 4 expands this authority: “TheUnited States shall guarantee to every state in thisUnion a republican form of government, andshall protect each of them . . . against domestic vi-olence.” The modern authorization for Federalsupport to civil authorities is based on the Robert

Major General David L. Grange, USA, is director of operations, readiness, and mobilization at Headquarters, Department of the Army,and Lieutenant Colonel Rodney L. Johnson, USA, serves in the Directorate of Military Support on the Army Staff.

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G r a n g e a n d J o h n s o n


T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assis-tance Act (public law 93–288) and the EconomyAct. The former enables the Federal Governmentto “provide assistance to U.S. states, territories,and possessions to alleviate suffering and mitigatedamage resulting from major disasters and civilemergencies.” The latter empowers Federal agen-cies to provide routine support to each otherunder certain conditions if reimbursed. The keyagency for emergency assistance to civil authori-ties is the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA). By executive order the Presidentappointed FEMA as the lead Federal agency (LFA)for disaster and emergency assistance and as pro-ponent for the Federal response plan (FRP). Pub-lished in 1992, that plan details how 28 Federal

departments and agencies will supplement stateand local government responses.

In order to manage Federal assistance, FRPclassifies assistance into 12 emergency supportfunctions and assigns primary responsibility forthem (see figure 1). DOD is the primary agency forpublic works and engineering and has named theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers as operating agentfor planning, preparedness, and response. In addi-tion, DOD provides support to designated leadagencies in responding to all other functions.FEMA is also tasked as LFA for consequence man-agement, defined as actions taken to provide animmediate response to an incident to contain andmitigate its effects. By contrast, the Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) is LFA for crisis manage-ment, defined as measures to resolve a hostile situ-ation, investigate, and prepare a criminal case forprosecution under Federal law.

When a domestic disaster occurs, the first re-lief assistance is provided by the local police, firedepartments, and rescue organizations. Depend-ing on the severity of the disaster, the next levelof aid is normally through state disaster relief or-ganizations that can call upon all state assets. Thegovernor will appoint a state coordinating officer(figure 2) in major disasters and can also put theNational Guard on state active duty which is atremendous asset and is used extensively in moststates. As an example, the daily employment av-erage for National Guard assets in FY96 was 1,760man-days. The governor may request help fromthe President when local needs exceed state re-sources. When required, FEMA will appoint a co-ordinating officer to correlate Federal disaster re-lief assistance. FEMA and that officer thenfunction as the vital link between state require-ments and DOD assistance.

OrganizationThe Secretary of Defense delegates authority

to provide military support for civil authorities tothe Secretary of the Army who, as executiveagent, exercises operational control over all DODcomponents including the services and defenseagencies. Specific requirements include develop-ing planning guidance, plans, and procedures formilitary support; tasking components to plan forand commit resources in response to requestsfrom civil authorities; and developing (and task-ing DOD components to develop) generic and in-cident-specific support plans. The Assistant Secre-tary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, andEnvironment is responsible for oversight of mili-tary support to civil authorities (MSCA). The Di-rectorate of Military Support (DOMS) is the DODaction agent for planning and coordinating thissupport on behalf of the Secretary of the Army.

Figure 1. Federal Response Plan

Support Function Lead Agency

transportation Department of Transportation

communications National Communications System

public works and engineering Department of Defense

firefighting Department of Agriculture

information and planning Federal Emergency Management Agency

mass care American Red Cross

resource support General Services Administration

health/medical services Department of Health and Human Services

urban search and rescue Federal Emergency Management Agency

hazardous materials Environmental Protection Agency

food Department of Agriculture

energy Department of Energy

Figure 2. Disaster Support Relationships

President

State Governor

StateCoordinating

Officer

FederalCoordinating

Officer

DefenseCoordinating

Officer

DirectorFEMA

Secretary of Defense

JointStaff

Secretary ofthe Army/

DOMS

CINCs

support requestscoordination

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DOMS is led by an Army major general whois also the director of operations, readiness, andmobilization in the Office of the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, De-partment of the Army. DOMS and its designated

staff element, the MilitarySupport Division, essentiallyfunction as a joint staff, withboth Air Force and Navy one-star officers serving as deputydirectors. The DOMS staff hasthe responsibility to plan, co-

ordinate, and manage the full range of MSCA op-erations. It routinely coordinates with FEMA andthe other Federal departments and agencies andalso participates in interagency disaster relief ex-ercises. In this capacity its staff is represented onthe FEMA catastrophic disaster response groupexecutive committee.

The executive agent has designated the com-manders in chief of U.S. Atlantic Command(ACOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), andU.S. Southern Command as the DOD operatingagents for MSCA for states, territories, and posses-sions in their areas of responsibility. ACOM, withthe contiguous 48 states, assigns lead operationalauthority (LOA) to its Army component, ForcesCommand (FORSCOM), which accordingly cantask other ACOM component commands. More-over, in coordination with DOMS and the JointStaff, it can task supporting CINCs such as U.S.Transportation Command and supporting de-fense agencies.

Both PACOM and FORSCOM have desig-nated defense coordinating officers (DCOs) forstates and territories in their respective areas of

responsibility. When deployed these officers, whoare usually Army colonels, are the DOD represen-tatives on the ground with authority to validateall requests for support. They forward validatedrequests to either a joint task force (JTF) or re-sponse task force (RTF), if constituted, or tohigher headquarters. DOMS will then staff the re-quest and if appropriate task a defense element toprovide the support.

JTFs are normally formed for command andcontrol of operations when significant forcesfrom more than one service are deployed. Recentexamples of JTFs include the Los Angeles riots(1992), Hurricane Andrew (1992), and theOlympics (1996). RTFs are formed to support Fed-eral responses to terrorist incidents which involveweapons of mass destruction (WMD). The ele-ments of RTFs were prepositioned during theOlympics and the last Presidential inauguration.

Standing and Directed MissionsThe Secretary of the Army has seven stand-

ing missions as the executive agent for support.They include disaster relief, wildland fire fighting,civil disturbances, immigration emergencies,postal disruptions, animal disease eradication,and military assistance to safety and traffic(MAST). Among them, support to the Postal Ser-vice during labor disputes is potentially the mostpersonnel-intensive albeit the least likely. If fullyimplemented, more than 190,000 military per-sonnel would be committed to safeguard, process,and deliver mail. The MAST program providesaeromedical evacuation for civilian communities.Army and Air Force medical evacuation unitshave flown in excess of 100,000 hours since theprogram began in 1973. Any disaster requires aswift response to minimize suffering and loss oflife, and military units are ideally suited for thisrole. DOD has supported more than 200 domesticdisaster relief operations since 1975. It also sup-ports Federal fire fighting efforts. For example,more than 1,200 active duty soldiers and marinesfought fires in California and Oregon during1996. Military assistance in civil disturbances isprobably the most sensitive mission since use ofthe Armed Forces to reestablish law and order re-quires involvement at the highest national level.The last mission of this type was conducted in1992 when 13,000 active duty and Army NationalGuard personnel were employed in efforts to re-store order in the Los Angles metropolitan area.

In addition to standing missions, the Secre-tary of the Army also executes directed domesticsupport missions. The Atlanta Olympics set aprecedent for the level of both military and civil-ian agency contingency support. DOD support

DOMS and the Military Support Division essentiallyfunction as a joint staff

Fighting forest fires inClear Lake, California.

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included 14,653 active and National Guard per-sonnel from 47 states and territories, over 300aviation support missions, and more than300,000 items of equipment for use by state andlocal authorities.

Planning for the Presidential inauguration inJanuary 1997 involved six months of intensework by DOMS. Although the Armed Forces Inau-gural Committee is historically responsible for

routine military supportto the inaugural, the Sec-retary of the Army wasresponsible for ensuringa coordinated DOD re-

sponse for contingency operations during thatperiod. Critical tasks included development andcoordination of command, control, and commu-nication procedures for possible contingency op-erations; interagency meetings to clarify responsi-bilities and support requirements; execution of atabletop exercise for 80 action-level attendeesfrom numerous agencies to discuss, clarify, andcoordinate roles; conduct of a decision session tofinalize plans in November 1996; and distributionof an execute order outlining extensive DOD re-quirements.

The latest directed mission is implementa-tion of the Nunn-Lugar II Domestic Preparednesslegislation. The Defense against Weapons of MassDestruction Act of 1996 requires the Secretary ofDefense to execute a program to enhance Federal,state, and local agency capabilities to respond toincidents involving WMD. As DOD executiveagent, the Secretary of the Army is tasked withdeveloping and implementing guidance, plans,and procedures to establish a coordinated na-tional program. As action agent, DOMS is initiat-ing extensive interagency coordination and plan-ning to sustain this program. Specific tasksinclude providing emergency response training,advice, and assistance; activating a chemical-bio-logical hotline; assisting in the development andmaintenance of rapid response teams; testing andevaluating preparedness; helping in the inventoryof physical equipment and assets; and procuringequipment to interdict WMD movement.

DOMS is charged with integrating all capa-bilities in a consolidated program and is currentlystaffing additional guidance on timelines, budgetprocedures, reporting requirements, and specificresponsibilities associated with the above tasks.The Secretary of the Army recently appointed theArmy Chemical Biological Defense Command toimplement the program. Other key assets includethe Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Inci-dent Response Force, Naval Medical Research In-stitute, Air Force Technical Application Center,and Army Technical Escort Unit.

Requests for SupportDOD support to civil authorities is requested

almost daily. While most requests come from theappropriate LFA, some are received directly fromlocal civilian or state authorities and directed tothe right channels. In an ideal world requestswould be submitted formally in writing, but swiftresponse is often essential and DOMS begins tocoordinate requests after an initial phone contact.The entry point for written requests is the Officeof the Executive Secretary which processes them,conducts an initial evaluation, and forwards therequests to the Secretary of the Army for action.By exception all requests related to counterterror-ism are forwarded to the Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Special Operations and Low IntensityConflict for evaluation and action.

DOMS is tasked to ensure that requests arestaffed with all the parties concerned and thatany action meets six criteria: legality (authoriza-tion and applicability of posse comitatus); lethality(use of force by or against military personnel);risk (safety of personnel); cost (responsibility forexpenditures and their budget impact); readiness(implication for performing primary mission);and appropriateness (mission best served by DODor other means). Requests are coordinated withthe Joint Staff, services, general counsel, and sup-ported commands which provide support as wellas supporting commands and defense agencies.Once coordination is complete, DOMS is respon-sible for finalizing the execute order and submit-ting it to the appropriate official for approval.

The Secretary of the Army can approve mostrequests for DOD support as executive agent;however, the Secretary of Defense must person-ally approve responses in cases of terrorism orcivil disturbance, use of CINC-assigned forces,and support to law enforcement when confronta-tion or use of lethal force is anticipated. For re-quests which require approval by the Secretary ofDefense, DOMS prepares a recommended courseof action and forwards it to the Secretary throughthe Joint Staff and Chairman. Following a deci-sion, the Chairman will send the order throughDOMS to the appropriate CINC for execution andmanagement by the Secretary of the Army.

Such support to civil authorities is extensiveand occurs on an almost daily basis. The eightmost extensive support requirements during FY95and FY96 are summarized in figure 3. It should benoted, however, that DOMS spends considerabletime coordinating relatively small yet critical re-quests for particular types of expertise or equip-ment. This support is normally requested when itwould be too costly to procure the skill or equip-ment required for one-time use or when timeli-ness does not allow for normal procurement. Re-cent cases include a technical escort unit to

DOD support to civil authoritiesis requested almost daily

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support a Ricin chemical agent seizure by the Fed-eral Bureau of Investigation in Missouri; engineersupport after a dam break in New Hampshire;personnel and metal detectors to conduct asearch by the Secret Service for counterfeit moneyin Michigan; and providing air transport forFEMA urban search and rescue teams respondingto disasters. Every request must be properlystaffed to ensure that the support is appropriateand not in violation of posse comitatus (title 18,U.S. Code, strictly prohibits the use of Federaltroops for law enforcement).

Hurricane FranThe hurricane that struck near Cape

Fear, North Carolina, on the evening ofSeptember 5, 1996 had maximum sus-tained winds of 115 mph. Although itsstrength quickly diminished, in the next12 hours it caused 26 deaths, severeflooding from up to 15 inches of rain,$1.5 billion in damage, and a power lossto 800,000 households across five states.

The response to Fran started prior toits actual arrival. FEMA (the lead Federalagency) and DOMS began 24-hour opera-tions at 0700 hours on September 4. Thatsame day DOMS received five formaltaskings for DOD support and released anexecute order for it at 2000 hours withthe commander in chief, ACOM, tasked

as supported CINC. Initial actions required aC–141 to move a prepositioned forward assess-ment team from Texas to North Carolina on Sep-tember 5, the use of Fort Jackson to billet andsupport the emergency response team-nationaluntil mission completion, and nine helicopters totransport the team and support other missions.All missions were completed as required prior tothe arrival of the hurricane.

Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew.

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Figure 3. DOD Support to Civil Authorities, Selected Operations: 1995–1997

(peak DOD strength)

Active National Corps ofEvent Date Duty Guard Engineers

Oklahoma Bombing April–May 1995 457 545 48

Hurricane Marilyn September–November 1995 1,227 930 200

Summer Olympics June–August 1996 1,277 13,376 –

TWA Flight 800 July–November 1996 740 170 22

National Conventions August 1996 328 1,397 –

Western Forest Fires August–September 1996 1,265 930 –

Hurricane Fran September–November 1996 756 4,134 397

Presidential Inaugural January 1997 4,736 540 –

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DOMS coordinated all support operations di-rectly with FEMA until September 6 when the Pres-ident issued a major disaster declaration for por-tions of North Carolina. At that time ACOMdeployed a DCO and a disaster coordination ele-ment (DCE) to Fort Bragg to handle requirementsfor support. Until it stood down on September 28,DCE coordinated all support and forwarded re-quests to higher headquarters or DOMS only whenthey exceeded local capabilities. Ultimately DOMSworked 16 formal requests for support prior toceasing 24-hour operations on September 9.

DOD support to Fran recovery operationswas extensive and critical to minimizing the lossof life and suffering. Peak strength included 756active duty soldiers, 4,134 National Guardsmenfrom eight states on active duty, and 397 mem-bers of the Corps of Engineers. The majority of

active duty support was provided by DCO andDCE from the Federal mobilization site at FortBragg and also by elements of XVIII AirborneCorps which removed debris and provided reliefassistance. Of particular note was support by theCorps of Engineers that included damage surveys,power restoration, water and ice delivery, dredg-ing operations, and debris removal. As of Novem-ber 13, it had taken away 3,411,695 cubic yardsof debris, provided over 200 generators for emer-gency power, and delivered some 3.5 millionspounds of ice and 550,000 gallons of water. In ad-dition, the Corps of Engineers dredge McFarlandremoved 170,000 cubic yards of material in ef-forts to clear Wilmington harbor.

Oklahoma CityThe bomb that was detonated outside the Al-

fred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma Cityon April 19, 1995 resulted in 167 dead, 467 in-jured, and two missing. Unlike a hurricane therewas no warning. The event highlighted the abil-ity to provide technical support on extremelyshort notice in support of civil authorities. FortSill dispatched two medical evacuation heli-copters and Tinker Air Force Base deployed a 66-man rescue squad. Under his immediate responseauthority, the Secretary of the Army directedDOMS to establish the 24-hour crisis action teamone hour after the explosion and sent a liaison of-ficer to FEMA headquarters. DOD ultimately pro-vided technical support and equipment to manyagencies including the Federal Bureau of Investi-gation as LFA for crisis management and FEMA asLFA for consequence management.

DOMS received its first request for supportthree hours after the bombing when FEMA re-quested transportation for an urban search andrescue team from Phoenix. An airborne C–141from McCord Air Force Base was immediately di-verted to Luke Air Force Base to support the teamtasking and further actions were initiated in an-ticipation of a Presidential declaration of emer-gency. Following the declaration later in the day,DOMS staffed and issued an execute order taskingthe commander in chief, ACOM, as supportedCINC. DCO and the nucleus of DCE arrived at1800 (eight hours after the blast) and began coor-dinating all on-site requirements for support. Theteam from Phoenix reached the site at 2130 andother support arrived throughout the night.

Although the last formal request for supportwas received on April 29, DOD continued to as-sist in rescue and law enforcement efforts untilthe end of May. The peak strength reached 1,002personnel and included a large amount of avia-tion and ground transport, specialized equipmentwith operators, and life support items.

Oklahoma City,April 1995.

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Olympic GamesDuring the olympic

games, held from July 19to August 4, 1996 at 96venues in four states andthe District of Columbia,the focus of planning wason Atlanta. It was therethat organizers projected300,000–600,000 visitorsper day as well as the pres-ence of 40,000 volunteersand 15,000 media. Ascould be expected, thecompetition set a prece-dent for the level of sup-port requested and pro-vided by DOD and otherFederal agencies.

DOD planning wasinitiated in response to amemo issued by the Secre-tary of the Army in Au-gust 1995 that outlined aframework for support.The Secretary was also

designated executive agent for all DOD support,and DOMS was tasked as the action agent for exe-cuting all missions involving the Olympics. In ad-dition, the commanding general, FORSCOM, wastasked to furnish general officer oversight and atask force commander. The specific mission wastwofold: provide DOD non-emergency supportand prepare to execute appropriate emergencycontingency plans to assist civil authorities.

The impact of support to the Olympics wassignificant. More than 14,000 active, Reserve, andNational Guard personnel were directly commit-ted in Atlanta and other sites. The majority of mil-

itary personnel were membersof the Army National Guardfrom 47 states and territorieswho supported security opera-tions at the 96 venues. Morethan a thousand active dutysoldiers, sailors, marines, and

airmen transported athletes, officials, and law en-forcement personnel among various olympic vil-lages and widely dispersed venues.

The military flew over 300 missions in sup-port of law enforcement and security operations.DOD also provided more than 300,000 items ofequipment and supplies to more than 60 Federal,state, and local law enforcement agencies and or-ganizing committees. Bomb disposal personnelresponded to 490 calls about suspicious items. Lo-gistical support was provided to DOD personnelat nine base camps by a joint logistical task forcewith 1,300 members.

A tremendous effort was made to ensure acoordinated, immediate response for emergencycontingency operations. Assets prepositionedand/or forward deployed to the Atlanta area forthe Olympics included 26 explosive ordnance dis-posal teams, three chemical-biological technicalescort units, a response task force advance ele-ment, DCO and DCE liaison officers, FORSCOMand First Army emergency operation centers, heli-copters for current and on-call missions, and achemical-biological pharmaceutical package.

Moreover, DOD developed detailed plans toensure that critical assets were readily availablefor deployment to the area. This included a re-sponse task force, chemical-biological advisoryand response teams, chemical-biological labora-tory and diagnostics capability, added air evacua-tion and medical triage teams, and other specialtyassets. Clearly, DOD support was essential to thesuccess of one of the largest and most complexpeacetime events of this century.

TWA 800On July 17, 1996 a flight bound for Paris ex-

ploded in midair and crashed off Long Island withthe loss of all 230 passengers and crew memberson board shortly after it took off from JFK Interna-tional Airport in New York. This tragedy high-lights the ability to provide a range of multi-ser-vice technical support and specialized equipment.

The National Transportation Safety Board wasdesignated LFA while the Federal Bureau of Inves-tigation conducted a collateral investigation. Thefirst military support was provided almost imme-diately by the New York National Guard which ac-tivated an emergency operations center and dis-patched a C–130 with illumination flares and ahelicopter with forward-looking infrared radar.Support was coordinated, approved, and fundedby the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center. TheNational Guard continued to provide support overthe next three months with a peak strength of 170personnel, two helicopters, and 27 vehicles. Itscritical support included assisting in search and re-covery, roving patrols, cleanup and sustainment,and passive security which was provided understate authority at the governor’s direction.

The Navy received its first request for sup-port in accordance with a memo of understand-ing between the Navy supervisor of salvage andthe National Transportation Safety Board. Underthat agreement, a pinger locator system, side scansonar mapping system, remotely operated vehi-cle, salvage ship (USS Grasp), search vessel (MVPirouette), and 53 divers were provided initially.

On July 22 the FBI requested a helicopterand non-flying crew chief for the investigation.

more than 14,000 personnel were directly committed in Atlanta and other sites

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The National Guard Bureau coordinated for theDelaware Army National Guard to execute thismission. A forensic anthropologist from theArmed Forces Institute of Pathology was providedto assist with autopsies and identify remains. Inaddition, the Corps of Engineers furnished abarge to collect drift from the wreckage.

Ultimately, support to the crash site contin-ued to increase, and DOMS staffed and issued anexecute order approved by the Secretary of theArmy on July 23 which designated the comman-der in chief, ACOM, as the supported CINC forsite operations. He, in turn, tasked the comman-der in chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet as supported CINC

and directed the establishment of a disaster relieftask force to assume operational control. Over thenext two months this structure provided exten-sive support to recovery operations and aided inthe eventual recovery of the remains of 213 vic-tims and 95 percent of the aircraft. Navy strengthat the site peaked at 740 and included 140 divers.

The Armed Forces are trained and equippedto provide immediate response during disasterand emergency response operations. In fact, inmany cases DOD is the only Federal agency thatcan immediately provide some kinds of support.The military clearly recognizes the importance ofthis mission; however, there is a price to pay.Time, personnel, training, and funds spent forsuch support compete with our limited assets.Leaders on all levels must weigh the impact ofsuch missions on their organizations and makethe necessary adjustments. Support to the Nationis a demanding mission that the military mustcontinue to plan for and execute. JFQ

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If confronted with an enemy sniper in a dark-ened room would you want more ammuni-tion, a larger caliber weapon, or night visiongoggles? Those who make decisions on how

to man and equip our forces depend on modelsthat cannot answer this question. Built duringthe Cold War to respond to concerns over incre-mental changes in force structure and weaponry,these models are unable to measure the impact ofrevolutionary advances in information technolo-gies. Born of the industrial age, they are inade-quate for the information age. At stake is opera-tions research, a product of the industrial age,and more importantly our national securitywhich depends on this discipline.

A much promised peace dividend and con-sensus on the dawn of the information age raisedexpectations that we could anticipate significantdecreases in defense budgets and force structure.While the military has indeed been downsized,this has been a response to budget cuts and theend of the Cold War, not to investments in infor-mation technologies. The Armed Forces aresmaller, but we have not restructured to realizesavings in the same way as the private sector. Thisreflects the failure of decisionmakers and thoseoperations research analysts who support them toabandon the industrial age force-on-force modelsof the past.

The information revolution sweeping ourlives will also sweep the battlefield of tomorrow.

Yet budget decisions on forcestructure and military tech-

nology depend ondecades-old industrial-age attrition models.Such models were in-

tended to measureincremental

change and not to explore revolutionary ad-vances. The longer decisionmakers take to adapt,the less likely it is that we will attain the securityinnovations that capitalize on emerging tech-nologies. Moreover, we risk failing to demonstratethe tangible cost benefits associated with infor-mation technology.

Changing ModelsKnowing why a particular model was built is

key to understanding the types of questions itcan answer. Generally models were designed tomeasure the impact of improvements in weaponssystems or estimate force structure requirements.Force structure models served a variety of usefulpurposes during the Cold War when incrementalchanges in either force structure or moderniza-tion occurred. Large contests by land and airforces along the inter-German border or smaller

TheForce-on-ForceModel: An Anachronismin the Information AgeBy M A G G I E B E L K N A P

Major Maggie Belknap, USA, teaches at the Naval War College and is an academy professor in the Department of Systems Engineering atthe U.S. Military Academy.

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but more compressed clashes along the 38th paral-lel in Korea were ideal for conversion into linearmodels which is why steady state assumptionswere acceptable. (But what does war conducted ata steady state look like?) The builders of suchmodels never claimed that they could accuratelypredict the outcome of combat in terms of casual-ties or geographical displacement. They simplyasserted that they could demonstrate a relativeadvantage of one force over another or help dis-tinguish between alternatives for force sizing andmodernization.

Model building focused on combat forces.Thus many combat support and service supportfunctions were not included at the outset andwere added only as an afterthought or—in thecase of logistics—modeled by separate simula-tions and then used as input to combat models.The force-on-force, attrition-based notion of war

emphasized kill ratesand weapon efficiencyfactors such as accuracyand circular error proba-ble. In the industrial agethis mirrored manufac-turing problems of opti-

mizing processing rates and outputs in light ofscarce resources. It also supported decisions onwhich technology advancements in weapons im-provements should be explored.

While there have been changes in the mod-els over the past decade none were a result of theend of the Cold War or a commensurate changein national security strategy. One can be attrib-uted to passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in1986 which saw an end to models designed tosupport service-specific budgets and force struc-ture allocations. TACWAR is a model adopted bythe Joint Staff in 1988 that marked the recogni-tion of a need to demonstrate the impact of suchdecisions in a joint environment. It models landand air components in a single theater-levelmodel. Widely used because it is joint, this modelfalls short of realizing joint warfare synergies, letalone incorporating enhancements produced byinformation technology. In fact, it is a low resolu-tion model that is not sophisticated enough to beused as service-specific model. Like its predeces-sors, TACWAR does not account for much beyondthe force-on-force, attrition-type warfare.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, en-hancements in computerization and simulationhave led to higher resolution models. Precisecomputer mapping and graphics have made bat-talion-level models possible, such as Janus whichcan account for the impact of terrain on troopmovements and weapons systems in various sec-tors of the battlefield. The growing infatuationwith Nintendo-like computer graphics known as

virtual reality has propelled enhancements incomputer models, highlighted by the exact repli-cation of portions of the “hundred-hour war” intime and space using the most advanced com-puter graphics.

Reengineering WarIt is ironic that none of these advancements

can measure the impact of the greatest emergingtechnology on warfare today—information tech-nology. Instead, in aid of better and arguablymore user-friendly models, such advancementsbury the flawed assumptions of industrial-age, at-trition-based warfare under a sophisticated veneerof information-age computer interfaces.

Although C4I is often seen as a force multi-plier, we are only beginning to explore its forcestructure implications.1 In failing to realize thereal benefits of information technology invest-ments we join white-collar workers who havesimilar trouble identifying processes and measur-ing output. Many businesses have learned fromautomation and begun to reengineer, which meansoptimizing a process and automating it, as op-posed to installing automation to support an ex-isting process.

This coincides with an apparent divergenceon how the military looks at technology. If its pur-pose is to support warfare as we know it, that is tosimply automate it, there are only costs. If, how-ever, there is a tremendous advantage to be har-nessed, then we have a revolution together with areengineering of warfare. Similarly, if decision sup-port models are simply retooled to fit C4I to exist-ing force-on-force, assumption-based models, theywill fail to capture potential innovations and com-mensurate force structure and cost savings.

This sets the stage for civilian and militaryleadership to direct the analytical community toadvance decision support models in two possibledirections. The first is to improve current modelsto incorporate C4I or build new C4I models. Thesecond is to challenge military analysts to applytheir skills to support experimentation, explo-ration, creativity, and innovations in warfarethat may provide the basis for the next genera-tion of models.

To illustrate deficiencies in the first course, itis worth noting the hypothesis that “If we havedominant battlefield awareness, we win,” as ad-vanced by the former Vice Chairman, AdmiralWilliam A. Owens.2 Attaining this dominance re-quires enhancements in intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) and in C4I—neither ofwhich is considered today.3 But there are severalmethodologies used to compel models to provideinsights on the possible impact.

if decision support models are simply retooled they will fail to capture potential innovations

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One approach is to front-load the modelbased on some gross assumptions by invoking an“efficiency factor” for either side. That is, analystsmay multiply weapons effectiveness indicators onone side (but not the other) by some value to ex-press a relative difference between protagonists.This method requires front-end analysis; and itcould be argued that it leads to convoluted results.

Another method allows one side to find tar-gets immediately. Combined with old doctrineand battlefield arrays, this results in faster force-

on-force wars. Targets are ac-quired and destroyed fasterand with greater precision,mirroring the type of war con-ducted in the Persian Gulf.Hence the universal accep-tance level of the results is

supported by real world experience. Such model-ing techniques might suggest that dominant bat-tlefield awareness increases ammunition require-ments because more targets become available andthat ammunition costs may thus increase.

Dominant Battlefield AwarenessBut what if this dominance enables us to

identify major enemy vulnerabilities? Such issuesare beyond the capacity of current models that,for example, cannot simulate targeting and de-stroy a command headquarters. However, whilesuch a strategy cannot be simulated with modelstoday, it might result in lower ammunition re-quirements. Finding critical vulnerabilities re-quires network analysis, which is not beyond theability of operations research analysts. Many net-work analysis tools are available but simply havenot been used or are not compatible with force-on-force models.

Another method is to employ a “man-in-the-loop,” which is much more promising becausemilitary strategists decide how to array their capa-bilities on the battlefield and define some orderof battle. Analysts program the computer modelaccordingly, and it is then run for a specified timeor until a certain objective is achieved. Presentedwith those results, strategists then make theirnext move, and so on. Although included, strate-gists cannot truly exercise creativity because theyare restricted by the capabilities and assumptionsof the models.

Vigilant Warrior provides a situation inwhich one might ask a “man-in-the-loop” aboutthe value of improving ISR capabilities. Clearlythey saved the cost of revisiting Desert Storm.Based on superior intelligence assets, we are ableto enforce a strategy in the Persian Gulf todaythat relies on early warning, which has force im-plications. Perhaps an investment in technologiesto integrate and present information more

quickly to the National Command Authoritiescould have saved the cost of deploying troops in1994. Investment in processing and integratinginformation might be compared with such de-ployment costs. Obviously this kind of analysisgoes far beyond force-on-force models. But it alsosurpasses the “man-in-the-loop” wargames thatone might try to support with these models.

The inadequacy of such models with regardto advances in information technology justifiesdiscarding them in favor of new ones. Leavingaside the tremendous time it takes to build amodel that is valid and accepted, it is impossibleto stay abreast of emerging information technolo-gies that are improving exponentially. Some at-tempts to model C4I are only representations ofinformation flow, much like logistics. These areplaced over existing force-on-force models and donot model the significance of information capa-bilities nor the impact of denial of information.

Emergence of C4IAll these approaches simply layer dominant

battlefield awareness, or any information age ca-pability, over old doctrine and battlefield arrays.Models were not designed to identify critical vul-nerabilities or exploit them—they can’t reinventBlitzkrieg. Once breakthroughs occur military ana-lysts can account for innovations in modeling orbuild models that simulate such processes, butthey cannot find them with models. Old modelsdid not even account for basic synergies realizedfrom combining land and air operations.

These old models provided important ana-lytic tools to support resource allocation decisionsduring the Cold War. Built without considerationof command, control, and communications theywere sufficient for making decisions on weaponssystems and force structure in the industrial age.The emergence of C4I, however, demands achange in the tools used to support decisionmak-ing on weapons systems and force structure. Andthe issues go beyond weapons and force structureto systems integration and process changes thatmight yield force structure changes.

Practitioners of operations research should in-stantly recognize that those who continue to useforce-on-force models are breaking a fundamentalrule: don’t make the problem fit the model. Thisunfortunately describes attempts by analysts to getresults through workarounds and tinkering withcurrent models. Armed with only force-on-forcemodels, they must ultimately reduce every ques-tion posed to fit a force-on-force analysis.

In relative terms the next century is here.But clearly current models cannot be retooled nor

those who continue to useforce-on-force models arebreaking a fundamental rule

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quickly rebuilt to addressthe new issues that it willpose. Military leaders mustdirect the analytical com-munity to develop effortswhich support reengineer-ing warfare rather than au-tomating it. They must en-vision how strategy anddoctrine would change as aresult of new capabilitiesand structure the force ac-cordingly.

If strategy is informa-tion- or knowledge-based,force enhancements mightbe measured in terms of howsuch capabilities are lever-aged. For example, restruc-turing initiatives that elimi-nate layers of command andcontrol, that simply filter in-formation with no valueadded, would be such an en-hancement. These capabili-ties enhancements might bemeasured in terms of how

successfully they integrate or speed informationprocessing.

From a cognitive perspective, future develop-ments might focus on presenting commanderswith the right information in an understandableand usable format. Psychologically, one might askif the American people might be inclined to useunmanned autonomous vehicles and cruise mis-siles to lessen the chance of putting our forces inharm’s way.

Tools Are Not SolutionsOperations research analysts cannot answer

every question. But they might gather groups ofspecialists from various fields to examine the fu-ture of warfare. This would include evaluating theenvironment of the battlefield of tomorrow, howit will be changed by advances in informationtechnology, how the national strategy mustchange, and how war can be revolutionized tosupport that strategy. In addition to the usual line-up of experts in national and military strategy,this group must include cultural, economic, andintelligence specialists, computer experts, systemsengineers, network analysts, and social scientists.

This approach to problem solving is not new.Operations research traces its roots to World WarII when diverse groups of scientists teamed up tosolve complex problems. Many recognized thesynergism in bringing diverse expertise and viewsto problem solving, so the practice spread. Thesuccess of the methodology and models that

evolved is still widely recognized in the industrialsector. This discipline incorporates a commonmenu of techniques and mathematical modelsthat have been developed over the years. But asoperations research textbooks warn, these aretools, not solutions to problems. One of the mostfundamental errors that any operations researchanalyst can commit is to apply the wrong modelto a problem.

The essence of operations research is creativ-ity and innovation—not employing models likecook book recipes. Its tools are useful in studyinga wide range of problems. But often there are noappropriate models for particular problems. Thatis an opportunity for both the art and science ofoperations research to grow, to develop new mod-els. Determining the impact of the revolution ininformation technology on warfare is one suchopportunity.

Failure to redirect the analytical communitytoward reengineering warfare misses the chancefor military strategists and operations research ana-lysts to realize their potential. Yet the practice ofmaking incremental changes in strategy and mod-eling may continue unnoticed. If strategists do notconsider the consequences of C4I beyond thesafety of model-based wargames, tinkering withold ideas will be reflected in reworking models thatsupport them. Contractors will support expensivecomputer-based models by investing in graphic in-terfaces and resolution improvements that give theimpression that the models themselves have beenmodernized. But the opportunity will be lost to ex-ercise the core competencies of both military pro-fessionals and operations research analysts. Mili-tary professionals will fail to apply their art in anew era while operations research analysts will failto fulfill the potential of their art and science envi-sioned a half century ago. JFQ

N O T E S

1 The Army is exploring how to adapt with a three-phase training and learning program task force ad-vanced warfighting experiment using a digitallyequipped experimental force. The plan is briefly out-lined in an Army pamphlet entitled Force XXI: America’sArmy of the 21st Century, pp. 23–29.

2 William A. Owens, open letter to the Military Oper-ations Research Society, December 1, 1994.

3 William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Sys-tems,” Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May 1995), p. 37.

Deploying for VigilantWarrior.

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■ O P E R A T I O N K I N G P I N


One of the more controversial operationsduring the Vietnam War did not in-volve defoliants or bombing remotehamlets; rather it was an attempt to

rescue 54 Americans held captive in the north.Operation Kingpin was the raid to retrieve prison-ers of war (POWs) from a camp located nearHanoi at a place called Son Tay. This effort is bestremembered because the captives had beenmoved prior to the raid and the camp was foundto be empty. But despite failing to accomplish theobjective, this mission offers some valuablelessons in jointness.

Kingpin proved that a joint mission could bewell planned, trained, and executed—lessons for-gotten ten years later in Eagle Claw, the abortedmission to rescue American captives from Iran.

The raid on Son Tay demonstrated that service ri-valries could be effectively overcome to organizean appropriate force, sort out equipment interop-erability problems, conduct proper training, andcomplete contingency planning to execute a mis-sion despite the inevitable friction of war.

The MissionMost American POWs were held in Hanoi,

whereas Son Tay was located 23 miles from theNorth Vietnamese capital. Using various intelli-gence sources, the United States discovered thesite of the camp in May 1970 and identifiedmany of the captives.1 A plan then was developedto insert 56 members of Special Forces to performa rescue. They would be delivered at night by AirForce helicopters, spend less than 30 minutes onthe ground, and return with the POWs. The mis-sion would involve the coordinated efforts of AirForce and Army special operations units as well asnaval aviation forces who conducted a diversion-ary attack over Hanoi.

Captain William C. Thomas, USAF, is editor of Soldier-Scholar andassistant professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy where he teachesjoint doctrine and warfare.

Operation Kingpin—Success or Failure?By W I L L I A M C. T H O M A S

HH–3s.

DOD

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T h o m a s


Intelligence assets monitored the camp dur-ing the six months of planning and preparation.Reconnaissance indicated it had been emptiedbut could not confirm this fact by other sources.Photos taken by SR–71s and Buffalo Hunterdrones indicated it was vacated sometime afterJune 6. POWs later reported that they weremoved on July 14.2 The camp showed signs oflimited activity but there was no way of deter-mining if the Americans had returned. Althoughanalysts prefer to have at least two independentsources before relying on information, missionpreparations proceeded. However, two days be-fore the raid a source inside the North Viet-namese government indicated that the prisonershad been moved to another camp.3

There remains speculation on why the POWswere moved. Some believe it was because of possi-ble flooding resulting from a CIA operation

known as “Popeye” whichseeded rain clouds to createadverse weather in NorthVietnam. Another possibilityis that the camp was underrepair or being expanded.The raiders found lumber,

cement, and tools. Whatever the reason, the com-mand staff decided to go ahead with the mission,stating that it would be “unforgivable” to not goin after all the training and preparation only tofind out later that the POWs had been there.

Special Forces personnel would be transportedvia Air Force HH–53 and HH–3 helicopters fromUdorn with MC–130 Combat Talon aircraft fromTahkli serving as pathfinders (see map). Close airsupport would be provided by A–1 Skyraiders, con-sidered too slow by the conventional Air Force butperfect by air commandos. While the Navy stageda diversionary attack over Hanoi to draw attentionfrom the camp (they had to drop flares sincebombing missions over the north were forbiddenat this time), helicopters would fly in and depositthe team at Son Tay. The prison assault team, ledby Captain Dick Meadows, would crash land insidethe prison aboard an HH–3. The small helicopterwould be abandoned rather than risk having itshot down while departing and falling on thetroops below. As the assault team moved quicklyinto the cells another group would create an es-cape route by blowing a hole through the prisonwall. A third team would defend the raiders fromenemy response. Once the POWs were rounded upthe helicopters would return from a nearby land-ing zone, pick up the raiders and POWs, and re-turn to Thailand. The teams planned to be on theground no more than 28 minutes (this estimatewas off by only 15 seconds).4

Building a ForceConcerns arose during planning for the raid

over the size of the force as estimates of 350 per-sonnel were proposed. This was not unusual sincethe services tend to exaggerate their role by in-creasing their contributions. In this case, how-ever, planning was done primarily by operatorsrather than by the Joint Chiefs whose exclusionreduced service parochialism.

A special operations team of Army and AirForce personnel was formed over Marine Corpsobjections. Selection was not based on rank or ser-vice but rather on experience in Southeast Asia oroperational specialty. The Army and Air Forcewere chosen based on mission needs: the abilityto move safely and strike quickly. Special Forceswere best suited for the mission, which required asmall unit that could discriminately apply concen-trated firepower. Air Force special operations pilotshad the most experience in low-level night inser-tion and extraction missions. By combining tech-nical expertise with regional familiarity and notinsisting that every service be used the plannersdeveloped a force well suited to the objectives.

The lesson is that force structure must be de-termined by mission goals and the constraints in-herent in an operation. If that means using everyservice, then they should be used. If not, don’t.Planners court disaster when they cater to the ser-vices by enlarging their roles and ultimately theirbudgets. When JCS planned Eagle Claw ten yearslater this lesson was forgotten. According to onesenior observer, “there was a general feeling thatit would be nice if everyone had a piece of thepie.”5 That general feeling can lead to putting thewrong people into a job.

InteroperabilityToday a major problem facing joint opera-

tions is interoperability. Too often services findthat their equipment is not compatible whenthey must work together. Each has its own acqui-sition process even though the Office of the Sec-retary of Defense compiles a consolidated budgetrequest. Despite the scrutiny provided by theJoint Requirements Oversight Council, the ser-vices typically buy equipment only with theirown purposes in mind. This will change—butslowly. Meanwhile the services must overcomethis problem. Kingpin proved that it can be done.

The most significant problems challengingmission planners involved the resources of onlyone service. Four types of aircraft were needed indirect support of the ground force. An HH–3would carry one team while HH–53s took in theremaining Special Forces. Because the helicopterslacked navigation equipment to find Son Tay atnight, two MC–130s would serve as pathfinders.Close air support would be provided by A–1s.

planners court disaster whenthey cater to the services byenlarging their roles

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THAILAND

S O U T H C H I N A S E A

G U L F O F

T O N K I N

Takhli

Bangkok

Saigon

Da Nang

Quang Tri

Hanoi

Son Tay

AirRefuelArea

UdornNakhonPhanom

CHINA

BURMA

CAMBODIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

NORTH VIETNAM

LAOS

SONG

CON

Bamboo gate

Pond

Fish pond

Steps

GardensGardens

Bridge

Pond

“Beer house”

“Opiumden” Headquarters

Support Group

Command Group

Assualt Group

Automatic weapon position

Automatic weapon position

40' 40'

Trees 40' high

40' 40' 40'20'

20'

Clothesline

20'6 steps

Trenches

Trenches

N

Concertinawire on

wall

“Cat house”

Well

MH–53.

Source: Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

Source: Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

DO

D

Son Tay.

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T h o m a s


The problem was speed because the HH–3was the slowest aircraft. That made it difficult forMC–130s; when flying just over their stall speedthey were still ten knots faster than the HH–3.Since MC–130s were navigating for the heli-

copters, it would not be ac-ceptable for the slowest air-craft to lag behind. A–1s wereeven faster and would be overthe target area long beforethe raiders arrived thereby in-creasing their exposure. A

way had to be found to keep the aircraft together.Although some might have proclaimed the

obstacle unsolvable and the mission impossible,Kingpin planners recognized that most problemscan be overcome through innovation and cre-ative thinking. MC–130s would fly just abovetheir stall speed with the HH–3 “drafting” behind

them. By flying in the slipstream of larger aircraftthe HH–3 could gain the ten knots needed tokeep up. A–1s would fly large S-turns along theflight path to keep from getting too far ahead.This plan allowed all the aircraft to arrive at SonTay together.

Despite the fact that the aircraft came fromone service the lesson applies to joint operations.Mission requirements will dictate that certainforces be used. They may not be able to immedi-ately integrate. Their equipment may be incom-patible or their skills may not be complementary.Instead of making the choice between accepting abad situation or canceling a mission, plannersmust find the means to remedy such problems.The answer may be obvious or require innova-tion, but again this lesson was forgotten in EagleClaw when an array of forces from all serviceswas employed. They did not have the right ra-dios. Rather than ensuring that the widely dis-persed personnel could communicate in a securefashion, the leadership accepted a bad situationand hoped for the best. It was this lack of com-munication that contributed to mission failure.

Proper TrainingThe mission validated the fact that joint

training must be accomplished before an opera-tion. It is difficult to train as a single service andthen to fight jointly; forces need to train as theyfight. Once a plan is developed, if the servicestrain by themselves the required synergy will notbe there. Fortunately this was not a problem inKingpin. The raiding team trained at Eglin AirForce Base using a full-scale mockup of the SonTay camp built from reconnaissance photos. Theyran dry-fire exercises during the day, then atnight, followed by daytime live-fire exercises andfinally three full rehearsals at night. Helicoptercrews practiced with MC–130s and trained at themockup camp. Over 150 practice sessions wererun. Troops thus got used to being a team andbetter understood the needs and capabilities ofother services.

Joint training is critical because each servicehas needs that can only be met by a supportingservice. When the Air Force provides close airsupport or insertion and extraction for Armyunits, pilots have to know how the Army fights tosupport the troops on the ground. On the otherhand, if Army planners are depending on AirForce support they must understand Air Force ca-pabilities. Fortunately, the special operators in-volved in Kingpin had worked with the other ser-vices, and the planning staff included both Armyand Air Force representatives.

U.S

. Air

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.S. A

ir Fo

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Model of prison usedas training aid.

Aerial view of Son Tay,North Vietnam, 1970.

if the services train by them-selves the required synergywill not be there

2315Thomas 8/5/97 2:25 PM Page 123



Eagle Claw planners forgot this critical les-son ten years later. The senior leadership as wellas ad hoc units formed for the mission had lim-ited joint experience. In six months of prepara-tions not one rehearsal integrated all task forcecomponents. Knowing the capabilities of otherservices leads to planning that allows various ele-ments to support and complement each other.Moreover, such an awareness coupled with inte-grated training also enables operators to developresponses to unexpected contingencies. The bet-ter the preparation, the better the ability to reactif things don’t go according to plan.

Preparing for ContingenciesFirst planned for late October, Kingpin was

postponed for a month by the national securityadviser to the President, Henry Kissinger. The un-expected delay proved essential for the raiders.With no other taskings and not wanting the teamto lose its edge, planners began asking “what if?”It was during this period that they planned andtrained for a range of contingencies.

The planners anticipated various possibili-ties. What if a helicopter was lost? What if NorthVietnamese reinforcements arrived? What if theprisoners were unable to walk or were too scaredto leave their cells? While it is impossible in suchsituations to think of everything, operators will atleast be in the frame of mind to find a solutionwhen something goes wrong. This turned out tobe critical once Kingpin was executed.

The helicopter carrying Colonel Arthur D.(“Bull”) Simons, the ground forces commander, ac-cidentally landed at another facility 400 yardsaway. Realizing he and his 21-man team would beout of action until picked up, he radioed the mes-sage “option green” which alerted Meadows, whowas inside the camp, that he was now in com-mand. Simons and his team were lifted out after abrief fire fight, but once on the ground at the rightplace he resumed command. The transfer wasseamless and the mission was never disrupted de-spite briefly losing its commander and nearly halfthe ground forces. If the raiders had not consid-ered unanticipated problems this incident couldhave spelled disaster for the entire team.

By contrast Eagle Claw demonstrated whatoccurs when potential problems are not tackledearly on. Rather than devising methods for work-ing around obstacles, the planning staff expectedto abort the mission if things went wrong. Theuse of go/no-go abort points was mandated in theoriginal operational requirements.6 Such a fatalis-tic approach leads operators to focus on halting amission rather than resolving problems. As it

turned out, the mission was called off when threeof eight helicopters were lost because of naviga-tional or mechanical difficulties. The loss of threehelicopters was one of the abort thresholds.

The fact that unexpected situations occurhighlights the need for effective joint operations.Using two or more services makes the wholegreater than the sum of its parts. While there maybe some redundancy in such operations, this mayfree up resources from one service, allowing themto be applied elsewhere and thus enhance econ-omy of force and the ability to respond to prob-lems which arise.

Operation Kingpin is a model of joint plan-ning and operations. Its force structure reflectedthe politico-military objectives of the missionrather than interservice rivalry. Instead of ignor-ing equipment incompatibilities, planners foundways around them. The services conducted realis-tic training that allowed them to resolve prob-lems before rather than during the operation. Fi-nally, the raiders were ready for unanticipatedissues that arise in all missions. Was the operationsuccessful? If one is asking if it met its objectivesthe answer is no. Despite intelligence, planning,and training not one POW was rescued. But ifone is inquiring whether this was a joint missionthat reflects realistic planning, appropriate forcestructure, quality training, and effective use ofground and air assets, the answer must be an em-phatic yes. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Operational aspects are discussed in Benjamin F.Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Harper and Row,1976), p. 56.

2 Interview with Col Henry P. Fowler, Jr., USAF (Ret.),one of the Son Tay captives, January 29, 1996. Interviewwith MAJ Richard J. Meadows, USA (Ret.), May 5, 1995.The assault force was led by Meadows, who searchedeach cell looking for prisoners.

3 Speculation continues over whether human intelli-gence verified that the prisoners were gone, and seniormembers of the joint task group refused to either con-firm or deny it. Schemmer recounts an exchange whichinvolved the Chairman, ADM Thomas H. Moorer, USN;the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, LTGDonald V. Bennett, USA; and the special assistant forcounterinsurgency and special activities on the JointStaff, BG Donald D. Blackburn, USA. According toSchemmer they discussed the recent intelligence andrecommended that the mission continue. Other sourcesalso believe that actual verification was received.

4 The summary of the plan is consolidated from Ben-jamin Kraljev, “The Son Tay Raid,” Airlift Operations Re-view (January 1981), pp. 27–31, and Schemmer, The Raid.

5 John E. Valliere, “Disaster at Desert One: Catalyst forChange,” Parameters, vol. 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), p. 78.

6 Robert L. Earl, “A Matter of Principle,” Proceedings,vol. 109, no. 2 (February 1983), p. 30.

2315Thomas 8/5/97 2:25 PM Page 124


Designed as an operational template toguide the Armed Forces, Joint Vision2010 has four major tenets: dominantmaneuver, precision engagement, full

dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Ajudicious application of technological innovationand information superiority is billed as the criti-cal enablers of this process. Any initiative of thisbreadth is bound to be controversial. Critics have

raised various points: that maneuver, strike, pro-tection, and logistics are hardly new operationalconcepts and that technology is stressed over thehuman element. But our objectives remain funda-mentally the same. What will change is how theywill be achieved.

Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen fightand win wars, not technology. All the technolog-ical sophistication in the world is of little valuewithout high quality and trained people. How-ever, technology enables the warfighter to ac-complish the mission with increased precision,lethality, and at a human, political, and eco-nomic cost we can afford. Technology goes a

Lieutenant General John J. Cusick, USA, is director for logistics (J-4), andLieutenant Colonel Donald C. Pipp, USAF, serves in the Readiness andRequirements Division (J-4), Joint Staff.

In Search of

Focused LogisticsBy J O H N J. C U S I C K and D O N A L D C. P I P P

CH–46 moving cargo fromUSS John Paul Jones.

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long way toward improving the quality of life ofwarfighters by accomplishing tasks more effec-tively and efficiently, thus allowing them to“work smarter not harder.” Focused logistics, afull partner in JV 2010, takes a basic issue andseeks the best way to provide combat support tothe warfighter. The most often quoted reasonsfor developing focused logistics are downsizing,changing threat environment, technology, andpolitical and fiscal realities. Attracting little at-tention is the fact that logisticians in all servicesare dissatisfied with the level of support providedto warfighters. They know they can be more ef-fective and efficient. They have the opportunityand high caliber people to make a genuinely evo-lutionary change in how they do business.

Air Force lean logistics and Army velocitymanagement programs are literal springboards forquantum improvements in logistics. By accelerat-ing movement of assets through transportationand repair cycles, support has been improved atless cost and confidence is building that the sys-

tem will work whenrequired. Advance-ments in strategiclift—sea and air—will go a long way

toward providing deployability, a vital element ofour military strategy. Senior leadership has suc-cessfully argued for the acquisition of C–17 air-craft and roll-on/roll-off ships. The air mobilityexpress and integrated use of commercial carriersby the Air Force are illustrations of innovationsthat provide unprecedented strategic force projec-tion capability. While we have not yet finalizedthe elements of joint reception, staging, onwardmovement, and integration or of theater distribu-tion or joint logistics command and control,there is unanimous agreement on the necessity ofmore clearly defining roles and responsibilities inthe area of force projection. Thus near-term reso-lution is probable.

Supporting the entire network from thesource of supply to point of need will be the globalcombat support system (GCSS). It is intended to dofor logisticians what the global command and con-trol system does for operators. GCSS will facilitateaccess to critical resource data anytime and any-where in the world without specific hardware. De-velopments in joint total asset visibility and in-transit visibility will culminate in quantum leapsin the effectiveness and efficiency of logistics sup-port to warfighters by providing critical resourceinformation throughout strategic, operational, andtactical levels of any military operation.

Each service has a way of ensuring logisticsconnectivity and resupply to deployed forces.Problems often arise where these methods notonly vary among the services but sometimes from

unit to unit. GCSS will provide logisticians much-needed visibility of critical resources in factoriesand wholesale locations, in transit to and from thetheater, and in storage at units both in and out oftheater. Multiple requisitioning of an item in thehope that at least one will arrive when needed willbecome a thing of the past. The logistics footprintof the future will strike a more precise balance: justin time and just in case = just enough.

New developments in automated informationtechnology will provide automated tracking of as-sets worldwide. Incorporating requirements forthis technology in the acquisition process couldoffer global visibility of assets throughout their lifecycle. These efforts are noble indeed but are of lit-tle consequence unless conscious efforts are madeto monitor progress through to completion.

The Logistics Directorate (J-4), Joint Staff, isdeveloping a focused logistics action plan to iden-tify initiatives to improve support for thewarfighter. Focused logistics takes its cue from twoprocesses: the joint warfighting capabilities assess-ment (JWCA) and the joint monthly readiness re-view (JMRR). CINCs and the services articulate is-sues that they feel have adverse impacts on theircapabilities through these processes. While theprograms require intensive management, theyhave already proven their worth as a vehicle forchanneling and resolving joint issues. They haveresulted in considerable cost savings, improvedsupport to CINCs, contributed to our goal ofbeing the premier deployer in the world, andmade significant contributions to joint logisticsoperations. While JWCA/JMRR is a key element ofthe process it is by no means the only one.

Strategic direction found in the NationalMilitary Strategy, Joint Strategy Review, JV 2010,Quadrennial Defense Review, and other planningguidance form a baseline for developing the fo-cused logistics plan. Meanwhile service visionstatements and strategic logistics plans of theCINCs, services, and Office of the Secretary ofDefense were reviewed for common themes andinnovative concepts with the intent of drawingon the many talents of strategic planners acrossthe services. Other sources included the excep-tional work done by the Defense Science Board,think tanks, and Joint Warfighting Center. Thetarget date for publishing the plan is this sum-mer after extensive coordination with CINCs andthe services.

Evolving concepts influence various dimen-sions of the operating environment, and focusedlogistics is no exception. It has major implica-tions for doctrine, organization, training, mater-ial, leadership, and personnel. Not surprisingly,

■ F O C U S E D L O G I S T I C S


the logistics footprint of the futurewill strike a more precise balance

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C u s i c k a n d P i p p


GCSS forms a common thread through theseareas. The quality of life benefits derived from fo-cused logistics are boundless: computer basedtraining, reliable modeling and simulations, stateof the art decision tools, medical readiness, assetvisibility, smart card technology, and estimates ofthe extent to which industry can provide logisticssupport. Logistics organizations will be stream-lined as the logistics footprint is adjusted andmore progress is made in areas such as logisticscommand and control and theater distribution.Logistics doctrine is being reviewed and modifiedto keep pace with rapid developments and to pro-vide overarching guidance regarding traditionalas well as developing capabilities.

The focused logistics plan will be a concisepublication of joint logistics issues of highest con-cern to CINCs and the services as identified in theJWCA process. It will provide logisticians with aconcise overview of the principal issues and pro-jects under development on behalf of the joint lo-gistics community. In addition, it will furnishmetrics for programs identified to the extent pos-sible. The plan will be a think piece for unified

commands and the services in either developingor reviewing various strategic logistics plans.

The focused logistics plan will be a livingdocument and as such will be subject to change.Its utility will not be judged by how many pagesor graphs are produced, but by validated progressin identified programs. Focused logistics is notthe latest fad to be encountered in the introduc-tion of some new regime. It is a dynamic plan ofaction as well as a state of mind that we must sus-tain throughout the joint logistics community forcombat support to the warfighter. JFQ

Pushing cargo ontoC–17 Globemaster IIIat Rhein-Main.

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When logistics cannot support anoperation all else becomes irrele-vant.2 But despite the critical roleof logistics, joint doctrine does not

provide commanders with review criteria to evalu-ate the logistic plan. Joint doctrine, however, doesgive combatant commanders a hierarchy of con-siderations for the operation plan. The principlesof war offer broad guidance for the concept devel-opment phase. Operation checklists identify lesserbut not insignificant issues that require attentionduring the execution phase. Between these twoextremes, doctrine contributes two sets of mid-level standards: operational considerations andoperation plan review criteria. Operational consid-erations address ends, ways, means, and risks.3 Forinstance, commanders should determine if mili-tary conditions produced in operational theaters

Commander (Select) Kevin R. Wheelock, USN, is director of CommodityBusiness Unit-V at the Defense Industrial Supply Center in Philadelphia.

Review Criteria for theLogistic PlanBy K E V I N R. W H E E L O C K

A sound logistic plan is the foundation upon which a war operationshould be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

—Admiral Raymond A. Spruance1

USS George Washingtonand USNS Yukon.

U.S. Navy (Jim Vidrine)

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W h e e l o c k


can achieve the strategic goal (ends) and if the se-quence of actions is likely to create the conditions(ways). Using the operation plan review criteriacommanders evaluate plans for their adequacy,feasibility, acceptability, and compliance withjoint doctrine.4 Commanders must be wary of aproposed plan that does not satisfy both opera-tional considerations and the review criteria.

Combatant commanders do not possesscomparable mid-level criteria for the logistic plan.The library of joint publications provides princi-

ples of logistics and logis-tic checklists. Betweenthe principles and check-lists one would expect re-view criteria for the logis-tic plan, a short list withprobing questions to de-

termine how well logistics will support a militaryoperation. But no such criteria exist. Comman-ders will have more confidence in an operation ifthey can evaluate the logistic plan against a sepa-rate set of criteria rooted in principles of logistics.

Review CriteriaThe proposed review criteria have four dis-

tinct characteristics. First, they define the limitsof the logistic system and available resources. Indelineating the system they defuse the inherenttension between planners and logisticians. Plan-ners must be encouraged to adopt an uncon-strained vision and develop an operation plan

that achieves strategic objectives dictated byhigher authorities. The plan designed with such avision places tremendous demands on the logisticsystem. Tension arises when logisticians comparean operation plan against the capabilities of thelogistic system and decide that the plan may notbe supportable. As Joint Pub 4-0 explains, at thatpoint planners and logisticians have reached anoperations-logistics gap. To integrate operationalintentions with logistic capabilities commandersmust bridge it and either lobby for more re-sources or pare down the plan. Resolution is im-perative. It is a basic tenet of joint doctrine thatan operation plan cannot “break” the logisticconcept without sacrificing the operation itself.

Logistics is inherently a constraint. HenryEccles once defined it as “military economics”wherein all resources are finite. Elsewhere he re-marked, “At the strategic level economic forceslimit our ability to create combat forces; opera-tional logistic factors limit our ability to employour combat forces.”5 Combatant commandersshould thus use logistic plan review criteria to de-termine the limits of the logistic system andwhere an operations-logistics gap may exist.

Second, the review criteria allow informationto be managed by exception. Once aware that lo-gisticians are resource-constrained and that re-view criteria seek to identify the limits of avail-able resources, commanders should not expectlogisticians to ignore resource constraints. Insteadlogisticians will provide exceptions that do notmeet criteria. Candid answers reduce the informa-tion for commanders to matters that demandtheir attention.

Third, these criteria fill the void previouslyidentified between the principles of logistics andthe logistic checklists. Finally, they have universalapplication. Their interpretation depends uponthe particular circumstances surrounding an oper-ation and service perspectives of both combatantcommanders and their subordinate logisticians.

ResponsivenessThe first criterion is that the plan must be re-

sponsive to force needs. Joint Pub 4-0 advises thatresponsiveness means having the right support atthe right place at the right time. Despite its limi-tations, a logistic system that answers the needsof combat forces will allow them to reach theirfull potential. To be responsive logisticians mustanticipate a range of requirements. Commandersmay need logistic mobility to support advancingforces, flexibility to sustain expanding forces, orsimply heroics to reconstitute exhausted forces.In response logisticians may apply three conceptsof operational art: the arrangement of operations,logistic discipline, and synchronization.

Military Operations Value Model

commanders should not expectlogisticians to ignore resourceconstraints

Phase Operations Logistics

ConceptDevelopment

Principles of War

Principlesof Logistics

PlanningProcess

OperationalConsiderations

Operation PlanReview Criteria

Logistic PlanReview Criteria

(Proposed)

ExecutionPhase

OperationChecklists

Logistic Checklists

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How well a logistic system responds to thedemands of the arrangement of operations willdetermine the success of phasing, the branchesand sequels, and ultimately the timing, tempo,and momentum of an operation. Since the out-come of any phase is uncertain, each hasbranches and/or sequels of its own. To be respon-sive logisticians must marshal logistic support ac-cordingly for each phase and all possiblebranches and sequels. Anticipating suchprospects, they may ascertain that the logistic sys-tem cannot accommodate the unique demandsfor a particular branch or sequel. Time and dis-tance factors or availability of critical items maylimit support.

The calculus of logistic support is furthercomplicated by the uncertainty arising when onephase transitions to the next. How quickly canthe system respond? For instance, phases may besequential or concurrent. If in the fog of warphases planned as sequential become concurrent,logistic needs will multiply across the support

spectrum. During the development of a responseto the first criterion, logisticians may find thatsupport is impossible if planned sequential opera-tions (logistically supportable) become concur-rent (and perhaps insupportable).

The Logistic SnowballResponsiveness is a hostage to logistic disci-

pline. Since transport, supplies, and logistic per-sonnel will always be limited, they must be dis-tributed to best meet the requirements of combatforces and the arrangement of operations. Logis-tic discipline promotes economy, efficiency, andeffectiveness. But its absence can ultimately cre-ate a logistic snowball, “a huge accumulation ofslush [that] obscures the hard core of essentialcombat support.”6 If combat or logistic resourcesare not allocated appropriately, additional re-sources must be expended to reallocate them to

C–5 delivering suppliesduring SouthernWatch.

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combat forces in need. Expediting material con-sumes time and other resources to pinpoint andmove a handful of critical supplies. A logistic sys-tem that is not disciplined and must consume ad-ditional resources to overcome the logistic snow-ball cannot respond as well to the operationalneeds of a commander.

Logisticians must be sensitive to synchro-nization and its associated demands for respon-sive logistic support. Synchronization suggeststhere is a decisive time and place where combatforces will produce maximum relative combat

power against enemyforces. Unfortunately, thisposes a dilemma. Achiev-ing maximum relativecombat power in a syn-chronized maneuver, com-bat forces will simultane-

ously generate the greatest logistical demands forsustainment. At the peak of battle resource avail-ability will be at a premium. Resources needed toschedule, arrange, transport, and distribute sup-plies may not be readily available or could be ob-structed by the proximity of combat. Thus syn-chronization may bring combat forces to theirculmination point before the logistic system canresupply them. A system that does not resupplybefore the culminating point is unresponsive.

General Walter Bedell Smith, USA, describedthe difficulty of coordinating logistics with themovement of combat forces. “It is no great matterto change tactical plans in a hurry and to sendtroops off in new directions. But adjusting supplyplans to the altered tactical scheme is far moredifficult.”7 This challenge does not diminish theneed for logistic support to be responsive to thedemands generated by the arrangement of opera-tions and synchronization. Combat forces that donot receive the right support at the right place atthe right time may be placed in grave danger.Thus, as Joint Pub 4-0 describes, responsiveness isthe most important of the seven principles of lo-gistics and the centerpiece of the first logisticplan review criterion.

SustainmentThe second criterion is that the plan should

sustain the force. The concepts of sustainabilityand sustainment appear throughout joint doc-trine. Sustainment is pivotal to operational logis-tics,8 and sustainment planning is one of the fivepillars of joint operation planning.9 In addition,it is a principle of logistics that can be measuredin terms of “availability” or “days of support.”

Operational art provides a myriad of issuesto consider regarding the sustainment of combatforces. For instance, logisticians will encountergreat difficulties in supporting troops that con-

duct forcible entries into immature theaters. Lightforces with limited supplies are inserted initiallyand their success often depends upon prompt ar-rival of properly balanced combat and supportforces. If operations security is critical, combatantcommanders may delay follow-on logistic prepa-rations to conceal operational intentions.

In an immature theater logistic intelligenceis required to determine the extent of in-countryresources. Absent host nation support logisticiansmust develop an infrastructure to support theforces. They must be flexible and balance a myr-iad of issues, including survivability of the logis-tic system, needs of expanding forces, and avoid-ance of bottlenecks.10 Viewing a logistics systemas a critical vulnerability, an enemy may attack itand its sustainment capabilities. Operations andlogistics must be closely coordinated to ensuresurvivability of such systems.

According to Eccles, “Logistics is the creationand sustained support of combat forces andweapons. Its objective is maximum sustainedcombat effectiveness.”11 Logistics may even dic-tate the options available to commanders whenforcibly entering an immature theater. The fol-lowing is a description of planning for OperationOverlord:

Logistics was greatly responsible for the preference ofAmerican military chiefs for a cross-Channel attackfor the main effort as opposed to a Mediterranean orother approach on the Continent. . . . Logistics domi-nated the definition of objectives, the choice of land-ing sites, the size of the assault force, and plans forbuilding up the initial forces and pushing inland.12

Sustainment of forces ashore was critical be-cause “the men who planned Operation Overlordwere well aware that the success of an eventualAllied invasion of Europe would depend above allon their ability to feed in troops and equipmentat a higher rate than the enemy.”13 Regardless ofthe theater (mature or immature), type of opera-tion (forcible or permissive entry), or type of war-fare (attrition or maneuver, conventional or spe-cial operations), sustainability and sustainmentare the crux of successful military operations andof the second review criterion.

Logistic Culminating PointsThe third criterion is determining the logistic

culminating points. Joint Pub 3-0 indicates that lo-gistics fixes the operational reach of combatforces—the distance over which military powercan be concentrated and employed decisively. Itcan extend operational reach by forward basing,transport, effective lines of communication, and throughput of supplies. It also dictates the

logisticians will encountergreat difficulties in supportingforcible entries

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characteristics of operational reach, including thesize of combat forces, depth of attack, and speed ofadvance. With operational reach combat forcescan achieve positional advantage relative to theenemy center of gravity. “The ability to maneu-ver,” according to Joint Pub 3-0, “must be a traitnot only of combat forces but also of the logisticresources that support them.”

Operational reach has a finite range beyondwhich a logistic system cannot support forces. Atthat point where the offensive becomes logisticallyoverextended forces encounter the logistic culmi-nating point. Beyond it, offensive combat powerno longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defendersto continue the thrust and consequently freedomof action is inhibited. Joint Pub 3-0 provides opera-tional logisticians with a prescription to preventthe arrival of the culminating point:

Synchronization of logistics with combat operationscan forestall culmination. . . . At both tactical and op-erational levels, theater logistic planners forecast thedrain on resources associated with conducting opera-tions over extended distance and time. They respondby generating enough military resources at the righttimes and places to enable their commanders toachieve strategic objectives before reaching their cul-minating point. If the commanders cannot do so, theyshould rethink their concept of operations.

More than one logistic culminating pointmay exist. A short supply of ammunition, fuel, orsome commodity may create its own. Logisticiansmust identify such points to combatant comman-ders. Otherwise, past any culminating point logis-tics starts to command the commanders.

Operational RisksThe next criterion is identifying the risks in

executing the plan. Combat operations requireprudent risk management. Combatant comman-ders must weigh the risk associated with move-ment or positioning of forces against expectedbenefits and may elect to either reduce that risk

or accept it to achieve some objective. Logisticculminating points are the ultimate risk and areaccorded their own logistic plan review criterion.But the logistic plan has other risks. The tempo ofoperations may cause forces to expand faster thanwhat the logistic system can support, bottlenecksin supply distribution, or loss of asset visibility intheater. Moreover, the system is vulnerable to di-rect and indirect attacks on friendly lines of com-munication, operational fires directed at friendlylogistic infrastructure, political decisions that af-fect access to host nation support, loss of logisticcommand and control systems, and the effects ofinformation warfare.

In addition to operational risks, the logisticplan may not adhere to the remaining principlesof logistics. It may not be flexible, simple, eco-nomical, or survivable, and there may be linger-ing doubts about whether it is attainable. This cri-terion should identify the risks for commanderswho must assess them and plan accordingly. AsSir Archibald Wavell observed, “A real knowledgeof supply and movement factors must be thebasis of every leader’s plan; only then can heknow how and when to take risks with those fac-tors, and battles are won only by taking risks.”

“a real knowledge of supply andmovement factors must be the basisof every leader’s plan”

Landing ships in Italy, 1944.

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Meeting the UnexpectedThe fifth criterion is that there must be

ample resources to react to unplanned contingencies.Logisticians can never have sufficient resources torespond to every conceivable contingency. Butcareful analysis should reveal which requirementsare likely and which can and cannot be satisfied.This analysis may persuade commanders to fol-low a less risky course. Logisticians who can affectoperational decisions have mastery over logistics.Equally important, they avoid a course that cancreate a logistic bottleneck and enslave logisti-cians, commanders, and forces to logistics.

For example, suppose a commander intendsto execute action “A” to initiate battle. It has ahighly desired strategic endstate but may gener-ate substantial casualties. The logistician antici-pates that they would inundate in-theater med-ical units and that the additional medical assetsrequired to be flown in would overwhelm thetransport and distribution system. He envisionsthat this logistic bottleneck will develop into aformidable problem. The airlift system from thestrategic to tactical theaters would have to adaptto a new and more urgent priority of transportingmedical resources. Airlift assets would have to berescheduled, unloaded, reloaded, flown into the-ater, and compete with other missions for mater-ial-handling equipment, cargo-handling person-nel, warehousing, and distribution. Dedicatingsuch assets to a more robust medical infrastruc-ture leaves fewer to sustain combat forces. In ad-dition, the lead time for other critical nonmedicalsupplies increases.

Logisticians must inform commanders of thesufficiency of in-theater resources to react to anunplanned contingency, the risk of creating a lo-gistic bottleneck as friendly forces react to thiscontingency, and the second and third order ef-fects on the sustainment of combat forces.

The logistic plan review criteria provide anagenda for both commanders and logisticians todiscuss the merits and hazards of the logisticplan. They define the limits of the logistic systemto support an operation beyond which comman-ders incur additional and possibly unacceptablerisks. The criteria are not intended to make logis-ticians arbiters between the feasible and the infea-sible. Nor are logisticians expected to respondrecklessly or boast of capabilities the system can-not deliver.

On the other hand, logisticians must be ableto convincingly discuss the ability or inability ofa logistic system to respond to and sustain com-bat forces. Fortitude is needed to identify boththe culminating points and risks associated withmilitary options. In addition, they must candidlyexplain to what degree a logistic system can react

to unplanned contingencies. Using these criteriato identify limits and risks, the greatest contribu-tion made by logisticians is helping commandersto see the most viable course, isolate its logisticrisks, and bridge the operations-logistics gap.Armed with logistic plan review criteria, combat-ant commanders can quickly identify the criticallogistic issues and determine if the logistic plansupports the operation plan. A sound operationplan must have adequate logistic support. As Ad-miral Spruance reminded us, if combat forces donot receive adequate logistic support operationswill suffer and may ultimately fail. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics(1995), p. 33.

2 Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of JointOperations (1995), p. II–1.

3 See Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations(1995), p. II-3.

4 Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations(1995), pp. I-13 through I-14.

5 Henry E. Eccles, Logistic Research Notes (Washing-ton: The George Washington University Logistics Re-search Project, 1961), p. 3.

6 Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965),pp. 83–85.

7 Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Six Great Deci-sions (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company,1956), p. 82.

8 Operational logistics “encompasses those supportactivities required to sustain campaigns and major oper-ations,” according to FM 100-5, Operations, p. 12-3.

9 The pillars are mobilization, deployment, employ-ment, sustainment, and redeployment planning. SeeJoint Pub 5-0, p. I-3.

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Capstone andKeystone Primer (1995), p. 60.

11 Eccles, Logistic Research Notes, p. 22.12 James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics

1775–1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office,1966), p. 523.

13 Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics fromWallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1977), p. 206.

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■ O F C H I E F S A N D C H A I R M E N

General George Scratchley Brown(1918–1978)

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air ForceChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Montclair, New Jersey; graduated from Military Academy (1941); flying school, Pine Bluff andKelly Field (1941–42); B–24 pilot, 344th and 329th Bombardment Squadrons (1941–42); 93d Bombard-ment Group, Libya (1943–44); 2d Bombardment Division, England (1944–45); Army Air Force Train-ing Command (1945–46); Air Defense

Command/Continental Air Command(1945–50); commander, 62d Troop Carrier Group(1950–51); commander, 56th Fighter InterceptorWing and 4708th Defense Wing (1951–52); assis-tant director and director of operations, Fifth AirForce, Korea (1952–53); commander, 3525th PilotTraining Wing (1953–56); student, National WarCollege (1956–57); executive assistant to chief ofstaff of the Air Force (1957–59); military assis-tant to Deputy Secretary and Secretary of De-fense (1959–63); commander, Eastern TransportAir Force (1963–64); commander, Joint TaskForce II (1964–66); assistant to Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff (1966–68); commander, SeventhAir Force, and deputy commander for air opera-tions, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam(1968–70); commander, Air Force Systems Com-mand (1970–73); chief of staff of the Air Force(1973–74); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff(1974–78); died in Washington.

The American military has no separate life of its own. It is not an end in itself, butsimply a means to the end of protecting and preserving our national security. In the final analysis, it is the American people who determine our national goals and objectives, including the defense and security of our Nation. The Armed Forcesare the instruments of the people. They are constituted and supported by the electedrepresentatives of the people, and serve to achieve national goals.

—Armed Forces Day address by George S. Brown,delivered in Phoenix, Arizona (May 15, 1975)

Portrait by Maxine McCaffrey.

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Doctrine

JOINT DOCTRINEWORKING PARTY

The 19th meeting of the joint doc-trine working party (JDWP) was hostedby the Joint Warfighting Center at FortMonroe on April 1–2. Attended by repre-sentatives of unified commands, services,Joint Staff, and doctrine developmentcenters, the meeting was briefed on jointdoctrine proposals and approved the fol-lowing decisions:

■ cancel Joint Pub 3-09.2, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures [JTTP] for GroundRadar Beacon Operations

■ cancel Joint Pub 1-01.2, Joint ElectronicLibrary Users Guide

■ conduct an early revision of Joint Pub 4-01.5, JTTP for Water Terminal Operations,to include the single port manager concept

■ consider expanding the concept of operational maneuver during the revision ofJoint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

■ include the concept of consequencemanagement in Joint Pub 3-07.6, JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and Joint Pub 3-07.7, JTTP for Domestic Support Operations

■ develop a JTTP publication for legalsupport to military operations

■ include post-hostilities guidance inJoint Pubs 3-0, 3-07.3, 3-57, 5-0, 5-00.1, and5-00.2.

In other areas, JDWP agreed that thejoint doctrine electronic information sys-tem should be recommended to theChairman as a means of reorganizing thejoint doctrine hierarchy. A series of en-hancements to the joint doctrine devel-opment system were approved to includeposting changes on the World Wide Web,using the Joint Doctrine Web Site to staffdraft pubs, and making combatant com-mands part of the process of coordinat-ing final versions of joint pubs.

The next JDWP meeting will heldon October 28–29, 1997. JFQ

Education

NONRESIDENT PMEThe College of Continuing Educa-

tion (CCE) of the Naval War College willconduct its nonresident seminar programat 17 locations during 1996–97. CCEseminar students who complete corecourses in strategy and policy, nationalsecurity decisionmaking, and joint mar-itime operations receive an diploma andcredit for phase 1 of the program forjoint education (PJE).

A nonresident program informationguide with enrollment details is availableby calling (401) 841–6528/DSN 948–6528or via e-mail at [email protected].

JFQ

NATO COURSEOfficers about to embark on their

first NATO staff assignment or who dealwith European security affairs are encour-aged to enroll in the NATO Staff OfficerOrientation Course (NSOOC) offered bythe Institute for National Strategic Studiesat the National Defense University. Estab-lished in 1987 under CJCS Instruction1210.01, the course is an intense two-week program of instruction which isconducted seven times per year. It ismandatory for all O-4s through O-6sbeing assigned to NATO headquarters andagencies in Europe and North America.

This course is also useful for bothmilitary officers and civilians who serveon the staffs of commands and agenciesresponsible for NATO/European affairs,including the Joint Staff, Office of theSecretary of Defense, and Department ofState. Military attachés assigned to U.S.missions and students en route to staffand war colleges in Europe can also bene-fit from the program.

The NSOOC staff is also availablefor “outreach training” through con-densed presentations on NATO specifi-cally tailored to customer needs whichcan be provided to U.S. Governmentagencies and military organizations in-cluding the Reserve components.

For details on upcoming coursedates and registration contact: NationalDefense University, ATTN: NDU–NSS–NSOOC, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62),Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.23019–5055; telephone: (202) 685–3828/DSN 325–3828; Fax: (202) 685–3829/DSN 325–3829; e-mail: [email protected].

JFQ

History

JOINT HISTORY ON-LINE

Several titles issued by the Joint His-tory Office are now available on the JointDoctrine Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. Click on the Joint Elec-tronic Library for the following publica-tions: The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, The Development of the Base Force,The History of the Unified Command Plan,and Operation Just Cause. JFQ

For your reference shelf . . .A new edition of Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint StaffOfficer’s Guide 1997, is now available. This illustrated 450-page volumeprovides a comprehensive summary of details on joint planning and

execution that cannot be found elsewhere. It presentsan overview of the players, processes, and proceduresused in the joint arena as well as a wide range ofreference material of interest to joint staffs as well asofficers in the field and fleet.

AFSC Pub 1 can be found on the Internet (at www.afsc.edu) and also can be accessed throughthe Joint Electronic Library. Copies are for sale fromthe Superintendent of Documents at $38.00 each by writing to: U.S. Government Printing Office,Washington, D.C. 20402, or phoning (202) 512–1800[GPO stock no. 008–020–01422–2]. In addition, it

may be purchased from the Defense Automated PrintingService (DAPS) for $14.00 by contacting Don Mruk in San Diego, California, at (619) 556–7187/ DSN 526–7187 or Everett Morton in Norfolk, Virginia, at(757) 444–7724 / DSN 464–7724 (extension 19). JFQ

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Lieutenant Colonel Sean J. Byrne, USA(Army War College)

“Defense of Sovereignty: Domestic Operations, Legal Precedents, and Institutional Confusion”

Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Fox, Jr., USA(Army War College)

“Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa:The DOD ‘Point of the Spear’ for Engagement

and Enlargement”

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Kaufmann, USA(Industrial College of the Armed Forces)

“Fractured Synthesis: The Military’s Encounter with Postmodernism”

Lieutenant Colonel Martha J.M. Kelley, USAF(Air War College)

“Into the 21st Century: Solving the Air Force’s Problems of Gender Differences and Leadership”

Captain Christopher P. McNamara, USN(National War College)

“Breathing New Life into Dead Reckoning: A Proposal for the Next National Security Strategy”

Lieutenant Colonel David M. Riester, USAF(Marine Corps War College)

“Spacelift: Search for a National Vision”

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell S. Ross, USA(Army War College)

“National Information Systems: The Achilles Heel of National Security”

Lieutenant Colonel Randal G. Tart, USA(Army War College)

“Civil-Military Relations and General Maxwell Taylor:Getting it Right and Getting it Wrong!”

Colonel Cliff Tooley, USA(Army War College)

“The Machine Nexus: Institutional Bias Against a Capabilities-Based Force”

1997CJCS Essay CompetitionThe 16th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strat-egy Essay Competition was conducted on May 22–23 at theNational Defense University. This event challenges studentsat intermediate and senior colleges to write on some aspectof international security, defense policy, or military affairs,with special emphasis on joint topics.

F I R S T P L A C E E S S A Y

Commander Jeffrey Kline, USN(National War College)

“Joint Vision 2010 and Accelerated Cumulative Warfare: The Masters of War Evaluate a Future Strategy”

D I S T I N G U I S H E D E S S A Y S

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O F F T H E S H E L F ■


JOINTNESS INDEFENCE OF THEREALMA Review Essay by

JEREMY R. STOCKER

Britain remains America’s strongest andclosest ally today. Increasing U.S. in-

terest in the Asia-Pacific region andgreater, if often reluctant, British involve-ment in Europe have not altered thatstrategic reality. Although no one canpretend that it is a relationship of equals,cooperation on intelligence, nuclear, andmaritime issues is close. Many post-ColdWar problems facing the U.S. military areechoed in Britain, though with a some-what different geographic and culturalemphasis as well as a wide disparity ofscale. Downsizing and jointness domi-nate British defense policy much as theydo that of the United States.

In Britain, adjustment to the loss ofempire and world power status broughtabout a defense policy closely focused onthe security of Western Europe throughNATO and the so-called “special relation-ship” with the United States. For the lat-ter half of the Cold War, Conservativeand Labor governments rested defensepolicy on four pillars: defense of theUnited Kingdom, a contribution to thedefense of Western Europe (especiallyGermany), the security of the eastern At-lantic, and a separate nuclear deterrentbased on the Polaris system. Residualout-of-area commitments (such as HongKong and the Falklands) and wider inter-ests were covered by forces earmarkedprimarily for NATO. Defense spending asa proportion of GDP, though much lowerthan in the United States, remained con-sistently higher than in nearly any otherEuropean NATO nation.

Post-Cold WarEvents since 1989 have brought a

significant shift in British defense and se-curity policies and in the forces intended

to implement them. The late Conserva-tive government introduced “front linefirst” that sought to maintain operationalstrengths as high as a falling defense bud-get allows, but at the expense of muchsupport and training infrastructure. Thedrive for operational efficiency was givenadded impetus by the Defence CostsStudy that has, among other measures,introduced commercial practices, de-volved budgeting, and agency status tomany support activities within the de-fense establishment. The defense budgethas fallen steadily in recent years, repre-senting about 2.8 percent of GDP today,down from nearly double that figure adecade ago. Military personnel have beenreduced from nearly 300,000 to214,000—half in the Army, the rest di-vided among the Royal Navy, Marines,

and Air Force. Peacetime force commit-ments to the NATO Central Front in Ger-many have been significantly scaleddown and will eventually include with-drawal of all fixed-wing aircraft to theUnited Kingdom.

British defense policy now has amuch more explicit world-wide emphasisthan at any time during the last thirtyyears. Power projection and expedi-tionary warfare are back in vogue, havingbeen taboo terms for many years. Forcereductions have not hit the marines orairborne forces, and the Royal Navy’smodest carrier force has not been af-fected by the cuts in the frigate/destroyerand submarine fleets. The Royal Air Force

has enhanced and modernized air trans-port and tanker fleets. New amphibiousships, plans for larger replacement carri-ers and aircraft, and the purchase ofTomahawk missiles all demonstrate thenew focus of defense planning.

NATO, however, remains the centralfocus of Britain’s security. Changes as aresult of the end of the Cold War haveprofoundly affected contributions to theAlliance. The commander and over 60percent of the headquarters personnel ofthe new Allied Rapid Reaction Corps areBritish. Altogether, some 55,000 troopsare assigned to this corps, principally l Armoured Division based in Germanyand 3 Division (mechanized) in theUnited Kingdom. Danish, Dutch, andItalian units also come under those divi-sions when assigned. Britain also con-tributes 24 Airmobile Brigade to Multina-tional Division (Central).

Force StructureThese changes have led to the devel-

opment of a regular force structure worthnoting (see the accompanying figure).The reserve force of 60,000 personnelprovide the Army with a further 70 regi-ments and battalions, and relatively fewindividuals supplement the regular RoyalNavy and Royal Air Force, many of themspecialists. Recent legislation updated thestatus of the reserves and gave the ser-vices greater flexibility in the call up ofselected reservists in peacetime. Reservepersonnel have recently been deployedoperationally, notably in the former Yu-goslavia and the Falklands.

By comparison, the division of tasksand assets among the British services issomewhat different from the U.S. mili-tary. Maritime patrol aircraft and supporthelicopters are, for purely historical rea-sons, flown by the Royal Air Force. In anera of increasing jointness this ought tobe progressively less important, althoughit does impose a joint problem where(conceptually at least) none need exist.The disruption from any change of own-ership of such assets probably outweighslikely gains. Britain does not have a coastguard, and management and control ofoffshore assets and responsibilities is agood deal less tidy than in the UnitedStates. Most patrol vessels (what the U.S.Coast Guard calls cutters) are operated bythe Royal Navy, search and rescue heli-copters by the Royal Air Force, and otherassets by various government depart-ments, civilian contractors, and even acharitable organization (the Royal Na-tional Lifeboat Institution). All (not just

Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01,British Defence Doctrine

London: Ministry of Defence, January 1997. 178 pp.[ISBN 0–85516–150–7]

Lieutenant Commander Jeremy R. Stocker,Royal Naval Reserve, is a postgraduatestudent at the University of Hull.

Min

istr

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Def

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some, as in the United States) afloat sup-port ships and some amphibious ships,are civilian-manned, although hydro-graphic survey work is undertaken by theRoyal Navy itself.

DoctrineOne growth area in British defense

is doctrine. Traditionally a concept asso-ciated mainly with the Army, all threeservices have recently produced new or updated doctrine publications, followednow by the appearance of Joint WarfarePublication (JWP) 0-01, British DefenceDoctrine. The introduction to JWP 0-01explains the nature of doctrine and itsplace in the conduct of our business.

Doctrine is “that which is taught.” It “isinformative, whereas policy is essentiallyprescriptive.” What is more it resultsfrom hard-won experience. Doctrine “isenduring” but “not unchanging.” It un-derlies everything we do, from formulat-ing policy and plans to executing tasks. Itis, if you like, the philosophy of Britishdefense. The publication attempts tobring together strategic and operationalconcepts common to all aspects usingmilitary force, introducing previously un-familiar terms and ideas to each service.British Defence Doctrine inevitably hassomething of the feel of a basic text. Thatpoints to the roles of such a book: part ofan officer’s essential military education, ameans to influence public, political, andacademic opinion, and a medium for ex-ercising influence abroad.

The second chapter of this jointpublication examines the nature of warand armed conflict and reminds us thatwarfare is the essence of the profession ofarms, but also that it is necessarily both apolitical act and a limited one. What wedo is for political reasons and must belimited by political requirements, frustrat-ing though that can be for the militarymind. Moving to a description of strategy,JWP 0-01 discusses ends, ways, andmeans. These are essentially what is to bedone, how it is to be done, and what in-struments are to be employed. The politi-cal character of strategy is again stressed,particularly where international consen-sus and legality are essential. There arealso short definitions of information war-fare (IW) and command and control war-fare (C2W), but it is not altogether clearjust what the difference is. Large portionsof the respective definitions could be ex-changed with no appreciable change inmeaning. Although both subjects are verymuch part of warfare in the 1990s, noone in Britain seems to have firmly estab-lished what IW is that C2W is not already.There is a short section on the politico-legal implications of targeting policywhich, it is interesting to note, is to be re-tained on “the strategic level.”

A chapter on security and defenseponders the relationship between these levels of activity. Security is con-cerned with territorial integrity and pur-suit of legitimate interests at home andabroad whereas “defence policy supportssecurity policy.” It determines strategyand force planning and both protectsand promotes security interests.

JWP 0-01 moves on to cover mili-tary capabilities by discussing the typesof operations that the services may be re-quired to perform. They include combat,deterrence, support to diplomacy, home

defense, military aid to the civil authori-ties, noncombatant evacuations, human-itarian aid, arms control monitoring, andpublic and ceremonial duties. To mountthis range of tasks, different categories offorces are used. Permanently committedforces are dedicated to their tasks on aday-to-day basis, such as nuclear deter-rence. National contingency forces aretasked to meet challenges to national in-terests or to international peace and sta-bility. Finally, there are forces for generalwar, a “regeneration and reconstitution”capability “within the warning timelikely to be available.” This must be ofparticular concern since “front line first”emphasizes the maintenance of forces inbeing at the expense of support infra-structure, which is precisely what isneeded to “regenerate.”

British policy features three defenseroles in lieu of the four pillars of the lateCold War era:

■ role one—ensure the protection andsecurity of the United Kingdom and depen-dent territories even when there is no majorexternal threat

■ role two—insure against a major exter-nal threat to the United Kingdom and our allies

■ role three—contribute to promotingthe wider security interests of the United King-dom through the maintenance of interna-tional peace and stability.

Each of these roles is broken intospecific military tasks such as MT 1.7, theprovision of military aid to the civil com-munity; MT 2.4, air immediate reactionforces; and MT 3.7, the provision of amilitary contribution to operationsunder international auspices.

The seven mission types on whichBritish forces may be employed in imple-menting these defense roles and tasks asoutlined in the latest annual Statement onthe Defence Estimates include:

■ military aid to the civil authorities inthe United Kingdom (such as Northern Ireland)

■ internal and external security of de-pendent territories or overseas possessions(such as the Falklands)

■ contributions to new NATO and West-ern European Union (WEU) missions (such asBosnia)

■ other military assistance and limitedoperations to support British interests and in-ternational order and humanitarian principles(such as Angola)

■ a serious conflict (but not an attack onNATO) which could adversely affect Europeansecurity, British interests elsewhere, or interna-tional security (such as the Gulf War)

■ a limited regional conflict involving aNATO ally who calls for assistance under arti-cle 5 of the Washington Treaty

■ general war—a large scale attackagainst NATO.



Army41 infantry battalions11 armored and armored reconnaissance

regiments (900 tanks)16 artillery regiments (530 guns plus MLRS)10 engineer regiments5 army air corps regiments (280 helicopters)

12 signals regiments1 special air service (SAS) regiment1 NATO corps headquarters2 divisional headquarters

20 brigade headquartersRoyal Navy and Royal Marines

4 ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with Trident D5

12 nuclear attack submarines (SSN)3 V/STOL light aircraft carriers (CVSG)

10 amphibious and sealift ships(LPH/LPD/LSL/roll-on, roll-off)

35 escorts (DDG/FFG)18 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMV),

increasing to 2519 fleet air arm squadrons (170 aircraft: Sea

Harriers and helicopters)1 marine commando brigade5 special boat squadrons (SBS) plus afloat

support, survey, and patrol vesselsRoyal Air Force

18 attack and reconnaissance squadrons(Tornado/Jaguar/Harrier)

7 air defense squadrons (Tornado)4 maritime patrol squadrons (Nimrod)2 airborne early warning squadrons

(E3D Sentry)9 transport and tanker squadrons

(Tristar/Hercules/VC10)13 helicopter squadrons (Chinook/Sea King/

Puma/Wessex) plus training, support, andsurface to air missile (Rapier) units

British Armed Forces

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Still under development, apparentlywith some difficulty, is JWP 0-10, UnitedKingdom Doctrine for Joint and CombinedOperations, which will cover operationalas opposed to strategic doctrine. On thetactical level, Britain has a good deal ofjoint doctrine and abundant procedures.In air defense, for example, the RoyalNavy and Royal Air Force have workedclosely together for many years, to someextent as a result of the demise of partsof naval air defenses when large conven-tional strike carriers were phased out inthe 1960s and 1970s. Royal Navy antiairwarfare destroyers and Sea Harrier-equipped light carriers are fully inte-grated into the United Kingdom Air De-fense Region using NATO coordinatedair-sea procedures developed and provenin Britain.

Joint rules of engagement have re-placed the separate service rules of a fewyears ago. Aircraft procurement, mainte-nance, and training are increasingly coordinated among the services, withRoyal Air Force fast jets (Harrier GR7s)operating today from a carrier (HMS Illus-trious) in the Far East, alongside RoyalNavy Sea Harrier F/A2s.

Joint DevelopmentsThe services have become increas-

ingly coordinated and in some ways in-tegrated over the last thirty years or so, aprocess that has accelerated in recentyears for much the same reasons as inthe United States. Separate governmentministries (War Office, Admiralty, andAir Ministry) were abolished in the

1960s in favor of a single Ministry of De-fence (the DOD level in Americanterms). The purple Central Staff has beenprogressively strengthened at the ex-pense of service staffs, and the serviceslost their ministers in the early 1980s(who were equivalent to pre-1947 cabi-net-level Secretaries of War and Navy inthe United States), though the three ser-vice chiefs and their modest staffs havebeen retained to address service-uniquematters. The Chief of the Defence Staff(a post equal to the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff), is now principal militaryadvisor to the government.

Britain does not have a systemequivalent to the unified command planin the United States because of its moremodest force structure and regional com-mitments. In peacetime, each service hasthree commands to deal broadly with operations, materiel, and personnel. Con-trol of operational forces, however, is al-most totally joint. Prior to last year jointoperations were run by whichever serviceheadquarters was most appropriate. Re-covery of the Falkland Islands, known asOperation Corporate, was controlled fromFleet Headquarters at Northwood, whileBritain’s contribution to Desert Shield/Desert Storm (alias Operation Granby)was conducted from Royal Air ForceStrike Command Headquarters at HighWycombe. Such ad hoc arrangementswere ended in April 1996 with the establishment of Permanent Joint Head-quarters (PJHQ) at Northwood in the

northwestern suburbs of London, whichstands alongside the existing nationaland NATO maritime headquarters. PJHQwill predict, plan, and conduct joint (andcontributions to combined joint) opera-tions, using forces provided by the indi-vidual services. Moreover, PJHQ is respon-sible for developing joint warfaredoctrine, procedures, operational stan-dards, training, and exercises. To an ex-tent, it may be seen as a single Britishequivalent of several unified commandsunder the U.S. system.

The principal tool of PJHQ is thenewly-formed Joint Rapid DeploymentForce (JRDF) that will fulfil a range ofmissions, mounted nationally or as acontribution to NATO, WEU, coalition,or U.N. operations. While no units arepermanently assigned to JRDF, its core is3 Commando Brigade of the RoyalMarines and 5 Airborne Brigade from theArmy, which incidentally were the prin-cipal land force elements in the Falklandscampaign of 1982. Other assets will bedrawn from the national contingencyforces of all three services as required(such as a carrier task group or an ar-mored division). Royal Navy amphibiouslift (of broadly brigade-size capability)and the Royal Air Force’s air transportfleet (mainly C–130s) are integral to theJRDF concept. Both PJHQ and JRDF wereexercised last year during Purple Star inNorth Carolina.

This year also sees the demise of theindividual service staff colleges, with theformation of the Joint Services Com-mand and Staff College. Initially in tem-porary accommodation on the site of theold Royal Air Force Staff College at Brack-nell to the west of London, it will even-tually have a permanent home atShrivenham in western England.

Technological HorizonThe RMA debate in America is being

followed with considerable interest onthe other side of the Atlantic. In generaltwo themes dominate British and Euro-pean views on RMA. The first is a some-what skeptical view on the true impactand importance of new technologies infundamentally altering the nature of war.European strategic and military culturestend to be less technologically-focusedand consequently give less weight to thesignificance of technology. On the otherhand, there is increasing concern that ifBritain is to continue to operate in themajor league but cannot afford to de-velop or acquire new systems, it must atleast do enough to maintain compatibil-ity and connectivity with the U.S. mili-tary. Britain is probably better placed to

Gurkhas making house call at Camp Lejeune,CJTF ‘96.

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do this than many other U.S. allies whichhave even more modest defense re-sources and force structures.

On the related issue of defense co-operation, Britain continues to be tornbetween being the junior partner intransatlantic projects such as the jointstrike fighter, and having a stronger butstill minority role in European projectssuch as transport/tanker aircraft and theBritish-French-Italian Project Horizon forantiair warfare ships. While there are in-creasing political imperatives to joiningEuropean defense projects, the militaryand financial advantages of working withthe United States remain considerable.Needless to say, Britain remains deeplysuspicious of any European defense andsecurity identity (ESDI) if it threatens toundermine NATO primacy.

It would be wrong to pretend thatthe British defense establishment is allone might wish. Resource constraints inrecent years have been severe, and whilethe new Labor government has criticizedaspects of the last administration’s de-fense policy, including an overstretch offorces, it seems unwilling to do muchabout it. There will not be additionalmoney for defense, and a further budgetsqueeze is quite possible. Labor promiseda comprehensive defense and security re-view in its first six months, but broadsupport for the major tenets of the lastgovernment’s approach has been ex-pressed. These include maintenance ofthe nuclear deterrent, active involvementin U.N. and other peace operations, andan intervention/expeditionary warfarecapability.

The British military has faced muchchange and turmoil in recent years, andconsolidation is needed and promised.Some overdue rationalization of the de-fense establishment has certainly takenplace, but there are concerns about someaspects of sustainability and regenerationcapability. Interservice cooperation isgreater and more effective than at anytime in the past, although interservice ri-valries can still be strong and active com-petition for scarce resources has certainlynot gone away. Greater emphasis on joint-ness has not come at the expense of com-bined operations, and Britain’s interactionwith its NATO allies is undiminished.

JWP 0-01 elucidates the warfightingdoctrine of the “other” half of the Anglo-American special relationship against abackground of change in the defense es-tablishments of both countries. As jointdoctrine, this new publication shouldstrike a familiar cord within the U.S.Armed Forces. JFQ

JOINT TRAINING FOR MOOTWA Book Review by

SHAWN C. WHETSTONE

Actions placed under the nebulousrubric of military operations other

than war (MOOTW) make up a rapidlygrowing share of missions conducted bythe Armed Forces. U.S. interventionforces often find themselves in situationsthat intermix political and military ob-jectives, combatants and civilians. Howdo soldiers prepare for these exigencies?The Battle for Hunger Hill provides an in-sight into the demands of MOOTW andtheir effects on the men and women whomust conduct them. Drawing on the ex-perience of leading an air assault infantrybattalion through two rotations at theJoint Readiness Training Center (JRTC),Lieutenant Colonel Daniel P. Bolger, USA(currently an operations officer with the101st Airborne Division) derives lessonson the nature of leadership and tacticsrequired under such conditions.

Located at Fort Polk, Louisiana, JRTC is peopled with villagers, hunters,farmers, reporters, relief workers, andguerrillas who create a scene increasinglyfamiliar to the U.S. military. This is thefictitious island of Aragon which is com-prised of three countries: pro-AmericanCortina, neutral Victoria, and Marxist At-lantica. Conventional Atlantican govern-ment forces and guerrillas of the Cortin-ian Liberation Front provide the opposingforces. American intervention involves allservices including close air support by theAir Force and naval gunfire which is tar-geted by Marine liaison teams.

It is into this setting that Bolger leadsmembers of 1st Battalion, 327th InfantryRegiment in September 1994. The unitfights as an element of 3d Brigade, 101st

Airborne Division. The book opens by re-viewing the history, organization, and tac-

tics of the combatants to set the stage forthe looming action. It recounts both suc-cesses and failures impartially through theeyes of the author who indulges in noself-praise and offers no excuses.

By its very nature training cannotfully replicate the experience of life-and-death situations under live fire. However,units often become totally immersed inthis exercise with the fear of failure pro-viding some of the same edge. So too, thenarrative often sweeps the reader alongand assumes the intensity of combat his-tory. Reality is not forgotten as the com-promises necessary in a training environ-ment are dealt with at appropriate times.

The title of the book is derived fromthe unit’s first rotation. While activelyseeking supply points one company dis-covered a large camp tentatively identi-fied as the main guerrilla supply base. Butthe cache was actually an elaborate decoyto lure his unwary troops. Mortar firebegan raining on the site. The guerrillasdecimated the surprised company and se-verely hampered battalion efforts to re-cover their comrades. The location,named Hunger Hill by the unit, repre-sented a situation that its soldiers did notwant to repeat. It became a rallying cryfor changes that were implemented as aresult of lessons learned. In this and otherbattles during the rotation one senses thefrustration of a conventional force fight-ing an elusive unconventional enemy.

Foremost among the lessons was arealization that often gets lost amidstother concerns and activities: the pri-mary tasks for infantry are to controlground or kill the enemy. The latter be-came the unit’s guiding principle and de-fault mission.

Leaders implementing lessons fromsuch an experience often do not have theopportunity to observe the fruits of theirlabors. Current personnel rotation poli-cies and training center schedules rarelyallow commanders to take their unitsthrough two rotations. However, Bolgerand the 1/327 Infantry had that chance.Approximately nine months after theirfirst rotation, the unit went back to JRTCto test new ideas and exact revenge onthe Cortinian Liberation Front.

The second rotation featured differ-ent scenarios and missions. But the guer-rillas remained and were ready to tanglewith U.S. forces. From the start the bat-talion showed it had learned its lessons.Almost every organizational and tacticalchange improved their combat effective-ness. The reader detects confidence and



The Battle for Hunger Hill: The 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry

Regiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center

by Daniel P. BolgerNovato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1997.

363 pp. $24.95[ISBN 0–89141–453–3]

Shawn C. Whetstone is a research staffmember at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

2715OTS 8/6/96 1:39 PM Page 140



a sense of accomplishment in turningthe table on the guerrillas. More impor-tantly, the second rotation bothstrengthens and gives credence to thebook’s observations.

The author’s knowledge of militaryhistory offers unique insights whichmerge theory and praxis. He reviews therole of doctrine, personnel policies, thedecisionmaking process, command andcontrol, staff work, and fratricide. Hedoes not claim to have solved the dilem-mas that face commanders in MOOTW.Rather, his experiences demonstrate thatneat school book solutions do not alwaysfit messy real world situations. Whilethat appears obvious, the day-to-day de-mands of commanding a unit often ob-scure that simple lesson.

The United States prefers utilizingfirepower in dangerous situations ratherthan placing its soldiers, sailors, marines,and airmen directly in harm’s way. JTFs can strike fear into the hearts of awould-be opponent. When it was able,1/327 Infantry employed available airsupport and naval gunfire to devastatingeffect. But MOOTW will often involveenemies who are not as vulnerable tohigh tech. Such operations require troopswho can handle complex problems,defuse violence, and fight unconven-tional forces while minimizing collateraldamage as well as casualties. Resultingexpectations and pressures can betremendous. The Armed Forces musthave experience to execute missions tothe standards demanded by their leadersand the public. Just as the NationalTraining Center proved its worth in thePersian Gulf War, JRTC is demonstratingits value in interventions by the ArmedForces in places like Panama, Somalia,and Haiti. The training is realistic and al-lows for mistakes to be made in acquiringthe skills to execute increasingly complexmissions. In relating his insights on gain-ing expertise in this regard, Bolger haswritten a book that both entertains andeducates. For those who haven’t beenthere or can’t go, The Battle for HungerHill provides a taste of what it is like. JFQ

RIDING THETOFFLER WAVEA Book Review by

M.E. AHRARI

When one thinks of futurists whohave depicted new vistas and writ-

ten lively accounts of social and techno-logical progress, the Tofflers—Alvin andHeidi—immediately come to mind.Their influence on the military is a trib-ute not only to iconoclasm but to the resolve of today’s professionals in keep-ing abreast of technological revolutionsin other sectors.

Just as the Nation as a whole cannotafford to take its eye off technologicalcompetition, the military comprehendsthe peril of becoming first among equals,much less second. The emphasis in pro-fessional military education is a persua-sive indication of this thinking. PaulKennedy’s advise appears to have beentaken to heart by both business and mili-tary elites: we do not wish to confront adecline in the economic realm lest it re-duces our capacity to remain a super-power. The Tofflers began admonishingus along those lines years ago when theysuggested a blueprint for avoiding “fu-ture shocks”—the disorientation causedby super change that the post-World WarII period visited on the industrial sector.

Before examining Creating a NewCivilization: The Politics of the Third Wave,it is helpful to review the earlier work bythe Tofflers for two reasons. First, almostall their writing—notably The ThirdWave, Future Shock, and War and Anti-War—has been studied by our militaryleaders. One of the major arguments inThe Third Wave that impressed them wasthe idea that each wave of change bringswith it a new kind of civilization. “Todaywe are in the process of inventing a thirdwave civilization with its own economy,its own family form, media, and poli-tics.” The military in the 1980s appliedTofflers’ thesis to their profession. The

third wave, they concluded, was also inthe process of transforming war.

An obsession with lessons learned,especially from the Vietnam experience,also influenced the military in the early1980s. Demoralization stemming fromthat war played a part in forward think-ing among our best military minds. Thusthe appearance of The Third Wave in1980 served to assure many senior offi-cers that they were on the right trackabout a technological revolution thatwould make the world a global village(not just metaphorically as was the caseprior to the 1980s).

The second reason for reviewing thebody of work by the Tofflers is that Creat-ing a New Civilization summarizes theirearlier books and advances a number ofarguments initiated there. Still, thosewho have not read the other books maynot be totally unfamiliar with the argu-ments in Creating a New Civilization,which though a short read at 112 pages isrich in content.

The theme of accelerated changefound in Future Shock was developed inThe Third Wave. The term third wave, ac-cording to the authors, “is not just a mat-ter of technology and economics. It in-volves morality, culture, and ideas as wellas institutions and political structure. Itimplies, in short, a true transformationin human affairs.” The third wave isabout the information revolution. Today,dictatorships and remaining Staliniststates—Cuba, North Korea, and to alesser extent the People’s Republic ofChina and Vietnam—are under tremen-dous pressure from within. The choicesare stark: either change or be swept aside.The information revolution is no lesschallenging to democracies. Ruling elitescan no longer govern on the basis of a“father knows best” approach, especiallysince arguments over social problems arebecoming numerous and convoluted. Apublic glutted with information is in-creasingly impatient with its leaders.

War and Anti-War advanced an idio-syncratic proposition: “The way we makewar reflects the way we make wealth—and the way we make anti-war must re-flect the way we make war.” In Creating aNew Civilization, the Tofflers developed a“coherent approach” and a “new frame-work for change.” The explosion of infor-mation is among other considerationsrevolutionizing markets and the natureof employment worldwide. While onemay get nostalgic over the victory of cap-italism and think glibly about the “endof history,” we must be concerned withthe potentially deleterious effects of

M.E. Ahrari is associate dean of the Jointand Combined Warfighting School at theArmed Forces Staff College.

Creating a New Civilization: ThePolitics of the Third Wave

by Alvin and Heidi TofflerAtlanta: Turner Publishing, 1995.

112 pp. $14.95[ISBN 1–57036–224–6]

JFQwelcomes your lettersand comments

Fax your correspondence to(202) 685–4219/DSN 325–4219or via e-mail to [email protected]

2715OTS 8/6/96 1:39 PM Page 141

growing competition among nations. Al-ready we have been witnessing an in-crease in the formation of trading blocks.Where will this trend lead?

The Tofflers touch on this issue indiscussing the move from a “bisected” toa “trisected” world. In the latter, the firstwave sector supplies agriculture and min-eral resources. Cheap labor and mass pro-duced goods come from the second wavesector, while dominance by the thirdwave sector is “based on the new ways inwhich it creates and exploits knowl-edge.” They unequivocally state that the“globally competitive race will be won bythe countries that complete their thirdwave transformation with the leastamount of domestic dislocation and un-rest.” This prognosis does not bode wellfor the rest of the world.

The authors also predict that “his-toric change from a bisected to a trisectedworld could well trigger the deepestpower struggles on the planet as eachcountry positions itself in the emergingthree-tiered power structure.” So howshould we manage the race among sec-ond wave countries to join the ranks ofthe third wave? Is there any way of ame-liorating the effects of the competition?The authors do not say. My hunch is thatthey would opt for social Darwinism.

An engaging problem raised in thebook is “conflict between the second andthe third wave groupings” in the UnitedStates. Who will “shape the new civiliza-tion rapidly rising to replace it?” The waythis conflict will be resolved in Americais significant. However, it is equally im-portant to apply this question to domes-tic scraps between different generationsof leaders in European and Asian nations.Erstwhile members of the former WarsawPact are likely to experience similar con-flicts in a decade or two as they rebuildinstitutions on the pattern of the West-ern democracies. But the countries of theBalkan region, most of the Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS), theCaucasus region, Middle East, Africa, andSouth America will have to wait severaldecades to answer this important ques-tion. It is safe to speculate that althougha new generation of leaders in manycountries has grown up in the secondwave, its thinking might be colored byan exposure to the third wave era in theage of electronic communications. Thisgeneration is bound to respond quite dif-ferently to social changes than did its im-mediate predecessor.

In the 1990s and beyond both rulersand ruled will probably behave unlike

their forefathers of the second wave. Willthis be a change for the better? Some de-velopments are not promising. The riseof ethno-nationalism in Europe, Asia,and Africa; religious extremism in theMiddle East, South Asia, and Africa;weakened governments in some ThirdWorld countries (states belonging to thefirst or second wave) suggesting to somethe end of the nation-state—these are ex-amples of what we will witness with therevolutionary changes of the third wave.

The remainder of the analysis is fo-cused on U.S. political battles of the1990s. They label opponents of theNorth America Free Trade Agreement—paragons such as consumer advocateRalph Nader and columnist and peren-nial political candidate Pat Buchanan—assecond wave figures while Vice PresidentAl Gore has “one toe wet in the thirdwave.” The bureaucracy and civil serviceare derided as second wave entities thatare “largely unreformed, unreengineered,unreinvented.” The last phrase refers toefforts by Mr. Gore to “reinvent” (read:fix or make efficient) government.

The 1996 election had its share of“wave-related” rhetoric like Clinton’sharping on designs to build a bridge tothe next century, portraying his candi-dacy as part of the third wave. At thesame time, in a not-too-veiled referenceto his opponent, Clinton questioned the“age of his ideas,” implying that the Dolecampaign was characterized by “secondwave ideas.”

Second wave elites are struggling “toretain or reinstate an unsustainable pastbecause they gained wealth and powerfrom applying second wave principles,and the shift to a new way of life chal-lenges that wealth and power.” More-over, both political parties “reflect second wave.” But the brunt of criticismis borne by the Democrats whose coreconstituencies—labor unions, the civil service, etc.—make it unable to follow its most forward-thinking leaders.

According to the Tofflers, third waveconstituencies encompass “industriesbased on mind work rather than musclework,” which includes data-enriched ser-vices such as finance, software, commu-nications, entertainment, medicine, andeducation. The authors believe these sec-tors will agree on “liberation from all theold second wave rules, regulations, taxes,and laws laid in place to serve the smoke-stack barons and bureaucrats of thepast.” Third wave activist citizens, politi-cians, and policymakers will assess pro-posals for change based on the following:

■ Does it resemble a factory (symbol ofthe second wave)?

■ Does it massify society (an apparentreference to mass production and assemblylines, mass education, masses, and massmedia, all symbolizing the second wave)?

■ Does it promote vertical organizations(second wave) or virtual organizations (thirdwave structures that parcel out services andstay slim)?

■ Does it empower the home? Demassi-fication will enable many people to work athome using computers, facsimiles, and otherthird wave technologies.

In their conclusion the authors offersome principles of third wave govern-ment. The first wave was characterizedby “minority power” and the second op-erated on the basis of majority rule sinceit “almost always meant a fairer break forthe poor.” In countries undergoing thethird wave revolution, the poor are nolonger in the majority, according to Tof-flers. “In a good many countries, they—like everyone else—have become a mi-nority.” Consequently, majority rule isnot only inadequate as a legitime princi-ple in societies moving into the thirdwave; it is no longer necessarily human-izing or democratic. On this point per-haps they are so focused on the futurethey ignore current realities. Recent re-ports indicate that the level of poverty inthe United States has increased. Thus it ishard to imagine that the poor will be-come a minority any time soon. Therecord of other industrialized countriescannot be that much better. The Tofflersalso recommend the modernization ofthe entire American system “so as tostrengthen the role of the diverse minori-ties. . . .”

Their second proposal is “semi-di-rect democracy,” a mix of direct and in-direct democracy. Thirdly, to break thedecision logjam they propose dividingand reallocating decisions by “sharingthem more widely and switching the siteof decisionmaking as the problems them-selves require.” Interestingly, the Republi-can “Contract with America” consideredsuch suggestions. By devolving Federalpower to state governments and empha-sizing the role of the private sector inmany issues, the Republican majority inthe 104th Congress activated the “semi-direct democracy” and attempted toavoid decision logjam. However, whetherthese attempts will bring about qualita-tive changes or accelerate America’sprogress as a third wave society has yet tobe seen.

The “super struggle” between effortsto preserve second wave societies and ef-forts to create third wave ones is unlikely



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to end soon. As the Tofflers see it, “cre-ation of new political structures for athird wave civilization will not come in asingle climactic upheaval but as a conse-quence of a thousand innovations andcollisions at many levels in many placesover a period of decades.” The fact thatthe thrust of Creating a New Civilizationdeals with political, social, and techno-logical change suggests that the UnitedStates will remain in the vanguard of thethird wave. If indeed technological inno-vations substantially determine the fu-ture of this civilization, then Americawill be in the forefront. But the Tofflersargue that the third wave involves morethan technology and economics. “It in-volves morality, culture, and ideas as wellas institutions and political structure.”But this definition compels us to searchfor this civilization around the world.

One reason for the increased num-ber of conflicts in the post-Cold Warworld is the level of strife involving firstor second wave states. Weakened nationsin Africa underscore the inability of somesocieties to pull themselves out of the

first wave and into the third with only abrief transition in the second. Little at-tention is paid to the regional securityimplications of such a conversion.

At least some interest is beingshown in countries that are scramblingto pull themselves out of the second andinto the third wave. We have witnessedshock waves created by such endeavorsin Russia, where the government is strug-gling to maintain its influence after un-dergoing a radical shift from control ofan empire to confronting the multi-faceted challenges of the informationage. Other CIS states are bound to un-dergo cataclysmic changes in their effortsto emulate the industrial democracies ofthe third wave, especially the UnitedStates, Japan, and Germany. The impactof such changes on European securitywill be considerable.

In the Middle East, the transitionfrom the first or second to the third waveis complicated by Islam. Some analyststreat the role of Islam in a superficial and

misinformed way by casting it as an ob-stacle to modernization. Because a transi-tion from the first to the third wave erapromises to modernize societies, one canapply this negative argument and takethe position that Islam would opposesuch changes. In reality all Muslim coun-tries in the 1990s are coming to gripswith how to modernize without Western-izing. Put differently, these societies arecaught between adopting the technologi-cal but not the cultural aspects of the sec-ond and third waves.

The ultimate influence of the Tof-flers’ work on the profession of arms andof the third wave on the future of warcannot be known. But one has only tonote the petulant title of the preface to this slim volume (“A Citizen’s Guideto the Twenty-First Century”) and its author (Newt Gingrich) to appreciatethat its potential audience is legion. JFQ


READERSHIP SURVEY

A questionnaire was enclosed in issue 13 (Autumn 1996) to solicit relevant information from JFQreaders. Results of that survey are abstracted below. (For purposes of comparison, data collectedfrom the only previous survey which was conducted in 1994 is displayed in parentheses.)

Of all respondents, 84 (83) percent were members of the Armed Forces. The service affiliation of activeand Reserve component respondents was Army, 31 (30) percent; Navy, 28 (32) percent; Marine Corps, 10 (7)percent; Air Force, 28 (30) percent; and Coast Guard, 1 (1) percent. Majors and lieutenant commanderscomprised 24 (29) percent of military readers; lieutenant colonels and commanders, 32 (32) percent; andcolonels and captains, 17 (19) percent; general and flag officers, 7 (8) percent; and all other officers and enlisted personnel, 20 (12) percent.

Among all readers, 44 (49) percent usually read most articles and another 48 (41) percent read some.Other than feature articles the most stimulating contributions (ranked in order of their popularity) wereThe Joint World (professional notes), Out of Joint or commentary, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Interms of overall relevance, balance, and accuracy, 36 (31) percent rated JFQ as excellent and 59 (65) percentas either very good or good. Responding to how faithfully the journal achieves its stated purpose—to promoteunderstanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces—30 (28) percent found that it was right on target and another 66 (66) percent indicated that it met the pur-pose either very closely or closely.

Asked to identify the exclusive form in which they would prefer to receive JFQ in the future, 81 percentof all readers opted for print, 10 percent for cumulative issues on CD–ROM, and 9 percent for on line.

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■ A N O T E T O R E A D E R S A N D C O N T R I B U T O R S

DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet throughservice channels. Individuals and organizations interested in receiving thejournal on a regular basis should make their requirements known throughcommand channels. Any corrections in shipping instructions for servicedistribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below.

■ ARMY—Contact the installation publications control officer (citingMisc. Publication 71–1) or write: U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center,ATTN: Customer Service, 1655 Woodson Street, St. Louis, Missouri63114–6181, or call (314) 263–7305 / DSN 693–7305 (extension 286); ororder via Starpubs or the Internet [http://www.usappc.hoffman.army.mil].

■ NAVY—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer ServiceList Maintenance (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia,Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be sent by Fax to (215) 697–5914(include SNDL, UIC, and full address).

■ MARINE CORPS—For one-time distribution of an individual issue writeto Marine Corps Logistics Base (Code 876), 814 Radford Boulevard, Albany,Georgia 31704–1128; request by Fax at (912) 439–5839 / DSN 567–5839.To be placed on standard distribution contact Headquarters, U.S. MarineCorps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (Room 1302), Navy Annex,Washington, D.C. 20380; request by Fax at (703) 614–2951 / DSN 224–2951.

■ AIR FORCE—Submit AF Form 764A with short title “JFQN (indicateissue number)” to the base publications distribution office to establish unitrequirement through the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 EasternBoulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896.

■ COAST GUARD—Contact Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, ATTN:Defense Operations Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.20593–0001.

In addition to service channels, bulk distribution is made directly todefense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, andother activities. Changes in shipping instructions should be communicatedto the Editor (see schedule below).

SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Govern-ment Printing Office. To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)on the order and mail with a check for $17.00 ($21.25 foreign) or provide aVISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superinten-dent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250–7954,or Fax the order to: (202) 512–2233.

Individual copies may be purchased through GPO bookstores nation-wide for $8.00 each.

CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members ofthe Armed Forces as well as from both defense analysts and academicspecialists from this country and abroad, including foreign military officersand civilians. There is no required length for contributions, but manuscriptsof 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, toinclude letters, commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions ofsupporting material (such as maps and photos) should be submitted withmanuscripts; do not send originals. Unsolicited book reviews are generallynot accepted for publication.

All submissions to JFQ must be accompanied by a covering letter whichstates that the manuscript has not been previously published and is not beingsubmitted simultaneously to any other publication. In addition, the letter mustinclude the author’s full name (including military grade, service/component,and assignment if applicable), a complete postal address (with Zip code), anda work telephone number. Submissions which do not comply with theseconditions may not be considered for publication. Neither facsimile nor e-mailmanuscripts will be accepted as formal submissions.

All unsolicited manuscripts are reviewed, a process which may taketwo to three months. To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manu-script together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographicaldata on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors)in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing themanuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should always be used. Both the manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitationsand conform to the journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted forpublication are not normally returned to authors for review.

Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selectedfor publication which are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forcesor employees of the Federal Government are forwarded to the Office of theAssistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security review.No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication ofarticles submitted by servicemembers or U.S. Government employees.

If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescriptversion. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed,WordPerfect is preferred (disks will not be returned unless requested).Information on the submission of contributions is available by contacting (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, orwriting to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, 300 FifthAvenue (Bldg. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066. JFQ

DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULEA total of 35,000 copies of Joint Force Quarterly is distributed worldwide. Of this number, more than 18,500 copies are sent directly to the five services for breakdown and delivery to subordinate commands, units, bases, etc. Bulk shipments also are made to the following organizations:

copies

Office of the Secretary of Defense 400Joint Staff and Joint Activities 700Services

Army 4,000Navy 6,500Marine Corps 1,500Air Force 6,500Coast Guard 125

Unified CommandsU.S. European Command 275U.S. Pacific Command 275

U.S. Forces Korea 75U.S. Forces Japan 50Alaska Command 25

copiesPME Institutions

U.S. Army War College 600U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College (including the School of Advanced Military Studies) 1,525

Naval War College (both resident and nonresident programs) 1,750

Naval Postgraduate School 300Marine Corps War College and Marine

Corps Command and Staff College 400Air War College 450Air Command and Staff College

(including the School of Advanced Airpower Studies) 900

copies

U.S. Atlantic Command 150U.S. Southern Command 150U.S. Central Command 275U.S. Strategic Command 275U.S. Space Command 150U.S. Special Operations Command 150U.S. Transportation Command 100

Defense AgenciesDefense Information Systems Agency 125Defense Intelligence Agency 150Defense Logistics Agency 150Defense Mapping Agency 25Defense Nuclear Agency 25National Security Agency 25

In addition to the above, approximately 3,500 copies of JFQ are distributed to general/flag rank officers and members of Congress; service doctrine centers;U.S. and foreign military attachés; and selected educational institutions, journals, and libraries in this country and abroad.

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Published for theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

by the Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense University

Washington, D.C.

RMA Essay

Interservice

Military SuThe Nation

The Son Tay

coming next . . .

The Quadrennial Defense Reviewplus

leveraging joint training and education,the introduction of carrier aviation,

civil affairs meets MOOTW,and more in the Summer 97 issue of JFQ

NATO, EUSECURIT

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