NATIONA LINTELLIGENC EESTIMATE

Troubles in East Africa

(Supersedes ' ME 70-67)

CONTENTS

PageNOTE 1

THE ESTIMATE 2

I . A REGION IN FERMENT 2

II . GROWING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 5

A. Kenya 5B. Uganda 8C. Tanzania 9D. Zambia 1 0

III . EAST AFRICA AND THE COMMUNISTS 1 1

A. Tanzania and Zambia 1 1B. Uganda and Kenya 12

IV. EAST AFRICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 12

V. OUTLOOK 13

A. Regional Cooperation 13B. Political Stability 14C. Implications for External Powers 15

The Prominent Personalities of East Afric a

JULIUS NYEREREPresident of Tanzania

SHEIKH KARUM E1st Vice President of Tanzani aDominant figure of Zanzibar' s

Revolutionary Council

IDI AMI NPresident of Ugand a

KENNETH KAUNDAPresident of Zambia

JOMO KENYATTAPresident of Keny a

SIMON KAPWEPW EFormer Vice President of Zambi a

Leader of newly formedUnited Progressive Party

TROUBLES IN EAST AFRIC A

NOT E

For the purposes of this estimate, we are defining East Africa t oinclude Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia . Though Zambia wasnot part of the traditional geographic area of British East Africa, itsgrowing economic and political ties with Tanzania warrant its incl

usion. Our principal judgments about the future of the area are contained in paragraphs 38-48.

THE ESTIMATE

I . A REGION IN FERMEN T1 . In the 1960s, the newly independen t

states of East Africa seemed to be off to apromising start . Under national rulers of co

nsiderable stature, the countries set about devising means of developing their societies an d

economies in an atmosphere of relative political stability. The brief army mutinies o f

1964, which simultaneously afflicted Uganda ,Kenya, and Tanganyika,) were quickly sup -pressed with assistance from the UK an dappeared to have a salutary effect on gover

nment relations with the military. In colonialtimes, the UK had established common tran

sportation, communications, and monetaryservices for Kenya, Tanganyika 1, and Uganda .In 1967, these services were consolidated inan East African Community (EAC) . Eachof the national rulers confronted and over-came internal political challenges . PresidentKenneth Kaunda's leadership qualities weretested by adversities, and his friendship with

[footnote 1] Tanganyika federated with Zanzibar several month slater in 1964 to form the state of Tanzania .

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania helpe dbring Zambia much closer to the EAC.

2. The euphoria of this immediate, post -independence period has since given way t ofrustration and disappointment . The rulersof East Africa, like their counterparts else -where on the continent, have gradually foun dthemselves confronted with a host of worse

ning problems: for example, inefficiency an dcorruption in government, dimming prospect sfor sustained economic growth, growing rate sof unemployment and urbanization, difficu

lties caused by replacing foreigners in government and commerce, and the resurgence o f

tribal jealousies . Domestic pressures, mutualsuspicions of the national leaders, and th euneven patterns of development of the variouseconomies have led to more nationalistic po

stures in foreign relations. Though spared th ecivil strife which afflicted Nigeria and th e"revolving door " presidential changes of smallWest African states, East Africa is clearlypassing through a period of change and cha

llenge in which former arrangements andagreements are under increasing pressure .

3. The overthrow of Uganda's PresidentMilton Obote by General Idi Amin in Jan

uary 1971 significantly altered the traditiona lalignments in the area and underscored th ecritical importance of personality in Africanregional and national politics . And, to a largeextent, the predilections of the national leaderdetermine the character of relations withneighboring states . Obote was an ardent sup-porter of Nyerere; Amin considers Nyererea dangerous radical and an enemy. Insultsand sabre-rattling between the two leader shave worsened relations . Shortly after Amin' scoup, Tanzanian troops headed towards th eUgandan border and Nyerere contemplate dmilitary action to restore Obote ; he still doesnot recognize the new regime, and a variet yof further provocations have kept the feudalive . Amin accuses Nyerere of harboring andtraining pro-Obote guerrillas . Small armedborder clashes have aggravated the situation .

4. The dispute between Amin and Nyerer eis both personal and ideological . It has co

ntributed to an atmosphere of distrust amon gother African leaders in the area who als olean towards simplistic views of foreign rel

ations (i.e ., seeing neighbors as pro-Arab oranti-Arab, pro-Communist or anti-Comm

unist). President Mobutu of Congo (Kinshasa )has talked with Amin about creating a bel tof anti-Arab, anti-Communist nations (Ethi

opia, Kenya, Uganda, and the Congo) to stemthe southward flow of radicalism, which theyfear, and to isolate Nyerere and Kaunda .Though no formal arrangements are in thecards, a variety of bilateral ties tend to brin gthe conservative states together. Kenya is pr

oviding assistance to the Ugandan securit y

services . Kenya and Ethiopia have defenseagreements against Somali irrendentist efforts .Uganda, Congo (Kinshasa), and Ethiopia ar esupporting the southern Sudanese in theirstruggle against Khartoum and are coopera

ting in various ways, but for different reasons ,

with the Israelis .

5.

[one paragraph (twenty lines of source text) not declassified]

6. Meanwhile, Tanzania and Zambia arebuilding a special relationship of their own .Nyerere and Kaunda are close friends andare both personally committed to the liber

ation movements in southern Africa. They pro-vide support to a variety of freedom fightersand have become the leading spokesmen an dlobbyists for their cause. In addition, Zambi adepends to a large extent on the Tanzanianpipeline, road system, and port of Dar e sSalaam. The most dramatic connection, how -ever, is the Tan/Zam Railroad, which, aftermany years of study and planning, is no wunder construction and scheduled for co

mpletion by 1975. This huge and costly projectwill lessen Zambia's dependence on tran

sportation routes through Rhodesia and Portuguese territories.

7. The current political conflict betweenTanzania and Uganda plus a host of unilatera leconomic moves by each member country

have already limited the scope and effectiveness of the EAC. The trend is away from the

idea of a common market . The EAC no longerhas a common currency. Trade is more r

estricted than it was, and there is duplicationof industries . In the past year, Uganda ha sexpelled Tanzanian and Kenyan workers, Ta

nzania has set up exchange controls, an dKenya has imposed currency movement r

estrictions. Ugandan and Tanzanian official shave wrangled for months about appoin

tments to the EAC staff, and Presiden tKenyatta of Kenya has chosen not to inte

rvene. In the past, the EAC's success waslargely due to the determination of Obote ,Nyerere, and Kenyatta to cooperate for th ecommon good. This spirit no longer prevails,though the leaders make public gestures o fsupport for the community .

8 . A fundamental problem in regional economic cooperation is the imbalance amon g

the economies of the EAC member countries .Kenya earns a huge trade surplus in intr

a-community trade because its manufacturin gsector is large (for Africa) and diversified.Kenyan manufactured exports have increase ddespite a transfer tax established to protectdomestic industries in Uganda and Tanzania .By comparison, Uganda and Tanzania havesmall manufacturing sectors, and nationaliz

ations in both have discouraged foreign investment. Various indirect subsidies compensat e

for their losses in trade with Kenya, however .For example, landlocked Uganda benefit sfrom the favorable rates on rail shipments o fagricultural products to the Kenyan port o fMombasa .

9. The EAC's greatest success has beenpreserving the common services establishe dby the UK : railways, harbors, airways, postaland telecommunications services, and electricalpower . Other African countries (Zambia ,Burundi, Ethiopia, and Somalia) have in thepast applied to join the EAC, but none ar eprepared to give much to the community .Zambia wants to use the railways and roads;Burundi is eager to use ports and harbors butnothing else; Ethiopia hopes to enter the co

mmon market, but does not desire to participat ein other activities of the community ; Somalia ,pleading poverty, asks for special consider

ations. Zambia suspended its application afterObote's overthrow. Adapting to the EAC'sprotective tariff would cause difficulty forZambia, which has few manufacturing i

ndustries and already suffers from the hig hcost of trade diversion from southern Africa .Nevertheless, Zambia probably will join, a

ssuming the EAC overcomes its current difficulties.

10. Kenya's attitude, however, will continu eto be the key to the future of the EAC.Kenyatta apparently believes that Tanzani ais taking great advantage of Kenya monetarilyand not fulfilling its EAC obligations . He i sconcerned that Chinese imports are replacin gKenyan imports in Tanzania and believes thatTanzania would be practically bankrupt with -out Chinese support . Kenya pays the largestshare of EAC expenses, but the favorabletrade balance is an inducement to stay inthe EAC .

TRADE BETWEEN THE EAST AFRICANCOMMUNITY COUNTRIE S

Kenya to Uganda to Tanzania to

Uganda Tanzania Kenya

Tanzania Kenya UgandaIn Millions of US Dollars

1967 41 .4 31 .9 28 .5 6.8 9 .2 2. 11970 48 .4 42 .1 30 .3 5.6 16 .8 4.1

II . GROWING DOMESTIC PROBLEM S11. The governments of East Africa ar e

beset by problems common to other Africa nlands : maintaining some kind of authorityover disparate tribal, ethnic, and special i

nterest groups; increasing government service sto satisfy growing public demands whilehandicapped by severely limited resources ;and reducing dependence on foreign entr

epreneurs and advisors without greatly restricting the efficiency of either the governmen t

or the economy. Each country, however, ha sits own unique set of troublesome issues an dnational priorities . The styles of governmentdiffer from country to country, but all ar erun by tough, authoritarian rulers with stron gpersonalities . This characteristic makes p

olitical stability dependent on the nature an dstaying power of the national leader.

A. Kenya

12. Kenya has for a decade ranked amon gthe most stable and most prosperous countrie sin Black Africa, but tribal frictions—and th eincreasingly partisan performance of the n

ational leaders—have created an atmosphereof tension and unrest. The Kikuyu tribal co

mmunity, able, industrious, and aggressive, ha sbeen consolidating its hold on the government ,reaping most of the economic benefits o findependence, and seeking to improve its pos ition in the army as well . The Kikuyu establishment, with President Kenyatta's knowledgeand support, is making a power play, blatan tand unconcealed, to assure its pre-eminenceafter Kenyatta's death or incapacitation. Thisapproach, buttressed by chilling tribal oathsnever to relinquish power, has built up resen

tment among other tribal groups and ensure sa difficult period of political adjustment after

Kenyatta's death. The Kikuyu with only abou t

20 percent of the population would find i tvery difficult to govern without the acquie

scence of other tribes.

13. Opposition to Kenyatta's inner circl eof southern Kikuyu politicians is found no tonly in the leadership of other major tribes(the Luo and Kamba) but also among clan sof the northern Kikuyu, who have not gottentheir share of the spoils of office. Although amajority in the National Assembly supports th eregime, some backbenchers have attacked th egovernment for corruption, nepotism, and in-efficiency ; they have also spoken out agains tall foreign interests in Kenya and have urge dthe government to follow a more militan tpolicy on southern Africa. Potentially the mos timportant focus of opposition, however, is inthe armed forces, traditionally dominated inthe upper grades by the Kamba. Some inthe army think that political intervention bythe army will be necessary sooner or later .These feelings were greatly strengthened b yAmin's coup in Uganda. The army is alsojealous of the Kikuyu-dominated General Ser

vices Unit ( GSU), a well-armed paramilitar ypolice force. The Chief of the Defense Staff ,a Kamba, was implicated with some Luo p

oliticians and a few other Kambas in a recen tcoup plot and forced to resign . His colleaguesremain on edge. As long as Kenyatta is inpower, however, there are many factors whichmilitate against a military coup .

14. The Kikuyus remain in possession ofconsiderable assets with which to countermoves against their dominant position . Theycontrol a reasonably efficient police and s

ecurity apparatus acutely sensitive to anti -regime activities . The GSU, unlike many otherparamilitary outfits in Africa, is consideredto be an effective force . And, even in thearmy, the Kikuyus are gaining strength, esp

ecially in the junior and middle grade office rranks . But the old guard of Kikuyu politician sdepends heavily on Kenyatta, who command svast respect and power as father of his cou ntry. He is also a shrewd and skillful politician,as he demonstrated by his astute handling of

the recent coup plotting . Though nearly 80(no one knows for sure how old he is) ,Kenyatta continues to demonstrate vigor an dauthority . Yet, a few years ago, he had somemild strokes, and still complains of circul

atory problems.

15. Even with Kenyatta on the scene, th ecountry will be increasingly affected bymounting unemployment and populationgrowth . Keny a's economy is growing at aroun d6 or 7 percent a year, and, among under-developed countries, Kenya's growing output ,price stability, and degree of capital form

ation are exceptional. The population is in-creasing, however, at a rate of about 3 per -cent a year, and there are not nearly enoughjobs to satisfy the hundreds of thousands o fpartially educated youth and other migrant sto the cities . The increase in the numbersof unemployed and underemployed Africa ncity dwellers has led the government to pu tpressure on Asian entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, thousands of whom have lost their livelihoods . Pressures are growing for a still morecomprehensive assault on all foreigner

s holding jobs coveted by Kenyans.

B. Uganda

16. The tribal violence and breakdown oforder, only a possibility in Kenya, is a realit yin Uganda and is taking on some aspects ofthe Congo in its most turbulent days . Thecrime rate has jumped dramatically, and th e

police are unable to cope with nation-wide

assaults by armed bands. Amin's effort to

purge the army of its pro-Obote elements got

out of hand, as local commanders seized th e

opportunity to settle old scores and massacr e

tribal contingents . Soldiers from Amin's Wes t

Nile tribe have been fighting soldiers from th e

Acholi and Lango tribes (the latter Obote' s

kinsmen) . At the time of Amin's coup, the

army numbered some 8,000 officers and men .

Since then, approximately 2,000 of these hav eeither deserted or been killed. Amin claim sthat most lost their lives in clashes with pro-Obote guerrillas from Tanzania, but he i sclearly using the relatively small border clashe sas an explanation for losses caused by domesti ctribal clashes . The army, never well disc

iplined, appears to be out of control in someareas .

17. Amin has changed the character of thearmy in other ways too . He came to powerlargely with the support of devoted follower samong the enlisted men . Many of them havebeen promoted to the senior officer ranks ,thus infuriating many of the old timers aswell as ambitious and better qualified junio rofficers . He has also packed the army withhis own West Nile tribesmen . The size of th earmy has grown to approximately 10,000 de -spite the losses described above . And Aminhas instructed his ministers to spare no expensein equipping the army with modern weapons ,tanks, and planes ( "to get to Khartoum or Dares Salaam and back") .

18. Amin himself is a blunt and colorfu lspeaker. He has spent much of his time stum

ping the country, and he has acquired considerable popularity despite his tendency to

put his foot in his mouth . Until recently, he ha dhandled the Baganda, Uganda's largest andmost advanced tribe, quite well . They weredelighted to be rid of Obote, who had sy

stematically excluded them from national politics. Shortly after Amin took over, they were

permitted to bury their traditional tribal king ,the Kabaka, who had died in exile . But, afterraising hopes among the Baganda that the ywould be permitted to crown a new Kabaka,Amin announced that he would not permit

the re-establishment of the kingdom. This i s

an important matter in Uganda's tribal society.

The Baganda elders yearn for a Kabaka topreserve their tribal identity, while other tribes

fear a resurgence of Baganda hegemony.Amin's awkward handling of this troublesom eissue will cause him problems with theBaganda for some time to come .

19. Amin's cabinet includes some capabl etechnicians who are not allowed to make d

ecisions, and the government is on the whol ebadly managed or not managed at all. Theeconomy is in especially bad shape. Obote'slavish spending on such projects as a hug eassembly hall for the Organization of AfricanUnity had already depleted Uganda's foreignexchange reserves when Amin took over.Amin's appetite for military hardware seemsto be insatiable . He has already made someexpensive purchases, and his ambitious plansfor further military expenditures are likely t oproduce a large budget deficit, despite someausterity in non-military spending . More bo

rrowing abroad is going to be very difficult ,given Uganda's worsening financial situationand unfavorable prospects . Prices are rising,especially for staple foods . The governmenthas moderated some of Obote's more extrem enationalization schemes and reinstituted someincentives and guarantees to foreign investors .But continued instability and limits on over-seas remittances will discourage foreign in-vestment . The government may be forced tocut back both its payroll and imports, thu sdiminishing its popularity still further.

C. Tanzania20. Julius Nyerere, who calls himself

Mwalimu (the teacher), probably has themost ambitious plans of any African leaderfor reordering the structure of his society(e.g., through communal villages and educ

ational reforms designed to convince studentsof the virtues of farming) . His program is,in a sense, the reversal of the standard co

ncept of modernization through urban development, industrialization, and the cultivation of

an educated elite . But, despite Nyerere's char mand personal appeal, his schemes have notcaught on. The peasants resist changes intheir traditional ways of doing things ; the st

udents still strive for desk jobs in the cities ;and government officials, unlike Nyerere, ar enot convinced of the virtues of personal au

sterity. Though Nyerere does not have to con -tend with serious tribal problems, he noneth

eless labors under some pretty heavy burdens .21. Nyerere is an impulsive leader who

dominates Tanzanian political life . He is occasionally influenced by radicalsin the Ta

nganyika African National Union (TANU ), theofficial party . Two of his most recent initi

atives, the Acquisition of Property Act and th ecreation of a People's Militia,—taken afterTANU prodding—have aroused considerableconcern and some potentially significant op -position. The property act enabled the gover

nment to acquire all rental housing valued a tmore than $14,000. In one fell swoop, Ta

nzanian businessmen and officials were deprived of their last safe investment oppo

rtunity and much of their revenue and sourceof collateral . Most affected were the pro

sperous Asians, whose unpopularity and political weakness made them an easy target .

Many of the most skilled and talented members of the Asian community have fled th e

country, including members of the Aga Khan' sIsmaili sect. Most of the Ismailis had becomeTanzanian citizens and contributed a greatdeal to the country, but the Aga Khan recentlycame to fear for their safety . He is now su

ggesting that they leave while they can stillsalvage something . The exodus represents notonly a loss of critically needed skills and entr

epreneurship, but a substantial drain aswellon Tanzania's already slender foreign exchang eholdings. Moreover, as Asians have closeddown their businesses and halted their buil

ding projects, a large number of Africans hav ebeen thrown out of work . Consumer shortages

and rising prices add to the economic malais eand, if prolonged, will feed the general di

ssatisfaction with Nyerere.

22. The establishment of a civilian People'sMilitia, in the wake of the coup in Uganda ,was designed in part as a deterrent to a mil

itary coup in Tanzania. It may instead havelaid the groundwork for one. In other Africancountries, e.g ., in Ghana and Mali, the creationof a rival militia of this sort triggered an angryoutburst in the army . While we do not knowmuch about attitudes within the Tanzania nArmy, it is clear that the level of grumblinghas increased . One of the most common co

mplaints is over the presence of as many a s600 Chinese advisors with the armed forces ;other grounds for dissatisfaction include th eattention given to supporting Ugandan exilesand general misgivings over Nyerere's brin

kmanship in dealings with Amin's regime. Sofar discontent within the army has been pa

ssive, and there are no identifiable cliques inthe officer corps.

23. Mainland Tanzania's relations with Zanzibar have always been shaky. Nyerere engineered the federation between Tanganyika

and Zanzibar in 1964 because he feared thespread of radical influences to the mainland .Sheikh Karume, the dominant figure in Zanz

ibar's Revolutionary Council, felt the need forsupport and protection so that he could co

nsolidate his control over the island. These co

ncerns are no longer so important. Despite theunion, Zanzibar has retained independence in

most fields and remains a brutal police stat erun on the whims of an arbitrary clique.Karume, who is also First Vice-President o fTanzania, resented Nyerere's interference i nhis persecution of the Arabs and Asians lef t

on the island . He now fears that Nyerere'sgovernment is trying to gain control over Za

nzibar's relatively hefty foreign exchange re -

serves . The two leaders will probably continue

to make compromises in order to keep th eunion going, partly because their prestigewould suffer if it were dissolved . Thus theunion is likely to muddle along as long a sNyerere and Karume are in power, but fewother Tanzanians would mourn its passing.

D. Zambia

24. Zambia is beset by tribal problems aki nto those in Kenya . The aggressive Bemba areout to enlarge their already substantial shareof national jobs and benefits . Large numbersof young Bemba have left their inhospitablehomeland in the northeast to work in thecopper mines where labor and urban unres tis growing. But, unlike the Kikuyu, their a

spirations far exceed their political power. Atthe most recent conclave of President Kaund a' sruling party, Bemba representation was cu tback and a high level party post held by aBemba was abolished . Other incidents havebrought some prominent Bemba leaders, i

ncluding former ministers, to charge the government with persecution of the tribe.

25. In August 1971, Simon Kapwepwe, aformer vice president of Zambia and the bestknown Bemba, announced the formation ofa new party—composed almost entirely ofBemba—to compete with Kaunda's . The p

otential cooperation between this new partyand the long dormant African National Co

ngress Party is creating awkward political problems for Kaunda. Though the two parties have

nothing in common except opposition toKaunda, they have sought to capitalize on th eelectorate's discontent over rising prices, u

nemployment, and food shortages. In September, Kaunda cracked down hard o

n Kapwepwe's party, despite its failure to generat emuch visible support even among the Bemba .About 100 of its leaders were arrested underZambia's security laws. The arrests may eve

ntually lead to a formal banning of the party .

Politically conscious Bemba will be furthe ralienated, although few will probably ris kpublic disagreement with Kaunda's stemmeasures .

26. Kaunda uses his personal stature, political skills, and control of national patronage

to hold dissident politicians in line. Kaundais one of the few Zambians, however, who ha ssome sense of national—rather than tribal—identity. His disdain for tribal bickering i srespected, though not always shared, by hi sfollowers . His stubborn insistence that unitybe preserved is probably the major barrierto tribally-based political chaos .

27. The Zambian economy is dominated b ythe nationalized copper industry, which ac -counts for more than 90 percent of exportsand gives the Zambian Government some o

ptions denied to less richly endowed Africa ngovernments . In the Zambian order of pr

iorities, considerable attention is paid to meansof avoiding dependence upon white-ruledsouthern African states . Accordingly, much ofthe income from the copper mines has gonefor pipelines, new transportation routes, an dalternate sources of fuel and power. The Za

mbian economy remains undiversified, and th eagricultural sector is unable to come close t osatisfying domestic requirements for food.Consequently, Zambia's import bill amountsto nearly $440 million a year, the second hig

hest figure in Black Africa, exceeded only b yNigeria . For political reasons, Zambia has beenshifting its trade from Rhodesia and SouthAfrica, despite the resulting disruptions in re -liability, efficiency, and cost to transport . Evenso, the Zambian Government still has to d

epend on the white-controlled territories forfood imports, coal, electrical power, and tran

sportation facilities.

28. Zambia is vulnerable not only to thesharp fluctuations of the price of copper, butalso to various kinds of retaliation from the

white-ruled lands of southern Africa. Earlythis year, after five Portuguese civilians werekidnapped in Mozambique by a minor liber

ation movement and then killed in Zambia, th ePortuguese refused to permit Zambian cornimports to pass through ports in Angola an dMozambique. Zambia suffered a period of foo dshortages and then purchased corn from Rh

odesia to forestall another one. Zambians alsorealize that their security forces (6,600 men )are incapable of repelling an invasion by Po

rtuguese, Rhodesian, or South African ArmedForces . Kaunda, who believes in keeping openlines of communication with the white-rule dstates, has signed an agreement of sorts withthe Portuguese, placed some additional curb son the minor liberation movements, and soughta rapproachement with Malawi, which hasacted as an intermediary during disputes .Although Kaunda has so far been unwillin gto clamp down on the more important liber

ation movements, he is clearly trying to avoidanother confrontation with the Portuguese .

III . EAST AFRICA AND THE COMMUNISTS

A. Tanzania and Zambi a29. In undertaking to build the Tan/Zam

Railway, which will link Zambia's copper bel twith the Tanzanian coast 1,100 miles away ,Peking has embarked on its first major show-case project overseas . The Chinese have ex -tended a $400 million, 30-year interest-freecredit . The Africans have agreed to purchas eChinese goods to sell for the local currenc yneeded. Approximately 13,000 Communis tChinese laborers are now in Tanzania wor

king on the first phase of the railroad's construction. The Chinese offered to build the

road less than a year after the World Ban kturned it down. They probably did so largel yto increase their prestige in the Third Worldand to associate themselves more directly withthe supporters of the southern African liber

ation movements.

30. On the whole, the Zambians, traditionally suspicious of all foreigners, are mor e

wary of the Chinese than are the Tanzanians .The Zambian Government is alert to any at-tempts at political indoctrination, and its i

ntelligence services try to keep close tabs o nChinese personnel . Moreover, Kaunda hasstressed the need for caution in dealing withthe Chinese workers, and his political partyhas instructed local officials not to fraternizewith the Chinese. Nyerere takes a rather di

fferent approach. He admires the Chinese organizational ability and work discipline, and

has expressed his hope that his countryme ncan learn from the Chinese example . At thesame time, Nyerere is wary of Chinese p

olitical indoctrination.

31. Since the departure of the Canadianmilitary mission in 1970, the Chinese Co

mmunists have become the sole suppliers, ad -visors, and trainers of the Tanzanian ArmedForces . They are directing the construction ofnew naval facilities, rare in East Africa, atDar es Salaam and helping to develop ai rand naval units as well . Nearly 350 Tanzaniannaval and air force personnel are being trainedin Communist China . Chinese advisors areworking closely with Tanzanian army andmilitia units, but Tanzanian senior officer shave been careful to keep Chinese advisorsout of the general command structure .

32. The Soviets may be displeased aboutthe magnitude of the Chinese effort in Ta

nzania and Zambia, but they have shown littleinclination to compete with China to winfriends and influence governments . Russianaid programs are small, credits extended earlierhave not been drawn down, and terms offeredby Moscow are not deemed very generousby Nyerere or Kaunda. In Zanzibar, the Sovie t(and East German) aid programs have beendisplaced by Chinese programs .

B . Uganda and Kenya33. Obote's overthrow in Uganda cannot

have been a subject of much concern in Moscow and Peking. Obote 's sporadic outbursts

of anti-Western sentiment had won some favorable responses from Moscow and Peking ,

but neither Communist state had much of astake in Uganda . Obote had purchased armsfrom China and Russia (and also Czechosl

ovakia), and the USSR was providing som epilot training for the air force . General Ami nhas appeared to be intensely anti-Communis tand has terminated Soviet assistance for thearmed forces. He recently said, however, thathe would welcome Soviet economic aid . If hecannot get the arms he wants from the West ,he might even turn to the Communists .

34. In Kenya, both the Soviets and theChinese are making steady, if unspectacular,progress in repairing the damage caused bytheir own past blunders . It is well known inKenya that the Communist powers were a tone time competing among themselves t osupport former Vice President Oginga Odinga ,but Odinga's eclipse (after a series of co

nfrontations with Kenyatta) has in a sens efreed the Communists from an albatross . TheSoviets and Chinese have refrained latelyfrom objectionable involvement in Kenyanpolitics, and the Kenyans have winked atdisclosures of their past malpractices . Neve

rtheless, the Kenyan Government still restrict sthe movement of Communist personnel and isprivately more suspicious of them than it spublic utterances would suggest.

IV . EAST AFRICA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

35. The UK still maintains the most activeinterest in East Africa of any Western cou

ntry, though even that is declining. Kenya isthe linchpin of British involvement, largelybecause of the concentration of British in-

vestment (over $130 million), expatriates, andmilitary and political ties there. The UK i salso concerned about Soviet naval activitie sin the Indian Ocean . Yet, even if violenc ewere to break out once again in Kenya, th eBritish would probably not introduce troop sin an effort to restore order . The British woul dhave more logistical problems bringing introops today than they did in 1964, and Britis hpublic opinion would be far less inclined t oendorse this kind of intervention anyway . TheUK is much more likely to continue to workquietly behind the scenes to try to influencethe direction of Kenyan politics .

36. The UK was initially delighted withObote's overthrow in Uganda, and its quickrecognition of the new regime probablyhelped to deter Tanzania from mounting amilitary operation against Amin . Amin's subsequent behavior, however, has left the Britishwith mixed feelings : pleasure that Amin hasmoderated some of Obote's nationalizatio nprograms, but concern about Amin's jingoism,excessive military spending, and his disru

ptive effect on East African regional affairs .The UK has turned down Amin's more outlandish requests for military assistance against

the Tanzanians and Chinese (e .g ., mounting

a naval blockade) .

37. Neither the British nor the US Governments have much influence in Tanzania or

Zambia these days . These regimes have n

ationalized most foreign holdings, and Zambi ahas a controlling interest in its copper indu

stry. If Zambia should see advantages inchanging the terms of settlement, it woul dnot hesitate to do so. At this point, Kaunda'sgovernment seems satisfied . Both Kaunda andNyerere proclaim non-alignment as the fu

ndamental principle of their foreign policies ,but this is often expressed in an anti-West

fashion . Yet they want to maintain good rel

ations with the West. This concern, plus the

lack of many more foreign interests to nationalize, and the realization that there is n o

point in looking to the West for much assistance in the liberation of southern Africa, wil l

probably combine to make for a less abrasivebut also a looser relationship with the Wes tin the long run.

V. OUTLOO K

A. Regional Cooperation38. As long as General Amin remains in

office in Uganda, relations with Tanzaniawill be strained. Some kind of detente ormodus vivendi might be worked out, perhap sby way of high-level outside mediation. Butthe odds are against this kind of arrangedsettlement lasting very long. Both Amin an dNyerere are stubborn and quick to blow u peach political squabble or border incidentwith self-righteous rhetoric. Nyerere is anidealist and would not necessarily drop th ediscredited Obote because it is the reasonabl ething to do. Amin will continue to need fo

reign scapegoats to shore up his domesti cpolitical position . Yet neither president a

ppears to want any further escalation of hostilities. They are both probably aware of p

otential problems with their armies and unwilling to risk the uncertainties that woul d

accompany military adventures on a largerscale .

39. A prolonged period of hostility between Tanzania and Uganda would hav e

seriously adverse effects on the functionin g

of the EAC. Even in the best of circumstances, it will be difficult to revive th e

spirit of compromise and accommodation to

gain common objectives . There is still a potential for community development, but n o

sign of the impetus to give it life . Ugandaand Tanzania are in dire economic straits ,especially in terms of foreign exchange, andboth governments will be acting in their own

economic self-interest. The better-off Kenyansfeel that they have been subsidizing theirpoor neighbors for years, and have receivedlittle tangible benefit in return. IncreasedTanzanian purchases from China, in conne

ction with the Tan/Zam Railroad arrangements, will reduce imports from Kenya .

Kenyatta seems to look to a continuation o fcurrent economic ties with Uganda, but t ono new concessions or favors for Tanzania .Despite these unfavorable trends, the EACis likely to be useful to the three member sand to go on providing certain basic services .

40. No matter what happens to the EAC,relations between Tanzania and Zambia willprobably become closer . For example, thecommon fear of military assaults from th esouth may lead to modest cooperation insecurity matters. But the relationship betweenTanzania and Zambia is not without its ownstrains and problems . Zambian officials ar econcerned about the inability of the port o fDar es Salaam to handle even its curren ttraffic. The construction of five new berths ,now underway, will ease the problem some-what, but it is doubtful that the port facilitie swill be sufficient to handle the two milliontons of goods expected to pass through upo ncompletion of the Tan/Zam Railroad . More-over, Zambian officials have made it clea rthat they do not want to become dependen ton any one route to the sea . Thus, Zambia willhave to use the ports of Beira in Mozambiqueand Lobito in Angola, even after completionof the Tan/Zam Railroad.

41. The political and economic ties between Tanzania and its northern neighbors

have been deteriorating for some time . Thenew links with Zambia are being consolidatedin several ways . Nevertheless, the new rel

ationships of states in the area are very muchdependent on the character and inclinationsof the rulers in each country. Another drasticchange of regime in any of them along the

lines of the coup in Uganda might rescramblerelations . Emotionalism, racialism, and n

ationalism will probably continue to influenc ethe foreign policies of East African state smore than ideology or alignments with themajor powers.

B. Political Stability42. In Kenya, political tensions will persist,

at least until the issue of succession to Kenyatta is settled. The Kikuyu will try to hold

onto the reins of power. This will cause wide-spread unrest and perhaps major tribal vi

olence. According to the constitution, VicePresident Moi, a member of a minor trib ebut closely associated with Kenyatta's innercircle, would inherit the Presidency for 90days until a parliamentary election could beheld. But the army could step in at any tim eand probably would do so if tribal disorde rseemed to be spreading. Tribal divisionswithin the army, however, would limit it seffectiveness in this role and perhaps lead tobloodshed along Ugandan lines . Kenyatta' ssuccessor is certain to have more difficultythen Kenyatta in coping with tribal and r

egional differences.

43. Uganda is a very difficult country togovern. General Amin will probably be unabl eto survive in office for very long . He lacksthe political skills necessary to hold togethera quarrelsome and violent set of tribes; helacks administrative talents as well . The armyis likely to remain the dominant force in th eland, but internal divisions and rivalries wil lpersist . Coup attempts are possible from anyof a number of factions, including Acholitribesmen, junior officers, and the Baganda.The only sure thing for the foreseeable futur eis the continuation of disorder throughout th ecountry.

44. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere's mainsource of power lies in the support of thepeople for his position as the national leader

and "teacher." Nevertheless, despite the hig hesteem in which he is held by his countrymen,the people of Tanzania have never been ver yenthusiastic about his programs . This does notmean that we expect a popular uprising. Ta

nzanians are more likely simply to ignore exhortations or to grumble as they are adversel y

affected by his schemes . But, if the armythreatened to unseat Nyerere, there wouldbe little movement to support him . The armymight seek to oust Nyerere if it felt threatene dby the rival People's Militia, Chinese influence ,or witch hunts . Other moderate elements i nthe civil service, political elite, and businesscommunity would probably welcome a change .Nyerere's position will become less secure i fthe economy continues to suffer from his rashmoves or if he embarks on repressive measure sto enforce his nation-building efforts .

45. In Zambia, President Kaunda will hav esome difficulty in persuading Bembas to co-operate with his government, but there is noimmediate threat to Kaunda as national leader .He retains the respect and affection of mostinfluential Zambians, including the recentlyZambianized army forces . His chief problemswill continue to revolve around keeping openseveral routes to the sea and warding offretaliation by southern African white regimesfor actions by freedom fighters . Yet, tribal te

nsions are normally very close to the surface ,and can easily be brought to the flash-point .Zambian political institutions, including theruling party, are in a rudimentary stage ofdevelopment. Hence a change in regime couldcome quite abruptly.

C. Implications for External Power s46. It appears that the USSR is not greatl y

interested in East Africa and foresees few favorable opportunities there. The Chinese, on

the other hand, already have some influencein Tanzania (mainland and Zanzibar) an dthe potential for developing considerably

more. Their extensive military assistance t oground, naval, and air elements of the Ta

nzanian armed forces, their economic aid pro -gram, and their support for African liberatio nmovements contribute to this influence . More-over, Nyerere and a few other high officialsare favorably impressed by Chinese method sand attitudes . If the Chinese continue to per -form quietly and effectively, they are likel yto improve further their position in Tanzani aand to develop their influence in Zambia. Butthe Chinese will be dealing with hypersens

itive Africans quick to react to any interferencein their internal affairs . Though the Ta

nzanians may continue to rely on Chinese military assistance, the value to China of the ec

onomic assistance program is almost certain t odecrease after completion of the Tan/ZamRailroad. Some Tanzanians are already co

mplaining about high import prices of Chines egoods, their poor quality, and the difficultyof getting spare parts. This kind of complaintwill probably grow as Chinese products be -come more plentiful on the local market .

47. East Africa has gradually loosened itsties with the West. The UK still has the mostimportant interest of any Western country, bu tits influence and concern have diminished overthe years . The British will probably continueto work quietly behind the scenes in Kenya,but in the event of violence would probabl ynot introduce troops . Elsewhere in East Africa ,the British will seek to avoid involvement inpolitical squabbles .

48. The significance for the US of developments in East Africa depends on what the U S

chooses to call important in the area . It canbe argued that the US has no major interestsin East Africa. The US depends on no EastAfrican products that it cannot obtain else-where . American investment is small co

mpared to other parts of the underdevelope dworld (no more than $200 million in Zambia ,$100 million in Kenya, and $10 million each

in Uganda and Tanzania) . On the other hand,the US has a stake in continued progress in thearea. Kenya's relatively open political atmo

sphere and economic prosperity are model swhich the US would like to see other countrie sfollow. Tanzania and Zambia are frontlin estates in the confrontation between black an dwhite areas of southern Africa, and PresidentsNyerere and Kaunda have been importan tleaders of world opinion on the African rac eproblem. Changes in the leadership of these

two states would certainly affect the southernAfrican situation and, therefore, the US rel

ationship with the area. The denial of landin gor overflight rights in East Africa would re -quire considerable revision of US military co

ntingency planning. Prolonged instability any-where in the area would jeopardize pro-Westregimes, endanger existing regional arrang

ements, worsen prospects for economic development, and lead to the spread of violence

in a volatile part of the Third World .