nation building in mesopotamia: u.s. military engineers in

Nation Building in Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq. Monday, September 12, 2005, 10:00-11:50 a.m. Col. Gordon M. Wells, P.E., U.S. Army retired

Freese and Nichols, Inc.

February 2005 n ARMY 17

By Brig. Gen. Steven R. Hawkinsand

Col. Gordon M. WellsU.S. Army retired

he motto of the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers is “Essayons,” which is

French for “Let us try.” At every turn

during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi

Freedom, Essayons has epitomized the response

of U.S. military engineers to the monumental

challenges that seem to arise every day. From

planning the reconstruction of Iraq’s national

infrastructure to working with Iraqi doctors to

get power to hospitals in downtown Baghdad,

the response of U.S. military engineers has con-

sistently been “Let us try.” This is just one

T

Photographs: U.S. Army

snapshot of a small group of military engineers whoserved in Kuwait and Iraq from January to July 2003 aspart of a larger military and civilian team charged with thereconstitution of an entire nation.

On January 24, 2003, National Security Presidential Di-rective 24 established the Post-War Planning Office to syn-chronize the efforts of multiple federal agencies to planand execute post-hostilities operations in the event of warwith Iraq. This organization, known as the Coalition Provi-sional Authority (CPA), was initially formed and led by Lt.Gen. Jay Garner, U.S. Army retired. Ambassador L. PaulBremer succeeded him in May 2003.

Knowing that the military would play a key role in the

reconstitution of post-war Iraq, the Joint Chiefs of Staff di-rected the establishment of a military organization, JointTask Force IV (JTF-IV). This unit’s mission was to workwith the commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) toconduct the military’s planning efforts for the post-hostili-ties phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Because JTF-IVwould eventually include other members of the coalition,it was subsequently named Combined Joint Task Force IVor CJTF-IV.

I was the commander of CJTF-IV. Shortly after I reportedto CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Fla., I noted thatthe manning document for CJTF-IV was missing an engi-neer staff section, an element that would be essential inplanning the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure. I im-mediately enlisted the aid of Col. Gordon Wells, the com-mander of the Corps of Engineers’ Fort Worth District.

Col. Wells was to form a 12-person forward engineersupport team (FEST) of military and civilian engineersfrom the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and deploy themto Camp Doha, Kuwait, where they would link up with therest of CJTF-IV.

This FEST team would form the core of the CJTF-IV En-gineer (C7) staff section. Col. Wells was selected for thistask because the Fort Worth District had been supportingU.S. forces in Afghanistan for well over nine months withdeployed FEST teams collocated with the U.S. Army’sXVIIIth Airborne Corps at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. Twoindividuals who had previously served in Afghanistan onFort Worth FEST teams, Maj. Brad Westergren and MarkValentino, volunteered to deploy to Kuwait to help buildthe CJTF-IV engineer team.

The concept behind Corps of Engineers FEST teams is todeploy a relatively small, multidisciplined team of engi-neers and related professionals (for example, computeraided design and drafting and geospatial information sys-tem personnel) capable of conducting in-theater assess-ments and obtaining more complex engineering solutionsthrough the use of reach back to the 38,000 employees of

18 ARMY n February 2005

BRIG. GEN. STEVEN R. HAWKINS served as commander anddivision engineer of the Great Lakes and Ohio River Divisionof the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers until January 14, 2005.He directed all Corps of Engineers water resources develop-ment in the Great Lakes and Ohio River basins, in all or partsof 17 states, and he directed design and construction of bar-racks, hospitals, airfields and family housing at Army, AirForce and DoD installations in Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, Illi-nois and Michigan. In January 2003, he was deployed for sixmonths under Central Command as commanding general tosupervise the effort to restore Iraq’s power, water and sewer-age, inspect Iraqi facilities and work with Iraqi officials. Heholds a master’s degree from North Carolina State University.COL. GORDON M. WELLS, USA Ret., served in the Armyfor more than 24 years. His final assignment was as the com-mander of the Fort Worth District, U.S. Army Corps of Engi-neers. From January to April 2003, Col. Wells served in theengineer staff section of Combined Joint Task Force 4 and JointTask Force Fajr to help plan the reconstruction of Iraq and toprovide immediate assistance in redressing infrastructuredamage and disrepair there. A graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy at West Point, he has master’s degrees in civil engi-neering from Virginia Tech and in military arts and sciencesfrom Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

The forward engi-neering supportteam (FEST) inIraq. The FEST

provides engineer-ing planning, ana-lytical capabilities,

solutions and reachback for theDepartment of Defense.


the Corps worldwide. In addition to having a highlyskilled and motivated team of professionals on the groundin support of deployed U.S. forces, each FEST team de-ploys with a sophisticated equipment package that in-cludes hardened notebook computers, satellite phones andother fly-away design tools. The team’s computers are de-signed to be networked internally, as well as connected toCorps offices worldwide through a tele-engineering kitthat provides secure worldwide satellite communications.The most powerful aspect of the tele-engineering kit is thatit allows for secure video-teleconferencing, a capabilityused extensively throughout Operations Enduring Free-dom and Iraqi Freedom.

By mid-February, the Fort Worth FEST team, composedof volunteers from across the Corps of Engineers, hadlinked up with the rest of CJTF-IV at Camp Doha, Kuwait,where they went to work with the rest of the staff in writ-ing various plans for the reconstitution of Iraq. The teamwas augmented with individuals possessing unique skills,who were subsequently assigned to CJTF-IV. These indi-viduals included coalition engineer-soldiers, such as Maj.Tony Glasgow of the U.K. Royal Engineers and Capt. JohnKlemunes, an Army reservist with a strong background inthe private sector. In addition, Capt. (later Maj.) Ben Kuyk-endall was an Army Engineer officer with a background inpublic affairs, a skill set that proved to be invaluable indealing with the press once we deployed to Baghdad.

The engineers’ first planning task was to provide a base-line analysis of Iraq’s infrastructure that eventually grewinto the Iraqi infrastructure database and geospatial infor-mation system (IID & GIS), a web-based GIS database, de-veloped in conjunction with the Mobile District of theCorps of Engineers. With a strong background in this area,

Lt. Col. Todd Skoog, Col. Wells’ deputy, led this effortalong with Maj. Andy Backus, the team’s expert on powerproduction systems. Eventually, this product, along withengineer intelligence and map products developed by theteam’s engineer-intelligence officer, Maj. Bob Swithers, wasused to support the Coalition Forces Land ComponentCommand (CFLCC) staff, as well as Garner’s staff, whohad deployed to Kuwait by early March.

In addition, the CJTF-IV engineers took the lead to de-velop the military plan for post-hostilities humanitariandemining and unexploded ordnance (UXO) operations. Inearly April 2003, the CJTF-IV engineers co-hosted a two-day humanitarian demining conference in Kuwait City. At-tendees included representatives of CENTCOM, CFLCC,the United Nations and several nongovernmental organi-zations. Despite being periodically interrupted by IraqiSCUD missile attacks, the conference was successful. Thefundamental determination that came out of the meetingwas the decision to deviate from previous models used inthe Balkans and to develop two separate mine and UXOcenters: a mine action center (MAC) run out of the CPA toconduct traditional U.N.-style humanitarian demining,and a coalition-hosted mine and explosive ordnance coor-dination center (MEOCC), that would be focused on mineand UXO database development to facilitate the force pro-tection of deployed coalition forces.

Working with the U.S. Army Engineer School at FortLeonard Wood, Mo., Maj. Regan McDonald, the CJTF-IVengineer in charge of this project, arranged for the 1138thEngineer Team, an Army Reserve unit from Missouri, toreceive appropriate training in both the United States andthe Balkans. Shortly after their arrival in theater in May,the 1138th was organized as a MEOCC and deployed for-

The FEST working area. The FEST's tele-engineering kit allows it to reach back and access Corps of Engineer of-fices worldwide and provides a critical secure video-teleconferencing capability among its features.


ward to Baghdad where they immediately went to work.Shortly after U.S. forces entered Baghdad in early April,

the power inexplicably went out. Obviously concernedthat the loss of all electrical power in a major metropolitanarea the size of Los Angeles would create a humanitariandisaster, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, commander of theU.S. Third Army and CFLCC, directed me to form and de-ploy a team of engineers into Baghdad to assess the situa-tion and get power back on as quickly as possible.

Within 24 hours, I formed a team consisting largely ofWells’ engineers and a contingent of military doctors to as-sess Iraqi hospitals, and had them sitting on the ramp at amilitary airfield in Kuwait. Late in the night on April 12,this 28-person team, designated Joint Task Force Fajr (pro-nounced “FA-JER” and meaning “dawn” or “new light” inArabic), boarded a C-130 aircraft and began their journeyto the newly renamed Baghdad International Airport

(BIAP) that had opened to U.S. aircraft several days earlier.After a three-hour flight, the pilots, wearing night visiongoggles and flying in total blackout conditions, guidedtheir aircraft into a corkscrew descent and safely deliveredmy team at 2:30 in the morning on April 13 at BIAP.

I, Wells and a small contingent of engineers found Col.John Peabody, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division’sEngineer Brigade, at his headquarters on BIAP. The 3rd In-fantry, having already added to their long, illustrious his-tory with a historic attack through southern Iraq, was nowfaced with the challenge of pacifying a major city whoseutility systems were no longer functional. Despite the diffi-culty posed by ongoing combat operations, Peabody wassuccessful in locating several Iraqi electrical engineers whowere familiar with the Baghdad power system. After beingon the ground for just a few hours, the U.S. Army engi-neers met with their Iraqi counterparts to assess the situa-

tion.American and Iraqi engineers faced

each other for the first time in theheart of Baghdad, which was still be-ing subdued by U.S. forces. Their ini-tial meeting was unique. Neverthe-less, everyone promptly agreed thatthe key mission at hand was thereestablishment of power in Baghdad.Despite language barriers and the factthat we were still at war, as fellow en-gineers we quickly found commonground in our shared desire to im-prove the quality of life for millions ofIraqi civilians. All of us knew thatpotable water, sewer systems and hos-pitals would not function withoutpower, and the suffering of the Iraqipeople would become unbearable.

The pattern that developed thatfirst day would continue for severalmonths as JTF Fajr worked hand-in-hand with Iraqi engineers to rebuildthe Iraqi utility infrastructure. Wewould meet each morning to assessthe current situation and define thetasks for the day, then set out to solvethe most important tasks in priorityorder. Initially, tensions were high be-tween U.S. and Iraqi engineers. De-spite the fact that most of the Iraqiswe worked with were techniciansand, at best, low-level Baathists withminimal ties to the former regime, the

FEST members inspect the Doura power plant.


process of building trust was our most important initialtask. The palpable fear etched on the Iraqis’ faces wasstark—after years of living in what may well prove to beone of the most horrific regimes the world has ever seen, itwas difficult for them to place their trust in anyone.

Our efforts were further complicated by the fact that theIraqi governmental system was compartmentalized to theextreme. One day we asked the chief of water and sewerutilities for Baghdad, Faris, and his counterpart for electri-cal distribution, Muhammad, to show us on a map of thecity where their key facilities were in relation to each otherso we could jointly plan how to best get power to the criti-cal water and sewer facilities. Two aspects of that eventwere unforgettable. First, these two gentlemen had nevermet and were obviously not used to working together. Sec-ond, they had trouble reading the map because under Sad-dam Hussein, maps were controlled items and not com-monly used. Imagine a major U.S. city operating with thesenior utility managers not even knowing each other andnot knowing how to read a city map!

Despite our encouragement, initially it was a significantchallenge for the Iraqis to work across functional lines.They had grown up in a society in which information waspower and decision making was highly centralized. Whenwe showed up and simply expected them to work withinmultidisciplinary teams and at whatever level it took to getthings working again, they undoubtedly thought we werefrom another planet. Our greatest challenge was not tech-nical, but cultural, and not ethnic culture, but organiza-tional culture. In the democratic, free-market economies ofthe West, and particularly in America, we tend to be rela-tively entrepreneurial and are not necessarily constrainedby organizational structures and procedures if they don’tmake sense. For the Iraqis, structure and procedure wereall-important, and deviation from either under SaddamHussein could be terminal.

Nevertheless, through these early discussions and meet-ings, we eventually all agreed that we could get more doneby working issues in an integrated fashion. We discovered,for example, that a major water treatment facility, theKarkh Water Treatment Plant north of the city, had a smallpower generation capability (10 MW) that was still func-tional and that this power could be routed through an in-termediate substation to a generation plant, providing itwith enough power to begin generating from a “blackstart.” We suggested that we draw power from the waterplant in order to jump-start power inside Baghdad. Em-ploying the language skills of another of our FEST teammembers, Maj. Dave Hurley, an engineer officer fluent inArabic, we coordinated a joint U.S.-Iraqi trip to the Karkhplant and successfully routed enough power into Baghdadto establish an initial power grid.

Using the power from the Karkh Water Treatment Plantto jump-start the system, we connected to several otherpower plants to set up a small grid. Over time, we wouldrepair both power plants and transmission lines, alongwith local substations and generators, and through an iter-

ative process, rebuild the Baghdad electrical grid back tothe point where it was relatively stable. One week after ourarrival, power began to flicker on in parts of Baghdad.Within several weeks, enough power was being generatedand transmitted to priority facilities to avert a humanitar-ian crisis. At this point, we had accomplished the initialmission Gen. McKiernan had given us.

Gen. McKiernan then directed me to expand the missionto oversee the reconstitution of the entire nation’s powergrid, specifically, the 400 kVA super grid that moved poweraround Iraq. JTF Fajr and its Iraqi counterparts continuedto labor jointly toward this next task. During this time wealso took on the added challenge, led by Col. Peabody, ofbuilding an Iraqi electricity police organization, as it wasquickly becoming obvious that there were not enoughcoalition forces to protect every power facility, and theCPA was still working to build a national Iraqi police force.

By the end of May, although not well publicized, the av-erage Iraqi was probably receiving more power than underSaddam Hussein, when daily programmed blackouts, partof a centralized load-shedding program managed out ofBaghdad, were a regular part of Iraqi life. Admittedly, onereason more power was available for domestic use was be-cause Iraqi industry and the military were no longer draw-ing nearly as much as they previously had been. Neverthe-less, the additional power would be very important as thesummer months approached.

Early in the mission, it seemed that every problem wesolved pointed to many more challenges that required ourattention. For example, we conducted joint Irrigation-Elec-tricity Ministry meetings in which we discussed issuessuch as balancing turbine releases through upstream hy-droelectric dams against releases for downstream watersupply. At one early meeting, an Iraqi hydraulic engineerexpressed concern that the Tigris River was about two me-ters too high and that this was probably due not so muchto hydropower or water supply releases, but to irrigationgates upstream having been opened wider than theyshould, possibly due to water looters stealing water fortheir own use.

We learned that the Iraqis had developed a complex sys-tem of irrigation structures for irrigating their croplandsaround the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers (this being the Fer-tile Crescent region of the world), and that the Iraqi Irriga-tion Ministry was responsible for their operation andmaintenance. The Irrigation Ministry managed the overallbasin to ensure that water would be available for multipleyear-round uses. Unfortunately, shortly after the fall ofSaddam Hussein’s regime, looters attacked and destroyedmany of the governmental ministry buildings as a meansof exacting symbolic vengeance on Saddam and his follow-ers—despite the irreconcilable fact that much of this dam-age was only going to make it much harder to reestablishbasic services. Such was the case with the Irrigation Min-istry, which lost around 100 years of hydrological and me-teorological data.

Fortunately, through the use of tele-engineering, we

were able to obtain real-time assistance from the Corps’vast capabilities in basin modeling and operations. Maj.McDonald, our FEST team hydrologist, worked through asecure satellite and e-mail connection with counterpartsfrom the Mobile District and the Waterways ExperimentStation, enabling us to build a numerical model of theTigris and Euphrates basins. With a model in place, wewere able to pass critical information on to the Iraqi hy-drologists who were then able to quickly reestablish con-trol over their hydraulic structures, close the appropriategates and avert an excessive loss of stored water. The factthat we were able to do this so quickly, working with hy-drologists and hydraulic engineers on the other side of theworld, was key to averting significant water shortageslater in the summer.

As the Iraqi engineers from the Irrigation Ministry be-gan to look at their dams, diversion structures and gatedspillways, they expressed concern that some of them hadbeen damaged. Within a week, the Corps of Engineers dis-patched a dam safety assessment team to Iraq. Workingthrough the deployed units across Iraq, we were able tomove this team of experts relatively quickly around thecountry. Within several weeks they had conducted inspec-tions of every major hydraulic structure in Iraq and pro-duced a report with prioritized recommendations for re-pairs and improvements.

Another issue that became obvious very early was the

intrinsic link between the Iraqi powerproduction infrastructure and the pe-troleum industry. Because the vastmajority of Iraqi power production fa-cilities are either thermal units run offof petroleum products or natural gasturbines, we concluded that “as thenational petroleum industry goes, sogoes Iraqi power production.” Wecould not run power plants withoutfuel, and at the same time, the refiner-ies could not produce fuel withoutelectricity. As a result, the hydroelec-tric plants proved to be a major sourceof the base load power supply as welabored to get both power and fuelproduction repaired so they couldwork in tandem once again—bal-anced against the need to avoid re-leasing too much water too soon toprevent water shortages in the sum-mer and fall.

This fact prompted us to establishregular Oil-Electricity summits between the Iraqi Oil andElectricity Ministries, similar to those we had started be-tween the Electricity and Irrigation Ministries. Out of thesemeetings, additional issues surfaced, such as the need tobalance the types of petroleum production to meet otherimmediate needs such as cooking gas and gasoline. Even-tually, these issues became the responsibility of a deployedtask force out of the Army Corps of Engineers, Task ForceRestore Iraqi Oil, or TF RIO, commanded by Brig. Gen.Bob Crear of the Corps’ Southwestern Division in Dallas,Texas. TF RIO, originally deployed to plan and execute theextinguishing of oil well fires, quickly became the leadcoalition organization overseeing the reconstitution ofIraq’s petroleum infrastructure.

The continually expanding missions of engineer organi-zations like TF RIO and JTF Fajr highlight the fact thathelping Iraq get its national infrastructure reestablishedand on the path to recovery was and continues to be amonumental engineering task. Also, it is important to un-derstand that one does not simply restart a complex, in-dustrialized society without some trade-offs. You cannotdo everything at once and we were constantly assessingand reprioritizing our efforts to maximize their effects. De-spite the fact that nation building is hard work and we ex-perienced more than our share of setbacks, for the mostpart JTF Fajr enjoyed some remarkable successes. Thesesuccesses were largely the result of the unheralded efforts

Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein,looters ransacked government buildings,destroying years of critical recordspertaining to the management of the Iraqi infrastructure.


of individual engineers, both coalition and Iraqi, who sim-ply rolled up their sleeves and tackled difficult and criticaltasks, one at a time.

For example, under the skilled leadership and manage-ment of Rich Heine, an environmental engineer from theFort Worth District, we were able to develop a comprehen-sive program for the reconstitution of the Baghdad waterand sewer systems. JTF Fajr’s highly talented civil engi-neer, Army engineer Capt. Kim Walter from the Corps’Kansas City District, worked with the CPA to develop aplan for the reconstruction of key highway bridges aroundthe nation. Kim also assisted in developing a plan for thereconstruction of various Iraqi ministry buildings in Bagh-dad to facilitate the reestablishment of a necessary govern-ment bureaucracy. Maj. Ben Kuykendall successfully led acontingent of NCOs trained in major power systems to es-tablish initial power at BIAP, a factor in improving condi-tions for the various major headquarters based there andenabling regular airfield operations. The small contingentof doctors assigned to JTF Fajr did heroic work under ex-tremely dangerous conditions to help the Iraqi HealthMinistry reestablish Baghdad hospitals and to stand up thesupporting medical supply systems.

Unfortunately, the successes enjoyed by the Iraqi andAmerican engineers did not go unnoticed by those in thedefeated regime, and an insurgency developed that tar-geted not only coalition forces and Iraqi police, but utilitiesas well. In May, a team of U.S. doctors working with theIraqi Health Ministry was ambushed and a senior Armymedical officer was severely wounded. Snipers routinelytargeted joint U.S.-Iraqi Electricity meetings until a muchmore highly trained U.S. Army sniper ended their careerduring one meeting in late April. By late June, attacks onIraqi electrical engineers and facilities in and around Bagh-dad were a daily occurrence. One senior Iraqi distributionengineer was gunned down in front of several of her sixchildren as she left her home. Electrical substations wereroutinely targeted by rocket-propelled grenade attacks and

many of the Iraqis we worked with received daily deaththreats.

Another element you rarely hear about in the Westernpress is the heroism displayed by common Iraqis who la-bor under constant threat to improve the lives of theircountrymen. The chief of Baghdad water and sewer utili-ties mentioned above, Faris Abdul Razzaq al-Asam, wasmurdered on October 26, 2003, just hours after returningfrom the World Donor Conference in Madrid, which he at-tended to selflessly address the overwhelming needs of hisnation. Faris was a friend and fellow engineer, who wascommitted to improving the conditions in his homelandfor his fellow citizens. The father of a teenage son and 9-year-old daughter, Faris was the moral opposite of thecowards who killed him in cold blood.

JTF Fajr remained in Baghdad until June 15, 2003, whenit was disbanded and its functions assumed by engineerswithin CJTF-7, the coalition command currently responsi-ble for military operations in Iraq. At the request of the Of-fice of the Coalition Provisional Authority under Ambas-sador Bremer, I returned to Baghdad in October to serve ascommander of a temporary provisional command, TaskForce Restore Iraqi Energy, in order to help CPA and theIraqi Electricity Commission manage new contracts fo-cused on accelerating the repair of power generation andtransmission infrastructure.

Despite the tendency of politicians from both parties toeschew nation building as a national policy since the endof the Vietnam War, the simple fact is that is that this is pre-cisely what we are doing in Iraq today. It is also what ourArmy has actively engaged in throughout much of its his-tory. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point wasfounded in 1802 as the nation’s first college of engineering,in large measure because Congress recognized the need forArmy Engineers to take the lead in building the new na-tion. Today, nation building in Mesopotamia is essential tohelp the people of Iraq get back on their feet and rejoin thefamily of nations. It is a function that remains very much

in the purview of engineers and is anhonorable role for those of us in theengineering profession to play. It is inthe process of nation building that wecan contribute to the economic pros-perity and governmental stability ofregions of the world where stability isso badly needed. In so doing, we alsocontribute to global stability and eco-nomic prosperity—clearly in our na-tional interest.

Essayons! B

The Mosul dam seen from the air. A U.S.Corps of Engineers dam assessmentteam inspected every major hydraulicstructure in Iraq, prioritizing repair and im-provement efforts.


1

APWA National Congress 2005

Rebuilding Iraq

Rebuilding Iraq

Major John P. Lawlor

Public Works Team Chief

1st Infantry Division

[email protected]

[email protected]

Agenda

• Introduction• What is Civil Affairs• My role in Iraq• Public Works Team function• Initial planning steps for projects• Iraqi surprises• Governmental structure• Problems with new Public Works

system

2

Agenda

• How did we adjust the new system• $ for reconstruction• Insurgents and their effects• Project samples• Completed projects• Culture / Media

Soldier vs. Public Works Director

Director of Public Works

Private and municipal practice

Active in community

Plans officer/Team chief

Twenty plus year career

Several deployments

Civil Affairs

Those activities in support of militaryoperations embracing the interactionbetween the military force and civilian

authorities and the populace whichfoster the development of favorable

attitudes, emotions, and behaviors inneutral, friendly, or hostile groups.

3

Civil Affairs

•Purpose

•Policies

•Missions

1ID Public Works Team

•Specialize in Oil, Water, Power, Sanitary Sewer, Contracts

•Recommended improvements, and organizational changes to improve systems

•Regularly met with National Ministers

Kirkuk

Baghdad

Mosul

Tikrit

1ID Area of Operations

Fallaujah Samara

Rebuilding IraqTurkey

Syria

Jordan

Saudi Arabia

Iran

Kuwait

4

Initial Steps toward reconstruction

Initial Assessments

Assessments drove objectives and plans

I-FEST Engineers

Hire local specialists when possible

Surprises

•Non-War related damage

•Neglect

•Saddam’s view toward communities

Iraqi Infrastructure Management

•The Iraqi Government was EXTREMELY centralized

•Each Element (Ministry) was headed by one person in Baghdad

•Oil sales funded other Ministries

•Govenorates were the next lower level of organization

•Any purchase at the local level could require Ministry (national level) approval

Ministry

Govenorate

Local

5

Infrastructure Management Changes

Public Works DivisionCity Engineer

Public Works Superintendent Planning Director Engineering Services

Administrative Support

Roads

Sewer

Water

Planner

Document Control

Planner

Solid Waste

Survey/R-O-W

Construction Manager

Design

Design

Public Works Department

Problems with the new system

•Govenorates were not responsive

•Local communities became too empowered

•Systems were “owned”, managed or staffed by local communities

6

Supplemental Construction Totals

Salah ad Din

At TamimSulaymaniyah

Diyala

264 Million 437 Million

504 Million

544 Million Iraq Total Program

$12.6 Billion

Effects of Insurgents (Baiji Oil Fire)


7



Baiji O il F ire


8

Al Alam soccer stadium video !!

Abu Rajash Water Treatment Project

Al Door Irrigation Project

9

Baiji Sewage Pumping Project

Iraqi Culture

•Iraqi appreciation

•Education = Acceptance

•Local Hospitality

•Fears of Democracy

•Negative Media Influence

Baghdad

10

Questions/Comments

nation building in mesopotamia: u.s. military engineers in

Documents