Jared Ritenour

Nasserism: The Rise and Fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Pan-Arabic Vision

European imperialism caused intense resentment and anger in the Middle East. Through

regulations, capitulations, and other agreements, Europeans projected their influence in the

Middle East and stirred enormous tensions. European and Western ideas greatly affected

economies, governments, and daily life in the Middle East, causing many traditionalists to form

nationalist movements against the Europeans. One of the most pivotal movements against

imperialism was pan-Arabism, and from pan-Arabism, Nasserism and an assortment of other

political ideologies, such as Ba’athism. Pan-Arabism was an Arab unification idea based on the

concept that all Arabs shared a history, ethnicity, and culture. To unite the Arab world into a

singular state or federation was the goal of the pan-Arabs and many leaders took to the task of

achieving that end. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser was among those leaders who

sought to expand pan-Arabic ideas and reject European influence. Nasser’s political ideology,

Nasserism, flourished in the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt and the Middle East and was the most

popular and noted pan-Arabic vision among the Arabic states. Nasserism, as an ideology, was

successful initially because of Nasser’s ability to play into anti-imperialist sentiments, the

nationalization of the Suez Canal, and through Arab socialist ideas involving land, industrial, and

education reform, but problems with his Arab socialist reforms, the failure of the United Arab

Republic, his interventionism in Yemen, and the Six Days War weakened the Nasserist and pan-

Arabic philosophy.

Many historians point to the British as the force exacerbating Arab nationalist tendencies

in the Middle East. When the British began their correspondence with Sharif Husain in the

Hijaz, they dredged up Arab nationalist ideologies. Nationalist ideas fueled the Arab Revolts in

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1916, which weakened the Ottoman Empire. Out of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the

British gained a heavy hand in the Middle East, including Egypt. It was out of European

imperialism (although it was not called “imperialism” per se) that the roots of Gamal Abdel

Nasser’s rise to power were born. Rejecting European interventionism, Nasser rose from

obscurity to become the icon for Arab nationalism.1 His policies initially were successful and

united the Egyptians, especially the fellaheen (peasants).

Nasser’s rise to power resulted from a military coup that he, along with leaders such as

Anwar al-Sadat, orchestrated in July of 1952. Nasser was a powerful leader in a military group

known as the Free Officers. The Free Officers were dissatisfied profoundly with the state of

Egyptian affairs, especially the influence that Britain held over Egypt and were also unhappy

with King Farouk, the tenth in the dynasty of Muhammad Ali. Farouk was a distant and carless

ruler who lived in luxury while his people suffered and lived in poverty. Farouk’s distance from

his people and the ever-increasing influence of Britain in Egyptian affairs led to the bloodless

coup of the Free Officers. A new government was created under the Free Officers called the

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The leaders of the Free Officers ran the RCC and had

control over all Egyptian governmental policy. Over the next few years the RCC suffered from

political infighting between leaders like President Muhammad Nagib and Nasser.2 Eventually, in

1956, Nasser was named president of Egypt and Nasser’s political and nationalist ideologies

were manifested in what became known as Nasserism.

As president, Nasser was a powerful ruler and incredibly influential in the Arab world.

In Egypt, he was a unifier, building upon the nationalist tendencies of the Arab-Egyptian people.

1 Rashid Khalidi, “Arab Nationalism: Historic Problems in the Literature,” The American Historical Review 96, no. 5 (Dec., 1991): 1371; Curtis Richardson, In-class notes, History 370, Spring 2013, 3/14/2013.2 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1971), 20-27; Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 43-44; Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 157.

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Through his socialist policies, he was able to help build a strong following, especially among the

fellaheen and his anti-Western positions made him popular among those disaffected by the

British intrusions into their lives. The British cared only about their economic interests in Egypt:

cotton, the Suez Canal as a way to ship oil, and the sale of British goods.3 Greed was the

overwhelming catalyst in the British efforts in Egypt, causing many Egyptians to harbor

resentment. The British controlled the major economic interests of Egypt and it resulted in a

large disparity of wealth. The poor grew while the rich grew richer, aggravating the already

growing anti-imperialist desires of the Egyptian people. The lack of empathy among the British

for the Egyptians and the meddling in the Egyptian economy created fierce resentment and

opposition to Britain. Nasser’s nationalism gave Egyptians pride in their heritage and also

enhanced their connection to their Arab roots.4

It is not surprising that Nasser’s ideas caught hold in other areas of the Arab world

because of its anti-imperialist message. Imperialism had caused many problems in the Arab

world, especially under the League of Nations mandate system. Groups that were traditionally

enemies were placed within the same borders causing violence and turmoil to grow.5 Nasser’s

ideas and actions gave hope to the Arab world, proving that the Arabs could come out from

beneath the shadow of the Europeans. It was through the nationalization of the Suez Canal that

Nasser first showed his true fortitude against the British and proved to the Arab world that the

Europeans could be dealt with through strength and persistence.

Perhaps Nasser’s greatest achievement was the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the

construction of the Aswan Dam. The nationalization of the canal was a direct result of reneged

3 Wawro, 155.4 Barry Rubin, “Pan-Arab Nationalism: The Ideological Dream as a Compelling Force,” Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. 3/4 (Sept., 1991): 536.5 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, Fourth Edition (Philadelphia, PA: Westview Press, 2009), 205.

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financial support from the United States and Britain for the funding of the Aswan Dam. Nasser

believed the dam to be an economic boon to Egypt, but the country was short on capital. Nasser

went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ask for monetary support and the United

States, playing a large governing role in the IMF, agreed to support financially the building of

the Aswan Dam. At the same time, Egypt was doing business with the Soviet Union, buying

arms from Czechoslovakia to use against Israel. Eventually the United States discovered the

Egypt/Soviet deal and considered dropping the financial support it had promised. The US

decided to attach a stipulation to the deal requiring Nasser make peace with Israel, something

Nasser refused to do. The US decided to cut all funding for the Aswan Dam. Outraged, but

unable to find another way to counter the lost US financial support, Nasser called for the

nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.6

The nationalization of the Suez Canal alarmed Britain, France, and Israel who secretly

met to devise a plan to stop it. Britain and France planned to have Israel begin an unprovoked

conflict that they would join after the first Israeli strike. Israel complied and attacked Egypt,

taking parts of the Sinai Peninsula. Britain and France joined it and attacked Egypt. The

“Tripartite Aggression” as the Egyptians called it, was orchestrated without the knowledge of the

US. President Dwight Eisenhower was furious at the three powers for the attack and went to the

United Nations to draw up a cease-fire. Britain, France, and Israel accepted the cease-fire and

the former two pulled out of Egypt. With the United States on his side at the time and the defeat

of the tripartite powers, Nasser became a hero to Egypt and the rest of the Middle East.7

Although Nasser’s armies were almost decimated, Nasser emerged from the Suez Crisis with a

burgeoning cult of personality surrounding him and the Suez Canal in his hands.6 Peter Johnson, “Egypt Under Nasser,” MERIP Reports, no. 10 (July, 1972): 5; Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 106; Douglas Little, American Orientalism (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 2002), 166-169.7 Little, 180.

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The Suez Crisis served to strengthen Nasser’s power and also help Egypt finance the

Aswan Dam. Through nationalization, Cairo gained control of the operations of the canal and

profit from it through tolls and taxes. The money that Cairo made went towards building the

dam. The Aswan Dam was an important economic project for Egypt because it would help

power much of Egypt’s electricity and it would help irrigate the Egyptian desert. Nasser realized

the importance of the Aswan Dam and the nationalization of the Suez Canal helped support the

financing of the dam. The Suez Crisis also served as a blow to British and French imperialism

and decisively removed British influence from Egypt. Nasser was a hero and his cult of

personality grew.8

Even before he became president, Nasser’s political and nationalist philosophy was

manifested in the RCC, over which he held control. The RCC announced a platform of six

policy goals: liquidation of imperialism, abolition of feudalism, an end to monopolies and their

domination of capital, the creation of a strong army, achieving social justice, and establishing a

democracy.9 The platform of six goals was central to the RCC government and was put in place

to help build an egalitarian Egypt. The first of the policies put into place was agrarian reform,

which helped build fellaheen support for the RCC and eliminated “feudal” influences from

Egypt.10

The wealthy landowners and the government profoundly exploited the fellaheen prior to

the rise of the RCC. Between the large landholdings of the government and King Farouk, the

fellaheen owned and operated a meager portion of Egypt’s land assets. Believing that a wider

distribution of land amongst the fellaheen would lead Egypt to a more prosperous future, the

RCC instated agrarian reform. Nasser, as vice-chairman of the RCC, was heavily behind the

8 Wawro, 186-187; Curtis Richardson, In-class notes, History 370, Spring 2013, 4/2/13.9 Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab Nationalism: A History (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2000), 182.10 Hopwood, 125.

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land reform laws. The new land reform laws limited the amount of land a person could own to

200 feddans, which was equal to slightly more than 200 acres. The remainder of the land, which

was a massive sum, was redistributed among the fellaheen. The socialistic agrarian reform of

Nasser and the RCC was a social and political weapon against the wealthy landowners who had

willingly supported Britain and King Farouk. By enfranchising the peasant farmers, Nasser and

the RCC built support and at the same time crushed the ability of the wealthy landowners to

mount a successful counter-movement to remove the RCC from power.11

While land reform seemed to be the answer to Egypt’s wealth disparity problem, it was

not entirely successful. While land may have been redistributed, a hierarchy system still existed

in Egypt. Egypt realized that it was easy to change the wealth status of an individual, but to

eradicate a class system that had existed for generations was almost impossible. Despite the

prevalence of the deeply ingrained class system, those in Egypt and the Arab world lauded the

RCC’s land reform, especially in its early days.12

Alongside agrarian reform was education reform. In Egypt, Islamic schools were the

foremost source of education, where the ulama (religious leaders) instructed students in Islamic

traditions and beliefs. Nasser’s secular vision forced the end of the Islamic state schools. Under

Nasser’s policies, primary, secondary, and higher education became free and accessible to all of

the social classes. Free education revolutionized the way Egyptians lived and created many

opportunities for the lower classes. The free education system was a useful tool to influence the

political thought of the young students. Students were often taught the ideals of Arabism,

nationalism, and socialist thought which helped build the nationalism of the Egyptian people. In

turn, the growing intellectual base of Egypt worked to strengthen Nasser’s power and influence.13

11 Dekemejian, 123; Hopwood, 126.12 Fouad Ajami, “On Nasser and His Legacy,” Journal of Peace Research 11, no. 1 (1974): 41.13 Hopwood, 136-140.

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Despite the success of Nasser’s education reform, there were problems. With the influx

of new students, schools became crowded and inefficient with many teachers who were not

proficient or educated enough to handle the growing demand of the students. The higher

education system also became bloated and many facilities were understaffed which became a

problem. There were too many students for too few teachers and lecture halls were over filled.

Nasser added to the problems of over enrollment by promising jobs in the government to those

who graduated from the universities. Initially, Nasser’s promise was not a problem because the

Egyptian government was a fledgling creation, but eventually it became oversaturated and many

Egyptians were unemployed or underpaid. The growing unemployed, educated class became

restless and active against Nasser’s regime in the late 1960s.14

Along with education reform and land reform, Nasser sought to nationalize the Egyptian

economy in the vein of Ataturk in Turkey. Ataturk, realizing that there was little middle class to

support industry in Turkey, decided to nationalize industry. Taking his cues from what Ataturk

had done in Turkey, Nasser followed suit, nationalizing the banks, industry, insurance, and other

sectors of the economy. Small businesses and agricultural production remained in the hands of

private interests, but the small farmers and business owners were a minor part of the Egyptian

economy. In truth, Egypt’s economy was not truly socialistic, but more of a state capitalist

system. Still, Egypt’s economy and land reform systems harkened to socialist philosophical

ideals. The goal of nationalization was to build capital, which was in short supply in Egypt

because there were few foreign investors willing to take a stake in the Egyptian market. Like the

land and education reforms, Nasser’s nationalization of the economy fell short of its intended

goals. The economy stagnated and there was little competition which led to a decline in product

quality. Salaries were capped and taxes on the upper-level salaried workers were incredibly

14 Hopwood, 140-141; Curtis Richardson, In-class notes, History 370, Spring 2013, 4/2/13.

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high. Increasingly, Egypt became dependent on outside sources like the Soviet Union to supply

them with capital and other materials. Nasser’s form of Arab socialism was not as successful as

he had hoped. Indeed, the failing economy of the late 1960s sealed Nasser’s political fate and

the fate of his ideology.15

Nasser’s ideology, as previously written, was dependent on the idea of nationalism. As

leader of Egypt, he built enormous support for Egyptian nationalism, with Egyptians embracing

their Egyptian heritage and nature. Despite Nasser’s growing Egyptian nationalism, he was also

an Arab nationalist with a desire to unite the Arab world. Egyptian nationalism seemed like a

stepping stone towards his greater goal. By removing Britain and other Western powers from the

Middle East, Nasser’s goal of Arab unification was one step closer. To remove the Europeans,

exacerbating nationalist tendencies among the people was a necessity. Nationalism was growing

throughout the Middle East and Nasser was seen as a hero due to his success against the tripartite

powers during the Suez Crisis. To create his Arab nation, Nasser played into the leadership role

that much of the Arab world had symbolically placed upon him.16

Before delving into Nasser’s international plans, attention should be given to Nasser’s

perceived role for Egypt in his pan-Arabic vision. Nasser saw Egypt as the center of three

worlds: the African world, the Middle East, and the Muslim world. Egypt was African, Middle

Eastern, and predominantly Muslim so it seemed logical to Nasser that Egypt should spearhead

the eventual uniting of the Arabic peoples. To achieve his goals, Nasser hoped to instill a

nationalist ideology throughout the three worlds so he decided on a policy of non-alignment. By

not joining America or the Soviet Union, Nasser wielded a power and influence apart from the

15 Cleveland and Bunton, 316-319; Johnson, 6-8.16 Cleveland and Bunton, 313.

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two great powers and promoted his nationalist ideologies.17 It was from Nasser’s pan-Arabic

desires that he agreed to unite Egypt with Syria into a United Arab Republic.

The United Arab Republic (UAR) was formed in 1958 at the behest of Ba’ath Party

leaders in Syria who feared a communist takeover of the government. The Ba’ath leaders

approached Nasser, advocating the uniting of Egypt and Syria into one nation. The idea was

tempting and perhaps the beginning of the Arab nation Nasser was seeking. Nasser agreed to

merge the countries into a united republic with himself as the head. The union started out with a

positive note, a new constitution was written and Nasser’s personal fame was a catalyst in

creating a large mass of support in both Egypt and Syria. Soon, though, Nasser exerted more

control on Syria than the Syrians expected. He disbanded the Syrian political parties, including

the Ba’ath Party, and sent in Egyptians to run Syria which was an affront to the Syrians.

Nasser’s goal was to set up the system of government in Syria that had worked so well for the

Egyptians. What he did not take into consideration was that the Syrian people were different

from the Egyptians. The Syrians were unable to handle the new form of government and legal

system thrust upon them by Nasser.18

The UAR lasted until 1961 and became a black mark on Nasser’s record. The UAR was

destined to fail because it had been pieced together so quickly with little planning. The demands

that Nasser put on the Syrians and the influence he exerted over them crushed any hope of the

ability of the republic to work. Seemingly it was Nasser’s ego that allowed him to believe that

what he did in the UAR would work. Nasser believed that the cult of personality that surrounded

him was enough to guarantee success, but that was not the case. The Ba’ath Party and the

military decided to rebel against Egypt and seized control of the Syrian government again. The

17 Little, 168.18 Cleveland and Bunton, 314; Hopwood, 58-60.

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UAR failed and Egypt and Syria parted ways after four mishandled years under Nasser. Nasser’s

quest for Arab unity had failed and he turned back to Egypt, taking on numerous domestic

projects, such as his education and industrial reforms. Despite the failure, Nasser remained

interested and involved in affairs outside of his country. The hope for a united Arab world

continued to echo through Nasser’s mind. Indeed, Nasser continued to involve himself in the

affairs of the rest of the Arab world, often to his own detriment.19

It was not long after the failure of the UAR that Nasser decided to intervene in Yemen.

Nasser spurred a military coup against the leader of Yemen, Imam Muhammad al-Badr and was

successful. The leaders of the Yemeni uprising announced the creation of the Yemeni Arab

Republic, although they failed to capture al-Badr who organized a resistance. A civil war began

with Nasserite military leaders facing the Saudi-backed al-Badr. To Nasser, Yemen was a way

to regain his standing as de facto leader of the Arab world. Success in Yemen could lead to

regaining his stature after the failure of the UAR. The problem for Nasser was that Egypt was

spending millions of dollars a day, which Cairo did not have. As he was seeking to regain his

former status, Nasser was allowing Egypt to weaken through his excessive wartime spending.

Nasser continued to keep troops in Yemen even into 1967 during the breakout of the Six Days

War. Because he could not stay out of the affairs of the other Middle Eastern countries, Nasser

harmed his own country economically and Egypt’s war effort during the Six Days War.20

Nasser previously faced Israel militarily in the Suez Crisis and had handily dealt with it

with the assistance of Eisenhower and the United Nations. The Six Days War was a different

experience from the Suez Crisis and ultimately became the death knell to Nasserism and pan-

Arabism. In the Six Days War, Egypt and a host of other Middle Eastern countries faced Israel

19 Hopwood, 60-62; Cleveland and Bunton, 314.20 Cleveland and Bunton, 454; Wawro, 243-246.

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and were ill-prepared to handle the technologically advance Israeli military. The Israeli defense

force was equipped with the best technologies and weapons the Middle East. Much of the

technology and advanced weaponry came from the United States and was sold in arms deals with

the Pentagon. The Israelis were also fighting for a nationalist cause, the Zionist homeland

against the invading Arabs. The cause bolstered Israeli will to fight because it realized that loss

would inevitably lead to Israel’s destruction. As for the Arabs, they were many in number but

their militaries were not as modern or dedicated as the Israeli forces. Egypt’s military was the

best of the lot, but it faced weak leadership and untested men. It did not aid the Arab effort that

Egypt still had several thousand troops in Yemen, fighting a futile civil war.21 The Six Days

War, which began in June of 1967, was a result of Arab-Israeli hostilities and it in turn, created

even more tension between the two groups.

Lies ignited the Six Days War. Due to the actions of Israel, there were thousands of

Palestinian refugees seeking asylum. Nasser, as the voice of the Arab world spoke out harshly

against Israel in support of Palestine. Nasser realized that there could never be a united Arab

world without a sovereign Palestine, so he exacerbated issues with Israel. It was in May of 1967

that Nasser, through Soviet channels, learned that Israel was moving forces toward Syria. The

report was wrong, but Nasser did not realize the inaccuracy of the report and began mobilizing

his troops. When Israel caught wind of Nasser’s mobilization, it decided to mobilize and landed

the first strike. The Six Days War had erupted and before the United States or the Soviet Union

could intervene, it was finished. Israel decimated the Arab troops, forcing them to call for a

quick truce and treaty. Expanding its borders, Israel created new tensions among the Arab

Middle East.22

21 Wawro, 248-255.22 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Eighth Edition (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013), 280-289.

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The Six Days War weakened Nasser’s influence and position in the Middle East. It

effectively destroyed what little hope remained of a united Arab world and stigmatized him. The

Six Days War was not only a disaster for Nasserism but a calamity for Egypt. The Suez Canal

was closed and the Egyptians lost millions of dollars in revenue that they desperately needed;

Egypt had to take money from other countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Along with the economic

problems, the military who had built Nasser’s Egypt was in ruins. Egypt, a once proud country,

was also forced to cede some of its land, including the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, to

Israel. Nasser offered to resign as president, but the people of Egypt urged him to remain in his

post. He acquiesced to their request and remained president until his death in 1970. Despite

remaining in power, Nasser’s influence waned and his prestige in the Middle East collapsed. As

the primary form of pan-Arabism, Nasserism’s demise was the proverbial nail in the coffin to the

movement. The Ba’athists remained, but eventually evolved into a more nationalistic

movement, rather than a pan-Arabic movement. Pan-Arabism was essentially dead from June of

1967 onward.23 The defeat of the Arabs in the Six Days War set the stage for another showdown

in 1973 that resulted in another Israeli victory.

When Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970, so did his political and nationalist ideology.

Pan-Arabism’s survival was heavily tied to Nasserism because they were closely linked.

Although Nasserism was only one variety of pan-Arabism, the reality that it was the most

successful form of the movement meant that pan-Arabism’s credibility and continuation hinged

on Nasserism. With Nasser’s death, the ideologies of Arab socialism and pan-Arabism collapsed

and new policies and ideas replaced them. When Anwar al-Sadat took the Egyptian presidency

upon the death of Nasser, he realized that changes needed to be made. He replaced Arab

socialism with limited free enterprise and attempted to reform Egypt. Islam regained its hold as

23 Cleveland and Bunton, 339-341; Ajami, 46.

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a unifying force among Arabs, eventually leading to a rise in pan-Islamism. The Muslim

Brotherhood and other pan-Islamic groups that were essentially silenced during Nasser’s secular

reign began to gain prominence and grow in power. Nasser’s influence in Egypt and across the

Middle East cannot be disregarded, though. Nasser’s ideas held sway over leaders like

Muammar Gaddafi and neo-Arabism movements that grew and declined in the decades after his

death.24 Despite the effect Nasser had on the minds of leaders like Gaddafi, pan-Arabism was

never truly resurrected.

As a movement, Nasserism was powerful and popular upon its inception in the early

1950s. It promised social justice and an end to British domination of the Egyptian system.

Nasserism’s success can partially be attributed to the charisma and forceful personality of its

namesake and the great lengths he went to ensure Egypt’s role as the center of the Arab world.

Nasser plugged into Egyptian nationalism and history and made it the most powerful Arab

country in the Middle East. In the beginning, Nasser’s great plans for Egypt and the rest of the

Arab world seemed feasible and offered immense promise, but Nasser’s egotism and policies

eventually led to the weakened state of Egypt and the pan-Arabic movement. Nasser, even when

he was better off maintaining a policy of non-intervention, continued to meddle in the affairs of

other Arab countries, such as Yemen and Syria, in the hopes of building his pan-Arabic state.

His inability to focus entirely on Egypt led to many conflicts including the Yemeni Civil War

and the Six Days War. Despite his foibles, Nasser remained a powerful force in Middle Eastern

politics until his death. While his movement and ideologies essentially died with him, Nasser

continues to hold a revered place in the minds of many Arabs and Arab leaders.

24 Ian Tuttle, “Egypt’s War for Peace,” The History Teacher 42, no. 1(Nov., 2008): 60; Choueiri, 206-210.