NASA: The Quest for the Moon

By Oleg Nekrassovski

Introduction

Preamble

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union became the first nation to start space voyages by

successfully launching Sputnik I into earth orbit. Less than a month later, this achievement was

followed by the launch of Sputnik II, which put a living creature (a dog) into space for the first

time (Kay, 2005). Aside from being first in space, these two satellites weighed 184 and 1120

pounds respectively, and hence were far heavier than the 4 pound payload the US Navy was

struggling to get into orbit, around the same time. Thus, to many contemporary Americans,

USSR was not only the first to put satellites into space, but had superior rocket technology in

the first place (Kay, 2005).

Following the success of Sputniks, the Soviet Union continued to stun the world with a

new, even more ambitious, series of satellites. In January 1958, Luna I became the first human-

made object to orbit the sun, and used that advantage to get within 3000 miles of the moon

(Kay, 2005). On September 14, 1959, Luna II, which was carrying the Soviet flag, hit the surface

of the moon; and during the following month, Luna III orbited the moon, making the first

photographs of the lunar farside (Kay, 2005).

The parallel American space program looked like a joke by comparison. On December 6,

1957, the 4 pound Vanguard exploded on live television during a test launch (Kay, 2005). And

the first successful US satellite, Explorer I, was not launched until January 31, 1958, and

weighed only 23 pounds. Thus, even the first American success underlined Soviet leadership in

space travel (Kay, 2005).

All of these anxieties and setbacks compelled the US Government to create a new

federal agency called the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which

officially started operating on October 1, 1958. And according to Kay (2005), NASA’s paramount

mission, upon its foundation, was to make sure that the United States will remain the world’s

leader in education, science and technology, and, most importantly, space. However, Kay

(2005) argues that the main goal of this leadership was US national security, or even ‘national

survival.’

Be as it may, the present paper will focus on what it assumes was NASA’s main strategic

issue in the first decade, or so, of its existence: Take the internationally perceived position of

leadership in space travel, away from the USSR.

Stakeholders (1958-1961)

Table 1: Stakeholder Analysis - Adapted from Joyce (2012)

Stakeholder group Attitude (after Sputnik)

towards ‘beating’ the USSR in

the space race (scale: -10 to

+10)

Power of the stakeholder

group with regards to

funding of America’s space

program (scale: 1 to 10)

1) Executive Branch 0 (before 1961)a; +10 (late

April, 1961)b

3c

2) Congress +8d 10e

3) American Public +10f 5g

4) US Department of Defense +10h 10i

5) Aerospace Industry +10j 8k

6) Scientific Community +8l 8m

Notes: a Kay (2005). b Ibid. c The executive can ‘lobby’ the Congress and advertise its views to the public, but has no direct

power over funding of federal government programs (Kay, 2005; Gordon, 2008; Fisher, 2008). d Kay (2005). e Congress has nearly absolute power over the funding of all federal government programs

(Fisher, 2014). f Kay (2005). g The public can pressure its Congressional representatives, but has no direct power. h Beginning in early 1958, the air force, army, navy , and NACA (NASA’s small predecessor)

prepared their own proposals for putting a man into space; all of which were designed to do so

(at least in theory) in a fairly short amount of time. The air force even went so far as to call its

proposal “Man in Space Soonest” (Kay, 2005). i The Pentagon always had a much larger budget than NASA, which it could (and often did) use

to fund space programs (Kay, 2005; Gordon, 2008). j The Aerospace industry stood to gain a lot from an increased pace of the space race, since the

likes of Pentagon and NASA always heavily relied on the aerospace industry for everything from

missiles/rockets to pressure suits (de Monchaux, 2011; Thomas and McMann, 2012). k The Aerospace industry has always formed a politically powerful interest group. l Kay (2005) m While forming an inherently, relatively weak lobby group, post-Sputnik U.S. scientists

generally obtained powerful political support for their requests by pointing to greater or equal

Soviet efforts in the same fields of research (Kay, 2005).

NASA’s Governance Structure

NASA’s administrator, between 1961 and 1968, was James Edwin Webb. The Apollo

Project (aimed at landing a man on the moon) was launched soon after his appointment,

making the job of managing NASA even more challenging. After all, the agency was already

working on a “variety of other pioneering projects such as communications satellites and

unmanned probes to the vicinity of Mars and Venus” (Wilford, 1969). So, to handle the added

heavy challenge of Apollo, Webb almost immediately turned NASA’s single leadership into a

triumvirate. In this triumvirate Webb became NASA’s contact with the White House and

Congress; Hugh L. Dryden (NASA’s deputy administrator) became the link with the scientific

community, and Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (NASA’s associate administrator) – “the general

manager and the main contact with industry” (Wilford, 1969).

During its first few years, the Apollo Project was directed by Brainerd Holmes who

became the director of the Office of Manned Space Flight in September 1961. Holmes’ deputy

director was Joseph F. Shea whose “main task was to analyze mission choices and the systems

and equipment considered for use in the Apollo program” (Wilford, 1969).

External Environment (1958-1961)

Political Issues

The Soviet government has long been working on portraying the USSR as an ‘advanced,’

‘revolutionary’ society. So, beginning with Sputnik I, Soviet media, scientists, and leaders,

argued that the fact that their country was ahead of the United States, in its space

achievements, proved the superiority of the socialist economic and political system (Kay, 2005).

Hence, USA’s leaders and commentators were worried that the fact that USSR managed to

transform itself, in just 40 years, from a relatively backward country into the world’s first space

power, and was actively advertising itself as a progressive, future-oriented society, would make

communism especially alluring to the developing counties (Kay, 2005).

Soviet leadership in space exploration and relevant technology also led to a number of

serious strategic concerns. The main one among these was the clear proof that the USSR

already had a rocket which could serve as an intercontinental ballistic missile (Kay, 2005). This

meant that for the first time in history, the United States could be subjected to a direct military

attack, despite being separated from the potential aggressor with vast oceans. Many Americans

were deeply shaken by a sense of vulnerability that this realization brought on (Kay, 2005).

Almost immediately after its creation NASA set about working on its first major

program: Project Mercury. Perhaps not surprisingly, the aim of Project Mercury was to put a

man into space before the USSR, and thus take the image of space travel leaders away from the

Soviets (Kay, 2005). The value of this project was publicly justified by various US government

officials, all of whom stated that the international political situation demands that the United

States demonstrates its technological capabilities, and thus maintains its position of ‘leadership’

by being the first to put a man into space. And that this achievement will have a much greater

psychological effect on the peoples of the world than any unmanned space flight; and hence

will represent the true conquest of outer space (Kay, 2005).

Unfortunately for the United States, on April 12, 1961, a Soviet air force pilot became

the first man to fly into space. He made one orbit around the earth in a spacecraft, called

Vostok I, before safely landing back onto the Soviet territory (Kay, 2005). The negative effect of

Vostok on the United States’ self-image, and its positive contribution to USSR’s efforts of

communist propaganda around the world, were similar to that of Sputnik, but were far

stronger. Moreover, the American ‘response’ to Vostok, in the form of an attempted manned

space flight, again made the US space program appear backward, compared to that of USSR;

and again led to numerous calls for the US to ‘catch up’ (Kay, 2005).

Economic Issues

Following Sputnik, there was a marked increase in federal spending on research and

development. Between 1955 and 1960, there was a rise from $2.6 to $7.4 billion in total federal

spending on R&D for civilian agencies, and from $9.6 to $23.0 billion for the Department of

Defense (Kay, 2005).

NASA was created through the passing of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, on

July 8, 1958, by both houses of Congress. However, before being passed, a lot of discussion,

debate, and amendment of the Space Act, took place in Congress (Kay, 2005). And while the

proponents of NASA’s creation mostly focused on the contributions such an agency would

make towards American Cold War efforts; they did not forget to mention various possible

economic benefits that can result from NASA’s work (Kay, 2005). Thus, Chairman and House

Majority Leader John W. McCormack mentioned in his speech, in favour of NASA’s creation,

various economic benefits that, he argued, will flow from the expanded space program. Some

of the benefits that he mentioned were the creation of new industries and employment

opportunities, as well as the creation of new technologies in weather forecasting,

transportation, and communications (Kay, 2005). Similarly, Gordon Mcdonough of California

stated that the costs of the expanded space program “are fully justified in any event, for

reasons of national survival. But, in addition, there will unquestionably flow from this effort

inestimable economic benefits” (Kay, 2005).

By 1961, the political forces driving the expansion of the U.S. space program have

subsided somewhat, leading President Eisenhower (who was always among the few opponents

of the space race with the USSR) to recommend, in his last budget submission in January 1961,

that NASA be given $190 million less than it requested for FY 1962. Moreover, most of this

decrease was to happen at the expense of the budget for manned space flight, including Project

Mercury (Kay, 2005). But in March 1961, the new Kennedy administration restored much of this

reduction in funds; though the new budget was still 40% below NASA’s request (Kay, 2005).

However, after the humiliation brought about by Vostok, all objections, to NASA’s large

budget requests, temporarily disappeared. Consequently, following Kennedy’s “Urgent National

Needs” speech (in which he proposed a trip to the moon) on May 25, 1961, Congress voted an

immediate 50% increase in NASA’s budget (Kay, 2005). In his Urgent National Needs speech,

Kennedy also asked Congress to approve $125 million increase in funding for continued

development of communication and weather satellites. Moreover, he didn’t forget to add that

the accelerated space program, that he was proposing, will yield a wealth of benefits for

America’s “freedoms, economy, professions, and standard of living” (Kay, 2005).

However, criticisms of the programs’ high cost began in late 1961, and continued for

the rest of the decade. To answer, or even ignore, such criticisms, and avoid the possibility of

dramatic cuts to NASA’s budget, Apollo’s supporters continued to define the contemporary

course of the U.S. space policy as being essential to national survival. Kennedy, for example,

when asked about the high costs of Apollo, would sometimes raise the threat of a new,

dramatic Soviet breakthrough in space, which would undermine U.S. national security (Kay,

2005).

Social Issues

The American public of the 1950s took it for granted that they were the richest, freest,

most powerful, best educated, and most technologically advanced people on Earth. While

Sputnik’s and Vostok’s successes suddenly made them question all these assumptions (Kay,

2005). Moreover, the success of Soviet space program meant, to many contemporary

Americans, that the Space Age was officially opened by the USSR, not their own country. And

what’s worse, these successes were viewed all over the world as acts of enormous historical

significance. So, all in all, for many contemporary Americans, USSR’s success in space was a

source of humiliation, shame, and alarm (Kay, 2005).

Technological Issues

Rocketry

In the early 1950s, the US Army built the Redstone rocket, which was designed to be a

ballistic missile capable of sending a small warhead to any distance up to 500 miles. Like many

of its successors, the Redstone rocket was built by the Army’s rocket team of German

engineers, headed by Wernher von Braun (Launius, 1994). The Redstone went through 36 test

launches, over several years, including the one on August 8, 1957, which tested blunt body

shapes and the use of ablative materials to negate the effects of superheating during reentry

into the atmosphere (Launius, 1994). A slightly modified Redstone was used to launch first two

Mercury capsules (Wilford, 1969).

The Redstone rocket led to the development of the Jupiter C rocket. Jupiter C was

designed to be a ballistic missile of an intermediate range, which was capable of delivering a

nuclear warhead while completing a non-orbital space flight. It was first successfully tested on

May 16, 1958 (Launius, 1994). A slightly modified version of Jupiter C was used to successfully

launch America’s first orbital satellite (Wilford, 1969).

In 1960, NASA acquired that part of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, which was led by

Wernher von Braun. By that time von Braun’s team was hard at work on Saturn I. Saturn I was a

new rocket specifically aimed at facilitating space travel. It consisted of two stages (Launius,

1994). The first stage was a cluster of eight Redstone boosters and a Jupiter fuel tank. It used a

combination of liquid oxygen (LOX) and RP-1 (a type of kerosene) as a fuel, and could generate

205,000 pounds of thrust. The second stage of Saturn I used a revolutionary mixture of LOX and

liquid hydrogen as a fuel, which allowed for the generation of greater thrust to weight ratio.

However, this mixture was highly volatile and was difficult to handle, making the development

of the second stage, difficult. Either way, the second stage could generate an additional thrust

of 90,000 pounds (Launius, 1994).

Spacecraft/Capsule

The most sophisticated spacecraft developed to date, was, of course, the Mercury

capsule. On the outside, Mercury capsule’s end, which was oriented forward during

atmospheric reentry, was covered by a heat shield, as well as having a retropack attached to it

(Bond, 1961). The retropack contained three retrograde or braking motors, which were used to

initiate reentry from orbit, as well as three posigrade motors that were used to achieve

separation from the launch vehicle (Bond, 1961).

The Mercury capsule was of double-wall construction, with bulk insulation material

separating the two walls (Bond, 1961). The capsule’s crew compartment housed a single

astronaut, as well as cabin equipment, communications, attitude control, and environmental

control systems. While the equipment compartments contained explosive devices, electrical

power, and landing and recovery systems (Bond, 1961).

Although all of Mercury’s systems have been designed for completely automatic

operation (Bond, 1961), capsule decompression would cause many of the electronics to

overheat and fail (Thomas and McMann, 2012). And since there was a desire to prevent such an

accident from ending the mission, “the Mercury capsule was equipped with a pilot viewing

window and manual controls designed to function in space vacuum.” The astronaut, who would

take over manual controls, was, of course, to be protected and sustained by a spacesuit

(Thomas and McMann, 2012).

Spacesuits

In 1959, the existing pressure suit technology was evaluated for the Mercury Project, at

Wright–Patterson Air Force Base. The objective was to select a suit that would best enable the

astronaut to survive and comfortably operate the Mercury spacecraft, if the latter suddenly lost

all pressure (Thomas and McMann, 2012). The B. F. Goodrich, David Clark Company, and

International Latex Corporation took part in this informal competition for the best pressure suit

contractor. The prototypes presented by David Clark and the International Latex were serious

contenders. But in July 1959 the Goodrich design was selected to be the Mercury suit (Thomas

and McMann, 2012).

The Goodrich Mercury suits “utilized a rubberized bladder with an integral bias ply

construction (similar to the lay-up used in automotive brake lines) without convoluted mobility

joints” (Thomas and McMann, 2012). To avoid creating uncomfortable contact points, the suits

lacked any hard details or unfriendly shapes. The outer layer provided structural restraint and

bladder protection, and was aluminized. To fit better in the cramped cabin of the Mercury

capsule, and to minimize pressurized volume to be overcome for movement, the suits were

tight fitting and custom made (Thomas and McMann, 2012). To improve visibility, the helmet

allowed down/up mobility by moving with the head via restraints. However, no side-to-side

movement of the head was possible, when the suit was pressurized, due to the absence of

pressure-sealed neckring bearing. However, “the helmet pressure visor was movable and used

a tiny oxygen bottle to provide a pressurized seal when lowered.” The inlet and outlet

ventilation umbilicals provided the life support for these suits by being connected to the

capsule’s environmental control system (Thomas and McMann, 2012).

Computers

In the late 1950s, the newly established NASA hired MIT Instrumentation Laboratory to

study guidance, control, and navigation for various planetary missions. Part of this study

consisted of a design of a special-purpose control computer for a photographic, unmanned

mission to Mars, and other aerospace applications (Hall, 1996). The proposed computer’s

design called for the storage of data and programs in a small read/write (RAM) and read-only

(ROM) core memory. Logic circuits (for instruction processing) were core-transistor. Core

memories and core-transistor logic allowed operation at very low power (Hall, 1996).

The proposed computer was supposed to provide the spacecraft with autonomous

navigation and control for the proposed mission to Mars. It was assumed that a general-

purpose, programmable type of computer would be required for such a task. It was proposed

that this computer support a novel application of program interrupts, which would adapt real-

time inputs and outputs to digital computations (Hall, 1996). The design also called for a large

library of subroutines (interpretive instructions) to be stored in ROM. These instructions

augmented the severely limited machine instructions of the computer, and performed a variety

of high-level arithmetical and logical operations, reducing the number of computer logic circuits

required for instruction processing (Hall, 1996).

The result was a computer with 128 words of RAM and 4000 words of ROM. It was

estimated to weigh about 20 lb, and occupy about 0.5 ft3, and to consume about 25 W during

maximum load (Hall, 1996). By 1961, a satisfactory proto-type, meeting all of the above

specifications, was constructed, and was undergoing various tests. However, this computer’s

functions for a probe to Mars, mainly the navigation of the spacecraft, were only a subset of

those that a manned landing on the moon, for example, would require (Hall, 1996).

Internal Environment (1958-1961)

NASA was a union of different organizations, which had one thing in common – many

years of experience in rocketry, spacecraft design, tracking, communications, and other

fundamentals of spaceflight (Wilford, 1969).

The first group absorbed by NASA was the old National Advisory Committee for

Aeronautics (NACA), which was established in 1915 (Wilford, 1969). Initially NACA was small,

but over the decades it expanded, made major contributions to aircraft wing design, conducted

research of upper atmosphere with the rockets that it built, “and helped design the X-15 rocket

plane, a precursor of manned space vehicles.” By the time of its incorporation into NASA, NACA

employed 8,000 people and had five operations and research centers (Wilford, 1969).

Next, in December 1958, California Institute of Technology’s (Caltech’s) Jet Propulsion

Laboratory (JPL) was also absorbed by NASA. JPL was to be owned by NASA, but operated by

Caltech on a contract basis. JPL was founded in 1936 and was the first organization to give

American engineers an organized opportunity to conduct experiments in rocketry (Wilford,

1969). During and after World War II, JPL conducted “pioneering experiments in radio-guided

missiles, techniques for transmitting instrument data via a radio link (telemetry), and the

development of prototype earth-orbiting satellites,” including America’s first successful

satellite, Explorer 1 (Wilford, 1969).

The third major group to be absorbed into NASA, was also the most highly prized,

because it was Wernher von Braun’s team of German rocket specialists. During WWII they

made the first workable ballistic rocket, Hitler’s V-2. After the war, they (von Braun and 120

aides) were ‘bought’ by the U.S. Army and moved to the United States (Wilford, 1969). And in

the 1950s they were responsible for the development of Redstone and Jupiter missiles. In July

1960, in spite of Army’s protests, President Eisenhower transferred von Braun’s team, which by

now consisted of 4,600 engineers and workers, to NASA, where it was given the primary

responsibility for developing rockets for spaceflight (Wilford, 1969).

Finally, the fourth major group to be absorbed by NASA, was the Naval Research

Laboratory’s Vanguard scientific satellite project team. The Vanguard team formed the core of

the, soon created, Goddard Space Flight Center, which later became “the communications

center for Apollo’s worldwide tracking network” (Wilford, 1969).

Recommendations

On April 20, 1961, less than a week after Vostok’s flight, President Kennedy sent a

memo to Vice President Johnson, asking him to do a survey of USA’s overall position with

regards to space travel (Kay, 2005). The first item in that memo read as follows: “Do we have a

chance of beating the Soviets by putting a laboratory in space, or a trip around the moon, or by

a rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man? Is there

any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?” (Kay, 2005).

Even though Johnson soon prepared a detailed report assessing the state of USA’s

position in space travel; in his initial reply to Kennedy, Johnson identified lunar landing as an

“achievement with great propaganda value” and a goal in which the US may be able to be first

(Kay, 2005).

Hence, on May 25, 1961, Kennedy delivered an “Urgent National Needs” speech before

a joint session of Congress, in which he stated: “I believe that this nation should commit itself to

achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him

safely to the earth” (Kay, 2005). And the nation, led by NASA, did decide to commit itself to

achieving Kennedy’s vision. NASA called its project, dedicated to achieving this vision, the

Apollo Project; and its first, immediate problem was about the exact means that should be used

to land men on the moon and return them safely to earth. Five basic schemes were soon

proposed.

The first proposed method, called direct ascent, involved a three-stage ‘monster’ rocket

carrying a 150,000 pound spaceship from the earth’s surface straight to the lunar surface. The

same ship would then use its rocket engines to lift off the moon and head directly back to earth

(Wilford, 1969).

Strengths: This method appeared to be the simplest, and many top NASA engineers

liked it (Wilford, 1969).

Weaknesses: However they soon realized that it would be impossible to develop the

required hardware in time for landing on the moon before the end of the decade

(Wilford, 1969).

Opportunities: After all, a direct ascent would require building a rocket nearly twice as

powerful as anything in sight, which would have to have an initial thrust of 13 million

pounds (Wilford, 1969).

Threats: Nor could the moon scientists, of the time, guarantee that a 150,000 pound

spaceship would not break through the lunar crust or sink in the thick dust, which many

of them assumed covered the lunar surface. Also, there was a risk that such a tall

spaceship (80-100 feet) would fall over upon landing (Wilford, 1969).

The second proposed method, named the earth-orbit rendezvous, involved launching,

into earth orbit, as many as five parts of the spaceship, with smaller rockets, and assembling

the whole spaceship in earth orbit, once all the parts rendezvous (Wilford, 1969).

Strengths: This method could be executed with small rockets that were already in

existence. Moreover, it was favoured by von Braun, and appeared to be the most likely

choice, for months (Wilford, 1969).

Weaknesses: Successful rendezvous of various pay-loads, delivered into orbit, by

multiple launches, would require split-second timing for these launches (Wilford, 1969).

Opportunities: If the powerful rockets that NASA was already working on, were made

ready in time, only two, instead of five, launches would be required (Wilford, 1969).

Threats: In either case, the weight of the assembled spaceship would be similar to the

one proposed for the direct ascent approach. So, the likely success of the lunar landing

would be just as questionable (Wilford, 1969).

The third method, called the tanker concept, was a variation of the earth-orbit

rendezvous. It proposed sending an unmanned tanker into earth orbit. Next, a manned

spaceship, apparently similar in size to that for the direct ascent approach, would be sent into

earth orbit using a powerful rocket that was being developed at that time. The spaceship would

then rendezvous with a tanker, fuel up, separate, and fly straight to the moon (Wilford, 1969).

Strengths: The large spaceship would be delivered in one piece, from the earth to the

moon, without the ‘monster’ rocket proposed in the direct ascent approach.

Weaknesses: Transferring rocket fuels, such as super cold liquid oxygen, in orbit, was a

problem of undetermined complexity (Wilford, 1969).

Opportunities: All resources allowed for rocket development would be devoted to

building the powerful rockets that were already under development; enabling them to

be built earlier than otherwise.

Threats: The manned spaceship apparently would be identical, or at least similar, in size

and weight to the one proposed for the direct ascent approach; making the likely

success of the lunar landing just as questionable.

The fourth approach was called lunar-surface rendezvous, and involved sending extra

fuel and supplies to the lunar surface, aboard unmanned spacecrafts. As in direct ascent, the

manned spaceship would still fly directly from the earth’s surface to the lunar surface. But the

astronauts would refuel for a trip back to earth, on the surface of the moon, using the

separately delivered supplies of fuel.

Strengths: Presumably, this approach would allow the manned spaceship to be much

smaller and lighter than otherwise, since it wouldn’t have to carry the fuel for the trip

back to earth.

Weaknesses: There may be no way of knowing whether the supplies have landed

undamaged (Wilford, 1969).

Opportunities: This would be the first approach, so far, where the manned spaceship

would be much smaller; reducing the risk of it breaking through the lunar crust, sinking

in lunar dust, or falling over.

Threats: There is a risk that the manned spaceship would land too far from the sent

supplies, and would be unable to refuel; resulting in the ship and the astronauts being

stranded on the moon (Wilford, 1969).

The fifth approach, which was the one to be adopted and followed, and which came to

be called lunar-orbit rendezvous, involved a single, powerful rocket, which was already in

development, taking a small spaceship with a detachable lunar landing craft, from the earth’s

surface to the lunar orbit (Wilford, 1969). The command ship would stay in the lunar orbit,

while some of the astronauts would descend to the lunar surface in the detachable lunar

lander. And after a brief stay on the lunar surface they would use the lunar lander to travel back

to the lunar orbit, and rendezvous with the command ship. Next, the lunar lander would be left

in the lunar orbit, while all the astronauts will use the command ship to travel back to earth

(Wilford, 1969).

Strengths: This approach would save a great amount of fuel. After all, the lunar lander

would not need to carry supplies for the full mission and would not require a heavy heat

shield needed for the return through earth’s atmosphere. Consequently, the lunar

lander could be tens of thousands of pound lighter than the landing vehicles in other

proposed approaches (Wilford, 1969).

Weaknesses: Some scientists were worried that all the instruments required for a

significant study of the moon, would not fit into the small lunar lander (Wilford, 1969).

Opportunities: Lunar-orbit rendezvous, when compared to other proposed methods,

clearly offered schedule advantages, cost advantages, and development simplicity, all of

which led to it being chosen as the best approach (Wilford, 1969).

Threats: Many Apollo planners argued that performing rendezvous maneuvers, at

230,000 miles away from the earth, was far riskier than doing anything similar in earth

orbit; where the astronauts could be brought back to earth, with much less difficulty, in

the event of anything going wrong (Wilford, 1969).

Implementation of Recommendations

Resolving Organizational and Operational Difficulties

Opportunities

Contractors bidding for a share of work for Apollo had to submit their proposals to a

system of evaluation boards, which Webb created in the summer of 1961 in order to advise the

triumvirate. The technical competence, feasibility, cost, and management capability of each

contractor’s proposal was to be rated by these boards, which were composed of NASA

engineers. Their recommendations would then be reviewed by Webb, Dryden, and Seamans,

who took final action (Wilford, 1969).

Accomplishing a manned lunar landing by the end of the 1960s required combining

different organizational cultures and approaches into a single, inclusive organization, working

towards a single goal. So, NASA decided that the program management concept (PERT),

developed by the military-industrial complex to coordinate the building of nuclear missiles,

would be most appropriate for bringing order to their program. Consequently, military

managers were brought in to oversee it (Launius, 1994).

Strengths

The most important military manager hired by NASA, for this purpose, was U.S. Air

Force Major General Samuel C. Phillips. Phillips reported directly to NASA’s Office of Manned

Space Flight, and “created an omnipotent program office with centralized authority over

design, engineering, procurement, testing, construction, manufacturing, spare parts, logistics,

training, and operations” (Launius, 1994). In this way, Phillips’ program office coordinated

20,000 contractors, 300,000 individuals, and countless physical systems (de Monchaux, 2011).

Among the various groups working on Project Apollo, engineers and scientists formed

two most identifiable groups (Launius, 1994). Engineers usually worked in teams and built

hardware that could help land a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s. Hence, their main

goal was to build reliable space vehicles, while limiting themselves to the fiscal resources

allocated for the project. On the other hand, space scientists engaged in pure research and

were more interested in designing experiments that would increase our knowledge of the

Moon (Launius, 1994).

All the engineers and scientists working on Apollo had little experience in managing

broad, complex projects. And none of them, of course, ever worked on a project as

comprehensive as Apollo. But there was a new breed of engineers who were trained to judge

the engineering and scientific validity of concepts generated by others (Wilford, 1969). These

engineers were also proficient in making all work systems mesh into one, on time, by expertly

coordinating the work of thousands of contractors. This new breed of engineers came to be

known as ‘systems engineers’ or ‘systems managers.’ These men kept track of everything using

a system they called PERT, for Program Evaluation and Review Technique (Wilford, 1969).

PERT was developed into a valuable management tool by the U.S. Navy during its

struggles to develop the Polaris submarine missile. PERT is a statistical technique for measuring

and forecasting progress in R&D programs. It is a decision-making tool designed to save time in

achieving end-objectives. PERT takes into account three factors: time, resources, and technical

performance specifications (Fazar, 1959). Under PERT, performance specifications and planned

resource-applications are reflected in the time variable. Some developmental programs require

effort for which there is little or no previous experience. PERT quantifies knowledge about the

uncertainties involved in such developmental programs, using units of time as a common

denominator (Fazar, 1959). Under PERT, “the major, finite accomplishments (events) essential

to achieve end-objectives; the inter-dependence of those events; and estimates of time and

range of time necessary to complete each activity between two successive events” are

represented by data which is processed by an electronic computer (Fazar, 1959). Thus, PERT is a

management control tool that assesses the chances of meeting objectives on time; “highlights

danger signals requiring management decisions; reveals and defines both methodicalness and

slack in the flow plan or the network of sequential activities that must be performed to meet

objectives; compares current expectations with scheduled completion dates ... and simulates

the effects of options for decision – before decision” (Fazar, 1959).

PERT was adopted by NASA for all its activities, especially Apollo, in September 1961. An

organizational chaos may have ensued if NASA attempted to tackle its projects without PERT or

anything similar (Wilford, 1969).

Weaknesses

As already mentioned, according to the program management concept (PERT), cost,

schedule, and reliability are three critical factors, which are interrelated and have to be

managed as a group. Hence, if program managers hold cost at a fixed level, then either

schedule or reliability, or both (but to a lesser degree) would be adversely affected (Launius,

1994). And this was true for the Apollo program. The schedule was firm; and since humans

were to be involved in flights, a heavy emphasis was placed on reliability. As a result, redundant

systems were extensively used in the project. All of this, of course, drove the cost much higher

than would have been the case if the schedule was more relaxed, for example (Launius, 1994).

Threats

Each installation, contractor, university, and research facility employed by NASA had

different views on how to work towards the task of accomplishing a manned lunar landing

(Launius, 1994). And with so much personnel involved, getting them to work together was a

constant challenge for the program managers. In fact, various groups working for NASA

competed for resources with each other, and had different views on what should be the

program’s priorities. Moreover, the scientific and engineering communities working for NASA

also had many internal differences and disagreements. And since there were many other allied

groups, competition on all levels was a constant aspect of the program (Launius, 1994).

This diversity, of course, ensured that all sides expressed their views while being forced

to prove the merits of their positions. However, sometimes the conflicts, between and within

various groups, became too great, and had the potential to jeopardize the conduct of the

program. Consequently, Phillips, as the head of the program, worked hard to keep these factors

balanced, so as to promote order and to allow the program to accomplish its goal on time

(Launius, 1994).

Due to the magnitude of the project, and its time constraints, most of the detailed

technical work was done not by NASA’s engineers and scientists, but by the hired contractors.

As a result, NASA’s technical personnel seldom engaged in the building of hardware, or even

the operation of missions. Instead, they planned the program, prepared work guidelines,

judged the competitions between contractors, and oversaw their work (Launius, 1994). The

expertise and reliability of various contractors soon turned out to be insufficient, requiring

intensive inspection and oversight by NASA’s personnel. Consequently, it was soon decided that

10% of all of NASA’s funding was to be spent on ensuring the expertise and reliability of

contractors’ work (Launius, 1994).

Project Gemini

Weaknesses

In the early stages of the Apollo program, when Project Mercury was nearly complete,

NASA’s program managers noticed a huge gap between what was learned about human

spaceflight during Project Mercury, and what would be required to successfully land a man on

the moon. They quickly proceeded to try and close this gap with experiments and training on

the ground, but certain things required experience in space (Launius, 1994).

Opportunities

Three major areas of focus essential for the success of Project Apollo required

experience in space. The first of these involved locating, maneuvering towards, rendezvousing,

and docking with another spacecraft in space. The second was about astronauts’ ability to work

outside the spacecraft. And the third – more sophisticated physiological data on the response

of the human body to extended spaceflight had to be collected (Launius, 1994).

Strengths

To gain experience in these three areas before attempting a manned lunar landing,

NASA devised Project Gemini. Gemini involved building a capsule that could accommodate two

astronauts for flights of more than two weeks (Launius, 1994). For powering this spacecraft,

Project Gemini pioneered the use of fuel cells instead of batteries, while also making some

modifications to hardware. The whole system was to be put into space by a ballistic missile,

called Titan II, which was recently developed for the Air Force. And from March 1965 to

November 1966, Gemini capsule made a total of ten manned flights and managed to achieve all

its goals (Launius, 1994).

Threats

Despite managing to achieve all its goals Gemini encountered multiple problems during

each of its flights. However, perhaps this should not be surprising because Project Gemini

suffered from various problems from the start. Titan II, for example, suffered from longitudinal

oscillations, while the fuel cells leaked and had to be redesigned. However, through hard work

of the engineers working on this project, most of the problems with Gemini were resolved by

the end of 1963, making the Gemini capsule ready for flight (Launius, 1994).

Learning about the Moon

Threats

NASA’s scientists did not feel they knew enough about the Moon, in order to say with

certainty whether, or at least how, NASA’s astronauts would be able to land and survive on the

lunar surface (Launius, 1994).

Opportunities

So, NASA’s scientists had to learn more, than was known at the time, about the Moon.

They needed to learn the geography and composition of the Moon; whether the lunar surface

was solid enough to support a lander; whether communications systems, then in use, would

work on the Moon; and whether any other factors (e.g. geology, geography, radiation, etc.)

could affect the astronauts (Launius, 1994).

Strengths

Consequently, three distinct satellite research programs were set up to answer these

questions. The first of these was Project Ranger, which, in the mid 1960s, had three probes

photograph a lunar surface (Launius, 1994). The second was the Lunar Orbiter, which was

tasked with mapping the lunar surface. It involved the launch of five satellites between August

10, 1966 and August 1, 1967 that were placed in orbit around the Moon. Each of these satellites

carried a powerful camera for photographing the lunar surface, as well as three scientific

instruments –selnodesy, meteoroid detector, and radiation measurement – the measurements

done by which were critical to Apollo. All of the five satellites successfully achieved their

objectives (Launius, 1994).

The third project was Project Surveyor, which involved landing small unmanned

spacecrafts, with tripod landing legs, on the Moon; in order to see how the lunar surface will

handle spacecraft landings; to take up-close photographs of the lunar surface; and to perform

various scientific measurements (Launius, 1994). This project involved the launch and lunar

landing attempts of seven spacecrafts, between 1966 and 1968. Surveyor 1 successfully landed

on the Moon on June 2, 1966, and transmitted over 10,000 high quality photographs of the

lunar surface; while Surveyor 3, “provided photographs, measurements of the composition and

surface-bearing strength of the lunar crust, and readings on the thermal and radar reflectivity

of the soil” (Launius, 1994).

Weaknesses

While together, the seven flights of Project Surveyor managed to supply sufficient

scientific data for Apollo, two of them failed in their mission altogether (Launius, 1994). Thus,

during a midcourse maneuver of Surveyor 2 one of the engines failed to ignite, resulting in an

unbalanced thrust which caused the spacecraft to tumble. All subsequent attempts to salvage

the mission failed, and Surveyor 2 crashed into the Moon. In addition, Surveyor 4 made a

flawless flight to the Moon; but about 2.5 minutes before its touchdown, radio signals from the

spacecraft abruptly stopped. All subsequent attempts, to reestablish contact with the

spacecraft, failed (Lunar and Planetary Institute, 2014).

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