mystery and reality in bonhoeffer's ethics

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LETTING REALITY BECOME REAL

On Mystery and Reality inDietrich Bonhoeffers Ethicsjore_479 321..343

Ulrik Becker Nissen

ABSTRACT

In Dietrich Bonhoeffers Ethics the notion of reality plays a central role.

The present article focuses on the ethical implications of the Chalce-donian Christology underlying this concept. This approach is tied to the

debate on the relationship between the universal and specific identity of

Christian social ethics in public discourse. In the opening section the

article outlines the pertinence of this debate with regard to Bonhoeffers

Christological ethic. In the following section the article analyzes Bonho-

effers concept of reality and the implied Chalcedonian traits. With this

foundation established the article raises the question about its social

ethical implications. The final part of the article argues that Bonhoeffers

ethics and ecclesiology cannot be separated from each other, explaining

why Bonhoeffers notion of reality leads to an assertion of the churchs

role in letting reality become real. In the light of Bonhoeffers notion of

reality the last section argues for the reconciliation of Christian witness

and participation in public discourse.

KEY WORDS: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, reality, social ethics, liberal democracy,

Chalcedonian Christology, Christian witness, universality, specificity

1. Introduction

The foundations of Christian ethics must be evangelical founda-

tions; or, to put it more simply, Christian ethics must arise from the

gospel of Jesus Christ. Otherwise it could not be Christian ethics

(ODonovan 1994, 11, emphasis in original). Forthright in its designa-

tion of the identifying signature of Christian ethics, ODonovan makes

a point one is well advised to consider. At one level it is simply a logical

point, but at another, deeper level, it is a fundamental and substantial

claim. Logically, it does not make sense to separate any ethical position

from its identifying origins, in this case Christian ethics from the good

news of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. More sub-

stantially, this claim points to the foundation of Christian ethics and

implies the material dimension of this identifying signature. Even if

JRE 39.2:321343. 2011 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.


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only stated implicitly, the argument is that one cannot show the

meaning and significance of Christian ethics if it is isolated from the

Christ event. Even if one may agree with ODonovan on this point, it

also raises the question of the universality of the Christian ethicapoint which is also of central concern to ODonovan in his Resurrection

and the Moral Order. Throughout this book ODonovan argues that the

resurrection of Christ implies an affirmation of created order. For

ODonovan the ethics of the kingdom and the ethics of creation are

not to be understood in contrast to each other. Rather, the former

implies an affirmation of the latter.

[T]he very act of God which ushers in his kingdom is the resurrection of

Christ from the dead, the reaffirmation of creation. . . . In the resurrec-tion of Christ creation is restored and the kingdom of God dawns. Ethics

which starts from this point may sometimes emphasize the newness,

sometimes the primitiveness of the order that is there affirmed. But it

will not be tempted to overthrow or deny either in the name of the other

[1994, 15].

This discussion of the relationship between the specific and universal

dimension of Christian ethics is both a classical and a contemporary

debate. One of the reasons for the renewed necessity of this debate in

a contemporary context is the question about the role of religious voices(in this case Christian ethics) in public discourse, which has been a

highly debated issue in recent years. Some of the most prominent

contributors to this debate are John Rawls (1996; 1997) and Stanley

Hauerwas (for example, Hauerwas 1981)each marking polar oppo-

sites. Whereas Rawls argues for a liberal democratic assertion of public

reason, Hauerwas emphasizes the formative role of the church and how

this role may be at odds with the fundamental premises of liberal

democracy. The present article aims to contribute to this general

debate about the role of Christian ethics in a public discourse. Its pointof departure, however, is the Lutheran tradition, as Lutheranism is

particularly prone to a potential dichotomy between Christian ethics

and public discourse.1

This article wishes to argue that it is an essential challenge to the

truthfulness of Christian ethics to neglect either the universal or

specific dimension of a religious voice in the public discourse. Part of

this argument is to contribute to a position where it is possible to

maintain both at the same time. Hereby the article seeks to place itself

close to the positions delineated by, for example, Jeffrey Stout and

1See, for example, Ulrik B. Nissen 2004 and Tage Kurtn 2007 for relatively recent

analyses and critique of dichotomous approaches to Luther and the Lutheran tradition

on this question.

322 Journal of Religious Ethics


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Nigel Biggar. Even if their argumentative premises are different, both

of these authors argue for a conversational model for public discourse.

Whereas Stout argues for a discursive or expressive rationality shaped

by the virtues of democracy (2005, 1011), Biggar opts for a polyglotliberalism (2009b).2 Both authors maintain a position between liberal-

ism and traditionalismterms that may be viewed as somewhat

similar to universalism and specificity, which I am striving to reconcile.

In making the distinction between the universal and specific, I do not

differentiate sharply between the terms universal or common, nor

am I drawing a sharp line between the specific or particular aspect

of Christian ethics. Whereas the former is simply seen as that which

a Christian ethic shares with worldviews or viewpoints different from

itself, the latter is seen as that which is derived more explicitly froma Christian foundation and possibly differs from other views. In pur-

suing this universality and specificity at the same time, the article

hopes to contribute to what may be called a Chalcedonian understand-

ing of Christian social ethics. In pursuing this Chalcedonian motif,

however, the article does not go into detailed historical or dogmatic

analyses of a Chalcedonian Christology, nor is it concerned with dif-

ferent church traditions understandings of this issue. Rather, Chalce-

donian Christology is used in a general sense, inspired by the central

formulation that the two natures of Christ are without confusion,change, division, or separation. The article uses this formulation as an

inspiration in its argument for a unity and difference of the universal

and specific identity of Christian social ethics at the same time. In

taking this approach to the notion of Christian social ethics, the article

furthers the contribution by Franklin Sherman (1964), who argued for

a similar understanding.

The following discussion of the universal and specific identification

of Christian ethics will be raised in the light of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.3

The focus will be his Ethics as the culmination of his theology andthereby a hermeneutical key to his theology in general.4 Other writings

2See also Biggars critical discussion of Stout and others in a recent essay (2009a).

Biggars recent book (2011) is highly relevant for the article, but unfortunately it

appeared too late to be included in any substantial way.3

Including Bonhoeffer in the aim of critically assessing the Lutheran traditions

understanding of the relation between universality and specificity in its social ethics

presumes, of course, a reading of Bonhoeffer as Lutheran. It would lead too far in thepresent context to make this argument. Instead, I refer the reader to a recent article,

where Bonhoeffers Lutheran background and theology is endorsed (Krtke 2008).4

The references to Bonhoeffer primarily refer to the volumes in the German original

edition of his collected works in the series Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke (DBW). Quotations

in the text are taken from the English translation (DBWE) currently under publication.

Letting Reality Become Real 323


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of Bonhoeffer will be discussed only when necessary.5 Within the

discussion of Bonhoeffers Ethics the focal point will be his understand-

ing of reality, as this is both an essential concept for his ethics and a

concept fundamentally shaped by the Christological understandingunderlying the entirety of his works.6 In the analysis of Bonhoeffers

notion of reality, I hope to shed light on the thesis that Bonhoeffers

understanding of reality is shaped by a Chalcedonian Christology and

as such implies an affirmation of the universal and specific dimension

of Christian ethics at the same timeand that this understanding

holds essential implications for the understanding of social ethics and

the role of the churchs witness in a public sphere. The argument for

this thesis comes in three steps: The first part of the argument is an

analysis of Bonhoeffers understanding of reality. Here I attempt todemonstrate that even if we can find particular aspects of this concept

(such as the spatial, temporal, and ontological), the overarching idea is

the Chalcedonian differentiated unity of the universal and specific

identity. As this differentiated unity holds fundamental implications for

the identity of Christian ethics in a public discourse; the second part of

the argument turns to an assessment of these inferences. That section

raises the question, what does the Chalcedonian understanding of

reality found in part one (exemplified in the spatial, temporal, and

ontological dimension) imply for Bonhoeffers social ethics? After pon-dering this question, the article turns to the third and last step of the

argument, where the focus is on the churchs role in the world, which

is an issue closely linked to the two previous parts. If Bonhoeffer

argues for a differentiated unity of the universal and particular dimen-

sion of Christian ethics, this implies that one can also take a particular

stance and yet see this as an affirmation of the universal dimension.

This is the question in the third part, where we will ask, can Bonho-

effer argue for a positive role of the church in the public realm and yet

maintain the universal dimension?Methodologically, the present article employs both an analytic and a

more constructive approach. In the first part of the article the main

concern is to determine what Bonhoeffer means by reality. As such,

this part is based on an immanent reading of Bonhoeffers own writ-

ings. This will serve as the background for the second part of the

articlethe analysis of the socialethical implications Bonhoeffer

draws from this understanding of reality. The last part of the article

5

See, for example, Clifford Green 2002 for a substantiation of this hermeneuticalapproach to Bonhoeffer.

6The focus in this article is not on the concept of reality in general, but more

specifically how Bonhoeffer understands this notion. For an overview of reality as a

concept more generally, the reader is kindly referred to, for example, Krtke 2005 and

Janke 2004.



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will turn to a more constructive reflection on the significance of

Bonhoeffers views in a contemporary context and how the social and

ecclesiological motifs in Bonhoeffers ethics substantiate the idea of

letting reality become real. This approach will be undertaken in adialogue with contemporary contributions to a Christian social ethic.

2. What Does Reality Mean for Bonhoeffer?

When we turn to Bonhoeffers understanding of reality in his Ethics,

we will not go far before seeing that a central concern for him is to

argue that there is only one realitythe Christ-reality. In this notion

Bonhoeffer finds the reality of God and the reality of the world affirmed

at the same time:

There are not two realities, but only one reality, and that is Gods reality

revealed in Christ in the reality of the world. Partaking in Christ, we

stand at the same time in the reality of God and in the reality of the

world. The reality of Christ embraces the reality of the world in itself.

The world has no reality of its own independent of Gods revelation in

Christ. It is a denial of Gods revelation in Jesus Christ to wish to be

Christian without being worldly or [to] wish to be worldly without

seeing and recognizing the world in Christ. Hence there are not two

realms, but only the one realm of the Christ-reality [Christuswirklichkeit],in which the reality of God and the reality of the world are united [DBWE

6, 58; DBW 6, 43, emphasis in original].

For Bonhoeffer the Christ-reality is a differentiated unity of the reality

of God and the reality of the world. Neither is understood separate

from the other or identified with the other. Rather, it is an appreciation

and affirmation of both realities in the same reality at the same time.

Therefore, Bonhoeffer argues that one cannot be Christian without

being worldly simultaneously. As the reality of Christ embraces the

reality of the world, the Christian is never separated from the world,nor is the world separated from Christ.

The understanding of the inseparability of the reality of God and the

reality of the world is closely related to Bonhoeffers anthropology. This

relationship is apparent when he relates these deliberations to his

understanding of human beings as indivisible wholes and links his

understanding to the concept of reality as the source of good:

Human beings are indivisible wholes, not only as individuals in both

their person and work, but also as members of the human and created

community to which they belong. It is this indivisible whole, that is, this

reality grounded and recognized in God, that the question of good has in

view. . . . To participate in the indivisible whole of Gods reality is the

meaning of the Christian question about the good [DBWE 6, 53; DBW 6,

38, emphasis in original].



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Following a summary critique of the positivist-empiricist and ideal-

istic approach, Bonhoeffer turns to the Christian ethical perspective.7

Here, Bonhoeffer claims that in Christian ethics reality is understood

as an ultimate reality [letzte Wirklichkeit] beyond and in all that exists.The notion of reality is fundamentally linked to the reality of God and

Gods self-revelation in Jesus Christ. It is in the reality of God as it has

been revealed in the real world in Jesus Christ that the reality of God

proves not to be just another idea. Bonhoeffer refers to the Christo-

logical hymn in St. Pauls letter to the Colossians (1:17) to suggest that

in Christ all things exist. Therefore, it makes no sense to speak of

reality separate from Jesus Christ. All concepts of reality that ignore

Jesus Christ are abstractions (DBWE 6, 54; DBW 6, 39). Conse-

quently, Bonhoeffer also rejects the idea that is and ought are to beregarded as opposing categories. This distinction is overcome in Jesus

Christ, where the good has become reality. The irreconcilable opposi-

tion of ought and is finds reconciliation in Christ, that is, in ultimate

reality. To participate in this reality is the true meaning of the question

concerning the good (DBWE 6, 55; DBW 6, 40).

As we have seen, Bonhoeffers understanding of the Christ-reality

implies that he cannot follow the traditional separations also so

common in contemporary Christian ethics. Bonhoeffer does not believe

the reality of God and the reality of the world are in opposition.However, at the same time he does not give up on the differentiation

between these concepts of reality. Rather, they are held together in

what he calls a polemical unity (DBW 6, 45), that is a differentiated

and tense unity where the differences are maintained and yet not

separated. Here the analogy to the Chalcedonian Christology becomes

quite clear, at least at a general level. Bonhoeffer does not make it

explicit here, but does elsewhere (see, for example, DBW 8, 44041 and

DBW 12, 32736).8 With this general understanding of reality in mind,

let us turn to more specific aspects of Bonhoeffers notion of reality, thespatial, temporal, and ontological, to see if we can find this same

differentiated unity.

Turning to the spatial understanding of reality, we see that for

Bonhoeffer it is important that there are not two realms, but only one

Christ-reality (DBW 6, 43). In the German original Bonhoeffer uses the

word Raum, which holds more explicit spatial connotations than the

7 The mentioned critique could be developed in more detail as a critical thrust of

Bonhoeffers notion of reality. This is an important aspect of Bonhoeffers ethics. In thepresent article, however, the emphasis is on the Chalcedonian traits in Bonhoeffers

understanding of reality and what this implies for the relationship between the universal

and specific dimension of a Christian social ethic.8

See also Nissen for an analysis of this Chalcedonian Christology as an underlying

structure in Bonhoeffers ethic as a whole (Nissen 2006b, 46366).



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English rendering realm. When Bonhoeffer uses the term Raum to

describe the relationship between the worldly and the Christian

reality, he seems to be using the word primarily in a negative sense. He

refers to the position from which he distances himself and says thatthis position is under the spell of this conceptual framework of realms

[Raumdenkens] (DBWE 6, 58; DBW 6, 43). Thinking in two realms in

this way seems to imply that one can move from one space to the other.

There are two distinct spaces that can be seen as confronting each

other. One can place oneself in either one or the other, or one can try

to stand in both realms at the same time (DBW 6, 43). According to

Bonhoeffer, this type of thinking is a denial of the unity in the one

Christ-reality in which we stand. In this Christ-reality any attempt to

think in different Rume is rejected. Rather, the reality of God and thereality of the world are one in the Christ-reality. Consequently, Bon-

hoeffer rejects the theme of two realms [das Thema der zwei Rume]

and says that this contradicts both biblical and Reformation thought

(DBW 6, 44). Rather, everything is to be seen from the worldly reality

as drawn into and held together in Christ.

There are not two competing realms [Rume] standing side by side and

battling over the borderline, as if this question of boundaries was always

the decisive one. Rather, the whole reality of the world has already been

drawn into and is held together in Christ. History moves only from this

center and toward this center [DBWE 6, 58; DBW 6, 44].

In addition to the spatial understanding of reality, Bonhoeffer also uses

the concept in a temporal sense. In the section Heritage and Decay he

reflects on the Western Christian heritage. Bonhoeffer differentiates

between antiquity, Christianity, and what he calls the pre-Christian

past in tracing the roots of Western heritage. With regard to Chris-

tianity, he argues that this is a historical heritage and a common

Western heritage. This is where he uses the concept of reality in atemporal sense, claiming that [t]he unity of the West is not an idea,

but a historical reality whose only foundation is Christ (DBWE 6, 109;

DBW 6, 99, my emphasis). When Bonhoeffer relates the unity of the

West to Christ in this context, it is the historical continuity between

the Old Testament, the Jewish people, the fact that Jesus was a Jew,

and the foundation of the West in this same historical setting that

makes it possible for him to say that this is a historical reality founded

in Christ. Jesus Christ has made the West into a historical unit

(DBWE 6, 109; DBW 6, 99).In the later section of his ethic, History and Good [1], Bonhoeffer

returns to this temporal understanding of reality. He reflects on a

central passage of his ethicGood is the action that is in accordance

with the reality of Jesus Christ; action in accordance with Christ is



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action in accord with reality (DBWE 6, 22829; DBW 6, 228, emphasis

in original)and explains how this can be misunderstood in two ways.

It can either be seen as an endorsement of a new ethical ideology that

is in constant contrast to historical reality, or it can be seen as anaccommodation to this same reality (DBW 6, 228). With regard to the

first misunderstanding, Bonhoeffer relates this to his understanding of

history and claims that it would be a negation of historical reality. The

good cannot be separated from its historical setting without ignoring

the affirmation of reality which is implied in the incarnation of Christ

(DBW 6, 227). Therefore, the tendency of an ethic of Jesus, as

Bonhoeffer calls it, to ignore the historical setting may lead to a

privatization of Christian ethics and thereby a disregard of historical

responsibility (DBW 6, 229). In Bonhoeffers view, it is important thatboth of these misunderstandings are reminded of the concrete histori-

cal responsibility implied in the ethic of Jesus. Just as the first

misunderstanding tends to separate the two, the second misconception

tends to regard the historical reality as autonomous and thereby as

essentially different from the Christian ethic. According to Bonhoeffer,

both misconceptions are grave misinterpretations of the relationship

between, on the one hand, historical reality and, on the other hand, the

ethic of Jesusthat is the Sermon on the Mount and the incarnation

of Christ:

[W]hat is overlooked here is the decisive fact from which alone the

structure of what is real can be understood, namely, Gods becoming

human, Gods entering history, taking on historical reality in the reality

of Jesus Christ. What is overlooked here is the fact that the Sermon on

the Mount is the word of the one who did not relate to reality as a

foreigner, a reformer, a fanatic, the founder of a religion, but as the one

who bore and experienced the nature of reality in his own body, who

spoke out of the depth of reality as no other human being on earth ever

before. The Sermon on the Mount is the word of the very one who is thelord and law of reality. The Sermon on the Mount is to be understood and

interpreted as the word of the God who became human. That is the issue

at stake when the question of historical action is raised, and here it must

prove true that action in accord with Christ is action in accord with

reality [DBWE 6, 23031; DBW 6, 22930, my emphasis].

The ontological dimension of Bonhoeffers understanding of reality is ap-

parent in his distinction between the ultimate and penultimate things.9

With regard to reality, Bonhoeffer argues that [t]he relationship

9For a further elaboration on this distinction, see DBW 6, 13762. Also Feil 2005,

297303 may be consulted. The ontological dimension also holds fundamental epistemo-

logical implications; however, it exceeds the aim of the present article to examine these

implications. See, for example, 2006b for further analysis of theses issues.



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between the penultimate and ultimate in Christian life can be resolved

in two extreme ways, one radical and the other as compromise (DBWE

6, 153; DBW 6, 144). The radical solution is concerned only with the

ultimate and endorses a complete break with the penultimate. In itsemphasis on Christ as the ultimate, it excludes and disregards the

penultimate and is expressed in exclusive categories of all or nothing.

According to the radical position, what happens to the world is not

interesting (DBW 6, 14445). The compromising solution, on the other

hand, also separates the ultimate from the penultimate, but it is done to

maintain the penultimate as having a right in itself. The relation to the

ultimate is rejected. The world stands as it is and human beings are held

accountable for it (DBW 6, 145). For Bonhoeffer both of these extremes

are false. To advocates of the radical solution it must be said that Christis not radical in their sense; to followers of the compromise solution it

must likewise be said that Christ does not make compromises (DBWE

6, 154; DBW 6, 146). What is important for Bonhoeffer is neither the

understanding of a pure Christianity as such nor the idea of the human

being as such. Rather, what is important is Gods reality and human

reality as they have become one in Jesus Christ. . . . In Jesus Christ

Gods reality and human reality take the place of radicalism and

compromise. This is the point where Bonhoeffer moves into an onto-

logical understanding of the notion of reality. In his rejection of both theradical and compromising positions, he argues that there is no human

being as such. Such an understanding would imply an exclusion of God.

Rather, [t]here is only the God-man Jesus Christ who is real, through

whom the world will be preserved until it is ripe for its end (DBWE 6,

155; DBW 6, 146). According to Bonhoeffer, the ontological foundation of

human reality is given in the unity and differentiation of the two natures

of Christ. Ontologically speaking, human reality and human being

cannot be understood rightly as separated from this foundation.

The ontological aspect of his understanding of reality is also appar-ent when Bonhoeffer speaks about the subject matter of a Christian

ethic being an issue of Gods reality revealed in Christ becoming real

[wirklichwerden] among Gods creatures (DBWE 6, 49; DBW 6, 34).

Bonhoeffer formulates the central concern of a Christian ethic as the

relation between reality and becoming real (DBWE 6, 50; DBW 6, 34).

Therefore, Christian ethics becomes a question of participating in the

reality of God as it is revealed in Jesus Christ. In Bonhoeffers view,

this means that the good is not separate from what exists.

Good is the real itself [das Wirklichke], that is, not the abstractly real

that is separated from the reality of God, but the real that has its reality

only in God. Good is never without this reality. It is no general formula.

And this reality is never without the good [DBWE 6, 50; DBW 6, 35].



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Bonhoeffer believes that the good is ontologically given with reality

as that which exists, but this is not a reality separate from God.

Rather, reality is only rightly understood in close connection to

God as the source of reality. It is only by participating in reality,understood as the reality revealed in Jesus Christ, that we share in

the good.

As we have seen in the spatial, temporal, and ontological aspects of

reality outlined in this section, a continuous theme in Bonhoeffer is the

affirmation of the reality of God and the reality of world as they are

both one and yet differentiated in the Christ-reality. This simultaneous

unity and differentiation is related to a Christological understanding of

reality shaped by a Chalcedonian view of the two natures of Christ. In

this sense, one can point to a certain mystery (Geheimnis) in Bon-hoeffers notion of reality:10

In Christ we are invited to participate in the reality of God and the

reality of the world at the same time, the one not without the other. The

reality of God is disclosed only as it places me completely into the reality

of the world. But I find the reality of the world always already borne,

accepted, and reconciled in the reality of God. That is the mystery of the

revelation of God in the human being Jesus Christ [DBWE 6, 55; DBW

6, 40].

However, for a Christian ethic it is not sufficient to point to this

mystery of reality. The Christian ethic must also ask how the reality of

Christ becomes concrete in human experience and how life should be

lived in this reality. For Bonhoeffer it is important that this Christ-

reality is not just an abstract idea, but rather has concrete, formative

implications for human life and reality. With this concrete formation of

the Christ-reality in the world, Bonhoeffer once again stresses that the

reality of God and the reality of the world are affirmed at the same

time:

The Christian ethic asks. . .how this reality of God and of the world that

is given in Christ becomes real in our world. . .the question is how the

reality in Christwhich has long embraced us and our world within

itselfworks here and now or, in other words, how life is to be lived in

it. What matters is participating in the reality of God and the world in

Jesus Christ today, and doing so in such a way that I never experience

the reality of God without the reality of the world, nor the reality of the

world without the reality of God [DBWE 6, 55; DBW 6, 40, emphasis in

original].

10In Bonhoeffers theology and ethics the notion of mystery plays a central role. See

the recent anthology by Busch Nielsen, Nissen, and Tietz 2007 for a collection of essays

on various approaches to this concept.



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With this challenge to Christian ethics, we now move to the next

question of concern: the socialethical implications of Bonhoeffers

understanding of reality.

3. What Does the Notion of Reality Imply forBonhoeffers Social Ethics?

When we turn to our second question about Bonhoeffers notion of

reality, we will see that the dimensions of reality just outlined also play

an important role in his social ethics. The main question here is: What

does the Chalcedonian understanding of reality found in part one

(exemplified in the spatial, temporal, and ontological dimensions)

imply for Bonhoeffers social ethics?11 Before we can engage moredirectly with this question, we have to indicate what we mean by

social ethics, as Bonhoeffer is quite critical of this concept and

regards it as an ethical aporia (DBW 6, 36). Bonhoeffer criticizes this

notion for its implicit dissolution of the unity between the good and the

real or the person and his or her works. According to Bonhoeffer, it is

important that the question of the good is derived from the very

concept of reality including all of Gods creation, the human person,

and his motives and actions (DBW 6, 37). Therefore, the use of social

ethics in what follows is merely a convenient way to refer to issuesrelated to ethics in the political and social dimensions of human life.

One of the reasons why Bonhoeffer is reluctant about the concept of

social ethics stems from his understanding of human existence as

characterized by a fundamental sociality. In his classical work on

Bonhoeffer, Clifford Green argues that the concept of sociality is an

underlying structure throughout Bonhoeffers theology (Green 1999).

The belief that all of humanity is united in this common sociality has

fundamental implications for the understanding of ethics and is par-

ticularly clear in Bonhoeffers understanding of responsibility, in whichhe argues that reality is constituted in the moment of accepting the

responsibility for another person. In this moment the ethical situa-

tion arises. It is the concrete encounter with the other that is the

source of ethical responsibility:

The moment a person accepts responsibility for other peopleand only in

so doing does the person live in realitythe genuine ethical situation

arises. This is really something different from the abstract way in which

people usually seek to come to terms with the ethical problem. The

subject of the action is no longer the isolated individual, but the one who

11This approach focuses the reading on foundational issues in Bonhoeffers social

ethics. The reader is kindly referred to, for example, Nissen 2009 for more concrete

implications of Bonhoeffers political thought.



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is responsible for other people. The actions norm is not a universal

principle, but the concrete neighbour, as given me by God [DBWE 6, 221;

DBW 6, 220].

When Bonhoeffer says that one lives in reality in the very moment that

the individual accepts responsibility for the other, it is important to

note that he is not speaking of a philosophically understood constitu-

tion of ethical reality. Rather, Bonhoeffer states that in this very

moment one lives in reality, meaning that at this very point one lives

in accordance with reality as it really is (DBW 6, 221). For Bonhoeffer,

this responsive affirmation of reality is closely linked to the Christo-

logical character of reality. (Here we find the return of our Chalce-

donian motif.) It is the incarnation of Christ which makes it possible to

act in accordance with reality. Only through this incarnation is it

possible for the world to remain, as God has taken care of the world

and declared it under his rule (DBW 6, 223). In this understanding of

the reality of the world, the actual [faktische] is both affirmed and

limited. The affirmation and contradiction of the world is based on the

reality of the reconciliation of the world with God in Christ. Therefore,

action in accord with reality is only possible in Christ. In Christ, all

human reality is taken on. That is why it is ultimately only in and from

Christ that it is possible to act in a way that is in accord with reality

(DBWE 6, 224; DBW 6, 223). Bonhoeffer continues further with adialectical understanding of the affirmation and contradiction of the

worldly reality, which in the present context is read as a possible basis

of the universal and specific dimension of the Christian ethic at the

same time:

The origin of action that is in accord with reality is neither the pseudo-

Lutheran Christ whose only purpose is to sanction the status quo, nor the

radical, revolutionary Christ of all religious enthusiasts who is supposed

to bless every revolution, but rather the God who became human, JesusChrist, who loved human beings, judged them, and reconciled them with

God [DBWE 6, 224; DBW 6, 223].

If we return to the earlier-mentioned dimensions of reality, we see that

reality as the immediate encounter with the other is also reflected in

Bonhoeffers rejection of the two-realms thinking. When Bonhoeffer is

pondering the spatial dimensions of his notion of reality, he argues that

the church takes up space in the world. This affirmation of the spatial

dimension of reality is part of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

But rather than mistaking this as strictly empirical, Bonhoeffer viewsthis as an act of Gods embracing of the whole reality of the world in

this narrow space and revealing its ultimate foundation in Jesus

Christ. The Church is not competing with the world, but rather

testifying to the world that it is still a world, loved and reconciled by



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God (DBW 6, 4849). As such, the task of the church is to carry a

witness of Jesus Christ to the world. The Holy Spirit will equip Gods

church-community of sanctified life to this task. Bonhoeffer even makes

the point that it is a sign of the Churchs true life that it maintains thiswitness. Where that witness has become silent it is a sign of inner

decay in the church-community, just as failure to bear fruit is a sign

that a tree is dying (DBWE 6, 64; DBW 6, 50).12 Therefore, for

Bonhoeffer it is very important that one does not understand the role

of the church defined within a narrow realm without a role for the

world. The church cannot be confined to a narrow self-understanding

where it exists only for itself and forgets its witnessing role in the

world. According to Bonhoeffer the two-realms thinking endangers the

very concept of the church whereby the church forfeits its propheticrole in public discourse:

When one therefore wants to speak of the space of the church, one must

be aware that this space has already been broken through, abolished, and

overcome in every moment by the witness of the church to Jesus Christ.

Thus all false thinking in terms of realms is ruled out as endangering the

understanding of the church [DBWE 6, 64; DBW 6, 50].

In his rejection of two-realms thinking, Bonhoeffer points to an alter-

native image in which the relationship between the church and theworld can better be describedthe body of Jesus Christ (DBW 6, 5253).

It is in the body of Jesus Christ that God is united with humanity, all

humanity is accepted by God, and the world is reconciled to God (DBWE

6, 6667; DBW 6, 53). There is no part of the world that is not in Christ;

therefore, it makes no sense to withdraw the church from the world.

The world belongs to Christ, and only in Christ is the world what it is

(DBWE 6, 67; DBW 6, 53). Bonhoeffer considers the relation between

Christ and the world so close that just as the world is the world in Christ,

Christ is also Christ only in the midst of the world. The world and Christcannot be understood rightly if one is separated from the other.

A further argument for Christs inseparableness from the world can

be found in the temporal motif, as we saw earlier in the article. When

we turn to the socialethical implications of this view, it is important

to observe that it does not entail a political conservatism in Bonhoeffer.

An example is apparent in his notion of guilt. In the section titled

Guilt, Justification, Renewal, Bonhoeffer argues that a core issue in

Christian ethics is the formation of Christ among human beings. As

human beings can only be understood rightly in relation to Christ, they

12See, also, Bonhoeffers remarks on the dangers of Reformation theology in its focus

on the preaching of the word in its ecclesiology. This understanding implies the risk of

forgetting the role of the church in relation to the world (DBW 6, 410).



14/23

are called to be conformed to him. The human being understood as the

self-creator has fallen away from the true nature of the human being.

According to Bonhoeffer, the only way to return to the true foundation

of human nature is to acknowledge ones guilt to Christ. The recogni-tion of guilt is an acknowledgment which takes place in the church as

the place of the preaching of the grace of Christ. Therefore, the church

is the place where guilt is both acknowledged and forgiven, and

thereby also the place where the formation of Christ in the world takes

place. It is at this crucial point where Bonhoeffer also links individual

and corporate guilt. The church is not only the place where the

individual guilt is acknowledged, but also the place where the Western

worlds falling away from Christ is acknowledged. As the place of

personal and corporate rebirth and renewal (DBWE 6, 135; DBW 6,126), the church is the place where Jesus makes his form real in the

midst of the world. Thereby, the historically acknowledged guilt (the

Western worlds falling away from Christ) serves in Bonhoeffer to

argue for the formative role of the church in the realization of Christ

in the world. This understanding of the churchs formative role is in

itself a significant socialethical motif, as the church as a social reality

is not separated from the world, but is ascribed a highly significant

role. This point is made even clearer in the following parts of this

section in his Ethics. Here, Bonhoeffer writes a confession of thechurch, structured around the Decalogue, in the historical situation of

his contemporary Germany. In this confession the socialethical

mandate of the church is repeatedly emphasized (DBW 6, 12936).

Following from Bonhoeffers understanding of discipleship, just as the

church as a whole is burdened with the guilt of the Western world, the

individual Christian is also called to carry the guilt of ones neighbor.

The Christian is called to follow Christ in carrying the guilt of the other.

Christ enters into human guilt and is burdened with the guilt of human

beings as real human beings (DBW 6, 233). Christ does not introduce anew human being. Rather, in his love for human beings he is burdened

with their guilt. In this being burdened with human guilt, the historical

dimension of human reality is also affirmed: As one who acts respon-

sibly in human historical existence, as a human being having entered

reality, Jesus becomes guilty (DBWE 6, 234; DBW 6, 233).

Lastly, we turn to the ontological motif in Bonhoeffers notion of

reality. This concept is a central notion in his argument for the ethical

responsibility of human beings toward each other. The ontological

motif is initially evident when Bonhoeffer reflects on the good as beingreality itself. Elsewhere in his Ethics, Bonhoeffer adds that the clas-

sical utilitarian and deontological ways of thinking about ethicsor, as

he calls them an ethic of consequences and an ethic of motivesare

insufficient (see, for example, DBW 6, 3539). Neither an ethic of



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consequences nor one of motives can ensure the realization of the good,

because they both make an abstraction out of it and separate it from

reality (DBW 6, 37). For Bonhoeffer it is important that the good is

reality itself, as it is seen and recognized in God. It is created realityas a whole as it is held in the hands of God:

Good is not the agreement of some way of existence that I describe as

reality with some standard placed at our disposal by nature or grace.

Rather, good is reality, reality itself seen and recognized in God. Human

beings, with their motives and their works, with their fellow humans,

with the creation that surrounds them, in other words, reality as a whole

held in the hands of Godthat is what is embraced by the question of

good. The divine behold, it was very good meant the whole of creation.

The good desires the whole, not only of motives but also of works; itdesires whole persons along with the human companions with whom they

are given to live [DBWE 6, 53; DBW 6, 37].

Here Bonhoeffer seems to imply a more concrete understanding of

reality than we find in other passages. In the immediately preceding

passages, Bonhoeffer has given an account of Christ as reality, where

the central concern has been how Gods reality revealed in Christ can

become real among Gods creatures (DBW 6, 3335), but in the present

passage Bonhoeffer seems to understand reality as the created reality.

It is important, however, to notice that this emphasis is made in orderto avoid severing reality into separate parts. Therefore, in subsequent

passages Bonhoeffer argues for human beings as being indivisible

wholes, in both person and work, as members of the human and

created community (DBW 6, 38). Even if Bonhoeffer speaks about

reality in a more concrete sense in the passage cited above, he still

maintains a close link between this notion of reality and the under-

standing of Christ as the real one. In his section on the responsible life,

Bonhoeffer argues that reality is not something impersonal. Rather, it

is the Real One [der Wirkliche], namely, the God who became human(DBWE 6, 261; DBW 6, 261). The link between the two seemingly

different understandings of reality becomes apparent, when Bonhoeffer

maintains that the undivided whole is to be understood as creation in

terms of its origin and as the kingdom of God according to its goal.

Both of these are equally far from us and yet near to us, because Gods

creation and Gods kingdom are present to us only in Gods self-

revelation in Jesus Christ (DBWE 6, 53; DBW 6, 38).

In this section we have seen that Bonhoeffers notion of reality has

important socialethical implications. The very understanding ofreality is linked to his concept of responsibility and thereby the

indissoluble relatedness to the needs of the other. Further, this is

connected to both an affirmation and contradiction of worldly reality as

an expression of a Chalcedonian Christology. This understanding is



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closely related to spatial, temporal, and ontological dimensions. The

spatial understanding implies an emphasis on the churchs witness to

the world and an endorsement of the essentially socialethical meta-

phor of the church as the body of Jesus Christ. The temporal motifimplies an appreciation of the understanding of guilt as an individual

and corporate concept, the call to carry the guilt of the other, and the

church as the place where this guilt is confessed and forgiven. Finally,

the ontological motif implies an understanding of reality as fundamen-

tally linked to Jesus Christ. The good is derived from reality itself, and

this cannot be understood separate from Jesus Christ. Throughout this

analysis of the socialethical implications of Bonhoeffers understand-

ing of reality, we have seen the Chalcedonian Christology as an

underlying mode of thought. Just as the two natures of Christ areunited and yet differentiated, the reality of the world and the reality of

Christ are united and yet differentiated from each other. Bonhoeffer

considers this a unity and differentiation given in the Christ-reality.

The human being is within this reality and as such is in the world and

in Christ at the same time, implying that all human beings share a

fundamental Christological condition of being. We have also seen how

this Chalcedonian understanding of reality implies an ecclesiological

outlook, and how this is derived from the socialethical implications of

Bonhoeffers notion of reality. The following section provides a moreexplicit consideration of these ecclesiological motifs.

4. Letting Reality Become Real

As we have seen in the two preceding sections of this article,

Bonhoeffer stresses the notion of reality both in his ethic in general

and in his social ethics. His notion of reality is closely linked to his

understanding of the presence of Christ in the world. The reality of

Christ and the reality of the world cannot be separated from eachother. In this section we turn to what can be considered the epitome of

the particularity of a Christian ethic in a public discourse. In order to

test the thesis that Bonhoeffer maintains the differentiated unity of the

universal and particular dimension of Christian ethics, we now

examine the issue of the witness in the public context.

It is important to note that the following argument claims the

specificity of a Christian social ethic without giving up on the uni-

versality. The argument could also have taken the opposite posi-

tion and argued for the common dimension without neglecting theparticularity.13 It is a central aim hereby to assert the complete

affirmation of both dimensions without disregarding either, in the

13 See, for example, Nissen 2006a for such an approach.



17/23

Chalcedonian motif previously detailed. Arguing for the witness of a

Christian social ethic does not mean that common public discourse is

ignored. Rather, I argue for a differentiated unity of the universal and

specific dimension of a Christian social ethic. As previously mentioned,the intention is to place the argument close to the communicative and

conversational positions of, for example, Stout (2005) and Biggar

(2009a; 2009b). The affiliation with Biggars position is apparent, for

example, when he speaks of his polyglot liberalism as reconcilable

with the witness:

What this polyglot liberalism requires is not a single tongue, but a

responsible mannernot so much public reason, as public reasonable-

ness. This amounts to an ethic of communication, and it depends on a

certain anthropology, namely, a view of human beings as endowed witha special dignitythe dignity of beings who are equal in their capacity to

open themselves to what is good, to discern what is right, and to bear

witness to them [2009b, 168, my emphasis].14

In arguing for a Chalcedonian position, I also attempt to stress the

polemical and contradictory nature of this stance.15 By the assertion

of the simultaneous universal and specific dimension I attempt to go

beyond positions where these dimensions are simply contrasted or

merely reconciled. It is my aim to argue that each dimension affirms

and yet is different from the other. The specificity affirms the uni-

versality and vice versaand, at the same time, it maintains the

respective differences. Therefore, even if there are many common

concerns with Robin Lovins study of Bonhoeffers ethics and his

argument for a Christian realism, the present article deviates from

the argument for middle axioms (Lovin 1984, 173). I argue for the

differentiated unity of the specific and universal dimension of a

Christian social ethic based on a Chalcedonian Christology, and

contend that there is a communicative exchange between these two

dimensions. This exchange makes it possible to maintain either

dimension and, at the same time, see the other affirmed.16

14 The affinity to Stout 2005 can be seen when he, for example, argues for conver-

sation as a description of his aim (10) and when he argues for the inclusion of religious

views in the democratic conversation (8485).15

In this polemical position there is a certain affinity to Christ and Culture in

Paradox, as depicted in Richard H. Niebuhrs classical work, Christ & Culture (Niebuhr

1951). For a more recent assertion of a paradoxical position along the same lines, see

Robert Bennes The Paradoxical Vision (Benne 1995).16Consequently, the present article does not see the Christian witness and partici-

pation in public discourse as opposites, as Lovin tends to in his recent book on Christian

realism (Lovin 2008, 119). Even if I share the emphasis on Bonhoeffer and wish to argue

for a Christian realism, I contend that it is possible to maintain a paradoxical unity of

universality and specificity without giving up on either of them. In continuation of a



18/23

The link between Bonhoeffers notion of reality and his ecclesiology

was already apparent in his endorsement of a spatial motif in his concept

of reality. It is a well-known characteristic of Bonhoeffers theology that

ethics, anthropology, and ecclesiology cannot be understood as separatefrom each other (see, for example, Rasmussen 1972, 20). The unity of

ethics, anthropology, and ecclesiology accounts for why Bonhoeffers

understanding of reality has fundamental implications for the indis-

soluble link between his ecclesiology and his social ethics. Earlier we

looked at the spatial motif and its socialethical implications for

Bonhoeffers notion of reality. This motif implies an understanding of the

church as the body of Jesus Christ that is visible and takes up space in

the world. The understanding of reality, the church, and the social

ethical implications are fundamentally linked to each other.The link is also apparent in a chapter on Bonhoeffers ethics where

Hauerwas speaks of the call to the church to live faithfully and witness

to the truth. Hauerwas argues that the visibility of the church was

crucial to Bonhoeffer and that the church can never give up on the

truthful proclamation of the Gospel (Hauerwas 2004, 5572). Hauer-

was is quite right in his emphasis on the church and the witness in

Bonhoeffer. Among other places, the emphasis is particularly clear in

Bonhoeffers Discipleship, where he stresses the visibility of the church

community and the notion of the church taking up space in the world.17We also find this emphasis in Ethics, when Bonhoeffer reflects on the

church taking up space in the world. For Bonhoeffer this understand-

ing does not imply that the church is separate from the world. Rather,

the church is called to be in the world and witness to the world about

its reconciliation to God through Jesus Christ (DBW 6, 49).18 It is a

task of the church which is extended to the members of the Christian

churchthey are called to be witnesses of Jesus Christ to the world.

But this role cannot be separated from the church, as Bonhoeffer

emphasizes that it is the Holy Spirit which equips Christians to fulfillthis task as it comes out of sanctified life in Gods church-community

(DBWE 6, 64; DBW 6, 50). Bonhoeffer believes that the notion of the

communicative approach, I argue that it is possible to maintain both the specific witness

and the claim of universality implied in public discourse.17

DBWE 4, 225: The body of Christ takes up physical space here on earth. By

becoming human Christ claims a place among us human beings. . . . anything that takes

up space is visible. Thus the body of Jesus Christ can only be a visible body, or else it

is not a body at all. See DBWE 4, 22552 for further elaboration on Bonhoeffers viewon the visibility of the church in his Discipleship. See also Hauerwas 2004, 4348.

18In the English edition of Bonhoeffers Ethics the prophetic role of the witness of the

church is not as explicit as in the German originalsee, for example, DBWE 6, 63.

Bonhoeffer repeatedly uses the German zeugen or bezeugen, but this is rendered into, for

example, demonstrating or testifying, which is something quite different.



19/23

churchs witness dissolves any attempt to think in separate realms and

isolated spaces of the church. He claims that this witness calls the

world into the community [Gemeinschaft] of the body of Christ to

which the world in truth already belongs (DBWE 6, 67; DBW 6, 54).Even if it is a call where the church community will experience itself

as strange to the world, it is still a witness that calls the world to let

the reality of its true nature become real.

The role and place of the witness in Bonhoeffers social ethics is also

made quite clear in his understanding of the mandates. Again we see

that the churchs witness fundamentally has an ethical character. The

church maintains its socialethical responsibility by witnessing to the

world. Bonhoeffers view of the mandates is an indirect critique of

the Lutheran understanding of the orders of creation among some ofhis Lutheran contemporaries (see, for example, DBWE 6, 74n93). Even

if Bonhoeffer was right in this critique, it is worth noting that Luthers

own understanding of the three estates holds similarities to Bonhoef-

fers notion of the mandates. Luther would also argue that there is

close connection between these estates, just as it is not part of Luthers

doctrine to argue for a division of the individual between these estates.

A significant difference between Luther and Bonhoeffer seems to be

Luthers theological foundation, whereas Bonhoeffer develops a more

christological position, but in the relationship between the estates orthe mandates the difference does not seem to be very strong.19 For

Bonhoeffer it was important to argue for the divine mandates of work,

marriage, government, and the church as divinely imposed tasks and

thereby move beyond a static notion of the orders of creation where

they are seen as determinate forms of being.20 What is important for

the present purpose is the role of the church in the affirmation of

reality.

In Bonhoeffers work the church plays a crucial role in letting reality

become real, as the divine mandate of the church is the commission ofallowing the reality of Jesus Christ to become real in proclamation

[Verkndigung], church order, and Christian life (DBWE 6, 73; DBW

6, 60). The mandate of the church reaches into the other mandates, as

all the mandates overlap with each other. This overlap is closely linked

to Bonhoeffers spatial understanding of reality, as he rejects any

division into separate realms [Rume]. Human beings as whole persons

partake in the one reality of Jesus Christ and are called to fulfill this

reality and thereby carry the witness of the church to the world:

19See DBW 6, 54n70 for an explanation of how Bonhoeffers mandates grow out of a

traditional Lutheran understanding and yet how he emphasizes the commissioning

word of God in his more dynamic understanding of the mandates.20 See DBW 6, 5461 and 392412 for an account of the mandates.



20/23

Human beings as whole persons stand before the whole earthly and

eternal reality that God in Jesus Christ has prepared for them. Only in

full response to the whole of this offer and this claim can the human

person fulfill this reality. This is the witness the church has to give to theworld, that all the other mandates are not there to divide people and tear

them apart but to deal with them as whole people before God the Creator,

Reconciler, and Redeemerthat reality in all its manifold aspects is

ultimately one in God who became human, Jesus Christ [DBWE 6, 73;

DBW 6, 5960].

Rather than seeing the human person as the place where the mandates

are in mutual conflict, Bonhoeffer understands the mandates to be

directed at the whole person standing in reality before God. It is in the

human person, in concrete human life and action, that the mandatesare united. For Bonhoeffer this point again is closely related to recon-

ciliation in Christ, as he argues that the unity of the mandates in the

human person happens when people allow themselves to be placed

through Jesus Christ before the completed reality of Gods becoming

human, the reality of the world that was reconciled to God in the

manger, the cross, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ (DBWE 6, 73;

DBW 6, 60).

According to Bonhoeffer, the role of the church is to proclaim this

reality of the world and thereby witness to the world that the mysteryof reality implies that all of reality is one in Christ. With specific

reference to the socialethical implications of this view, Bonhoeffer

reminds the church of its calling not to withdraw from the world, but

to let the world be what it really is and bear witness to the world of its

true realitythe world as reconciled to God in Jesus Christ.

It is important to bear in mind that, for Bonhoeffer, the very core of

Christian ethics is related to the concept of reality. The essential

concern is how the reality of God as it is revealed in Jesus Christ

becomes real among Gods creatures. The pivotal issue is the relation-ship between reality and becoming real (DBW 6, 34). Bonhoeffer

connects the issue of reality to the Holy Spirit. The relationship

between Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit is so close that Bonhoeffer

considers it to be synonymous with the relationship between reality

and becoming real (DBW 6, 35). When Bonhoeffer writes on the will of

God elsewhere, this theme is also intimately related to the realization

of the one Christ-reality. It is a reality revealed in Jesus Christ that is

to become real in the world. The reality both affirms and transforms

the world at the same time:[T]he will of God is nothing other than the realization of the Christ-

reality among us in and in our world. The will of God is therefore not an

idea that demands to be realized; it is itself already reality in the

self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The will of God is neither an idea



21/23

nor is it simply identical with what exists, so that subjection to things as

they are could fulfill it; it is rather a reality that wills to become real ever

anew in what exists and against what exists [DBWE 6, 74; DBW 6, 61].

In the affirmation and transformation of what exists, the mystery ofthe Christ-reality implies a confirmation of both the universal and

particular dimension of Christian ethics. In its verification of all that

exists, this understanding of the Christ-reality recognizes the univer-

sality of Christian ethics, and yet at the same time the contradictory

transformation involves the affirmation of the particular. Bonhoeffers

notion of reality demands a polemical unity between the universal and

particular and thereby points to a source of Christian ethics that moves

beyond a futile dichotomy between the universal and specific under-

standing of the identity of Christian ethics. Even if Bonhoeffersapproach to the question of identity and the role of Christian ethics in

the public realm only provides us with a step in the right direction, it

is worth noting that fact. Bonhoeffers Chalcedonian-inspired under-

standing of the simultaneous identity and difference in the relationship

between the worldly and the Christian seems to point to a viable course

in the contemporary debate on Christian ethics in a public discourse.

The contribution stemming from Bonhoeffers ethics leads to an under-

standing that affirms the worldly reality and yet maintains the Chris-

tian specificity at the same time, and this position is a much-neededcontribution in our contemporary setting.21

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The article is part of a larger research project on Lutheran social ethics entitledSocial Ethics Between Universality and Specificity: A Study of the Identity of Theologi-

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