multilateral ism bad

8/3/2019 Multilateral Ism Bad

1/5

CO-OP FAILS

Multilateralism undermines sovereignty, slows decisions. Solved by unilateralism.

(Devanny 09President of the Cambridge Union Society MultilateralismVS Unilaterlismhttp://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic_details.php?topicID=310)

This need only be a concern for weak countries. Those countries that are strongenough to act alone do not need to worry about nebulous and unreliablegoodwill. Moreover,ifthe actionistakenin the name ofuniversal principles, likefreedom andjustice thenpeopleinother count ries will intimecometosee the error oftheir ways in opposing the actioninthefirst place. If a state has the strength to act alone, and isconvinced of the righteousness of its cause, it should not hesitate to act.

Unilateralism does not entail an absence of consultation and discussion with allies and other interestedstates. It merely reserves the right, when discussion and consultation has not secured international support,to take action alone. Some acts, like waging a war to defend ones own nation or free another fromoppression, are too important to be discarded just because no other country is willing to share the burden.Too much talk can impede action. Too many points of view can cloud the issue.Whilstcooperationwithother countries shouldbep ursuedas far as possible, no concessions

can be offered that compromise key objectives, and unlimited time for negotiation cannot be afforded. Oneshould not let threats get bigger and more unmanageable whilst one forlornly tries to form a coalition of thewilling; whennecessary, one simply must be prepared to act alone. Multilateral bodies only move as quickly as their leastconstructive members will allow. Worse, the consensus they reach may in fact be wrong or unrealistic,providing no real solution and creating other problems in the long term. Sometimes unilateral actionbyone state can provideleadership,behind whichother,like-minded states cangather.Even ifdifferent states adoptdifferent approaches,this policy competition canbeproductive,sho wing which ideas aremost deserving ofwider adoption.Multilateralism undermines sovereignty by limiting the freedom of action of governments, and so can deny apeople the rights of democratic decision and self-determination. Mostimportantly,in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world,anationanditsleaders must have the right todefine what constitutes a threat, and what form self-defense should take, without reference to other nations.If a government has an electoral mandate for action, then it should be able to do as it wishes, withoutallowing other states a veto over its decisions. This is particularly true when so many multilateralorganizations give equal voting weight and even veto powers to undemocratic nations.

Genuine cooperation will always fail- Not in states best interest.

Grieco 88 Professor of Political Science at Duke University [Joseph M, Summer 1988,International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3 Pages 485-507, www.jstor.org/stable/2706787, Accessed: 7/24/11]

Differences in the realist and neoliberal understanding of the problem of cooperation resultfrom a fundamental divergence in their interpretations of the basic meaning of internationalanarchy. Neoliberal institutionalism offers a well-established definition of anarchy, specifying that it means "the lack of commongovernment in world politics. "51 Neoliberalism then proceeds to identify one major effect of international anarchy. Because ofanarchy, according to neoliberals, individuals or states believe that no agency is avail- able to"enforce rules," or to "enact or enforce rules of behavior," or to "force them to cooperate witheach other.' '52 As a result, according to neoliberal theory, "cheating and deception are endemic" in international relations.53

Anarchy, then, means that states may wish to cooperate, but, aware that cheating is bothpossible and profitable, lack a central agency to enforce promises. Given this understanding of anarchy,neoliberal institu- tional theory correctly identifies the problem of cheating and then proceeds to investigate how institutions can

ameliorate that particular problem. For realists, as for neoliberals, international anarchy means theabsence of a common inter-state government. Yet, according to realists, states do not believethat the lack of a common government only means that no agency can reliably enforce promises.Instead, realists stress, states recognize that, in anarchy, there is no overarching authority toprevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them. AsKenneth Waltz suggests, in anarchy, wars can occur "because there is nothing to prevent them,"and therefore "in international politics force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed asthe first and constant one."54 Thus, some states may sometimes be driven by greed or ambition,
http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic_details.php?topicID=310http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic_details.php?topicID=310


2/5

but anarchy and the danger of war cause all states always to be motivated in some measure byfear and distrust.55 Given its understanding of anarchy, realism argues that individual well- being is notthe key interest of states; instead, it finds that survival is their core interest. Raymond Aron, forexample, suggested that "politics, insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to signify-in both ideal and objective terms-

simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states. "56 Similarly, RobertGilpin observes that individuals and groups may seek truth, beauty, and justice, but he

emphasizes that "all these more noble goals will be lost unless one makes provision for one'ssecurity in the power struggle among groups."57 Driven by an interest in survival, states areacutely sensitive to any erosion of their relative capabilities, which are the ultimate basis fortheir security and independence in an anarchical, self-help international context. Thus, realistsfind that the major goal of states in any relationship is not to attain the highest possibleindividual gain or payoff. Instead, the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is toprevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities. For example, E. H. Carr suggestedthat "the most serious wars are fought in order to make one's own country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent anotherfrom becoming militarily stronger.' '58 Along the same lines, Gilpin finds that the international system "stimulates, and may compel,a state to increase its power; at the least, it necessitates that the prudent state prevent relative increases in the power of competitor

states. "59 Indeed, states may even forgo increases in their absolute capabilities if doing soprevents others from achieving even greater gains. This is because, as Waltz suggests, "the firstconcern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system."60

States seek to prevent increases in others' relative capabilities.

[ ] Cooperation fails- States want to prevent others from achieving goals.


Instead, realists argue that states are more likely to con- centrate on the danger that relative gainsmay advantage partners and thus may foster the emergence of a more powerful potentialadversary.A4 Realism, then, finds that states are positional, but it also finds that statepositionality is more defensive than offensive in nature. In addition, realists find that defensivestate positionality and the relative gains problem for cooperation essentially reflect thepersistence of uncertainty in international relations. States are uncertain about one another's

future intentions; thus, they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relativecapabilities in the future.65 This uncertainty results from the inability of states to predict or readily to control the futureleadership or interests of partners. As Robert Jervis notes, "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift,

new opportunities and dangers can arise."66 Thus, realism expects a state's utility function to incorporate twodistinct terms. It needs to include the state's individual payoff, V, reflecting the realist view thatstates are motivated by absolute gains. Yet it must also include a term integrating both thestate's individual payoff and the partner's payoff, W, in such a way that gaps favoring the stateadd to its utility while, more importantly, gaps favoring the partner detract from it. One function thatdepicts this realist understanding of state utility is U = V - k (W - V), with k representing the state's coefficient of sensitivity to gapsin payoffs either to its advantage or disadvantage. This realist specification of state utility can be contrasted with that inferred from

neoliberal theory, namely, U = V. In both cases, the state obtains utility from the receipt of absolutepayoffs. However, while neoliberal in- stitutional theory assumes that state utility functions are independent of one another andthat states are indifferent to the payoffs of others, realist theory argues that state utility functions are at least

partially interdependent and that one state's utility can affect another's.

[ ] Cooperation impossible-States fear others gains


In addition, a state that knows it will not be cheated still confronts another risk that is at least asformidable: perhaps a partner will achieve disproportionate gains, and, thus strengthened,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787


3/5

might someday be a more dangerous enemy than if they had never worked together. For neoliberaltheory, the problem of cooperation in anarchy is that states may fail to achieve it; in the final analysis, the worst possible outcome

is a lost opportunity. For realist theory, state efforts to cooperate entail these dangers plus the muchgreater risk, for some states, that cooperation might someday result in lost independence or se-curity. Realism and neoliberal institutionalism offer markedly different views con- cerning the effects of international anarchy onstates. These differences are summarized in Table 2. Compared to realist theory, neoliberal institutionalism understates the range

of uncertainties and risks states believe they must overcome to cooperate with others. Hence, realism provides a morecomprehensive theory of the problem of cooperation than does neoliberal institutionalism.

ALTRUISM DOES NOT EXIST

(9/16/2011 Thomas Houghton, International Relations, Third Party

Intervention in Ethnic Conflict www.e-ir.info/?p=14090)

As this essay has demonstrated, it is not possible for third-party intervention in a

conflict to be disinterested. The idea of a truly selfless act does not exist at the state

level, and nor should it. A state exists to serve its citizens and their interests whichmay, on occasion, result in the rescue of an ethnic group within another state who

are unable to protect themselves from oppression at the hands of their government

or another ethnic group. The case of NATO action with regards to Kosovo

illustrates how a powerful military alliance can have interests at stake in a remote

and apparently unimportant state. Rather than let ethnic cleansing take place,

NATO decided that it was in its interest to uphold moral values and act on the

behalf of an oppressed group. As we have seen, the means by which it pursued its

aims and the extent to which it went to attain them were again governed by interest.

Cooperation fails -States will always maximize gains


Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors.It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating,the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions,

the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists un- derstand that statesseek absolute gains and worry about compliance. How- ever, realists find that states arepositional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concernsabout cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gainmore from cooperation than they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute andrelative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a

joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relativelygreater gains.Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to internationalcoop- eration: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements ofgains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former, and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for thelatter. Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their

survival as independent actors.According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow'senemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the presentmight produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, states must give seriousattention to the gains of partners. Neoliberals fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, andthis allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet, in doing so, they fail
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787


4/5

to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation. In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis onconflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than

does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory ofinternational politics.

MULTILATERALISM GIVES THE FALSE ILLUSION OF PRODUCTIVITY WHERE ONLY

MILITARY MIGHT SOLVES.

(Krauthammer, 06, The Good the Bad, the Ugly Side of Multilateralism, Townhall.com,

http://townhall.com/columnists/charleskrauthammer/2006/08/25/the_good,_bad_and_ugly_side_

of_multilateralism/page/full/)

There is nothing to be done anyway, so multilateralism gives you the cover of appearing to

do something.

The six-partynegotiations onNorthKorea arean exampleof the second.North Koreawent nuclear a long timeago.Our time toactwas during theBush41 andClintonadministrations.N othing wasdone.Andnothing canbedone now.Oncea countryhas gone nuclear, thereis noreturn.T henukes themselves actas adeterrentagainst militarymeasures.And nodiplomat,however mellifluous,is going totalk a nuclear NorthKoreainto dismantling the one thing thatgives it anysignificanceintheworld.

Like most multilateral efforts, the six-party talks give only the appearance of activity, thereby

providing cover to a hopelessly lost cause.Nothing wrong withthatkind ofmultilateralism.

Lebanon is an exampleof the other category-- multilateralism thatmight actuallyaccomplishsomething.TheU.S.wor ked assiduouslywith Francetodrafta SecurityCouncil resolutionthatwould createa powerful international force, and thus a real buffer,in southLebanon. However,when theLebanesegovernm entandthe ArabLeagueobjected, France became their lawyer andrenegotiated thedraftwith the U.S.The StateDepartment acquiesced toafar weaker resolution onthequite reasonablegrounds that since France was going toleadandbe them ajor participantintheinternational force, we should notbedictating theterms under which the forcewould operate.

Butwe underestimated French perfidy.(Overestimating itis mathematicallyimpossible.) Oncetheresolution was passed,France announcedthatinstead of the expected5,000troops, itwouldbesending 200.T he Frenchdefense minister explainedthat they werenotgoing tosendoutsoldiers under a limitedmandateand weak rules of engagement-- preciselythe mandateandrules of engagementthat the French hadjustgotten us toagree to.

This breathtaking duplicity -- payback for theLouisianaPurchase?-- lefttheState Departmentred-f aced. (Itrecoupedsomewhat when,Thursdaynight,Fr ancereportedlyagre edtosend 1,500 to2000troops.)But the setback was minor compared to what we now face with Iran.

Hezbollah in south Lebanon is a major irritant, but a nuclear Iran is a major strategic threat.

The problemis notquite as intractable as NorthKoreabecause Iranhas notcr ossed the nuclear threshold.AndA merican diplomacyhas, upuntil now, been defensible.SecretaryRice's Juneinitiative,postponing SecurityCouncil debate onsanctions,wasmeant to keep the allies on board. It offered Iran a major array of

economic and diplomatic incentives(including talks withthe U.S.),with but a single condition: Iran had to verifiably halt

uranium enrichment.

Iran's answer is now in. It will not. Indeed, on the day before it sent its reply to the U.N., Iran

barred IAEA inspectors from the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz. Our exercise in

multilateralism has now reached criticality. We never expected Iran to respond positively. The

whole point in going the extra mile was to demonstrate American good will and thus get our

partners to support real sanctions at the Security Council.

But this will not work. The Russians and Chinese are already sending signals that they will

allow Iran to endlessly drag out the process. Evenifwed ogetsanctions imposedonIran, theywill undoubtedlybe weak. And evenif they arestrong,the mullahs will not give up the glory

and dominion (especially over the Arabs) that come with the bomb in exchange for a mess of

pottage.

Realistically speaking, the point of this multilateral exercise cannot be to stop Iran's nuclear

program by diplomacy. That has always been a fantasy. It will take military means. There will beterribleconsequences fromsuchan attack.Thesemust be weighedagainst

the terrible consequences of allowing an openly apocalyptic Iranian leadership from

acquiring weapons of genocide.


5/5

INTERNATIONAL FIATSUCCCCKKKKKKKKSSSSS

Multi-Actor Fiat Bad

Strat SkewMoots the 1AC and steals aff ground

EducationMultiActor plans kill in depth education on the topic and force the debate to

shift away from the resolution

Unpredictablethere are millions of actors that the negative could fiat in the round.

Constantly changing, have to be up-to-date information.

(Jones 01, International Political Economy Routledge Encyclopedia ofInternational Political Economy: Entries A-F (Page 199))

FairnessThere are too many other actors that are out there to research that the negative

could propose which is key to education.

multilateral ism bad

Documents