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Abstract— This paper examines the international, inter-

organizational collaboration processes for the development of cognitive radio, wich will be at the basis of potentially profound changes in the telecommunications value network, as well as its functional architecture, cost and value structure and the eventual value proposition of any services deployed in such a value network. The paper will analyse the transition in telecommunications from linear standardization taking place mainly in the domain of formal Standardization Organizations, to a highly complex and multi-layered process simultaneously involving formal organizations, informal bodies and industrial consortia. Subsequently, the paper discusses the development of a Cognitive Pilot Channel to show how innovation in telecommunications markets is determined by this complex interplay, and explores how the collaborative process between research, regulation and standardization of a Cognitive Pilot Channel in different standardization platforms (viz. IEEE SCC41 and ETSI TC RRS) might influence the eventual deployment of such a cognitive radio technology and networks and services enabled by it, as well as the business models for it, by performing an exploratory business model scorecard analysis on some of the different revenue sharing models coming out of diverging design choices of the CPC.

Index Terms—Standardization, Business Modelling, Cognitive Pilot Channel, Radio Enabler, Business Modeling

I. INTRODUCTION It is safe to say that standardization in telecoms has undergone dramatic changes over the past century or so. The times are definitely over in which incumbent telecommunications operators, who were often the creators, implementers and exclusive users of a standard within their territory, only needed to work together with national equipment manufacturers –so-called national champions– to provide end-

Manuscript received May 1, 2008. This work was performed within the E3 project, which has received research funding from the Community's Seventh Framework programme. This paper reflects only the authors' views and the Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. The contributions of colleagues from E3 consortium are hereby acknowledged.

Simon Delaere is a researcher at the Centre for Studies on Media, Information and Telecommunication (SMIT) of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. SMIT is part of Interdisciplinary Institute for Broadband Technology (IBBT) (e-mail: simon.delaere@vub.ac.be)

Pieter Ballon is a programme manager at SMIT-IBBT, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (e-mail: pieter.ballon@vub.ac.be)

to-end solutions to customers, and in which international, formal organisations brought together operators, manufacturers and regulators to enable inter-country connectivity. Nor is it still true that large integrated companies, with full-time standards-developing staff, collaborate exclusively in the standardization organisation that they were historically linked to and/or that fits best with their broader objectives. Today, driven by privatization, competition (policy) and the much increased complexity of telecommunications technologies and their markets –a trend further reinforced by the continuing convergence with the IT and media sectors– this kind of linear process is no longer sufficient. In order for a technology to be successfully introduced, it needs to be standardized on at least a regional and preferably a global scale, with support from a large variety of stakeholders –operators, network and equipment manufacturers, service providers, regulators and user groups– and interoperable with the modules, systems and services offered by many of these stakeholders. Moreover, where it concerns wireless technologies, adequate spectrum needs to be found which, in many cases, needs to be harmonized on a regional or multi-regional basis, requiring significant political and industrial support and, equally important, time. As a consequence, many different platforms for standardization have now been established, which include formal, de iure as well as de facto standardization organisations, complemented by ad hoc industrial consortia and fora and situated on national, regional and global levels. These organisations both work in parallel, cooperate and compete with each other, and nationally or regionally based consortia often attract stakeholders from outside their original territory and subsequently strive to extend the influence of their standards beyond the borders of that territory. Moreover, while some of these bodies may have originated in a telecoms context, others find their roots in the IT or electrotechnical world or spectrum community, yet all of these bodies now work on standardizing converged beyond 3G services. Often, different processes of standardization are initiated at least partly simultaneously on different levels, for example in order to gain geographical influence, tackle different components of the technology in a different way, or simply to play out one standardization body against the other in what could be called a standardization shopping strategy. In short, standardization of telecoms has become a complex, multi-layered process involving many stakeholders and varying strategies.

Multi-level standardization and business models for cognitive radio: the case of the

Cognitive Pilot Channel Simon Delaere and Pieter Ballon

IBBT-SMIT, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium Tel +32-22691622, E-mail firstname.lastname@vub.ac.be

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In this paper, we will examine this trend from linear standardization taking place mainly in the domain of formal Standardization Organizations, to a highly complex and multi-layered process simultaneously involving formal organizations, informal bodies and industrial consortia. Subsequently, we will apply the insights gained above to the relatively recent trend towards Flexible Spectrum Management, by analysing the recently initiated standardization –and concurrent regulatory– process of one of its potential key enablers, the Cognitive Pilot Channel (CPC). Flexible Spectrum Management (FSM), used as a concept pointing to a set of new and dynamic procedures and techniques for obtaining and transferring spectrum usage rights and dynamically changing the specific use of frequencies, plays an important role in fully exploiting the advantages of cognitive, reconfigurable networks and terminals. Here, we argue that the standardization of the CPC, although in a very early stage, constitutes a good example of the complex, synchronous, multi-layered collaboration process towards innovation in wireless telecommunications. Finally, starting from the assumption that crucial design choices with regard to the CPC will be taken during the standardization and regulation process, and that these design choices might influence the eventual deployment of such a cognitive radio technology and networks and services enabled by it, as well as the business models for it, we perform a business model scorecard analysis on some of the different revenue sharing models coming out of diverging (theoretical) design choices of the CPC. To be clear, this part of the analysis shall be exploratory in nature: since the CPC standardization process has only just begun, technology choices are yet to be made and political or industrial alliances to be formed; even the concept in itself is far from being accepted. However, we consider it worthwhile to make an ex ante analysis of what the consequences of future choices with regard to the CPC could be, as an alternative to the more common ex post evaluations of standardization processes, precisely because so much is still unknown and so many different directions could still be taken in its eventual deployment.

II. FROM LINEAR TO MULTI-LAYERED STANDARDIZATION

A. Linear, Formalized Standardization of Telecommunications

It is impossible to locate the roots of standardization as a means of facilitating goods production; without any doubt, agreements have been concluded between craftsmen or traders on procedures and rules for production, construction, trading conduct and other industrial and commercial activities at any point in history. However, standardization as we know it today, defined by ISO as the process of creating a “document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context [1], first became important in the nineteenth century. In this era, production of goods became centralized, resulting in the emergence of large economies of scale and scope. Fordist and

Taylorist production methods [3], which were first introduced in the United States and from there spread to Europe, lead to the production of uniform products; parts of both these end products and the machines assembling them were uniform, replicable and interchangeable thanks to agreements between manufacturers, in order to speed up and simplify production, lower maintenance and inventory holding costs and stimulate the specialization of production. During the First World War, scarcity in the workforce meant an increase in machines needed and, thus, an increased importance for standardization. Initially, low strategic importance was attributed to standardization; industry and trade associations contented themselves with what they perceived as common benefits of standardization, leading to lower inventory holding costs and giving incentives to specialize production in interchangeable parts [4]:8-9 [5]. As David and Steinmueller note, the increasing importance of standards for reaching economies of scale and interchangeability implied that ad hoc agreements between industry actors started to give way to more formalized, regulated types of standardization. As informal associations and periodic regulatory interventions were no longer sufficient to meet the growing demand for standards, dedicated Standards Development Organisations (SDOs) started to be established. The first such body on a national level was the British Standards Institute (BSI), founded in 1901. German (DIN) and French (AFNOR) organisations followed in 1917 and 1926 respectively, while the US-based ANSI was established in 1918. Soon, these national SDOs –which, according to the authors, numbered more than 81 in 1996– were complemented by regional and international bodies. For the telecommunications sector, but arguably for any specialized area, the International Telecommunications Union (established as a UN agency in 1947, but with roots going back to 1865) is probably the oldest example. Other important ones include the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO, 1947), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN, 1961), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC, 1906) and, for Europe, the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC, 1973) and the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI, 1988). More than in other sectors, an immediate need for international standards was felt in the telecommunications sector in order to ensure safety and network interoperability, leading many international SDOs in this sector to precede generalized national standardization bodies [5]-[14]. As technology progressed and (national) markets expanded, standardization became more and more crucial in the sector of telecommunications. As Schmidt and Werle put it: “Autonomous actors involved in the production, operation and use of such a large technical system as telecommunications rely on a minimum amount of coordination.” [15]:108. It is therefore not surprising that, although some 25 other international organisations exist which are similar to the ITU in terms of standardization activities, the ISO, IEC and ITU together are responsible for 85% of all current international standards [5].

Although international coordinating bodies for telecommunications have existed since the nineteenth century,

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they were essentially inter-governmental in that they merely ensured interconnection of different, heavily protected national markets. Indeed, until at least the end of the 1960s, postal and telecommunications operators (PTOs) were mostly owned by national governments, which means operation and regulation were dealt with by the same administrations, and exclusive links existed with domestic manufacturers, the so-called national champions. In many cases, this was justified as being a remedy against market failures and a consequence of natural monopolies, even though the history of many incumbents clearly also shows the involved states’ interest in appropriating monopoly profits -dating back to pre-industrial postal monopolies [16][17]. Many of the PTOs were large integrated companies –integrating R&D, production as well as distribution of their products and services– with a staff of full-time engineers dedicated to develop the organisations’ internal standards and introducing them to specific recognized SDOs [18]. Since vertical integration between PTOs and their preferred equipment providers was tight, the technical agreements resulting from this integration had a status similar to intra-firm standards, which were subsequently interconnected on an international level [4]:10 [15]:44. As a consequence of this triple integration (between PTOs on the one hand, and regulators, equipment manufacturers and standards developers on the other hand), the members of the international SDOs were mostly PTOs themselves [4]:100, coordinating their international communications business through such international treaty organisations [5]. However, two evolutions began to put a strong pressure on the standardization of telecommunications which could, until then, be characterized as relatively simple, formal and controlled by national monopolies: increasing system complexity –ultimately culminating in complete convergence between telecoms, IT and broadcasting worlds– and the liberalization of markets.

B. Transformations 1) System Complexity

As Steinmueller and Werle argue, only three internationally standardized, end-to-end-compatible telecommunications services existed in the 1970: telegraphy operated by PTOs, telex-based business communications and telephony [5]:123. However, as data generated an increasing amount on telecommunications networks, and potential as well as demand for new types of services grew, SDOs were confronted with an increased amount of standardization activities. In the same vein, Blind distinguishes three reasons why increased technical complexity increases the needs for standardization. Firstly, further increase in mass production and inherent economies of scale extend the drive towards variety and cost reduction; secondly, not only are complex products and services less transparent to users, they also carry with them new types of risks which may affect not only to users but the wider community as well, and may occur not only during the period of usage but for much longer periods. Finally, the increased demand for health, safety and environmental protection brought about by increased economic welfare also further stimulates the formulation of rules and procedures [19]:1-2.

Further exacerbation of this complexity of telecommunications systems standardization has been caused by the convergence of the sector with others, such as those of IT and broadcasting. To be clear, this convergence is not just technological in nature, but in fact comprises four different domains: institutional (e.g. the move of telecoms groups into cable operators), technological (e.g. digital broadcasting requiring telecommunications based transmission processes for conditional access systems, set top boxes, electronic programming guides etc.), functional (e.g. the rise of the internet as an add-on to traditional telecommunications), and infrastructural (e.g. telecoms services running over cable systems or video-on-demand via copper wire DSL lines). [20] Therefore, not only does standardization of these networks and services bring together experts from diverging technological backgrounds, but also previously separated interest groups focusing on different basic functions of the technologies they support, and traditionally relying on diverging infrastructures. In this context, the coming about of the X.25 standard for packet switched inter-computer datacommunications, issued in 1976, is one good and early example of the sometimes “theatrical clash” between the IT and (voice) telecommunication sectors within the Comité Consultatif International Télégraphique et Téléphonique (CCITT, the predecessor of ITU-T) [14]:91-92; [4]:182-184. A final factor influencing standardization complexity is the globalization of telecommunications [19]:89. According to Brunsson, this influence manifests itself in four ways: more actors are involved which are far apart geographically, more organisations are international or transnational in nature –and thus, cannot be pinpointed onto a national interest or jurisdiction (see also [15]:143 in this regard), communication over vast distances is possible and people feel more associated and more receptive to developments happening in other parts of the world (what Brunsson calls mental globalization). Brunsson argues that while globalization increases the demand for standardization (because the need of interfaces to interconnect national or regional systems, and the general absence of common norms), the smaller mental distance equally facilitates such standardization. Besides this, globalization obviously creates global markets for telecommunication-related products, providing another strong incentive for standardization whilst at the same time rendering it more complex [21]:37-39.

2) The Liberalization of Markets As said above, for many decades the standardization of telecommunications was a matter either of companies themselves (internally or within the national context on a more or less ad hoc basis) or of formal national, regional or international SDOs whose members were in most cases again the incumbent operators [4]. However, from the 1970s onwards this situation started to change. In Europe, the economic depression of the seventies helped to create a free market rationale which was at the basis of many of the policy initiatives taken towards telecoms market liberalization. Furthermore, an ‘electronic alliance’ of large corporate users, multinational companies and IT equipment suppliers gave a strong impetus to this drive. Policy action on the European level coincided with national tendencies inside and outside the EU: the initial focus on liberalization of telecoms under

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Commissioner Davignon in 1979 almost coincided with Thatcher’s call for telecoms liberalisation in UK opposition in 1978, and came in the midst of the illustrious government-incited AT&T divestiture operation in the US (already preceded by important events such as the Hush-a-Phone, Carterfone, MCI and Execunet decisions between 1957 and 1978) bringing an end to nearly a century of telecommunications monopoly and opening up competition in the long distance, manufacturing and R&D markets [17][22][23]. A similar, gradual path was followed on the European level, albeit with a slower pace. First, equipment and value added services markets were liberalized in 1988 and 1990 respectively (severing ties between PTOs and equipment ‘national champions’ after a thirty month legal battle between the European Commission and several Member States). Subsequently, the 1997 Open Network Provision (ONP) Directive created a full-fledged market for public network services, and forced the separation between market regulation and service provision, leading to the establishment of independent regulatory authorities in most Member States [17]. Obviously, these evolutions have had a far-reaching impact on the standardization process. Firstly, the separation between regulators and operators decreased the influence of PTOs in SDOs, leading to pressure for reform. Secondly, the liberalization of markets resulted in the establishment of new, private telecommunications operators having their own interest in standards, and setting up their own networks, which needed to be interconnected to the existing ones. Finally, the separation between PTOs and equipment vendors caused a proliferation in the number of systems, increasing the need for standardized interfaces. Taken together, these influences –the increased number of heterogeneous stakeholders and systems, and vertical disintegration of the telecoms ecosystem including regulation and standardization– started to exert great pressure on standardization bodies and methods.

C. Shift Towards Alliance Based Standardization and SDO Reform

As mentioned, the above evolutions towards increased technical complexity, increased number of stakeholders coming from more heterogeneous backgrounds, globalization and a regulatory context of liberalization and competition-oriented policies, have changed the way in which standards come about. As a first consequence, criticism grew on the formal SDOs, of which the decision making procedures were increasingly considered slow and cumbersome, at a time when more and more standards were needed to enable and interconnect converging networks and services contributed to by a very large array of actors. As a consequence, other, seemingly more dynamic ways of standardization are increasingly explored. As Sherif puts it: “It is widely believed that formal standards bodies are less responsive to market needs than industrial associations or consortia. This belief has had at least two consequences. First, there has been an unprecedented increase in the number of ad hoc groups to promote specific technologies. Second, some traditional standards-developing organisations have fallen out of favour and have reduced their activities” [24]. Van Wegberg summarizes the drawbacks of SDOs as follows:

• Slower procedures, • Possibly comprising participants with different

backgrounds and antagonistic objectives, • Intransigent participant behaviour caused by diverging

views, slowing down the process since it is consensus oriented,

• If a new standard replaces existing solutions, firms may participate to slow down its standardization [25].

Wehnert, who studied standardization processes within CEN, concurs with the view that much could be done to increase the efficiency and speed of SDOs; among other factors, he cites lack of personal and technical support, lack of focus by both the SDO and the actor that steers its work (viz. the European Commission), lack of funding, suboptimal management, no full representation by the problem owners (e.g. users), the voluntary nature of the standardization work, lack of willingness to compromise, incompatible working methodologies, cultural differences and administrative constraints including enquiry and balloting procedures and translation requirements [26]. A number of these elements, particularly with regard to speed, are also echoed by Schmidt and Werle ([15]:142-146), Sherif [24] and Egyedi ([4]:108). To this, the latter author adds that some of the basic ideological principles differentiating formal SDOs from consortia, such as the orientation towards consensus and democratic procedures, may not be as clear when it comes to their practical application: “dominant rhetoric underestimates openness of most industry consortia and overestimates the practical implications of the formal democratic procedures” [27]. Not only does Egyedi note a “friction between ideology and praxis” (for example because national delegations to SDOs most often consist of industrial delegations), but also a friction between ideological features (for example those of broad representation on the one hand, and technical discussion on the other hand) and negative effects of ideologies on the process of standardization itself. Examples of this are the consensus principle which promotes compromises and multi-option standards, national membership which increased politicization of standardization activities, the democracy principle allowing minorities to hijack the process, and the need for internationally recognized standards which again results in more compromise oriented activities [4]:113-116. Finally, in 1996 David and Shurmer identified the following difficulties for formal SDOs, concluding that these occasion “profound doubts as to the long term sustainability of an institutional regime founded on the present set of industry-based SDOs” [28]:

• Potential bias towards less innovative solutions due to need of consensus,

• Difficulties due to large growth in number of participants: paradox of increased need for interoperability versus an increased complexity of reaching it; many SDOs still have a sphere of expertise and membership structure based on a limited number of incumbents,

• Globalization and convergence have increased the economic stakes of telecommunications, increasing the risk of antagonized vested interests and the deliberate slowing down of standardization processes,

• Convergence causes uncertainty with regard to the ‘jurisdiction’ of SDOs in closely related areas.

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The criticisms on formal SDOs gave rise to two evolutions, one being the proliferation of standardization consortia, and the other the reform of SDOs procedures to better fit industry needs. For what the first tendency is concerned, David and Shurmer distinguish two strategies. At one extreme, there is the de facto standardization performed by non-cooperative, competitive industrial players, which, in the absence of the need for a regulated solution, may provide a rapid and efficient mechanism for selecting a technology and gaining momentum for it. Often, one major player introduces a technology and creates a so-called bandwagon effect, causing early adopters to take on the system and alternative provider to integrate the proprietary specifications into their products and/or services. A second option consists in the formation of private standardization consortia. According to David and Shurmer, more than 400 such private organisations existed in the US alone by the early 1930s. Often these consortia have cooperation agreements with formal SDOs; however, more and more these SDOs are simply by-passed, and standards agreed upon by a private consortium are directly passed on to the market for de facto ratification –that is, acceptance through uptake. Unlike technocratic formal or professional committees, which are described as “collective attempts to achieve consensus in a collaborative professional effort” [15]:61, business interests have a very central role in these consortia, and industry-wide consensus on the technical solution is not primordial. Often, these types of consortia directly compete with others, such as in the recent cases of HD-DVD (supported by Toshiba, NEC, Sanyo, Microsoft, RCA, Intel, Kenwood and others) versus BluRay technologies (promoted by Sony, Hitachi, LG, Panasonic, Philips, Samsung, Sharp, Dell, HP and others) and WiMAX versus LTE. Some of the advantages of these types of consortia identified by David and Shurmer, which contribute to the flexibility and speed of the standardization process, are:

• Membership, internal organization and procedures tailored to the objectives of the group,

• More adapted to ICT standardization characterized by short product cycles, faster change and inherently more collaborative R&D-styled standardization tradition (as opposed to traditional SDO diversity reduction activities among several existing technologies),

• Flexibility to dispense with rules and guidelines that slow the decision making process,

• Less political intervention, • More financial resources than formal SDOs [28].

These advantages attributed to industrial consortia are widely mentioned in the literature. However, a lot of criticism also exists as to the ideological bias of statements, which hail SDO by-pass strategies to the detriment of formal SDO standardization. Egyedi has already been mentioned in this respect; Similarly, Sherif argues that “unqualified statements on the benefit of one type of standardization over another are essentially ideological statements that, in the current context, tend to favor deregulation, privatization, and the establishment of unfettered markets”. According to the author, the need for rapid standardization is ultimately dependent on whether it concerns radical, substitutive technologies with long lead times for development or deployment, or more incremental innovations. Moreover, many consortia use

formal standards as a basis for their work, many private consortia take long a long time to revise their initial standards, and little are free of delayed or cancelled standards. Finally, not all private organisations are free of political influence: the example mentioned by Sherif is that of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has been described as an “open and democratic forum”, but which has been heavily influenced by the US Department of Defense, and of the related Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which was authorized by the US Department of Commerce to oversee domain name assignment and registration processes, and has been criticized of not being democratic [24]. Finally, David and Shurmer add some additional relevant concerns with regard to private consortia:

• Duplication of efforts by rival groups, • No single standards for certain technologies (e.g. diverging

cellular technology standards in the US and New Zealand, different co-existing DVD standards),

• Potentially high start-up costs, • Loss of specialized administrative and procedural

expertise, • Prioritization of profit driven private interests over public

interests (e.g. in technology choices made), • Lack of openness and democracy: free and equal access to

committee meetings, access and feedback channels to draft recommendations, possibility for non-exclusive licensing of technologies at reasonable rates and restrictions on the use of monetary side-payments for speeding up consensus,

• Lack of continued support for legacy standards and provision of backwards compatibility,

• If coupled to recognition by formal SDOs, inferior quality formal standards.

In summary, whereas a clear tendency towards de facto standardization by private consortia can be noted, this strategy too is not without its deficiencies. The second way that criticisms on formal SDOs have been dealt with, is to reform of SDOs themselves, in order to create rules and procedures that better fit the needs of converged IT and telecoms industries. A good typology of the different mechanisms at play is again provided by David and Shurmer, who locate the first of these reforms already in the early 1980s, and distinguish between three types of changes. Firstly, procedural reforms have been undertaken. These include, for example, the strengthening of committee support; the introduction of new project information management systems and new production techniques, by-passing of the SDO’s General Assembly for certain approval procedures or increase of General Assemblies’ meeting frequency; speeding up and streamlining of Technical Committee procedures for deliberating, drafting, public comment and revision stages; and introduction of e-mail and internet deliberation in order to drive down meeting costs. A second category of reforms is related to new modes of coordination and cooperation between different SDOs. As mentioned, many jurisdictional problems have arisen between global, regional or sectoral bodies with different backgrounds and memberships. While fearing that “there will be further intensification of the already dysfunctional jurisdictional competition and inter-organisational turf battles”, David and Shurmer do see considerable effort in SDOs to coordinate

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their activities, and to find ways of cooperating with private consortia, for example by formally approving specifications first drafted inside these private organisations (which for example was tested with Digital Video Broadcasting standards in ETSI), or to bring more flexible, rapid standardization structures directly under the umbrella of an SDO. A third and final domain of reform is the introduction or refinement of mechanisms for conflict resolution. Here, the four key strategies identified are: sacrificing the strict consensus principle (e.g. by introducing weighted majority voting); standardizing ahead of the market (i.e. before considerable costs have been incurred by partners and before much is known about the possible market impacts for certain solutions compared to others); incomplete standards-setting (creating meta-standards or high level performance-oriented standards); and altering participants’ intellectual property rights in order to increase incentives for industrial partners to start up SDO trajectories [28].

D. Towards Multi-layered Standardization As the sections above have demonstrated, the complexity of telecommunications standardization has significantly increased over the past years. Numerous factors have been mentioned which contribute to this increased complexity: convergence of previously separated heterogeneous technologies, markets and companies; globalization; and liberalization and competition policies breaking up the vertical integration between equipment, carrier infrastructure, service provision and regulation and causing a proliferation of companies to take into account and technologies to standardize and interconnect. These trends have put the traditional, formal SDOs under pressure, and have caused a partial transfer of standardization activities to private consortia, which with their higher degree of flexibility and speed are deemed more appropriate to respond to an ever higher need for standardization of products and services with ever shorter product life cycles. Many SDOs, in their turn, have responded by adapting their membership, rules and procedures, in order to move away from standardization cycles taking more than four years on average; weighted majority voting, increased support systems and changed IPR rules strengthen this process. Also, SDOs spend significant effort in finding a modus vivendi with other formal SDOs as well as with private consortia and other standardization bodies, sometimes taking the role of “official validator” of standards first developed within the private sphere, in other instances internalizing alternative working methods within their own organization. In spite of all these measures, standardization complexity has not decreased, and jurisdictional tensions between standardization bodies (both formal and informal, both geographical and sectoral) have not disappeared. As has been demonstrated above, both formal and de facto SDOs have their strengths and their weaknesses; qualities such as speed, openness (in membership, access to draft documents, standards and meetings, IPR arrangements etc.), orientation towards consensus, technical quality, acceptance rate and so on are different from one body to the next and, despite all ideological claims, rarely do all these characteristics unite in one specific organization. Companies wanting to standardize

are fully aware of this, and wish to maximize the potential of their technologies by taking advantage of as much qualities as possible: on the one hand, they want a rapid and streamlined process leading to a quality standard that is accepted in practice and even accredited or mandated by official bodies; on the other hand they are also keen on protecting intellectual property rights introduced in the standard, maximizing the rents derived from these property rights and having maximum impact on the market. Also, companies are aware that standardization bodies –even if they strive to be globalized and holistic– still often have a background in a specific sector (IT, telecommunications, broadcasting or other) and a specific region, and may not in themselves have the capacity to provide standards that are universally acceptable, or that cover all aspects of a technology. For these reasons our hypothesis is that, beyond linear formal standardization, the drive towards industrial consortia and the related transformation of traditional organisations, standardization is evolving towards a third, new stage, actively and simultaneously combining the merits and weaknesses of both formal and de facto standardization. This standardization strategy acknowledges that different aspects of a standard might need to be standardized in different bodies, at different moments in the research, development and deployment cycle of a product or service, and possibly in different regions. It also presumes that a successful standard might not only need technical quality and industrial support, but often also regional or global acceptance and political support, and that neither formal SDOs, nor industrial consortia are able to provide these in equal measures. In other words, we hypothesize that standardization has become a multi-layered process, not only characterized by its multi-dimensionality but also by its complexity and lack of certainty. As technologies enter the standardization phase –or better said, multiple concurrent or subsequent standardization trajectories– very early onwards in their development and far ahead of the market, very little is known about the possible market impacts of design choices made, and stakeholders participating in the standardization process have difficulties in estimating what choices would serve their interest best. Moreover, in a multi-layered standardization context companies might be confronted by diverging alliances in the different standardization bodies; for example, while one might be a private consortium with roots in the IT sector and dominated by US based firms, another might be a European telecommunications oriented formal standardization body. Companies might be forced to be simultaneously active in these different bodies, but could also be absent from one or the other, causing alliances to be radically different and the outcome of the process even more uncertain. The multi-track standardization activity with regard to the Cognitive Pilot Channel constitutes an interesting potential example of this new evolution. As shall be shown below, the standardization of this technology takes place in multiple contexts that are, amongst other things, different in geography, type of body, membership, accessibility and objective. As will be shown, efforts are being made to delineate as well as align the different trajectories. Also, the CPC is a good example of a technology that is entering standardization far ahead of market introduction. In the absence of definitive design choices for

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the CPC, this paper will introduce some potential options, and show what the market impact (in this case the possible revenue sharing models, and the feasibility and desirability of these models) could be.

III. THE CASE OF THE COGNITIVE PILOT CHANNEL

A. Introduction In this section, we will apply the insights gained above to the relatively recent trend towards Flexible Spectrum Management, by analysing the recently initiated standardization –and concurrent regulatory- process of one of its potential key enablers, the Cognitive Pilot Channel (CPC). Flexible Spectrum Management (FSM), used as a concept pointing to a set of new and dynamic procedures and techniques for obtaining and transferring spectrum usage rights and dynamically changing the specific use of frequencies, plays an important role in fully exploiting the advantages of cognitive, reconfigurable networks and terminals. It is therefore strongly linked to the development of cognitive radio (CR) and software defined radio (SDR) in terms of research, standardization and regulation. As already mentioned in the introduction of this paper, what we will argue in this section is that the standardization of the CPC constitutes a good example of the complex, synchronous, multi-layered collaboration process towards innovation in wireless telecommunications. At the same time, we posit that the way in which protocols and interfaces for the CPC are standardized, and the specific harmonization of bands for it, may have a significant impact on the market deployment of the CPC itself and of the networks and services enabled by it. To be clear, this part of the analysis shall be exploratory in nature: since the CPC standardization process has only just begun, technology choices are yet to be made and political or industrial alliances to be formed; even the concept in itself is far from being accepted. However, we consider it worthwhile to make an ex ante analysis of what the consequences of future choices with regard to the CPC could be, as an alternative to the more common ex post evaluations of standardization processes, precisely because so much is still unknown and so many different directions could still be taken in its eventual deployment. Below, we will first explain the concept of the CPC. Then, an outline will be given of the regulatory process towards the 2011 ITU World Radio Conference, followed by an analysis of the multi-level standardization process currently set up for the CPC. Finally we shall reflect on the possible consequences of standardization en harmonization on the market structure and business models for the CPC itself and FSM-enabled wireless networks and services.

B. CPC concept The concepts of Flexible Spectrum Management and reconfigurability carry the potential to significantly enhance spectrum efficiency. In particular, underused frequencies can be leased or sold to parties which value these frequencies more, secondary use may be allowed if it does not cause excessive interference, radio access technologies (RATs) operating on these frequencies may be changed, and

opportunistic RATs may use varying frequencies depending on their availability, e.g. by using spread spectrum techniques. The paradox here is that, in an environment where regulators increasingly make use of market based methods, where reconfigurable systems decentralize decision-making to a significant degree and where real-time mechanisms for dynamic spectrum management are used, certain inherent risks and challenges could necessitate the introduction of new, centralized instruments of coordination and control. In [41], where these central controlling entities are discussed in more detail, five risk domains are distinguished where these entities might prove necessary (based on an earlier analysis of potential secondary market failure performed by Xavier and Ypsilanti [29]) 1) an information deficit; 2) interference; 3) a lack of coordination and harmonization of frequencies; 4) anti-competitive behaviour; and 5) threats to the public interest and consumer protection issues. Regarding the first risk domain (viz. the information deficit), different types of controlling entities can be envisaged, some of which already exist; examples mentioned in [41] include central registers of spectrum availability, license ownership and rights of use, databases of real-time spectrum occupancy (including secondary usage) GIS mappings of such data etc. However, in a composite and dynamic radio environment, this information deficit may become even more acute. In particular, as radio frequency usage becomes highly complex and variable in terms of frequency and bandwidth as well as Radio Access Technology (RAT) used for a given service at a given time and in a given space, cognitive radio terminals –although able to reconfigure themselves in order to connect to all these different RATs on various frequency bands- may experience significant difficulties in locating wireless services in the first place. In order to get knowledge of its radio environment, cognitive radios might simply scan the entire spectrum or significant parts of it, but most probably this process would be far too power- and time consuming to be efficient. Therefore, a new type of central controlling entity is currently under research, which could be considered as an advanced, active registry: the Cognitive Pilot Channel (CPC). This concept consists in using an invariable radio link to convey, in real-time, all necessary information to terminals concerning the available frequency bands, RATs, services, load situation, network policies, etc., so that terminals can be reconfigured to connect to whatever service available on whatever frequency. Moreover, CPC-distributed policies could help to manage composite networks by imposing certain constraints upon terminals, while at the same time potentially allowing terminals to dynamically make use of whatever RAT fits the requested service best (in terms of bandwidth, quality of service, price etc.). Therefore, the CPC may not only be considered as a potential new controlling entity in the telecommunications ecosystem, but as a crucial environment-knowledge enabler for the Cognitive system in a multi-Radio Access Technologies (RATs) and dynamic spectrum allocation context [30]. In the current state-of-the-art of the concept, the CPC would operate in a certain geographical area subdivided into meshes. A mesh is defined as an area where certain radio-electrical commonalities can be identified (e.g. a certain frequency that is detected with a power above a certain level in all the points

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of the mesh etc.). The mesh is defined by its geographic coordinates, and its size would depend on the minimum spatial resolution where the mentioned commonalities can be identified. Figure 1 illustrates the concept [31].

Figure 1: CPC meshes

Three variants of the CPC are under study. The first is the Global/Public Advertiser CPC, where a single, previously non-existant operator would deploy an infrastructure to transmit RAT and frequency information for all operators in a given mesh. This CPC would preferably use a dedicated, universal frequency, making it accessible regardless of the deployed RATs available or the country or region in which the terminal is located. From a business/regulatory perspective, this type of CPC could be run by a government agency (regulatory option), by one designated operator (under strict rules), or by multiple operators in a competitive setting. The second variant of the CPC is the Private Advertiser CPC, in which the CPC falls under the domain of the existing operators. This solution does not need a dedicated frequency and infrastructure, but reduces discoverability of the CPC as well as possibilities for DSA in the country or region where it is deployed. From a business perspective, two subvariants are possible: a ‘pure’ operator model on the one hand, and an association model on the other hand, in which an operator deploys a CPC but allows complementary RATs from other operators to be advertized on it. The third and final variant would be a hierarchical solution, combining both an upper-level, single CPC on a harmonized frequency and several lower-level, operator-based CPCs. The four options (operator, association, intermediary and hierarchical) are shown in Figure 2 [30][31].

Figure 2: Four deployment models for CPC

As mentioned, the CPC as a concept is currently still in a research phase; for a general, up-to-date overview we refer to [30] as well as to [32], while [33]-[40] provide further technical background. Also, Delaere and Ballon have already performed exploratory business-model oriented research as to possible deployment configurations and revenue sharing options [41][42][43]. However, at the recent ITU 2007 World Radio Conference, the issue of the CPC was put on the agenda for WRC-11, effectively initiating a regulatory roadmap for it, and different components of the concept are part of current standardization activities. Below, we shall give a short overview of the current regulatory context and standardization process underway, focussing on the two main areas of standardization activity, i.e. that within IEEE and ETSI.

C. Regulatory context A worldwide implementation of the public CPC in the same frequency channel –which would constitute the optimal solution for maximizing the benefits of a CPC while minimizing the complexity by not having take into account regional, national or even sub-national CPC frequencies– requires not only standardization but also regulatory activity. A worldwide implementation requires an appropriate decision taken by a World Radio Conference (WRC) modifying the Radio Regulation (RR) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). WRCs convene every four years and the agenda of a WRC is decided at the previous one. Often, a decision on including a particular item is taken at the second WRC where this item is discussed. To prepare such potential agenda setting, work was undertaken from 2006 to initiate a Question on Cognitive Radio within the ITU. In the ITU-R context, a question is defined as a “statement of a technical, operational or procedural problem, generally seeking a Recommendation” [44]. Recommendations in their turn are defined as international technical standards developed by the Radiocommunication Sector of the ITU, which are approved by the Member States and which, while not mandatory, enjoy a relatively high status and are widely implemented [45].In September 2006, the question was approved. With regard to

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the CPC, it is important to note that subquestion 2 of this document includes “reconfigurable radio, policy-defined adaptive radio and their associated control mechanisms and their functionalities that may be a part of cognitive radio systems” (own emphasis) as objects of study. The question further resolves to include the results of the studies performed in one or more recommendations, reports or handbooks, and sets the deadline for these studies at the year 2010, thereby making WRC-11 the first potential forum for introducing regulatory change [46]. Then, in June 2007, a contribution from France Télécom was filed which specifically introduced the CPC concept into the work of ITU-R 8A [47]. This contribution stemmed from the EU research project E2RII and had the support of project partners such as Motorola, Nokia, Alcatel Lucent, Telefonica and Telecom Italia. As a consequence, the CPC was included as a related radio technology in the working document which was to lead to a draft report, and a detailed explanation was added as an annex [48]. The most recent meeting of ITU-R 8, which changed into ITU-R WP5A following an internal restructuring of activities, was held in February 2008. Meanwhile, however, efforts shifted towards the upcoming 2007 WRC. In July 2007, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) submitted a proposal to put the CPC concept on the agenda for the 2011 edition of the WRC, and CEPT members promoted this agenda item in the discussions that took place at the WRC-07 (October-November 2007, Geneva). At the same time, a number of Arab States, via agenda item 1.10, introduced their own proposal with regard to cognitive radio studies, putting more emphasis on SDR aspects. As a result of the ensuing negotiations, in which the Netherlands administration allegedly played an important mediating role, the approved agenda of the WRC-11 proposes “to consider regulatory measures and their relevance to enable the introduction of software defined radio and cognitive radio systems based on the results of ITU-R studies”, indicating with regard to the CPC that “some studies indicate a possible need for a worldwide harmonized cognitive supporting pilot channel (…) whilst other studies indicate that the availability of a database could support access and connectivity, and therefore support the use of these systems” . However, it needs to be noted that wired or wireless access to some form of database is also mentioned as a potential alternative to the CPC [30][49][50][51]. Following the inclusion of this agenda item to WRC-11, studies are now to be carried out between 2007 and 2011 at CEPT and ITU levels so that appropriate proposals can be considered and possibly endorsed by WRC. Although different Study Groups are concerned (SG1 and SG3 to SG7) and different relevant Questions are being studied (e.g. Question ITU-R 230-1/8 on Software Defined Radio), with specific regard to the CPC this first and foremost concerns the work within ITU-R WP5A mentioned above [51]. Relevant accepted contributions made so far with regard to the CPC include a proposal by Alcatel-Lucent, France Telecom, Motorola, Telecom Italia and the administration of The Netherlands to alter the definition of “Cognitive Radio Systems” in such a way that it would better fit the CPC concept (re-wording the capability for radio systems to “sense

and be aware of their environment” into the capacity to “gain knowledge on that environment”, so that assisting, central controlling entities are also included) as well as a description of the concept of cognitive networks, mentioning that these networks enable the introduction of a cognition radio enabler, such as the CPC [52][53][54]. However, as mentioned, the deadline of 2010 for completion of the report leaves many questions unanswered. The figure below represents the hypothetical regulatory path for the CPC in the coming years.

Figure 3: Potential CPC regulatory roadmap

Besides the very early, specific regulatory steps described above with regard to the Cognitive Pilot Channel, one also needs to take into account the more general regulatory evolutions towards more flexible forms of spectrum management which, for example, introduce secondary trading of spectrum frequencies, flexible use of spectrum (by which is meant that the specific RAT to be used on a certain frequency is no longer prescribed in the spectrum license), and secondary use of frequencies. An overview of the European context in this regard, including the WAPECS initiative, as well as evolutions in the US and a number of EU Member States, is provided in [43]. With regard to policies towards FSM, this paper concluded that, while there is a clear shift of policy focus from the command-and-control model to more market based forms of spectrum management, other mechanisms have not been abandoned, and no consensus exists among regulators as to what constitutes the optimum balance between them. In view of this existing work we shall not go into these evolutions here; however, it is clear that these changing policies –as well as the relatively slow pace at which these changes occur and the considerable resistance against some of them– play an important role in relation to the (lack of) development of cognitive, reconfigurable telecommunications networks and services in general, and to the scope of application and the potential success of the Cognitive Pilot Channel in particular.

D. Standardization of the CPC As was mentioned already, different standardization tracks have been set up for the CPC, in conjunction with the regulatory roadmap 2006-2015. The most important of these are the IEEE’s P1900.4 SCC41 committee, which started as a Study Group in September 2006 and in evolved into a Working Group in the Spring of 2007, and the ETSI RRS committee, which initiated as an ad-hoc group on SDR and

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CR in May 2007 and was upgraded to a committee in January 2008. Both activities will be discussed here. Figure 4 provides

an overview of standardization activities in relation to the regulatory roadmap of the CPC.

As will be shown below, the discussed platforms for CPC standardization differ from each other in quite a number of aspects, of which the most important are: 1) timing; 2) geography; 3) member structure; 4) scope of work; 5) nature of the standard. These variables to a great extent explain the chosen strategy of initiating these multiple parallel standardization tracks.

1) In IEEE SCC41 The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE, now only referred to by its acronym due to the considerable expansion in other than the original domains of expertise) is a professional, not-for-profit organization established in 1963 as a merger of the Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE, 1923) and the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE, 1884). A United States based organization in principle, the 900-staff IEEE now counts more than 375,000 members in more than 160 countries, grouped in 324 geographical sections, 1,784 local chapters, 38 subject-related societies, 7 technical councils and 390 affinity groups (data of end 2007) [55].

Besides the publication of 144 journals and the yearly sponsoring of more than 850 conferences, the IEEE is also active in standardization through its IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA). It develops global industry standards on a wide range of topics, including power and energy, biomedical and health care, information technology, transportation, nanotechnology and information assurance. More than 20,000 people contribute to the standards portfolio of IEEE-SA, which currently counts 1,300 standards and

projects under development [56]. In the typology of Krechmer, the IEEE-SA is defined as a Standards Setting Organisation (SSO) on the same level as, for example, ETSI or ANSI, because it is directly or indirectly recognized by a government (and in that sense is to be distinguished from industrial consortia) [18]. Egyedi however –along with many other scholars– differentiates the IEEE as a de facto standardization body which, unlike de iure bodies (such as ETSI), operates outside of official, national or regional administration related SSOs [4]:5-6. Then again, the distinguishing notion of “official recognition” is a vague one since IEEE standards are widely distributed, and the IEEE-SA has strategic relationships with the IEC, ISO and ITU, as well as satisfying all SDO requirements set by the World Trade Organization [56]. Equally, although IEEE is a US national organisation in origin and is accredited as such by the American National Standards Institute [57]:91, this geographical distinction is no longer tenable since the IEEE, as mentioned, is internationally oriented in its activities and membership, its standards are often applied worldwide [1]:9-10. Because of this confusion, Egyedi rightly introduces a specific type of de facto standards called grey standards, of which professional organisations such as the IEEE are important providers. Grey standards are defined as “publicly available or accessible multi-party specifications, which are developed with a multi-vendor intention”, which distinguishes them from proprietary de facto standards developed within industry consortia and later ‘imposed’ onto the market. [4]:6). Finally, when following the typology of De Vries, developed

Figure 4: Overview of CPC standardization and regulation roadmaps

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as a consequence of his critique on formal versus informal and national versus international standardization typologies, one could describe IEEE-SA as a sectoral standardization organisation, to be distinguished from consortia, governmental organisations and company standardization, and defined as “standardization set by an organization that unites parties in a certain branch of business” [1]:11.

Standardization activity in the IEEE typically takes place within Working Groups. These are initiated after an IEEE-approved organization has taken up sponsorship of a standard, and the IEEE-SA standards board has reviewed and approved a Project Authorization Request. After a standard is drafted and approved within the Working Group, it goes into a balloting process in which all interested members of IEEE-SA, as well as entities that have paid a balloting fee, may vote on the proposal. There is a quorum of 75 percent (of those individuals and entities which expressed their interest in the standard at the beginning of the activity), and an approval rate of 75 percent of votes cast. Upon approval, the standard is then reviewed by the IEEE-SA Standards Board Review Committee and receives a final vote from the IEEE-SA Standards Board [55]. Although every individual is able to contribute to a standard, the membership and balloting fees (almost USD 4,000 for entities), and the registration fees and travel costs for Working Groups do constitute a significant barrier for smaller organizations and individuals.

The standardization of the CPC within IEEE was initiated through the creation of a new Working Group P1900.4 within the P1900 Standards Group, dealing with “New Generation Radio Standards”. This Standards Group was established in early 2005 under joint sponsorship of the IEEE Communications Society and the IEEE Electromagnetic Society, with the objective to develop supporting standards dealing with new technologies and techniques being developed for next generation radio and advanced spectrum management. Three earlier Working Groups were already dealing with Standard Definitions and Concepts for Dynamic Spectrum Access (P1900.1), Recommended Practice for the Analysis of In-Band and Adjacent Band Interference and Coexistence Between Radio Systems (P1900.2) and with a Standard for Assessing the Spectrum Access Behavior of Radio Systems Employing Dynamic Spectrum Access Methods (P1900.3). After a meeting in May 06 (Hannover, Germany) between IEEE representatives, the P1900 and P1900.3 chairmen and interested parties, a Study Group (SG) P1900.B was set up in September of that year, which was more specifically oriented to the overall system architecture of cognitive radio systems. A few months later, in December 06, a PAR was approved and in February 07 P1900.B was upgraded to a Working Group entitled “Architectural Building Blocks Enabling Network-Device Distributed Decision Making for Optimized Radio Resource Usage in Heterogeneous Wireless Access Networks”. One month later, IEEE P1900 was reorganized into the Standards Coordination Committee 41 (SCC 41), Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN). Again, the IEEE Communications Society and EMC Society are sponsoring societies for this Committee. Like all Working Groups under SCC41, WG 1900.4 continued its work under this name. The objective of

this group was to complete work by the end of 2007 and to initiate the IEEE sponsor balloting process at that time [58][59]. The official purpose of SCC41 1900.4 is defined as “to improve overall composite capacity and quality of service of wireless systems in a multiple Radio Access Technologies (RATs) environment, by defining an appropriate system architecture and protocols which will facilitate the optimization of radio resource usage, in particular, by exploiting information exchanged between network and mobile Terminals, whether or not they support multiple simultaneous links and dynamic spectrum access.” [60].

To work towards this objective, three reference use cases of the P1900.4 system have been defined: a) Dynamic Spectrum Assignment, i.e. the dynamic assignment of frequencies to a given RAT within a composite network for a given space and time; b) Dynamic Spectrum Access, i.e. the dynamic access by different RATs to a given set of overlapping frequencies without excessive interference and with or without negotiation; and c) Distributed Radio Resource Usage Optimisation, i.e. an optimized use of spectrum by different RATs in a composite network by distributing decision-making intelligently between networks and terminals. On this basis, a number of system requirements were collected, and three crucial system entities defined:

• The Network Reconfiguration Manager (NRM), managing the Composite Wireless Network and terminals for network-terminal-distributed optimization of spectrum usage,

• The Terminal Reconfiguration Manager (TRM), managing the terminal for network-terminal-distributed optimization of spectrum usage within the framework defined by the NRM and in a manner consistent with user preferences and available context information,

• The Radio Enabler (RE) used as a logical communication channel between NRM and TRM.

It is this last component, which may run over one or more existing (or dedicated) RATs, that constitutes the Cognitive Pilot Channel. These entities, extended by additional ones on terminal and RAN side (in either case an entity for reconfiguration control and an entity for measurements collection) have subsequently been integrated into a System Architecture, and functional requirements for them have been listed. As a further refinement, a functional architecture based on these functional requirements has been introduced. Subsequently, an Information Model has been elaborated which is to match the requirements of the System and Functional architecture, is to be extensible and flexible, not overly complex, and making use of platform and technology-independent information and data type definitions. Finally, scenario examples are given to show how the NRM manages the TRM via the RE, by performing operations (read/set/create/delete) on a number of well-defined objects in the system. It should be noted that the actual execution of reconfiguration operations on the network or terminal side, based on the choice made by NRM or TRM, is outside of the project’s scope, as are the protocols needed for these operations [61][62][63]. After successful working group internal letter ballot in July 08, it was expected that a sponsor ballot on the 1900.4

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Baseline Document would start in August 08. As of July 08, the Working Group consisted of 21 voting members. A large number of these were/are participants in the European E2R II and E3 projects (e.g. Motorola, France Telecom, Alcatel-Lucent, Toshiba Research Europe, King’s College London, the Universities of Athens and of Piraeus and the Polytechnic University of Catalunya). A significant part of the other members is from Japanese origin (e.g. NICT, Tokyo University of Science, Hitachi, KDDI, NEC, ISB Corporation, Kozo Keikaku Engineering and Worldpicom). Other members are, e.g., Intel and BAE systems [58].

2) In ETSI TC RRS The European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI) is a European regional standardization organisation for Information and Communication Technologies. It was established in 1988 by the Conférence Européenne des Administrations des Postes et des Télécommunications (CEPT), the organisation of European postal and telecoms administrations. CEPT did this at the incitement of the European Commission, whose Directorate-General XIII (Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation) had proposed the creation of the organisation in its 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications; the Commission itself took up the position of Counsellor and could influence ETSI’s priorities through the use of mandates; yet it was not until 1992 that the organization was officially recognized as a European SSO. Egyedi interestingly notes that, while ETSI was primarily oriented towards DG XIII in its first years, ‘competing’ organisations CEN/CENELEC focused on DG III (Internal Market and Industrial Affairs) which preferred the national sub-structure of the latter bodies, a structure ETSI, with its direct individual membership and clear European outlook, clearly (and consciously) lacked; this, at least partly, explains why ETSI was able to be established as an independent organisation. Later, the three bodies would conclude a “CEN-CENELEC-ETSI Basic Cooperation Agreement for the Handling of Technical Work”, thereby streamlining a cohesive European standardization [4][64]. As with the IEEE, ETSI has local roots and enjoys official recognition on a regional level, but has since its establishment grown into a global standardization organisation, counting almost 700 member organisations from 62 countries. This international outlook is evidenced first and foremost by the global application of some of ETSI’s standards such as GSM, the SIM card, DECT, TETRA, xDSL and DVB. Secondly, ETSI has a permanent representation in China and contributes to several collaboration projects with Latin America. Finally, but equally important, the organisation has partnership agreements with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Standards Organisation (ISO) and with the ITU, and keeps formal links with 3GPP, EMTEL, MESA, ICANN and GSC. Within Europe, ETSI has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with National Standardization Organisations (NSOs) in 36 countries, regulating, among other things, the flow of information between the bodies, the standstill procedure (obliging NSOs not to undertake standardization activity which could jeopardise the preparation of European harmonized standards) and the transposition of these standards into national ones.

The recognition of ETSI by the European Commission as well as by the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) implies a number of ‘official’ responsibilities. One well-known example is the set of harmonized standards (currently over 270) that ETSI has released in pursuit of the Commission’s Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive (R&TTD) of 1999. It is this set of standards that allows equipment manufacturers to self-declare conformity of their products and introduce them in all European markets. Another important point of interaction is the use of mandates by the Commission and by EFTA in order to develop standards in line with European policies. Since 1996, 49 such mandates have been forwarded to ETSI [14]. Taking all the above into account, we can conclude that ETSI is a formal, de iure standardization organization. Note that, as Egyedi points out, de iure does not mean that standards must imperatively be applied since ETSI, as most formal bodies, works towards consensus-based, voluntary standards. Like IEEE, ETSI is regional in nature but supersedes this level through its daily activities and membership [4]:5; [1]: 9-11. This membership includes network operators, manufacturers, consultants, national standardization organisations and administrations, but also service providers, universities, public research bodies and user associations. For the latter three categories, as well as for micro-enterprises, reduced membership fees apply, whereas for large companies and administrations contributions are determined by turnover and country GDP respectively [14]. The standardization activities of ETSI take place inside Technical Committees, Special Committees, Projects and Partnership Projects. A Technical Committee (TC) is defined as a “semi-permanent entity organized around a number of standardization activities addressing a specific technology area”. TCs may have different Working Groups, which in their turn discuss one or more Work Items. These Work Items are inserted into ETSI’s Work Programme. During the work, consensus is sought but weighted, secret balloting is also possible, in which case 71 percent of votes is needed (or 71 percent of full member votes in a second round); however, no quorum applies. Eventually, the work of a Technical Committee (as other Technical Bodies) results in European Standards (EN), Harmonised Standards, ETSI standards, ETSI guides, Technical Specifications, Technical Reports, Special Reports and Group Specifications. For the approval of these different types of deliverables, diverging and complex regulations exist which fall outside the scope of this paper [65]. The work of ETSI regarding the Cognitive Pilot Channel will take place in a newly established Technical Committee on Reconfigurable Radio Services (RRS). Following a workshop on SDR and Cognitive Radio in February 07, the ETSI Board decided to establish the SDR/CR ad hoc group, in order to evaluate the potential for standardization on these topics and propose orientation to the Board. The ad hoc group held its first meeting in May 07 and decided to draft a report analyzing SDR/CR requirements and standardization opportunities, and making recommendations to the Board. Among other things, the report –completed in September 07– called for more support from Members for the effort and suggested that the outcome of WRC07 would first be awaited. Therefore, the ETSI Board approved the establishment of the TC RRS only

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in January 08, and the first meeting was held in Sophia Antipolis in March of this year [58][66]. As defined by its Terms of Reference, the Committee’s primary tasks at this stage are to 1) study the feasibility of standardization activities related to Reconfigurable Radio Systems; 2) collect and define the related Reconfigurable Radio Systems requirements from relevant stakeholders; and 3) identify gaps, where existing ETSI standards do not fulfil the requirements, and suggest further standardization activities to fill those gaps. Deliverables envisaged are Technical Reports and ETSI guides, which are to be completed within 18-24 months. In other words, actual ETSI standards on reconfigurability principally are not part of the committee’s current description of work; rather than this, the focus is on the mere feasibility of standardization, requirements from stakeholders and shortcomings in current standardization material that would legitimize ETSI standardization [67].

At the time of writing of this section, two meetings of ETSI TC RRS have taken place. During the second meeting, which was held in Sophia Antipolis on 02-04.06.08, a Working Group on Functional Architecture and Cognitive Pilot Channel was set up [68] with the following responsibilities:

• To collect and define the system functionalities for Reconfigurable Radio Systems. These system functionalities are e.g. related to Spectrum Management and Joint Radio Resource Management across heterogeneous access technologies,

• To develop a Functional Architecture for Reconfigurable Radio Systems including the defined system functionalities as building blocks,

• To describe key interfaces between these building blocks, • To describe and analyze the concept of a Cognitive Pilot

Channel as an enabler to support the management of the RRS including on how information on e.g. available radio resources and network policies are distributed and how to take decisions based on this information,

• To verify that the Functional Architecture and Cognitive Pilot Channel fulfils the requirements for Reconfigurable Radio Systems as defined in the WG SA – System Aspects.

The CPC aspects of this work will be dealt with in the context of a specific Work Item on Cognitive Pilot Channel Specification, which was set up during the same meeting [69]. Its scope is to study the CPC as a means “to support and facilitate end-to-end connectivity in a heterogeneous radio access environment where technologies are used in a flexible and dynamic manner in their spectrum allocation context”. This implies that technical work has now started, and a first parallel WG meeting will take place in September 08. A clear differentiation needs to be made between the IEEE 1900 and ETSI work on CPC. Proposals so far seem to indicate that, while IEEE focuses on Cognitive Radio aspects of Reconfigurable Systems (including context information gathering and autonomous terminal behaviour), the role of ETSI could lie more in the facilitation of the adoption of SDR equipment by industry, through the definition of interfaces and APIs and –in a second stage– the through provision of cognitive support functions such as context provisioning, decision making in terminals, etc. [70].

IV. IMPACT OF CPC STANDARDIZATION ON MARKET STRUCTURE AND BUSINESS MODELS

A. Introduction In the sections above, we have given an overview of the transitions in telecommunications standardization, and have outlined the different concurrent regulatory and standardization tracks of the Cognitive Pilot Channel as an example of this. It is clear that these trajectories are only in the start-up phase, and that no definite design choices have been made on which an analysis of potential business impacts can be performed. However, on a conceptual level it is possible to outline at least some of the design choices for which a decision will eventually have to be taken, and to use these design choices as the basis for an exploratory analysis of possible business impacts. For this paper, we have focused on how different deployment models might influence the relationships between different actors in the telecommunications ecosystem, focusing in particular on the revenue sharing models that are feasible when introducing certain CPC deployments. As shall become clear, different deployments lead to different potential revenue sharing models, not all of which are technically feasible, economically viable or strategically desirable. Therefore, after defining nine different CPC-enabled revenue sharing models, we will apply the business model scorecard methodology to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of these models.

B. Flexible Spectrum Revenue Sharing Options The CPC typology proposed in Section 4.5.1, which distinguishes between an Operator, Association, Intermediary and Hierarchical model, puts an emphasis on the different configurations that are possible for the CPC (e.g. with regard to which actors exchange data, how many CPCs would need to be standardized and deployed, and how many RATs they need to carry) and their impact on FS business models. However, when considering the different ways in which value may be created through the CPC, some other discriminating options need to be taken into account.

First, asset control and customer ownership need to be distinguished when considering different potential revenue streams. Second, the various configurations identified earlier need to be taken into account. Obviously, in the pure Operator model no revenue sharing mechanism is needed, therefore the associated revenue model can be combined conceptually with the Association model, in which also a single operator operates the CPC. Therefore these configurations will be summed up below as both being operator-based models.

Two basic variables can be distinguished which may each have three modes.

• Variable 1 is linked to the question of CPC control –i.e. who deploys the CPC? The potential modes, related to the FS business configurations identified earlier, are: o Mode 1: a CPC is controlled by the operator, e.g. in

both the operator-based models, o Mode 2: a CPC is controlled by both the operator and

an independent party (i.e. the hierarchical model), o Mode 3: a CPC is controlled by an independent

intermediary (i.e. the intermediary model).

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• Variable 2 refers to the issue of customer ownership –i.e. with whom does the end user have a contractual agreement and/or billing relationship? Again, the potential modes, related to the FS business configurations identified earlier, are: o Mode 1: CPC customer ownership. In the operator-

based models, this implies that one operator deploys a CPC, and that various other operators are present under that CPC, but that the end user only has an agreement with the CPC-operating entity to get access to the different RATs available under the association. The CPC-operator would then pay the RAT operators for making their services available. In a hierarchical scenario, this implies that the customer has a contract with a CPC operator, to offer this customer favourable access to a host of operators via their CPCs, but does not have direct contact with these operators’ CPCs. In an intermediary-based scenario, the end user has an agreement with an independent CPC operator to get

direct access to the RATs of different operators listed on this CPC. In the two latter variants, the CPC operator remunerates the RAT operators that it gives access to,

o Mode 2: Mixed customer ownership. In the operator-based models, this implies that the customer pays a

CPC operator to get access to the services of this operator as well as to those listed by partners of the operator association, and then may enter into a contractual relationship with one of these partners offering one or more particular RATs. In a hierarchical scenario, the end user pays both the independent CPC-operator and the operators of the listed RATs that this end user chooses via the CPC. In an intermediary-based scenario, the end user similarly pays for the services of an independent CPC operator, and for use of the RATs chosen,

o Mode 3: RAT customer ownership. In the operator-based scenarios, this means that the discovery of the services offered by an association of operators happens via the CPC of one particular operator, but that the end user does not pay the CPC operator but enters into an agreement with the operator of the RAT chosen. In a hierarchical scenario, similarly only the operator (deploying its own, second-level CPC and underlying

RATs) is paid by the end user. In an intermediary-based scenario, the end-user also only pays the operator of the underlying RATs. In these three variants, the RAT operators then compensate the CPC operator, or it is a subsidized entity.

Figure 5: FS Revenue Sharing Models

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When coupling this typology with an updated graphical representation of the deployment models (including the

financial flows between the different stakeholders), this results in the diagram included in Figure 5. It is important to note that this classification is a conceptual one and that

therefore that not all nine options necessarily represent viable business models. The analysis below aims to provide a preliminary assessment of this viability, which will be further elaborated in subsequent research.

A. Exploratory Business Model Scorecard Analysis Based on [71] a number of crucial parameters can be defined with regard to the viability of FS revenue sharing models. The first parameter is whether roles and revenues between stakeholders are balanced, more in particular between those actors that concentrate the control over the main system gatekeeping function(s) or gateway(s) on the one hand, and the control over the value network’s core assets on the other hand. The notion of balance may denote both a centralisation (concentration in one actor) and a decentralisation (distribution over multiple actors) of revenues, as long as this distribution is in line with the relative weight of the respective actors in the value network.

Relative to FS business models, it can be argued that the influence of the revenue balance on viability is defined by two subparameters. The first subparameter is defined by the question whether gateway and core assets are spread over different actors. The assumption here is that gateway control –in this case control over the CPC– should ideally be aligned with asset control –in this case control over a large-scale mobile network. Previous analysis into this matter [42] suggests that the underlying RATs remain the most essential asset in the value network for all nine models described above, with the CPC in each case acting as an enabler, rather than as the main determinant, of dynamic access to different RATs. This implies that models that feature gateway control by an actor not owning the core assets (i.e. in case of a separate CPC role) are less likely to be supported. In the business model scorecard presented in I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 1. Control & Revenue Balance 1.1. Alignment Gateway ~ Asset High 2

High 2

High 2

Med 1

Med 1

Med 1

Low 0

Low 0

Low 0

1.2. Alignment Value ~ Asset High 2

High 2

High 2

Low 0

Med 1

High 2

Low 0

Med 1

High 2

2. User Value 2.1. Billing Complexity Low 2

High 0

Low 2

Low 2

High 0

Low 2

Low 2

High 0

Low 2

2.1. Service Diversity Low 0

Low 0

Low 0

Med 1

Med 1

Med 1

High 2

High 2

High 2

Total 6 4 6 4 3 6 4 3 6

, this results in a positive score for those models where the CPC operator also controls RATs (i.e. the underlying core assets). In this case, two points were attributed in the case where gateway control and asset control are owned by the same actor (the operator models), one point where gateway control is shared over two actors (hierarchical models) and zero points where gateway and asset control are distributed over separate CPC and RAT operators (intermediary models).

The second subparameter refers to the somewhat related question of whether the role owning the core assets is also the role which has the most impact on the value proposition made to the customer. This is also influenced by the question of whether this role maintains customer ownership (e.g. through branding, through establishing a billing and/or long-term contractual relationship, etc.) and is the guarantor of the value provided by the service. As a rule, the value guarantor, which is responsible and liable for delivering the eventual value proposition to the end user, is the most viable actor to take customer ownership and to take up a substantial segment of the revenue [71]. It can be hypothesized that, here again, primary contribution to the value proposition should run parallel to asset ownership. This implies that a CPC operator defining and guaranteeing the value proposition while not providing the underlying RAT assets, seems less likely to be supported by those asset owners. In other words, revenue sharing models in which a CPC operator independent from the network operators gains direct revenue from end users for a service essentially defined and guaranteed by the network operators themselves (i.e. the provision of network connectivity and/or value added services over diverse RATs, with nothing more than service discovery offered by the CPC) will not be accepted by most stakeholders involved. Therefore, in the business model scorecard below, models in which the CPC does not have customer ownership and is no guarantor of value are scored two points; this is the case for the three operator scenarios (because the CPC in these cases is part of a RAT operator, and as such does not exist as an externally identifiable role) and for types VI and IX where customer ownership resides purely with the RAT operators. The two non-operator models (V and VIII) with mixed customer ownership are scored one point, whereas the models where customer ownership resides purely with an independent CPC operator are scored zero points.

The second crucial parameter is the evaluation of the total FS end-user value proposition in a given configuration. While some of the components of this end-user value proposition, such as cost control and quality-of-service, cannot be determined yet at this stage of FS and CPC development, other factors influencing end user value can already be analyzed. The relevant subparameters considered here are billing complexity (billing complexity is considered to exist if the end user is forced to enter into a billing relationship with more than one actor, which complicates an essentially transparent service to the user and decreases user value) and supply diversity (whether a user is locked into the services of one operator or, through the CPC, has a choice between multiple operators). As to the subparameter of billing complexity, models with mixed customer ownership (i.e. types II, V and VIII) are scored zero points in the scorecard, whereas models with single customer ownership (i.e. the other six models) receive two points. Regarding the supply diversity subparameter, a value of zero is attributed if a customer is locked into one operator (i.e. in the operator models), one point is awarded if a higher level CPCs allows some margin of

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choice, after which a customer is then ‘locked’ into the CPC of the chosen operator (i.e. in the hierarchical models), and two points are given if the CPC allows choice between operator RATs at all times without allowing operators to lock-in customers (i.e. in the intermediary models). Taking these two parameters together, it becomes clear that the more possibilities a specific configuration offers to users, with the least complexity in terms of billing relationships and distribution of liability, the more the elaboration of a revenue sharing model for enabling this configuration will be justified. The two main evaluation criteria, their respective parameters and the values attributed based on our preliminary analysis are summarized in Table 1.

Although neither of these parameters is predictive of the viability of specific business models in se, their combination does provide indications on the likelihood of stakeholders to accept certain revenue sharing configurations and reject others. As a relatively high degree of consensus between different network operators and one or more CPC operators will be required, it is assumed for the analysis of the different configurations presented below that only those models scoring the highest amount of points – representing 4 configurations in total – may obtain sufficient support to be considered for implementation. I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 1. Control & Revenue Balance 1.1. Alignment Gateway ~ Asset High 2

High 2

High 2

Med 1

Med 1

Med 1

Low 0

Low 0

Low 0

1.2. Alignment Value ~ Asset High 2

High 2

High 2

Low 0

Med 1

High 2

Low 0

Med 1

High 2

2. User Value 2.1. Billing Complexity Low 2

High 0

Low 2

Low 2

High 0

Low 2

Low 2

High 0

Low 2

2.1. Service Diversity Low 0

Low 0

Low 0

Med 1

Med 1

Med 1

High 2

High 2

High 2

Total 6 4 6 4 3 6 4 3 6

Table 1: CPC Business Model Scorecard

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS In this paper, we have examined the trend in telecommunications standardization from a linear, largely formal to a complex and multi-layered process simultaneously involving formal organizations, informal bodies and industrial consortia. This standardization strategy acknowledges that different aspects of a standard might need to be standardized in different bodies, at different moments in the research, development and deployment cycle of a product or service, and possibly in different regions. It also presumes that a successful standard might not only need technical quality and industrial support, but often also regional or global acceptance and political support, and that neither formal SDOs, nor industrial consortia are able to provide these in equal measures. In other words, we hypothesize that standardization has become a multi-layered process, not only characterized by its multi-dimensionality but also by its complexity and lack of

certainty. As technologies enter the standardization phase –or better said, multiple concurrent or subsequent standardization trajectories– very early onwards in their development and far ahead of the market, very little is known about the possible market impacts of design choices made, and stakeholders participating in the standardization process have difficulties in estimating what choices would serve their interest best. Moreover, in a multi-layered standardization context companies might be confronted by diverging alliances in the different standardization bodies.

As an example of this trend, we have discussed the current regulation and standardization paths (in IEEE, ETSI and ITU concurrently) of the Cognitive Pilot Channel, one of the potential key enablers of Flexible and Dynamic Spectrum Management. Then, starting from the assumption that crucial design choices with regard to the CPC will be taken during the standardization and regulation process, and that these design choices might influence the eventual deployment of such a cognitive radio technology and networks and services enabled by it, as well as the business models for it, we have performed an exploratory business model scorecard analysis on some of the different revenue sharing models coming out of diverging (theoretical) design choices of the CPC. In particular, we have distinguished four deployment models of the CPC and, based on two crucial variables, transformed these into nine different revenue sharing models on which we have then performed the mentioned scorecard analysis.

As a result we can firstly conclude that types I and III, which can be characterized as pure association (where the ‘main’ operators holds the customer ownership and allows its subscribers access to partner RATs) and MVNO-type models (where other operators make use of the CPC infrastructure of a larger operator to advertise their services, and remunerate this larger operator for this) respectively, are the most plausible candidates for preliminary CPC deployment.

Secondly, the hierarchical and intermediary model variants where the RAT operators keep customer ownership, and where the non-operator CPC is deployed by either the regulator or by a consortium of operators (types VI and IX), are also considered to be viable options. In these cases, the upper-level, multi-operator CPC would become more of a thin intermediary, with most control delegated to the RATs. As it is considered that end users or third-party advertisers are not likely to form a direct source of income for a CPC operator (see also [42]), its revenues would have to be provided by the operators advertising on it. The costs for having the CPC would then be incorporated into the general cost structure of the RATs operating under it, and the CPC would primarily serve to cut costs in the underlying RATs operations, and to create new user value (and thus possibly new revenue) by enabling innovative, flexible combination of these RATs, e.g. in an always-best-connected scheme.

Finally, when looking at the models not reaching the critical threshold, it appears that scenarios with mixed customer ownership (types II, V and VIII) are unlikely to be supported. Also, scenarios where an independent CPC operator takes over the customer relationship (types IV and VII) are equally considered to be difficult, since it is unsure how these

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operators can become standalone entities creating viable and sustainable services towards end users. For the same reason, the viability of multiple independent CPCs is equally doubtful.

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