monitoring & reporting mechanism information management...
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MONITORING & REPORTING MECHANISM INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
FINAL REPORT
Chris Robertson
December 2009
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CONTENTS
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6
1.1 Introduction 1.2 Mapping of Current MRM Information Systems 1.3 Other Information Systems and Databases 1.4 Needs Assessment 1.5 Proposals for the Task Force Information System 1.6 Proposals for the Global Information System 1.7 Monitoring the Impact of the MRM 1.8 The Information needs of MRM Practitioners 1.9 Recommendations and Next Steps
2 INTRODUCTION 13
2.1 Terms of Reference 2.2 Concepts and Definitions 2.3 Overall Approach to the Consultancy 2.4 Work Plan 2.5 Constraints 2.6 Structure of the Report
3 MAPPING OF CURRENT MRM INFORMATION SYSTEMS 18
3.1 Questionnaire Responses 3.2 Sudan 3.3 DRC 3.4 Sri Lanka 3.5 Nepal 3.6 Somalia 3.7 Common Issues at the Country Level 3.8 Global Information Management
4 OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS & DATABASES 37
4.1 OHCHR Global Human Rights Database 4.2 OHCHR Special Procedures Database 4.3 ICRC Database 4.4 HURIDOCS Human Rights Database 4.5 UNHCR/UNFPA GBV Monitoring System 4.6 IMSMA Mine Action Database 4.7 OCHA Access Monitoring & Reporting Framework 4.8 Inter‐Agency Child Protection Database 4.9 DevInfo 4.10 MRM Task Force Feedback 4.11 Common Issues
5 NEEDS ASSESSMENT 48
5.1 MRM Task Forces 5.2 Global Partners
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5.3 Overview
6 PROPOSALS FOR A COUNTRY‐BASED INFORMATION SYSTEM 54
6.1 The Rationale for a Standardised Information System 6.2 System Objectives 6.3 System Design 6.4 The Interface with Other Information Systems & Databases 6.5 Ensuring Security 6.6 Challenges and Practical Issues
7 PROPOSALS FOR A GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEM 68
8 MONITORING THE IMPACT OF THE MRM
8.1 National Impact Monitoring 8.2 Global Impact Monitoring
9 THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF PRACTIONERS 73
10 RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 76
10.1 Recommendations 10.2 Implementation – Next Steps
LIST OF APPENDICES 1 Terms of Reference
2 Schedule of Visits & Consultees
3 Field Questionnaire (Blank Form)
4 Summary Analysis of Field Questionnaire Responses
5 Global Questionnaire (Blank Form)
6 Summary Analysis of Global Questionnaire Responses
7 OCHA Access Monitoring & Reporting Framework
8 Data Requirements Framework
a) Explanatory Notes
b) Data Requirements Format
c) Confidential Data Sheets
d) Data Requirements Example 1 – Recruitment & Abduction
e) Data Requirements Example 2 – School Attack
9 Perpetrator Reports
a) Commentary
b) Graphs and Tables
10 Risk Assessment Framework
a) Security Guidelines
b) Risk Assessment Template
c) Risk Mitigation Matrix
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11 Database Specification
a) Database Specification
b) Data Entry Menus and Screens
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ABBREVIATIONS
CAFAAG Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
IACPD Inter‐Agency Child Protection Database
IACPIS Inter‐Agency Child Protection Information System
GIS Geographical Information System (Mapping Software)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
INSMA International Management System for Mine Action
IRC International Rescue Committee
MRM Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
MRMTF Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism Task Force
OSRSG‐CAAC Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children Affected by Armed Conflict
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
SCWG Security Council Working Group
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
Unicef United Nations Children’s Fund
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks are due to everyone who contributed their time, knowledge and ideas to this piece of work, especially all those who managed to find time in their heavy schedules to complete my mammoth questionnaire, the Task Forces that hosted my field visits and gave unstintingly of their time, and Stephane, Lara and colleagues at Unicef in New York who supported my work throughout and patiently answered my endless questions.
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The consultancy was commissioned by Unicef on behalf of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) for the six grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict It was designed to assess the information systems and databases currently being used at the country level to support the MRM and to make recommendations for developing and rolling out a more standardised system. This involved a mapping of current practice and a needs assessment at both country and global levels, together with the development of a detailed specification for any new system required. The main focus was on the monitoring of the incidents themselves, but the review also touched on other aspects of information management, including impact monitoring and the information needs of MRM practitioners.
1.1. Introduction (Section 2)
The overall approach taken to the consultancy and the methodology adopted are both outlined in the Introduction. The analytical framework focused on the way in which the information system helps support the strategic objectives of the MRM and its partners, what data is recorded and how the system performs against a range of indicators. The methodology included a review of available documentation, meetings with global partners in New York and Geneva, field visits to Sudan, DRC and Sri Lanka and detailed questionnaires that were completed by country Task Forces and global partners.
An effort is also made in the Introduction to clarify some of the key concepts and definitions involved, including the differences between an information system and a database, quantitative and qualitative data and monitoring as opposed to case management.
1.2. Mapping of Current MRM Information Systems (Section 3) The mapping of the information systems that are currently used to support the MRM was based upon a very detailed questionnaire that was completed by 16 countries and three field visits that were made to DRC, Sudan and Sri Lanka. Additional information from previous work undertaken for Nepal and Somalia has also been included in the report.
It is clear that most Task Forces have invested heavily in information management, but that despite some examples of good practice, many are frustrated with their systems’ failure to deliver what they need. The main issues that emerged from the mapping were:
Approaches to Monitoring – There is considerable diversity in the way monitoring itself takes place, due not only to the nature of the conflicts themselves, but also Task Force capacity and the lack of detailed guidance on certain key issues (e.g. how the minimum dataset should be implemented). This is reflected in the range of data being recorded and the way in which it is collected. Of particular importance are the differences between real time and retrospective recording, child specific and “event” monitoring and centralised and decentralised verification. Whether focal agencies are used for each violation and how the MRM interfaces with other child protection programmes has also been crucial to the design of information management systems.
System Development – Very few Task Forces have access to specialist information management expertise and as a result system development tends to lack a strategic focus, is often “data led” and gives insufficient priority to objectives and outputs. Resources are always limited and there is a reliance on IT staff from MRMTF members, who have many other competing priorities. Regular
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staff turnover can also create difficulties. It can often take a very long time to develop a fully operational system and this can be very frustrating when responding to an emergency. There are also several instances of systems being abandoned in favour of a fresh start, either because the first system fails to meet expectations or because new staff want something different.
System Architecture & Implementation – Most Task Forces use both manual and electronic systems. Data collection forms vary enormously in format and complexity. Some use just one form while others have one for each violation. Some make considerable use of multiple choice questions as well as open‐ended ones, but other forms are very unstructured. It is clear that many questions are routinely left blank, so data collection aspirations are often unrealistic and data quality is quite variable.
More Task Forces make use of a database than a spreadsheet. MS Access is the most common software being used. Some databases are completely centralised with all the data being entered in the capital by the UN agency hosting the system, while others are highly decentralised and are used to manage the documentation and verification process in he field. The data manipulation capacity of systems varies considerably, but in general their reporting capabilities are quite limited.
System Security – Everyone recognises that security is crucial, but few countries have implemented a full risk assessment or developed a security plan for their information system. The result is a mixture of good practice alongside serious weaknesses. Manual systems are generally more vulnerable than electronic ones, especially in the field and where data has to be moved from place to place. Some Task Forces have addressed this by entering data directly into their electronic system. Others have decided to exclude personal data that can be used to identify individual children from the main information system. No security system is foolproof. Human error and a lack of vigilance is just as important as the technical measures, so the lack of security training and security audits is a concern.
At the global level the information system is primarily focused on the annual reports and horizontal notes submitted by each country and the minutes of SCWG deliberations. While there are guidelines for these reports, the format varies from country to country and there is little systematic analysis of the caseload. The diversity of practice at the country level and the lack of a common dataset or agreed data definitions mean that it is impossible to undertake any global analysis of the data.
1.3. Other Information Systems and Databases (Section 4)
The review also looked at other information systems that are currently being used to support human rights monitoring and child protection programming in emergencies, both from the perspective of transferring data into the MRM and to see if they can provide insights into the challenges that the MRM might face in developing its own information system. The review encompassed a wide range of systems, most of which used a database of some kind. A number of common issues emerged:
There is a very clear distinction between systems that focus on “monitoring” and those that are designed to support “case management” as they require very different data structures and functionality. Very few, if any, systems attempt to fully integrate these two different functions.
The majority of the systems examined were being used for “decision support”. They provide a convenient mechanism for storing, accessing and manipulating data about individual cases. Quantitative analysis is allocated a relatively low priority by most systems.
A number of organisations have used their information systems and, in particular, their databases as a means of ensuring consistency in the implementation of their monitoring procedures across their many different country programmes.
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Most organisations highlighted the importance of having a robust data structure, focusing on clear “one‐to‐one” or “one‐to‐many” relationships and explicit data definitions that are rigorously enforced.
Many highlighted the considerable challenges involved in trying to balance the drive for consistency and standardisation with the demand and need for local flexibility and customisation. The solutions to this dilemma varied depending on the overarching purpose of the system.
Apart from the UNHCR/UNFPA GBV system, none of the systems attempted to consolidate their analysis at the global level. There are several reasons for this reluctance. Many agencies believe that the diversity of the situations being monitored and the variable monitoring capacity in each country make such comparisons unhelpful and potentially misleading. Some agencies allow significant local customisation of their systems, making global level comparisons impossible. Many also believe that the data belongs to the country level offices and that they are the ones that are best placed to make decisions about its use.
Protecting confidentiality was a priority for all those focused on human rights monitoring and most tried to ensure this by separating personal data from incident details, often by excluding the former from their main database.
All the organisations emphasised the importance of allocating adequate resources for the implementation as well as the development of the system and indicated that these could be substantial. Most of the more impressive systems had been developed over a period of years and had undergone significant upgrades.
1.4. Needs Assessment (Section 5) Respondents at the country and global levels were asked whether they favoured the creation of a more standardised approach to information management and, if so, what form it should take.
The majority of country‐based Task Force respondents favoured a more standardised approach and 77% supported the development of a common database. The main advantages of this approach were seen as access to specialist information and data management expertise, resource savings and the opportunity to make comparisons between different countries. The main concerns revolved around the degree of diversity at the country level and whether this could be accommodated effectively. The top priorities for any new system were identified as:
Flexibility – the ability to customise the system to meet local needs
Strong reporting and analytical capabilities
Simplicity and user‐friendliness
Strong system security
Some people also wanted to reduce the use of, or even eliminate, paper forms
When asked which strategic objectives people wanted the system to support, most Task Force respondents included advocacy, programme planning, immediate interventions, referrals and the management of the MRM itself, in addition to the core function of preparing the formal reports for the Security Council.
There was a greater diversity of views among global partners about the priorities for information management at the country level. This involved issues of principle as well operational concerns.
The former reflected the differing organisational mandates of the partners. At one end of the spectrum, the OSRSG‐CAAC were primarily concerned about the information needs of the formal
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reporting to the Security Council and believed that these were best met by having access to quality data about a limited number of fully verified case studies that could be used to highlight key issues. At the other end of the spectrum, partners with wider child protection mandates wanted the MRM information system to play a broader role and were keen to see more comparative analysis and trends that could be used to support advocacy, programme planning and other objectives.
The operational concerns related to the value of any quantitative analysis and the cost effectiveness of using a database. The OSRG‐CAAC felt that the MRM caseload was too small and unrepresentative to be used in any quantitative analysis. While many of the other respondents recognised this problem, they still saw a benefit in being able to analyse the data, especially if it could be combined with other contextual information (e.g. non‐verified incidents and the proposed macro monitoring).
Most partners recognised that much of the database development that has taken place at the country level has been problematic, but drew different conclusions from it. The OSRSG‐CAAC felt that a database was unnecessary. They would prefer to receive descriptive reports and think the development of a standardised database would be a waste of valuable resources. However many other partners feel that a database is essential for managing and analysing the caseload and think that developing one standardised version could help overcome some of the problems experienced to date.
These differences of view were also reflected in respondents’ views about the information requirements at the global level, although data security and reconciling the objectives of different partners were seen as additional challenges. Some of those who wanted to make comparisons between countries and plot trends favoured having a unified database system at the global level, while others were happy to rely on reports provided by the country‐based Task Forces.
1.5. Proposals for a Country‐based Information System (Section 6)
It is clear that, despite the expenditure of significant resources and some limited successes, the current situation at the country level is generally unsatisfactory. A more standardised approach could help improve things, but only if the diversity of views outlined above can be resolved and the system can be made flexible enough to accommodate the needs of all the countries involved.
The differing objectives of the global partners are not unexpected and are consistent with their individual mandates, but they are not as mutually exclusive as might initially appear to be the case. There is also a strong case for trying to develop a system with sufficient flexibility to meet their differing objectives and in so doing to ensure the maximum buy‐in and participation from all stakeholders in the MRM itself.
There is actually more overlap in what people want out of the information system than is often recognised. For instance, those who are drafting reports for submission to New York need to be able to analyse the caseload and identify which cases are most significant and merit inclusion, while those who are looking at advocacy and programme planning are likely to want access to case study material and qualitative data as well as quantitative analysis.
There is no reason why the information system cannot provide quick and easy access to both case studies and quantitative analysis, but this needs to be based on a robust and consistently applied mechanism for recording the verification status of cases in which everyone can have confidence. This will require greater standardisation in how the minimum dataset and common data definitions are operationalised, including those relating to case documentation and verification. These ideas are explained in Section 6 and Appendix 8.
The use of a more standardised system will also provide an opportunity to improve the consistency with which documentation and verification takes place in the field and consequently reduce the tension that sometimes arises between New York and some individual Task Forces.
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In theory this data could be collected, stored and manipulated manually using paper forms and files, but only if the numbers remain fairly small and the monitoring system very simple. Once the numbers rise, as has happened in most countries implementing the MRM, and more agencies become involved in the monitoring process, some form of electronic system becomes inevitable. The volume of data and the complexity of data relationships mean that a database is the most appropriate solution.
The problems experienced with the current MRM databases are primarily due to the way in which they have been developed and do not imply a fundamental weakness in the technology or that it is unsuited to the task. In addition to making it possible to manage large numbers of cases, a database can offer real advantages in terms of data security. It can also play a role in enforcing documentation and verification standards, while at the same time allowing Task Forces to monitor other non‐MRM‐verified violations if they want without undermining the quality of the core MRM.
The “unrepresentative” caseload does mean that analytical reports can be problematic and need to be used with care and always in context, but can still be of value as shown by the example in Appendix 9. Analytical reports can also be used in combination with other sources of information, including the proposed Macro Monitoring, to create a more holistic picture.
Section 6 and Appendices 8 and 11 contain detailed proposals for the information system and database. They are based upon a data structure and definitions that would need to apply in every country, but would still allow for significant local customisation of the user interface, include a facility for adding user‐defined fields and provide for flexible report generation. To ensure maximum protection for all the individuals involved, it is proposed that no personal data (names, addresses, etc) should be included in the database itself. This sensitive data that could be used to identify individuals should be held in a separate location, but with the ability to cross reference it with the database using shared ID codes.
The proposed database is designed to accommodate different monitoring arrangements and implementation models (centralised and decentralised, standalone, networked or web‐based) and includes comprehensive security provisions. Section 6 also explores the relationship between the proposed MRM database and the IACPD and concludes, for a mixture of technical and non‐technical reasons, that this should be based on having maximum compatibility of data formats and, where needed, automated data exchange, rather than full integration.
The proposed database contains robust security features, but protecting confidentiality is about much more than technology. All Task Forces should undertake a comprehensive risk assessment and prepare a full security plan for their information system, including provision for appropriate training and security audits. Detailed guidance is contained in Appendix 10.
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of some of the practical issues that will be faced in putting the proposals into effect, including the choice of software and the need for phased implementation, and contains an outline of the next steps required to take things forward.
1.6. Proposals for the Global Information System (Section 7)
If a standardised database is implemented at the Task Force level, it will be possible to consolidate the data globally to provide the comparisons and trends requested by most partners. The challenges in doing so will be not be technical, but about how useful any analytical reports will be, how security will be ensured and how the ownership of data and the resulting reports will be handled.
Two main technical options are identified. The first involves the export of standard reports from each Task Force database and their consolidation globally. This could be automated and would provide a
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range of basic reports without the need to transfer any case specific data to New York, but no further investigation or customised analysis would be possible. The second option would involve the consolidation of all or part of the Task Force databases in New York, which would provide unlimited opportunities for analysis. Data security would be a bigger risk, but this could be manageable if, as proposed, personal data is excluded from the databases at the country level. A global “back‐up” would also guard against data loss during any serious unrest at the country level, especially if this resulted in the evacuation of staff and/or the withdrawal of key agencies.
The diversity of factors impacting on the data from each country would make interpreting the analysis more difficult, so it is more likely to be of value internally within the MRM as a catalyst for further investigation and research. Once again context will be crucial and the analysis will be more useful when viewed in combination with other sources of information.
1.7. Monitoring the Impact of the MRM (Section 8)
Although not the main focus of the consultancy, monitoring the impact of the MRM was a concern for many consultees. Impact monitoring is notoriously difficult, especially for something like the MRM, where there are many other factors that can have a much more significant impact on the level of violations. Hence it is necessary to identify surrogate indicators which are more sensitive to the MRM. Apart from the two narrowly defined indicators that are focused on the children whose cases have been recorded by the MRM itself, the report also proposes the use of a simple matrix to provide a more structured approach to monitoring the impact of advocacy initiatives, Action Plans negotiated with parties to the conflict and the outcomes of annual reports and the resulting recommendations from the SCWG.
1.8. The Information Needs of MRM Practitioners (Section 9) The consultancy also looked at the information needs of those involved in implementing the MRM and reviewed the MRM website CAACNET. Apart from their wish to see the MRM Guidelines finalised, improved access to key documents, opportunities for networking and improved bilateral contacts were practitioners’ highest priorities.
A serious lack of resources means that CAACNET is currently unable to meet these needs. The user interface is uninspiring, it is very difficult to search for documents, many of which are now out of date and there are no opportunities for inactive use. The report includes detailed suggestions for a replacement website with a full range of resources and opportunities for much greater interaction between users (blogs, discussion topics, etc.). However for this to be implemented additional resources will be required, most critically so someone is able to allocate time to managing and supporting the site on a regular basis.
1.9. Recommendations & Next Steps (Section 10)
The final section of the report contains a full list of the main recommendations, which are reproduced below for ease of reference. More detail of these proposals is included in the appropriate sections of the report and in the individual appendices. Section 10 also contains details of the practical steps required to implement the recommendations.
a) Minimum Dataset
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The MRM should seek to operationalise the minimum dataset using mandatory and non‐mandatory fields that can be supplemented locally with additional user‐defined fields and used in either a manual or electronic format. For this to be successful standardised data definitions and options must be adopted. (Section 6 and Appendix 8)
b) Treatment of Personal Data
The MRM should move towards a system which keeps confidential personal details about all the individuals involved in the monitoring process separate from the main data about incidents and violations. (Section 6)
c) Manual or Electronic Systems
The MRM should, to the extent possible, minimise the use of manual (paper) forms and maximise the use of suitably protected electronic systems for the storage and manipulation of data. (Section 6)
d) Standardised Database
The MRM should develop a standardised database that can be used by Task Forces at the country level. It should be based upon a robust data structure, clear data definitions and a mix of mandatory and non‐mandatory data fields, with sufficient flexibility to cope with the diverse approaches to monitoring adopted in different countries. (Section 6 and Appendices 8, 9 & 11)
e) System Security
All MRM Task Forces should undertake a full Risk Assessment and use it to develop a Security Plan for their information system. This should be revisited on a regular basis and updated to take account of changing circumstances. (Section 6 & Appendix 10)
f) Global Analysis
Any global analysis of MRM data should initially be based on a small number of simple Excel proformas, but once the standardised MRM database is in place at Task Force level, it should be used to consolidate non confidential data. This should be undertaken by one agency on behalf of all the partners with clear protocols in place for the disclosure of reports into the public domain. (Section 7)
g) Impact Monitoring
The MRM should consider utilising a more structured approach to impact monitoring utilising a matrix of the kind described in the report and place greater emphasis on communicating the results to its stakeholders, including those in the field who have contributed to the collection of data. (Section 8)
h) Website Development
The MRM should consider the possibility of establishing a new upgraded website for MRM practitioners with an emphasis on providing users with opportunities to engage interactively with each other, BUT only if adequate resources can be provided for its ongoing support and management. (Section 9)
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2. INTRODUCTION 2.1. Terms of Reference The consultancy was commissioned by UNICEF’s Child Protection Section in New York on behalf of the wider partnership of agencies working on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) for the six grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict that was established in response to Security Council Resolution 1612 in 2005. The MRM is currently being implemented or in the process of being established in 17 countries.
In July 2007, after examining the lessons learnt from the first seven pilot countries, the Global MRM Steering Committee agreed to conduct a comprehensive study to assess the existing databases and information management systems being used to support the MRM and to make recommendations for developing and rolling out a global MRM Information System and in particular to assess the need for and viability of a standardised global database system.
The consultancy was finally commissioned in September 2008. The full terms of reference are contained in Appendix 1, but the main requirements were as follows:
1. Conducting a comprehensive database and information management needs analysis for the standardised MRM database and information management system at the global and country levels of those countries of those countries implementing the MRM to clearly define:
a) The minimum data requirements and formats
b) The case management requirements and how the two datasets need to interface.
2. Executing a comprehensive global mapping and assessment of all existing initiatives of database and information management (DBIM), including inter‐agency systems used by UN and NGO agencies and relevant government agencies, in the fields of:
a) Monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children,
b) Human rights monitoring; and
c) Child protection case management and follow‐up (separated children, sexual violence, CAAFAG, etc)
3. Distinguish between aspects of MRM data management requirements that need to be developed as part of global systems, vs MRM data management that are better developed at country level.
4. Assessment of hardware and software capacity available at regional, national and field levels with UN and other NGO partners involved in the MRM.
5. Based on the analysis of them aping and needs, recommend the most efficient way to develop an MRM database and information management system template for both the national and global level and identifying all of its components (software, security measures, fields, etc) with two requirements documents, one for a simple MRM system and the other for a full case management system. Recommendations should also consider how this global system can link into and communicate with existing databases in the field.
6. To develop a final report with the findings, recommendations and with a detailed work plan identifying resources (financial, material, human) and timeline needed to develop and roll out the MRM DBIM.
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2.2. Concepts and Definitions
The Terms of Reference include a number of key concepts that are of fundamental importance to the consultancy. Hence it is important at the outset to clarify our understanding of these terms and their relevance to the MRM.
2.2.1. Information Management & Databases
The most fundamental distinction is the one between an information management system and a database. Information management is the more strategic term and describes the way in which organisations use information to fulfil their objectives. Information comes in many different forms and can be organised in different ways depending on the aims of the system. It can also be managed using many different techniques and tools.
A database is just one of these tools. By using the power of a computer it is possible store, organise, access and manipulate large quantities of data very quickly and easily. However all these tasks can also be carried out using a manual system with paper files, card indexes, etc. or even an oral system of the kind common in pre‐literate societies (e.g. the tradition of “griots” and praise singers in West Africa).
It is important that the choice of “tools” is based upon the needs of the information system (the outputs required or the questions that it needs to answer), rather than just opting for the highest tech solution. This is particularly important in the case of a database, which can often be a very resource intensive solution, both to develop and operate. The most common risk is that database design will be driven by the availability of data rather than the information system’s objectives. As a consequence it can end up containing the wrong data organised in inappropriate ways, making it difficult to generate the outputs required and leading to frustration for all those involved.
2.2.2. Quantitative and Qualitative Data The second key distinction is between qualitative and quantitative data and the way in which they can be used.
Quantitative data is information that can be counted or measured and is used to define something. It is usually concerned with attributes, characteristics and properties. Qualitative data on the other hand is not normally countable or measurable and is used to describe something. Qualitative data can be a richer source of information, providing a more holistic picture, but is much more difficult to manipulate or use in making comparisons or identifying trends.
There is always a risk that the two types of data will be seen as mutually exclusive alternatives or that one is intrinsically more valuable than the other (e.g. qualitative data is more useful than simple numbers that can over‐simplify the situation). In reality they are complementary and most information and monitoring systems make use of both and often try to “quantify” some of this “soft” qualitative data by creating indicators for things like attitudes, competencies, outcomes, and impact, using carefully defined categories and definitions.
2.2.3. Monitoring & Case Management
The third key distinction is the difference between monitoring and case management. The Terms of Reference are not explicit, but it is often assumed that monitoring relates to the MRM, while case management is about response. This however would be misleading as the crucial difference is a more generic one. Monitoring is concerned with gathering data in order to describe and analyse something,
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while case management involves using the information system to manage a process of some kind. The provision of support and services to children who have experienced a violation could certainly fall into the second category, but case management could equally be about the way in which an incident is documented and verified (i.e. collecting data about the different stages of the process and making it possible to manage the system by which this happens).
The two systems can contain some common data, but they are fundamentally different in the way in which they process the data and the outputs that they deliver. The former is primarily concerned with describing a situation, either statistically or in the form of case studies, and is largely static. The latter is more dynamic with an emphasis on providing operational support to field staff and enabling managers to keep a check on the progress of work so that resources can be redirected or corrective action taken to ensure that targets are met.
2.3. Overall Approach to the Consultancy
The Terms of Reference for the consultancy are extremely detailed, but essentially focus on the development of information systems at the country and global levels, with a requirement to map existing provision, assess needs and develop recommendations that will meet these needs given the available resources and constraints impacting on the MRM.
There is an inevitable overlap between the mapping of existing information systems and the needs assessment, so the methodology has sought, wherever possible, to integrate the two processes and minimise the level of duplication. This is particularly important when looking at the basis for planning and evaluating the systems and a common framework has been developed utilising three key questions:
How does the information system support the strategic objectives of the MRM?
What key data should be recorded in the system
How does the information system perform against a range of key indicators?
These can be understood as follows:
2.3.1. Support for Strategic Objectives The framework identifies eight strategic objectives to which the information system might be expected to contribute. These range from ones that everyone would recognise and support (i.e. the preparation of the Annual Reports and Horizontal Notes) to ones that may be more contentious (e.g. Referrals, Response and Managing the MRM itself). These can be summarised as follows:
Strategic Objective Details
Annual Reports & Global Horizontal Notes
Providing access to caseload profiles and detailed individual case studies that can be used in drafting reports for New York
Advocacy & Action Planning Providing information that can be used to help plan and implement advocacy initiatives, either locally or nationally, develop Action Plans with the various armed forces/groups and assist in monitoring the implementation of these Plans
Impunity & Accountability Providing information that can be used in negotiations with armed groups about specific incidents and/or in efforts to hold individual perpetrators to account.
Immediate Interventions Providing information about individual incidents that can be used to initiate immediate interventions designed to address the violations involved (e.g. to secure a child’s release) and to monitor their success.
Programme Planning Providing a profile of the caseload than can help in planning programmes to prevent and respond to violations.
Referrals Providing the information that is required by the agencies that provide long term support to children who have experienced violations and ensuring that referrals take
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Strategic Objective Details place in a timely manner.
Long Term Response Providing information that can help these agencies deliver and manage the provision of this longer term support to children.
Managing the MRM Providing the information needed to assess how effectively the MRM is being implemented and how it might be strengthened.
2.3.2. Data Requirements
The second part of the framework focuses on the ten types of data that might be included in the system. The first three are concerned with the process by which the case is documented and verified, the next four with the details of the incident itself and the final three with the actions that may be taken in response to it. These can be summarised as follows:
Type of Data Details Initial Source of the Allegation Date and source of the alert, whether an UN Monitor was an eye witness, etc.
Documentation of the Allegation Dates and names/categories of informants, sources of documentary/physical evidence, reliability of evidence, etc.
Verification Details Status of case, date of verification, etc Incident Summary Date and location of incident, description of what occurred, etc Child(ren)’s Details Name, DOB/age, address, ethnic/religious affiliation, family situation, etc. Perpetrator(s)’ Details Name/group, state/non‐state, armed/unarmed, etc.
Violation Specific Details Different data fields for each violation ‐ e.g. type/size of school, type of attack, impact on school, etc.
Details of Immediate Interventions Date, type of Intervention, outcome, etc. Referral Details Date of referral, agency involved, purpose, etc. Follow‐up/Reintegration Details Detailed data about the actions undertaken by the agency providing longer term
response.
2.3.3. System Performance
The third part of the framework comprises nine indicators against which the performance of the system can be assessed and which can also be used to establish the priorities for any new system. The first five are concerned with various aspects of the data recorded in the system, while the next three are focused on the way in which the data is used to meet the needs of users and the final one focuses on cost effectiveness. They can be summarised as follows:
Performance Details
Data Quality The extent to which the data collected is in the required format (i.e. one which can be used in any automated analysis)
Data Reliability The extent to which the data accurately reflects/describes the reality of the case.
Data Comprehensiveness The extent to which the data required is regularly collected (i.e. how many data gaps exist)
Data Consistency The extent to which data is reported in a consistent manner for each case (e.g. is it always a data of birth, or is sometimes an age or even an age range).
Data Coverage The extent to which the caseload reported is representative of the actual profile of incidents (e.g. by area and violation).
Timeliness The extent to which the system provides users with access to data and reports at the times when they are needed and the extent to which any reports contain up‐to‐date data.
Relevance The extent to which the outputs of the system (reports) are relevant to and meet the needs of users (e.g. content, format, etc).
Accessibility The extent to which the data about individual cases and/or statistical reports (both standard and bespoke) are accessible/available to those who need them.
Value for Money The extent to which the benefits gained from the information system justify the cost involved, taking into account the “opportunity costs” involved (i.e. what else the resources could have been used for).
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The wording of the Terms of Reference makes it very clear that the main focus of the consultancy should be on the management and use of data relating to the incidents that the MRM is designed to monitor. At first sight this may seem fairly obvious, but the information management requirements of the MRM are actually much wider than just incident monitoring. It is also important to consider the way in which the impact of the MRM itself can be monitored and how the information requirements of the MRM partners and Task Force members can best be met. It is not possible for all these diverse requirements to be accommodated in one database or manual data system, so where appropriate these issues are discussed separately in the report.
2.4. Work Plan The evaluation began with a brief visit to New York in September 2008 to agree the scope of the work with UNICEF and hold preliminary meetings with other partners at the global level. This was followed by desk research and field visits to three countries: Sudan, DRC and Sri Lanka to undertake more detailed field research. These visits took place in November 2008 and January 2009 and were followed by another series of consultations with global partners, this time in Geneva, in June 2009.
On the basis of the desk research and the outcome of the various field visits, two detailed questionnaires were developed, one targeted at the country‐level MRM Task Forces and one at the global level partners. These were designed to provide a comprehensive picture of all existing information management systems and to enable all interested parties to contribute towards the needs assessment.
A second visit was made to New York in July 2009 for a further round of meetings with global partners, to present and discuss the preliminary findings of the consultancy and agree the format of the final report.
2.5. Constraints The Terms of Reference for the consultancy were very ambitious and fulfilling them has been dependent on the availability of a large amount of detailed documentation and the collaboration of a wide range of partners, both globally and from the individual MRM Task Forces. While many individuals have committed a considerable amount of time and effort to supporting the consultancy, for many, the MRM is just one of their many responsibilities. As a result timescales have often slipped, but this has been a small price to pay for the exceptionally high level of participation in the process.
Of more significance is that very few countries have fully documented their information systems. Most have been developed incrementally in response to emerging needs, often by staff who were not information management experts and so obtaining all the data required for the consultancy has been a considerable challenge.
The implementation of the consultancy has taken considerably longer than originally anticipated. While this has partly been due to the time required to obtain feedback from the field and set up visits, the consultant also had to undertake the work alongside another unrelated piece of work and then experienced a prolonged period of ill health at the beginning of 2009 that led to a delay of several months.
2.6. Structure of Report The main report is split into 10 substantive sections, including the Executive Summary.
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This introduction is followed by the mapping of the existing information systems, both those used by MRM Task Forces (Section 3) and by other organisations (Section 4). This is followed by the needs assessment based upon the field and global questionnaires and the outcome of various face to face meetings with MRM partners at the global level (Section 5).
The next part of the report contains a synthesis of all this information and includes proposals for what should happen at the country/Task Force level (Section 6) and globally (Section7).
The final two substantive sections cover other information management issues: – impact monitoring (Section 8) and the information requirements of MRM practitioners in the field and suggestions for website development (Section 9). The report concludes with a summary of the main recommendations and an indication of what needs to be done to implement them (Section 10).
The report is supplemented by 11 appendices. In addition to the detailed Terms of Reference and a schedule of visits and meetings (Appendices 1 & 2), these include the two questionnaires used in the consultancy and a summary of the responses (Appendices 3 – 6), details of the OCHA access monitoring and reporting framework (Appendix 7) and four appendices containing the detailed specifications for the proposed information system and database, including the minimum data set, the suggested format for analytical reports, the security guidelines and the database specification itself (Appendices 8 ‐11).
3. MAPPING OF CURRENT MRM INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Two approaches have been taken to mapping the information systems and databases that are currently being used to support the MRM at the country level:
A detailed questionnaire that was sent to every MRM Task Force
Field visits that were made to 3 countries (Sudan, DRC and Sri Lanka).
Additional information about Nepal and Somalia based upon other work undertaken by the consultant prior to this contract has also been included.
3.1. Questionnaire Responses
The questionnaire was designed to map the existing information systems and seek the views of each MRM Task Force on the potential for developing a more standardised approach. There was inevitably some overlap between these two issues, but this section of the report focuses exclusively on the mapping.
A response was received from 16 countries. This provided an excellent basis for the mapping, although, some respondents were only able to complete part of the form. This was inevitable given that some countries are still in the process of setting up the MRM and others lacked the necessary information or the time to cover everything. Some of the responses represented the views of the Task Force as a whole, while others were limited to those of the person completing the form.
A full analysis of the responses is contained in Appendix 4. The consultant had to summarise some of the comments and interpret others that were unclear, so if there are any errors these are the responsibility of the consultant.
The quantitative analysis of the factual questions was relatively straightforward, but it is clear that different respondents approached the subjective questions in very different ways, so it was often not possible to make direct comparisons. This was particularly true where the effectiveness of existing
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information systems was being assessed. Perhaps inevitably there was a tendency for those who had played a major role in creating the systems to be on average more positive than those who had not been!
3.1.1. MRM Background
The first section of the questionnaire asked for background information about the MRM itself, the membership and structure of the Task Force and the way in which monitoring and reporting is organised, as this will have a major impact on the design and operation of the information system.
The MRM Task Forces have between 6 and 12 members, with most between 8 and 10. Some are exclusively or primarily made up of UN agencies (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan), while others have more significant participation from NGO’s and local Human Rights bodies (e.g. Nepal where non‐UN agencies make up over 60% of the Task Force). Sri Lanka is the only country where government linked organisations have participated in the Task Force.
The MRM Task Force is normally co‐chaired by Unicef together with a representative of the UN Resident Co‐ordinator, SRSG or OHCHR. Of more significance to the consultancy, responsibility for information management and, in particular, for hosting any database was shared among 5 different UN agencies: UNICEF (6), DPKO (3), OHCHR (1), UNHCR (1) and ILO (1).
There is considerable variation in the structure of the Task Forces and the way in which responsibilities are allocated. 6 countries have adopted a “Lead” or “Focal” Agency approach with responsibility for each violation being given to different agencies. In practice the situation is often less clear cut, with some partners much more active than others and in some countries it appears that most of the work is done by the two or three core agencies. However the “Lead” Agency approach can make it more difficult to create an integrated information system, especially if each organisation uses its own in‐house systems to record data.
3 countries have, or are in the process of establishing, a decentralised structure with regional Task Forces and this will have additional implications for information management.
The monitoring process itself involves three distinct stages – receiving the initial “alert”, documenting the case and finally verifying it. The complexity of the information system will be dependent on the number of agencies involved in each stage and how this process is organised. The responses indicate considerable diversity with between 2 and 10 agencies involved in receiving the initial alerts, between 1 and 7 in documenting the incidents and between 1 and 5 agencies with responsibility for making verification decisions. This means that some countries have a highly centralised system with just one agency having responsibility for all three tasks, while in others there are multiple agencies involved in each of the processes.
The questionnaire also attempted to quantify the caseload being handled by each MRM Task Force, but many of the responses were incomplete and some were contradictory. This may have been because the information system was unable to provide this kind of quantitative data, but the wording of one of the questions may also have been at fault. However the answers that were provided indicated that the number of cases varied enormously from just a few hundred to many thousands. Clearly it is extremely difficult to “manage” a caseload of many thousands without some kind of electronic system in place, but at the other end of the spectrum it will be hard to justify the cost of a database for just a few hundred records.
In some countries, it is possible to collect detailed data about each child that has experienced one of the four “individual” violation (i.e. abduction, killing and maiming, recruitment and sexual violence), while in others, access and security problems mean that only very limited incident data can be collected (e.g. just the number of children involved). Irrespective of the consequences of the diversity
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for verification decisions, this clearly has major implications for the design of the information system and the kind of outputs (reports) than can be generated (e.g. whether profiles of the children involved can be generated).
3.1.2. Manual (Paper) Information System
Most countries have some type of manual system using paper forms, but their design varies considerably from country to country.
Some have a separate form for each of the six violations, often requiring a considerable amount of detailed information, although it is unclear how many of the fields are regularly completed. Others have focused on having just one simpler “event” based form, sometimes with the option of adding more detail about individual children if this is available.
Some forms are completed when the initial alert is received, some after verification and others incrementally as more information is gathered. In two countries the paper forms are only used as a template or a checklist and the information is actually entered directly into the electronic systems.
In a small number of countries (e.g. Colombia and DRC) a two stage system has been adopted with one simple form for recording the initial alert and a more detailed one for the full documentation and verification. This is particularly useful when different agencies are involved in the process and data needs to be transferred between them.
Les than half the MRM Task Forces were able to provide an estimate of how many staff were involved in data collection (and by implication the entry of data into the paper forms), but the numbers mentioned ranged up to a maximum of 200.
Two thirds of the countries have some way of checking the forms for quality and accuracy, but this is dependent on individual case reviews, sometimes at several levels. In over half the countries cases are regularly referred back to the field so that errors can be corrected or missing data provided. In 3 countries the percentage of referrals was between 10 and 20%, but in another 3 it was 50% or higher.
3.1.3. Electronic Information Systems
13 of the 16 countries use some type of electronic data management system or have one under development. Nine use, or plan to use, a database and four some kind of spreadsheet. Of the other three, Cote d’Ivoire have made use of Microsoft Excel to maintain a simple list of cases and the Philippines are waiting until a decision is made about a global database before moving forward. The following table summarises the current situation.
Database Spreadsheet No Electronic System
Access/Visual Basic Access Excel
DRC, Sri Lanka & (Chad) Afghanistan, Iraq,
(Israel/OPT), Somalia, Sudan & Uganda
Burundi, CAR, Colombia & Nepal,
Cote d’Ivoire, Myanmar & Philippines
3 6 4 3
Countries in parenthesis have yet to implement the electronic system.
All the database applications have made use of Microsoft Access, two of them in combination with Visual Basic to create a more sophisticated “front end” or interface. Seven have been developed “in‐country”, either internally by one of the MRM Task Force partner’s own staff or by short term consultants. The eighth, Sri Lanka, has recently replaced their in‐house database with the Inter Agency Child Protection Database, although the MRM fields are still under development, and Chad are moving in the same direction.
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Most systems (80%) have been “bespoke” (i.e. developed specifically to meet the local Task Force’s own requirements), although four have modelled their systems on something that had been originally developed elsewhere. This “cross fertilisation” has occurred because an individual has moved from one country to another, whether a staff member or a consultant (e.g. the DRC system owed something to the development of the first, aborted database in Sudan and the current development work in Iraq and Israel/OPT draws on aspects of the Sudanese experience). In only one instance was a formal “systems requirements document used.
The way in which these electronic systems have been implemented is of particular importance. Of the 9 countries that responded to this question, six have chosen to centralise their system, hosting it with a single agency in the capital, while three have opted for a decentralised, multi‐agency model. This inevitably has significant implications, both technically and organisationally, for system design and implementation.
The majority of systems have been designed to accommodate all six violations, although in many cases this has not happened in practice and multiple systems have been used alongside each other. Furthermore the data requirements for some of the “less common” violations (e.g. sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, denial of humanitarian access) have been minimal.
Half the countries enter data as soon as they receive any information about an incident, while others wait until the case is fully verified. Where the system has been decentralised, the data is often entered by the monitor, sometimes as an alternative to using a paper form, while the centralised systems are more likely to use specialist data entry staff.
Half the MRM Task Forces indicated that the people responsible for entering data had received specific training on the information system and all of them said that they have or plan to introduce some form of quality assurance, mainly in the form of case reviews.
3.1.4. Outputs Respondents were asked to comment on the reporting capabilities of their systems (manual and electronic), but the responses were fairly limited. This was partly because several countries have yet to develop this part of their systems, but also because this is probably an area of weakness for most information systems.
Most of those with a database claimed that they could search records and produce either standard or bespoke analytical reports, but none appeared capable of generating individual case summaries. Unfortunately no‐one provided examples of their reports, so it was impossible to judge their quality and usefulness. Indeed, many of the explanatory comments in this section seemed to suggest that this was an area that required improvement and in a number of countries the reports were described as “work in progress”.
Those countries using spreadsheets or relying exclusively on manual systems were inevitably less able to analyse the data and produce reports and this was a significant frustration for them.
In over half the countries, these reports were only available to the Co Chairs of the MRM Task Force and to those responsible for drafting the annual reports and horizontal notes. Just three countries indicated that they were or would be circulated to all Task Force members.
3.1.5. System Security
The responses to the questions about system security were very mixed and while there was certainly evidence of good practice, there were also some glaring gaps and little evidence in most countries that a comprehensive security plan had been formulated.
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Three countries reported carrying out a systematic Risk Assessment, but no examples were provided, so it is difficult to judge their quality. Three other countries stated that they were planning to carry out an assessment.
The section covering the security of paper based records revealed considerable diversity in practice. 36% of those responding kept the names and other personal data that could be used to identify children separate from the rest of the monitoring data and 33% used a system of codes to protect sensitive data. The majority (78%) only entered data after they had returned to the office, whether into paper forms or directly into the computer.
The storage of paper records also lacked consistency with only 57% using a locked filing cabinet and less than half having the use of a locked room. Two countries reported that all their paper records were moved to the capital and another two said that they shredded the paper forms once the data had been entered into the electronic system.
As far as the electronic systems were concerned, all but one country used some kind of password protection, but only around 50% allocated a different password to each user or used a hierarchy of access levels (e.g. administrator, data entry, reports, etc). Only one country said that passwords were changed on a regular basis and this was not something that the system itself enforced. Only two systems were able to generate an audit trail to show which individuals had accessed the database or who had made changes to it.
Half the countries had installed the system across their office network, while the others had opted to use a standalone computer, presumably to help enhance data security. Just less than 50% of respondents reported that their electronic system was loaded onto a laptop and three respondents reported that these laptops were taken outside the office without the data being encrypted.
Two countries transfer data via portable media (memory stick or similar) and five use email. All but one of them encrypt the data being transferred.
Only one country has provided specific security training to the staff who use the electronic system and none have implemented audits to check the effectiveness of the security measures they have put in place.
3.1.6. Resourcing 7 countries attempted to answer the questions about resourcing, but the responses are probably too diverse for any meaningful analysis. However it is clear that developing and operating the information system comes with a significant resource cost, probably in excess of $50,000 in most instances. The biggest costs are those involving staff, consultants and training, with the hardware and software of less significance, possibly because they have utilised existing infrastructure. Almost all the technical support costs appear to be subsumed in corporate budgets and very little is externally sourced.
The limitations of this data are not surprising, but given the potential costs involved and the pressures on funding for the MRM and other child protection programmes, there is a strong argument for more rigorous monitoring of costs, especially in relation to the number of cases being reported, which are relatively modest in some countries.
3.1.7. Effectiveness Respondents were also asked to assess the effectiveness of their current information system. These were subjective judgements, in some instances they were based on future plans and expectations rather than current performance and some assessments seemed to be much more generous than
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others! Notwithstanding all these limitations, the comparisons between the different criteria are still useful.
Only four countries attempted an overall assessment of their system’s effectiveness, (1 Good, 1 Fair and 2 Poor), but between 7 and 13 responded to the more detailed questions. These were organised into the three areas identified in section 2.3 above:
a) Supporting Strategic Objectives
The first asked how effectively the IMS supported the MRM’s various strategic objectives.
Overall just 33% of the responses rated the existing systems as Excellent or Good, with the performance of 67% rated as only Fair, Poor or Non Existent. Unsurprisingly the system was considered to be most effective in providing information for MRM Annual Reports and Horizontal Notes (69% Excellent or Good) compared with 45% for Managing Referrals and between 25% and 35% for every other objective except for Managing the MRM itself, where only 8% rated their system Excellent or Good.
Strategic Objective No of Responses Excellent or Good Fair, Poor or Non
Existent Annual Reports & GH Notes 13 69% 31% Advocacy & Action Planning 13 31% 69% Impunity & Accountability 12 25% 75% Immediate Interventions 11 18% 82% Programme Planning 12 33% 67% Referrals 11 45% 55% Long Term Response 11 27% 73% Managing the MRM 12 8% 93%
b) Data Requirements
The second assessment focused on the systems’ ability to capture data about the different aspects of the case and the way in which it was documented:
Categories of Data No of Responses Excellent or Good Fair, Poor or Non
Existent Initial Source of Alert 10 60% 40% Documentation Process 9 67% 33% Verification of the Case 9 33% 67% Incident Summary 9 56% 44% Children’s Details 9 56% 44% Perpetrators’ Details 9 44% 56% Violation Specific Details 8 25% 75% Immediate Interventions Details 8 25% 75% Referral Details 8 38% 62% Long Term Response Details 8 38% 62%
45% of responses rated their systems as Excellent or Good. The highest ratings were given to the details of the Initial Alert or report (60%) and, rather surprisingly, the process by which the case was Documented (67%), although it is possible that this category may have been misunderstood by some respondents. Over 50% rated the Incident Summary and Children’s Details as Excellent or Good, while the systems were rated as least effective in capturing Violation Specific Details and data about any Immediate Interventions (both just 25% Excellent or Good)
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c) Performance
The third assessment focused on the performance of the system against a range of specific criteria:
Performance of the System No of Responses Excellent or Good Fair, Poor or Non
Existent Data Quality 10 60% 40% Data Reliability 9 78% 22% Data Comprehensiveness 9 56% 44% Data Consistency 8 50% 50% Coverage 9 44% 56% Timeliness 9 22% 78% Relevance 9 33% 67% Accessibility 9 22% 78% Value for Money 7 29% 71%
44% of the responses rated the performance of their current systems as Excellent and Good. Respondents rated Data Reliability and Data Quality highest (>60% Excellent or Good). At the other extreme only 22% rated their systems as Excellent or Good in terms of Timeliness (the extent to which the system provides users with access to data and reports at the times when they are needed and the extent to which the data they contain is up to date) and Accessibility (the extent to which data about individual cases and statistical reports are accessible/available to those who need them).
3.1.8. Major Challenges
Respondents were also given an opportunity to add general comments and highlight major challenges. Resourcing, both human and financial, was identified as the biggest challenge by most MRM Task Forces, followed by the lack of specialist information management expertise and the difficulties experienced in getting partners to collaborate and share data. A number also emphasised that their systems were still under development and not yet able to deliver what they needed. Several highlighted the importance of being able to generate statistical analysis, although others placed more emphasis on the qualitative data.
Global partners were also asked to comment on the country‐level information systems, but only two INGO’s provided feedback. They highlighted concerns about system security, the unrepresentative nature of the caseload and the absence of any contextual data. They also argued that many of the information systems lack transparency as far as the agencies providing data are concerned and that this, together with the lack of adequate feedback on the impact of the MRM, could undermine commitment and support for the mechanism in the long term.
3.2. Sudan The MRM consultant visited Sudan for five days in late November 2008. In addition to meeting with partners in Khartoum, he made a short field trip to West Darfur. The summary below also incorporates additional information from Sudan’s response to the IMS questionnaire.
Sudan’s MRM Task Force was established in April 2006 and consists almost exclusively of UN agencies. The complexity of the country’s conflicts and the existence of two UN Peacekeeping Missions (UNMIS and UNAMID) both make for a unique situation. UNICEF and UNMIS‐Child Protection are the Co‐Chairs of the Task Force. UNICEF has taken the lead on information management and database development, while UNMIS‐Child Protection has been responsible for drafting the reports for New York.
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The Task Force has allocated responsibility for each of the six violations to different agencies. UNICEF leads on Recruitment and UNMIS‐CP on Abduction, leaving UNMIS/UNAMID‐Human Rights with responsibility for Killing and Maiming and Sexual Violence. UNDSS was given responsibility for Attacks on Schools and Hospitals, but has rarely provided any data, and OCHA provides an input on the Denial of Humanitarian Access when reports are being prepared. This means that the verification of incidents for the MRM is quite decentralised with at least five agencies involved. This situation may become even more complex once UNAMID’s child protection structure is fully operational and its role within the MRM is clearly defined.
The security situation, especially in Darfur, where most of the current violations are taking place, means that access is extremely limited, even for UN agencies, so documenting and verifying incidents can be extremely challenging. Detailed data about individual children is only very rarely available and it can even be difficult to determine the identity of armed group responsible.
UNICEF employed a consultant in 2005/6 to undertake a feasibility study and develop a detailed monitoring framework and information management plan. Initially this was primarily focused on Recruitment, but the recommendations were also, in principle, relevant to the other five incidents. It was decided that the primary focus would be on incident monitoring, but with the option of including detailed data about the individual children when it was available. In practice there have been very few cases where this optional data has been forthcoming, so only the total number of boys and girls has routinely been captured.
The paper incident monitoring form was shared with UNMIS‐CP and other partners, but there was no requirement on them to use the form provided the basic data was collected. The plan was that the paper forms would be shredded once they had been scanned or the data entered into the database. In practice the paper forms have been used primarily as a template or guide, as most data has been recorded electronically, primarily by UNICEF staff.
An IT consultant was employed to create a simple electronic system to manage this data. He spent approximately six months developing a database using Access and Visual Basic. Unfortunately he left before it was finished and recruiting a replacement proved to be a slow process and this resulted in a further delay of another 6 months. When the new consultant was finally appointed, he decided to start again from scratch rather than try and finish off the original database. He opted to develop this second database using only MS Access because he felt that this would be simpler, would avoid any problems in running the system on Unicef’s IT network and would be easier for other people to modify into the future. This second database was just being rolled out to the UNICEF offices in Darfur at the time of the MRM consultant’s visit and field staff were starting to input data.
The second IT consultant had previously worked on UNICEF’s Underage Recruitment Database in Sri Lanka and used this experience in designing the Sudan system. It incorporates a number of automated routines for checking data quality, spotting inconsistencies and gaps, and these are backed up by a manual review of the data in Khartoum and regular feedback to the field offices.
To date UNICEF field staff in Darfur have entered data directly into their own copies of the database which are then consolidated in Khartoum to produce the national overview. Incidents are entered into the system by the monitoring staff themselves as soon as the initial alert is received and further information is added as and when it becomes available. The system can be used to manage the documentation process and flag up the need for follow‐up work on cases that are pending verification.
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Information about incidents monitored by other agencies has been passed to UNICEF in Khartoum and then entered into the central copy of the database. For instance UNAMIS‐CP has historically recorded cases in their weekly reports, which are largely descriptive in nature. UNICEF stated that picking out the relevant data to “feed” the database had been relatively straightforward for “incident‐based” monitoring, but might be more challenging if detailed data about individual children became available.
The initial decision to create a database was driven by UNICEF management’s desire to analyse the data and generate some simple tables and graphs to support local advocacy work. However, the reporting functions of the database are still under development and so could not be evaluated during the field work. The fact that this is still “work in progress” illustrates that achieving a fully functional database at the field level can be a very lengthy process, even for a relatively simple event‐based system of this kind. It is hoped to eventually incorporate a GIS (Geographical Information System) component in the database so that users can view data in a map format.
The Sudanese government’s reaction to the indictment of President Bashir by the International Criminal Court in The Hague has also had an impact on the development of the system. It proved necessary to remove the database from field offices for a number of months and the experience of both UN and NGO partners highlighted the importance of ensuring the highest possible levels of security. The data held in the system is encrypted and there is password protection linked to differential access levels. Data being transferred from the field to Khartoum for consolidation and is exported in the form of an Excel spreadsheet. Data security is provided by encryption with the use of codes to represent key fields
The eventual aim is that the database will be fully decentralised. Initially this has only happened within UNICEF, but there are now plans to install the system in the UNAMIS‐CP field offices. Discussions about whether and how it will be implemented within UNAMID‐CP are still on‐going. Of crucial importance will be how this decentralisation is structured; whether there is just one copy of the database in each location, hosted by a “lead agency”, or if each agency has its own copy. The former makes it easier to identify duplicate cases and generate an overview of the caseload at field level, but means that agencies will not have immediate access to their own cases and may be tempted to create parallel information systems, increasing workloads and undermining their commitment to the central database.
It has been difficult to pin down exactly how many cases have been reported and verified by the MRM in Sudan. During the November visit figures of 200+ cases and 600 children were quoted, but the questionnaire completed in June reported around 500 violations. On the other hand a more detailed analysis of data exported from the database in November revealed a total of 156 incidents involving 379 children. The variances illustrate just how difficult it is to generate reliable and consistent statistics without a robust information system, especially where different figures can often be used interchangeably (e.g. events, violations and children).
The detailed analysis of the exported data revealed that Recruitment was by far the biggest category (35% of incidents and 59% of children), but Killing and Maiming (23% and 23% respectively), Sexual Violence (24% and 10%) and Abduction (9% and 8%) were also significant. The data recorded against each incident was fairly limited, partly because many were old cases from the period before the database was fully implemented. Apart from a short description of what happened, there were basic details of the initial alert (date, type, category and sex of source, name of reporting agency and reliability), the incident itself (date, location, number and sex of the children affected, name of perpetrator group and violation type) and whether the case had been verified for inclusion in the MRM. The incident data was fairly comprehensive, but the details of the source of the alert were
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often incomplete and the consent field was blank in the majority of cases, presumably because there was no direct engagement with the children involved.
It had originally been planned to share a summary analysis of the caseload with the government as part of the MRM’s advocacy strategy. In the end the deteriorating political and security situation meant this was not possible, but the database does have the capacity to record a public summary of each case that can be used for advocacy work. This is prepared centrally in Khartoum, where they remove any sensitive data or personal details that could put individuals at risk. This may be a practical approach with the current number of new cases (circa 10/12 per month), but could become more difficult if numbers increase significantly.
The MRM database is being implemented alongside a number of other information systems that handle similar data. As has already been mentioned, information management within the two peace keeping missions is based upon regular descriptive reports that are produced for internal use and cover a wide range of topics. In addition to MRM violations, they also report on DDR, Juvenile Justice and training activities undertaken by the Child Protection Advisers (CPA’s). The section on grave violations includes a fairly detailed series of questions covering the new reports received, investigations carried out, additional information received, follow‐up activities undertaken and future plans, but there is no standardisation in the format of the answers, making quantitative analysis impossible. While UNMIS‐CP is now planning to use the MRM database, this will presumably be in addition to, rather in place of, their weekly reports.
There will also need to be agreement on the protocols for accessing data gathered by UNMIS‐HR about Killing and Maiming and Sexual Violence. This may be more difficult due to concerns about the confidentiality of data, especially when UNAMIS‐HR implement the OHCHR database.
The Inter‐Agency Child Protection Database was first implemented in northern Sudan in 2004. It was originally planned that the database would be used on an inter‐agency basis to support family tracing and reintegration activities for CAAFAG, with UNICEF consolidating the data in Khartoum to generate a nationwide analysis. For a number of reasons this objective wasn’t fully realised and eventually Save the Children assumed responsibility for coordination. SCUK actually had two version of the database, one inherited from Unicef with a largely dormant caseload of 900 children dating back to 2005 and another that was being used to support its UNHCR funded work with around 200 vulnerable children living in and around Khartoum. At the time of the consultant’s visit database management capacity within SCUK was limited and it seemed that relatively little use was being made of either database.
The government of Sudan was unwilling to share its CAAFAG data with INGO’s and so decided against using the IACPD. Instead it developed a new database specifically designed for the DDR programme with an Arabic interface.
Finally, while security and access were both major challenges for the MRM, one of the common themes to emerge from the Sudan visit was the impact of resourcing constraints. This was primarily a human resource issue with insufficient staff in the field and a lack of continuity in Khartoum, especially on the IT side. It also appeared that liaison between the key partners was stronger at the Khartoum level than in the field, where staff we less aware of the MRM and their role in its implementation.
3.3. DRC DRC is another country with a UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC), but has adopted a quite different approach to both monitoring and information management than in Sudan.
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The main focus of the conflict is in the east of the country and, like Sudan, it is physically very remote from the capital. The national MRM Task Force contains more NGO participation than in Sudan with three INGO’s and one NNGO, but MONUC and UNICEF are the central players. UNICEF has seconded a staff member who works within MONUC and plays an important role in drafting the reports for New York. There are also two regional 1612 groups, one in Uvira and another being established in Bunia, while in Goma and Bukavu the Protection Coordination Meetings, chaired by UNICEF provide a forum for discussing MRM activities.
In contrast with Sudan, most of the cases involving the four “individual” violations are documented on the basis of interviews with the children involved or an adult caregiver and hence include a much greater level of detail. This is partly because the largest proportion of cases involves recruitment violations which are documented retrospectively when the child is released through the DDR process or otherwise leaves the armed group. While this certainly ensures robust verification and comprehensive documentation, it can mean considerable time lags in the monitoring compared with countries that concentrate on what might be regarded as real time monitoring.
Some cases are identified directly by MONUC’s own Child Protection Advisers, but many are channelled through a network of NGO’s and other local partners. They use a relatively simple two page form to record the basic details of the incident. The same form is used for all six violations and apart from details of the date, location, type of violation and basic profiling data, its main focus is an open ended description of the incident.
This form is passed to MONUC at the field level; who are then responsible for verification and in most cases will revisit and interview the key informants. The CPA’s use a second electronic format (an excel spreadsheet) to record the details of each verified case. There is a different “verification” form for each violation, but the overall format is fairly consistent. They concentrate on three main areas:
Event Details (Date, Location, Brief Description and Source – Organisation), Profiling Data for the Child (age, sex, nationality, ethnicity and violation specific data) Perpetrator Details (name, group and details of any arrest, trial, sentence and judicial follow‐up)
Most of the form consists of Yes/No answers. This helps ensure a standardised response and allows the CPA’s to select multiple options, but allows for little qualitative information. There are a small number of fields into which the CPA’s can type more detailed descriptive information, but the formatting only displays the first few words of each entry, so it is unclear how much these are used. It may be that the CPA’s standard weekly reports are used for recording the more substantive qualitative information.
The strong focus on capturing the details of any legal action taken against the alleged perpetrators (largely dates and Yes/No answers) is the most unusual characteristic of these forms and reflects the priority MONUC allocates to addressing impunity and accountability on an individual basis. At present very little data about legal action is actually collected, so for most cases these fields remain blank. They would like to see this given more priority into the future, but this will be dependent on their success in bringing perpetrators to justice. DRC appears to be the only country where data about legal action is included in the information system in this way.
It is also important to note that these internal MONUC forms distinguish between mandatory and optional fields. Only around 20% of the fields are mandatory and most of these relate to the event or incident (Location, Date and Source). Only two pieces of data about the child are mandatory (Sex and Age) and just one about the perpetrator out of a total of 19 (the name of the armed group).
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Once completed, these verification forms are emailed in an encrypted form to the MONUC HQ in Kinshasa where they are printed out and the data transcribed into the database. At present this is a manual process, but there are plans to automate data transfer when the system is upgraded.
The development of the database, which has been given the title “Mauve”, was funded by UNICEF. It uses Access for the database itself and Visual Basic for the frontend or user interface. The development work was carried out by the IT consultant who had previously been responsible for the first, unfinished Sudan database. He used a similar developmental approach, but with a much greater focus on the individual child. The data entry screens replicate the fields used for the verification forms and the overall user friendliness of the system is quite impressive.
The system can generate a number of standard reports which can be exported into Excel for enhanced formatting. At present these reports are primarily Event and Child focused, but there are plans to increase the number of Perpetrator‐related reports later in the autumn.
Database implementation is highly centralised with the only operational copy of the system loaded onto a single standalone computer in MONUC’s Kinshasa office with just one person responsible for data entry and system management. The system’s analytical reports are circulated internally within MONUC and some of the information is used in the preparation of external reports (i.e. for New York), but the database reports themselves are not currently shared with any other Task Force partners. While this guarantees a high level of data security, it also leads to frustration among other agencies who feel the system lacks transparency and that its potential as a tool for advocacy and programme planning is not effectively exploited.
While all the cases verified by MONUC are entered into the database, other incidents which are verified by UNICEF and Save the Children, especially those involving cases of sexual violence, seem to be handled differently. The details of these incidents, some of which are identified by UNICEF’s Implementing Partners in the East, are forwarded directly to Kinshasa through the agencies’ own channels and are fed directly into the drafting of annual reports and horizontal notes without necessarily being entered into the database itself.
A training programme for field staff involved in the implementation of the MRM was provided in 2007, with refresher courses in 2008. The programme covered specific elements of information management, including how to complete the initial documentation form, as well as more general background details about the MRM and the monitoring process.
3.4. Sri Lanka
The third field visit which took place in January 2009 provided another interesting contrast. The Task Force contains both UN and NGO partners, but uniquely also includes two organisations with links to the government. However there is no UN Peacekeeping Mission or significant OHCHR presence in Sri Lanka, so the Task Force has access to less specialist human rights monitoring capacity than is normally the case. This means that UNICEF has had to take on the main leadership role for the MRM while at the same time trying to maintain a developmental relationship with the government in the areas of the country not affected by the conflict.
The Task Force has allocated lead responsibility for the violations to UNICEF (Abduction, Killing and Maiming, Recruitment and Attacks on Schools and Hospitals) and UNHCR (Sexual Violence and Denial of Humanitarian Access). To date there have been no cases of Sexual Violence and very few involving the Denial of Humanitarian Access, so almost all the incidents have been channelled through Unicef.
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They have developed a detailed manual form for each violation and these are completed in the field, primarily by UNICEF’s own staff after they have completed the first stage of the verification process. Final verification decisions have been centralised in Colombo. Initially these were made by the Task Force itself, but in 2008 responsibility for verification was delegated to a Technical Working Group and in May 2009 a protocol was agreed that gave this responsibility to UNICEF.
The main focus of monitoring has historically been on Recruitment and this is something that predates the MRM. UNICEF developed an in‐house Underage Recruitment database using Microsoft Access back in 2003. In contrast with the approach adopted in DRC, the monitoring was based on information provided by family members and the database was used in support of UNICEF’s advocacy efforts to secure the release of children by the LTTE and later by the Karuna Faction. The database generated lists of children that were used in regular meetings with the armed groups together with basic analytical reports in the form of tables and graphs.
The Underage Recruitment Database has only been used to record recruitment violations, so UNICEF has also made use of Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for data relating to the other three violations for which it is responsible.
UNHCR do not have manual forms or an electronic system to help monitor Denial of Humanitarian Access. The details of incidents are normally recorded in Sit Reps and are then incorporated into their regular protection reports. None of the data is suited to quantitative analysis. They do find the task of searching out relevant data for 1612 reports a time consuming process and believe that a database could help in overcoming this problem, although the number of cases is fairly small and a simple list might be more appropriate.
While the Underage Recruitment database was helpful in supporting advocacy and negotiations with the armed groups, UNICEF became increasingly frustrated by the lack of any effective linkages with the response and reintegration programmes being coordinated by Save the Children. As a consequence they eventually decided to replace it with the Inter Agency Child Protection Database. This change was underway at the time of the consultant’s visit in January. The data had been transferred into the new database and the system was being installed in UNICEF and Save the Children’s field offices, although modifying the system to accommodate the other 5 MRM violations was still “work in progress”.
The intention is that the new database will be operated on a decentralised basis, allowing field staff to enter data directly into the system with consolidation taking place in Colombo. This is an important issue for Sri Lanka as the earlier system had involved the use of manual forms at field level and several years ago, for security reasons, it was decided to move all this documentation to Colombo for safe keeping. This created real difficulties for field staff that needed access to case data on a regular basis. Scanning documents and making them available online was a very time consuming and cumbersome solution. The data for new cases and updates for existing cases that were generated in the field also created problems with the risk that manual data about cases could end up being held in two places at the same time.
The new database will be shared by UNICEF and Save the Children and will be used to support both monitoring (MRM violations) and case management (reintegration support). Unicef also place see the statistical tables and graphs as being important both for advocacy and their work with funders who want to see evidence of the need and what is being delivered.
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3.5. Nepal
Nepal was not visited as part of this consultancy, but an earlier review carried out for UNICEF’s Regional Office for South Asia (ROSA) provided some useful evidence for this piece of work.
Nepal’s MRM Task Force was established in late 2005 and was co‐chaired by UNICEF and OHCHR, who had a major presence in the country. The limited UN Peacekeeping Mission was established at a much later date and only joined the Task Force after the system had been established. Most of the monitoring in Nepal has been undertaken by NGO’s and they make up 60% of the Task Force membership. The monitoring system is highly decentralised with preliminary verification decisions being made at District level by the monitoring agencies. Ultimate responsibility for information management has rested with OHCHR, who consolidate all the data, check for duplicates and go back to the field to fill any gaps in the documentation. OHCHR were also responsible for confirming the verification decisions for all the cases.
UNICEF secured funding for two Nepali NGO’s who have documented roughly two thirds of the incidents. To help them manage this caseload, UNICEF recruited a secondee from their Sri Lanka office to develop a simple Access database. Data was entered into the database at District level and then consolidated at national level, first by the individual NGO’s and then by UNICEF. The database was developed very quickly in matter of weeks and there was no time to incorporate any analytical reporting capabilities. However the data collected was in a standardised format and the analysis carried out during the ROSA review provided some very valuable insights.
Unfortunately this database was not used by the other NGO’s involved in the monitoring and OHCHR opted to use a spreadsheet to collect and consolidate the data. This meant that the data from the UNICEF database had to be exported into an Excel spreadsheet before it could be integrated with the rest of the caseload. The OHCHR spreadsheet was really just an electronic list and there were no controls on the format of the data being entered into it, so the quality was very variable and it was impossible to sort, search or analyse the caseload. There was a separate spreadsheet for each of the six MRM violations, which mirroring the UNICEF database, although there were significant differences between the data fields themselves. The spreadsheet was also very cumbersome and extracting information for reports was effectively a manual process.
All the Task Force members were frustrated by the information system and their inability to make effective use of the data. Consequently they decided to develop a new database that would be used by all of them. They commissioned a Nepali IT consultant to develop the database. The design was based primarily on the existing manual data forms but there was no specification document and hence no clarity about the system’s objectives and what outputs were required.
Many of the fields in the UNICEF database and the OHCHR spreadsheet were routinely left blank due to a lack of data and this was a cause of frustration for the agencies involved. Despite this experience, they actually increased the number of fields in the new database,
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which risked exacerbating the problem. This is a not unusual when systems are reviewed and updated as there is always an extra piece of information that people fell might be useful.
In the circumstances the consultant did a good technical job and the database, when seen in its “beta” version, looked to be a significant step forward. Transferring data from the UNICEF database and the OHCHR spreadsheet provided difficult. Each agency was asked to check the accuracy of their own data and this highlighted lots of problems, especially where OHCHR had made changes without informing the NGO responsible for documenting the case. In the end it was decided to abandon the new database and revert to the spreadsheet. This decision needs to be viewed in the context of the evolving situation in Nepal because the new system had been developed at a time when the conflict appeared to be coming to an end and the focus was starting to switch towards post conflict transition. There had also been a long running concern about the links between the MRM and the CAAFAG programme that was primarily concerned with reintegration and the absence of an effective referral mechanism. This was overcome by developing closer collaboration between the MRM and CAAFAG groups, who decided to start using the Inter‐ Agency Child Protection database to manage their caseload.
3.6. Somalia
The final case study focuses on Somalia. Once again this was not visited as part of the consultancy, but the consultant provided some advice on their information system and database during 2007.
Somalia is an interesting case study for two reasons. Firstly, the security situation means that the international agencies have been forced to base themselves in Nairobi and so do not have a permanent presence in the country itself. Secondly the MRM has been integrated into the wider human right monitoring regime covering adults as well as children.
Most of the monitoring has been carried out by Somali CBO’s, many of whom have been supported by Oxfam/Novib. Up until 2007 they used a fairly unstructured paper form to collect the data. It contained very few multiple choice or tick box questions, so the monitors were able to record data in any format they wished. The form also contained some composite questions where effectively several different questions had been combined into one (e.g. age, sex and the number of victims) but without the structure needed to ensure consistency. There were also a number of logical inconsistencies in the form and in one or two of the more structured questions the monitors were able to enter mutually incompatible answers.
They initially decided to use Huridocs, an open source Human Rights database to store and analyse the data. This is a generic piece of software and users are able to modify it as they wish. The Task Force engaged a local programmer to undertake this work, but the result proved very unsatisfactory. In common with the manual data collection form, most of the fields allowed the data clerk complete freedom (i.e. there were no menus or look‐up tables), so the resulting data could not be effectively sorted or analysed. The arrangements for data entry were also excessively complicated with several linked screens which required some data to be entered several times with no mechanism for identifying errors or inconsistencies. The layout and functionality of the data entry screens was poor and the modifications to the
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original Huridocs database had undermined the stability of the software and resulted in repeated runtime errors which crashed the system.
After assessments undertaken by UNHCR and UNICEF it was decided to abandon the Huridocs Database and UNHCR’s Somalia office offered to develop a replacement. At the same time the Task Force developed new paper data collection form. Both new manual and electronic systems were a considerable improvement on the earlier versions, but still not without their problems. They contained many more controlled questions with a limited number of potential answers and a more logical layout, but they were still quite detailed and, based on the data collected prior to 2007, it was unclear whether the monitors would be able to provide what was required. The database took much longer to develop than originally anticipated and still hadn’t been fully implemented by mid‐2008 leading to considerable frustration. The design was also based primarily on the structure of the paper form and so was effectively “data‐led” as no systems requirements document was produced to guide the process.
3.7. Common Issues at the Country Level
Information Management is clearly a major challenge for all the MRM Task Forces. Despite a very considerable investment of human and financial resources and some examples of good practice, many remain frustrated that their systems are not delivering what they need. In considering the best way forward, it will be crucial to understand why this is the case.
Based on all the evidence gathered during the consultancy it is possible to identify a number of key issues at the country level that underlie these problems and that will be critical for the design and effectiveness of any future information management system. These include:
3.7.1. Monitoring Arrangements
Firstly, the way in which monitoring takes place varies enormously from country to country. This is primarily because the conflicts are all different and this impacts on things like security and access which are crucial for monitoring. However the mix of agencies involved in each Task Force, the lack of detailed guidance (e.g. how the minimum dataset should be interpreted) have also contributed to the degree of diversity. The most important factors from the perspective of information management are:
Whether most violations are monitored in real time (i.e. when they happen) or retrospectively when all the relevant details are likely to be available (e.g. after children are released by an armed group).
Whether comprehensive personal details are available for all the children affected or if access and security mean that only “event” level data is collected for some incidents.
Whether the same agency documents and verifies each incident or if responsibility passes from the documenting agency to the verifying one. If the latter, information management will be much more complicated.
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How many agencies are involved in documenting and verifying incidents and whether verification decisions are centralised or decentralised. If the latter, the verification itself will need to be recorded in the information system.
Whether all the documentation and verification takes place at the same time or whether information is gathered incrementally. If the latter, this will require a more sophisticated information system.
Whether focal agencies have been given responsibility for each violation and, if so, how this impacts on information management (are they all using their own internal information systems, how do they transfer data into the MRM system.
How the MRM monitoring interfaces with other child protection activities, including response and reintegration programmes, the monitoring of non‐MRM violations and even adult human rights violations. This varies considerably depending on the makeup of the Task Force (e.g. where programmatically orientated agencies are more significant, greater priority is given to managing referrals and to links with service providers).
The 16 countries currently implementing the MRM include examples of all these alternatives, so their information systems will reflect this diversity.
3.7.2. System Development
While there is considerable diversity in the information systems being used and their level of sophistication, there a number of common factors that emerge from the mapping:
Very few Task Forces have access to specialist information or data management expertise (as distinct from IT professionals). As a consequence most systems lack a strategic focus and are developed incrementally in response to evolving needs. In most cases this means that they are “data led” and give insufficient attention to the overarching objectives of the system and the outputs that are needed. This means that many systems are primarily repositories of data with weak reporting and data manipulation capabilities and this leads to frustration, because many fail to meet users’ needs and expectations.
Resources for system development are often very limited and as a consequence there is reliance for any database development on internal IT staff from one or more of the MRM agencies who have to integrate this work with their other in‐house priorities, which can mean very slow progress. Other Task Forces utilise short term IT consultants for system development, but recruitment can be very long winded and continuity can be a big problem.
There is evidence from a number of countries that some systems have been abandoned in favour of a “fresh start”, either because the first one failed to deliver what was required or because a new person has taken over with new ideas, possibly based upon their experience in another country. In the absence of a standard model for the information system, an individual’s personal preferences can have a disproportionate influence on design, which, given rapid staff turnover, can be disruptive.
System development, especially when a database is involved, can be a lengthy process. It can sometimes take a couple of years before something acceptable is in place, which in an
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emergency can be very frustrating and is clearly not in the best interests of the children affected by the conflict.
3.7.3. System Architecture and Implementation
Most Task Forces utilise both manual and electronic systems for managing their data.
There is a wide diversity of manual data collection forms. This is partly a response to how the monitoring is organised, but also the lack of clear guidance. All the systems provide an opportunity to record a general description of the incident, but they also include a range of specific questions. Some require monitors to select their answers from a list of alternatives, but most are open ended. There is also evidence that many of the questions on the more detailed forms are only answered in a minority of cases, making any quantitative analysis of the data problematic.
Some Task Forces have a different form for each of the 6 violations, but there is considerable overlap in the questions, although the actual layout of the forms can be quite different and sometimes confusing. Even where there are forms for each violation, they are not always utilised as some agencies will prefer to use their own internal systems.
Most Task Forces have chosen to develop and use some form of electronic system for managing their data. Some systems are used exclusively by the lead agency for information management in the capital and everything else is done manually, while others are highly decentralised both geographically and organisationally (multiple agencies hosting the system) with consolidation taking place nationally.
Some systems have better data manipulation and reporting capabilities than others, but overall the outputs of systems are less than might be expected and it is difficult to say that the investment has generated the best value possible
3.7.4. System Security
Security of data and protecting the identity of children and all those involved in the MRM is of crucial importance, both as a moral imperative and also to give people the confidence to report violations. Hence this has been a major focus for the mapping and once again there is considerable diversity in the approach currently being used.
A strategic approach to security planning for information management is relatively rare and very few countries have undertaken a systematic risk assessment. As a consequence there is a mixture of good practice and serious weaknesses. This applies to both manual and electronic systems.
No security system is foolproof, but the human element is just as important as the technical side of things. Hence it is worrying that very few countries provide training for their staff in how to maintain the security of their information systems and security audits to test their robustness are very rare.
Paper‐based systems are particularly vulnerable, especially where documentation is held at the field level by non‐UN partners. Some Task Forces have addressed this issue by opting to enter all data directly into an electronic system.
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Few countries have a security plan that provides guidance in how to respond to an emergency evacuation, especially where a multi‐agency response would be required.
3.8. Global information Management
At the global level the MRM information system is largely focused around the annual reports and horizontal notes that are submitted by each country. While the Draft Guidelines lay down a general format for these reports, each country uses its own distinctive approach. The reports are largely descriptive with brief case studies and examples to illustrate key points in the text, but they do not normally include any systematic analysis of the caseload.
The reports provided by each Country Task Force are reviewed and revised in New York and on a number of occasions the OSRSG‐CAAC has challenged the quality of the underlying data and whether the verification has been sufficiently robust. Resolving these problems appears to rely on undertaking a detailed examination of individual cases as there is currently no systematic way of documenting or interrogating the verification process.
The diversity of practice at the country level and the lack of a common dataset mean that it is not possible to consolidate data at the global level, to make comparisons between different countries or to identify trends over time. This is not something that the OSRSG‐CAAC consider worthwhile or legitimate, but other MRM partners are clearly frustrated by absence of any of quantitative analysis. This is a key issue for the consultancy and is explored in more detail later in the report.
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4. OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS & DATABASES
Many other information systems and databases are being used to support both human rights monitoring and emergency child protection programmes. Some are agency specific while others have been developed on an inter‐agency basis or are available as shareware. It is not possible to describe them all in detail, so the focus here is on those currently being used by MRM partners that are potential sources of data for the MRM or offer useful insights into the challenges likely to be faced in developing a more standardised MRM information system.
4.1. OHCHR Global Human Rights Database
In recent years OHCHR has invested heavily in the development of a Global Human Rights Monitoring Database for their country offices. This has been done with the aim of encouraging greater standardisation and consistency in the way monitoring takes place in the field and to improve levels of data security.
It is essentially a case management system that is used by field staff to support their day to day work and consequently contains considerable levels of detail about each incident and all the interventions and actions taken to address the individual violations involved.
To achieve greater consistency they have, wherever possible, used data fields with a limited number of predefined options. This has required them to develop a controlled vocabulary for the database with a very explicit definition for each option. Most of the vocabulary has been developed at the global level, but inevitably some things (e.g. geographical definitions, the names of armed groups, etc.) are country specific.
To support the database they have developed a standard data collection form, or more accurately, a suite of forms, which also help to ensure consistency. These include a Case Summary, which excludes any personal data, a separate Personal Data sheet that is completed for each witness, victim and source, an Interview form for each witness, victim or source, a Perpetrator sheet, an Information and Analysis sheet which is used to synthesise all the evidence and assess the case against the relevant legal instruments, and finally a Follow‐Up form.
Data is entered onto the paper forms and into the database incrementally as the investigation and subsequent interventions progress, so the electronic records contain both verified and non‐verified cases. They aim for consistent verification standards across all countries, although they recognise that local circumstances will sometimes make this difficult and some flexibility will be needed. They also see a value in retaining unverified cases in the information system to help provide a context within which the verified cases can be interpreted.
Each user of the database has their own individual password and the system has provision for different access levels with the ability to hide sensitive data from some users.
Each country has its own free‐standing version of the database. They make no attempt to consolidate the data regionally or globally and feel that country‐based staff are best placed to
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make the judgements needed to protect the confidentiality of victims and informants as they have a clearer understanding of the local situation.
The database has comprehensive search and filtering capabilities and can be used to generate basic analytical reports, although these are of less importance than its case management functions.
The database can be filtered to create lists of cases involving minors (<18 years), but OHCHR would not normally share this data with other agencies and certainly would not allow any personal data to be transferred into another database.
4.2. OHCHR Special Procedures Database
OHCHR have another human rights database which is used to support their Special Procedures section in Geneva. In contrast to the Global HR database, this is only used in Geneva and contains details of the cases being handled by the Special Rapporteurs for the different rights violations.
Most of the cases are not confidential as the victims want their cases raised with the relevant government and the details are published online in the Rapporteurs’ communication reports. Where they do need to conceal the identity of an individual (e.g. a minor) they either use the first name only or the initials.
The database fulfils a fairly simple case management function. It contains the basic details of the complainant and a description of the alleged violation together with details of any letters written by the Rapporteurs or responses received from the governments involved (scanned copies of these documents are included as attachments).
The system can be used to record incidents involving several individuals and multiple violations, but there does not appear to be a clear hierarchy as far as the data is concerned (i.e. whether the individual comes before the violation or vice versa). However the fairly simple functionality of the system means that this is probably not a particular problem
Data entry is handled by just two staff in Geneva and the main users of the system are the Rapporteurs when they are writing letters or preparing reports. The database has search and filtering capabilities, but is not used to generate statistical reports and no systematic analysis of the caseload is undertaken.
4.3. ICRC Database
ICRC’s information management system and database have been developed over an extended period and have been well resourced.
Once again the database is primarily used for case management and contains the details of every action taken by ICRC/CICR and every contact they have with the victim/survivor. In common with many other agencies involved in human rights monitoring they focus on incidents as well as individuals, but even with their many years of experience, deciding what constitutes an incident can sometimes be difficult (e.g. if a patient is killed when an ambulance is attacked, is the incident the killing of the patient, the attack on the ambulance or the bombing of the village during which the ambulance was attacked).
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They have strict criteria for the verification of cases and the information system reflects this, but they also accept that these have to be interpreted differently in each country depending on the local situation. The database has a certain amount of flexibility and can be adapted to local circumstances, but all the customisation is done in Geneva by their specialist IT staff so they can keep control and ensure consistency.
Confidentiality is a key priority and no personal details that could be used to identify the victim are entered into the database. They are held instead in a paper file which is shredded as soon as practically possible in sensitive or vulnerable areas and certainly once the case is closed.
Their primary focus is on individual cases, but they will also group cases together to highlight systemic issues. The database can be used to sort and filter cases and to generate simple reports, but statistical analysis is not a high priority for them and the database has not been developed to generate sophisticated reports.
They repatriate all the electronic records to Geneva for storage, but do not attempt to make comparisons between countries or consolidate statistics as they believe each situation is completely different and the number of cases recorded will also be dependent on the capacity of the delegation in each country.
In their experience, adequate resourcing (both financial and human, at the field level is of crucial importance in ensuring effective management of the system and particularly in maintaining data quality and consistency.
4.4. Huridocs Human Rights Database
Turning away from the UN system, the Huridocs Database developed by Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems International, a Human Rights networking organisation based in Geneva provides an open source solution for NGO Human Rights agencies.
Once again it is essentially a case management system that revolves around the relationship between events and individuals, be they victims, perpetrators, informants or those responsible for humanitarian interventions. It has been developed in Microsoft Access and can be downloaded direct from their website.
In principle, the fairly complex system of relationships between the different events and individuals should make it possible to capture a very detailed picture of the evolving investigations and responses, but the complexity also creates problems and the main value of the database seems to be the storage and retrieval of large quantities of data, as opposed to its manipulation and analysis. The interface is also rather awkward and makes navigation around the system difficult.
It is possible to search and filter the records using multiple criteria and there is a statistical option in the menu, but the reporting capabilities seem to be fairly limited.
It is possible to modify the standard data entry screens and the drop‐down menus, so some customisation of the main system is allowed, but it also possible for developers to make more fundamental changes to the core system, as happened in Somalia, but this is always likely to
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be a high risk strategy, especially if relatively inexperienced technicians are working without adequate resources and back‐up.
While the system probably fulfils a valuable case management function for some organisations it is not well suited to monitoring and illustrates the potential risks of allowing uncontrolled modifications.
4.5. UNHCR/UNFPA GBV Monitoring System
UNHCR, in collaboration with UNFPA, have created a global system for monitoring Gender‐based Violence which is used by a large number of their country offices.
The system uses a comprehensive manual form for data collection, which is effectively an initial interview form. It captures data covering several different areas, including the source of the report, survivor information, details of the incident, perpetrator information and planned action or referrals. It also has a section that requires the interviewer to make an assessment of the survivor’s emotional state and safety needs and space for the survivor or guardian to confirm their consent to sharing their data anonymously.
A large proportion of the questions have a limited range of fixed options, but there is also an opportunity for the interviewer to enter a description of the incident and to add explanatory notes where appropriate. The lists of alternative answers are pre‐defined globally for all the key data fields, but there is an opportunity for each country to customise other fields that are considered less crucial for global monitoring (e.g. the location of the incident, the occupation of the perpetrator and the details of any referral appointment). The customisable sections of the form are clearly identified in the global template.
Some of the data from the manual form is entered into an electronic data management system. The focus of this system is exclusively on statistical analysis, so they only transfer the data from questions that can be analysed in this way (i.e. those with the globally determined options). The exclusive focus on statistical analysis as opposed to case management or individual case profiles has led them to use a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet rather than a database. Data is entered into a single worksheet with the majority of fields using drop‐down menus, but has the ability to generate 12 standardised tabular reports, all of which can be customised by using a range of filters, together with two simple graphs.
The spreadsheet based system has the advantage of being simple to operate and suitable for field staff with relatively limited IT knowledge or resources, while still being capable of delivering useful outputs. The reports are immediately available, cover all the major areas that they require and could be expanded if further analysis is required. The use of globally defined options for all the key questions enables them to keep control of the system and prevent individuals undermining the system’s functionality by adding an excessive number of options or ones that overlap or conflict with each other.
Geneva provides field staff with very clear definitions for the key options which also help ensure consistency. This also gives them the opportunity to integrate data from different countries and generate comparative statistics at the global level, although these figures will need to be carefully interpreted to take into account the diversity at field level.
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The system benefits from the fact that they are monitoring just one violation and consistent profiling data is gathered through 1:1 interviews with the victim/survivor. They use a limited number of sub‐categories for GBV, ranging from Rape to FGM, but they keep things simple by only recording one sub‐category for each violation. This is made possible by adopting a hierarchical approach in which Rape is considered the most serious violation, followed by Sexual Assault, etc and they focus on the most serious sub‐category that applies.
The electronic system also benefits from the fact that it has just one focus: statistical analysis, but this means that they need to retain paper documentation at the field level to support the work with each individual survivor, so they need to ensure adequate security for these manual records.
The system incorporates data on both adults and children and is concerned with all GBV violations and not just those that are conflict‐related. In a number of countries UNHCR or UNFPA have delegated responsibility for Sexual Violence monitoring within the MRM and hence are likely to be using the Excel system to manage their data. It will therefore be important to ensure that as far as possible categories and sub‐categories used by any MRM system are compatible.
4.6. IMSMA Mine Action Database
IMSMA or the International Management System for Mine Action is a database developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). It has been adopted by the UN and is widely used to support demining programmes around the world.
The first version of the software was implemented in Kosovo in 1999 and the system has been continuously upgraded over the last 10 years. There are now two versions: IMSMA Legacy and IMSMA NG (New Generation). Both combine a relational database and a GIS and use commercially available software, including ArcView.
They are both classified as decision support tools, which equates to a case management database in child protection terms, and are designed to provide direct operational support to de‐mining programmes. IMSMA Legacy is the older and more prescriptive of the two systems as it assumes a particular approach to de‐mining in which the various processes are structured as a single linear process and the main data fields are predetermined.
The lack of flexibility in IMSMA Legacy led to the creation of lots of add‐ons (customised tables, forms and queries) to meet individual requirements. Legacy is still supported, but is now being replaced by the newer IMSMA NG which is more flexible and can be customised locally to meet the needs of whatever approach is being used by the partners involved. Data fields are defined by the users at country level.
The database is able to capture data about hazards (i.e. UXO’s, minefields, etc), demining and hazard reduction activities (e.g. technical surveys, marking and clearance), accidents, victims, mine risk education activities and quality assurance/quality control activities. The system essentially has three main functions:
Data Entry – with the potential of the user to define the data fields they require. The system can also be used to generate manual data collection forms.
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Data Validation – with the potential for customising data validation rights (i.e. deciding who can validate data before it becomes part of the database)
Data Search and Reporting – with the potential to export data in *.csv format, ODBC and ArcGIS connectivity and i‐report.
It is possible to configure access levels so that verification can only be carried out by a limited number of users, while data entry is extended to a wider number of individuals. Unverified cases are held on the “workbench” until verified.
The GIS component of IMSMA allows users to display everything that is geo‐coded in map form, which is clearly of crucial operational importance given the nature of their work.
The system has clearly benefited from significant investment and development over the last 10 years and is now a powerful and sophisticated tool. It is provided free of charge to users, but clearly requires significant levels of IT support and resourcing at field level. Users require adequate training in order to make use of all its facilities and this can sometimes be a challenge.
As indicated above, IMSMA is a decision support tool designed to assist in implementing mine action programmes at field level. Hence its main strengths lie in storing and providing access to comprehensive data about this work, with powerful search and filtering tools and the ability to display data in an accessible and functional manner.
The database also has statistical reporting capability, but this is not its primary function. The scale of local customisation means that there is little scope for generating consolidated reports at regional or global level and it is felt that any consolidated reports could be misleading or would lead to distorted comparisons. Furthermore the data “belongs” to the individual Mine Action programmes and hence is not held centrally.
There is another database that is used to record details of de‐mining accidents at a global level, known as DDAS (the Database of Demining Accidents). At one stage it came under the auspices of GICHD, but it is now managed by an independent demining consultant. It is essentially a repository of case studies which can be accessed by anyone working in the sector, contains mainly descriptive data and has no reporting or analytical capabilities.
While the IMSMA software is very impressive and shows what can be achieved with significant investment over an extended period, it is essentially designed to meet operational as opposed to monitoring objectives. The scale of demining activity and the criticality of the operations provide a very clear justification for the level of resources committed to its development. Some of the data on accidents and victims could be of direct relevance to the MRM, but there is no guarantee that this would be held in a consistent format from country to country and hence it would be difficult to guarantee data compatibility with a global MRM system.
4.7. OCHA Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework
OCHA has developed a framework for monitoring and reporting on factors affecting humanitarian access. OCHA’s objective is to systematise and standardise the monitoring, reporting and trend analysis of constraints affecting humanitarian access in situations of armed conflict in order to inform policy and operations of humanitarian actors concerning
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access. A database application is currently being developed to assist in the collection and management of information and to generate reports in line with the access monitoring and reporting framework.
OCHA’s access monitoring and reporting framework consists of three main components:
Access constraints and their consequences: An ongoing record of the most significant constraints on access based on (i) measurable indicators of constraints (i.e. actual events or status of specific impediments), (ii) their humanitarian consequences, and (iii) implications for humanitarian operations. Ten distinct types of constraints on access have been identified along with corresponding indicators for each constraint. These constraints concern both impediments to humanitarian actor’s access to conflict‐affected populations as well as these populations’ access to the assistance being provided.
Policies and other measures in effect: An ongoing record of formal policies in effect which apply to or directly affect access to humanitarian assistance and/or humanitarian operations, the duration they have been in effect and the sectors of humanitarian activity affected. This covers policies or measures enforced by state or non‐state actors as well policies or measures internal to the humanitarian community, for example, concerning operational security management.
Action taken and outcome: An ongoing record of actions that have been taken to address the access constraints and what the results of these actions have been.
As an example of the type of information collected, one of the constraints is defined as “Restrictions on or interference with the passage of agencies, personnel and goods within the country” which is explained as “Impediments to freedom of movement as experienced by humanitarian actors in‐country in order to reach affected populations and transport essential relief”. The Status Indicators include checkpoints or barriers and policies that impose travel bans, visa restrictions, relief quotas, etc. The Event Indicators might include the amount of staff time spent at checkpoints, the type and number of actions designed to slow or frustrate movement (e.g. unloading and re‐loading trucks), the number of travel permits declined and the quantities of goods delayed or refused.
Their system will of course monitor access to all humanitarian assistance and not just the provision of services to children. The information recorded in the database will also be used to develop access maps illustrating the prevalence and severity of access constraints as well as varying categories or levels of access.
Monitoring access to humanitarian assistance is a much more complex challenge than monitoring violations like recruitment or sexual violence that impact on individuals. Descriptive reports covering access issues have regularly been produced at field level by some OCHA Field Offices but consistent and systematic monitoring and reporting have been difficult to establish pending the development and roll‐out of a database application designed for this purpose.
During the initial development of the access monitoring and reporting framework, there was an attempt to standardise a means of ranking different access levels, ranging from full access to complete lack of access. This has proved to be extremely complex, due to the huge number of variables that could be used to determine access levels. OCHA chose to focus on getting more basic components of access monitoring and reporting up and running first before tackling defined access level categories. Similarly they wanted to incorporate some
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contextual indicators (e.g. political or economic developments or events which may have a bearing on the interests and motivations of various actors in the operational context), but this has also been deferred until after the core system is in place.
OCHA consulted with NGOs and UN agencies during the development of the access monitoring and reporting framework and incorporated their feedback. At the field level, implementation currently varies from context to context, however OCHA is increasingly active in facilitating information flow within the humanitarian community for more consistent access monitoring and reporting. When a prototype of the access database application is available, OCHA will again solicit feedback from partners and then seek facilitate joint inter‐agency efforts to fully operationalise access monitoring and reporting at field level. As such, while the aim is to create something that can be used on an inter‐agency basis, at this stage OCHA are working internally on the development of the technical tools, specifically the database system.
While OCHA’s work is not specifically focused on children, they have been in discussion with UNICEF about how OCHA can accommodate MRM’s requirements and how best they can feed information into it. However it is important to recognise that OCHA is concerned with monitoring all the factors that constrain access as opposed to “denial” of access, which implies a deliberate act on the part of an identifiable individual or group.
4.8. Inter‐Agency Child Protection Database
The inter‐Agency Child Protection Database (IACPD) is a case management system that has been developed by IRC, Save the Children and UNICEF to support their emergency child protection work globally. It grew out of a number of local initiatives that were eventually used as the basis for a global initiative and provides a good example of the advantages and disadvantages of a bottom up development strategy.
The first version of the database was developed in 2003 by Save the Children UK in Goma! It was a very simple Microsoft Access database designed to capture data about DDR and family tracing that took just two weeks to develop. A second implementation in Liberia resulted in some major modifications and the same thing happened in Sudan in 2004.
At this stage it became clear that none of the country programmes had the resources necessary to develop their own fully functional database and that having a different version in each country was a major barrier to providing effective support. As a result it was eventually agreed to work towards a more standardised system. This required each country to compromise as far as their specific requirements were concerned, although the system did include some opportunities for local customisation.
The work on re‐specifying the database was carried out in Khartoum towards the end in 2004 and the development work was finished in time for the new version to be implemented in Aceh following the tsunami. The revised database still had an Access back‐end, but also utilised Visual Basic for the front‐end.
The logic of moving towards a more standardised version of the database and the challenge of providing adequate support was also a motivation for moving towards an inter‐agency approach, as was the collaborative structure of most family tracing and DDR programmes.
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This led to the creation of the inter‐agency consortium for the database in 2005 comprising IRC, Save the Children and UNICEF as members of the steering group.
The database is fundamentally a case management tool and was originally designed to provide operational support for the various stages of the family tracing process, including verification and reunification. Its strengths were the ability to search and match records, generate mass tracing lists, flag up overdue tasks, etc. Statistical reporting came later and was based upon the pre‐existing data structure.
A simple DDR module had always been attached to the core FTR structure together with a facility to record follow‐up visits both before and after reunification. The follow‐up form provided scope for recording details of the child’s care arrangements and a basic needs assessment. A simple form for recording other “protection concerns” or vulnerabilities was added, but with only a very limited capacity for recording details of the required response.
The database has subsequently been implemented in a number of countries to support child protection work. The system has been upgraded and enhanced over the subsequent four years, but its underlying structure based around family tracing and DDR has remained largely unchanged. In 2009 however a major redevelopment of the programme is underway designed to improve the system’s flexibility and extend its scope to include new areas of work, such as child labour, juvenile justice, children in care, trafficking and migration. An initial pilot version of the database that has been developed by the DevInfo Support Group in New Delhi (see below) is currently being tested.
The developmental history of the IACPD provides some useful lessons for the MRM. The decentralised approach during the first two years ensured that the early implementations were very responsive to local needs and there was a strong sense of ownership at the country level, but the approach lacked strategic coherence and system design could become over dependent on the views of individual staff with little experience of information management or database design. Resource constraints at the country level also limited the amount of development time available, which negatively impacted on the quality of the final product.
The move to a standardised global system has helped to address these weaknesses and has resulted in a more strategic and better resourced system, but it has not been without its challenges. Reconciling the diverse demands of each country can requires considerable time and energy and there will always be a tension over how much customisation is permitted and accommodating everyone’s “wish list” can eventually result in levels of complexity that can undermine the system’s effectiveness. At a more mundane level it can also be hard for the centre to meet the field’s increasing expectations in terms of technical support.
The IACPD is used in a number of countries where the MRM is being implemented and is used to manage the reintegration and support provided to children who have been referred from the MRM or whose cases have been reported to the MRM by the child protection agency involved. Consequently the interface between any MRM information system and the IACPD will be crucial, especially as it affects the management of referrals and the exchange of information. This issue is explored in more detail in Section 6 below.
4.9. DevInfo
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The DevInfo database system is used for monitoring human development indicators, including the Millenium Development Goals. It was originally developed by UNICEF under the ChildInfo name, but is now used by many UN agencies and their government and NGO partners. Its aim is to provide a common database platform incorporating global standards that can be used to facilitate data sharing among partners and provide a flexible tool for displaying data and indicators using tables, graphs and maps for use in reports, presentations and in support of advocacy.
The system has been progressively developed over a period of 15 years and is now a highly sophisticated and flexible piece of software. It has been adapted for use in many different countries (e.g. NepalInfo) and for different specialist purposes (e.g. EmergencyInfo and RefInfo). It has been developed using Microsoft .NET technology and can be deployed as a desktop application or as a web‐based application. The source code is owned by UNICEF but it makes the software freely available to its partners. The database is supported by the Dev Info Support Group which consists of a team of 50 IT professionals based in New Delhi. Individual agencies and consortia can purchase additional development and training support as and when required.
DevInfo can accommodate both quantitative and qualitative data, but it is primarily concerned with the analysis and presentation of indicators, so there is normally a need for qualitative data to be standardised. The system can be used as a decision support tool as well as for the presentation of statistical analysis in reports and for advocacy.
In 2007 preliminary discussions took place about the possibility of using DevInfo technology for a MRM database and an initial proposal was developed by DevInfo, but this was eventually shelved in preference for a wider review of the available options. More recently the DevInfo Support Group has been used to upgrade the Inter‐Agency Child Protection database with the dual objectives of broadening its scope and improving its functionality and user interface (see 4.8 above). This could be beneficial if linkages are needed between the IACPD and any new MRM database.
4.10. MRM Task Force Feedback
Each MRM Task Force was also asked to comment on the other information systems and databases being used at the country level. Apart from references to the Inter Agency Child Protection Database (3 countries), the OHCHR Global Database and the UNFPA/UNHCR GBV spreadsheet, most references were to local systems operated by Human Rights Commissions or other non‐government agencies, but very few details were provided and data sharing seemed to be fairly limited. Several countries mentioned the UNDSS monitoring database, but there was little evidence that this had been a significant data source. The countries that were planning for post conflict transition were more focused on the development of wider child rights monitoring systems and the potential for using any MRM database as a basis for a post conflict system.
4.11. Common Issues While there are enormous differences between the various information systems described above, a number of common themes and issues of relevance to the MRM can be identified:
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There is a very clear distinction between what is often described as “monitoring” and “case management” which require very different data structures and functionality. Very few if any systems attempt to combine these two different functions.
The majority of systems are being used for decision support. They provide a convenient mechanism for storing, accessing and manipulating data about individual cases and quantitative analysis is allocated a relatively low priority.
Several organisations saw their information systems as having an important role in ensuring consistency in the implementation of their monitoring across many different country programmes.
Most organisations highlighted the importance of having a robust data structure, focusing on clear one‐to‐one or many‐to‐one relationships and explicit data definitions that are rigorously enforced. Many highlighted the considerable challenge of trying to balance this against the demand and need for local customisation. The solutions to this dilemma varied depending on the overarching purpose of the system.
Apart from the UNHCR/UNFPA GBV system, none of the systems attempt to consolidate their analysis at the global level. There are several reasons for this reluctance. Many agencies believe that the diversity of the situations being monitored and the variable monitoring capacity in each country make such comparisons unhelpful and potentially misleading. Many agencies allow significant local customisation of their systems making global level comparisons impossible. Furthermore many believe that the data belongs to the country level offices and that they are best placed to make decisions about its use.
Protecting confidentiality was a priority for all those focused on human right monitoring and most tried to ensure this by separating personal data from incident details, often by excluding the former from the main database.
All the organisations emphasised the importance of allocating adequate resources for the implementation as well as the development of the system and indicated that these were substantial. Most of the more impressive systems had been developed over a period of years and have undergone significant upgrades.
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5. NEEDS ASSESSMENT After mapping all the systems currently in use, the second part of the consultancy explored the information management needs of the MRM at the country level and canvassed the views of each Task Force and all the Global Partners.
5.1. MRM Task Forces
Each Task Force was asked to identify the main advantages and disadvantages of developing one standardised information system, with or without a single database, and then to indicate whether, on balance, they would support the idea. A full analysis of the responses is contained in Appendix 4 and from these it is clear that most respondents assumed that a database of some kind would form part of any standard system.
The advantages of a standardised approach that people mentioned most often were the potential for resource savings, the opportunity to learn from other countries and access specialist information and data management expertise, and the chance to undertake global or inter‐country comparisons.
The diversity in the way in which the MRM is being implemented in different countries was seen as the major disadvantage or problem, with people expressing doubts as to whether a single system would be able to accommodate the different requirements of each Task Force. The second potential problem was the loss of local ownership if a system is imposed from the centre and its impact on motivation and participation.
Overall 77% of those responding to the questionnaire were either supportive or strongly supportive of a standardised system, while 15% had significant reservations and 8% were undecided. Support was strongest among the countries that have yet to develop their own systems, while those that have already invested heavily in development were, on average, less enthusiastic, although some of them still recognised the potential benefits for new countries. The countries with atypical monitoring arrangements (e.g. Somalia) were also likely to have more reservations.
Strongly Supportive Supportive Possibly Reservations No response 7 3 1 2 4
54% 23% 8% 15%
Task Forces were also asked to identify the most important features that a standardised system would need to provide. The ones mentioned most often were:
Flexibility and the ability to customise the system to meet local needs.
Good reporting and analytical capabilities.
Simplicity and user friendliness – concern was expressed that a globally developed system might be too complex and onerous to operate.
Strong system security.
They were also asked about the critical success factors for any standardised system and, in addition to the things mentioned above, adequate training, technical support and securing buy‐in from all the protection agencies were identified as important.
Several people also suggested that the system should also be designed to help reduce the collection and movement of manual (paper) data, which was seen to be a security risk.
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The respondents were also asked to rank the priorities for any standardised system using the framework outlined earlier in section 2.3. They were given four alternatives: Excellent, Useful, Marginal or Of No Relevance. The results are summarised in the tables below:
5.2. Strategic Objectives
70% of the respondents stated that all the objectives were either Essential or Useful, and 50% rated six of the eight objectives as being Essential. Unsurprisingly the preparation of Annual Reports and Horizontal Notes was considered the top priority, but Advocacy and Action Planning, Immediate Interventions and Referral also scored highly. The objectives that were considered least significant were Programme Planning, Impunity and Accountability and Managing the MRM itself.
Strategic Objective No of
Responses Essential Useful
Marginal or None
Annual Reports & GH Notes 12 92% 8% ‐‐‐ Advocacy & Action Planning 13 69% 23% 8% Impunity & Accountability 13 54% 23% 23% Immediate Interventions 13 62% 31% 8% Programme Planning 13 38% 31% 31% Referrals 13 54% 38% 8% Long Term Response 13 38% 46% 15% Managing the MRM 13 46% 31% 23%
5.2.1. Data Requirements
The respondents were asked to rank the importance of the different types of data for both a manual and electronic system. More people commented on the needs of an electronic system, possibly because they didn’t use or require a manual one. The black figures in the table below relate to an electronic system and the blue ones to a manual or paper one.
Categories of Data No of
Responses Essential Useful
Marginal or None
Initial Source of Alert 11 (9) 64% (78%) 36% (28%) ‐‐‐ (11%) Documentation Process 11 (9) 64% (56%) 27% (22%) 9% (22%) Verification of the Case 11 (9) 73% (44%) 18% (22%) 9% (22%) Incident Summary 11 (9) 82% (89%) 18% (11%) ‐‐‐ (‐‐‐) Children’s Details 11 (9) 55% (33%) 45% (56%) ‐‐‐ (11%) Perpetrators’ Details 11 (9) 73% (44%) 27% (44%) ‐‐‐ (11%) Violation Specific Details 11 (9) 36% (33%) 55% (44%) 9% (22%) Immediate Interventions Details 11 (9) 45% (22%) 45% (78%) 9% (‐‐‐) Referral Details 11 (9) 27% (33%) 64% (56%) 9% (11%) Long Term Response Details 11 (9) 27% (11%) 55% (67%) 18% (22%)
The overall impression from the responses is that most countries want a system that can capture all the main types of data, although the Incident Summary, Perpetrator Details and Verification Details were considered the most important.
5.2.2. Performance Priorities
Finally the respondents were asked to indicate their priorities with regard to the performance of the system. Most considered all the priorities of importance, but the most interesting feature of the responses was the priority allocated to Timeliness and Accessibility (rated as essential by 67% and 80% of respondents respectively). This compares with very low scores for the performance of existing systems (only 22% were rated Excellent or Good), so this will be a crucial area for any new system.
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Performance Priorities No of
Responses Essential Useful
Marginal or None
Data Quality 10 60% 30% 10% Data Reliability 10 90% 10% Data Comprehensiveness 10 70% 20% 10% Data Consistency 9 56% 33% 11% Coverage 10 70% 20% 10% Timeliness 9 67% 33% ‐‐‐ Relevance 10 80% 20% ‐‐‐ Accessibility 10 80% 20% ‐‐‐ Value for Money 9 67% 33% ‐‐‐
5.3. Global Partners
Global MRM partners were asked to comment on both the desirability and form of a standard information system at the country level and the information management needs that exist globally. 8 of the 9 partners responded in writing, although some did not complete each and every section of the questionnaire. The OSRSG‐CAAC opted to provide their input through a series of face‐to‐face meetings. This was partly due to other competing demands on their time, especially in the run up to the Security Council session, but this approach also suited their input better.
5.3.1. Country Level Information Systems
Only three agencies provided a detailed response to this section of the questionnaire. Others only contributed the occasional comment, but their views about global information management requirements often provided an insight into what they felt should happen at the country level. All these detailed comments are contained in Appendix 6. Many partners also provided additional feedback during face‐to‐face meetings and these have been integrated into the comments below.
The global responses revealed a fundamental difference in view between those agencies that think the information system should focus primarily, or exclusively, on supporting the preparation of reports to the Security Council and those that see the MRM IMS having a wider role in advocacy and in building up a more comprehensive picture of how conflicts are impacting on children.
The main proponent of the former view was the OSRSG‐CAAC. They argue that the preparation of annual reports for the Security Council and Horizontal Notes should be the primary objective of the information system and that the focus should be on recording qualitative descriptions of the individual cases that have been fully verified and that can be used to illustrate the issues raised in the reports. They believe that this information is best recorded in routine weekly reports of the kind that are used by the Child Protection Advisers employed by UN Peacekeeping Missions.
They are unconvinced that a quantitative analysis of the caseload will be worthwhile, as the relatively small number of fully verified incidents can never be representative of the overall caseload and so the results are likely to be misleading. Consequently they are not in favour of using the more targeted or “closed” questions, including those with a limited number of predetermined answers that are commonly used by monitoring systems, especially those that use databases to manipulate or analyse the data.
They also believe that the heavy investment in database development at the country level has proved largely to be a waste of resources and has distracted partners from what they see as the MRM’s core purpose. In their view few, if any, of the databases have delivered worthwhile benefits, especially in terms of what they see as the central objectives of the MRM.
On the other hand the majority of the other global partners were strongly supportive of having a more standardised system and those that responded felt that it should be capable of supporting all of the
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strategic objectives outlined in section 2.3.1 above except for the provision of Long Term Response. This reflected their more holistic view of the MRM. While recognising the central importance of the Security Council reporting, they placed much more emphasis on broader advocacy work, on using the data to inform other programming decisions and ensuring that cases are effectively referred to response providers in a timely manner. Hence they would prefer to see more of a balance between case studies that utilise qualitative data and quantitative analysis that makes it possible to make comparisons and analyse trends.
Some partners also expressed a concern that the current information systems were too narrowly focused and that the demanding verification standards required for Security Council reporting meant that the number of cases included in the system was too small and consequently unrepresentative of the total caseload. Hence they argued for a greater emphasis on contextual data, especially in countries where the conflict makes verification particularly difficult. They also wanted to see a more transparent information system that could provide greater feedback to members of the Task Force and those undertaking the monitoring at field level.
Notwithstanding these differences of opinion, there was general agreement that the database development that has taken place so far at the country level has not been as successful as hoped and that the reasons for this need to be investigated before any further investment is made. Security was also a major concern for many partners and one that they felt should be given the highest priority in the design of any future system.
5.3.2. Global Information System
Attitudes towards information management at the global level mirror the different approaches outlined in 5.2.1 above. The majority of those who submitted a written response want to see some form of global analysis to help them monitor trends and make comparisons between different countries. Most of the face‐to‐face meetings with partners in New York and Geneva reinforced this view, but the OSRSG‐CAAC’s reiterated their reservations about the value of quantitative analysis at the global level and argued that the data is even more unsuited to mapping trends or making global comparisons. Other partners expressed wider concerns about confidentiality and how the differing objectives of partners could be reconciled.
The written responses also provided some valuable evidence of what people might want from any global system. Partners were asked to comment on its objectives; the types of information that should be included in it and who should have access to it; the way in which the system should be structured and the kind of reports required.
a) Objectives All the agencies that responded to the questionnaire wanted a global information system that could support general advocacy activities as well as the formal reporting requirements of the Security Council, and seven of the eight also wanted something that could help in planning programme interventions, including activities designed to prevent or reduce violations, and in monitoring the effectiveness of the MRM itself. Several respondents emphasised the importance of monitoring the impact of the MRM and mention was also made of using the system to improve accountability and support fundraising efforts.
b) Information Requirements
The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate which information should be available globally and to whom. They were asked to choose between four options, two of which involved information about individual incidents, while the other two were limited to statistical reports and analysis.
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Just over a third of respondents (3 agencies) thought that the details of all the individual cases should be available globally. Two of these agencies felt this should be restricted to OSRSG‐CAAC and UNICEF but a third agency was not specific about who should have access to this data. A much larger proportion (75%) favoured having access to detailed information about a limited number of cases at the global level to illustrate specific issues or problems and for use in advocacy. Three agencies felt that this data should be restricted to OSRSG‐CAAC and UNICEF, while another three felt it should be made available to all MRM partners or were not specific.
Information Requirements OSRSG‐CAAC & Unicef
only All MRM Partner
Agencies Yes (no specific)
No
Full details of All incidents 2 1 5
Details of Selected Incidents (e.g.’s)
3 2 1 2
Country Statistics in consistent format
1 4 3
Consolidated global or regional statistics
1 4 3
By contrast all the respondents (100%) wanted to see statistical reports available at the global level. Most felt these reports should be available to all MRM partners, but one agency thought that they should be restricted to OSRSG‐CAAC and UNICEF.
Several of the agencies that did not favour holding individual case data at the global level, mentioned the risks to confidentiality for the children involved. Others queried the need to hold this data at the global level and, if the details of selected cases were required, suggested that this could be done without recourse to a database.
c) Structure of Information System
The majority of respondents favoured using a global database containing a limited “quantitative” dataset or a reliance on reports provided by the individual MRM Task Forces, provided these were in a standardised format. Less than a third of respondents favoured a comprehensive global database containing the details of every case.
Options Statistical reports provided by
MRM Task Forces Limited Global Database (quantitative data only)
Comprehensive Global Database (all case data)
% in Favour 71% 86% 29%
d) Reporting Requirements
Almost all the outputs required from the information system involved some form of quantitative analysis, including comparisons based on location, violation, victim/survivor or perpetrator and trends mapped over time. Both tables and graphs were requested and a couple of respondents mentioned the possibility of map‐based (GIS) presentations.
e) Challenges Respondents were asked what challenges they would anticipate in creating and operating a global information system. This generated more responses than for all the other questions put together, but most related to country level challenges and these have been summarised earlier in the report. The main issues of global significance were the need to manage the differing objectives and priorities of
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MRM partners and how this might impact on access to the information system and whether there would be sufficient consistency across all the contributing countries to facilitate global comparisons.
5.4. Overview It is clear that while the majority of respondents at country and global levels support the development of a more standardised information system and would like this to include a database capable of mapping trends and making comparisons, this is not a unanimous view. The fundamental issue revolves around the different organisational mandates of the partners. The primary concern of the OSRSG‐CAAC is ensuring that the 1612 reporting requirements are effectively fulfilled and it is in this context that their more narrowly focused objectives for the information system need to be understood. Equally their reservations about value of quantitative analysis and the cost effectiveness of databases are both based on legitimate concerns. On the other hand, the desire of other partners to see the MRM operating within a wider framework and contributing to child protection in other ways is equally valid.
Reconciling these different viewpoints will clearly be crucial if a more consistent approach to information management is to be possible and this issue is explored further in Section 6 below.
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6. PROPOSALS FOR A COUNTRY‐BASED INFORMATION SYSTEM
Having mapped the existing information system and completed the needs assessment, it is time to consider what is actually possible, initially at the country level. This section of the report looks at the rationale and opportunities for developing a more standardised approach, the objectives of any such system and the way in which it would need to be structured and implemented.
6.1. The Rationale for a Standardised Information System
It is clear from all the mapping and field visits that most MRM Task Forces have made a considerable investment, both human and financial, in their information management and their electronic systems in particular. This “bottom‐up” approach has certainly had its advantages, worthwhile progress has been made in some countries and some valuable lessons have been learnt, but the overall situation remains unsatisfactory.
Many systems have failed to deliver against people’s expectations, most notably in their ability to generate useful reports. Many have taken an excessively long time to develop and several have been abandoned after they failed to meet people’s expectations. The lack of in‐house information management expertise has often resulted in an insufficiently strategic approach to the planning of many systems, too great an emphasis on data collection and an insufficient focus on the purpose of systems. Despite some limited evidence that people have drawn on the experience of other countries, there has clearly been a considerable amount of duplication, wasted effort and what might be described as “re‐inventing of the wheel”.
For all these reasons and because many people want the opportunity to compare themselves with other countries, the majority of MRM Task Forces are supportive of developing a more standardised global information system (as distinct from a database). At the same time however, there is an understandable concern about whether such a global system will be able to accommodate the different requirements of each country that is implementing the MRM.
It is clear from the mapping that the operational diversity at the field level is very considerable. This is partly a reflection of the nature of each conflict and the capacity of the monitoring agencies involved, but the delay in finalising the new MRM Guidelines means that people have been free to “do their own thing” and this has served to exacerbate the situation. The lack of a common dataset and the different ways in which the verification standards have been interpreted are particularly important in this regard.
While it is clear that leaving things as they are is not a viable option, imposing one rigid system on each country is equally unworkable. The challenge will be to create something that is based on and supportive of the global monitoring requirements, while still allowing sufficient flexibility to accommodate the each country’s needs. This will be far from easy and the tensions between standardisation and customisation were very evident during the review of the other information systems described in Section 4 above. It is also important to note that the more flexibility a system provides, the more complex it will be and hence the more expensive to develop and potentially to support.
The design of the information system must be based on a common understanding of the objectives it will be expected to meet and this is clearly another area where there is a wide spectrum of views. These essentially extend from a focus on just providing the information required to prepare the
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annual reports and horizontal notes required by New York to a much wider view encompassing a variety of advocacy activities, the monitoring of immediate interventions and referrals and helping to support the planning of other programmes designed to protect children.
These differences of emphasis also extend to people’s views about the value of analytical or statistical reports and whether a database offers an appropriate and cost effective solution to the MRM’s information management needs. Any decisions about system design would also need to take into account the other issues highlighted in the needs assessment, including the ways in which data security is addressed and the interface with other information systems and databases.
6.1.1. Reconciling Objectives The diversity of views outlined in Section 5 is a reality that has to be confronted. They reflect the differing organisational mandates of the agencies involved and from this perspective the different positions all have legitimacy. The different views are not however as mutually exclusive as they might initially appear and there is a strong case for trying to develop an information system that has the flexibility to accommodate the diversity. Otherwise there is a risk that the motivation of some partners to participate in the MRM will be undermined and, in the worst case scenario, it could result in the creation of two completely separate information systems, which would inevitably lead to duplication and potentially undermine the collaboration needed by all parties.
There is also a greater degree of overlap in what people actually want out of the information system than is sometimes appreciated. For instance those people who are drafting reports for submission to New York need to be able to analyse the caseload and identify which cases are most significant and merit inclusion, while those who are looking at advocacy and programme planning are likely to want access to case study material and qualitative data as well as quantitative analysis.
The use of a more standardised system also provides an opportunity for improving the consistency of documentation and verification that has been a source of tension between New York and some individual Task Forces and which will be essential if the differing objectives of the various stakeholders are to be effectively met.
6.1.2. The Value of Analytical Reports The value of analytical or statistical reports is a complex issue. The number of cases recorded by any Task Force will inevitably be limited and, even in favourable circumstances, will never be fully representative of the situation on the ground or the overall impact on children. Consequently a simplistic use of analytical or statistical reports based on the MRM caseload could be misleading and, if the numbers are relatively low because of access or capacity constraints, could give the impression that the problem is much less significant than is actually the case. Indeed, there is evidence in some countries of an inverse relationship between the severity of the conflict and the number of cases reported (i.e. when the conflict intensifies, the number of violations is likely to increase, but access will become more difficult and people may be less willing to report cases).
This does not however mean that there is no value in quantitative analysis of the caseload provided it is interpreted “in context” and anyone viewing it is fully aware of the circumstances in which the monitoring has taken place. Appendix 9 provides an illustration of how this kind of analysis can be used to help understand what is happening on the ground and how the MRM is operating, while at the same time highlighting its limitations. Perhaps the most important lesson is that analysis of this kind should be seen as a basis for further questions and investigation rather than as an end in itself. Any analysis generated from the MRM should also be seen as just one of many sources of evidence that can be used to build up a picture of what is happening to children.
The Macro Monitoring initiative being developed by Unicef, the Communicable Diseases Centre in Atlanta and Columbia University will be another important component of what is a much wider
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monitoring system, as will the views of children and their families which often provide a very different insight into what is actually happening (e.g. children in Nepal indicated that sexual violence was their biggest concern, but this violation was very rarely recorded by the MRM).
6.1.3. The Need for a Database It is clear that some of the database development undertaken at the country level has been of limited value. The reasons are not difficult to identify and have been described in detail earlier in the report. On the other hand the reasons why countries have decided to try and develop electronic systems are also quite understandable and logical. Once the number of cases reaches a certain level, it becomes very difficult to manage the data effectively with a manual system, especially on a multi‐agency basis. An electronic system also offers significant data security benefits, especially where data is collected by non‐UN partners and has to be transferred from one place to another. At the same time evidence from other sectors demonstrates that, provided a database is planned strategically and its development is adequately managed and resourced, there is no reason why it should not provide a cost effective solution.
Some Task Forces have opted for an Excel spreadsheet to manage their MRM data. The UNHCR/UNFPA Monitoring System for GBV cases demonstrates that this approach is well suited to a straightforward monitoring system focused on quantitative analysis and it has the advantage of using software with which many field staff are already familiar. However the complexity of the MRM with six quite different violations, multiple relationships between incidents, children and perpetrators and the need for descriptive case studies as well as simple quantitative data means that a database is the only realistic option.
6.2. System Objectives The starting point for any information system must be its objectives. These can be identified as follows:
a) Provide a simple and straightforward framework for collecting and recording the details of incidents in as secure a manner as possible.
b) Provide a mechanism for managing the documentation and verification process to ensure that it is done consistently to the required standard and that this can easily be checked. This should help avoid uncertainty and disagreements about which cases merit inclusion in the MRM reports themselves.
c) Provide a mechanism for storing data about incidents in a convenient and secure manner irrespective of the impact of the conflict.
d) Provide a simple and efficient means of sorting, searching and otherwise manipulating the caseload against a range of different criteria.
e) Provide an easy way of generating case summaries for individual incidents which can be used in annual reports, horizontal notes and advocacy efforts.
f) Provide a mechanism for analysing the caseload and generating statistical reports (tables and graphs) that can be used to help facilitate comparisons and identify trends.
g) Provide the highest possible level of security for all the individuals involved in the process – the children, their families, informants and monitors.
These objectives must be deliverable in a range of different circumstances. In particular the system must be capable of accommodating the following scenarios:
a) Centralised or decentralised and single or multi‐agency implementations
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b) Incremental documentation and verification
c) The inclusion of additional “non‐MRM” violations.
To be acceptable the system must also be simple to use and capable of making life easier for Task Force members rather than imposing extra burdens on them.
6.3. System Design
The detailed design of the proposed system is documented in Appendices 8 and 11. The summary below is primarily intended to explain the rational for the various features.
6.3.1. Common Data Structure
The starting point for the design of the system must be the data structure and the relationship between the key elements of information included in the database. This structure must be capable of handling the different approaches to monitoring used across the globe and applicable irrespective of whether we are dealing with a manual or an electronic system. Once this structure is established, the creation of the individual data fields will be relatively straightforward.
The central element of the information system should be the incident, which is defined as an event that takes place in a discrete location at a specific time and can involve one or more perpetrators who commit violations against one or more children. At first sight this might all appear very straightforward, but in reality the relationships between these different components can be very complex. This is because each incident can potentially involve several perpetrators and several children, and each child can experience more than one violation during an incident and in theory each violation may have been committed by a different perpetrator! This can lead to what are described as multiple “many‐to‐many” data relationships which can be extremely difficult to manage and even more difficult to analyse.
Hence some simplification in the structure is essential to ensure that only “many‐to‐one” relationships are used. To achieve this, it is proposed that the “incident” which forms the core of the system, should be linked independently with the child(ren) and the perpetrator(s) in “many‐to‐one” relationships and that the children are similarly linked to the violations in another “many‐to‐one” relationship. This means that the violations are not linked directly with the incident or the perpetrator(s) except through the children. Perhaps even more importantly any actions or interventions undertaken, or referrals made, should also be linked directly to the individual child(ren) rather than to the Incident or the violation. This hierarchy of relationships can be summarised as follows:
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Incident
Child(ren) Perpetrator(s)
Violations Actions/Interventions/Referrals
This may all seem rather arcane, but it will form the basis for the design of the data collection forms and any electronic data management system and enable individual countries to customise some of the data fields without undermining the underlying integrity of the system.
6.3.2. Data Fields and Definitions Once the data structure is finalised, the individual data fields can be determined. These include both open ended text fields that can be used to record detailed descriptions and closed questions with a defined set of predetermined answers. This approach will provide the required combination of qualitative and quantitative data and the use of well designed multiple choice questions will make data entry much quicker and easier. A full schedule of these fields is contained in Appendix 8b, including definitions for the options in each look‐up list.
These definitions will be crucial if any meaningful analysis of the data is to be possible. The data fields have been chosen on the basis of the requirements agreed by the MRM Steering Group and the data definitions have been drawn up on the basis of detailed discussions with key individuals. The aim has been to create logical lists of options that can be used to answer questions quickly while ensuring consistency of interpretation and avoiding overlaps and inconsistencies
The schedule consists of a limited number of mandatory fields that must be completed for every incident and a larger number of non‐mandatory fields that will be used dependent on the violation involved and the data available. All the options linked to the core fields (mandatory and non‐mandatory) will need to be the same for all users if any comparative analysis is to be possible. Customisation will be limited to user defined fields (see sub‐section c) below).
a) Disaggregating Personal Data
To protect the identities of the individuals involved in the monitoring process, it is proposed that their names, addresses and any other details that could be used to identify them should be excluded from the main monitoring system and instead entered into a separate schedule that can be stored in a different location. A simple system of reference numbers will make it possible to cross reference the two systems when this is required.
This arrangement is based on the principle that access to personal data should be on a strict need to know basis and that once a case has been documented and verified, most of the users of the data will not need this access. This will be particularly important if monitoring is organised on a multi‐agency basis and the data is consolidated and analysed centrally, whether this happens nationally or globally. It also assumes that any response will be provided locally and/or will be managed separately from the
One
One
Many Many
Many Many
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monitoring system. The main drawback of this arrangement is that it will make the identification of duplicate cases more difficult, but the database itself will be able to search against other key data (date, location, perpetrator group, violation, etc) to identify matches and the separate list of personal details will also be searchable if held as a simple spreadsheet (see Appendix 8c).
b) Data Fields
The data fields have been split in to two sections – Parts 1 and 2. Part 1 applies to every case, but there are three versions of Part 2 depending on the nature of the incident.
Part 1
Part 1 contains most of the mandatory fields covering the documentation and verification process and the incident summary. The documentation fields provide an opportunity to record basic details of the informants who have provided information about the incident and any physical evidence that has been observed. In addition to “full‐MRM verification”, the system allows users to record a lower standard of verification (Documented). This is particularly important in countries where security and access make full verification particularly difficult. It also provides space to indicate why a verification decision has not been possible.
The main descriptive incident summary is the one that will provide the basis for examples in annual reports, etc, but there is also an opportunity for recording a “public” summary from which sensitive data has been removed, which can be used for other advocacy work, as is done in Sudan.
Part 2
Part 2 covers the profiling data of the child(ren) involved, the violations they have experienced and the details of any actions taken to address them. There are three alternatives:
Part 2a
Part 2a is intended for cases involving the four “individual” violations (killing & maiming, recruitment, sexual violence and abduction) for which full details are available for each child involved (i.e. those required for full MRM verification). It contains a series of profiling questions for each child and specific questions for each violation. It should be possible to tag each of the first three violations if an abduction also took place at the same time, so that it is only necessary to record “other” abductions separately, minimising any duplication. For the same reason the section relating to the release of a child from an armed group has also been consolidated and linked to the child rather than to each violation. There is also a section for recording the basic details of any actions that are taken to address the violation itself and any referrals that are made.
Part 2b
Part 2b is very similar to 2a in that it covers the four “individual” violations, but it is designed for cases where the monitoring agency is unable to collect full details about the individual child(ren) involved, primarily due to security and access problems (e.g. Sudan). It may be that these cases cannot be fully verified to the main MRM standard, but agencies may still want to record the information and possibly classify them under the “documented” category. The questions are very similar to those in Part 2a, but they are non‐mandatory and so the monitor is free to leave some blank or, more usefully, select the “don’t know” or “unknown” options.
Part 2c
Part 2c is designed for cases involving the two “group” or “non‐individual” violations (i.e. attacks on educational and health facilities and denial of humanitarian access). The summary profiling data for the children affected is the same as for 2b with specific questions for each of the two violations. The
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ones for attacks on educational and health facilities are fairly straightforward although there are slightly different options for education and health. Denial of humanitarian access is a much more difficult issue, as will have been clear from the description of the OCHA Access Monitoring & Reporting Framework in Section 4 and Appendix 7. Three simple questions have been included for those Task Forces that wish to record these incidents, but it is recognised that others may prefer to take the information for their reports directly from the OCHA system.
c) Customisation of Data Fields
It is recognised that individual Task Forces will want to customise the system to meet their own requirements, but if any comparative analysis is to be possible, the core fields and data definitions must remain identical across all the countries. Consequently customisation will be possible in three ways:
a) Users will be able to configure their data entry screens to include or exclude non‐mandatory fields depending on the data they are able to collect. This means that they will be able to keep the data entry interface as simple and user friendly as possible (see Appendix 11b).
b) Users will be able to add extra fields provided that these are consistent with the data structure described below. They will be able to define data formats and create look‐up lists for these fields. These local fields will not form part of the global system and comparisons.
c) One important feature of these “user defined fields” will be the opportunity to include additional “non‐MRM” violations (e.g. trafficking), which is a facility requested by some Task Forces, but once again this can only be done within the overall data structure. Data about these violations will of course be excluded from any MRM reports.
6.3.3. Required Outputs and Reporting Capabilities The system in its electronic form should be capable of providing a range of outputs, including:
a) The ability to search the database against one or several criteria.
b) The ability to generate case summaries that can be customised by the user (i.e. the user can determine which fields should be included).
c) The ability to generate simple lists to help manage the documentation and verification process.
d) A range of standard analytical reports (tables and graphs) with the potential to create “bespoke” or customised reports. A more detailed schedule of reports is included in Appendix 11, while Appendix 9 provides an illustration of the formats that are required.
e) The possibility of including a facility for displaying data using a GIS (overlaid onto maps) has been included as an option in the specification. However this will need to be evaluated in cost benefit terms as the value may be primarily cosmetic rather than functional. It would be possible to display quantitative analysis down to the lowest of the three admin levels (e.g. a Division, sub‐Prefecture or Chiefdom), but the question would be whether this provides significant added value when compared with a table or graph. GIS is clearly important for the INSMA system where it is used as a decision support tool and they have geo‐coded each mine and explosive device, but this is not the case for the MRM and the value of geo‐coding each incident would need to be considered against the security implications for the individuals involved.
6.3.4. Other Design Features The other aspects of the proposed system design are relatively straightforward and are described in detail in Appendix 11a and 11b. Particular points of interest:
a) Access Privileges – It is proposed that each user should be set up with customised access privileges, selecting multiple options if required, including one specifically for verification, so that
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the system can be used to control who makes these decisions if required. The privileges also extend to what users can view, with the option of restricting some users to analytical reports only (i.e. no access to individual case details). There is also a facility for distinguishing between those who are only able to view standard reports and “Power Reporters” who can make use of the bespoke report generator to create customised analytical reports.
b) Implementation Options – The system needs to be capable of multi‐agency or multi‐site installation with consolidation at the national level by the agency with overall responsibility for information management.
At the agency level it should be possible to install the system on a standalone computer or an office network, but the developer will also be required to include proposals for web‐based implementation as an additional option. This could offer some advantages, especially when emergency evacuation is necessary, but it is unlikely that internet connections will be robust enough for this to be the default implementation, especially where a decentralised multi‐agency implementation is adopted. Hence it can only be considered as an option in combination with the other configurations.
It is also important to recognise that it could lead to other security risks, especially if a government intelligence agency or a more technically adept non‐state actor attempted to breach its on‐line security. Hence it would be necessary to employ high level security measures equivalent to those used by financial institutions. There would also be a need to clarify issues around the location of the main database, to ensure that local data protection and access legislation do not create difficulties.
c) Software & Development Tools – Most of the country level databases have been developed using MS Access. This is an understandable choice for a locally developed and supported system. The software is part of the extremely popular Microsoft Office package and most people in the IT sector will be familiar with it. Hence it is relatively easy to find someone able to develop and support an Access database and it should be easier to maintain continuity in managing and supporting the system despite the invariably rapid changeover of staff in the field. However the software has a number of limitations which make it less suited to the development of a more sophisticated database, notably the limitations of its user interface and its performance on larger networks.
The IACPD addressed the first of these issues by using Visual Basic to develop the “front‐end” of their system, but have retained Access for the Back‐End to store and manage the data, and this has helped to create a more flexible and user friendly interface. This would be an option for the MRM system, but a more powerful alternative would be to use SQL for the main database or the Microsoft .NET technology used by DevInfo. This would provide greater flexibility and provide access to a wider range of development tools. It would offer advantages in terms of data security, especially if it is decided to use a web‐based implementation and SSL (Secure Socket level) is required. SQL is also an “open‐source” alternative for which a wide range of development tools are available.
The lack of specialist technical expertise at country level should not be problem, provided the system is robust, has been rigorously tested and there is adequate technical support available at the global level. Furthermore, customisation will not require in‐depth technical knowledge of the system and so there will be less risk of people at the local level inadvertently undermining the system’s integrity.
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6.4. The Interface with Other Information Systems and Databases
So far the proposals for a standardised MRM information system and database have been discussed in isolation, but there are two issues that need to be explored in terms of its relationship with other information systems and databases
6.4.1. Importing & Exporting Data
The first involves the transfer of data both into and out of the MRM system. The inward movement of data concerns those incidents that are initially documented using another information system (e.g. the UNHCR/UNFPA GBV system). In an ideal world it would be possible to automate the transfer of data and technically this would not be difficult, but issues around compatibility (whether the two systems have the same data fields and use the same data definitions) will be more challenging. Wherever possible efforts have been made to achieve this compatibility in the system design, but unfortunately each of the other systems is likely to have different objectives and different data formats, so it will not be possible to achieve full compatibility with all of them.
The hope is that an acceptable level of compatibility will be achieved for the core mandatory fields, but only a proportion of the non‐mandatory ones are likely to be fully matched. Having said all this, it is likely that non‐technical issues will be the main determinant of whether data transfer of this kind will be possible. For instance many human rights monitoring organisations will have reservations about transferring detailed case data, even after all the personal information has been removed, so the real issues will be about demonstrating the security of the MRM system and finding innovative ways of importing data.
Discussions about exporting data from the MRM system have primarily focused on the issues of response and reintegration. The needs assessment indicated that people were much more concerned about the issue of referrals and most respondents did not want the MRM system to get involved in the management of response. The crucial issue is therefore about identifying the key data fields and ensuring that they are in a compatible format to those used by response agencies. This is primarily about the relationship between the MRM system and the Inter‐Agency Child Protection Information System, but this involves more than data transfer and is discussed in greater detail below:
6.4.2. Development Strategy ‐ Standalone or Integrated?
A number of respondents expressed the view that any MRM database should be developed as part of the existing IACPD. There are several arguments in favour of such an approach:
a) Considerable development resources have already been invested over a number of years in the development of the IACPD. It is now a fairly mature system and the MRM could take advantage of all this work.
b) Resources for the development and support of child protection databases are limited and there could be cost savings in integrating the two systems.
c) Integration would simplify the data entry for those agencies that already use the IACPD and avoid any duplication.
d) Integration would also make it easier to manage the referral of cases so that children who had experienced violations can be provided with the reintegration support and services they need in the most efficient and effective manner.
It is argued that the additional fields could be added to the existing IACPD and that its existing security facilities (passwords, differential access levels and encryption) would provide the necessary levels of protection for sensitive data.
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All four of these arguments merit serious consideration, but there are inevitably other factors which point in the opposite direction. Some of these are purely technical, but others are organisational, political or policy issues that have implications for both the children and the agencies involved.
a) Technical Issues
i. The IACPD is primarily a case management system and at will be clear from Section 4 that trying to integrate case management with monitoring can be problematic and result in an excessively complex system.
ii. The data structure being proposed for the MRM system is incident‐based rather than child‐based and a significant number of cases will not include detailed data about individual children (i.e. both the two non‐individual violations and those cases where this data is unobtainable), so the two systems do not necessarily fit naturally together and at the very least will significantly complicate the IACPD. On balance the simpler a system and the more clearly focused the better.
iii. It would obviously be difficult to implement the recommendation that the personal data that could be used to identify a child should be excluded from the MRM system, if it was fully integrated into the IACPD. Conversely it is important to consider whether it is appropriate or necessary for all the MRM monitoring data to be made available to the agency providing response.
iv. While the technical security measures may be robust, most security leaks occur due to human error (i.e. the systems are not effectively implemented). Consequently the more places the data is located, the more vulnerable it will be.
b) Organisational, Political & Policy Issues
i. The MRM database in each country must be hosted by a UN agency. While some UNICEF offices use the IACPD, there is no guarantee that the other UN agencies that host the MRM database would be willing to adopt a system that was also used by non‐UN and non‐MRM agencies involved in service delivery. This is particularly relevant in countries with a Peacekeeping Mission (DPKO would argue that the Mission should host the main information system because the SRSG will have ultimate responsibility for the data and the reporting) or where a human rights orientated agency (e.g. OHCHR) is responsible for information management.
ii. Human Rights monitoring agencies may be even more reluctant to share data with the Task Force if it is stored on a system that is also used to manage response, irrespective of the protocols in place to prevent unauthorised access.
iii. Some NGO’s are reluctant to be publically associated with the MRM because they feel it could compromise their relationship with the government, preferring instead to pass details informally to a representative of the Task Force. The inclusion of the MRM within the IACPD could make this separation harder to sustain and potentially make agencies more vulnerable. The recent indictment of President Bashir may have been an extreme case, but the growing emphasis on combating impunity through institutions like the ICC could lead to increased difficulties for any agencies seen to be directly involved in the MRM.
iv. The agencies providing response and reintegration services do not necessarily need all the data that is required for the MRM. Some children and their families might be reluctant to see all this information remain “on their file”, especially if the IACPD was being used on a multi‐agency basis.
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On balance, for both technical and non‐technical reasons, full integration is probably unwise, although that is not to say that they shouldn’t or couldn’t be “sister” applications or that as many data fields as possible should be compatible. This could involve the DevInfo Support Team in Delhi being involved in the development and support of the system, provided they are able to do so at a competitive price.
If this approach is adopted the critical issue will be to determine which fields need to be common, to ensure that the data formats and definitions are compatible and depending on the number of fields involved, determine the best way of transferring data.
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6.5. Ensuring Security Security is clearly a crucial issue in the design and operation of the information system and, on the basis of the mapping data, something that needs to be considerably strengthened. Specific measures have already been mentioned earlier in Section 6, but Appendix 10 contains detailed Security Guidelines which hopefully will assist with this process. They cover the identification and assessment of risk, security planning and the wide range of mitigation measures that can be used to address these risks, both for manual and electronic systems. Several specific issues are worth highlighting here:
6.5.1. Risk Assessment & Security Planning
Firstly, as every country will be different, it is important that each MRM Task Force carries out a comprehensive risk assessment and, on the basis of its conclusions, develops a security plan. The appendix contains a risk assessment framework and a matrix of “mitigation” measures to assist with this process.
It is important to remember that however robust and comprehensive the technical security measures that are in place, it is the human factor that will be crucial. Awareness of the security risks, an understanding of the security features of the system and the procedures for making use of them are essential. This requires comprehensive security training for everyone involved in collecting the data and using the information system, with regular refresher events to ensure people are kept up to date with changes and reminded of its importance. This training should be supplemented with regular Security Audits that can be used to test both the technical security measures and their use. These are both explained in more detail in Appendix 10a.
Security will obviously be dependent on the choice of information system and the evidence available suggests that an electronic system, provided it is properly used, can provide a more robust solution. This may be less crucial where all the documentation is generated and stored by a UN Peacekeeping Mission at its main base, but this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Holding large numbers of manual forms and files in the field and/or moving them from one place to another (e.g. to the capital) creates significant vulnerabilities which are difficult to mitigate. Where paper‐based systems are considered unavoidable, it is important that their security is given the same level of priority as electronic ones.
6.5.2. Specific System Design Features
As far as the proposed information system and database is concerned, the most important security feature is actually non‐technical and involves the exclusion of personal data from the database containing the rest of the MRM monitoring data. This is an approach that has already been adopted by several Task Forces and which is common in other human rights monitoring systems.
It is recognised that this can create some complications if individual children or informants have to be contacted, but the separate list of personal data and the cross referenced ID codes are a small price to pay for the additional protection. This will be particularly important if the systems are consolidated and used to generate analytical reports at different levels, as the more people who have access to sensitive data the greater the risk.
The suggestion that the use of paper based systems should be kept to a minimum or even eliminated is also an important element in the security framework. This is primarily focused on the various data collection forms and the NGO’s and other field based monitors, rather than the system of weekly situation reports etc that are used by DPKO Peacekeeping Missions, etc.
The other security features of the database are relatively straightforward, including robust passwords (i.e. at least 12 digits, including both letters and numbers), comprehensive data encryption, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) security for any web‐based implementation, an automated audit record of system
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use, automated back‐ups and a requirement to re‐enter the password if the system is left unused for over an agreed number of minutes.
6.6. Challenges and Practical Issues
There are several practical issues that need to be addressed in taking forward the proposal for a more standardised database. The two most significant are:
Task Force Buy‐in and Roll Out – It is one thing to develop the database and quite another to get it implemented by every Task Force. While the majority of respondents may be in favour of developing a single standardised database, it is inevitable that some will have addressed the issue from a theoretical standpoint rather than on the basis that they would need to change their current system.
Those countries that have yet to develop their own systems are likely to be the most willing “early adopters”, while those that have invested heavily in their current systems that are now well established, may well be less enthusiastic.
On the other hand a phased implementation will have a number of advantages as it will allow resources for training and support to be focused on a limited number of countries and the first version of the database can be tested and refined before being rolled out more widely.
In the final analysis it will be the quality of the database that will convince countries to adopt it and that will require evidence from live implementations rather than attractive brochures and glossy PowerPoint presentations. The downside of a phased implementation will of course be delay in getting consistent data from all the Task Forces and hence limitations on any comparative analysis. On the other hand, the prospect of this comparative analysis should also be motivator for adopting the standardised database!
However successful the proposed database, there may still be some countries whose monitoring arrangements are so different that they remain reluctant to use it. Somalia with its integration of the MRM with adult human rights monitoring might be one such example. It is difficult to know in advance how this situation will evolve, so it will need to be managed creatively as things move forward.
Cost of Development – It isn’t possible at this stage to estimate the cost of creating the new database as there are a number of optional features involved and much depends where the development takes place – costs can vary considerably between countries. However, it is self evident that even if the central database is significantly more complex and expensive than any of the current country‐based initiatives, it will still be much cheaper than the combined development costs for all the Task Forces. It is also true that there are many developers capable of developing a database of this kind using SQL, so it is a pretty competitive marketplace.
Training Requirements – With all the focus on system development it is easy to forget the importance of training. This should not just be about the technicalities of the database and how to use it, but also the wider issues of information management and how the outputs of the system should be interested and used. Some of these things will apply irrespective of any database development and have implications beyond the MRM itself, so these aspects of the training could be started before the database development work is completed.
Providing Feedback – Another key challenge will be how the information system can be used to provide feedback to those who have contributed and recorded data in the field. If communities and monitoring staff are to be motivated to report incidents, they need to see how the information is being used, otherwise the system will be seen as a “black hole” into which things disappear. For this to happen effectively, consideration must be given to the format of the
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feedback and making it appropriate to different audiences, including children themselves. Security will also be an issue to remove any risk of the information being used to identify individuals.
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7. PROPOSALS FOR A GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEM
Turning from Task Force to global information management requirements, the needs assessment indicated that most partners wanted to see some comparative statistics and trends based on a consolidated MRM dataset. Many also wanted access to individual case studies for use in advocacy work, although most respondents did not support the idea of having detailed data about every incident available centrally.
What might be possible at the global level will depend on a number of different factors:
a) Data Consistency – While descriptive case studies can come in a range of forms, any quantitative analysis will require data in a consistent format. At the moment this is not the case, so no analysis is possible. The new Task Force information system and database that is being proposed would overcome this problem, but much will depend on how quickly this can be implemented and how many countries adopt it. Some of the countries that have already invested heavily in their own information systems may be reluctant to switch, which will make a comprehensive analysis impossible.
b) Meaningful Analysis – Achieving data consistency is a technical issue and one that could be resolved internally by the MRM partners if it was given sufficient priority, but there is another wider issue that will impact on the usefulness of any analysis. The differences between the conflicts in each country, the capacity of each Task Force and the way in which monitoring is carried out, will all have a big impact on the data collected. These differences will make it difficult to make meaningful comparisons between countries and hence make it difficult to interpret the global analysis. For instance the data may show that the number or proportion of sexual violence cases is much higher in one country than another, but it will be impossible to tell why this is the case from the analysis itself.
This is the reason why many others have decided not to attempt global comparisons which they feel can be misleading. These problems are also faced at the national level, but the differences are likely to be less significant and it is easier to place the analysis in context than is the case at the global level.
This does not render global comparisons meaningless, but they do need to be used carefully, especially in the public domain. Their main value is likely to be internal to the MRM as a catalyst for discussion and further research. They are likely to be of less value in supporting advocacy work unless used in a selective and opportunistic manner.
c) Data Security ‐ The need to protect the confidentiality of the individuals involved in the MRM is equally important at the global level. This is relevant for case study data which must be suitably anonymised, but also for data about individual incidents that is held centrally for analysis. The proposal to exclude personal details from the main MRM database would go a long way towards ensuring protection for the individuals involved, but it may also be a question of perceptions. People at the field level need to have confidence that their data will be protected and may be ambivalent about the prospect of their details being held at the global level. Hence it will be important that the way in which any global information system uses data and protects identities is clearly explained and implemented.
d) Data Ownership – Finally there is the question of who has ownership of the data and the resulting analysis and how it is used. At the country level this can create tensions when one member “goes
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public” without consulting the other partners. The same will be true at the global level and the inevitable competitive element, especially when trying to access funding, can make for additional difficulties. Hence it will be important to agree protocols that lay down who will manage the global information system, who can request analytical reports and how they can be used. Once again it is the public use of reports that is the real issue here and it may be necessary to agree a list of standard reports and mechanism for their release.
There are probably two options for the global information system:
a) Standard Report Formats
This would involve each country being asked to provide analysis in a standardised format.
At the present time this would probably require New York to develop a number of simple Excel spreadsheets that each country would be asked to complete on a regular basis. They would probably need to focus on some very basic indicators such as the number of incidents, children and violations as there is insufficient data consistency to go much further.
Once a standardised database is in place, those countries using it could be asked to submit all their standard reports, possibly as Excel exports and these could easily be consolidated centrally to generate a comparative analysis and some simple trends. The value of these reports would be dependent on the number of countries that are using the new database.
The advantage of this approach is that it is very simple and can be implemented without the extra costs involved in developing a separate global system and without the need to send any sensitive case data to New York. On the other hand the range of reports available will be limited and there will be no possibility of undertaking further bespoke analysis or investigation. Equally there will be no access to individual case study data for advocacy work.
b) Database Consolidation
The other alternative would be to consolidate the new database, or some portion of it, in New York. Technically this would be very straightforward as the database will already have been designed for consolidation at the country level and this would just add one further stage to the process. Equally if it was decided to use the web‐based implementation, the data would already be held in one place and be available for analysis.
This approach would provide much greater opportunities for bespoke analysis and research, but would mean that some or all of the case data would need to be held globally. It would be possible to configure the data export and global consolidation so it only included specific data fields if this was considered necessary. However if the country databases don’t contain any personal details for the individuals involved, it may be difficult to identify a logical basis for deciding which data fields should be consolidated and which excluded. One possibility would be to exclude the detailed description of the incident unless it is marked as suitable for use as a case study (see Appendix 8b – Part 1 – Section 3), but other options could easily be implemented.
In order to ensure data security and manage the use of the information, the database would be best hosted by one agency, which logically would be either Unicef or the OSRSG‐CAAC. They would have responsibility for generating regular standard reports and undertaking any bespoke analysis required and other partners would be able to request specific reports when needed (e.g. a cross border consolidation where for a sub‐regional conflict).
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8. MONITORING THE IMPACT OF THE MRM
The main focus of the consultancy has been on the monitoring of violations, but many respondents and interviewees wanted to see a greater focus monitoring the effectiveness and impact of the MRM. This happens in an unstructured way through the reports produced by key MRM partners, but there is also an opportunity to address the issue more systematically at both the national and global levels and, just as importantly, communicate the result more proactively to all stakeholders, especially those who are directly involved in implementing the mechanism at the field level.
In principle the effectiveness of the MRM should be demonstrated by an improvement in the protection of children affected by conflict and, in particular, a reduction in the number of violations perpetrated against children. However there are many other factors that are likely to have a greater influence on overall the level of violations, so the impact of the MRM can easily be swamped. For instance, we have already seen that there can actually be an inverse relationship between the intensity of the conflict and the number of cases being reported. Furthermore at the global level the impact of the MRM is likely to be determined by its ability to raise the profile of child rights among decision makers and change attitudes, but this is likely to be a very long term process and extremely difficult to monitor. Hence the number of incidents or cases is unlikely to be a useful guide to impact or effectiveness.
This problem is not unique to the MRM. Monitoring the impact of any activity or programme is notoriously difficult as there are invariably many factors that are beyond the control of the agencies involved. To overcome this problem, it is necessary to identify surrogate indicators. These can include some of the more discrete outputs and outcomes over which the MRM can have a more direct influence.
These can be identified at the national and global levels:
8.1. National Impact Monitoring
At the national level there are probably two immediate output indicators of relevance and a number of more indirect outcome indicators. The two output indicators are:
a) The number of children who have been released by, or who have left, an armed group as a direct or indirect consequence of the MRM (i.e. it is unlikely that this would have happened without the involvement of the MRM). This could be expressed either as a number or as a percentage of the number of recorded incidents. Calculating this figure would need to take into account the answers to the questions about immediate intervention and the reasons for the release (Appendix 8b – Parts 2a & 2b – Section 3.3).
b) The number of children identified through the MRM that have been referred for support and reintegration services. This figure would need to exclude those children originally identified by the response agencies themselves, and whose details were subsequently referred to the MRM Task Force.
These two indicators are concerned with the impact of the MRM on the individual children whose cases have been recorded by the mechanism, but are not reflective of the broader objectives of the MRM. For this it is necessary to look at the advocacy undertaken by the Task Force and any Action Plans that have been negotiated with the parties to the conflict.
One way of monitoring the impact of this work might be to record the details of these activities in a simple matrix using a series of standard questions. These might include some or all of the following:
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a) What advocacy activities have been initiated? If possible these activities should be grouped into categories based upon their nature and the desired outcome.
b) Who was the target of these activities? This could be the name of the armed group, key decision makers, the media, the general public, etc.
c) What were the objectives of the advocacy initiative?
d) What was the reaction of the target group to the initiative? In addition to any descriptive text, it might be worth categorising the response. For instance this could include: a refusal to engage or acknowledge the issue; a willingness to engage but a refusal to accept any responsibility; a willingness to engage and some non‐specific undertakings to address the issue; a willingness to engage and a commitment to implement one or more specific actions to address the issue(s) raised.
e) What specific commitments have been made by the target organisation (e.g. changes in policy, a commitment to take action against individual perpetrators, a promise to release specific groups of children, etc)?
f) What evidence is there that these commitments have been fulfilled or ignored? The evidence should be disaggregated into these two categories and could even be categorised (e.g. fully implemented; partially implemented; no evidence of compliance)?
g) What level of success has been achieved against the various objectives of the advocacy (e.g. fully met, partially met, no progress)?
h) What, if any, follow‐up activity has been initiated or undertaken by the Task Force?
This matrix is designed to provide a little more structure to the monitoring what should hopefully be happening anyway. Some of the responses where specific categories have been used could be quantified, but given the small numbers involved any numerical analysis should be treated with caution.
One way of using the matrix to put any initiatives into context would be to create a matrix with a separate column or section for each party to the conflict or potential target of advocacy. This would make clear the scope and coverage of the Task Force’s advocacy work and highlight any important gaps – it may not be possible or appropriate for the Task Force to try and undertake advocacy with every armed group at the same time, but at least this approach would ensure that the issue is addressed and explained.
This general approach could be used in a modified form to monitor any work undertaken by the Task Force to agree Action Plans with the different parties to the conflict. Some of the specific questions might be slightly different, but the overall approach would be the same.
Monitoring of this kind is a tool that can help the Task Force plan and evaluate its work, but it can also be used to communicate information about its activities with key stakeholders. These might include government, donors, other humanitarian agencies, other parties to the conflict and, perhaps most importantly, the staff who are involved in implementing the mechanism at the field level and the communities who are affected by the conflict and whose children are subject to the violations. This can help to raise the profile of the MRM, increase transparency and encourage feedback that the Task Force can use to challenge and reflect upon the effectiveness of its work and how it might be improved.
How this is done needs to be appropriate to the country and the needs of the different stakeholders. In some countries an annual MRM report designed for internal audiences may be the best solution,
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while in others a more disaggregated and less formal approach may be needed, especially as the needs of each constituency and interest group will be different.
8.2. Global Impact Monitoring
Impact monitoring at the global level will be more difficult as many of the activities are more diffuse and the potential outcomes more long term.
The most obvious focus of monitoring will be the annual country reports that are submitted to the Security Council Working Group and the outcome of their deliberations. These things are already covered in the various reports and minutes that are prepared, but it can be difficult to get an overview of their impact and any long term trends from such a large number of complex documents. If this is felt to be the case, there is no reason why a similar structured matrix could not be used to summarise the process and to highlight the key outcomes for each country in terms of the Security Council’s recommendations, the formal responses from the parties to the conflict and any hard evidence of changes in policy or practice at the country level. If the recommendations of the Working Group can be categorised (e.g. by their target group/organisation and the type of change or action required) it might be possible to identify changes over time and also determine which type of recommendations are the most effective.
Implementing this kind of approach would require inputs from the national Task Forces as well as the global partners, but this would help demonstrate the practical linkages within the MRM and provide another way of communicating the work undertaken at the global level back to the field, which many respondents saw as a weakness of the current system.
While the monitoring of other global aspects of the MRM will always be more difficult, for the reasons already identified, the same monitoring principles can still be applied, but the most important thing will be how this information can be summarised and communicated to all the stakeholders in an accessible format.
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9. THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF PRACTITIONERS
The final issue that the consultancy was asked to consider and which was covered in the questionnaires was the information needs of MRM practitioners and how these can best be met, with particular reference to the MRM website CAACNET.
The feedback from the Task Force questionnaires was fairly consistent and highlighted three main issues:
a) The MRM Guidelines were unsurprisingly seen as being of crucial importance with a number of respondents highlighting the need for them to be finalised as soon as possible with several mentioning that the current version is too long and detailed, given the resource constraints being faced by individual Task Forces.
b) The awareness levels of CAACNET were fairly low and while some respondents identified positive aspects of the website, most notably the ability to access important documents, most described it as being difficult to use (a user unfriendly interface and poor search tools) and out of date. Many wanted to see it upgraded and several provided detailed suggestion about how this might be achieved.
c) The third priority for many practitioners was the ability to network bilaterally with other Task Forces, to share good practice and discuss common problems. Several mentioned that global or regional workshops had been valuable in this regard, but that there was a need for more regular contact.
The first issue is beyond the scope of this report, but the other two are quite closely linked and a relatively modest investment could generate significant benefits.
The criticisms of CAACNET were not unexpected. The website was developed very quickly and there have been insufficient resources available to support and manage it effectively as a resource for practitioners. Technically the site is quite limited and the interface is awkward to use and generally uninviting. More importantly it is primarily a repository of documents and at the moment it is extremely difficult to search on the basis of topics and themes, so unless you know exactly what you want, it can be a very slow and cumbersome process to find things. Over time this problem has been exacerbated because no‐one has had the time to update the documents on the site or to engage with users to find out what they want and how it could be improved. As a consequence many existing users have stopped using it and many new people have not even heard about it and the site has reached a point where New York are reluctant to publicise its existence until major improvements are implemented.
Based on the feedback of current and potential users, and a brief assessment of the site, it is clear that there is potential for an MRM website, but for something that is much easier to access, more responsive to users’ needs and, above all, interactive. There is little value in tinkering with the current site and the best approach would probably be to start afresh as the cost of developing a site with the development tools available on the web is likely to be relatively modest. The more significant cost will be for ongoing support which will require someone within UNICEF or the OSRSG‐CAAC to take responsibility for managing the site, liaising with users, updating material and moderating discussions. Without this time commitment, any investment in website development will only have short term benefits and the current problems will re‐surface.
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While a detailed plan for a new website is beyond the scope of this report, a few suggestions may provide a useful starting point. Firstly there needs to be clarity about the purpose of the site. This might be described by the following objectives:
a) Provide MRM practitioners with access to key documents and examples of good practice that can assist them in developing and implementing their work.
b) Provide a mechanism for members of different Task Forces to network, exchange ideas and discuss common problems in a flexible and supportive manner.
c) Provide MRM staff in New York with a more dynamic and flexible mechanism for communicating with colleagues in the various Task Forces than can be achieved through email and telephone contacts or through formal documents.
To fulfil these objectives, the site needs to have some or all of the following:
a) Up‐to‐date versions of all the key documents likely to be needed by MRM practitioners, with a facility for searching the site on the basis of key themes, subject areas and keywords. The person responsible for the website will need to review the documentation on a regular basis, removing or archiving out‐of‐date material and possibly creating a brief summary of new documents for inclusion on the site’s Home Page and inputting the necessary information for the search engine.
b) A full and up‐to‐date list of contacts for each Task Force/MRM partner and user of the website. In addition to the usual contact details (email, phone, etc) , it would be helpful to include a couple of sentences describing the individual’s current role within the MRM and any previous experience, a list of key interests and any specialist areas in which they are able to offer support or advice.
c) Another possibility might be a list of key resource people, both within the MRM family of agencies and freelance consultants, once again with an indication of their specialities.
d) A selection of case studies illustrating good practice or alternative ways of addressing particular aspects of the MRM (e.g. negotiating Action Plans, providing feedback to field staff, etc). These could be commissioned by the person responsible for the website or suggested by others working at the country or global level. Unsolicited contributions would need to be moderated to ensure that they were consistent with current guidelines, etc.
e) A selection of training materials and procedures manuals could also be included on the site, but once again these would need to be moderated to ensure that they provided evidence of good practice. The website manager could possibly group them by subject and provide a commentary explaining the different approaches and the issues that need to be considered when drafting the document or planning the activity.
f) An interactive calendar giving details of key meetings, workshops, visits, etc. and deadlines for responses or submissions. This could include a schedule of meetings for all key committees and working groups. Individual users could also add details of planned events in their own country or region, although there would need to be some guidelines and possibly moderation to ensure that the calendar didn’t become overloaded. The entry for each event, meeting, etc. should include some basic details of what is planned and who to contact for information.
g) A discussion forum on which any user would be able to raise questions and invite comments/contributions from colleagues. These would normally be self organising and regulating, but some moderation may be required from the website manager.
h) One or more regular blogs contributed by key individuals. These could easily be used to provide users at the country level with a lively and informal view of what is happening in New York
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(events, issues, concerns, hot topics, etc.) and vice versa. The possibility of a blog from the Security Council Working Group or other similar entities might also be worth considering.
i) Another possibility would be to invite contributions from other agencies/individuals with relevant expertise or ideas, including those involved in other kinds of monitoring work. This could be just for interest or as a way of inviting feedback and contributions from the MRM network (e.g. the Macro Monitoring Project and OCHA’s Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework).
If the website is to be a success in providing users with access to the information and documents they need and an opportunity to network and interact both bilaterally and multilaterally, there will be a number of key requirements:
Look and Feel – A flexible, user friendly interface with good search facilities is essential, but the website also needs to have a lively, spontaneous and even informal feel. It should not be just another place to read lengthy formal reports. People will only really engage with it, if they are encouraged to glance at it for a few minutes in the morning and possibly respond to a news item or a thread on the discussion forum. They will only do this if the format and style encourages this level of informality and engagement, while retaining its serious purpose.
Home Page – The home page of the website is the gateway to everything else and needs to signal the sites dynamism and flag up new topics, events and documents. It needs to be the place people are encouraged to look for a quick update and a pointer to new material.
Support & Moderation – The role of the website manager is crucial. For the website to have a chance of success this role will need to form a significant part of someone’s job description and they will need to take a proactive approach to the site’s development, updating the content, engaging with current and potential users, soliciting material and encouraging participation. They will also need to moderate the site, keeping an eye on discussion threads to ensure people are observing the “house rules” and that material being put forward is compliant with the current policy and practice.
House Rules – Given the sensitivity of the MRM it will be important to establish and enforce some simple house rules regarding what can be posted and discussed on the site. The most obvious one will relate to case specific data, but there may well be others that can be identified.
Access – The site will still need to be password protected and only accessible to registered users, so it will be important to decide who should be given access. The feedback to the questionnaire indicated that in some counties, access had been limited to just one individual from the Task Force, probably representing one of the Co Chairs, while in others a more liberal approach had been adopted. Much will depend on the sensitivity of the material being posted and the content of the house rules, but the website could provide a useful way of engaging with a wider constituency within the Task Forces at country level and motivating agencies on the periphery to become more involved in the mechanism. One possibility might be to have two levels of access with the more sensitive material reserved for the core users, but this would significantly complicate things and may not be worth considering during the early stages of the new website’s development.
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10. RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The main report and appendices contain a large number of very detailed proposals. These are summarised below in the eight key strategic recommendations that will require a formal decision before implementation can take place. For each recommendation there is a reference to the parts of the report where more details can be located.
The recommendations are followed by details of the steps required for their implementation.
10.1. Recommendations
i) Minimum Dataset
The MRM should seek to operationalise the minimum dataset using mandatory and non‐mandatory fields that can be supplemented locally with additional user‐defined fields and implemented in either a manual or electronic format. For this to be successful, predefined options and standardised data definitions must be utilised wherever possible. (Section 6 and Appendix 8)
j) Treatment of Personal Data
The MRM should move towards a system which keeps confidential personal details about all the individuals involved in the monitoring process separate from the main data about incidents and violations. (Section 6)
k) Manual or Electronic Systems
The MRM should, to the extent possible, minimise the use of manual (paper) forms and maximise the use of suitably protected electronic systems for the storage and manipulation of data. (Section 6)
l) Standardised Database
The MRM should develop a standardised database that can be used by Task Forces at the country level. It should be based upon a robust data structure, clear data definitions and a mix of mandatory and non‐mandatory data fields, with sufficient flexibility to cope with the diverse approaches to monitoring adopted in different countries. (Section 6 and Appendices 8, 9 & 11)
m) System Security
All MRM Task Forces should undertake a full Risk Assessment and use it to develop a Security Plan for their information system. This should be revisited on a regular basis and updated to take account of changing circumstances. (Section 6 & Appendix 10)
n) Global Analysis
Any global analysis of MRM data should initially be based on a small number of simple Excel proformas, but once the standardised MRM database is in place at Task Force level, this should be used to consolidate non confidential data. This should be undertaken by one agency on behalf of all the partners with clear protocols in place for the disclosure of reports into the public domain. (Section 7
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o) Impact Monitoring
The MRM should consider utilising a more structured approach to impact monitoring utilising a matrix of the kind described in the report and place greater emphasis on communicating the results to its stakeholders, including those in the field who have contributed to the collection of data. (Section 8)
p) Website Development
The MRM should consider the possibility of establishing a new upgraded website for MRM practitioners with an emphasis on providing users with opportunities to engage interactively with each other, BUT only if adequate resources can be provided for its ongoing support and management. (Section 9)
10.2. Implementation ‐ Next Steps Implementation of the main proposals will need to take place in a series of stages, although it will be possible to start some tasks simultaneously.
Timescales are difficult to predict at this stage and will depend most heavily on the MRM partners themselves, as opposed to the IT specialists (e.g. when providing feedback and comments at various stages of the process).
Stage 1
a) Undertake further consultation on the proposed approach and the recommendations above. Provided the recommendations are agreed and it is decided to move ahead with the creation of a standardised database, the detailed data fields and definitions will need to be finalised on the basis of feedback from partners and MRM Task Forces.
Stage 2
a) Invite proposals, based on the specification contained in Appendices 8 and 11, from a limited number of database developers. Their proposals and costings will need to cover the development of the database itself together with the provision of training and on‐going support. The various costs should be disaggregated and the optional elements (e.g. web‐based implementation, GIS, etc.) should be identified separately, so that decisions can be made about which components can be afforded.
The decision on allocating the contract should give significant weight to the providers’ track record in development and support and not be exclusively focused on the cost element in their quotes. Potential suppliers could initially be asked to provide outline proposals and costings. This will make it possible to draw up a budget for the project and decide on the exact approach to procurement at an early stage (i.e. the balance between competitive tendering and a negotiated contract with an existing supplier). This will enable negotiations to take place with potential donor(s) before any commitments are required.
b) At the same time all the Task Forces should be encouraged to move towards using the proposed data formats, including the data definitions detailed in Appendix 8b and to separate personal data from the core monitoring system. In the first instance this would probably involve the modification of the manual (paper) forms being used in the field or the adoption of a simple electronic version based on Appendix 8, although this may require some modification based on the consultation undertaken during Stage 1.
c) Task Forces should also undertake a risk assessment and review their security measures on the basis of the guidance in Appendix 10.
Stage 3
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a) Once the development contract is allocated, the first trial version of the standardised database should be developed and field tested in collaboration with a small group of countries. These should be selected on the basis of their willingness and capacity to participate and an effort should be made to encompass some of the key differences in approach that are found within the community of MRM Task Forces (e.g. child and incident‐based data monitoring, centralised and decentralised implementations, etc.).
b) The trial version of the database will need to be modified based on feedback from the field trials and the views of other Task Forces/partners. This may well need to be an iterative process, with several developmental phases, as the feedback becomes more tightly focused and the pilot countries get closer to “going live”.
Stage 4
a) Version 1 of the database, together with the necessary training materials, should be rolled out to the first group of participating countries. This is likely to include the pilot countries together with those that without a functioning system at that point in time or those that are keen to replace their existing dysfunctional systems. Centralised or regional training will be required for system administrators, who would then be responsible for local implementation.
b) At the same time other countries should be encouraged to produce reports in a similar format to those generated by the new database. These can then be used at the global or regional level to explore the opportunities for generating inter‐country comparisons and trends, together with the potential problems involved in doing so.
Stage 5
a) The system can then be rolled out to additional countries as and when possible. This will be determined by the level of interest/demand and the capacity to provide the more intensive support and training required during the initial implementation, so a phased programme is likely to be the most appropriate.
b) Further development and roll‐out of the global analysis will also be required, based on what has been learnt during Stage 4 and utilising the expanding dataset.
c) The performance of the system will need to be monitored and reviewed on an ongoing basis and bugs fixed and upgrades implemented as appropriate. There would be value in having a global or a series of regional review meetings at this stage of the system’s development.
Other Implementation Issues
a) Once decisions are made in principle and resources are allocated, the development of the impact monitoring framework and the interactive practitioners’ website can be implemented independently of the main information system/database.
The former can be done in‐house and it should be possible to outsource the development of the website for a relatively modest cost. One staff member will need to be trained and have time allocated for the ongoing support and maintenance of the website (circa 0.25 FTE).
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11. APPENDICES
LIST OF APPENDICES
1 Terms of Reference
2 Schedule of Visits & Consultees
3 Field Questionnaire (Blank Form)
4 Summary Analysis of Field Questionnaire Responses
5 Global Questionnaire (Blank Form)
6 Summary Analysis of Global Questionnaire Responses
7 OCHA Access Monitoring & Reporting Framework
8 Data Requirements Framework
f) Explanatory Notes
g) Data Requirements Format
h) Confidential Data Sheets
i) Data Requirements Example 1 – Recruitment & Abduction
j) Data Requirements Example 2 – School Attack
9 Perpetrator Reports
c) Commentary
d) Graphs and Tables
10 Risk Assessment Framework
d) Security Guidelines
e) Risk Assessment Template
f) Risk Mitigation Matrix
11 Database Specification
c) Database Specification
d) Data Entry Menus and Screens
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APPENDIX 1
TERMS OF REFERENCE The appendix contains the original Terms of Reference that were developed for the consultancy in May 2008.
UNICEF, Child Protection New York
Recruitment of L4 / L5 Officer (Consultant) POST TITLE: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism Database and Information
Management (DBIM) Consultant POST LEVEL: L4 / L5 TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: SSA DUTY STATION: New York, United States of America, DURATION: 5 months CLOSING DATE: 2 June 2008
Background to Assignment
In July 2005 the Security Council called for the implementation of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), through Security Council Resolution 1612 that would collect timely, accurate and objective information on six specific grave violations against children in situation of armed conflict. In 2006, the MRM was implemented in seven pilot countries namely, Burundi, Cote D’Ivoire, DRC, Nepal, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan. In 2007, the MRM was expanded to include Chad, Myanmar, the Philippines and Uganda. In 2008, the MRM will further expand to Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and probably to Colombia.
In July 2007, after examining the initial lessons learned by the pilot countries, the Global MRM Steering Committee agreed to conduct a comprehensive study to assess the existing databases and information management systems (DBIM) initiatives and make recommendations for the way forward on developing and rolling out an MRM DBIM. Such a system will be utilized for monitoring, reporting and assist in responding to a variety of child protection concerns, including but not limited to the six grave violations against children in situation of armed conflict being specifically monitored by the MRM, at both the field and global level. The consultant should additionally analyse the need for the development of a prototype case management system, to assist with response to the six grave child rights violations, as an option for countries who may wish to avail of such a system.
The consultant should also be aware that the context, priorities, structure, partners and systems for the MRM are highly varied throughout the world. Moreover, s/he should recognize the fluid and dynamic work environment in which the MRM is being implemented; where priorities and data management requirements may change over short periods of time. Flexibility and adaptability should be key features of the end product. It should consider sustainability from a field perspective; and should grow from field requirements.
Objectives and Deliverables
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Under the direct supervision of the UNICEF MRM Programme Officer and MRM Child Protection specialist, the consultant will be responsible for:
1. Conducting a comprehensive database and information management needs analysis for the standardized MRM database and information management system at the global and country levels of those countries implementing the MRM to clearly identify:
a. the minimum data requirements and formats; b. the case management requirements and how the two datasets need to interface.
2. Executing a comprehensive global mapping and assessment of all existing initiatives of database and information management (DBIM), including inter‐agency systems used by UN and NGO agencies and relevant government agencies, in the fields of:
a. monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children, b. human rights monitoring; and c. child protection case management and follow‐up (separated children, sexual violence, CAAFG, etc).
The mapping and assessment will provide an analysis of what databases and information management systems currently exist in this field; the type of data that is currently recorded; the reports that are capable of being produced by the existing systems; the strengths and weaknesses of each existing system; identification of lessons learnt and best practices in the existing systems; and an evaluation of existing technologies used such as Microsoft Excel, DevInfo / Emergency Info, Access and MySQL.
3. Distinguish between aspects of MRM data management requirements that need to be developed as part of global system; vs. MRM data management that are better developed at country level.
4. Assessment of hardware and software capacity available at regional, national and field levels with UN and other NGO partners involved in MRM.
5. Based on the analysis of the mapping and needs, recommending in a requirements document what needs to be undertaken and proposing the most efficient way to develop an MRM database and information management system template for both the national and global level and identifying all of its components (software, security measures, fields, etc.). Recommendations should also consider how this global system can link into and communicate with existing databases in the field. The consultant should write two sets of requirements documents:
a. One requirements document for a simple MRM statistical data management system (for those operations without protection case management or I.T. capacity)
b. (If the analysis concludes that this is appropriate) One requirements document for a more complex MRM data management system for case management or requirements to reconfigure an existing case management database to meet MRM requirements (for those operations that have the capacity for individual‐level intervention).
These two systems would need to be compatible with each other in terms of statistical reporting.
6. To develop a detailed work plan identifying resources (financial, material, human) and timeline needed to develop and roll out the MRM DBIM.
General principles:
1. The MRM DBIM is to provide an effective information management tool to simplify data storage with a user‐friendly interface that allows for analysis on the 6 grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict for reporting purposes and to establish trends over time.
2. Security of the data will be of utmost importance. 3. To the extent possible, the MRM DBIM should be built on existing initiatives, unless deemed not an optimal
solution. 4. The global database should be fed statistics automatically from the national databases. 5. To the extent possible, the databases should seek to run in real‐time. 6. Further to having a user‐friendly data entry interface, the DBIM will need to provide efficient reporting tools
such as systematic visual geographical mapping of the violations (including consideration of integrating a
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GIS), pull‐down menus to query on any aspects of the violations: by gender, by perpetrator, by time period, etc.
7. The mapping should provide an analysis component to establish if the MRM DBIM could or should be linked to or to integrate the broader child protection case management and follow‐up databases of the response component.
8. The MRM DBIM should be flexible enough for countries to modify it in a way that suits local needs as quickly and efficiently as possible; including flexibility for country to include additional fields, development of additional queries and reports as and when they require; and incorporate local language requirements.
9. The requirements documents and proposed solutions should take into account technical principles and best practices of both child protection and data management.
Methodology
1. The consultant will work mostly using email communications complemented by phone conversations, field visits and direct visits to partners at the global level.
2. The consultant will be expected to develop all necessary information gathering tools for the mapping, the needs assessment and the analysis at the beginning of the consultancy
Travel
Travel to two or three countries involved with the MRM will be required.
Skills and Qualifications
Advanced university degree or equivalent background, in Social Sciences, Information Management Systems, or other relevant disciplines.
Eight to ten years progressively responsible professional work experience at the national or international levels in monitoring, evaluation, particularly in relation to protection, information technology, database management, or related field.
Experience in working with and developing databases and information management systems is essential. Experience working on protection and armed conflict related issues and a familiarity with the monitoring
and reporting on violations against children in armed conflict, would be an asset. Excellent research skills. Communication skills in the English language and working knowledge of the French language would be an
asset. Demonstrated ability to work in a multi‐cultural environment and establish harmonious and effective
working relationships, both within and outside the organization.
Functional Competencies
Excellent analytical, planning, conceptual thinking and documentation skills. Ability to work with minimal supervision. Advanced computer skills, especially in the field of DBIM softwares. Documents required from applicants
Cover letter Updated Resume Updated UN P‐11
Please note that only short listed applications will be contacted. If you are interested in applying, please email your completed application to [email protected] and [email protected] by 6 June 2008.
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APPENDIX 2
SCHEDULE OF VISITS & CONSULTEES
Name Position/Department/Project Agency
Somalia – August 2008
Katherine Grant Child Protection Specialist Unicef
Paul Fizman Child Protection Officer Unicef
John Marinos Protection Officer UNHCR
Dvid Mugo IT Clerk UNHCR
New York (Trip 1) – 09/09/08–12/09/09
Stephane Pichette Project Officer Unicef
Lara Scott Child Protection Specialist Unicef
Rebecca Symington Senior Advisor, Child Protection in Emergencies Unicef
Shirin Nayernouri Programme Officer Unicef
Nicolas Pron DevInfo Global Administrator Unicef
Anne Grandjean Child Protection Specialist Unicef
Tonderai Chikuhwa Programme Officer OSRSG‐CAAC
Alec Wargo II Programme Officer OSRSG‐CAAC
Laurence Gerard Communications Officer OSRSG‐CAAC
Daniel Christiansen Humanitarian Affairs Officer UNOCHA
Jenny McAvoy Consultant ‐ Protection Adviser UNOCHA
Avid Reza Medical Epidemiologist CDC Atlanta
Mark Anderson International Emergency and Refugee Health Branch (IERHB) at the Center for Disease Control
CDC Atlanta
Alastair Ager Professor of Clinical Population & Family Health Colombia Univ
Les Roberts Clinical Associate Professor, Program on Forced Migration & Health, Mailman School of Public Health
Colombia Univ
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Ann Makome Child Protection Focal Point DPKO
Julia Freedson Director Watchlist
Severine Chevrel Project Coordinator IRC/IACPD
Sudan – 02/11/08 – 08/11/08
Ghada Kachachi CAAC Cluster Manager Unicef
Subajini Jayasekaran Project Officer, Child Protection Unicef
Ida Hyllested Child Protection Officer Unicef
Vinoraj Ratnaraj Database Consultant Unicef
Khaled Abou‐Elyousr Child Protection Officer, El Geneina Unicef
Mahgoub Mahgoub Child Protection Officer Unicef
Hazel de Wet Senior Child Protection Officer UNAMIS
Ranjita Child Protection Officer UNMIS
Ikram Hussein Human Rights Officer UNMIS
Shobha Rao Thematic Programme Adviser Save the Children (UK)
Democratic Republic of the Congo – 10/11/09 – 15/11/09
Alessandra Dentice Chief, Child Protection Unicef
Eloge Olengabo Protection Officer Unicef
Tasha Gill Emergency Child Protection Unicef
Ramatou Toure Child Protection Specialist Unicef
Pernille Ironside Protection Specialist Unicef
Judith Lavoie Chief Child Protection Adviser MONUC
Marting Nagler CPS Reporting Officer MONUC
Xavier Aurelio Tabbada Database Consultant MONUC
Dedo Nortey Deputy Country Director Save the Children (UK)
Emma Fanning Child Protection Coordinator Save the Children (UK)
India – 19/01/09 – 20/01/09
Arun Kapuria DevInfo Support Team
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Ratnakar Panigrahi Senior Technical Consultant DevInfo Support Team
Sri Lanka – 21/01/09 23/01/09
Andy Brooks Chief of Child Protection Unicef
Virginia Perez Child Protection Specialist – CAAC Unicef
Senathirajah Ravindran Child Protection Officer Unicef
Nayanathara Iddamalgoda Database Assistant – Child Protection Unicef
Lara Perera Protection officer – Monitoring and Reporting Unicef
Sebastian Kasack Mine Action Specialist Unicef
Barbara Profeta Child Protection Specialist (Vavuniya) Unicef
Denise Ulwar Zonal Protection Officer (Batticaloa) Unicef
Saravanamuthu Syvanesasingam Zonal Protection Officer (Jaffna) Unicef
Bindu Abraham Zonal Protection Officer (Trincomalee) Unicef
Bernadette UNHCR
Geoffrey Oyat Programme Manager Save the Children in Sri Lanka
Gaya Pathikirikoratna Law Enforcement Officer NCPA
London – 27/05/09
Jennifer Morgan Project Coordinator IRC/IACPIMS
Geneva – 09/06/09–11/06/09
Ahmed Motala Human Rights Officer, Methodology, Education & Training Unit (Global Database)
OHCHR
Li Fung Human Rights Officer, Peace Missions Support & Rapid Response Unit (Global Database)
OHCHR
Najah Didi Global Database OHCHR
Emmanuelle Croset Quick Response Desk, Special Procedures Database OHCHR
Kirstin Barstad Child Protection Adviser ICRC
Andree Jolidon Database Officer ICRC
Shelley Gornall Operational Data Management Specialist UNHCR
Marian Hodgkin Coordinator for Network Services Inter‐Agency Network for Education in
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Emergencies
Roberta Cecchetti UN Representative, Head of Office Save the Children Alliance
Misty Buswell Advocacy and Program Officer Save the Children Alliance
Sophie de Connick, ILO
Anton Hauser Direct Beneficiaries Monitoring & Reporting ILO
Susan Gunn Senior Technical Adviser, IPEC (Child Labour Monitoring Systems) ILO
New York (Trip 2) – 29/07/09–31/07/09
Stephane Pichette Project Officer Unicef
Lara Scott Child Protection Specialist Unicef
Pernille Ironside Unicef
Judy Grayson Head of the Mine Action Cluster Unicef
Eduardo Garcia Rolland Child Protection Adviser IRC
Giorgia Passarelli OHCHR
Severine Chevrel Watchlist
Alec Wargo II Programme Officer OSRSG‐CAAC
Anne Makome Child Protection Focal Point DPKO
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APPENDIX 3
FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE (BLANK) The appendix contains the blank questionnaire that was sent to each MRM Task Force. Many of the questions required the person completing the form to select from a list of options. These options can only be viewed in the electronic version of the questionnaire.
1. Introduction
This questionnaire is designed to elicit information from the countries currently implementing the MRM, or preparing to do so. Please complete as much of the questionnaire as possible given the situation in the country (e.g. the stage of development of the MRM, whether a database is currently being planned or used, etc). The questionnaire focuses on mapping the information systems currently being used to support the MRM in each country and on surveying the information management needs of each CTFMR so that the potential for developing a more standardized global system can be assessed and if appropriate a draft specification developed. Some questions, especially in the "MIS Overview" section, try to address both objectives in combination. This has been done to cut down on the amount of unnecessary duplication. It is not expected that each CTFMR will be able to respond to every question as this will depend on the stage of development and the way in which the MRM has been implemented (e.g. whether a database is being used), but please provide as much detail as possible. Wherever possible multiple choice answers have been included, which can be accessed via drop down menu, but there is also space to add comments and explanations. If you experience any problems using the questionnaire, please contact the consultant: Chris Robertson; +44‐1690‐760338 or [email protected].
2. Worksheets/Sections
The questionnaire is divided into 10 main sections, each in a separate worksheet, which can be accessed via the "tabs" at the bottom of the screen. This has been done to make things more manageable, but also to help countries allocate the task of completing the different sections to the appropriate individuals. For instance the more techical details of the information system and, if present, database will be best completed by the Technical Officr responsible for the database (TO) or the Lead Officer with overall responsibility for the MRM (LO), while the more strategic sections will need an input from the CTFMR. You will need to use the arrow keys at the bottom left of the screen to access some of the later worksheets.
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Worksheet Name Responsibility Content
Cover LO/TO Contact details for the person responsible for coordinating the completion of the questionnaire.
MRM Background LO/CTFMR General information about how the MRM is organisaed, the membership of the CTFMR, the role of members in case monitoring, the scale and pattern of violations reported. This will provide the context within which the information system operates.
Paper System TO Details of the paper forms that are used to record case data, how these have been developed and are being used.
Electronic System TO Details of the electronic data management system (database or spreadsheet) that is being used to support the MRM.
Electronic System 2 TO If there is more than one electronic data management system, details of the second one shoiuld be entered into this hidden worksheet ‐ just point at any "tab", right click, select unhide and select the required worksheet
Outputs TO/LO Details of the reports that the information system (primarily the electronic one) is capable of producing, how they are used and by whom.
Security TO Details of how the security of sensitive personal data relating to survivors, their families and witnesses are protected in both manual and electronic systems.
Resourcing LO/TO Details of the costs of developing AND operating the information system
Other MIS‐DBS LO/CTFMR
Details of other information systems (especially databases) that are being used by other organisations or networks to either monitor human rights/child rights violations or support longer term reintegration programmes, including the interface with the MRM system(s).
MIS Overview LO/CTFMR
This is probably the most important section of the questionnaire as far as the CTFMR is concerned. It focuses on the strategic objectives of the information system, the CTFMR's priorities and the effectiveness of the current system in meeting them. It also asks about the challenges that have been faced in developing and implementing the system.
Standardised System LO/CTFMR This section seeks the CTFMR's views on the idea of developing a standardised information system that could be adapted for use in different countries.
External Information LO/CTFMR
This final section moves away from case management and asks about the CTFMR's access to external sources of information (e.g. CAACNET), how they are currently used and how they might be improved or supplemented.
3. Data Entry Protocols
The questionnaire is contained in a series of Excel worksheets. These are all protected and only the cells requiring data entry have been unlocked. These are coloured either pale green or pale yellow (see below).
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Example Explanation
The Pale Green Cells contain a fixed menu of alternative answers. No other answers are possible. To access the menu: use the mouse/touchpad to click on, or highlight, the appropriate cell and a small arrow will appear; click on the arrow and the list of answers will appear; select your preferred answer by clicking on it.
The Pale Yellow Cells allow you to type in your answer. There are no pre‐determened alternatives. You can write as little or as much as you want. Do not worry if part of your answer is not visible when the worksheet is viewed or printed as everything will still be accessible and the row height can be adjusted accordingly.
4. Other Documents/Material Required
In addition to the questionnaire, the consultant will require access to the other documentation and materials listed below. Some may contain sensitive or confidential data, so wherever possible personal details (names addresses, etc) should be removed to protect identities. Where this is not possible, the documents/databases, should be password protected and the passwords forwarded in a separate email or by another means. All the material provided will be held on a secure computer and will be destroyed/deleted as soon as it has been reviewed by the consultant.
MRM Strategy and Operational Plan
These will provide additional information to supplement the answers in the "MRM Background" worksheet.
Detailed IS/IT System Specification
This document, if present, will provide an important insight into the early planning of the system (especially the database) and what objectives it was hoped it would meet.
Manual/Paper Forms
New York have already provided the consultant with some blank forms, but it is important to ensure that we have the most up to date versions. If at all possible, these forms should contain live data (suitably anonymised to protect identities) as this will provide an important insight into how they are used and the quality of data collected. If there have been major changes in the paper forms during the life of the MRM, it would be helpful to also have a set of the earlier version(s)
Database or Spreadsheet
The mapping of existing systems will require a detailed comparison of electronic systems, including their architecture, data fields and the quality of the data that they contain. This cannot easily be obtained through a questionnaire. Hence it is important that we receive copies of the database, preferably containing live data, but once again anonymised by the removal of personal details that could be used to identify the individuals involved. As with the paper forms, if there have been a change in the electronic system during the life of the MRM, it would also be useful to have a copy of the earlier version.
Statistical Reports Examples of the operational and statistical reports that the system can generate incorporating live data.
Internal or Horizontal Reports
Examples of reports produced by the CTFMR which illustrate how the outputs of the information system and database have actually been used. In addition to any horizontal reports, this might include progress reports and other papers prepared for CTFMR meetings, Action Plan reviews, etc.
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MRM INFORMATION MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
COVER SHEET
Country
Details of Primary Contact Person
Name
Position
Agency
Phone
Mobile
MRM BACKGROUND Please provide background information about the development and operation of the MRM as a whole to provide the context within which the information management system operates.
1. Timeline
When was the CTFMR established
When did case monitoring start
Comments & Explanation
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2. Membership
Please list the members of the CTFMR and their roles
Organisation/Agency Category Primary Role
Special Responsibility
Comments/Details
Comments & Explanation
3. Regional Task Force Structure
Are there Regional Task Forces in addition to the CTFMR?
Is YES, how many?
Is the membership identical to that of the CTFMR?
If NO, please give details below.
Comments & Explanation
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4. Task Force Meetings
CTFMR
Regional TF
How often do the different Task Forces meet?
Comments & Explanation
5. Lead Responsibility
Have individual members of the CTFMR been allocated lead responsibility
for specific violations?
If YES, please give details below.
Violation Lead Agency Comments/Details
Abduction
Attacks on Schools and Hospitals
Denial of Humanitarian Access
Killing and Maiming
Recruitment
Sexual Violence
Comments & Explanation
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6. Case Monitoring 1 ‐ Incident or Child Focused
Some incidents involve just one child, others involve groups of children. In some cases it is possible to obtain detailed data about each child, but in others this may not be possible, so the focus of the monitoring will be on the incident rather than each individual child. This has major implications for information management. Please try to give a rough estimate of the percentage of cases that fall into the categories described below (the total of the percentages should equate to 100%). These figures should exclude "Attacks on Schools and Hospitals" and "Denial of Humanitarian Access", which would not normally involve individual children's data.
Cases that involve just one child and where detailed data about the child is available >0%;<25%
Cases that involve a group of children, but where detailed data is available for the children
>75%; <100%
Cases that involve just one child, but where detailed data about the child is NOT available
>75%; <100%
Cases that involve a group of children, but where detailed data about each child is NOT available
100%
Comments & Explanation
7. Case Monitoring 2 ‐ Agency Roles
What role does each CTFMR member play in the monitoring of cases? For each member agency, indicate whether it is involved in receiving reports, investigations and/or verification, either for all, or just some, of the six violations. If only "some violations", specify which ones in the appropriate "pale yellow" cells.
Agency
Receiving reports of alleged violations (from victims/survivors, other witnesses, agencies, etc)
Investigating alleged violations (interviewing witnesses, collecting
documentary evidence, etc)
Verfying cases (making the final decision on
whether to include cases in the MRM)
Comments & Explanation
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8. Case Monitoring 3 ‐ Size of Caseload
How many incidents have been reported, investigated and verified since the MRM was established/over the last 12 months?
Since MRM established Last 12 months
Reported Verified Reported Verified
Abduction
Attacks on Schools and Hospitals
Denial of Humanitarian Access
Killing and Maiming
Recruitment
Sexual Violence
Comments & Explanation
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MANUAL (PAPER) DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Please provide details of the manual (paper based) data collection and management system used in support of the MRM.
1. Use of Manual (Paper Forms)
Are paper forms used to record the details of alleged violations
If NO, why and how are the details of cases recorded?
If YES, please provide copies of all manual (paper) data collection forms and guidelines, preferably several copies of each form containing live data to show how each form is actually used and the range and quality of data that it is possible to collect (delete or conceal any sensitive personal details that could be used to identify individual people or organisations)
2. Development of Paper Forms
Has the design of forms changed significantly since the MRM started?
If YES, please explain the reasons for the changes
If YES, please provide copies of the original forms.
3. Data Entry and Transfer
At what stage(s) in the monitoring process are the forms used (i.e. when is data entered?)?
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4. Other Forms and Checklists
Are any other pro‐formas or checklists used to support the data collection and management process? (e.g. proformas for witness statements, checklists of documents/evidence, verification checklists, etc)
If Yes, please provide details below and if appropriate provide copies.
5. Staffing and Training
Approximately how many staff are involved in entering data into these manual(paper) forms?
What initial training is provided for these staff? (length, content, etc)
What refresher training is provided for these staff? (length, regularity, content, etc)
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ELECTRONIC DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Please provide details of any electronic data management system (database or spreadsheet) used to support the MRM. Everyone should complete Question 1 below; all the questions are only relevant to those CTFMR's that use an electronic data management system. If several electronic systems are being used for different violations, please complete multiple worksheets (see Guidance Notes).
1. Scope
Is an electronic data management system used to support the MRM?
Is the system used for all six violations?
If NO, which violations are included?
2. Previous Systems
Is this the first electronic data management system used to support the MRM or has it been developed to replace for an earlier system?
If it is a replacement for an earlier system, please give a brief description of the earlier system and explain the reasons for the decision to abandon it.
3. Development Timescale
When did the CTFMR start planning the development of the system?
When did the system "go live"?
4. Development Strategy
What development strategy was adopted? (chose one of the three options)
The CTFMR developed a new "bespoke" system to its own specification
The CTFMR adopted a system that had been initially developed for the MRM in another country
The CTFMR adopted a system that had initially been developed for other (non MRM) Human Rights monitoring work
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If an existing system was adopted, were significant modifications made to it?
Please explain the reasons for the choice of development strategy below
Was a full system requirements document developed? (if YES, please provide a copy).
Was the system development undertaken in‐house or using an external consultant
5. System Overview
The questions below ask for some basic details about the system, but a full working copy of the database/spreadsheet is also required, preferably containing live data (with the sensitive details that could identify individuals deleted). This copy is needed so that the data structure and functionality of the database can be examined and compared with what is being used in other countries. This copy of the system will be deleted by the consultant as soon as it has been checked
Is the system a database or spreadsheet?
What is the name of the system?
What software has been used in its development?
Is the system operated on a centralized basis by just one agency that is responsible for entering all the data, or on a decentralized, multi‐agency basis, with data being entered into different versions of the system and consolidation at the national level for statistical analysis?
Please explain the reasons for the approach adopted (database/spreadsheet and centralized/decentralized)
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6. Operational Timescale
Please provide an estimate of how long it takes for cases to work their way through the system
At what stage is the data transferred from the manual system into into the electronic one?
How long does it take on average between the date when the incident is reported and the date when the case is entered into the electronic data management system at the national level and is incorporated into any statistical analysis
How long does it take on average between the date when the incident is verified and the date when the case is entered into the electronic data management system at the national level and is incorporated into any statistical analysis
Comments & Explanation
7. Data Entry
Who is responsible for entering the data into the electronic system
Please explain why this approach was chosen and indicate whether this has had any implications for data quality.
What training and support has been provided to the individuals responsible for data entry?
What else is done to try and ensure high standards of accuracy in data entry? (e.g. regular quality checks, case reviews, etc)
8. System Support and Management
Who has overall responsibility for the management of the system (person/agency)?
How many changes of personnel have there been in this position over the life of the system and what have been the consequences for continuity?
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Who is responsible for providing technical support and training to the users of the system and what are the main challenges they face?
What is the IT capacity of the different CTFMR partners (hardware and software infrastructure, technical skills, system management capabilities, etc.), what implications has this had for the design and implementation of the current information system/database and what constraints might it impose on any future development of the system?
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OUTPUTS (REPORTS)
Please provide details of the information's reporting capabilities, how these reports are used and by whom. The questions assume that some type of automated or electronic data manipulation is possible. If this is not the case, please give an indication of what reports can be generated from the manual system being used. Please provide examples of each type of output/report. Also indicate what additional features you would like to see provided:
1. Access to Case Data
Does the system have a user friendly search facility that can be used to produce lists of cases that meet selected criteria, and if so, against what criteria?
Search Facility Selection Criteria Comments/Explanation
Can the system provide a comprehensive and/or summary report for individual cases in an accessible/user friendly format, and if so what data is included and can this be customised? Please provide example(s)
Standardised Case Reports?
Customisation of Data? Details/Comme
nts
2. Standard Statistical Reports
What standard (automated) statistical reports are provided by the system (e.g. monthly trends, annual totals by violation type, etc), how can they be customised? Please provide examples.
Type of Report Format Customisation Criteria Uses
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3. Bespoke Reports
Does the system have a "report generator" which enables users to create their own bespoke reports? If so please give details and provide examples of the reports created.
Bespoke Report Generator?
Details/Comments (what reports, how used, by whom, for what purpose and how often
4. Reports based upon the Full Dataset (all the cases from all the CTFMR partners)
Who is responsible for generating reports based upon the full dataset?
Who receives copies of these reports? (i.e. what is the distribution list?) and how often are they produced?
Type of Report Circulation List Regularity
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Can individual CTFMR members request specific reports for their own use?
If so, how often does this happen?
5. Reports based on the dataset of individual CTFMR Partners (i.e. only the cases reported to/investigated by that partner)
Is it possible for other CTFMR members to generate reports based upon their own data set (i.e. the cases they have investigated)?
If not, can they request these reports from the CTFMR agency with overall responsibility for managing the database/spreadsheet/paper system?
How many CTFMR members have taken advantage of this facility?
How often do they do so?
Please provide an explanation and/or any comments below:
6. Additional Reports
What additional reporting capabilities would you find useful?
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SECURITY Please provide details of the security measures taken to protect both paper‐based and electronic systems.
1. Security Risk Assessment
Has a formal security risk assessment been undertaken for information management?
If YES, what were the most significant risks identified in the area of information management? (provide details below ‐ maximum five risk areas)
Risk 1
Risk 2
Risk 3
Risk 4
Risk 5
2. Security of Manual Data (1) ‐ Data Collection
How is the security of data collected in the field protected?
Sensitive personal data (e.g. names and addresses) is kept separately from the other details on the case
Data is only entered into the paper form in the office (i.e. not out in the field)
Data is entered directly into the electronic system (i.e. no use of paper forms)
Codes are used in place of sensitive data to hide the identities of survivors/witnesses or organisations
Other measures (please give details below)
Comments & Explanation
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3. Security of Manual Data (2) ‐ Data Storage
What arrangements are made to protect paper records?
Locked Filing Cabinet(s) used exclusively by MRM staff
Locked office/room used exclusively by MRM staff
Paper records moved to the capital/regional centre for storage
Paper records are shredded as soon as the data has been entered into the electronic system (including scanning of documentary evidence)
Other measures (please give details below)
Comments & Explanation
4. Security of Electronic Data (1) ‐ Users
Please give details of the agencies/staff who have access to the case data (paper & electronic)
Paper records
Electronic system
How many agencies have access to the whole data set (all cases)?
How many staff have access to the whole data set (all cases)?
How many agencies have the electronic data management system (EDMS) containing their own data?
n/a
How many agency staff have access to the EDMS containing just their own agency's data?
n/a
What % of users have been trained in procedures for protecting the security of the information system?
Comments & Explanation
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5. Security of Electronic Data (2) ‐ Password Protection
Please give details of the password protection used to secure electronic data
Is the electronic data management system protected with password(s)?
Does each user of the system have their own unique password?
Does the system incorporate different levels of security (e.g. Administrator, Data Entry, Manager, etc.),
Are the passwords regularly changed?
If YES, how often?
If YES, does the system force users to change them, or is it dependent on the individual users initiating the process?
Does the system maintain an audit trail so that the identity of the user who makes each change/adds new data is automatically recorded
Comments & Explanation
6. Security of Electronic Data (3) ‐ Physical Security & Encryption
Please give details the physical location of the system and how security of data is protected.
Is the system loaded onto a standalone computer or a network that serves the whole organisation/office?
Is the system loaded onto desktop or laptop/notebook computers?
Are these computers located in a locked room used exclusively by MRM staff?
If the system is loaded onto one or more laptops, are these taken out of the office?
If YES, is the data on them encrypted?
Is data transferred between locations using portable media (memory sticks, CD.DVD's, etc)?
Is data transferred between locations by email (as attached files)?
If YES to either of the previous two questions, is this data encrypted?
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Comments & Explanation
7. Testing/Auditing Security Procedures
Is the effectiveness of the security procedures tested on a regular basis?
If YES, how often does this take place?
If YES, please give details below (what is tested, how and by whom)
Comments & Explanation
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RESOURCING
Please provide an estimate of the cost of developing and operating the information system for the MRM. Where possible include the actual costs (e.g. payment of contractors, purchase of equipment), but where this isn't possible, the number of staff/hours involved or any other "in kind" equivalent would be useful.
1. Development of the Information System
Provide details of the cost of developing the system. This is likely to be primarily related to the development of the electronic (database) system, but any estimate of the resources required to develop the manual/paper forms would also be useful. The costs might include internal staff or external consultant costs for IT development, including but not limited to drawing up the system specification, development of bespoke software, customisation of existing software, etc. Also include the cost of any new computer hardware used exclusively for the MRM. Where more than one system has been developed during the life of the MRM, please try to include all costs, but make clear which version of the system they relate to.
Cost category Basis for calculation (actual cost or in‐kind) Actual Cost or
Financial Equivalent (if possible)
2. Operation of the Information System
Provide details of the costs of operating, maintaining and supporting the system. This is likely to include staff time for data entry, staff training, system management and maintenance, support for frontline staff, generation of statistical reports, etc. Also include any recurrent licensing/maintenance/support costs for hardware and software.
Cost category Basis for calculation (actual cost or in‐kind) Actual Cost or
Financial Equivalent (if possible)
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OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS/CHILD RIGHTS INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND DATABASES
1. Other Information Systems
Please provide details of any other information system used to monitor human rights and child rights violations or to manage programmes providing long term support to Children Affected by the Armed Conflict. Include details of the agencies hosting or implementing these systems, the purpose(s) for which they are used, highlight any exchange of data between them and the MRM system (i.e. referral of cases in or out, and synthesis of statistical reports), describe how this is organised and highlight any problems that have been encountered (e.g. confidentiality, incompatible data formats, etc)
Name of Information System
Lead Agency and Contact Details
Who uses them and for what
purpose(s)?
What linkages exist with the MRM Information System? ‐ give details of any data exchange that takes place (e.g. what data, for what purpose, what mechanisms and with what
safeguards, etc)
2. Improved Linkages
Give details of any initiatives or changes that you feel might help improve the linkages between the MRM Information System and other HR/CR Information Systems, either to ensure that violations reported by other networks can more easily be captured by the MRM or to ensure that any referrals of children for longer term support are managed as efficiently as possible.
3. Post‐Conflict Transition Plans
Has any consideration been given to what will happen after the end of the conflict and whether the systems developed for the MRM can have any role in the post conflict transition and the development of robust child rights monitoring systems? If so what conclusions have been reached and have these had any implications for the design of the MRM information system?
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MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Please provide information on the objectives, priorities and performance of the MRM information system(s)
1. Management Information Strategy and Effectiveness
The following table lists the objectives that a MRM Information System might be required to meet. Please rate the importance of each objective for your CTFMR and the effectiveness of your existing information system in meeting it. Use the final column to provide an explanation for these rankings, examples of how the current system is used and, if appropriate, suggest what "outputs" or reports you would find most useful for each objective. There are two "spare" rows for any other objectives that you consider important.
Objective Priority Effectiveness Comments, explanations
and/or suggestions
Preparation of Annual and Horizontal Reports ‐ provision of case profiles, statistical analysis, etc
Advocacy/Action Plans ‐ provision of flash reports for individual cases requiring action and statistical analysis to support Action Planning with the parties to the conflict
Addressing Issues of Impunity and Accountability ‐ providing perpetrator specific reports that can be used in advocacy and in identifying cases for future action (prosecution, TRC, etc)
Managing Immediate Interventions ‐ ensuring that any interventions designed to halt/reverse a violation take place in a timely manner
Support for Programme Planning ‐ using the profile of MRM violations to help identify programme priorities and to monitor the impact of these programmes.
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Managing Case Referrals ‐ ensuring that all cases are referred to the appropriate response/follow‐up agency in a timely manner.
2. Data Requirements
The following table lists the different categories of data that might be included in a MRM information system. The classification is based upon the different stages of the monitoring process and related activities. The list does not imply any particular level of detail as each category could contain as few as one or two items of data. Please indicate the importance of including each category of data in both the paper and electronic systems and the effectiveness of the current system in incorporating each category. Use the final column to provide an explanation for these rankings, examples of how the current system incorporates each category and, if appropriate, suggest what data fields you would like to see included in any future system. There are two "spare" rows for any other categories that you consider important.
Type of Data
Priority
Effectiveness
Comments, explanations
and/or suggestions
Paper Electronic
Initial Source of the Allegation (e.g. date of report, source of report ‐ name/organisation, etc)
Investigation of the Allegation (e.g. details of investigating agency, dates and names of witnesses, sources of documentary evidence, reliability of evidence, etc)
Verification of the Case (e.g. current status of case, date of verification, name of decision maker, etc)
Incident Summary (e.g. date and location of incident, category of violation, etc)
Child(ren)'s Details (e.g. name, DOB/age, address, ethnic/religious affiliation, family situation, etc)
Perpetrator(s)'s Details (e.g. name, group, state/non‐state, armed/unarmed, etc)
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Violation Specific Details (i.e. different data fields for each violation ‐ e.g. type/size of school, type of attack, impact on school, etc)
Details of any Immediate Intervention (e.g. date, type of intervention ‐ contacting police, outcome of the action, etc.).
Details of any Referrals for Follow‐up/Reintegration (e.g. basic needs assessment, date of referral, agency involved, purpose, etc.).
Details of any Follow‐up Support/Reintegration (i.e. more detailed data about the actions undertaken by the agency providing longer term response).
3. Performance of Current Information System
The following table contains a list of areas in which you are asked to evaluate the performance of the current MRM information system. Please indicate the importance of each category and the effectiveness of the current system in meeting your requirements. Use the final column to provide an explanation for these rankings, examples of how the current system performs and, if appropriate, suggest what you would like to see in any future system. There are two "spare" rows for any other categories that you consider important.
Area of Performance Importance Effectiveness
Comments, explanations
and/or suggestions
Data Quality ‐ the extent to which the data collected is in the required format
Data Reliability ‐ the extent to which the data accurately reflects the reality of the cases reported
Data Comprehensiveness ‐ the extent to which all the data fields are regularly completed
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Data Consistency ‐ the extent to which similar cases will be reported in a consistent manner
Coverage ‐ the extent to which the system contains a representative selection of cases (geographically and by type of violation)
Timeliness ‐ the extent to which the system provides users with access to data and reports at the times when they are needed and the extent to which the data they contain is up to date.
Relevance ‐ the extent to which the outputs of the system are relevant to and meet the needs of users (e.g. content, format, etc)
Accessibility ‐ the extent to which data about individual cases and statistical reports (both standard and bespoke) are accessible/available to those who need them).
Value for Money ‐ the extent to which the benefits gained from the information system justify the costs involved, taking into account the "opportunity costs" (i.e. what else the resources could have been used for).
4. Challenges and Problems
What have been the most significant challenges that you have faced in trying to develop an effective information management system for the MRM?
114
5. Overall Assessment
What is your overall assessment of the effectiveness of the current Information System in supporting the MRM and to what extent has it met your original expectations (please explain your ranking below and highlight any areas where the system has failed to deliver as anticipated)
6. Planned Improvements/Enhancements
Please give details of any enhancements or improvements that are planned for the current system and the timescales for their implementation.
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POTENTIAL FOR A STANDARDISED INFORMATION SYSTEM
This section provides an opportunity for you to express your views about the potential for developing a standardised MRM information system and, in particular whether there is a need for a standardised database, that could then be customised for use in different situations at the country level. Much of the more detailed information about objectives, priorities, data requirements and reporting formats has already been covered in the previous sections of the questionnaire (e.g. MIS Overview), so the questions below concentrate on the more general issues.
1. Pros and Cons of a more standardised Information System for the MRM
What, from your perspective, are the most significant potential advantages and disadvantages of a standardised information system and/or database for the MRM
Advantages/Opportunities Disadvantages/Risks/Concerns
2. Overall Assessment
What is your overall opinion about the potential for developing a more standardised, but customisable system?
Comments & Explanation
3. Essential Requirements
If a standardised system was developed, what would be the most essential requirements/elements that you would like to see included?
4. Critical Success Factors
What do you consider the most critical factors that would determine the success of any standardised information system developed to support the MRM?
116
5. IT Infrastructure
If a standardised database was developed for the MRM, how many members of the CTFMR would need to use it, where (head office and/or field) and what is the extent of their current IT infrastructure? Please select the categories that best describe each partner's circumstances and use the comments section to provide any explanations required.
Name of
Agency
MRM Implementation Requirements
Workstations Network Infrastruct
ure
Internal IT Support
External IT Support
Software & Applications
Currently in Use Comments
Total MRM
6. Other Potential Initiatives
If a standardised information system is NOT developed, what other initiatives could be taken to improve the quality an effectiveness of information management at the country level?
EXTERNAL INFORMATION SOURCES Most of this questionnaire is focused on the information system for managing case monitoring data, but CTFMR's also have other, wider information requirements, including access to information that can assist them in fulfilling their objectives more effectively. This final section provides an opportunity to identify what information is required, what is currently available, how it is disseminated and how its provision might be improved. In addition to what is or might be provided or facilitated centrally, the section can also be used to identify the ways in which information is shared or could be shared between individual CTFMR's.
1. Information Requirements
Please identify what information you do or might find most useful in enabling the CTFMR to fulfill its objectives effectively. This might include operational guidelines, case studies and examples from other MRM's, case studies and examples from other human rights/child rights monitoring organisations or networks, or other contextual data that could help you interpret your own in‐country statistics more accurately.
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2. Sources of Information
Please indicate the relative importance of the following sources of information, who (within the MRM) makes use of them, for what purpose, how regularly this happens and your overall assessment of their usefulness. Provide an explanation or comments where appropriate
Information Source Purpose Importance User(s) Quality
MRM Guidelines
Comments & Explanation
CAACNET
Comments & Explanation
Bilateral links with other CTFMR
Comments & Explanation
Other Sources (please specify)
Comments & Explanation
3. Information Gaps
Please indicate the most significant gaps in the availability of information to support your work
118
4. CAACNET
In addition to the general questions above, please provide more detailed feedback on CAACNET
How aware are CTFMR members at a national level of CAACNET and what it can provide
How aware are MRM staff at field level of CAACNET and what it can provide
If appropriate, how could the level of awareness be increased?
What aspects of CAACNET do you find most useful?
What aspects of CAACNET do you find least useful?
What things are missing from CAACNET that could make an important contribution to your work?
How easy is it to find what you want on CAACNET (its user friendliness) and, if appropriate, how could this be improved?
What other improvements would you like to see in CAACNET
5. Other Improvements
Please indicate any other specific improvements you would like to see in the provision of information relating to the MRM
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APPENDIX 4
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF FIELD QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES The appendix contains a summary of the 16 responses received from MRM Task Forces. Wherever possible the responses have been reproduced exactly, but some comments have been combined or summarized to improve the readability of the summary. It is hoped that this not have detracted from the meaning of the original responses.
120
Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
MRM BACKGROUND
Timescales
CTFMR Established Jul‐08 Dec‐08 Oct‐07 Dec‐08 Jun‐06 Aug‐06 Mar‐09 2007 Jun‐07 Nov‐05 Mar‐07 Nov‐05 Jul‐06 Apr‐06 Jun‐06Case Monitoring Started Prior to 07/08 6‐Aug Sep‐07 2006 Nov‐06 Late 06 Apr‐09 Nov‐05 Apr‐07 Jan‐06 Oct‐06 Jan‐07 Nov‐06
MRM Task Force Membership & Roles (including lead responsibility for MIS)
Unicef Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair Co Chair Co Chair Chair Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair (MIS) Co ChairUN Peacekeeping Mission Co Chair (3) Co Chair (MIS) Co Chair Co Chair Full (MIS) Co Chair (MIS) Full Co Chair + 2Office of Resident Coordinator Co Chair Co Chair Co Chair Co ChairSRSG/Deputy SRSG Co ChairOHCHR Full Full Full Co Chair (MIS) Observer Co ChairOCHA Full Full Full Full Full Observer Full FullUNHCR Full Full Full (MIS) Full Full Full Full Full Co Chair (MIS) Full Full FullUNIFEM FullUNDP Yes Full Full Full Full FullWFP Observer Full Full FullWHO Full Full Observer Full FullUNAIDS FullFAO Full Observer FullILO Full Full Full (MIS) Full FullUNFPA Full Full (MIS) Observer Potential FullUNDSS FullOther UN Agencies Full Full (UNRWA)Save the Children Full Full Full Full Observer Full Full FullOther INGO's Full Full (2) Full (2) Full Full Full (2) Obs (1) FullNNGO's Full (4) Full (x3) Full Full (x4) Full (x5) Full (2) Full FullNational Human Rights Commission/Ombudsman Full Full (x1) Full Full FullGovernment‐linked Body FullICRC Observer Observer Observer ObserverOther FullUN Agencies 7 3 9 9 6 12 5 n/a 5 6 4 5 4 5 7 3NGO's 1 6 1 4 n/a 5 2 6 3 4 3 1 2Others 1 1 1 1 n/a 1 1 3 1Total 9 9 10 9 8 12 10 n/a 10 8 11 9 8 11 8 6
Regional Task Force Structure? Yes No No No No No Yes (2) No No No No No No No Yes No
Regularity of MRMTF Meetings Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Monthly Every 6 mths Monthly Monthly Quarterly Monthly Quarterly Monthly Monthly Quarterly Bi‐monthly
Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
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Monitoring Arrangements
Lead Responsibility for Individual Violations? Yes No (but) No Yes No No Yes n/a Yes No No No No Yes Yes No
Abduction UNAMA‐HRUnicef (+ UNHCR &
MINURCAT)
Monaco/ Unicef/Coopi
OCHA Unicef UNMIS CP
Attacks on Schools & Health Facilities Unicef/WHO All TF SCUK (PPCC) Unicef UNDSSDenial of Humanitarian Access UNAMA‐HA All TF OCHA SCUK UNHCR OCHA
Killing & Maiming UNAMA‐HR Unicef OCHA(INSEC &
Unicef Mine Action)
UnicefUNMIS/
UNAMID HR
Recruitment Unicef BINUB/Unicef UnicefMonaco/ Unicef/SC
Unicef UNICEF
Sexual Violence UnicefSWWA/ Seruka
UNFPAUNFPA
(Monaco/ Unicef)
UNHCRUNMIS/
UNAMID HR
Type of Cases (1 = lowest %; 4 = highest %)
One child; Full Details 1 1 1 3 2 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 4Many Children, Full Details 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 0One Child; No Personal Details 3 0 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 1Many Children; No Personal Details 3 0 1 3 2 1 3 4 4 4 4 1 1 3
Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
122
Role of MRM Task Force Agencies
Receiving Reports 8 9 10 6 8 4 6 3 9 8 4 10 5 2Investigating Cases 7 9 8 6 7 3 4 2 3 8 6 4 5 1Verifying Cases 4 2 8 5 4 3 1 2 3 7 6 2 5 1No Role in Monitoring Individual Cases 1 3 2 8 2 2 2 3
No of Reported Violations (since start)
Abduction 386 294 29 n/a 21Attacks on Schools & Health Facilities 453 6 261 19Denial of Humanitarian Access 182 25 3 n/a 6Killing & Maiming 246 120 194 83 n/a 116Recruitment 380 389 4 131 2,161 34 n/a 253Sexual Violence e 148 97 1 71Total 1,351 124 131 3,224 156 261 486
% Verified
Abduction 69% 93% 97% 38%Attacks on Schools & Health Facilities 81% 67% 4% 37%Denial of Humanitarian Access 100% 100% 100% 83%Killing & Maiming 100% 2% 50% 100% 48%Recruitment 62% 0% 29% 88% 56% 82%Sexual Violence e 100% 82% 100% 44%Total 80% 2% 29% 85% 88% 629% 65%
No of Reported Violations (last 12 m)
Abduction 46 27 4 n/aAttacks on Schools & Health Facilities 490 27 2 1Denial of Humanitarian Access 84 22 18 n/aKilling & Maiming 255 17 38 23Recruitment 15 205 47 n/aSexual Violence e 41 20 5 55 1Total 931 291 139 55 25 2
% Verified
Abduction 57% 59% 100%Attacks on Schools & Health Facilities 54% 93% 100% 100%Denial of Humanitarian Access 94% 100% 100%Killing & Maiming 54% 100% 71% 87%Recruitment 33% 51% 85%Sexual Violence e 32% 100% 80% 100% 100%Total 57% 62% 85% 100% 980% 100%
General Comments
Afghanistan
Burundi
CAR
Chad
Colombia
Cote d'Ivoire
DRC
IraqIsrael/OPTMyanmar
Nepal
Philippines
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Uganda
Strong NGO presence, no lead agency system, but two specialist SV NGO's and Recruitment handled by UN Mission; quoted caseload exclusively Recruitment
Unicef provide secretariat and lead on report writing; NGO's unwilling to participate due to security concerns and Human Rights orgs. do not meet minimum confidentiality requirements
2 regional MRMTF being established in Uvira & Bunia; partial lead agency system in place; but most cases involve Recruitment and are only documented when children are released; all verifications done by MONUC ; database only contains verified cases, but want to get list of all reported cases.Unicef has been leading on the establishment of a MRMTF, but no detailed decisions have yet been made on its membership and structure.
Currently use a manual information system; MRMTF has not met during 2009
Informal MRMTF and monitoring since 2006, but government only accepted MRM in 2008; Unicef‐led MRMTF with UN and rotating NGO membership; still discussing possibility of lead‐members for each violation and whether NGO's can verify cases if trained by UN; over 50% of cases lack profiling data for individual children.
Cote d'Ivoire now delisted; MRMTF has not met since 2007 but Unicef & UNOCI still monitor violations; the only figures available historically are for recruitment (2,800)
Monitoring system still being formulated, forms introduced and database developed, so much information not yet available.
1612 violations monitored together with other human rights monitoring (child and adult caseload); all violations monitored by network of CBO's and NNGO's funded by Unicef and managed by Oxfam/NOVIB; UN partners will verify very high profile cases, otherwise delegated to Oxfam/NOVIB & Norwegian Refugee Council
Primarily a UN MRMTF, SCS attend as an Observer only; most MRR undertaken by Unicef & UNAMIS CP & HR; UNHCR & UNDSS not very active; Unicef provides database, UNAMIS CP leads on drafting the report; focal agency structure only partially effective; no monitoring for last 5 months due to security.Everything appears to flow through Unicef; primarily SGBVE cases; very few recently; very weak database;
MRM TF consists exclusively of UN agencies but NGO's part of monitoring network in east; MINURCAT replaced Unicef in drafting reports, etc. in May 2008; no Regional TF, but cross border coordination in East with Sudan every 6 months; system of focal agencies so some fragmentation of MIS; find it diffiuclt to fully document all cases of recruitment and abduction.
Country
Monitoring began before MRMTF established; verification by lead agencies still being formalised; extra category of "documented" (2 trusted sources but not fully verified); regional MRMTF membership depends on agency presence; appointment of UNAMA‐CPA may lead to some changes; most cases have limited data on individual children.
Only monitoring recruitment ‐ ILO forced labour mandate & Unicef through regular screening, but no contact details for most children, so not able to follow‐upLong established MRMTF, monitoring and verification decentralised to NNGO's at field level; regular meetings now integrated into CAAFAG/Mine Action groups, Unicef & UNMIN share report writing & OHCHR responsible for data management
Unicef led MRMTF and no OHCHR or mission involvement; two members with government links; prior to May 09 all verifications by central Technical Sub‐Committee, but now delegated to the "Secretariat".
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Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
MANUAL (PAPER) SYSTEM
Use of Paper Forms No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (but) Yes Yes Yes YesStructure Dual system Dual system 1 1 per violation1 per violation 1 Recruitment Event basedWhen Completed n/a Initial Alert Initial Alert Incremental After Verified 2 stage Incremental After Verified Variable After verified template onlyOther Checklists Verification No Agencies own See below No No Attachments Yes ‐ consent No NoNo of Data Collectors Variable 15 ? ? unknown 85 1/District 2 per CBO 4 200Training Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No need Yes Yes Yes No YesQuality Control Case Review Yes No Yes No No MONUC Not yet Too few Yes Unicef check Yes Yes ‐ no detail Case review YesReturned for Correction 80% 10% 50% 0% Unknown 100% 15% 10% n/a 20% 0%
General Comments
AfghanistanBurundiCARChadColombiaCote d'Ivoire
DRC
IraqIsrael/OPTMyanmarNepalPhilippines
Somalia
Sri LankaSudanUganda
ELECTRONIC SYSTEM
No of Electronic Systems 1 1 None 1 1 None 1 1 1 None 1 None 1 4 1 1
ILO and Unicef have their own forms used for different purposes (forced labour & reintegration respectively); Unicef receive details from government and cannot use their own forms.
Fomrs completed as soon as data is received and verification data added later; compreheinsive initial training and foolow‐up through regular Cluster meetings, quality control through Tachnical Group and Unicef/MINURCAT
Forms developed for each violation, but reporting often in MS Word document; all forms simplified in Feb 09; quality checked on a case‐by‐case basis by Agency, Unicef and OHCHR
Two manual forms used, one for investigation one for reporting; minimal training to date, but manuals being developed later in 2009
Form based on Sudan and Iraq model; some training completed, but implementation still in process.Country
Standardised form used as a guide, but data only entered back in the office; documentation can be attached if needed; monitors are members of local CBO's trained by Oxfam/NOVIB and supported by in‐country mentors; verification is inconsistent due to security and access problems.
Paper form used as a guide only; Unicef receive initial reports and then source supporting data from other sources as required (Unicef "complete" the form).
No paper forms due to security reasons; direct entry into electronic system; most need extra data; Killing/Maiming managed separately by UNAMA‐HR in OHCHR Database
Trained 24 NGO's in 2007, but only 2 provided data; Unicef and UNOCI use different forms & no unified information system.
Forms are completed at field level and channelled through the Unicef zonal offices; need to clarify who investigates and who completes the forms.
Initially all partners used their own formats, but now have standardised one
Forms drafted, but adoption deferred pending global version; currently receive reports from partners using their forms.
Data on all cases is sent to Bujumbura by email, cases are verified by BINUB field staff.
NGO's and Unicef use simple one page form to notify incidents to MONUC, MONUC CPS use more detailed format for verification (one form for each violation) and these are emailed to Kinshasa; annual training workshops in main regional centres for NGO partners
Only recruitment form used by Unicef in zones; quality check at national level.Use their event form and notes as a guide only; most data entered directly into the database.
Development
Type Database Spreadsheet Spreadsheet Database Spreadsheet Database Database Database Excel Database Database Database DatabaseScope Excl K/M & Ab Recruitment All Violations All Violations All violations All Violations All Violations Recruitment + All violation All violationsPrevious Systems? No No No No Yes (2) HURIDOCS UR Database 1 incomplete NoDate planning started Jul‐08 Sep/Nov 09 Dec‐08 2007 Nov‐05 2006 Jan‐08 Dec‐07 2006Date system became operational Dec‐08 Dec‐09 Jan‐09 Feb‐08 Not yet Jun‐06 2007 May‐09 Apr‐08 2006Development Strategy Adapt Nepal IACPD Bespoke Bespoke Sudan based Adapted Bespoke Bespoke IACPD Bespoke BespokeSystems Requirements Document No n/a No Yes No No No Yes (partial) NoDevelopment Approach In‐house IACPD In‐house In‐house In House (IAU) In House/Ext UNHCR Yes?? In House In HouseSoftware/DBMS Access Excel Access/VB Excel Access/VB Access Excel/Access Access Access/VB Access Access
Implementation
Centralised/Decentralised Centralised Centralised Centralised Centralised Centralised Decentralised Centralised Decentralised Decentralised CentralisedSingle/Multi Agency Single Agency Single Agency Single Agency Single Agency Single Agency Multi Agency Single‐Agency Multi‐agency Multi‐agency Single agency
Timescales for Data Entry
Data Entry Initial Report After verified Incremental After verified Initial report After Verified On Arrival After verified Initial report After verifiedTime Lapse (Report to Entry into National DBMS) 2 weeks <1 month Too early Monthly 3 weeks monthly 2 weeks VariableTime Lapse (Verification to Entry into National DBMS) 2 weeks 1 week <1 week Too early Monthly n/a monthly 2 weeks 1 week
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Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
Data Entry
Responsibility for data entry Data Clerks Data clerks Unicef CPO Data Clerks 1 Data clerk DC Clerks Data Clerks Monitors Monitors DC clerksTraining for data entry staff Yes None Yes Yes Yes Yes ?? NoQuality Control Case review Case Review DB Mgr Planned Case Review Case review Case review Case review Case Review
Management & Support
Responsibility for DBMSUnicef &
UNAMA‐CPACAR/Unicef Unicef CPO Monaco Unicef OHCHR UNHCR Unicef CPS Unicef CP Unicef CPO
Changes in staff responsible for DBMS None None None No yet High T/O IT OIC ? 3 4 staff
Technical SupportUnicef &
UNAMA‐HRInter‐agency Consortium
Not NeededInternal ‐ Monaco
IAU Internal UNHCR In house Unicef DCO Internal
General Comments
Afghanistan
Burundi
CAR
ChadColombiaCote d'Ivoire
DRC
IraqIsrael/OPTMyanmar
Nepal
Philippines
Somalia
Sri Lanka
SudanUganda
No electronic system, number of cases small, monitoring split between ILO and Unicef and limited data provided by government
Still work in progress
Unicef‐led development; first attempt abandoned after the developer left; now created a simple Access database to facilitate decentralised event based monitoring
In process of implementing IACPD for recruitment cases, but primarily to support reintegration programme. Main MRM IMS is manual or dependent on other partners (e.g. UNFPA).
Use Excel "form" to record cases, but really just an electronic list.
Recently replaced own UR Database with IACPD and working to adapt this to accommodate other violations, although this has been quite time consuming/ Unicef has also implemented a spreadsheet system for the other violations it monitors (killing & maiming, attacks on schools, abduction) and UNHCR uses their own global SGBV spreadsheet, although there are effectively no child related cases.
Plan to implement a modified version of the Iraq DatabaseCountry
Unicef & its two IP's used a bespoke in‐house Access database, but OHCHR only used a spreadsheet; a recent attempt to develop a single database was abandoned due to complexity and now only using a spreadsheet.
Basic Access database operated by Unicef in Kampala; highly centralised; system has few capabilities/outputs
Initially attempted to adapt Huridocs Human Rights database, but abandoned due to serious deficiencies; UNHCR have developed replacement using Access and now host the system in Nairobi; forms received from Somalia and entered by dedicated staff who can check for accuracy/quality; decentralisation to Somalia not possible now, but an aspiration for the future.
Inter‐Agency Unit have developed a database based on the Sudan experience but with modifications ‐ yet to go fully live
UNODC has supported development of Access database based on Nepal formats; reporting capability still to be finalised; eventual plan for decentralisation; Killing & Maiming & Abduction excluded as monitored by UNAMA‐HR(OHCHR Database); training ongoing ‐still much required at the regional level, including more systematic quality control and follow‐up
No electronic system (database), but some use of a spreadsheet
Developed spreadsheet with support of EASRO, but not being used systematically.
Using a simple Excel spreadsheet operated by Unicef and cases only submitted by partners every 6 months or so, but plan to develop a database during second half of 2009 which may be hosted by OHCHR.
No database or other electronic system as yet
The database was developed by a consultant; it was based on the first Sudan database that was ultimately never implemented, but has been radically changed to accommodate individual children; funded by Unicef but hosted by MONUC in Kinshasa and fed by electronic forms from MONUC CPA's; in principle the database can handle all 6 violations, but many cases of sexual violence and Denial of Access are monitored by other agencies (UNFPA, SCUK & OCHA) using different verification criteria and their own MIS, so these cases don't go into the database.
125
Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
OUTPUTS (REPORTS)
Search Facility WIP No Yes n/a Yes n/a No Yes Yes YesIndividual Case Summaries No No n/a No n/a No No Yes ?? NoStandardised Statistical reports Yes None No n/a Yes n/a No Yes Under dev'mnt NoBespoke Reports Via Excel No No n/a Yes Planned Yes Yes Potentially No
"Global" Reporting (based on the full dataset)
Who Generates Reports Unicef Unicef n/a Unicef Unicef Unicef/UNHCR Unicef UnicefCirculation of Reports All CTFMR Unicef TF Unicef/TF
Agency Specific Reporting (based on Agency's own dataset)
Generate independently Yes No No Yes NoRequest from central DBMS Manager Yes In theory Planned Yes NoUtilisation of reporting facility Rarely Never Planned Never Occasional
Additional Reports Required
Yes GIS
Monthly trends/updates Yes
General Comments
Afghanistan
CAR
ColombiaCote d'Ivoire
DRC
IraqIsrael/OPTNepalPhilippinesSri LankaSudanUganda
IACPD will provide reports on reintegration, FTR, etc, but not MRM itself
Reporting requirements not yet planned ‐ awaiting formation of the MRMTF
Database capable of producing standardised and bespoke statistical reports based on violations, but unable to produce case summaries or analyse against perpetrators; data entered on basis of incident date, but reports use reporting date, which can be much later.
No real search, case summary or statistical reporting capability, although the original Access system had this potential; their data is significantly under‐utilised.
Reporting is still work in progress, but range of standard reports (graphs by time, location, violation, perpetrator, status and reporting agency); potential to export to Excel for bespoke analysis; Unicef internal reports monthly, others to meet annual and GHN requirements.
Data consolidated manually by Unicef CP staff at zonal level & analysed manually at a central level ‐ no integrated information system.
Country
MONUC/ Unicef
Potential to search and query, but standardised report under development; will allow export to Excel for graphs., etc.System has no real reporting capability
Not completed as system still under development
No electronic systems or finalised manual forms, but able to tabulate reported and verified cases.
Regular monthly reports for external audiences (donors, media, HR/CR Agencies & Parties to conflict
Preliminary Excel spreadsheet has few reporting capabilities
UR Database produced standard reports, IACPD also has reporting capability', but neither system produces a case summary
No automated analysis
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d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
127
SECURITY MEASURES
Security Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment Undertaken? Planned No No No No Planned No Yes No No, but plan Yes YesNot everyone using passwords YesPasswords not changed frequently YesFiling cabinets not locked YesData on pen drives not deleted after use YesVulnerability of Witnesses & Staff YesImpact of emergency evacuations (destroy data) YesVulnerability of data when transferred YesRisk during data collection YesPhysical threats/attacks on those involved in MRM YesSensitivity/vulnerability of paper forms Yes
Manual System ‐ Data Collection
# of manual forms None Dual Dual 1 per violation 1 + 5 No 1Disaggregation of sensitive personal data? No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No Yes YesAll data entered in office? No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes n/aDirect entry into electronic system (no paper forms) Yes n/a No No No Yes No YesUse of codes to protect sensitive personal data No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Manual System ‐ Data Storage
Locked filing cabinet or cupboard Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes n/aLocked office, exclusive to MRM staff Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes n/aRelocation of record to capital/regional centres No No Yes No No No Yes n/aPaper forms shredded and entry into electronic DBMS No No No Yes Yes No No n/a
Electronic Systems ‐ Users
No of Agencies with access to full electronic dataset 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1No of Staff with access to full electronic dataset 2 Small 1 0 3 1 ? 3 4 2 3No of Agencies with access to own electronic dataset 1 0 2 3 2 2No of Staff with access to own electronic dataset 0 2 ? 4 15% Users trained in data security 0% 0% 0% 0% >75%
Electronic Systems ‐ Password Protection
Password Protection? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NoUser specific passwords? yes Yes No No No Yes NoDifferent access levels? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes NoChange of passwords No No No No No Yes NoRegularity of password change No n/a Quarterly n/aDoes the system force password changes No No n/a No m/aAudit trail of users' use of system No No Yes
Electronic Systems ‐ Physical Security
Standalone computer or a network Network standalone Standalone Network Both Network Both StandaloneDesktop or laptop/notebook computers? Laptop laptop desktop desktop Desktop Laptop Both DesktopLocated in a locked room used only by MRM staff? Yes Yes No No No No Yes NoAre any Laptops taken out of the office? Yes No Yes No No No YesIf YES, is the data on them encrypted? No No n/a Yes NoUse of portable media to transfer data No Yes No No No Yes No Yes NoUse of emails to transfer data? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes NoIf YES, is any transferred data encrypted? n/a No Yes Yes No Yes Yes n/a
Auditing Security Procedures
Security Audits No No Yes No No No No No No NoRegularity Quarterly n/a
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General Comments
AfghanistanBurundiCARChad
Colombia
Cote d'Ivoire
DRC
Iraq
Nepal
Sri LankaSudanUganda
RESOURCING
System Development
Manual system $20,000 $130,000Electronic system $14,300 $13,500 $36,686 $21,482 $20,000Other $13,000 $490,000Totals $14,300 $13,000 $33,500 $36,686 $490,000 $21,482 $150,000
Operational Costs
Staffing $9,600 $26,400 $70,000 $23,481Training $36,000 $25,000 $15,000IT Costs $3,600OtherTotals $36,000 $9,600 $55,000 $70,000 $23,481 $15,000
General Comments
AfghanistanBurundiChadColombiaDRCIraqNepalSudanSri LankaUganda
Data entered directly into electronic system, although no database as such.
Main costs relate to training
Main security feature ‐ separation of personal data and use of ID codes.
Still early days, but use codes rather than names on forms and shred paper record once entered into database.
Plan to introduce different access levels into database.
Use two forms to keep personal data needed during the investigation phase separate from monitoring data; centralise data storage to reduce risks; emphasis on the electronic rather than manual system for the most sensitive data.
Use of consultants for system development, 5 UNV's for implementation plus designated MRM officer in Unicef
Multiple systems used by multiple agencies make it difficult to generate an overview and inevitably mean more vulnerabilities
Development costs seem very high, but may relate to the full MRM and not just the MISNo financial data, but external Nepali consultant was retained to develop the second database that has not been implemented
Country
Enhanced security measures following recent problems (shredders, etc not used as entering data directly into database); also plan for a further security review.
Country
Answers relate to original Unicef/IP database and OHCHR Spreadsheet, so do not provide a totally consistent picture; highly decentralised data collection and entry devolves responsibility for security and inevitably leads to more vulnerabilities.
Development involved 3 months consultancy; staff training another month and full time staff for data entry and generation of reports.
2 people for 30 days each on developing database.
Costs also relate to the IACPD which has other functions.Main cost is staffing (TFT post)
No data
The simple "stage 1" manual form is completed by NGOs' and they may use codes in place of names; ; full details are entered into the MONUC electronic form and an encrypted version is emailed to Kinshasa; paper versions are printed in Kinshasa, but shredded once any amendments have been finalised; all users in MONUC use the same password although the system supports multiple access levels; data on location of children not included in electronic system for security reasons.
Only quoted cost relates to data entry clerk.
No specific security measures, but database only located in Unicef CO
Unicef & UNOCI retain their own data, so no central dataset to secure; no systematic security measures.
Information on security of electronic system incomplete as not yet fully implemented.
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OTHER HR/CR INFO SYSTEMS & DATABASES
Other Information Systems
OHCHR Yes YesUNDSS YesOCHA Yes YesUNFPA YesIACPD Yes Yes YesNational DDR Database Yes YesPolice CP Database YesDCI Palestine YesB'Tselem YesUNRWA YesLocal Human Rights Commission MIS Yes YesOther Yes Yes
Linkages with MRM MIS
Possible integration of MRM and IACPD Yes Yes Potential
Build links with OCHA Database for Denial of Access Attempted
Post‐Transition Plans
None Possibilities Too early None Not yet Separate DevWiden range of violations & perpetrators Yes
General Comments
AfghanistanBurundiCARColombiaCote d'IvoireDRCIsrael/OPTNepal
Philippines
SomaliaSri LankaSudanUganda
National Commission on Human Rights is developing a Human Rights database; Unicef is helping them create a Child Rights module which will incorporate MRM fields once global database in place.
Country
No linkages with OHCHR database; manual transfer of raw data from AIHRC; MRM system can accommodate other violations and will be extended to CPAN networks at Regional level.
Unicef supporting the development of national CPV monitoring database with government, could feed cases to MRM, but no direct linkages.UNFPA and OCHA use their own info systems to monitor GBV and Denial of Access, but no details and their data is not in a form that suits 1612.
Would like to see MIS feed a transitional justice programme in the long term, nothing done to date.
UNDSS and Ombudsman's Early Warning system flags up cases for further investigation, OHCHR share data when reports being written (i.e. data not transferred to MRM?)
No direct mention of IACPD as already part of MRM system.
Currently exploring how they will be able to transfer data from other databases and Excel spreadsheets used by partners
IACPD being piloted for UAC and OVC in Bangui, hope to extend to MRM, but also focus on response.
National DDR and Police CP database developed separately in Arabic; DDR database could export cases of re‐recruitment to MRM.
Have discussed the possibility of integrating 1612 into the IACPD; also looking at potential for widening the list of violations and perpetrators they are monitoring in the post conflict period.
No data
Government/World Bank DDR database fed cases to MRM
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MIS OVERVIEW
Strategic Priorities and Effectiveness
Priority Essential Essential Essential Esential Essential Essential Essential Awaiting TF Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Good Good Fair Good Good Fair Good Good Fair Good Good Good FairPriority Useful Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Awaiting TF Essential None Essential Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Good Fair Fair Fair Fair Poor Fair Fair Fair Good Excellent Good FairPriority Useful Essential Essential Essential Marginal Useful Essential Awaiting TF Essential Essential Marginal Useful Essential MarginalEffectiveness Poor Poor Poor Good Poor Non Existent Poor Non existent Fair Good Excellent Non ExistentPriority Essential Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Awaiting TF Essential Useful Useful Marginal Essential UsefulEffectiveness Fair Poor Fair Good Poor Fair Fair Fair Fair Good Non ExistentPriority Essential Essential Useful Useful Marginal Useful Essential Awaiting TF Essential Marginal Marginal Useful Essential MarginalEffectiveness Fair Fair Good Good Poor Poor Fair Fair Poor Good Excellent Non ExistentPriority Essential Useful Useful Essential Marginal Useful Essential Awaiting TF Essential Essential Useful Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Poor Fair Fair Excellent Poor Fair Excellent Fair Good Good GoodPriority Useful Essential Useful Essential Essential Useful Useful Awaiting TF Essential Essential Marginal Useful Marginal UsefulEffectiveness Poor Good Fair Fair Fair Non Existent Poor Good Poor Good Non ExistentPriority Essential Useful Marginal Essential Essential Essential Useful Awaiting TF Essential Essential Useful None Useful MarginalEffectiveness Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor Non Existent Good Fair Fair Non existent Fair Non Existent
Data Requirements
Paper Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Essential Awaiting TF Essential None EssentialElectronic Essential Useful Useful Essential Essential Essential Awaiting TF Useful Essential Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Good Fair Fair Fair Non existent Good Good Excellent Good ExcellentPaper Essential Essential Essential Marginal Useful Essential Awaiting TF Useful Marginal EssentialElectronic Essential Essential Useful Essential Marginal Essential Awaiting TF Useful Useful Essential Essential EssentialEffectiveness Fair Good Good Poor Poor Good Good Good ExcellentPaper Useful Useful Essential Marginal Essential Essential Awaiting TF Marginal Marginal EssentialElectronic Essential Useful Useful Essential Essential Essential Awaiting TF Essential Marginal Essential Essential EssentialEffectiveness Fair Good Fair Poor Non existent Fair Poor Good ExcellentPaper Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Awaiting TF Essential Essential EssentialElectronic Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Awaiting TF Useful Essential Essential Essential EssentialEffectiveness Fair Fair Fair Fair Excellent Excellent Excellent Good ExcellentPaper Essential Useful Essential Marginal Useful Useful Awaiting TF Essential Useful UsefulElectronic Essential Useful Essential Essential Useful Essential Awaiting TF Useful Essential Useful Essential UsefulEffectiveness Fair Good Good Fair Fair Good Excellent Good FairPaper Useful Useful Essential Marginal Essential Essential Awaiting TF Useful Useful EssentialElectronic Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Essential Awaiting TF Useful Essential Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Poor Poor Fair Fair Fair Good Good Good ExcellentPaper Useful Marginal Useful Useful Essential Essential Awaiting TF None Useful EssentialElectronic Essential Useful Useful Useful Essential Essential Awaiting TF Useful None Useful Useful EssentialEffectiveness Fair Fair Fair Poor Excellent Non Existent Good FairPaper Useful Essential Useful Useful Useful Useful Awaiting TF Useful Useful EssentialElectronic Essential Essential Useful Useful Marginal Essential Awaiting TF Useful Useful Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Poor Fair Poor Fair Excellent Fair Good FairPaper Useful Marginal Essential Useful Essential Useful Awaiting TF Useful Useful EssentialElectronic Essential Essential Useful Useful Useful None Awaiting TF Useful Useful Useful Useful EssentialEffectiveness Poor Good Non existent Fair Excellent Fair Good FairPaper Useful Useful Useful Useful Useful Useful Awaiting TF Marginal Marginal EssentialElectronic Essential Essential Useful Useful Useful None Awaiting TF Useful Marginal Useful Useful EssentialEffectiveness Poor Good Non existent Non existent Good Poor Good Fair
Vulnerability to further violations YesOther Data
Verification of the case
Initial source of allegation
Documentation of the allegation
Violation specific details
Managing Referrals
Managing Immediate Interventions
Supporting Programme Planning
Details of immediate interventions
Details of referrals
Details of follow‐up support/reintegration
Perpetrator's Details
Addressing Impunity/Accountability
Incident summary
Managing the MRM itself
Children's Details
Managing Long Term Response
Annual/Horizontal Reports
Advocacy/Action Plans
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132
Performance of Current Systems
Importance Useful Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential MarginalEffectiveness Poor Good Good Fair Good Fair Fair Excellent Good GoodImportance Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Essential Essential Essential Essential EssentialEffectiveness Poor Good Good Good Poor Good Excellent Good GoodImportance Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Marginal Essential Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Poor Good Fair Poor Good Poor Excellent Good GoodImportance Essential Useful Essential Useful Useful Essential Essential Essential MarginalEffectiveness Poor Good Fair Fair Poor Excellent Good GoodImportance Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential MarginalEffectiveness Poor Good Fair Poor Fair Poor Excellent Good GoodImportance Essential Useful Essential Useful Essential Useful Essential Essential EssentialEffectiveness Fair Non Existent Fair Poor Poor Poor Good Good FairImportance Essential Essential Useful Useful Essential Essential Essential Essential Essential EssentialEffectiveness Fair Fair Fair Poor Good Poor Excellent Good FairImportance Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential EssentialEffectiveness Fair Non Existent Fair Poor Fair Poor Good Good FairImportance Useful Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Essential Useful EssentialEffectiveness Good Fair Fair Fair Good Poor Excellent Fair
Challenges & Problems
Lack of time (recent launch of MRM) YesReinventing the wheel ‐ a basic model to start from needed YesLack of global database/not able to talk to other MIS YesSecuring inter‐agency agreement on data sharing YesSecuring NGO participation in monitoring/reporting cases Yes YesStaffing Constraints & Turnover Yes Yes Yes Yes YesLack of commitment by MRMTF members YesResourcing constraints Yes Yes Yes6 violations inadequate for post conflict period YesPresence of government on MRMTF has created problems YesLack of Baseline data to provide context for analysis YesNeed better reports YesNeed to manage follow‐up YesLack of MIS Expertise Yes Yes
Overall Assessment
Fair Weak n/a Good Poor
Planned Developments
Database development Post MRMRoll Out of IACPD YesPreparation of Operational Manual Post MRMImprove linkages with government/influence policy YesImprove linkages with response YesRe‐energise MRMTF/increase NGO involvement in reporting YesTraining Post MRMImplementation of database Yes
Yes
GIS Links Yes
Data Comprehensiveness
Data Consistency
Data Quality
Studies of recruitment, killing & maiming, sexual violence and trafficking
Coverage
Timeliness
Relevance
Accessibility
Value for Money
Data Reliability
Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
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General Comments
Afghanistan
Burundi
Colombia
DRC
DRC (SC) ‐ additional to TF response from MONUC
Iraq
Israel/OPT
Myanmar
Nepal
Somalia
Sri Lanka
SudanUganda
Strong emphasis on the importance of having robust statistics to support reporting, advocacy; extra difficulties due to time delays before verification; system struggles to support immediate interventions to address violations; need to prioritise response and reporting to government, etc; concerns about weakness of perpetrator information and ability to address accountability/impunity, but partly the difficulty of confronting government's role in committing violations; need partners to have better understanding of SCR1612/MRM; also need to establish MRM a provincial level.
More information on needs/priority than effectiveness, but overall assessment that the current system is unable to meet their requirements.
They see all the listed objectives as being of importance to the MRM.
MRM only recently established, so MIS still in early stages of development and fairly weak; seen as mainly providing qualitative data to support advocacy; little value for programme planning or follow‐up due to unrepresentative sample, long delays in reporting, etc. Data too sensitive to be used in ensuring personal accountability of perpetrator(s).
Information for advocacy needs to be case specific not statistical; info required to help establish reintegration & rehabilitation programmes
Database is the only way they could analyse the volume of cases for annual SC reports, etc, most local advocacy and immediate interventions happen before the data is entered into the database and depends on issues being flagged by data entry staff; insufficient information to deliver accountability at present and insufficiently representative caseload to help with programme planning; lack of consensus on strategic direction fro database ‐ every agency wants something different.
Limited input as no MRMTF in place yet.
All cases must be verified by MONUC and held in their database in Kinshasa 1,500km from the front line; MONUC's data collection is very laborious and overt; MONUC's involvement with FARDC also means they are not seen as neutral, so people unwilling to give them information; no analysis of the database is provided to partners; the caseload very unrepresentative of situation ‐ would prefer to see verified cases as a % of "rumoured caseload; would prefer MONUC system to be integrated into the Inter‐Agency CP Database; would like to see MRM used in addressing impunity, but only after security issues evaluated; data can help plot trends, but can only have a limited role, referrals and response are better managed by IACPD; MRM database too slow and cumbersome to support immediate interventions; there is a need to focus on the results/impact of the MRM which have been very limited in DRC to date (parties largely unaware of it).
Happy with database but face challenges making the monitoring happen on the ground and build inter‐agency collaboration
Country
Comments very positive, but many relate to the MRM more generally rather than Information Management specifically (see ROSA Evaluation); did find initial format too complex and have simplified it recently.
Currently implementing IACPD, so in process of transition; focus on links to follow‐up/response
MIS still being established; CP and MRM resources have been very limited; relied on UNODC for IT input; limited capacity in field and security constraints limit possibilities and linkages with programming; would like a system to flag need for action; data quality generally limited due to resources and security
Database provides statistical reports on 4 violations, but numbers unrepresentative of situation; immediate interventions and referrals handled locally so not using database, database unable to analyse perpetrator data; MONUC only include fully documented cases in database, but unrepresentative of violations and geographical split; timeliness a problem due to lack of human resources; believe electronic system essential; plan to upgrade in autumn.
Afghanistan Burundi CAR Chad ColombiaCote
d'IvoireDRC Iraq Israel/OPT Myanmar Nepal Philippines Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Uganda
134
STANDARDISED SYSTEM
Advantages
Resource savings Yes Yes Yes Yes YesFrees MRMTF time for monitoring (i.e. Not on creating IMS) YesAccess to specialist IMS expertise Yes Yes YesGreater consistency/standardisation sharing technical docs Yes Yes Yes YesLearning from other countries Yes Yes Yes Yes YesMonitoring of trends Yes YesHelp link monitoring to response Yes YesImproved reporting capabilities YesSupport for advocacy YesImproved data security Yes YesFaster implementation in new countries YesFacilitate global comparisons Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesImproved access to data, reporting, etc YesHelp efforts to hold government to account locally YesHQ would better understand what CO's can provide YesIncreased credibility from global system Yes
Disadvantages
Diversity of country requirements may be too great Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCould be over complex YesMay not accommodate non MRM violations YesLack of participation by service providers YesLimited coverage YesAccess to the database YesUndermines motivation (less freedom/creativity) YesControl & Ownership of data (only if centralised global system) YesLess flexible/responsive YesMore difficult to customise YesData transfer slower (? Only if a centralised global system) YesDriven by global definitions of violations ‐ not nuanced locally YesImpossible to integrate 1612 with other HR monitoring Yes
Yes
YesCost of entering data, etc Yes
Overall Assessment
Attitude towards a standardised system Supportive++ Supportive Supportive++ Supportive ?? Maybe Supportive ++ Supportive Supportive ++ Supportive ++ Reservations Supportive ++ Reservations Supportive ++
Essential Requirements
Security capabilities/protection of confidentiality Yes++ YesAccommodate a comprehensive dataset for all violations YesAbility to incorporate other violations Yes YesAbility to accommodate multiple violations (one child) YesAbility to analyse by perpetrators, etc YesUser friendliness (simple reporting) Yes Yes YesFlexibility to allow for local circumstances Yes Yes YesData on response and follow up YesGood central IT support YesReporting capacity Yes Yes YesAbility to share data with others YesIdentification of duplicate cases YesIncident monitoring + individual follow‐up Yes Yes YesGIS capability (useful) YesAbility to accommodate other contextual data Yes
Some countries may lack technical expertise
Difficult to engage with civil society, government, etc in country specific way
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Critical Success factors
Flexibility Yes YesAble to collect data from all sources/agencies YesAble to produce reports that are used by all stakeholders YesGiving access to MRMTF members & protecting confidentiality YesFocus just on MRM; must not undermine national CP systems YesMinimise time required for data entry & analysis Yes YesAbility to process and analyse data YesSecurity and protecting confidentiality YesTechnical expertise/IT Support Yes YesHuman resources YesTraining on system management YesMinimise manual transfer of data from field to centre YesUsed by all protection agencies operating in the countrySecuring partner buy‐in YesPotential to decentralise Yes
Yes
Consistent data collection by partners Yes
Partners' IT Infrastructure
Overall Assessment UN strong Strong Strong Strong (UN)
Other Potential Initiatives (if no standardised system)
Security protocol Yes YesDefine common verification standards/tools YesUpgrade existing databases and develop in other countries YesSimple software for local adaptation (database or Excel) Yes Yes YesList of standard reports suitable for use with Excel YesMRM Manual drawing on country best practice YesMore support from HQ to ensure MRMTF's have sound systems YesPersuade other agencies to be more committed to 1612 YesNational database YesCreate roster of people with 1612 database experience Yes
General Comments
AfghanistanBurundiCARColombiaCote d'Ivoire
DRC
Iraq
Israel/OPT
Nepal
Philippines
Somalia
Sri Lanka
SudanUganda
Strong support if it can be customised to suit local needs
CountryStrongly supportive but suggest the system is allowed to evolve from the bottom up through an upgraded CAACNET Forum.
Wary of standardised system as fear loosing control, but this maybe because seen as centralised system; would like to see standardised system built from bottom up (based on local experience).
Strong support for standardised system, provided simple, but need adequate human resources and training.
Ability to make governments more aware that they will be held accountable
Supportive for new countries, but doubtful where a system already exists; keen to see more sophisticated capabilities (multiple violations & more analysis)
Strong support for standardised system, provided simple, secure and flexible; may only envisage use by one MRMTF member; BUT also want sensitive data held on a centralised database and not on paper.Appears to support the idea, but range of concerns about capacity of partners to deliver
UN + SCinSL have strong IT
Unconvinced as need to integrate MRM with other HR monitoring and too much diversity between each country in what can be monitored and what it is used for.
Strong support, but must be use friendly and secureSupportive, but mustn't be too complex/onerous and should be able to accommodate non‐MRM violations and have good linkages with other systems.
Supportive of the idea ‐ already building on work in Sudan and Iraq
Keen to see a comprehensive system that is able to meet all needs in one place, but recognises it will require some agencies to modify their systems and exchange of sensitive data may be a barrier
Strongly supportive, especially to provide reporting capabilities
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EXTERNAL INFORMATION SOURCES
Information Requirements
MRM Guidelines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesInvestigation guidelines YesCommon verification guidelines YesStandardised TOR for MRMTF YesChecklist of Do's and Don'ts YesSecurity Protocol YesCode of Conduct YesBest practice from other Human Rights programmes YesData trends on CPV to provide context Yes YesLessons learnt from other countries Yes YesFeedback from NY (Unicef & SRSG's office) YesExamples of where Unicef is the only CP agency on the ground YesExamples of where OHCHR play a major role YesExamples of MRM/1612 is integrated with other HR monitoring YesExamples of MRM being managed remotely (outside country) YesExamples from other HR/CR agencies Yes YesCase Studies from of other MRMTF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current Sources of Information
Importance Essential Essential Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential Useful Essential Essential EssentialUsers All MRMTF All MRMTF All MRMTF MRM OIC only Some MRMTF MRM Lead All MRMTF MRM Lead Some MRMTF Some MRMTF MRM LeadQuality Good Not available Excellent Good Good Good Non existent Fair GoodImportance Essential Essential Essential Useful Useful No knowledge UsefulUsers MRM OIC only All MRMTF MRM OIC only MRM OIC only MRM OIC only MRM LeadQuality Poor Poor Fair Poor Fair GoodImportance Essential Essential Essential Useful Useful Useful UsefulUsers MRM OIC only All MRMTF Some MRMTF Some MRMTF MRM OIC only Some MRMTF MRM LeadQuality Poor Fair Fair Poor Limited Non existentWhat Ext Links OSRSG OSRSG‐CAACImportance Essential EssentialUsers All MRMTF Some MRMTFQuality Poor Good
Information Gaps
MRM Guidelines YesMore support from OSRSG‐CAAC YesModels for data management & tools YesFeedback on development/activities in NY YesFeedback from NY on developments in other regions Yes
CAACNET
MRMTF awareness of CAACNET at national level Little Limited Not aware MRM OIC only OIC/Unicef Not aware None Only Lead LimitedMRMTF awareness of CAACNET at local (field) level None Not aware Low None Aware but None None LimitedPotential for increasing awareness Uncertain Inappropriate Yes Yes Unicef resp Email n/letter
Access to info from other CTFMR Yes Yes YesTechnical documents Yes
Slow YesSome documents difficult to access YesAnnual Country Reports YesKey documents (e.g. Consultant's TOR) Yes YesUpdated documents Yes Yes Yes YesLack of Thematic Sections Yes
User Friendliness Poor Poor Poor Too slowUp to date list of contacts (NY & Field) Yes YesOpportunity for thematic discussions Yes YesRegular Unicef/OSRSG Updates Yes YesNew Policy papers, outcomes of Confs. Yes YesMake more accessible YesOpportunity for MRMTF to upload docs YesDetails of events, etc Yes
Least useful
CAACNET
Other
MRM Guidelines
Missing
Other Improvements
Most Useful
Bilateral links with other CTFMR
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Other non‐CAACNET Improvements
Finalise Guidelines YesMRM communications, training, etc (not fragmented) YesMRMTF Rep in NY for discussion of annual reports YesClear involvement of CTFMR in finalising annual reports & GHN YesAccess to other countries' tools YesMore feedback from NY on use of MRM data/reports YesSupport from NY on advocacy work YesList of MRM Focal Points and networking opportunities Yes
General Comments
AfghanistanColombiaDRCIraqIsrael/OPTNepalPhilippines
Somalia
Sri LankaSudanUganda
Country
Main interest on case studies and more contact with OSRSG‐CAACMain interest in case studies; little info on CAACNET
Little awareness or access to CAACNET, want to know if Guidelines yet finalised.
Colombia isolated as only MRM in Americas; participation in Pretoria and Jordan workshops very useful; fear NGO members could use other country info on CAACNET out of context. Priority for clearer guidelines, esp. on verification; could provide access to CAACNET with common username for MRMTF; demand more info, news; interactive CAACNET
Interested in sharing technical; documents with other countries; CAACNET needs to be faster and more regularly updated.
Keen to have access to details of other countries facing similar challenges to Somalia (remote management, integrated with other HR Monitoring, etc.; no knowledge of CAACNET; no substantive bilateral info exchange except regional meetings, but of limited value.
Keen to have a finalised set of Guidelines from NY; current MRM lead does not have access to CAACNET.Main request is for more feedback support from NY; CAACNET not used significantly and considered "outdated"
MRM Guidelines too long given human resources available; lots of ideas for improving CAACNET and improving coordination
Do not currently have a username and password to access to CAACNET so unable to comment
APPENDIX 5
GLOBAL QUESTIONNAIRE (BLANK)
The appendix contains the blank questionnaire that was sent to each of the MRM Global Partners. Many of the questions required the person completing the form to select from a list of options. These options can only be viewed in the electronic version of the questionnaire.
1. Introduction
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
This questionnaire has been developed to explore the information management and, if appropriate, database requirements of the MRM. It is designed to be completed by the main global partners involved in the MRM and will be complemented by a much more deta
MRM INFORMATION MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (GLOBAL PARTNERS)
The Terms of Reference for the consultancy are as follows:
Conducting a comprehensive database and information management needs analysis for the standardised MRM database and information management system at the global and country levels of those countries implementing the MRM to clearly identify:
a. the minimum data requirements and formats
b. the case management requirements and how the two datasets interface
b. human rights monitoring, and
Distinguish between aspects of the MRM data management requirements that need to be developed as part of a global system: vs. MRM data management that are better developed at country level.
Assessment of hardware and software capacity available at regional, national and field levels with UN and other NGO partners involved in MRM.
Based on the analysis of the mapping and needs, recommending in a requirements document what needs to be undertaken and proposing the most efficient way to develop an MRM database and information management system template for both the national and global
To develop a detailed work plan identifying resources (financial, material and human) and timeline needed to develop and roll out the MRM DBIM.
Executing a comprehensive global mapping and assessment of all existing initiatives of database and information management (DBIM), including inter‐agency systems used by UN and NGO agencies and relevant government agencies, in the fields of:
a. monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children.
c. child protection case management and follow‐up (separated children, sexual violence, CAAFAG, etc)
2. Structure of the Questionnaire
1)
2)
3) 3rd Party ‐ Other information systems and databases that are currently being used by partner agencies, either internally or on an inter‐agency basis, to support child/human rights monitoring or related support/response programmes and their interface with
The global questionnaire focuses on four main areas of interest, each covered in a separate worksheet:
Global ‐ The information management requirements at a global level and how these might best be met
Country ‐ The information management and, if present, supporting database systems that are currently being used at country level and the potential for developing a more standardised approach.
4)
It is recognised that each organisation will have a different role in the MRM and so may only be able to respond to some of the questions below. Please feel free to use the questionnaire in the most appropriate way possible to express your views and idea
Other ‐ Other information requirements of those involved in implementing the MRM and how these might best be met (including but not limited to bespoke developments such as CAACNET)
If you have any questions or experience any problems using the questionnaire, please contact the consultant: Chris Robertson: +44‐1690‐760338 or [email protected].
3. Data Entry Protocols
4. Other Documentation
The Pale Green Cells contain a fixed menu of alternative answers. No other answers are possible. To access the menu: use the mouse/touchpad to click on, or highlight, the appropriate cell and a small arrow will appear; click on the arrow and the list of
The Pale Yellow Cells allow you to type in your answer. There are no pre‐determined alternatives. You can write as little or as much as you want. Do not worry if part of your answer is not visible when the worksheet is viewed or printed as everything w
Example
If your organisation has or is aware of any key documents (internal or third party) that contain useful insights relating to information management and the MRM or any aspect of the Terms of Reference for this consultancy, please provide a copy or details
The main part of the questionnaire consists of four Excel worksheets. These are all protected and only the cells requiring data entry have been unlocked. These are coloured either pale green or pale yellow (see below).
Explanation
Agency
Details of Primary Contact Person
Name
Position
Phone
Mobile
MRM INFORMATION MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRECOVER SHEET
1. Existing Systems
1.2 Challenges ‐ What do you see as the main challenges that need to be overcome in developing an effective information management system at the country level (please highlight any specific problems and suggest how they might be overcome)?
Data Requirements ‐ the data should be recorded
Electronic Data Management System ‐ database or spreadsheet
Outputs & Utilisation ‐ the quality of analysis & reporting and its relevance to the MRM's objectives
Data Security ‐ both manual and electronic systems
Other Issues (give details)
CTFMR CASE MONITORING INFORMATION SYSTEMS
The following questions are not designed to duplicate the information being provided by individual CTFMR’s, but to provide an opportunity for agencies to give a more global perspective on the current situation at country level and the potential for develo
Based on your agency’s current involvement in the MRM, please comment on the following questions (1.1 ‐ 2.5). Only answer those that are relevant.
Manual Record System ‐ the paper system for recording and storing data
Data Quality and Consistency ‐ the comprehensiveness, accuracy and consistency of the data collected
1.1 Effectiveness ‐ What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the current information management arrangements at country level. In answering this question you might like to give attention to some or all of the following questions, but please feel f
Topic Effectiveness of Current Information Systems
Value for Money ‐ the extent to which the investment is justified by the outputs
Linkages with other Information Systems ‐ HR Monitoring & CP Response/ Reintegration
2. Future Developments
If YES, what would you like to see in such a system:
2.1 Objectives
Yes/No Priority
Advantages/Opportunities Disadvantages/Risks/Concerns
Do you feel that there is potential for developing a more standardised information system and/or database that could be customised for use at country level? List the main advantages and disadvantages below
Objective
Advocacy/Action Plans ‐ provision of flash reports on individual cases requiring action and statistical analysis to support Action Planning with the parties to the conflict
What objectives would you want the system to meet and what would be their level of priority? Use the spare line for any other objectives that you consider important, but are not listed.
Comments
Preparation of Annual and Horizontal Reports ‐ provision of case profiles, statistical analysis, etc
Addressing Issues of Impunity and Accountability ‐ provision of perpetrator specific reports that can be used in advocacy and in identifying cases for future action (prosecution, TRC, etc)
Managing Immediate Interventions ‐ ensuring that any interventions designed to halt/reverse a violation take place in a timely manner
Support for Programme Planning ‐ using the profile of MRM violations to help identify other programme priorities (prevention and response) and to monitor the impact of these programmes.
Managing Case Referrals ‐ ensuring that all cases are referred to the appropriate response/follow‐up agency in a timely manner.
Managing the Longer Term Response ‐ supporting longer term reintegration/follow‐up activities
Managing the MRM Itself ‐ monitoring the effectiveness of the MRM, its processes, coverage, etc. (spotting gaps/weaknesses/delays, etc).
2.2 Coverage
2.3 Data Requirements
Yes/No
2.4 OutputsWhat outputs (interrogation, reporting, etc) should the system provide and in what format(s)?
Details of Data Field Required
Should all six violations be included in a single database or should some (e.g. Attacks on Schools and Denial of Humanitarian Access) be handled separately by more specialised systems? Please explain and give reasons for your view.
What should be the minimum data requirements for any standardised system. You might like to consider these in the context of the following main subject areas:
Initial report of the violation (date of report, source, etc)
Basic data about the incident (date, location, type of violation, etc)
Data related to the investigation (sources of evidence, status of case, etc)
Category of Data
Data about the child/children (name, gender, age, family details, etc)
Data about the perpetrators (name, state/non‐state, etc)
Data relevant to the specific incident (different data for each of the violations)
Data about any action(s) taken in response to the violation (including referrals)
2.5 SecurityWhat security arrangements should be implemented to ensure the protection of sensitive data?
3. Alternatives to a more standardised Information System and/or DatabaseIf NO (to a standardised system), what other things could be done to improve information management at country level?
4. Other CommentsAdd any other comments or suggestions below
GLOBAL MRM INFORMATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
1. What objectives should any global or regional information systemfor the MRM seek to meet?
Yes/No
2. What is information is needed at the regional or global level to meet these objectives and who needs access to it?
Yes/No
3. How might these outputs best be provided (what type of global information system)?
Yes/No
Other objectives (provide details)Provide reasons for your answers below
The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the information that is needed at the global level about the cases that are being monitored and reported by each CTFMR and how this can best be delivered (the questionnaire does not assume any preferred tech
Enable partners to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the MRM itself and help identify potential improvements.
Support and inform the formal reporting of violations to the Security Council.
Support and inform other broader advocacy initiatives.
Support and inform the planning of programmes designed to prevent and respond to violations (and the evaluation of their effectiveness).
Other (please give details)
Details of all individual cases (suitably anonymised)
Details of selected individual cases (suitably anonymised) to highlight specific concerns or issues.
Provide any additional explanatory comments
Type of Information Who Needs Access?
Statistical reports provided by each individual CTFMR in a standardised format
A simple statistical database at the global level that imports a limited dataset that is primarily in a quantitative format, but allows for some degree of statistical analysis and manipulation.
Country specific statistics presented in a consistent format
Global or regional statistics that seek to integrate data from different CTFMR's to produce comparative or composite reports.
A more complex database containing a more comprehensive dataset including qualitative data relating to individual cases.
Other (Please provide details
Objectives of Global Information System
Type of Global Information System (technical options)
Please explain the reasons for your choice
4. What, if any, statistical reports would you like to see produced at the global or regional level? Indicate the type of report/the variables involved/style of presentation (e.g. tabular, graphical, GIS) and how it might be used.
Type of Statistical Report Likely use(s)
5. What challenges and problems would you anticipate in trying to develop a global information system and how might these be addressed?
Potential Challenges & Problems Possible Solutions or Responses
6. Give any other comments or suggestions regarding the potential for and development of a global information system
OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS & DATABASES
Please provide details of any other information systems or databases that you use globally or regionally, either internally or on an inter‐agency basis, to support your work in monitoring child or other human rights violations or for managing response, reintegration or other support programmes for children. Please comment on their potential and real linkages to the MRM. If there are several systems, please complete a separate section for each one.
System 1
Name
1. Type of System
2. Organisational Implementation
3. Main ObjectivesWhat are the main objectives (& uses) of the system
1
2
3
4
5
4. System OverviewPlease provide a brief overview of the system (e.g. software used, implementation arrangements, etc)
What is the primary purpose of the system?
How is the system implemented?
Explanatory Notes
Explanatory Notes
5. Linkages with the MRM (e.g. referral of cases, exchange of data, integration of statistical reports, etc)
5.2 What are the actual linkages with the existing MRM Information Systems/Databases at country level?
6. Other Comments
5.1 What are the potential linkages with the MRM Information System/Database(s) (i.e. how would you like to things work)?
System 2
Name
1. Type of System
2. Organisational Implementation
3. Main ObjectivesWhat are the main objectives (& uses) of the system
1
2
3
4
5
4. System OverviewPlease provide a brief overview of the system (e.g. software used, implementation arrangements, etc)
What is the primary purpose of the system?
Explanatory Notes
How is the system implemented?
Explanatory Notes
5. Linkages with the MRM (e.g. referral of cases, exchange of data, integration of statistical reports, etc)
5.2 What are the actual linkages with the existing MRM Information Systems/Databases at country level?
6. Other Comments
5.1 What are the potential linkages with the MRM Information System/Database(s) (i.e. how would you like to things work)?
System 3
Name
1. Type of System
2. Organisational Implementation
3. Main ObjectivesWhat are the main objectives (& uses) of the system
1
2
3
4
5
4. System OverviewPlease provide a brief overview of the system (e.g. software used, implementation arrangements, etc)
5. Linkages with the MRM (e.g. referral of cases, exchange of data, integration of statistical reports, etc)
5.2 What are the actual linkages with the existing MRM Information Systems/Databases at country level?
6. Other Comments
What is the primary purpose of the system?
Explanatory Notes
How is the system implemented?
Explanatory Notes
5.1 What are the potential linkages with the MRM Information System/Database(s) (i.e. how would you like to things work)?
EXTERNAL INFORMATION SOURCES Most of this questionnaire is focused on the information system required to manage case monitoring data, but those involved in MRM implementation at all levels have other, wider information requirements, including access to information that can assist them in fulfilling their objectives more effectively. This final section provides an opportunity to identify what information is required, what is currently available, how it is disseminated and how its provision might be improved. 1. Information Requirements Please identify what information you do or might find most useful in enabling MRM practitioners to fulfil their objectives effectively. This might include operational guidelines, case studies and examples from individual CTFMR's, case studies and examples from other human rights/child rights monitoring organisations or networks, or other contextual data that could help interpret statistics more accurately.
2. Sources of Information
Other Sources (please specify)
Bilateral links between practioners
MRM Guidelines
CAACNET
Please indicate the relative importance of the following sources of information, who (within your agency) makes use of them, for what purpose, how regularly this happens and your overall assessment of their usefulness.
Information Source Comments
3. Information GapsPlease indicate the most significant gaps in the availability of information to support your work on the MRM
4. CAACNETIn addition to the general questions above, please provide more detailed feedback on CAACNET
5. Other Improvements
Please indicate any other specific improvements you would like to see in the provision or exhange of information relating to the MRM
What other improvements would you like to see in CAACNET
What aspects of CAACNET do you find most useful?
Could CAACNET usefully be developed to provide a more interactive environment (discussion groups, blogs, etc)
How easy is it to find what you want on CAACNET (its user friendliness) and, if appropriate, how could this be improved?
What aspects of CAACNET do you find least useful?
What things are missing from CAACNET that could make an important contribution to your work?
How aware are staff within your agency (at global, regional and country levels) of CAACNET and what it can provide
If appropriate, how could the level of awareness be increased?
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APPENDIX 6
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL QUESTIONNAIRE
The appendix contains a summary of the 8 responses received from MRM Global Partners. The OSRSG‐CAAC did not provide a formal response, but some comments have been included on the basis of other discussions with them. These entries have been marked with an *.
Wherever possible the responses have been reproduced exactly, but some comments have been combined or summarized to improve the readability of the summary. It is hoped that this will not have detracted from the meaning of the original comments.
DPKO IRC OCHA OHCHR OSRSG SC UNHCR Unicef Watchlist
EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT COUNTRY INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Data Requirements
IRCOSRSGSC
Data Quality & Consistency
SC
Manual Record System
SC
Unicef
Data collected needs to be specific to the SC offices do not use MRM databases, but do collect data about individual children and their families in the IACPD or similar.
Unicef
Only a small proportion of cases are reported and the UN's role in verification when they are party to the conflict is likely to deter people from reporting cases
Paper records should wherever possible to avoided for confidentiality reasons, but where used robust security guidelines are needed.
Forms should contains standard fields but allow for local customisation; there should be a way of trasferring data to NGO's who undertake follow‐up without identifying the MRM as a source; SC have a data protection procedures that require the minimum no of copies of paper documentation to be kept and all destoryed if there is a risk from the parties to the conflict.
Data must be accurate and consistent to make analysis possible, but which data depends on agreeing its use, must only collect what is needed.
There is a need to encourage more agencies/front line staff to share SGV cases with the MRM.
154
Electronic Data Management System
OSRSG
SC
Outputs & Utilisation
IRC
SC
Unicef
Unicef
Not convinced that the investment in databases has been worthwhile*
Some good reports have been produced (to SC), but little impact ‐ no teethWhile there is clearly important that cases are well documented and verified to underpin reporting to SC, etc, but this means most cases are excluded, so need and alternative way of gathering other "contextual" evidence (group reporting?).
Should be password protected and encrypted and backed up in a third country; any system should be compatible with the IACPD to facilitate data exchange.
Minimal analysis possible at country level ‐ global comparions impossible
Spreadsheets and databases of different capabilities are used ‐ depends on monitoring capacity of TF.
Data Security
IRC
SC
Linkages with Other Information Systems
IRC
Value for Money
Unicef
OSRSG
SC
There is a risk that the financial downturn will impact negatively on child rights/protection work
Sudan evacuation highlights the need for advance planning and organisational commitment to the protection of children's data at all levels.
Concerned about security risks
Variable, need to move away from paper files, need contingency plans for dealing with an evacuation
IRC
There has been lots of talk, but little real progress
Concerned that database development is very expensive and the benefits do not justify the costs.Would want to see what the investment in the MRM so far has produced (e.g. Tools, procedures, training, etc); need to allocate more resources to responding to cases and facilitating children's participation; need to highlight impact and successes of the MRM otherwise people will become disillusioned (black hole ‐ one way process).
Challenges
SC
IRC
Unicef
The lack of response to violations is an ethical issue, but will also discourage people to report cases, so more resources should be devotes to response programmes and the development of referral mechnisms that avoid being tained by association with the MRM
No of verified cases is very small and unrepresentative and so need to find a way of capturing a wider range of data without the same verification requirements (contextual data).
Considerable diversity of data quality annd quantitiy at country level; willingness to collaborate and share data also varies; diversity of objectives, especially where DOPKO presence;; how to lonk with response mechanisms given sensitivities about sharing data.
Children, families anmd communities are often reluctant to report and fear the arrival of UN monitors, need to develop alternative mechnisms through which they can provide information.
Most field systems are pretty basic (including spreadsheets)Security concerns a barrier to cases being reported for many people.Agencies/staff in field don't understand global subtleties involved.
155
DPKO IRC OCHA OHCHR OSRSG SC UNHCR Unicef Watchlist
POTENTIAL FOR A MORE STANDARDISED INFORMATION SYSTEM AT COUNTRY LEVEL
Overall Assessment
Is there potential for developing a standardised database? Yes Yes No* Possibly
Advantages
Yes
Disadvantages
Yes
Objectives
Yes/No Yes Yes YesPriority Useful Essential EssentialYes/No Yes Yes YesPriority Marginal Essential EssentialPriority Yes Yes YesEffectiveness Essential Useful EssentialPriority Yes Yes YesEffectiveness Essential Essential UsefulPriority Yes Yes YesEffectiveness Useful Useful EssentialPriority Yes Yes YesEffectiveness Marginal Essential EssentialPriority Yes No YesEffectiveness Marginal Marginal MarginalPriority Yes Yes YesEffectiveness Useful Essential UsefulPriority YesEffectiveness
CommentsAny role in ensuring accountability and addressing impunity must ensure protection of victims and staff involved
SC
Managing Referrals
Unicef
Providing a comprehnsive system to ensure consistency, etc
Managing Long Term Response
Managing the MRM itself
Preparation of Annual/Horizontal Reports
Advocacy/Action Plans
Must be able to change and develop in response to changing requirements.
Managing Immediate Interventions
Supporting Programme Planning
Risk of duplication if have 2 systems ‐ keep MRM system simple
Addressing Impunity/Accountability
Early intervention is vital, but entry into database litkely to be too slow, so need protocols at local level.Can support programme planning if data is accurate, more reliable and realistic, so trends etc can be identified. Must be a mechanuism to ensure effective referrals, but avoid association with MRM.Need consistent reporting and analysis across countries for Annual reports/GHN's; long terms response could be part of MRM or a linked system
156
DPKO IRC OCHA OHCHR OSRSG SC UNHCR Unicef Watchlist
Coverage
All 6 violations in one database? Yes Yes + more Yes, but Yes, if possible
Data Requirements
Yes YesYes YesYes YesYes YesYes YesYes YesYes Yes
CommentsSCUnicef
Outputs
Security
Other Comments
As a minimum all countries need to adopt a minimum dataset.
DPKO
Unicef
IRC
SC
Violation specific details
Incident summary
SCSecure and confidential referral mechanism
Initial source of allegation
Investigation of the allegation
Unicef
IRC
Children's DetailsPerpetrator's Details
Details of immediate interventions
Unicef Trends ‐ some analysis of violations & perpetrsators
Decision needed about whether children's details should be held in MRM or transferred into another system
Statistics and Trends for at least 7 summary areas plus access to case specific details
Security procedures for manual and electronic systems, risk assessments, Data encoding, 3rd country back‐ups, evacuation procedures in place and practiced, Data Protection MOU's in place.
Reports on violations to support advocacy, learning & response.
Data relating to child, perpetrator and investigation should be removable to facilitate sharing with other agencies
Where there is a Peacekeeping Mission and the SRSG is finally responsible for the MRM reports, it is important that the Mission hosts the information system.
However good the system's security, data will always leak ‐ this will make non‐TF members reluctant to share cases.
Crucially important ‐ needs protocols and training ‐ provisions for evacuations, reduce use of paper records, have different levels of authority for accessing system/data
157
DPKO IRC OCHA OHCHR OSRSG SC UNHCR Unicef Watchlist
GLOBAL REQUIREMENTS
Objectives of Global Information System
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YesYes
Yes
Yes
Comments
Information Requirements
OSRSG/Unicef Yes No OSRSG/Unicef No No No NoAll Partners Yes OSRSG/Unicef OSRSG/Unicef All Partners No OSRSG/Unicef NoAll Partners Yes All Partners All Partners All Partners Yes OSRSG/Unicef YesAll Partners Yes All Partners All Partners All Partners Yes OSRSG/Unicef Yes
YesUnicef only
Protect Children/Describe their situation
Ensure accountability
IRC
OCHA
Country specific statistics in a consistent formatComparative regional or global statistics
Assess compliance with Human Rights standardsMonitor impact on MRM on policy development & implementation
Support formal Reporting to UNSCSupport other Advocacy initiativesSupport Programme PlanningSupport Monitoring and Evaluation of MRM itself
OHCHROSRSG
DPKO
SC
UNHCR
Unicef
Watchlist
Trends for individual violationsResponses, prevention activities
Details of All CasesSelected cases to illustrate issues
All the objectives are important, but the system must maintain the ability to accommodate new initiatives/ideas from the field.Anxious to see the gloabl system monitor the MRM's effectiveness in contributing to the development (change) and implementation of policyIdentify perpetrators, ensure accountability & redress abuse (Ed: are these global or national objectives?)
All needed globally
Focus should be on information requirements for SCR1612 reporting*Importance of having accurate and reliable data that can show country and global trends to strengthen advocacy, improve accountability, support fundraising between countries, inform programme planning and ensure open accountability.
Any system should explicitly serve the stated purposes of the MRM ‐ systematic gathering objective, specific and reliable information on grave violations committed against children in situations of armed conflict
The primary role must be to support reporting to the SC, but it should also be used to support other advocacy, programme planning and prevention initiatives (including programme evaluations); people will be more motivated to report if there is a clear link with response; it also needs to help monitor the impact of the MRM.
Supportive of the use of MRM outputs to support programme planning, but not for programme monitoring as these systems need to be more specialised
158
DPKO IRC OCHA OHCHR OSRSG SC UNHCR Unicef Watchlist
Comments
Type of Global Information System
Yes No Yes No* No Yes Yes YesYes Yes No No* Yes Yes Yes YesNo Yes Yes No* No No No No
Comments
Types of Reports required
Graphs rather than numbers Yes Yes YesGeographical Comparisons (District, Country, Region) Yes Yes Yes YesVictim profiles ‐ Gender, Ethnicity, Caste & Religion Yes Yes Yes YesPerpetrator Profiles Yes YesTrends over Time Yes Yes Yes YesAnalysis of actions taken by S Council in response to reports Yes
Users of Reports
Monthly reports at HQ to monitor trends in violations, immediate updates on individual countries.
OSRSG, Unicef, CP NGO's plus some given to state and non‐state actors as part of advocacy/ dialogue
SC
UnicefComparative analysis between countries, parties to the conflict, etc
OHCHR
DPKO
Comprehensive database containing all case data
UNHCR
DPKO
Watchlist
SC
UNHCR
OCHA
Simple statistical database with limited quantitative dataset
Watchlist
DPKO
Statistical reports from each CTFMR
Unicef
Watchlist
IRCOCHAOHCHR
Potential uses ‐ prevention, advocacy and assessment
Are we aiming for statistical analysis or just quantitiative analysis and systematic analysis of qualitative data?
No requirement to hold all cases centrally except as a back‐up; also need to to guard against breaches of data security; consistent stats useful but should allow countries to include other violations if it suits them; gobal statistics needed to support camnpaigning
Need to achieve a balance between complexity and simplicity of reporting at the global level; full details only needed at the local level to facilitate follow‐up and response, access arrangements to data must protect children's identities.
All Partners should not include governments, although they have a role to play
There is a need for some qualitative information on individual cases together with a statistical analysis of quantitative data (this needs to be collected in a more consistent manner).
Keen to see tabular, graphical and GIS (Map) based reports to be used primarily for planning and implementing advocacy
Any figures need to be based on a consistent means of calculation, are we talking about trend analysis or statistical analysis.Would like to see trends for individual violations (country, regional or global)
Inclusion of personal details/names must depend on circumstances of each (type of) case
Do not need full case details at global level, but do need to see what information is being collected and the ability to analyse trends so can eventually establish a a reliable baseline for each violation.
Global level system should focus on statistical analysi, trends, etc with some scope for manipulation, but there is no need for detail about individual cases ‐ other than for OSRSG/Unicef who will have access to country systems.
Data on individual cases is not required at the global level but may be required regionally or sub‐regionally for cross‐border work; access to data on individual children should be limited to agencies involved in providing response/support (Unicef or NGO's).
Access to selected cases is important at the global level, but does not require a database
Would like to see statistical reports from individual CTFMR in a standardised format plus qualitative data on individual cases in a "moderately complex" database to enable comparisons and trend analysis
159
Challenges, Problems ‐‐ Solutions & Responses
Other Comments
The data required for community level incidents (attacks on schools and denial of access) will be different from the data for the more individual ones and they do not fit easily together ‐‐ consider using two different systems.
SC
OCHA
Duplication of data collection ‐‐ make better use of data collected by other monitoring and response agencies & networks
Too many databases used for protection work, dangers of duplication ‐‐ any new database must be compatible (e.g. With the IACPD
Countries will have different technical capacities , some will struggle to computerise case management, while others will not be willing to abandon it ‐‐ provide different solutions for different situations, but with an emphasis on statistical analysis.
Data management capacity in the "deep" field is low ‐‐ avoid burdening them with an over ambitious system, especially if it isn't possible to deliver good end‐user support, start simple.
DPKO
UNHCR
Unicef
The integration of MRM monitoring into wider (adult) human rights systems will create problems ‐‐ Difficult to resolve, but possibly create a country‐level statistical system to into which the data can be transferred
SCNeed to further explore the potential for the IACPD to collect and export data on 1612 violations to the lead MRM agency, also need to ensure that children picked up by 1612 receive follow‐up.
As the MRM becomes more effective and holds perpetrators/government to account, the risks to agencies increase ‐‐ integrate monitoring with broader programming /ensure verification done very discretely.
Two main concerns: monitoring the impact of the MRM on policvy and clarity on the the required outputs (i.e. not aiming for true statistical analysis)
Competing needs and priorities of different agencies who need the information for different purposes.
WatchlistNGO's often have better access to information through their programme activities and sometimes more freedom to engage in advocacy, whether as formal TF members or by collaborating on a more informal basis
Under‐reporting of the true situation ‐‐ include trend and contextual data in analysis.Watchlist
IRC
How to facilitate effective sharing of information (how much, with whom, etc) ‐‐ clear information sharing protocols that meet the needs of competing agencies, but are flexible and easy to administer.
Involvement of different partners ‐‐ Unicef to host global system (but different agencies will want different things). Many partners would probably want to access the database.
Gaining access to affected communities/information on incidents ‐‐ UN collaboration with NGO's & Civil Society to access information/verify cases
Differing approaches to verification makes comparisons difficult ‐‐ need for MRM Guidelines to be finalised and clarify verification standards
Different interpretations of what constitute an incident will make it difficult to consolidate statistics ‐‐ try and use statistical tools to correct any bias.
Reconciling the demands of verification with confidentiality requirements ‐‐ develop a Code of Conduct
Getting people to report when they are fearful of the consequencesThe system will always be attacked/criticised, however good it is (people will want to undermine its credibility).
Assessment fatigue may reduce reporting ‐‐ ensure a visible link with response; improved and more standardised data collection and analysis tools provided by NY
Security risks to monitors and more particularly witnesses & victims ‐‐ risk assessments; improved procedures for protecting confidentiality, obtaining consent and enabling NGO's to report confidentially
Management of the system and ensuring accessManaging confidentialty
160
OTHER INFORMATION SYSTEMS & DATABASES
Inter Agency Child Protection Database
Purpose
Uses
Potential Linkages
Actual Linkages
OCHA Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework
Purpose
Objective/Uses
Implementation
Potential Linkages
EXTERNAL INFORMATION SOURCES
Information Requirements
in discussion with UNICEF, we agreed that the access monitoring & reporting framework and accompanying database should take into account the information needs of the MRM regarding "denial of access" to enable that information to feed into the MRM
See JM's notes (SC)
Response/Reintegration/Support Programming (IRC)Case management ‐ FTR/CAAFAG/Other vulnerable groups (SC).
Secure website with key resources for MRM Task Forces (guidelines, training materials, key documents); regularly updated; blog/Q&A section; updated contact details; news on deadlines, events, etc.
Summary analysis provided to TF in one country (IRC)Use of IACPD to collect data on 1612 violations in Sri Lanka (SC)
Unicef
To systematise and standardise monitoring, reporting and trends analysis on constraints affecting humanitarian access in situations of armed conflict in order to inform policy and operations concerning access.
Still under development; intended to be implemented on an inter‐agency basis, but current development of technical tools is primarily internal to OCHA until there is a prototype which can be used to solicit inter‐agency input.
Systematise and standardise quantitative and qualitative information on access constraints.
Case Management (SC)Programme Monitoring & Evaluation (IRC)
Provide information to Task Force (IRC)
161
DPKO IRC OCHA OHCHR OSRSG SC UNHCR Unicef Watchlist
Current Sources of Information
CrucialNeeds workIn demand
CAACNET
Awareness of CAACNET HQ awarePotential for increasing awareness Time
Downloaded documents
Poor search capabilityDifficult to keep updatedRapid staff turnoverUp to date documentsUpdated contact detailsIssue of passwords
User Friendliness PoorBetter search capabilitiesThematic approachDedicated staff
General Comments
Least useful
Unicef
CAACNET
Other
Improvements
Bilateral links with other CTFMR
MRM Guidelines
Missing
CAACNT needs up‐to‐date documentation, enhanced search capabilities, possibly a thematic structure, more opportunities for interaction between different users ‐ all this will be dependent on having the necessary staff resources.
Most Useful
162
APPENDIX 7
OCHA ACCESS MONITORING & REPORTING FRAMEWORK
The appendix provides an outline of the monitoring and reporting framework being developed by OCHA. It focuses on “access constraints and their consequences” , “formal policies and other measures affecting access” and any “action taken and its outcome”. It is not a monitoring system that focuses on denial of access.
Section Content
Access Constraints and their Consequences
o Type of Constraint
o Humanitarian Impact
o Implications for Operations
See pages below for a breakdown of indicators.
Each Field Office should select and focus on the most significant constraints in their context for monitoring and reporting. For each of these constraints, we should aim to establish:
o Trends in key indicators affecting access
o Trends in humanitarian implications/effects of constraints
o Trends in the implications of constraints for humanitarian operations (e.g. in terms of programme suspensions, scale and type of assistance, programme cost/expenditures and staff time lost)
Information on indicators for each of these constraints must be disaggregated as far as possible – e.g. by national/international staff; by type of humanitarian organisation (UN/NGO/Red Cross); by sector/cluster affected, etc.
Positive trends and any positive experiences within trends should also be reported and illustrated with specific examples.
Formal Policies and Other Measures Affecting Access
Formal policies and other measures imposed by state and non‐state actors currently in effect which apply to or directly affect access to humanitarian assistance and/or humanitarian operations, the duration they have been in effect, and which sectors of humanitarian activity are affected.
For example, host government policies concerning duties imposed on the import of relief items and equipment or quotas imposed on the transport of items into a given area.
Policies, practices and measures by humanitarian organisations which have an effect on access, for example, concerning security phases in effect, the duration they have been in effect, and which sectors of humanitarian activity are particularly affected.
Even when policies or other measures have been in place for some time, they should still be addressed in updates on access if they continue to have implications for humanitarian activities
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Action Taken and Outcome
Initiatives that are being undertaken to increase or restore humanitarian access, including action to address specific constraints, and what the results of these actions have been.
For questions or feedback, contact:
Jenny McAvoy, Protection of Civilians Section, PDSB, OCHA
tel: +1 917 367 9594, email: [email protected]
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Breakdown of Constraint Types and Indicators
In almost all cases, where information systems can support an appropriate level of detail, information against indicators will need to include, as far as possible: o Date(s) - Duration (where applicable)
o Location where event took place
o Actor (who is carrying out the action affecting access that we are recording)
o Agency affected (incl private contractor of international agency)
o For threats/violence against humanitarian personnel, needs to be disaggregated by national or international staff
o Sector/cluster affected
o Relief type and quantity affected
o Affected population - location, size, any special needs
Information needs specific to individual indicators are identified below.
Ref Constraints Explanation Status Indicators Event Indicators
1 Denial of the existence of humanitarian need or of entitlements to assistance by authorities
Policies or other measures by state and non‐state authorities which effectively exclude conflict affected civilian populations from humanitarian assistance. It includes deliberate and non‐deliberate exclusion, i.e. if the policy has the effect of exclusion, even if it is not intended to specifically exclude an affected population, it should be recorded.
Formal policies in effect Public and private statements by authorities either denying that humanitarian need exists or denying that certain people are entitled to assistance
2 Impediments on the Bureaucratic and administrative requirements for Formal policies in effect Staff hours/day to process administrative
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Ref Constraints Explanation Status Indicators Event Indicators
entry of agencies, personnel, goods into the country of operations.
entry into the country of operation, such as registration, visas and work permits for personnel, and constraints on import of equipment and relief items into the country.
(Please note that restrictions experienced once agencies, personnel and goods are in‐country are treated as a separate constraint.)
Number of international personnel planned vs number actually present in‐country
requirements for:
o Personnel
o Goods and equipment
o NGO registration
Taxes, duties, other costs incurred for personnel administrative requirements
Taxes, duties, other costs incurred for the import of goods and equipment
Relief items held in warehouse
o Duration, Type, Quantity
3 Restrictions on or interference with the passage of agencies, personnel, goods within the country.
Impediments to freedom of movement as experienced by humanitarian actors in‐country in order to reach affected populations and transport essential relief.
Checkpoints or barriers
o Type
o Location
o Actor
Policies in effect, e.g.:
o Searches or other requirements to pass through checkpoints (e.g. unloading and reloading goods)
o Travel permit requirements in effect
o Travel bans in effect
o Quotas on relief items/equipment permitted to enter a specific geographic area/location
Staff hours/day spent at checkpoints
Taxes and fees imposed for the passage of goods or people
Demand to search personnel or vehicles
Other requirements to pass through checkpoints (e.g. unloading and reloading goods)
Travel bans
Travel permit denials
Relief goods held back from transport and delivery ‐ type and quantity
4 Military operations and ongoing hostilities impeding humanitarian operations.
Implications of the military activities of the parties to conflict for the movement of people and goods.
Beneficiary population is unreachable due to military activity and ongoing hostilities (duration)
Suspension of humanitarian activities due to military activity and ongoing hostilities
Withdrawal of personnel, duration and number due to military activity and ongoing
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Ref Constraints Explanation Status Indicators Event Indicators
hostilities
5 Threats and violations against humanitarian personnel and facilities.
All types of violence and other criminal acts by all actors which directly affect humanitarian personnel, equipment and facilities. It includes generalised criminal violence as well as deliberate politically‐ and economically‐motivated acts of intimidation, harassment, looting, physical assault, abduction, detention, etc. It is vital to include a detailed breakdown of information regarding actors, types of events, location, etc in order to support an analysis of trends within this constraint type.
Type of incident (can use DSS typology for now)
o National or international staff
Ref Constraints Explanation Status Indicators Event Indicators
6 Interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities.
Direct interference with humanitarian activities, goods and facilities during or after their implementation.
This may include, for example, sabotage of watsan facilities, attempts to divert or interrupt a distribution, looting of goods following distribution, obstruction or intimidation of beneficiaries for participation in humanitarian activities, etc.
Type of incident (typology to be developed)
Distribution of aid by proxy, such as gatekeepers, and absence of direct monitoring
7 Presence of Mines and UXOs.
Mines, cluster munitions and other unexploded ordinance inhibiting the movement of equipment, goods and personnel or otherwise impeding humanitarian activities.
Demarcation of mined/demined area
Demarcation of area with cluster munitions or other UXOs
Implications for travel ‐ no go, longer route, longer time, etc.
Incidents/civilian casualties resulting from mines or UXOs
8 Physical environment Obstacles related to terrain, climate and lack of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges and
Status of roads, bridges, airstrips
Implications ‐ routes, added travel time or
Area inaccessible, duration and reason (terrain, climate, infrastructure)
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airstrips cost
9 Organisational security management
Security phases in effect and their influence on the levels of physical access by humanitarian actors to areas where conflict‐affected populations are located.
Policies in effect:
o Areas of UN accessibility only with armed escort vs accessibility without armed escort
o Staff ceilings ‐ numbers of national and international staff permitted at a given time
o Number days or weeks an area is inaccessible by UN agencies pending security assessment
Numbers of national and international personnel present per geographic area vs numbers planned
Number of organisations with sustained/unbroken presence and duration
10 Restrictions on, or obstruction of, conflict affected populations access to services and assistance
All events and practices which interfere with the ability of conflict‐affected populations to access assistance and services.
Restrictions on civilian travel and duration of restriction
Bureaucratic or administrative requirements to access assistance (e.g. personal identification documents required to seek health care)
Arrangements with gatekeepers (provide definition) which prevents direct interaction between humanitarian actors and beneficiaries
Forced movement of a displaced population away from services
Denial of an affected population’s access to locations of safety and available services
Involuntary return to country of origin
Prevention of direct access to aid distribution and/or access to humanitarian services
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APPENDIX 8a
DATA REQUIREMENTS FRAMEWORK ‐ EXPLANATORY NOTES
The attached manual data requirements formats are designed for use in monitoring the six MRM violations. They have been designed so they can be adapted to suit different monitoring environments, while retaining the same overall structure. The attached data formats are can be used as the basis for an electronic data management system as well as for the creation of manual paper forms.
Underlying Principles
The principles underlying the design are as follows:
The data requirements are based on the matrix approved by the MRM Steering Group (Field Supplement 1 – Overview of the international legal foundations and standards relating to the six MRM grave violations), but these have been modified slightly on the basis of field experience and consultation with MRM partners and information management good practice.
They can be used to monitor both the four “individual” and two “group” or “non‐individual” violations and can accommodate different levels of detail (e.g. whether or not full profiling information is available for individual children).
They contain a limited number of mandatory fields which must be completed for all incidents and a larger number of non‐mandatory ones that can be used where appropriate. The structure also makes it possible to for countries to add further fields or even new violations should this be needed.
They include a space for the monitor to describe the incident “using their own words” in as much detail at they wish, but this open ended section is supplemented by a series of closed questions, each of which has a fixed number of alternative answers which must be selected from a list. The latter are quick and simple to answer and ensure that the key minimum of information is collected for each incident, but more importantly they will make it possible to manipulate (sort and search) the data and generate a consistent quantitative analysis of the caseload across each country.
The design aims to maximise the number of common questions that apply to all six violations, so that there is a consistent structure to the monitoring, and every effort has been made to eliminate duplication where a child experiences multiple violations (e.g. cases that involve both recruitment and abduction).
The form can be completed electronically using Microsoft Excel. This will allow the user to select the appropriate answer for each question from a list that can be accessed directly from the appropriate cell. It is also anticipated that it will eventually be possible to automatically import the data from this electronic form into the database. If required the form can be completed in a paper form, but some modifications would be required to display the alternatives for each question with the necessary tick boxes alongside. This would inevitably increase the length of the forms.
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The data structure and fields used in these manual forms will match those in the specification for the proposed MRM database.
The attached formats aim to cover all possible alternatives and hence are fairly detailed and complex. Each country will need to adapt them for their own use, deciding which of the optional fields to include and whether to opt for a single comprehensive form that is used for all incidents or one for each violation, which will make each document much shorter.
The forms aim to capture data relating to the following subject areas:
o The process by which the incident has been documented and verified
o The basic details of the incident (where, when, what, to whom and by whom)
o The profile of the children affected by the incident (either individually or as a group)
o The violations that each child or group or children have experienced.
o Any immediate actions or interventions that the child, their family or the monitoring agency have taken to address the violation(s).
o The release of any child(ren) who were recruited or abducted by an armed group
o Any referrals that have been made to meet the child(ren)’s longer term support needs.
The forms have been designed on the basis that any personal data (e.g. names, contact addresses, etc) that could be used to identify the individuals involved (children, informants and monitoring staff) will be recorded and stored separately from the monitoring data and will only be shared on a rigorous “need to know basis”.
The Structure of the Forms
Based on these principles, the draft structure comprises two separate sections (Part 1 and Part 2).
Part 1 is designed to accommodate all the essential data that will apply to each and every incident, including details of its documentation and verification, a description if the incident in the words of the monitor, the identity of the alleged perpetrator and the number of children affected.
Part 2 is designed to capture the profiling data for the child(ren) affected, the specific details for each violation and brief information about any immediate actions undertaken and any referrals made.
Part 2 consists of three alternatives depending on the violations involved and the amount of profiling data available for the children affected. The relationship between the different parts of the form and guidance on which of the three Part 2’s to use are described below and summarised in the following diagram.
Part 2a – This should be used for the four “individual” violations (i.e. abduction, killing and maiming, recruitment and sexual violence) where the monitor has detailed profiling data for each of the individual children affected and data about the violations to which each of them have been subjected.
Part 2b – This should also be used for the four “individual” violations where the monitor DOES NOT have detailed data about each of the individual children affected and so is only able to provide some summary information (e.g. when an individual child or group of children have been abducted/recruited and cannot currently be accessed by the monitoring agency). It may not be possible to verify these violations to the
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same level as those included in Part 2a, but they may still be of significance in building up an holistic picture of what is happening.
Structure of the Manual Data Collection Forms
Part 1 All Incidents (all 6 violations) Mandatory data applicable every incident Initial Alert Documentation Record Verification Record Incident Summary Perpetrator Details Child Count
Part 2a Part 2b Part 2c 4 “Individual” Violations 4 “Individual” Violations 2 “Group” Violations (Abduction, Killing & (Abduction, Killing & (Attacks on Schools & Maiming, Recruitment Maiming, Recruitment Health Facilities & Denial and Sexual Violence) and Sexual Violence) of Humanitarian Access) + + + Individual child data Group/Summary data only Group data only Child Profile Data Group/Summary Profile Data Group Profile Data Violation Specific Data Violation Summary Data Violation Specific Data Immediate Action Data Immediate Action Data Immediate Action Data Release Data Release Data Referral Data Referral Data Referral Data Colour Key Data Collection Form Type of violation Data availability List of Data Fields
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Part 2c – This should be used for the two “non‐individual” violations (i.e. attacks on educational and health facilities and denial of humanitarian access) where it is not possible or appropriate to record data about each of the individual children affected.
It should be emphasised that Parts 2a and 2b represent the two extremes of the spectrum. It may well be that most countries will be operating somewhere between them and this will impact on the detailed design of any manual data collection forms. For instance, where several children, for whom profiling data is available, are involved in one incident and all the violation‐specific data is the same it may be possible to use a simple tabular approach for the profiling data (see below).
Sex Age Ethnicity Religion Refugee/IDP Status
Child 1
Child 2
Child 3
It is also possible that some complex incidents may need Parts 2a, 2b and even 2c to be completed alongside each other (e.g. where there has been an attack on a school during which several children were killed or injured and about which the monitor has detailed data), but this is likely to be a fairly unusual occurrence.
Navigating the Spreadsheet
The forms have been developed in Excel. The spreadsheet consists of eight (8) worksheets. Four (4) contain the data entry forms themselves (Parts 1, 2a, 2b and 2c), each of which has a separate “Guidance” worksheet that contains detailed instructions, data definitions and the lists of options for each of the closed questions. When the forms are in use and staff have been trained and are familiar with the format, these guidance worksheets can be hidden to keep things as simple as possible.
There are also three separate forms (worksheets) for recording the personal details of the children, informants and monitoring staff involved. These would be kept in a completely different location from the main monitoring forms with the ID numbers being used to cross reference the data when needed (e.g. when individuals need to be contacted or when checking for duplicates). The worksheet contains the minimum amount of data that would be required for the MRM Agencies involved in providing longer term support to children would of course require much more detail.
The data entry worksheets use a number of formatting conventions to assist users. The pale yellow cells are suited for direct data entry (i.e. data can be typed in), while the pale green cells contain look‐up lists from which the most appropriate options can be selected. The options can be accessed by clicking on the arrows for each question or by checking the “Guidelines” worksheets. The final column of each form (Column AE) has been colour coded either red to indicate that the data is mandatory (i.e. a minimum requirement) or blue to show that the data should be entered if it is available.
The numbering system for the data entry forms and the guidance notes are the same, but some of the questions also include an additional reference number (coloured red) that can be used to cross reference
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the manual forms with the database specification. These latter numbers are included here for information only and would not need to appear in any manual forms used by the monitors.
Finally, any questions or sections in Part 2 that are not required can be removed from the data collection forms by hiding the relevant rows. This can be particularly useful where the forms are only being used for a specific violation.
Further Guidance
The detailed instructions for each question are contained in the guidance worksheets, but a few more general explanations may be helpful:
Part 1
The initial questions covering the documentation and verification of each incident (Section 1), including the initial “alert” (date and source), the schedule of information sources and the verification status of the case will be particularly useful where data is entered incrementally and/or where verification is undertaken separately from the documentation.
In addition to the fields used to record the details of the incident itself (Section2), the form also provides an opportunity to record a “public” summary from which any sensitive details will have been removed and which can be shared with third parties or used in advocacy.
Part 2
Each of the three versions of Part 2 follow roughly the same format:
Profiling data for the child(ren) affected, including, wherever possible, information about whether they have given consent and if so, for what (Section 1).
Details of the specific violations to which the children have been subjected (Section 2). There is a sub‐section for each violation, but it is possible to hide one or more of these violations by using the filters in columns AG:AJ (the bright yellow cells). It is also important to note that where a child has been abducted for the purpose of recruitment or sexual violence this can be recorded in the Recruitment or Sexual Violence sub‐sections of the form, so it is not necessary to complete the Abduction sub‐section as well – this should only be used for “other” abductions (e.g. ones involving hostage taking or political indoctrination).
Details of any immediate interventions undertaken by the child or their family/community and the MRM monitoring agency, followed, where relevant, by an indication of whether, how and when any children have been released by or have left an armed group, and details of any referrals made for long term support (Section 3). Only the basic details of the referral itself should be included. Data about the response and support provided will be recorded in a separate system by the service provider.#
Attachments
These Explanatory Notes are accompanied by four spreadsheets:
Appendix 8b – Data Requirements Format
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This large and complex spreadsheet contains the full range of data formats required for each type of incident and violation with detailed definitions for the options under each Look‐up List. It also includes the codes required to cross reference all the fields with the Database Specification. It will need to be customised (and simplified) to suit local requirements before it can be used.
The two examples (Appendices 8d and 8e) show how these formats might be implemented in practice.
Appendix 8c – Confidential Data Sheets
This spreadsheet illustrates how the personal details of children, informants and monitors might be recorded separately from the main MRM monitoring forms.
Appendix 8d – Data Requirements Example 1 – Recruitment
This spreadsheet provides an example of how the formats described in Appendix 8b can be used to create an electronic data collection form for an incident involving a case of recruitment and abduction involving several children. It contains dummy data to illustrate how the form might be used.
This format is based upon having full details for each child, but a simpler tabular format could be used where more limited data is available (i.e. one line for each child with the questions across the top of the page).
Appendix 8e – Data Requirements Example 2 – School Attack
This spreadsheet provides an example of how the formats described in Appendix 8b can be used to create an electronic data collection form for an incident involving a case of an attack on a school. It contains dummy data to illustrate how the form might be used.
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APPENDIX 8b
DATA REQUIREMENTS FORMAT
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Country (i) Monitoring Agency (ii) Case Ref No (iii)
1. Documentation & Verification Record
1.1 Details of Initial Alert
Date of Initial Alert (iv‐a) Source of Initial Alert (iv‐b)
1.2 Direct Observation by UN Approved Monitor(s)
Did an UN Approved Monitor directly observe the incident? (were they an eye witness?) (iv‐c)
If YES, please enter identification number/code for the UN Approved Monitor (iv‐d)
1.3 Interviews with Informants
Were any informants interviewed about the incident?
If YES, please give details below:
1.4 Physical Evidence
Although not required for the verification process, was any physical evidence of the incident observed?
1.5 Verification Status
Date of Verification Decision (1.3.1)
ID Number of UN Approved "Verifier" (1.3.2)
What is the current Verification Status of the Incident? (1.3.3)
Resource Constraints Unwilling Informants Other
No Access (Security) Contradictory Information
Reliability of
Informant (1.1.8)
Reliability of Evidence (1.2.3)
Consent ‐ Access to
Personal Data (1.1.6)
If "Undetermined", why is this the case? Please select each category that applies in the instance. (1.3.4)
Use for all incidents
Sex (1.1.4)
Consent ‐ to Contact Again?
(1.1.7)
Please give details of how the case was documented and verified.
Type of Evidence (1.2.2)Date of Observation
(1.2.1)
Date of Interview (1.1.1)
Category of Informant (1.1.2)
Eyewitness to
incident? (1.1.3)
MRM INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION FORM ‐ Part 1
Identification Code of Informant (1.1.5)
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GUIDANCE NOTES FOR DOCUMENTATION FORM(S)
Tables and Options Guidance Notes and Definitions
PART 1PRELIMINARY INFORMATION
Country 1Country2Country3Country4Country 5
Agency 1Agency 2Agency 3Agency 4Agency 5
All cells marked red in column AE must be completed, even if the response is negative; all those marked blue should be completed if the information is available.
Monitoring Agency ID (ii)
What is the I/D of the Monitoring Agency responsible for documenting and verifying the incident? Depending on the sensitivities involved and the conclusions of the Risk Assessment, it may be wiser to use an ID number rather than the full name of the agency (e.g. where NGO's are fulfilling this role). The list of ID numbers (or agency names) needs to be determined at the country level.
Country (i)In which Country was the incident monitored? ‐ this can be entered by default when the form is set‐up, but will provide an opportunity for cross‐border, regional or global consolidation of the data if required.
Part 1 should be completed for all cases. Part 2a should be completed for cases involving the four violations that impact on individual children (i.e Abduction, Killing and Maiming, Recruitment and Sexual Violence) AND where you have profiling data for each individual child. Part 2b should be used for cases involving the four "individual" violations where you do not have data about each of the individual children involved. Part 2c should be used for cases that involve "community" violations (i.e. attacks on schools and health facilities and denial of humanitarian access).
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Case Reference Number (iii)
A system for allocating unique case reference numbers needs to be established. The number could be generated automatically by the database (if entry is direct) or groups of numbers can be pre‐allocated to each monitoring agency. The format proposed for the gloabl MRM database uses the first three digits to identify the country (CCC), the second three digits to identify the monitoring agency (AAA), the next digit to identify the location of sub‐office (L) followed by a four digit numerical cost that is generated sequentially.
1. DOCUMENTATION & VERIFICATION
1.1 Details of Initial Alert
Date of Initial Alert (iv‐a)When was the initial alert received? This should be the date on which the Monitoring Agency first heard about the alleged incident. The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Media/Website Report This would cover any cases emerging from routine monitoring of the media or websites by TF members.Victim/Survivor The initial report is made directly by the victim/survivor themselvesAdult Caregiver The child's adult caregiver (natural, adoptive or foster parent, or other recognised guardian).
Other Family Member Any other member of the child's familyTeacher A teacher, lecturer, instructor or other educational official
Health Worker Any health worker
Human Rights Activist Anyone recognised as fulfilling the role of Human Rights Activist, whether as a member of a network/group or not.
Community Leader Community elder, religious leader, etc, but not a local government official.Community Member Any other member of the wider communityGovernment Official Any official of the government, but excluding members of the armed forces
Member of Armed Group A members of any armed force or group (state or non‐state actor)UN Staff Member Staff member of an UN agency
Source of Initial Alert (iv‐b)What was the source of the initial alert? (from whom did the monitoring agency first learn of the incident?) ‐ Select the category that best describes the primary relationship between the source and the child (e.g. Where the source is the child's adult caregiver and a community elder, select "adult caregiver").
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INGO Staff Member Staff member of an international NGONNGO Staff Member Staff member of a national NGO
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
1.2 Direct Observation by UN Approved Monitor
UN Observed? (iv‐c)Did an UN Approved Monitor directly observe the incident? (were they an eye witness? If Yes, this may be a sufficient to support verification without futher documentation). A Yes/No answer
UN Monitor ID No (iv‐d)
If YES, please enter identification code for the UN Approved Monitor. The use of an ID Code can help in preserving confidentiality and ensuring that staff are not put at risk. The ID code can be cross referenced with the list of personal details, should it be necessary to make any follow‐up. Any coding system will be locally determined.
1.3 Interviews with Informants (1.1)
Interviews of Informants Were any informants interviewed about the incident? A Yes/No answer.
Date (1.1.1)This should be the date on which the interview took place. The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Victim/Survivor The initial report is made directly by the victim/survivor themselvesAdult Caregiver The child's adult caregiver (natural, adoptive or foster parent, or other recognised guardian).
Other Family Member Any other member of the child's familyTeacher A teacher, lecturer, instructor or other educational official
Health Worker Any health workerHuman Rights Activist Anyone fulfilling the role of Human Rights Activist, whether as a member of a network/group or not.Community Leader Community elder, religious leader, etc, but not a local government official.Community Member Any other member of the wider communityGovernment Official Any official of the government, but excluding members of the armed forces
Member of Armed Group A member of any armed force or group (state or non‐state actor)UN Staff Member Staff member of an UN agencyINGO Staff Member Staff member of an international NGONNGO Staff Member Staff member of a national NGO
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Eyewitness? (1.1.3) Did the person interviewed actually witness the incident? A Yes/No answer.
Sex of Informant (1.1.4) What was the sex of the informant?FemaleMale
Informant ID Code (1.1.5)It is suggested that all informants should be allocated an ID code, so their name does not need to be entered onto the form. This should start with the Case Reference Number followed by /1, /2, etc. Once again this can be cross referenced with a separate list if follow‐up is needed.
Anonymous
The informant is not prepared to share their name or any other personal details that might identify them with the interviewer/monitor. This may limit the usefulness of the information provided as far as full verification is concerned, but may still be worthwhile if adequately corroborated by other informants. The use of this category depends on whether information from ananymous informants is considered legitimate.
Consent of Informant (Sharing Personal Details) (1.1.6)
With whom is the informant willing to share their name and other personal details? ‐ The assumption is that this can be viewed hierarchically, so only one option will be required for each individual. Please note that this consent only extends to the informants own personal details and DOES NOT imply consent to share details of the case itself, which can only be given by the child or their parent/guardian.
Category of Informant (1.1.2)What is the category of the informant? Please select the one that best describes the individual interviewed. This list is very similar to the one used for identifying the source of the alert, but excludes the category for media/websites.
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Agency OnlyThe informant is prepared to give their name and personal details to the interviewer/monitor on a confidential basis, but does not want them to be shared with other TF member agencies.
Task ForceThe informant is prepared for their name and personal details to be shared with the other TF member agencies on a confidential basis.
ProsecutionThe informant is prepared to consider providing information should there be a prosecution or court action against an alleged perpetrator at some point in the future, but would need to be contacted again before any action is taken or their identity is divulged to a third party.
Consent of Informant (further contact) (1.1.7)
Is the informant willing to be contacted again by the monitoring agency if further information or clarifications are required?
Reliability of Informant (1.1.8)
What is the reliability of the informant and the information provided. Please take into account the neutrality/imparitality/independence of the informant, the consistency of their story and whether they have any previous "track record" of providing information. This is important in ensuring robust verification, especially when the verification decision is taken by someone other than the person who documented the case.
HighHigh degree of confidence based upon the factors identified above. If the information is provided by the victim/survivor or an eye witness, it could be considered as the primary or in some cases only basis for verification.
Medium
A reasonable degree of confidence, but some doubts due to uncertaintlies about netrality/impartiality/independence, the monitor's lack of knowledge of the informant (no previous track record) and/or some inconsistencies or gaps in the information provided. Verification would, in these circumstances, require the support of at least one other source of information.
Low
While not worthless, the information provided is open to significant doubt because of dounts about neitrality/impartiality/independence, the previous track record of the source and/or significant conflicts and gaps in the information provided. While such information may be useful in providing additional details about an incident, it will not normally be used as part of the formal verification decision.
1.4 Physical Evidence (1.2)
Physical EvidenceAlthough not required for the verification process, was any physical evidence of the incident observed? A Yes/No Answer. Please note that monitors should not, under any circumstances, put themseves at risk by attempting to seek out evidence. Physical evidence should never be removed from the site of the incident.
Date (1.2.1)This should be the date on which the physical evidence was observed. The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Type of Physical Evidence (1.2.2) What kind of physical evidence was observed?Physical Damage Physical damage to buildings, including schools and health facilities.
Injuries Injuries incurred by individual children, including corpses
DocumentationDocumentary evidence, including police reports, Ministry of Education reports about school attacks, photographs, medical reports, etc
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Reliability of Evidence (1.2.3)What is the reliability of the the physical evidence? Please take account of whether the evidience was observed at the site of the incident and if not the reliability of its source. You should also consider whether the evidence could be subject to different interpretations.
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1.5 Verification (1.3)
Date (1.3.1)This should be the date on which the verification decision was made. The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Verifier ID Code (1.3.2) What is the ID Number of the "UN Approved Verifier" who has made the verification decision?
Verification Status (1.3.3)
What is the current status of the case? ‐ All cases will start life in the "Pending Verification" category and once sufficient information has been gathered and a decision has been made the category can be changed. In normal circumstances this will only need to happen once, but if new information becomes available, the status can be updated (the Date and Verifier ID Code would also need to be updated at the same time.
Pending Verification (Work in progress)
The case is still in the process of being documented and has not yet reached the point where a verification decision is possible (i.e. It remains work in progress).
Fully Verified by UN staff memberThe case has been fully documented and has been assessed as meeting all the requirements for inclusion in MRM reports as a fully verified case by a UN staff member.
Fully Verified by Trusted UN PartnerThe case has been fully documented and has been assessed as meeting all the requirements for inclusion in MRM reports as a fully verified case by a trusted UN partner (NGO).
Documented
While it has not been possible to fully verify the case for inclusion in the MRM reports, possibly due to access, intimidation of potential informants, etc, the information available still provides sufficient justification for it to be included as a "trusted" of "documented" case for contextual purposes. This category might also be used for cases which have been documented by an NGO/CBO colleagues in very insecure areas who are not "UN approved monitors".
UndeterminedIt has not proved possible to document the case, possibly due to security, access or resourcing issues, and therefore no decision has been possible about its verification. There is no likelihood of this situation changing in the foreseeable future.
UnsubstantiatedThe documentation of the case contradicts the initial report to the extent that the original allegation is regarded as unsubstantiated.
Reasons for Non‐Verification (1.3.4)
If "Undetermined", why is this the case? This should only be completed for those cases where there is no realistic possibility of securing sufficient information for a formal verification decsion to be made (i.e. Its long term status is "Undetermined"). This will help the MRM Task Force monitor the reasons why vcases cannot be verified. Multiple options may be selected.
Resource Constraints The monitoring agency(s) lack the manpower, transport or other resources to follow‐up the reportNo Access (Security) The security situation in the area makes it impossible for TF staff to follow‐up the case.
Unwilling Informants Potential informants are unwilling to provide information about the case, possibly because they are being intimidated or for another reason fear the consequences of doing so.
Conflicting informationThe information gathered about the case is conflictual and as a consequence it is impossible to come to a conclusion about the case.
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
2. INCIDENT DETAILS
2.1 Incident Description (2.1)
Date of Incident (2.1.1)When did the incident take place? This should be the date on which the Monitoring Agency first heard about the alleged incident. The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required).
Time of Incident (2.1.2) At what time of the day did the incident occur?
Morning Any time from sunrise to lunchtime.Afternoon Any time from lunchtime to dusk.Evening After dark, but before most people retire to bed.Night Any time when most people would expect to be sleeping.
Unknown
181
Place of incident (2.1.3)Where did the incident take place? Please use the term that best described the location. (the list of options does, where possible, relfect the categories used by other UN information systems.
HomeField/Garden
SchoolHealth FacilityWorkplace
Path, Road, TrackBush/Forest
Religious CentreSports/Cultural Centre
Police StationMilitary Camp
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyUnknown
182
Admin Area ‐ Level 1 (2.1.4)Where did the Incident take place (Administrative Area 1 ‐ the largest unit) ‐ this is a locally determined list, but should be based upon the nationally recognised geographical structure which has been geocoded.
Province 1Province 2Province 3
Admin Area ‐ Level 2 (2.1.5)Where did the Incident take place (Administrative Area 2 ‐ the intermediate unit) ‐ this is a locally determined list. If this form is used electronically, the choice of Admin Level 1 will determine the options available for Level 2.
District 1District 2District 3
Admin Area ‐ Level 3 (2.1.6)Where did the Incident take place (Administrative Area 3 ‐ the smallest unit) ‐ this is a locally determined list. If this form is used electronically, the choice of Admin Level 2 will determine the options available for Level 3.
Division 1Division 2Division 3
Incident Description (2.1.8)
Please describe what happened (Tell the story ‐ what, when, where, by whom and why, explain the process of documentation and verification and any actions taken). This section should be used to give all the qualitative information about the incident. It may need to be updated as more information becomes available. You should avoid mentioning the names or personal details that could identify any of the individuals involved.
2.2 Perpetrator Details (2.2)
Category of Perpetrator (2.2.1)Was the alleged perpetrator(s) a State or Non‐State Actor? ‐ This question is primarily designed to distinguish between State and Non‐State Actors, but a third category has been included for non‐MRM cases in case this is
State ActorNon‐State Actor
Non‐MRM Perpetrator This should only be used where the form is also being used to record non‐MRM incidents/violationsUnknown
183
Sub‐Category of Perpetrator (2.2.2)To which armed force or group did the alleged perpetrator(s) belong? ‐ this is a locally determined list hich can be used to identify the specific peretrators responsible for the incident. Non‐MRM categories can also be included if required (e.g. family member, community member, teacher, etc).
Government ArmyGovernment PoliceGovernment MilitiaMain Armed GroupLocal Militia GroupPara MilitariesCriminal GangUnknown
Number of Perpetrators (2.2.3) How many perpetrators were involved in the incident?12
3 ‐ 56 ‐ 10
11 or moreUnknown
2.3 Child Numbers (2.3)
Number of Children (2.3.1)How many children were involved in the incident and experienced vioaltions of their rights. If there was a group and you are unsure of the exact number, please make an estimate.
3. CASE SUMMARY (Public Version)
Case Study? (2.4.1)Is this incident suitable for use as a case study for advocacy at the national or global level (assuming that all personal details that could be used to identify the individuals involved have been removed)?
Global Suitable for use as a case study to highlight issues at the global (and national) level.National Suitable for use as a case study to highlight issues at the national) level only.
No Not suitable for use as a case study in any advocacy activities.
Public Summary (2.4.2)Optional Case Summary for Public Use ‐ Excluding any sensitive or confidential data or anything that could be used to identify the individuals involved, providing a form of words that can be shared with perpetrators or used for public advocacy.
184
Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref No
MRM INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION FORM ‐ Part 2a
Use for "individual" violations (i.e. Abduction, killing & maiming, recruitment and sexual violence) where you have profiling data for each of the individual children involved.
1. Details of the Individual Child 1.1 Profiling Data for the Individual Child (at the time of the incident)
1.2 Consents
What level of Consent has the Child/Adult Caregiver given for sharing their personal details (3.1.8)
Is the Child and/or their Adult Caregiver will to be contacted again? (3.1.9)
ID Code (3.1.1)Date of
Birth (3.1.3)Care Arrangements
(3.1.7)
Does the Child/Adult Caregiver consent to their personal details being passed to another humanitarian agency willing and able to provide long term support? (3.1.10)
Religion (3.1.5)Refugee/IDP Status
(3.1.6)Sex (3.1.2) Ethnicity (3.1.4)
2. Details of the Individual Violation(s)2.1 Summary of ViolationsWhich Violation(s) did the child experience during the incident?
Please enter more detailed information below on each of the violations experienced by the child:
2.2 Killing & Maiming (4.1)
What caused the death or maiming of the child? (4.1.1)
Was the victim/survivor directly participating in hostilities at the time? (4.1.2)
Did the killing or maiming occur during or as a direct result of abduction? (4.1.3)
* selecting "Yes" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Killing & Maiming" & "Abduction")
What were the circumstances of the violation in the context of international law? (4.1.4)
What were the consequences of the violation? (4.1.5)
2.3 Recruitment (4.2)
Non‐MRM Violation 5
Non‐MRM Violation 6
Sexual Violence
Non‐MRM Violation 1
Non‐MRM Violation 3
Killing & Maiming
AbductionNon‐MRM Violation 4
RecruitmentNon‐MRM Violation 2
What factors contributed towards the recruitment of the child by the Armed Group (4.2.2)
* selecting "Abduction" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Recruitment" & "Abduction")
Family problems/abuse To seek revenge
To join/follow friends Other
Idealism
Does/did the child have a position of authority in the armed group (e.g. a Commander)? (4.2.5)
185
2.4 Sexual Violence
What type of sexual violence was committed against the child? (4.3.1)
Was this violation associated with Sexual Exploitation or Transactional Sex? (4.3.2)
Was this violation associated with Sexual Slavery? (4.3.3)
Was this violation explicitly intended to cause "Forced Pregnancy"? (4.3.4)
Did this Violation occur during or as a direct result of Abduction? (4.3.5)
* selecting "Yes" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Sexual Violence" & "Abduction")
2.5 Other Abduction (i.e. excluding any related to Killing & Maimimg, Recruitment & Sexual Violence)
What was the main purpose of the abduction (4.4.1)
3. Intervention(s)3.1 Immediate Action by Child/Adult Caregiver/Family/Community
What action, if any, did the authorities take in response? (4.5.2)
3.2 Immediate Interventions by the Monitoring AgencyPlease give details of any "immediate" action(s) taken by the monitoring agency itself to address the violation.
Type of Action (4.6.2) Comments/Explanatory DetailsDate of Action
(4.6.1)
Had the violation been raised with the relevant government authorities by the child/adult caregiver/family/community? (4.5.1)
3.3 Release or Departure of Child
If the child was abducted, recreuited or otherwise detailed by the armed group, please answer the questions below:
Has the child left the armed group? (4.7.1)
If YES, when did this occur? (4.7.2)
If YES, how did this happen? (4.7.3)
If YES, what factors contributed to the release/departure? (4.7.4)
Family Pressure NGO/UN Pressure Ransom paid
Community Pressure Discretion of Armed Group Other
Government Pressure Force (armed intervention)
186
3.4 ReferralsIs the child already receiving the appropriate support and assistance from humanitarian agencies? (4.8.1)
If no support is being provided and/or no referrals have been made, please indicate why (4.8.5)
Please give details of any referrals made for follow‐up and long term support, whether internally or to another agancy.
Date of Referral (4.8.2)
Agency (to which the child was referred) (4.8.3)
Objective of Referral (type of support required) (4.8.4)
Comments/Explanatory details
Tables and Options Guidance Notes and Definitions
All cells marked red in column AE must be completed, even if the response is negative; all those marked blue should be completed if the information is available.
GUIDANCE NOTES FOR DOCUMENTATION FORM(S)
Part 1 should be completed for all cases. Part 2a should be completed for cases involving the four violations that impact on individual children (i.e Abduction, Killing and Maiming, Recruitment and Sexual Violence) AND where you have profiling data for each individual child. Part 2b should be used for cases involving the four "individual" violations where you do not have data about each of the individual children involved. Part 2c should be used for cases that involve "community" violations (i.e. attacks on schools and health facilities and denial of humanitarian access).
PART 2A
1. DETAILS OF THE INDIVIDUAL CHILD
1.1 Profiling Data for the Individual Child (3.1)
Child's ID Code (3.1.1)It is suggested that each child should be allocated an ID code, so their name does not need to be entered onto the form. Once again this can be cross referenced with a separate list if follow‐up is needed.
Sex (3.1.2) What is the sex of the child?FemaleMale
Unknown
Date of Birth (3.1.3)
What is the child's Date of Birth? To facilitate analysis of the data it is important to record the date of birth of the child rather than their age, even if this has to be an estimate. Where you are unsure of the day of birth use the 1st of the month, where you are unsure of the month, use 1st January. You can also calculate the year of birth below (just enter the current year and the child's age).
Use this section to record details of cases involving Abduction, Killing & Maiming, Recruitment and Sexual Violence where you have detailed data on the individual child(ren) involved (1 form per child)
Enter the detailed profiling data for the child affected.
187
Current Year 2009Estimated Age 10Date of Birth 1999
Ethnic Affiliation (3.1.4)
What was the ethnic affiliation of the Victim/Survivor? ‐ this is a locally determined list. In some countries it may be a combination of ethnic affiliation and caste. If there is an intention to analyse this data, the categories should be kept to a manageable number (preferably less than 15). This may require combining small ethnic groups together into "families".
Ethnicity 1Ethnicity 2Ethnicity 3Ethnicity 4Ethnicity 5Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Unknown
Religion (3.1.5)What was the religious affiliation of the Victim/Survivor? ‐ this is a locally determined list (the ones listed are just examples).
BuddhistChristianHinduMuslimOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Unknown
188
Refugee/IDP Status (3.1.6) What was the status of the child at the time of the violation (refugee/IDP/returnees/community member)?Community Member The child (and their family) has not been displaced during the conflict.
IDP The child (and their family) was internally displaced within their own country.
Refugee The child (and their family) has been forced to relocate to another country and are registered with UNHCR.
ReturneeThe child (and their family) has returned to their home area after a period of displacement (as a refugee or IDP)
Unknown
Care Arrangements (3.1.7)What were the care arrangements for the child at the time of the incident/violation(s)? ‐ The choice of category will also make it possible to determine whether the child is separated and/or unaccompanied)
Both Parents The child was living with both natural or adoptive parentsLone Parent The child was living with just one natural or adoptive parentOther Family The child was living with other members of their wider extended family (i.e. not their parents).Foster Family The child was living with a temporary foster family with whom they ware not directly related.Care Home The child was living in some kind of residential care home
Independent Living The child was living independently without direct adult involvementOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Unknown
1.2 Consent
Consent of Child (3.1.8)With whom is the child and/or adult caregive willing to share their name and other personal details? ‐ The assumption is that this can be viewed hierarchically, so only one option needs to be selected.
AnonymousThe child/adult caregiver is not prepared to share their name or any other personal details that might identify them with the interviewer/monitor (this category will only be required if information can be accepted from anonymous informants).
Agency OnlyThe child/adult caregiver is prepared to give their name and personal details to the interviewer/monitor on a confidential basis, but does not want them to be shared with other TF member agencies.
Task ForceThe child/adult caregiver is prepared for their name and personal details to be shared with the other TF member agencies on a confidential basis.
PerpetratorThe child/adult caregiver is prepared for their case to be raised, directly or indirectly with the appropriate armed force/group in an effort to address the violation (e.g. to secure the release of the child).
ProsecutorThe informant is prepared to consider providing evidence for any subsequent prosecution or court action against an alleged perpetrator, although they would need to be contacted again before any action is taken or their identity is divulged to a third party.
Consent to be Contacted (3.1.9) Is the child and/or adult caregiver will be to be contacted again about the violations? A Yes/No Answer.
Consent for Referral (3.1.10)Does the Child/Adult Caregiver consent to their personal details being passed to another humanitarian agency willing and able to provide long term support? A Yes/No answer.
2. DETAILS OF THE INDIVIDUAL VIOLATIONS
2.1 Summary of Violations
Individual ViolationsWhich violations did the child experience during the incident? This question relates to the four "individual" MRM violations. The TF can if it wishes add other non‐MRM "individual" violations should it wish to monitor them for its own purposes (e.g. illegal detention, child labour, trafficking, etc)
AbductionKilling & Maiming
RecruitmentSexual Violence
Non‐MRM Violation 1Non‐MRM Violation 2Non‐MRM Violation 3Non‐MRM Violation 4Non‐MRM Violation 5Non‐MRM Violation 6
189
2.2 Killing or Maiming (4.1)
Cause of Violation (4.1.1) What caused the death or maiming of the child?Shooting (Crossfire)
Improvised Explosive DeviceSuicide Attack
Shelling/Mortar FireCluster Munitions
Other Aerial BombardmentLandmines
Execution/Extra Judicial KillingUse of White Weapon A weapon other than a firearm (e.g. Knife, machete, club, etc)
TortureOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Participation in Hostilities (4.1.2)Was the victim/survivor directly participating in hostilities at the time of the violation? A Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
Abduction (4.1.3)Did the killing/maiming occur during or as a direct result of abduction? ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know Answer. A "Yes" response will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations (i.e. "Killing/Maiming" and "Abduction").
Circumstances (4.1.4) What were the circumstances of the violation in the context of international law?Direct Attack The death or serious injury was the result of a direct attack.
Indiscriminate Attack
The death or serious injury was the result of an indiscrimiate attack, which is defined as being "by method or means of combat – including weapons ‐ the effects of which cannot be limited and consequently, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction: and attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (i.e. disproportionate attacks.)
Willful Killing, etc The death or serious injury was the result of willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment.Impossible to Determine
Outcome (4.1.5) What were the consequences of the violation?
190
Killing The death of the child/children, whether immediately or later as a result of their injuriesPermanent Disablement Permanent disability as a direct consequence of the violation
Serious Injury Serious injury that merited hospitalisation (whether or not this actually occurred) Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
2.3 Recruitment (4.2)
Type of Recruitment (4.2.1)Was the recruitment primarily "Forced" (e.g. Conscription, Abduction, or the use of intimidation and threats) ‐ A Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
Factors Influencing Recruitment (4.2.2)
What factors contributed towards the recruitment of the child by the armed group? This includes both push and pull factors. Please select all the factors that apply. Please note that selecting "Abduction" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Recruitment" and "Abduction").
Abduction * Abduction/kidnapping
ConscriptionAn orgnised system of compulsory recruitment (e.g. one person per family or all children agaed between certain ages).
Intimidation Any kind of intimidation or threats, whether directed at the child or their family.
Lack of basic servicesA lack of food and other basic services at home and the prospect of accessing some of these within or through membership of the group.
Access to securityWhere membership of the armed group is seen as a means fo providing protection from attacks by other armed groups/forces or factions.
Financial reasons Where the armed group offers financial incentives to recruitsFamily problems/abuse Where problems within the family cause the child to leave.To join/follow friends The wish to be part of a group, together with friends. The atttraction of excitement and adventure.
Idealism A belief in the cause espoused by the armed group, including a wish to defend their community.To seek revenge To seeke revenge (e.g. for the killing of relatives, looting of proety, etc)
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyDon't Know
191
Re‐Recruitment (4.2.3)Was this a case of re‐recruitment (this does not necessarily have to be by the same armed group) ‐ A Yes/No Don't Know answer.
Role in Armed Group (4.2.4) What role did the child play in the armed group?
CombatantThe child was directly involved in combat operations. This likely to include bearing a weapon, but could include any activity that might put the child at risk from the actions of an opposing armed group (e.g. mine clearance, espionage, etc)
Non‐Combatant The child was involved in non‐combat roles (e.g. cook, messenger, porter)
Sexual RoleThe "girlfriend" or "wife" of a commander/combatant/member of the armed group or any other forced sexual activity
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyUnknown
Position of Authority (4.2.5) Did/does the child hold a position of authority in the armed group (e.g. Commander)? ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know
Own Weapon (4.2.6) Did the child use/own a weapon? A Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
2.4 Sexual Violence (4.3)
Type of Sexual Violence (4.3.1) What type of sexual violence was committed against the child?
Rape Non‐consensual penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth with the penis or other body part (UNHCR).
Sexual AssaultAny form of non‐consensual sexual contact that does not result in or include penetration (e.g. attempted rape, fondling of or touching of genitalia and buttocks (UNHCR).
Forced Marriage The marriage of a child against his or her willEnforced Sterilisation Any forced sterilisation of the child
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Abduction (4.3.2) Did this sexual violence violation also involve abduction. A Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
2.5 Other Abduction (i.e. Excluding Recruitment & Sexual Violence) (4.4)
Purpose of Abduction (4.4.1) What was the main purpose of the abductionHostage (Extortion) With the aim of securing the payment of a ransom in exchange for the release or safe keeping of the child
Hostage (Intimidation)With the aim of bringing pressure on family members or others to get them to do things that they would not otherwise do in return in exchange for the release or safe keeping of the child.
Political IndoctrinationWith the aim of subjecting the child to political indoctrination designed to change/modify their views and win their support for the group's ideas or beliefs.
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyUnknown
3. INTERVENTIONS
3.1 Immediate Action by Child/Adult Caregiver/Family/Community (4.5)
Raised with the Authorities? (4.5.1)Had the case been raised with the authorities (by the child, adult caregiver or other relevant individual, BUT not by the monitoring agency). A Yes/No/Don't Know answer. This question could potentially be extended to include representations to all perpetrators.
Action taken by Authorities (4.5.2) What action was taken by the authorities (after the incident was reported to them)?
Armed interventionArmed intervention designed to secure the release of children or some other outcome related to the violation.
NegotiationNegotiations between the authorities and the armed group designed to secure the release of children, compensation, the prevention of future violations, etc
Legal action Formal legal action against the perpetrator(s) responsible for the violation.Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Unknown
192
3.2 Immediate Intervention by Monitoring Agency (4.6)
Date of Intervention (4.6.1)What was the date of the immediate intervention by the monitoring agency? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Type of Action (4.6.2)What type of immediate action was taken by the MRM Monitoring Agency? ‐ These should only be actions that are designed to address the violation itself and not longer term support for the child and/or their family.
Medical Intervention Efforts to secure emergency medical treatment or assessment.Report to Police Reporting the incident/violation to the police at local or national level.
Report to Government Authorities Reporting the incident/violation of another government authority (e.g. Ministry of education/Social Welfare)
Intervention with Armed Group Direct intervention with the armed group concerned to secure the release of the child or equivalent.Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Comments/Explanatory Details Please provide any additional details required about the intervention
UnknownNot Applicable
Contributory Factors (4.7.5) What factors contributed towards the children leaving the armed group?Family Pressure Pressure exerted by the child's family.
Community Pressure Pressure exerted by the local communityGovernment Pressure Pressure exerted by the government authorities, but excluding military action/armed interventionsNGO/UN Pressure Pressure exerted NGOs or UN agencies, including human rights activists (targeted advocacy)
Discretion of Armed Group A decision taken by the armed group without any external pressure or interventionForce (armed intervention) The use of armed force to secure the release, whether by the government, international forces or others.
Ransom paidThe payment of a financial ransom or some other demand made by the armed group was met (e.g. a resignation, change of policy, closure of a school, etc).
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
3.3 Referrals (4.8)
This section is intended to capture the basic details of any referrals made for follow‐up and long term support
Existing Support (4.8.1)Is the child already receiving the appropriate support and assistance from humanitarian agencies? A Yes/No/Don't Know answer. If YES, no referrals will be required.
Date of the Referral (4.8.2)When was the referral made? This should be the date on which the Monitoring Agency first heard about the alleged incident. The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Referral Agency (4.8.3)To which agency was the child referred? ‐ Once again a system of reference numbers can be used to maintain the confidentiality of the agencies involved.
ABC1234ABC1235ABC1236
Purpose of Referral (4.8.4) What was the purpose of the referral?
193
PsychosocialMedical/HealthEducationalVocationalLivelihood
LegalFamily TracingAlternative Care
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Reason for No Support (4.8.5) If no support is being provided and/or no referrals have been made, please indicate whyNo support needed A needs assessment indicates that no support is required.No support available Support needs have been identified, but no suitable provision is available.
Support declinedSup[port needs have been identified and suitable provision is available, but the child and/or their family does not wish to take up the offer.
Child Not Accessible The child is not accessible to humanitarian agencies (e.g. They are still being held by an armed group).Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Not Applicable
194
Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref No
Use for "individual" violations (i.e. Abduction, killing & maiming, recruitment and sexual violence) where you do not have data for each of the individual children involved.
MRM INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION FORM ‐ Part 2b
1. Details of the Children1.1 Profiling Data for the Group of Children
2. Details of the Specific Violations2.1 Summary of Violations
Which Violation(s) did the children experience during the incident?
Please enter below any, more detailed, information available about each of the violations experienced by the children:
AbductionKilling & Maiming
RecruitmentSexual Violence
Non‐MRM Violation 1
Number of Children (3.2.1)
Sex (3.2.2) Age (3.2.3) Refugee/IDP Status (3.2.6)
Non‐MRM Violation 5
Non‐MRM Violation 6
Please provide profiling details for the group of children (or for an individual child where it has not been possible to collect complete personal details)
Ethnicity (3.3.4) Religion (3.2.5)
Non‐MRM Violation 2
Non‐MRM Violation 3
Non‐MRM Violation 4
Please enter below any, more detailed, information available about each of the violations experienced by the children:
2.2 Killing & Maiming
What caused the death or maiming of the children? (5.1.1)
Were the victims/survivors directly participating in hostilities at the time? (5.1.2)
Did the killing or maiming occur during or as a direct result of abduction? (5.1.3)
* selecting "Yes" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Killing & Maiming" & "Abduction")
What were the circumstances of the violation in the context of international law? (5.1.4)
How many children were killed? (5.1.5)
How many children were maimed? (5.1.6)
2.3 Recruitment
Was the recruitment primarily "Forced" (5.2.1)
What factors contributed towards the recruitment of the children by the Armed Group? (5.2.2)
* selecting "Abduction" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Recruitment" & "Abduction")
195
Abduction * Lack of basic services
Family problems/abuse To seek revenge
Conscription Access to security
To join/follow friends Other
Intimidation Financial reasons
Idealism
Was this a case of Re‐Recruitment? (5.2.3)
What role did the children play in the armed group? (5.2.4)
Do/did the children have positions of authority in the armed group (e.g. a Commander)? (5.2.5)
Is there any evidence that the children use/own weapons? (5.2.6)
2.4 Sexual Violence
What type of sexual violence was committed against the children? (5.3.1)
Were these violations associated with Sexual Exploitation or Transactional Sex? (5.3.2)
Were these violations associated with Sexual Slavery? (5.3.3)
Were these violations explicitly intended to cause "Forced Pregnancies"? (5.3.4)
Did this Violation occur during or as a direct result of Abduction? (5.3.5)
* selecting "Yes" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Sexual Violence" & "Abduction")
2.5 Other Abductions (i.e. excluding any related to Killing & Maiming, Recruitment & Sexual Violence)
What was the main purpose of the abduction? (5.4.1)
3. Immediate Intervention(s)3.1 Immediate Action by the Children/Families/Community
Was the violation raised with the relevant government authorities? (5.5.1)
What action, if any, did they take in response? (5.5.2)
3.2 Immediate Interventions by the Monitoring Agency Please give details of any "immediate" action(s) taken by the monitoring agency itself to address the violation.
Comments/Explanatory detailsType of Action (5.6.2)Date of Action
(5.6.1)
196
3.3 Release or Departure of Children
Have some or all the children been released? (5.7.1)
If YES, how many have been released? (5.7.2)
If YES, when did this happen? (5.7.3)
If YES, how did this happen? (5.7.4)
If YES, what factors contributed to the release/departure? (5.7.5)Family Pressure NGO/UN Pressure Ransom paidCommunity Pressure Discretion of Armed Group OtherGovernment Pressure Force (armed intervention)
197
Tables and Options Guidance Notes and Definitions
PART 2B
GUIDANCE NOTES FOR DOCUMENTATION FORM(S)
Part 1 should be completed for all cases. Part 2a should be completed for cases involving the four violations that impact on individual children (i.e. Abduction, Killing and Maiming, Recruitment and Sexual Violence) AND where you have profiling data for each individual child. Part 2b should be used for cases involving the four "individual" violations where you do not have data about each of the individual children involved. Part 2c should be used for cases that involve "community" violations (i.e. attacks on schools and health facilities and denial of humanitarian access).
All cells marked red in column AE must be completed, even if the response is negative; all those marked blue should be completed if the information is available.
Use this section to record details of cases involving Attacks on Schools and Health Facilities or Denial of Humanitarian Access which impact on large groups of children and where collecting data from, or about, individual children would not be either possible or appropriate.
1. DETAILS OF THE CHILDREN
1.1 Profiling Data for the Group of Children
Number of Children (3.2.1) How many children were involved? Estimate the number if necessary.
Sex (3.2.2) What was the sex of the group of children involved?All FemaleAll MaleMixed The group consists of both female and male members.
Unknown
Age Bands (3.2.3) Into which age band did the children fall?<5 years Under 5 Years of age
≥5<10 years≥ 5 years or over, but less than 10 years≥10<15 years 10 years or over, but less than 15 years≥15<18 years 15 years or over, but less than 18 years
Mixed The group contains children from two or all three of the age bandsUnknown
Enter whatever general profiling data is available for the group of children affected.
2. DETAILS OF VIOLATION
2.1 Summary of Violations
Individual ViolationsWhich violations did the children experience during the incident? This question relates to the four "individual" MRM violations. The TF can if it wishes add other non‐MRM "individual" violations should it wish to monitor them for its own purposes (e.g. illegal detention, child labour, trafficking, etc)
AbductionKilling & Maiming
RecruitmentSexual Violence
Non‐MRM Violation 1Non‐MRM Violation 2Non‐MRM Violation 3Non‐MRM Violation 4Non‐MRM Violation 5Non‐MRM Violation 6
198
2.2 Killing or Maiming (5.1)
Cause of Violation (5.1.1) What caused the death or maiming of the children?Shooting (Crossfire)
Improvised Explosive DeviceSuicide Attack
Shelling/Mortar FireCluster Munitions
Other Aerial BombardmentLandmines
Execution/Extra Judicial KillingUse of White Weapon A weapon other than a firearm (e.g. Knife, machete, etc)
TortureOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Participation in Hostilities (5.1.2) Were the victims/survivors directly participating in hostilities at the time of the violation? A Yes/No answer.
Abduction (5.1.3)Did the killing/maiming occur during or as a direct result of abduction? ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know Answer. A "Yes" response will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations (i.e. "Killing/Maiming" and "Abduction").
Circumstances of Violation (5.1.3) What were the circumstances of the violation in the context of international law?Direct Attack The deaths or serious injuries were the result of a direct attack.
Indiscriminate Attack
The deaths or serious injuries were the result of an indiscriminate attack, which is defined as being "by method or means of combat – including weapons ‐ the effects of which cannot be limited and consequently, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction: and attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. (i.e. disproportionate attacks.)
Wilful Killing, etc The deaths or serious injuries were the result of wilful killing, torture or inhumane treatment.Impossible to Determine
How many children were killed? (5.1.4)
How many children were maimed? (5.1.5)
2.3 Recruitment (5.2)
Type of Recruitment (5.2.1)Was the recruitment primarily "Forced" (e.g. Conscription, Abduction, or the use of intimidation and threats) ‐ A Yes/No answer.
Factors Influencing recruitment (5.2.2)
What factors contributed towards the recruitment of the children by the armed group? This includes both push and pull factors. Please select all the factors that apply. * Please note that selecting "Abduction" will ensure that this is recorded under both MRM violations ("Recruitment" and "Abduction").
Abduction * Abduction/kidnapping
ConscriptionAn organised system of compulsory recruitment (e.g. one person per family or all children aged between certain ages).
Intimidation Any kind of intimidation or threats, whether directed at the child or their family.
Lack of basic servicesA lack of food and other basic services at home and the prospect of accessing some of these within or through membership of the group.
Number of Casualties
Access to securityWhere membership of the armed group is seen as a means of providing protection from attacks by other armed groups/forces or factions.
Financial reasons Where the armed group offers financial incentives to recruitsFamily problems/abuse Where problems within the family cause the child to leave.To join/follow friends The wish to be part of a group, together with friends. The attraction of excitement and adventure.
Idealism A belief in the cause espoused by the armed group, including a wish to defend their community.To seek revenge To seek revenge (e.g. for the killing of relatives, looting of property, etc)
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyDon't Know
199
Re‐Recruitment (5.2.3)Was this a case of re‐recruitment (this does not necessarily have to be by the same armed group) ‐ A Yes/No answer.
Role in Armed Group (5.2.4) What role did the children play in the armed group?
CombatantThe children are/were directly involved in combat operations. This likely to include bearing a weapon, but could include any activity that might put the children at risk from the actions of an opposing armed group (e.g. mine clearance, espionage, etc)
Non‐Combatant The children are/were involved in non‐combat roles (e.g. cook, messenger, porter)
Sexual RoleThe "girlfriends" or "wives" of commanders/combatants/members of the armed group or any other forced sexual activity
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyUnknown
Position of Authority (5.2.5) Did/do the children hold positions of authority in the armed group (e.g. Commander)? ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know
Own Weapons (5.2.6) Is there any evidence that the children use/own weapons? A Yes/No answer.
2.4 Sexual Violence (5.3)
Type of Sexual Violence (5.3.1)
Rape Non‐consensual penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth with the penis or other body part (UNHCR).
Sexual AssaultAny form of non‐consensual sexual contact that does not result in or include penetration (e.g. attempted rape, fondling of or touching of genitalia and buttocks, etc).
Forced Marriage The marriage of children against their willEnforced Sterilisation Any forced sterilisation of the children
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Sexual Exploitation (5.3.2)Were the violations perpetrated in the context of sexual exploitation/transactional sex (i.e. were they associated with an exchange of money, goods or services, irrespective of whether the survivor benefited from them or not) ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know answer
What type of sexual violence was committed against the children?
Sexual Slavery (5.3.3)Was this one of a series of sexual violence violations perpetrated on the children over an extended period of time? ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
Forced Pregnancy (5.3.4)Did the sexual violence form part of an explicit effort to make the children pregnant in order to change the ethnic composition of the population? ‐ a Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
Abduction (5.3.5) Did this sexual violence violation also involve abduction. A Yes/No/Don't Know answer.
2.5 Other Abduction (i.e. Excluding Recruitment & Sexual Violence) (5.4)
Purpose of Abduction (5.4.1) What was the main purpose of the abductionHostage (Extortion) With the aim of securing the payment of a ransom in exchange for the release or safe keeping of the child
Hostage (Intimidation)With the aim of bringing pressure on family members or others to get them to do things that they would not otherwise do in return in exchange for the release or safe keeping of the child.
Political IndoctrinationWith the aim of subjecting the child to political indoctrination designed to change/modify their views and win their support for the group's ideas or beliefs.
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyUnknown
200
3. INTERVENTIONS
3.1 Immediate Action by Children/Families/Community (5.5)
Raised with the Authorities? (5.5.1)Has the case been raised with the authorities (by the appropriate member(s) of the community or representatives of the institution affected, BUT not by the monitoring agency itself). A Yes/No answer
Action taken by Authorities (5.5.2) What action was taken by the authorities (after the incident was reported to them)?
Armed interventionArmed intervention designed to reverse the violation (e.g. Remove an armed group from a school or health facility, remove road blocks, etc).
NegotiationNegotiations between the authorities and the armed group designed address the violation, secure compensation, prevent future violations, etc
Legal action Formal legal action against the perpetrator(s) responsible for the violation.Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Unknown
3.2 Immediate Intervention by Monitoring Agency (5.6)
Date of Intervention (5.6.1)What was the date of the immediate intervention by the monitoring agency? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Type of Action (5.6.2)What type of immediate action was taken by the MRM Monitoring Agency? ‐ These should only be actions that are designed to address the violation itself and not longer term support for the child and/or their family.
Medical Intervention Efforts to secure emergency medical treatment or assessment for the victims/survivors of an attack.Report to Police Reporting the incident/violation to the police at local or national level.
Report to Government Authorities Reporting the incident/violation of another government authority (e.g. Ministry of education/Social Welfare)
Intervention with Armed Group Direct intervention with the armed group concerned to Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Comments/Explanatory Details Please provide any additional details required about the intervention
3.3 Release or Departure of Children (5.7)
Complete these questions for all children who have been abducted or recruited into an armed group.
Release (5.7.1) Have some or all of the children been released or left the armed group?Yes (All) All the children have been released or have left the armed group
Yes (Some) Some of the children have been released or have left the armed groupNone None of the children have been released or have left the armed group
Unknown
How many? (5.7.2) If YES, how many were released or have left the armed group?
Date of Release (5.7.3)When were the child(ren) released or when did they leave the armed group? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
201
How Left Armed Group (5.7.4) If the children left the armed group, how did it happen?
Formal DDRA formal programme of demobilisation negotiated between or with the parties to the conflict and normally supported by external agencies
Locally negotiated demobilisationAn informal agreement negotiated at the local level with an individual commander or group of commanders to secure the release of children, but not part of a wider national or conflict‐wide agreement
Individually Brokered An agreement was negotiated for the release of this group of children alone.
Dissolution of Armed GroupThe armed group disbanded or for some other reason ceased to exist, leaving the children to their own devices.
Captured/SurrenderedThe children were captured by, or surrendered to, another armed group (most likely the government forces) and were either released into the care of an humanitarian agency or placed in detention
Ran Away/Escaped The child(ren) left of their own initiative and against the wishes of their abductors.Killed or Died The child(ren) were killed while with the armed group or died of other causes during this period.
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyUnknown
Not Applicable
Contributory Factors (5.7.5) What factors contributed towards the children leaving the armed group?Family Pressure Pressure exerted by the children's families
Community Pressure Pressure exerted by the local communityGovernment Pressure Pressure exerted by the government authorities, but excluding military action/armed interventionsNGO/UN Pressure Pressure exerted NGOs or UN agencies, including human rights activists (targeted advocacy)
Discretion of Armed Group A decision taken by the armed group without any external pressure or interventionForce (armed intervention) The use of armed force to secure the release, whether by the government, international forces or others.
Ransom paidThe payment of a financial ransom or some other demand made by the armed group was met (e.g. a resignation, change of policy, closure of a school, etc).
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
202
Use for "community" violations (i.e. attacks on educational & health facilities and denial of humanitarian access).
Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref No
1. Details of the Children1.1 Profiling Data for the Group of Children
Please provide profiling details for the group of children involved
Ethnicity (3.2.4) Religion (3.2.5) Refugee/IDP Status (3.2.6)Number of
Children (3.2.1)Age (3.2.3)Sex (3.2.2)
MRM INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION FORM ‐ Part 2c
2. Details of the Specific Violations2.1 Summary of Violations
Which Violation(s) did the children experience during the incident?
2.2 Attacks on Education Facilities (6.1)
Was it a government or non‐government run facility? (6.1.1)
What type of facility was it? (6.1.2)
What was the sex of the client group served by the facility? (6.1.3)
What type of "attack" took place? Select every option that applies. (6.1.4)
Shelling Other Damage to Facilities Intimidation of Individuals
Aerial Bombardment Theft of equipment Occupation of buildings
Arson Physical Attacks on Individuals Other
What was the main objective of the "attack"? (6.1.5)
What were the consequences of the "attack"?
What was the impact on the physical infrastructure of the facility? (6.1.6)
Were any children killed or injured?* If Yes, how many? Killed (6.1.7) Injured (6.1.8)
Were any adults killed or injured? If YES, how many? Killed (6.1.9) Injured (6.1.10)
Non‐MRM Violation 6
Attacks on Health Facilities
Denial of Humanitarian
Access
Non‐MRM Violation 2
Non‐MRM Violation 4
Non‐MRM Violation 3
Attacks on Educational Facilities
Non‐MRM Violation 5
203
Was the facility closed as a result of the "attack"? (6.1.11)
If Yes, when did it reopen? (6.1.13)
If yes, on what basis? (6.1.15)
* Provide details under Killing and Maiming Section
2.3 Attacks on Health Facilities (6.2)
If partially, has a specific group been excluded/disadvantaged? (6.1.14)
If Yes, has it subsequently re‐opened (fully or partially) (6.1.12)
Was it a government or non‐government run facility? (6.2.1)
What type of facility was it? (6.2.2)
What was the sex of the client group served by the facility? (6.2.3)
What type of "attack" took place? Select every option that applies. (6.2.4)
Shelling Other Damage to Facilities Intimidation of Individuals
Aerial Bombardment Theft of equipment Occupation of buildings
Arson Physical Attacks on Individuals Other
What was the main objective of the "attack"? (6.2.5)
What was the impact on the physical infrastructure of the facility? (6.2.6)
Were any children killed or injured?* If Yes, how many? Killed (6.2.7) Injured (6.2.8)
Were any adults killed or injured? If YES, how many? Killed (6.2.9) Injured (6.2.10)
Was the facility closed as a result of the "attack"? (6.1.11)
If Yes, when did it reopen? (6.2.13)
If yes, on what basis? (6.2.15)
2.4 Denial of Humanitarian Access (6.3)
Was the violation targetted at the providers of assistance or the vulnerable children? (6.3.1)
What mechanism was used to deny humanitarian access (6.3.2)
What kind of assistance was affected by the denial of access? (6.3.3)
If Yes, has it subsequently re‐opened (fully or partially) (6.2.12)
If partially, has a specific group been excluded/disadvantaged? (6.2.14)
204
3. Immediate Intervention(s)3.1 Immediate Action by the Community/Institution (6.4)
Was the violation raised with the relevant government authorities? (6.4.1)
What action, if any, did they take in response? (6.4.2)
3.2 Immediate Interventions by the Monitoring Agency (6.5)Please give details of any "immediate" action(s) taken by the monitoring agency itself to address the violation.
3.3 Referrals
Is appropriate support and assistance already being provided by humanitarian agencies? (6.6.1)
If no support is being provided and/or no referrals have been made, please indicate why (6.6.5)
Type of Action (6.5.2)Date of Action
(6.5.1)
Please give details of any referrals made for follow‐up and long term support, whether internally or to another agency.
Objective of Referral (type of support required) (6.6.4)
Date of Referral (6.6.2)
Comments/Explanatory detailsAgency (to which the case
was referred) (6.6.3)
Comments/Explanatory details
205
Tables and Options Guidance Notes and Definitions
PART 2C
1. DETAILS OF THE CHILDREN
1.1 Profiling Data for the Group of Children (3.2)
Use this section to record details of cases involving Attacks on Schools and Health Facilities or Denial of Humanitarian Access which impact on large groups of children and where collecting data from, or about, individual children would not be either possible or appropriate.
GUIDANCE NOTES FOR DOCUMENTATION FORM(S)
Part 1 should be completed for all cases. Part 2a should be completed for cases involving the four violations that impact on individual children (i.e. Abduction, Killing and Maiming, Recruitment and Sexual Violence) AND where you have profiling data for each individual child. Part 2b should be used for cases involving the four "individual" violations where you do not have data about each of the individual children involved. Part 2c should be used for cases that involve "community" violations (i.e. attacks on schools and health facilities and denial of humanitarian access).
All cells marked red in column AE must be completed, even if the response is negative; all those marked blue should be completed if the information is available.
Enter whatever general profiling data is available for the group of children affected.
Number of Children (3.2.1) How many children were involved? Estimate the number if necessary.
Sex (3.2.2) What was the sex of the group of children involved?All FemaleAll MaleMixed The group consists of both female and male members.
Unknown
Age Bands (3.2.3) Into which age band did the children fall?<5 years Under 5 Years of age
≥5<10 years≥ 5 years or over, but less than 10 years≥10<15 years 10 years or over, but less than 15 years≥15<18 years 15 years or over, but less than 18 years
Mixed The group contains children from two or all three of the age bandsUnknown
Ethnic Affiliation (3.2.4)
What were the ethnic affiliations of the children involved? ‐ this is a locally determined list. In some countries it may be a combination of ethnic affiliation and caste. If there is an intention to analyse this data, the categories should be kept to a manageable number (preferably less than 15). This may require combining small ethnic groups together into "families".
Ethnicity 1Ethnicity 2Ethnicity 3Ethnicity 4Ethnicity 5Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyMixed Only applicable for groups of children that include more than one category.
Unknown
206
Religion (3.2.5)What was the religious affiliation of the children involved? ‐ this is a locally determined list (the ones listed are just examples).
BuddhistChristianHinduMuslimOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNoneMixed Only applicable for groups of children that include more than one category.
Unknown
207
Refugee/IDP Status (3.2.6) What was the status of the children involved at the time of the violation ?Community Member The children (and their families) have not been displaced during the conflict.
IDP The children (and their families) have been internally displaced within their own country.
RefugeeThe children (and their families) have been forced to relocate to another country and are registered with UNHCR.
ReturneeThe children (and their families) have returned to their home area after a period of displacement (as a refugee or IDP)
Mixed Only applicable for groups of children that include more than one category.Unknown
2. DETAILS OF VIOLATION
2.1 Summary of Violations
Individual Violations
Which violations did the children experience during the incident? This question relates to those cases involving the two violation that explicitly impact on groups of children (Attacks on Schools & Health Facilities and Denial of Humanitarian Access). The TF can if it wishes add other non‐MRM "individual" violations should it wish to monitor them for its own purposes (e.g. illegal detention, child labour, etc)
Attacks on Educational FacilitiesAttacks on Health Facilities
Denial of Humanitarian AccessNon‐MRM Violation 2Non‐MRM Violation 3Non‐MRM Violation 4Non‐MRM Violation 5Non‐MRM Violation 6
2.2 Attacks on Education Facilities (6.1)
Government/NGO (6.1.1) Is the facility a government, non‐government or community run institution?Government The institituion is managed by a government ministry or agency, either national or local.
NGO The institution is managed by a non‐government organisation, national or international.Community The institution is managed by the local community.
Type of Educational Facility (6.1.2) What type of Educational Facility was "attacked"?Primary
SecondaryTertiary
VocationalECD
Child Friendly SpaceMultipleOther
Sex of Students (6.1.3) What was the sex of the students?All FemaleAll MaleMixed The group consists of both female and male members.
Unknown
208
Type of Attack (6.1.4) What kind of "attack" took place?Shelling Artillery or mortar fire.
Aerial Bombardment Bombing or strafing from a fixed wing aircraft or helicopter Arson Any action designed to damage the facility by fire, other than shelling or aerial bombardment
Other Damage to FacilitiesAny other damage to buildings, equipment and other facilities (e.g. Smashing windows, throwing equipment out of windows, etc)
Theft of equipment Theft of equipment/looting, etc
Physical Attacks on IndividualsPhysical attacks on adults or children (details of individual Killing and Maiming should also be recorded as a separate violation)
Intimidation of Individuals Any threats or intimidation of adults or children working at or using the facilityOccupation of buildings Occupation of the facility by members of the armed group (short or long term)
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
209
Purpose of Attack (6.1.5) What was the main purpose of/motive behind the "attack"?Permanent Closure Closing the facility on an indefinite basis
Temporary ClosureClosing the facility for a limited period, possibly to make a political point or provide evidence of an armed group's power.
Exclusion of one group Preventing one group from using the facility, whether based upon sex, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation
Misuse of facilitiesUse of the facility by the armed group for other purposes (e.g. Accommodation for combatants or cadres, political indoctrination activities, military training)
Indiscriminate The attack was not specifically targeted at the educational/health facility.Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Unknown
Physical Damage (6.1.6) What level of physical destruction occurred?
Total destructionComplete destruction of physical infrastructure and facilities such that the facility cannot be re‐opened until major reconstruction has been undertaken.
Serious damageMajor physical damage to buildings and/or equipment, such that the facility can only be reopened with much reduced capacity (less than 50%) or after significant rehabilitation.
Minor damageMinor physical damage to buildings and/or equipment, such that the facility can be reopened fairly quickly, but possibly with a lower capacity.
None
Child Casualties Were at children killed or injured? A Yes/No Answer
Number Killed (6.1.7) If Yes, how many were killed? Estimate if necessaryNumber Injured (6.1.8) If Yes, how many were injured? Estimate if necessary.
Adult Casualties Were any adults killed or seriously injured? A Yes/No answer. Number Killed (6.1.9) If Yes, how many were killed? Estimate if necessary
Number Injured (6.1.10) If Yes, how many were injured? Estimate if necessary.
Closure (6.1.11) Was the school/health facility closed as a result of the attack? A Yes/No answer.
Re‐Opening of Facility (6.1.12)Fully The facility has re‐opened and is operating at or close to its original capacity (i.e. Prior to the "attack").
Partially The facility has re‐opened, but with significantly reduced capacity and/or serving fewer childrenNo The facility remains closed.
Date of Re‐Opening (6.1.13)When did the facility re‐open? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
If YES, has it subsequently re‐opened (fully or partially)?
210
Exclusion of Groups (6.1.14) If partially, has a specific group been excluded or disadvantaged?
Excluded Group (6.1.15) If YES, on what basis? (exclusion of one group from using the facility)Sex
EthnicityReligion
Political AffiliationOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
No Applicable
2.3 Attacks on Health Facilities (6.2)
Government/NGO (6.2.1) Is the facility a government, non‐government or community run institution?Government
NGOCommunity
Type of Health Facility (6.2.2) What type of Health Facility was "attacked"?Hospital
Health CentreDispensary
Mobile Health UnitMultipleOther
211
Sex of Client Group (6.2.3) What was the sex of the facility's client group?All FemaleAll MaleMixed The group consists of both female and male members.
Unknown
Type of Attack (6.2.4) What kind of "attack" took place?Shelling Artillery or mortar fire.
Aerial Bombardment Bombing or strafing from a fixed wing aircraft or helicopter Arson Any action designed to damage the facility by fire, other than shelling or aerial bombardment
Other Damage to FacilitiesAny other damage to buildings, equipment and other facilities (e.g. Smashing windows, throwing equipment out of windows, etc)
Theft of equipment Theft of equipment/looting, etc
Physical Attacks on IndividualsPhysical attacks on adults or children (details of individual Killing and Maiming should also be recorded as a separate violation)
Intimidation of Individuals Any threats or intimidation of adults or children working at or using the facilityOccupation of buildings Occupation of the facility by members of the armed group (short or long term)
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Purpose of Attack (6.2.5) What was the main purpose of/motive behind the "attack"?Permanent Closure Closing the facility on an indefinite basis
Temporary ClosureClosing the facility for a limited period, possibly to make a political point or provide evidence of an armed group's power.
Exclusion of one group Preventing one group from using the facility, whether based upon sex, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation
Misuse of facilitiesUse of the facility by the armed group for other purposes (e.g. Accommodation for combatants or cadres, political indoctrination activities, military training)
Indiscriminate The attack was not specifically targeted at the educational/health facility.Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Unknown
Physical Damage (6.2.6) What level of physical destruction occurred?
Total destructionComplete destruction of physical infrastructure and facilities such that the facility cannot be re‐opened until major reconstruction has been undertaken.
Serious damageMajor physical damage to buildings and/or equipment, such that the facility can only be reopened with much reduced capacity (less than 50%) or after significant rehabilitation.
Minor damageMinor physical damage to buildings and/or equipment, such that the facility can be reopened fairly quickly, but possibly with a lower capacity.
None
Child Casualties Were at children killed or injured? A Yes/No Answer
Number Killed (6.2.7) If Yes, how many were killed? Estimate if necessaryNumber Injured (6.2.8) If Yes, how many were injured? Estimate if necessary.
Adult Casualties Were any adults killed or seriously injured? A Yes/No answer. Number Killed (6.2.9) If Yes, how many were killed? Estimate if necessary
Number Injured (6.2.10) If Yes, how many were injured? Estimate if necessary.
Closure (6.2.11) Was the school/health facility closed as a result of the attack? A Yes/No answer.
Re‐Opening of Facility (6.2.12)Fully The facility has re‐opened and is operating at or close to its original capacity (i.e. Prior to the "attack").
Partially The facility has re‐opened, but with significantly reduced capacity and/or serving fewer childrenNo The facility remains closed.
Date of Re‐Opening (6.2.13)When did the facility re‐open? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Exclusion of Groups (6.2.14) If partially, has a specific group been excluded or disadvantaged?
Excluded Group (6.2.15) If YES, on what basis? (exclusion of one group from using the facility)
If YES, has it subsequently re‐opened (fully or partially)?
212
SexEthnicityReligion
Political AffiliationOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
No Applicable
2.4 Denial of Humanitarian Access (6.3)
Focus (6.3.1) Was the violation targeted at the providers of assistance or the vulnerable children?Provider The attempt to limit access was targeted on restricting the provider of humanitarian assistance
RecipientThe attempt to limit access was targeted at preventing the potential recipients of humanitarian assistance accessing it.
Both
Mechanism (6.3.2)What method(s) were used to deny humanitarian access? ‐ The first 5 options apply to violations that were targetted at the "Provider" and the following 3 apply to those targetted at the Recipient(s).
Entry RestrictionsBureaucratic and administrative measures designed to impede the movement of personnel into the country (including onerous visa requirements, work permits, etc.)
Import RestrictionsBureaucratic and administrative measures designed to impede the import of goods and services into the country (including onerous import procedures, duties and requirements, etc.)
Travel RestrictionsBureaucratic or administrative measures designed to restrict the movement of humanitarian workers within the country (checkpoints, travel bans or restrictions, quotas on relief items, etc)
Intimidation/Violence Any intimidation, threats or actual violence directed towards humanitarian workers and designed to impede their access to vulnerable children.
Direct ActionAny actions designed to directly interfere with the delivery of humanitarian assistance (e.g. Looting of supplies, destruction of facilities, etc)
Forced displacement Forced movement of vulnerable children to locations that are beyond the reach of humantiarian agencies
Travel RestrictionsBureaucratic or administrative measures designed to restrict the movement of vulnerable children within the country (checkpoints, travel bans, etc)
Intimidation/Violence Any intimidation, threats or actual violence directed towards vulnerable children and designed to impede their access to humanitarian agencies.
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
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Assistance (6.3.3) What kind of assistance was affected by the denial of access?Food
EducationPsycho‐social
HealthMultiple More than one type of assistanceOther Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
3. INTERVENTIONS
3.1 Immediate Action by Community/Institution (6.4)
Raised with the Authorities? (6.4.1)Has the case been raised with the authorities (by the appropriate member(s) of the community or representatives of the institution affected, BUT not by the monitoring agency itself). A Yes/No answer
Action taken by Authorities (6.4.2) What action was taken by the authorities (after the incident was reported to them)?
Armed interventionArmed intervention designed to reverse the violation (e.g. Remove an armed group from a school or health facility, remove road blocks, etc).
NegotiationNegotiations between the authorities and the armed group designed address the violation, secure compensation, prevent future violations, etc
Legal action Formal legal action against the perpetrator(s) responsible for the violation.Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Unknown
3.2 Immediate Intervention by Monitoring Agency (6.5)
Date of Intervention (6.5.1)What was the date of the immediate intervention by the monitoring agency? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Type of Action (6.5.2)What type of immediate action was taken by the MRM Monitoring Agency? ‐ These should only be actions that are designed to address the violation itself and not longer term support for the children affected.
Medical Intervention Efforts to secure emergency medical treatment or assessment for the victims/survivors of an attack.Report to Police Reporting the incident/violation to the police at local or national level.
Report to Government Authorities Reporting the incident/violation of another government authority (e.g. Ministry of education/Social Welfare)
Intervention with Armed Group Direct intervention with the armed group concerned to Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNone
Comments/Explanatory Details Please provide any additional details required about the intervention
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3.3 Referral (6.6)
This section is intended to capture the basic details of any referrals made for follow‐up and long term support
Current provision of Support & Assistance (6.6.1)
Is appropriate support and assistance already being provided to the insititution or the children affected?
Date of the Referral (6.6.2)When was the referral made? The data must be entered in the format dd/mm/yy or another date format that the computer will recognise (the cell can be modified to handle the American format mm/dd/yy if required)
Referral Agency (6.6.3) To which agency was the case referred?
ABC1234ABC1235ABC1236
Purpose of Referral (6.6.4)What was the purpose of the referral? This is most likely to relate to incidents involving attacks on schools and health facilities.
Relief Supplies Provision of emergency relief supplies for the affected children
Temporary FacilitiesProvision of temporary facilities (e.g. Tents and emergency education kits) while longer term rehabilitation takes place.
Alternative ProvisionProvision of services at an alternative location for the affected children (e.g. transfer of the children to another school).
Reconstruction Reconstruction of physical infrastructure (buildings, etc)Replacement Equipment Provision of equipment to replace what has been looted or destroyed.
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separately
Reason for No Support (6.6.5) If no support is being provided and/or no referrals have been made, please indicate whyNo support needed There is no requirement for further support or assistance from a humanitarian agencyNo support available Support is required but there is no agency able to provide it.Support declined Support is required and there is an agency able to provide it, but the offer has been declined.
Location Not AccessibleThe location is not accessible to humanitarian agencies (e.g. They are still being held by an armed group who are refusing access).
Other Use this category only in exceptional circumstances and provide an explanation separatelyNot Applicable
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CONFIDENTIAL
Use of Information
Further Contact
Referral Family First Second Admin 1 Admin 2 Admin 3 Detail Family First Second Admin 1 Admin 2 Admin 3 Detail
Enter the personal details of each child together with their ID Number so that they can be cross referenced with the main Monitoring Form/Database. Select the appropriate Conesnt levels from the drop‐down lists. Store separately from the monitoring data.
APPENDIX 8c
CONFIDENTIAL DATA SHEETS
SCHEDULE OF PERSONAL DETAILS
ID NumberNames Contact Address Name of Adult Caregiver Contact Address (if different)
Victim/Survivor
Consent Level
Consent 1 (sharing confidential information)AnonymousAgency OnlyTask ForcePerpetratorProsecutor
Consent 2 (being contacted again)
YesNo
Consent 3 (referral for further support or services)
YesNo
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APPENDIX 8dDATA REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE 1 ‐ RECRUITMENT & ABDUCTION
Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref No
1. Documentation & Verification Record
1.1 Details of Initial Alert
Date of Initial Alert Source of Initial Alert
1.2 Direct Observation by UN Approved Monitor(s)
Did an UN Approved Monitor directly observe the incident? (were they an eye witness?)
If YES, please enter identification number/code for the UN Approved Monitor
1.3 Interviews with Informants
Were any informants interviewed about the incident?
If YES, please give details below:
1.4 Physical Evidence
Although not required for the verification process, was any physical evidence of the incident observed?
1.5 Verification Status
Date of Verification Decision
ID Number of UN Approved "Verifier"
What is the current Verification Status of the Incident?
Resource Constraints Unwilling Informants Other
No Access (Security) Contradictory Information
DATA REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE 1 ‐ RECRUITMENT & ABDUCTION
Date of Interview
Category of Informant
Adult Caregiver01/08/09
14/08/09
Eyewitness to
incident?
Type of Evidence Date of Observation
MRM INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION FORM ‐ Part 1
Identification Code of Informant
INF1234A
Please give details of how the case was documented and verified.
Country2
Use for all incidents
Sex Consent ‐ Access to
Personal Data
CCCAAAL1234
No
Yes
Consent ‐ to Contact Again?
Agency 4
If "Undetermined", why is this the case? Please select each category that applies in the instance.
Fully Verified by UN staff member
15/08/09
No
UNAAA24
Adult Caregiver
Reliability of
Informant
Reliability of Evidence
Agency Only YesYes Female High
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2. Incident Details2.1 Incident SummaryPlease give details of the incident during which the violation(s) occured
Date of Incident Time of Day
Where did the Incident Occur?
2.2 Perpetrator Details
Which Armed Force or Group was allegedly responsible for the Incident?
State or Non‐State Actor? Name of Armed Force/Group
How many individual perpetrators were involved in the incident (if a group, please estimate its size)?
2.3 Child Details
3. Case Summary (Public Version)
Please complete Part 2a for each child who has experienced one of the four "individual" violations and for whom you have full details. Complete Part 2b for any incidents involving the four "individual" violations, but for which you lack detailed data on each child. Complete Part 2c for Attacks on Educational and Health Facilities or Denial of Humanitarian Access.
3 ‐ 5
How many children were involved in the incident and experienced violations of their rights? (if a group and you are unsure of the exact number, please estimate)
Admin Level 1 Admin Level 3
If required, provide a summary of the incident suitable for wider public use (i.e. excluding any confidential or sensitive information).
NoIs this incident suited for use as case study at the national and/or global level?
3
Please describe what happened (Tell the story ‐ what, when, where, by whom and why, explain the process of documentation and verification and any actions taken), but avoid mentioning the names or personal details of any of the individuals involved.
Non‐State Actor
Division 3
Place Admin Level 2
Bush/Forest
Main Armed Group
27/07/09 Morning
Province 2 District 1
A woman and her three children were collecting firewood in the forest close to their farm when a group of armed men confronted them. The mother recognised their leader as the commander of an anti‐goverment armed group whohad come to their village the previous month to demand that the community provide recruits for the armed struggle. The village elders had refused and the man had left threatening to return in force. The mother refused to allow them to take her children, but theyhit her and forced the children (two boys and a girl) with go with them into the forest. The mother reported the incident to the local Unicef office and they raised the children's the case with the armed group at their next liaison meeting. The commander eventually agreed to release one of the boys because one of his legs was shorter than the other and he couldn't keep up with his comrades, but refused to release his siblings. The boy has been reunfied with his mother and his case has been referred to a local NGO who assist diadvataged families with school fees, books, etc. Unicef are continuing to advocatefor the other two children.
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219
220
221
222
223
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APPENDIX 8e DATA REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE 2 ‐ SCHOOL ATTACK
Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref NoCountry4 CCCAAAL1235Agency 5
2. Incident Details2.1 Incident SummaryPlease give details of the incident during which the violation(s) occured
Date of Incident Time of Day
Where did the Incident Occur?
2.2 Perpetrator Details
Which Armed Force or Group was allegedly responsible for the Incident?
State or Non‐State Actor? Name of Armed Force/Group
How many individual perpetrators were involved in the incident (if a group, please estimate its size)?
2.3 Child Details
11 or more
How many children were involved in the incident and experienced violations of their rights? (if a group and you are unsure of the exact number, please estimate)
Admin Level 1 Admin Level 3
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Please describe what happened (Tell the story ‐ what, when, where, by whom and why, explain the process of documentation and verification and any actions taken), but avoid mentioning the names or personal details of any of the individuals involved.
Non‐State Actor
Division 1
Place Admin Level 2
School
Local Militia Group
29/06/09 Afternoon
Province 3 District 3
A female teacher from the school visited the Unicef zonal office to report that the local miltia had attacked her school 2 weeks previously. It is a large school with separate sections for girls and boys on adjacent sites. A large group of armed men arrived in the afternoon and forced all the teachers and students outside and were very threatening. Their main focus was on the giels section and they caused considerable damage, breaking windows, door and funriture and burning books. They said that the school would close indefinitely and drove all the staff and student off the compound. This story was later confirmed by a Human Rights Activist and an official from the Ministry of Education. The Official is well known to Unicef and has proved a reliable source of information in the past. Heindicated that the community had persuaded the militia to allow the Boys Section of the school to re‐open, but the Girls section remains closed. The school is located in an area that is not accessible to the UN or other humanitarian agencies for security reasons, so full verification by a UN staff member was impossible and no intervention or referral was possible.
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3. Case Summary (Public Version)
Please complete Part 2a for each child who has experienced one of the four "individual" violations and for whom you have full details. Complete Part 2b for any incidents involving the four "individual" violations, but for which you lack detailed data on each child. Complete Part 2c for Attacks on Educational and Health Facilities or Denial of Humanitarian Access.
If required, provide a summary of the incident suitable for wider public use (i.e. excluding any confidential or sensitive information).
NoIs this incident suited for use as case study at the national and/or global level?
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Use for "community" violations (i.e. attacks on educational & health facilities and denial of humanitarian access).
Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref No
1. Details of the Children1.1 Profiling Data for the Group of Children
2. Details of the Specific Violations2.1 Summary of ViolationsWhich Violation(s) did the children experience during the incident?
2.2 Attacks on Education Facilities
Was it a government or non‐government run facility?
What type of facility was it?
What was the sex of the client group served by the facility?
What type of "attack" took place? Select every option that applies.
Shelling Other Damage to Facilities Intimidation of Individuals
Aerial Bombardment Theft of equipment Occupation of buildings
Arson Physical Attacks on Individuals Other
What was the main objective of the "attack"?
What were the consequences of the "attack"?
What was the impact on the physical infrastructure of the facility?
Were any children killed or injured?* If Yes, how many? Killed Injured
Were any adults killed or injured? If YES, how many? Killed Injured
Was the facility closed as a result of the "attack"?
If Yes, when did it reopen?
If yes, on what basis?
* Provide details under Killing and Maiming Section
Yes
If Yes, has it subsequently re‐opened (fully or partially)
If partially, has a specific group been excluded/disadvantaged?
MRM INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION FORM ‐ Part 2c
CCCAAAL1235
Sex
Exclusion of one group
Minor damage
Non‐MRM Violation 5
Non‐MRM Violation 4
Non‐MRM Violation 3
Yes
12‐18 yearsMixed
Ethnicity Religion Refugee/IDP Status Number of Children
AgeSex
Ethnicity 4 Muslim Community Members
Non‐MRM Violation 6
Yes
Attacks on Health Facilities
Denial of Humanitarian
Access
Non‐MRM Violation 2
Country4 Agency 5
Community
Secondary
Mixed
Please provide profiling details for the group of children involved
Attacks on Educational Facilities
Yes Yes
Partially 18/09/09
Yes
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Country Monitoring Agency Case Ref No CCCAAAL1235Country4 Agency 5
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APPENDIX 9a
PERPETRATOR REPORTS – COMMENTARY
This appendix is designed to illustrate some of the opportunities and limitations of any quantitative analysis based upon MRM data. The focus of the analysis is on three groups of alleged perpetrator, but a similar analysis could be prepared with focusing on incidents, children or violations.
The attached graphs have been created using imaginary data to show what can be achieved with a limited amount of information (i.e. the date and location of the incident, the name of the armed group responsible, the number of children affected and the violations that they have experienced – i.e. just 5 pieces of data).
The value of all these figures will obviously be dependent on how representative the MRM caseload is of the actual situation in the country. There are many reasons why this might not be the case (access, security, the willingness of children and informants to report the different violations and the limited monitoring capacity in different parts of the country). However, even if they are not fully representative, they can still provide useful insights into the way in which the MRM is operating and some of the comparative figures and trends can still help to highlight important issues.
There are a total of six graphs in all:
Graph 1 – Incidents Analysed by Perpetrator
The first graph (a pie chart) shows that each of the three armed forces/groups was responsible for the same number of incidents during the year (93), so on first impression there seems little difference between them.
Graph 2 – Incidents Analysed by Perpetrator – Monthly Trend
The second graph (a bar chart) shows the number of incidents that occurred during each month of the year. The total figure each month seems to have been fairly consistent, but looking in more detail, the number of incidents involving Perpetrator 1 has fallen steadily throughout the year, whilst the number attributed to Perpetrator 3 has increased and the number involving Perpetrator 2 has remain fairly constant.
It would be important to try and determine why this had occurred. Was it due to changes in the pattern of the conflict itself and possibly the relative power and control exercised by each armed group? Alternatively had Perpetrator 1 taken any proactive steps to reduce the number of violations that their members were committing, possibly in response to Task Force advocacy or even in compliance with an Action Plan? On the other hand, depending why the number of incidents attributed to Perpetrator 3 had risen, there might be a case for prioritising advocacy and prevention work in areas where this armed group is particularly active.
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Graph 3 – Incidents Analysed by Perpetrator – Annual Trend
This bar chart shows the longer term trend over a period of four years. It would appear to confirm the impression given by the monthly trend analysis (i.e. the number of cases involving Perpetrator 1 has been progressively increasing, while those involving Perpetrator 3 are on a on a steady downward trend.
Graph 4 – Incidents Analysed by Perpetrator and Location
The fourth graph shows the geographical spread of the caseload, with 75% of the incidents concentrated in just three of the country’s six regions. Perpetrator 2 appears to be equally “active” throughout the country, but the other two armed groups are much more localised (Perpetrator 1 is concentrated in Regions 1 and 2, while Perpetrator 3 committed most of its violations in Regions 4 and 5).
As before, the key issue in interpreting these figures is to what extent they are reflective of what is actually happening on the ground. This means that they need to be evaluated against the pattern of the conflict in each part of the country (i.e. its intensity and the extent to which each armed group is present in each region). This will help determine whether the relatively low number of incidents in regions 3, 4 and 6 is representative of reality or possibly due to problems of access, security or monitoring capacity. This will help determine whether there is a need to redirect existing monitoring and response capacity and whether there is a case for focusing advocacy work in a particular region.
Graph 5 – Incidents Analysed by perpetrators and Violation
The fifth graph analyses the incidents by violation. It will be noted that the cumulative number of incidents is actually greater than the total in the earlier reports (306 compared with 279). This is because some of the incidents involved more than one violation and so have been “double counted” (e.g. recruitment and abduction).
It is also clear from the analysis that there is a significant difference between the violations committed by the different armed groups. Most of the Recruitment cases involved Perpetrators 1 and 3, while almost all the Sexual Violence incidents involved Perpetrator 2 and all the incidents involving “non‐individual” violations (e.g. attacks on schools and hospitals) were the responsibility of Perpetrator 3.
If these figures are an accurate reflection of the situation on the ground, it would suggest that different advocacy strategies might be required for each of the armed groups.
Graph 6 – Children Analysed by Perpetrator and Violation
The final graph focuses on the children affected by the violations rather than the incidents themselves. As would be expected the numbers of children affected by the “non‐individual” violations, especially the attacks on schools and hospitals, are much greater than the numbers who have experienced the four “individual” violations and this flags up the limitations of a comprehensive overview of this kind and the need to look “behind the figures”.
However, the number of children who have suffered killing, maiming and particularly recruitment were also much higher than the number of incidents, making them much more significant violations in terms of their overall impact. What is also very clear from the figures is that the average number of children killed, maimed or recruited per incident is much higher for Perpetrator 3 than for the other two armed
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groups (they were responsible for 77% of the total number of children but only 31% of the incidents involving “individual” violations).
It would be important to determine whether all of the recruitment incidents attributed Perpetrator 3 involved several children (the average figure was 3.8) or if there were just a couple of large scale incidents and most of the rest involved just one child. This could have significant implications for the design of advocacy and prevention strategies.
Conclusion
Many other, more detailed and sophisticated reports are possible, but which ones might be of most value will depend on the local situation and the issues that are highlighted by the initial analysis.
It may well be that the staff involved in the day‐to‐day work on the MRM will already be aware of some or all of the issues highlighted by this quantitative analysis, but the reports can still be valuable in confirming (or otherwise) these intuitive impressions and in communicating the picture to other key stakeholders and decision makers who have less detailed firsthand knowledge. The analysis can also provide a useful baseline against which the impact of changes in the conflict, the policies of the various armed groups and the activities of the MRM agencies can be monitored.
Finally the analysis illustrates that the looking at any one report will give a very partial and potentially misleading picture. Only by using a number of complementary reports is it possible to build up a holistic view of what has occurred, especially with the fairly complicated relationship between incidents, perpetrators, children and violations. This has important implications for staff training and for the dissemination of reports that could in isolation be misleading. One of the most useful roles of this analysis is to stimulate the thinking of the staff involved in managing and implementing the MRM and related activities and in highlighting the issues that need further investigation or consideration.
Attachment
Appendix 9b – Perpetrator Reports
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APPENDIX 9b ‐ PERPETRATOR REPORTS
INCIDENTS ANALYSED BY PERPETRATOR
No of Incidents
Perpetrator 1
93
Perpetrator 2
93
Perpetrator 3
93
Totals
279
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INCIDENTS ANALYSED BY PERPETRATOR ‐ MONTHLY TREND
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Total
Monthly Average
Perpetrator 1
3 4 5 4 6 7 8 9 11 11 12 13
93 7.75
Perpetrator 2
8 7 6 9 6 8 7 9 10 8 6 9
93 7.75
Perpetrator 3
12 11 12 10 9 9 7 6 6 4 4 3
93 7.75
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
233
Totals
23 22 23 23 21 24 22 24 27 23 22 25
279 23.25
INCIDENTS ANALYSED BY PERPETRATOR ‐ ANNUAL TREND
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Total
Annual Average
Perpetrator 1
3 7 23 93
126 10.50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
234
Perpetrator 2
97 84 88 93
362 30.17
Perpetrator 3
177 150 124 93
544 45.33
Totals
0 277 0 0 241 0 0 235 0 0 279 0 1032 86.00
INCIDENTS ANALYSED BY PERPETRATOR AND LOCATION
Perpetrator 3
Perpetrator 2
Perpetrator 1
Totals
Region 1
44 12 56
Region 2
41 21 62
Region 3
5 18 2 25
Region 4
2 13 12 27
Region 5
1 15 76 92
Region 6
14 3 17
0 20 40 60 80 100
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Totals
93 93 93 279
INCIDENTS ANALYSED BY PERPETRATOR AND VIOLATIONS
Perpetrator 3
Perpetrator 2
Perpetrator 1
Totals
Killing & Maiming
23 14 10 47
Recruitment
61 8 65 134
Sexual Violence
2 37 1 40
Abduction
22 34 18 74
Attacks ‐ Education
7 7
0 50 100 150
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Attacks ‐ Health
4 4
"Individual" Violations
108 93 94 295
"Non‐Individual" Violations
11 11
Totals 216 186 210 612
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CHILDREN ANALYSED BY PERPETRATOR AND VIOLATION
Perpetrator 3
Perpetrator 2
Perpetrator 1
Totals
Killing & Maiming
23 14 33 70
Recruitment
65 8 511 584
Sexual Violence
2 37 39
Abduction
22 34 29 85
Attacks ‐ Education
858 858
Attacks ‐ Health
147 147
"Individual" Violations
112 93 573 778
"Non‐Individual" Violations
1,005
1,005
0 200 400 600 800 1000
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Totals 112 93
1,578
1,783
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APPENDIX 10a
GUIDELINES FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND DATA SECURITY
These notes are designed to assist MRM Task Force members in ensuring that the best possible security arrangements are in place to protect sensitive data and the identities of individuals involved in the monitoring process. It does not aim to provide detailed technical guidance as this will be dependent on local circumstances and the software that is being used for any electronic data management system. The first part of these notes focus on the overall framework for risk assessment and security planning, while the second offers practical suggestions for each of the main risk areas.
1 RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK Data security should be a high priority wherever data relating to child rights violations is collected and every agency should already have a generic data protection policy in place. A conflict just increases the risks and means that the issues involved will be more complex and challenging.
Data security is not just about passwords and other technical devices that can be used to protect electronic data, but should also encompass the ways in which manual, paper‐based systems are organised and the decisions about who has access to what data and even how the data is collected in the first place. None of these things are primarily technical issues (the most sophisticated data encryption will be of little value if the passwords are given out to the wrong people or left lying around the office). Most of the time security isn’t a problem, but it is easy to become complacent and just one lapse or unexpected event can have very serious consequences, as recent experience in several countries gas demonstrated. Hence it is crucial that everyone understands the threats to security, their importance and is committed to combating them.
The starting point for any security strategy should be a full information systems risk assessment, which in its turn needs to be part of the wider risk assessment for the whole MRM. This should identify who is at risk, what risks they are likely to face, how likely it is that these risks will occur, how serious the consequences might be and what actions can be taken to mitigate them.
1.1 Who is at Risk? There are three main groups of individuals who are at risk:
Children and their Families – the children who have suffered the violations and their immediate families, whether they have reported the incidents themselves or the information has come to the MRM via a third party.
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Informants & Witnesses – Any individual who reports an incident or who provides information about one, whether first hand or as a third party, or anyone who provides access to relevant documentary evidence.
Monitoring Staff – both the staff who investigate the incidents AND those who are responsible for storing and analysing the data involved can also be vulnerable.
Agencies involved in the MRM or, perhaps even more significantly, other organisations that provide information about incidents on a confidential basis to the MRM, can also be at risk. This is particularly true for NGO’s that may also be involved in providing humanitarian assistance to civilians caught up in the conflict. If their involvement becomes known, their non‐MRM staff may find themselves targeted by one or other of the parties to the conflict and, at the organisational level, may find their access to potential beneficiaries blocked or permissions refused or withdrawn.
1.2 What Threats Might They Face? The threats can come in different forms and can have different objectives. These might include intimidation designed to dissuade them from reporting incidents or collecting data, retribution or punishment for doing either of these things and threats to force them to reveal confidential details of the incident to one or other of the parties to the conflict. The consequences for the individuals involved can be extremely serious and could include one or more of the following: ostracism, loss of employment/livelihood, eviction/displacement, denial of services, intimidation, abduction, torture and extrajudicial killing.
1.3 Areas of Risk
When undertaking a risk assessment it can help to focus on each stage of the information management process:
Data Collection
Data Storage
Data Transfer
Data Analysis & Use
1.4 Risk Assessment Matrix
Every situation will be different and there will be no single “right answer” or “perfect solution”. Absolute confidentiality can only be achieved by not collecting or holding any data at all, so decisions about security require that the risks be balanced against the potential benefits of any action or procedure.
The best way of ensuring that these decisions are made as effectively and consistently as possible, is to use a structured risk assessment matrix. This requires that you to assess the “likelihood” of any particular event occurring and, if it does happen, its “potential impact” on the individuals or
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agency involved. It is suggested that a five point scale should be used to rank both of these indicators (i.e. 5 – High; 4 – Above Average; 3 – Average; 2 – Below Average and 1 – Low) as illustrated in the table below:
Score Likelihood (of occurrence) Impact (if it does occur)
5 (High) Extremely High Probability Potentially catastrophic
4 (Above Average) Significant Probability Serious
3 (Average) Possibility Significant
2 (Below Average) Fairly Unlikely Minor
1 (Low) Extremely Unlikely Insignificant
The matrix should then incorporate an overall Risk Indicator which combines these first two indicators by multiplying them together. For instance the Risk Indicator for something with a Likelihood of 5 and Potential Impact score of 5, would be 25, while another with a Likelihood of 2 and a Potential Impact of 4 would have a Risk Indicator of 8. Clearly the higher the Risk Indicator, the greater the threat, and hence the greater the priority that should be allocated to implementing measures to mitigate the threat. Where it proves impossible to implement effective mitigation for risks with the highest scores (>20) consideration should be given to discontinuing that aspect of the monitoring system and to looking for a suitable alternative.
While this “numerical” approach to risk assessment has its limitations and should not be followed “mechanically”, it can provide a useful way of ensuring a systematic approach is adopted to risk assessment and planning. In this context the following schedule of overall Risk Indicators can provide a useful guide to your thinking:
Risk Indicator Score Action Required
>20 Extremely Serious Risk – mitigation measures must be a top priority and if this is not possible, consideration should be given to abandoning this aspect of the monitoring process.
Between 15 and 20 Serious Risk – high priority should be given to identifying and implementing mitigation measures and consideration should be given to modifying procedures.
Between 10 and 15 Medium Risk – while not the highest priority, this still constitutes an area of significant concern and identifying appropriate mitigation merits serious attention
Between 5 and 10 Minor Risk – while the risk may be minor, it should not be ignored and any possible mitigation measures implemented.
<5 Insignificant Risk – no special efforts are required to mitigate it beyond normal good practice and it should not be a priority for additional resources
It is also worth bearing in mind that Potential Impact is more important than Likelihood, so a risk with a Likelihood of 2 and a Potential Impact of 4 would probably attract more priority than one with a Likelihood of 4 and a Potential Impact of 2, even though both have the same Risk Indicator (8).
This approach to risk assessment is used across a wide range of organisations, but the exact format of the matrix can vary. The attached template provides one alternative, but it is important to remember that the matrix is only designed to help with prioritisation and decision making. It is not a decision making tool in itself. The template is supplemented by an indicative Risk Mitigation Matrix to help identify potential measures.
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2 RISK MITIGATION MEASURES In undertaking the risk assessment and identifying the detailed security measures required, the following questions and practical suggestions may be useful:
2.1 Data Collection Collecting data about an incident is probably the most vulnerable part of the whole monitoring process as the complainants and informants can most easily be identified when they are providing information or being interviewed. There are essentially two stages to this process:
Initial Reporting – This means the way in which the MRM monitoring agency initially hears about an incident. The key questions are as follows: How do people report cases to the monitoring agency? Must they do this in person, either by speaking to someone in the field or by coming to the office? Is there any provision for them to report confidentially or even anonymously via a telephone hotline or by post? Is there a phone line that is devoted exclusively to MRM reporting and, if so, how is this advertised to potential complainants? Alternatively, if calls come through to the main phone line, how are they screened and how can you ensure that complainants do not divulge personal details until they are put through to an MRM staff member? Similar issues apply to the people responsible for opening the post.
Gathering Evidence and Interviewing Witnesses – Will this be done in the field or at the office? Both alternatives come with their own risks and the choice between them will depend on local circumstances.
If the interview takes place in the field, what steps can be taken to keep the purpose AND the content of the discussion confidential. Is it possible for this to be done during a field trip for non‐MRM work, or does this put other parts of the programme and staff at greater risk? How should the key facts be recorded? Is it wise to fill in a paper form or is this likely to attract unwanted attention? A hand‐held data entry or recording device might be another option, but this might also provoke suspicions and could easily be stolen. The final option is for the interviewer to commit as much of the information as possible to memory and then wait until s/he returns to the office before recording it on paper or in electronic form.
The office can provide a more private environment for a complainant or witness to be interviewed and evidence can be recorded in real time, but the suitability of this approach will depend on the accessibility of the office (distance, transport availability, etc) and whether people come to the office for other (non‐MRM) purposes (if not, will it be assumed that anyone seen visiting the office is probably there to report an incident).
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2.2 Data Storage Once the data has been collected, decisions need to be taken about what to store, where to keep it and how to protect it. Data security can be compromised in three main ways:
A forced entry – break‐ins that target the data or the hardware being used to store it
An “Inside Job” – when one of the parties to the conflict places an agent covertly within the MRM organisation with the aim of accessing sensitive data.
An opportunistic loss – when it is carelessly left around and is visible to unauthorised individuals.
The detailed mitigation measures adopted will depend on which of these threats is thought to be the most likely, but as a general rule it makes sense to store the minimum data necessary to fulfil the needs of the MRM and to keep it in as few locations as possible.
Location – Most data will be collected at the field level, quite probably by several UN and NGO partners and will subsequently be forwarded to the single agency responsible for information management and analysis, probably in the capital city. As data is likely to be more vulnerable when stored in the field, especially by NGO’s, it is worth considering whether it is really necessary to retain the more sensitive data in the field once this transfer has taken place.
Some partners will be doing follow‐up and providing services to the children involved and so will need some data, but this work often involves both MRM and non‐MRM cases, so there could be an argument in favour of deleting any data that could identify the former, eliminating the risk of it falling into the wrong hands or being misused. This would mean keeping the personal details (name, address, age, etc) and anything else needed by those providing the response, but deleting details of the incident report, the subsequent documentation and verification process and the perpetrator(s) responsible.
Disaggregating Data – Much of the data is not that dangerous when viewed in isolation. It is only when data that can identify the individuals involved is linked with data about the incident that problems can arise. This risk can be reduced by using code or reference numbers in place of the names of victims/survivors, informants and monitoring staff. A list cross referencing the codes with the individual names can then be kept separately in another location.
Allocating Staff Responsibilities – The fewer staff that have access to the data, the better it is from a security perspective, especially as far as those holding keys or passwords are concerned. When deciding who should be given this responsibility, consideration should be given to their potential vulnerability to outside pressure and threats. For instance, in some circumstances it may be prudent to use only “internationals” so that local staff and their families are not exposed to unnecessary risks.
Physical Security Measures – What is possible in this regard will be heavily dependent on the design and location of the premises used to store the data and the resources of the organisations involved, but there are a few general principles that apply everywhere. The data should be held in a lockable room, preferably one that is used exclusively for this purpose or at least just by MRM
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staff. The locks should be substantial, windows and other vulnerable points (e.g. access through the ceiling) should be reinforced with bars or other appropriate measures. Attention should be given to overnight and weekend security when the room or the offices are more likely to be unoccupied. It would be unwise for MRM data to be stored in offices that lack 24 hour security. Any keys should be allocated to named individuals, who accept responsibility for their safe custody and a written record should be made whenever a key is transferred.
Manual (Paper) Records – Paper records will require a lockable filing cabinet or cupboard available exclusively for this purpose and the same rules should apply in terms of access to keys, etc. as pertains to rooms and buildings. The volume of paper records makes it less likely that they will all be stolen or removed, but opportunistic losses or targeted removal of individual files can be a more common danger. To minimise these risks it is important to have a system that requires people to “sign out” and “sign back in” files that they need for their work. This can be achieved by using a simple ledger with space for the name or reference number of the file, the name of the staff member involved and the two dates involved.
Electronic Records (database, spreadsheet or word processor files) – The use of passwords and encryption make it easier to protect electronic data, but the small physical size of the storage involved can make it easier for people to remove the records. The first decision required is whether the data should be held on the organisation’s network or on a standalone computer. The former can offer advantages if the network storage is physically well secured, but it means that anyone with access to the network could be in a position to exploit any security vulnerabilities or utilise passwords that they have obtained illicitly. These risks can be avoided by using a standalone machine, provided it is in an office that can be physically secured. A desktop computer will be more difficult to remove than a laptop or notebook, but wherever possible the computer should be physically secured to a substantial piece of furniture in the office. If a laptop or notebook, it will be doubly important that the data is encrypted and the possibility of using a machine with a fingerprint reader or similar security feature should be considered. Removing a laptop containing MRM data from the office (for a field trip or to work at home) should be avoided.
Both the computer and the software used to store and analyse the data must be password protected and the number of users kept to a minimum. Each authorised user should have their own individual password and these should be of sufficient length and complexity to provide adequate protection from the programmes available for cracking passwords (i.e. a minimum of 12 characters including a mix of letters and numbers). The passwords must not include sequences that can be easily identified (e.g. a person’s date or place of birth, or a repetitions of a short sequence).
Many organisations require their staff to change their passwords at regular intervals. This can help protect data if a password has inadvertently been compromised (left unattended on a piece of paper around the office), but it can also create new risks. Users often find it difficult to remember a password and changing it will make this difficult, especially if it consists of 12 random letters and numbers. Hence, provided the passwords are strong and staff are disciplined in their
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use (i.e. they do not commit them to paper and do not share them with colleagues) it may be better not to change them unless a security breach is suspected.
If the software is able to generate an audit trail of who has accessed the computer and/or the database/ spreadsheet, this will help in monitoring use and identifying any unusual patterns (e.g. night time access).
Wherever possible the computer should exclusively be for MRM use, so that the number of people accessing it can be kept to an absolute minimum. The database should also be set up to require re‐entry of the user’s password if it is left unattended for any significant period of time (5/10 minutes). This should not be something that a user is able to over‐ride and should be in addition to any similar facility that applies to the computer as a whole.
The data on the computer should also be encrypted to make it more difficult for anyone to access it if they gain access to the computer or its hard disk. Encryption is a valuable additional security measure and is likely to be the norm in larger organisations, but it is important to remember that it still relies on a password and so remains vulnerable to human error.
2.3 Data Transfer In every country some kind of data transfer will be required to move data from the field to the capital and from agency to agency. The only exception would be if all MRM agencies were using a web‐based database with a central data store, whether this is held in‐country or remotely, but limited internet access means this is unlikely to be something that will have comprehensive coverage.
Manual (Paper) Records ‐ The physical movement of paper files between agencies or between locations should be kept to a minimum and avoided wherever possible. Where it is necessary, the files should be moved in a secure lockable box or container, accompanied by two staff members and, wherever possible, transported by vehicle (by convoy where this is needed). There should be a system for recording when documents or files leave one location/office and when they arrive at their destination, whether this is done using a manual ledger or an electronic system. These records should be checked and reconciled on a regular basis to ensure that no documentation has gone missing.
Wherever possible files that need to be physically moved from one location to another should have any personal data removed and replaced with a code, so individuals cannot be identified if the documentation is lost.
Electronic Systems – The two main alternatives for data transfer are an email with attachments or some form of physical storage (e.g. an USB Stick, CD/DVD or even a laptop). Whichever option is used, the crucial thing is password protection and encryption. Wherever possible regular data transfer should only involve the changes and updates required and not the full dataset. This will reduce the amount of data at risk and make it easier to use data formats that are unreadable to anyone attempting unauthorised access.
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Email is probably the better of the two options. If a mobile storage device is used, the same procedures described above for manual records should be used. Irrespective of the option adopted, it is important to keep a record of when electronic data is sent and received.
2.4 Data Analysis & Use
Most, if not all, data analysis is likely to be undertaken centrally. The same principles as those used for data storage should apply. The number of individuals needing to access the sensitive data should be kept to a minimum. If data is to be manipulated using another software application (e.g. Excel), passwords and encryption should be used and, wherever possible, personal details should be omitted from any data that is exported from the main system.
Statistical analysis will, by its very nature, be anonymised. Individual case studies should exclude any personal data (names, etc) and consideration should be given to omitting anything that could be used to identify any of the individuals involved. Some programmes have opted to create a “public” summary of each case from which any sensitive data has been removed. This is a good way of providing extra security, but will be dependent on the number of cases involved and the manpower available. An alternative might be to just use this approach for a limited number of “exemplar” cases.
2.5 Data Back‐ups and Evacuation Procedures Regular back‐ups are a requirement for any computer system to guard against system failure, data corruption or other disasters, but they also have an important role to play in ensuring security. It is essential that regular back‐ups are taken and that the resulting data is stored “off‐site” in case the main office is attacked, damaged (e.g. by fire) or otherwise becomes inaccessible to agency staff. This is particularly important for NGO’s and small UN field offices whose premises may be more vulnerable. This clearly creates other problems for the MRM as the alternative location must also offer adequate security for data storage.
Emergency evacuation brings with it additional security threats and any security plan needs to incorporate contingency plans for such an eventuality, whether it is a response to a deterioration in the security situation or a policy decision by the government. Either scenario can occur very quickly, so it is essential that an up to date copy of the system is always held in another secure location and that there are procedures in place to destroy any data before staff leave.
At the national level the former is best achieved by sending a regular back‐up of the system to another country for safe keeping, possibly to a head office or regional headquarters. Another option would be a web‐based system where the main database would be located in a safe country and local users would access it remotely. This would have the advantage that someone outside the country could block access to the system if a problem occurred, making it more difficult for someone to gain unauthorised access by threats and intimidation. Web‐based systems come with their own vulnerabilities to hacking, etc. and will only be a realistic option if a global database is developed making use of high level security features of the kind used by financial organisations (e.g. SSL).
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Destroying data quickly if staff have to be evacuated can be a challenge, especially if the records are held in a paper format. Indeed, this is one of the strongest arguments for using an electronic system for data storage. As far as electronic storage is concerned, any system should have a simple emergency routine for deleting all the data, preferably with as few key strokes/commands as possible. This will be particularly important where the government or another armed group evicts the agency from its offices and confiscates equipment, whether or not this is with the intention of compromising data security. This is something that is easy to say, but not always easy to implement, especially if offices are occupied when the key staff are not present. Hence, the importance of data encryption and of using a system that keeps personal details separate from the monitoring data.
2.6 Staff Awareness and Training However good the security systems in place, they will only be effective if everyone involved is aware of the risks involved, appreciates their significance and has the skills, knowledge and motivation required to implement them. This means training is needed at all levels within all the MRM agencies responsible for handling sensitive data, from senior management right through to receptionists, data clerks and security personnel.
This training can be delivered as part of a comprehensive MRM training programme or handled separately as a standalone module, but irrespective of the approach used, there will be a need for regular refresher courses or workshops to ensure that a culture of vigilance is maintained.
2.7 Security Audits The security systems and procedures also need to be tested and audited on a regular basis in much the same way as fire drills and alarms are tested. In addition to helping identify any obvious weaknesses in the system, rigorous testing will also help to reinforce the importance of vigilance for all those involved is using the data. At last some of these audits should be carried out unannounced (similar to the “mystery shopper” approach), so that they capture the true situation rather than give people an opportunity to prepare specially.
For these audits to be effective, their results should be reported on a regular basis to the organisation’s management as they will ultimately be responsible for any security breaches.
Attachments:
Appendix 10b – Risk Assessment Template
Appendix 10c – Risk Mitigation Matrix
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APPENDIX 10b
RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK/TEMPLATE MRM Agency: Location:
Likelih
ood
Impact
Risk Indicator
Potential Mitigation Measures
Example
3 5 15
Gather data during other activities; don't make information gathering any more overt than necessary ‐ don't use forms in the field ‐ just keep discrete notes; undertake information gathering as part of other activities; provide opportunities for informants to contact monitoring agency in the way that suits them (in office, at a neutral location, etc.).
Data Collection
Data Storage
Data Transfer
Identify risks under each section and rank their Likelihood and Potential Impact on a scale of 1:5 (5 = High; 4 = Above Average; 3= Average, 2 = Below Average and 1 = Low). The spreadsheet will calculate the risk Indicator by multiplying the two values together and will highlight the risks requiring priority attention using three shades of red/brown. Indicate the mitigation measures that will be taken to address each risk in the final column. Hide rows that are not required and insert additional rows if required (it will be necessary to unprotect the worksheet and copy the formula in Column E).
Observation of Victims/Survivors and other informants being interviewed
Area of Risk
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Data Analysis & Use
Other Risks
Signed:
Name:
Date:
Position:
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APPENDIX 10c RISK MITIGATION MATRIX
This matrix lists some of the security measures available to MRM Task Forces and Agencies and indicates which of the main threats each of them may be effective against. These lists are not intended to be exhaustive, but provide an illustration of how a Security Plan could be put together. Each column can be filtered to highlight the measures that might be appropriate to any specific threat.
Data Collec
tion
Break‐in
Insid
e Job
Intim
idation
Accid
ental
Arson
Loss in Transit
Evacuatio
n
3rd Country Back‐up 1 15 Minute System Lock 1Data Destruction Plan 1Data Entry in Office 1Database Audit Trail 1Differential Access Levels 1 1Disaggregation of Personal Data 1 1 1 1 1 1Manual Document Control System 1 1Encryption of Data 1 1 1 1Enhanced Premises Security 1No Manual Files (only Electronic Records) 1 1 1 1 1 1Off‐site Back‐up 1 1 1Regular Security Audits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Regular Security Training 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Relocation of Paper Files 1 1 1Robust Password Protection 1 1 1Software for Wiping Disks 1Use of International Staff 1Use of Network Implementation 1Use of Standalone PC 1Web‐based Implementation 1 1 1 1 1 1
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APPENDIX 11a
MRM DATABASE SPECIFICATION
1. Overview A relational database is required to support the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) for Grave Violations against Children in situations of Armed Conflict. The database will be used to record details of incidents during which violations occur, sort, search and manipulate these records and generate a range of operational and statistical reports. Separate documentation will be provided to describe how the monitoring is organised.
The database will be available to every country which implements the MRM and must have the potential for some level of customisation to suit local requirements. At the same time it is anticipated that some consolidation and analysis will be required at the global level, so the core fields and data definitions will need to be fixed.
Data security, a user friendly interface and flexible implementation options will all be priorities
2. Objectives The objectives of the database are as follows:
a) Provide a simple and straightforward framework for collecting and recording the details of incidents in as secure a manner as possible.
b) Provide a mechanism for managing the documentation and verification process to ensure that this is done consistently to the required standard and that this can easily be checked. This should help avoid uncertainty and disagreements about which cases merit inclusion in the MRM reports themselves.
c) Provide a mechanism for storing data about incidents in a convenient and secure manner irrespective of the impact of the conflict.
d) Provide a simple and efficient means of sorting, searching and otherwise manipulating the caseload against a range of different criteria.
e) Provide an easy way of generating case summaries for individual incidents which can be used in annual reports, horizontal notes and advocacy efforts.
f) Provide a mechanism for analysing the caseload and generating statistical reports (tables and graphs) that can be used to help facilitate comparisons and identify trends.
g) Provide the highest possible level of security for all the individuals involved in the process – the children, their families, informants and monitors.
3. Data Structure & Definitions The core of the data structure will be the “incident”. An incident is defined as any event involving one or more alleged perpetrators and one or more children during which the children have experienced one or more violations.
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The detailed data structure is described in Appendix 1, together with detailed formatting requirements and data definitions for each field. There is a combination of mandatory and non‐mandatory fields and the data entry interface must make clear the distinction between the two (colour coding?). All the core mandatory and non‐mandatory fields are “fixed” and cannot be modified locally (i.e. the formatting of data entry and the content of the look‐up lists) except where local look‐up lists are required (e.g. geographical dictionaries and lists of perpetrator groups).
It is anticipated that users will opt to identify children, informants and monitors using reference numbers or codes, so that their names and addresses can be stored separately to protect their identities. A standardised format will be required for the ID reference numbers, incorporating identifiers for the country and monitoring agency, so that no duplicates can be created that could create problems if data is consolidated nationally or globally. The following format is suggested for illustrative purposes:
CCCAAAL9999 where CCC is the country code, AAA the agency code and L the location code (this could be used to identify a specific office where a decentralised implementation has been used). The first seven digits would be dependent on the initial set up of the system and the four numeric digits would be generated automatically for each consecutive case.
4. Data Entry and Customisation A suggested layout for the data entry screens and menus is included in Appendix 2, but there must be an opportunity for each country to customise the data entry interface to suit their own requirements.
Customisation will be possible in two ways:
By selecting which non‐mandatory fields will be displayed. This will allow agencies that only monitor one type of incident or violation to hide the fields that they do not require.
By creating user defined fields to capture additional data required locally. These fields must be consistent with the proposed data structure (see Appendix 1). Two possible examples might be:
o the introduction of a completely new non‐MRM violation, either “individual” or “non‐individual” that the members of the Task Force wish to monitor outside the formal reporting mechanism
o The introduction of additional field to capture profiling data about the child or details of one of the six violations or a characteristic of a Perpetrator group.
The local Administrator would be able to determine the format of these user‐defined fields and create look‐up lists where appropriate. These fields would not be incorporated in any upward consolidation of the database.
The system must check for duplicate incidents. As names of children may not be entered into the database, this should be done with reference to multiple fields (incident date, location, perpetrator, number and profile of children, nature of violation(s)).
5. Outputs The database should be capable of providing the following outputs:
a) Customisable Incident Summaries
This would provide a summary of the key data for an individual case. The user should be able to customise the summary by selecting the data fields required, depending on local circumstances and the target audience (e.g. if for public use as part of an advocacy campaign, the abbreviated
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“public” case description might be required rather than the full description. The administrator should be able to create one or more summary formats that users can select from a list.
b) Customisable Lists of incidents
It should be possible to search the database against any criteria (single or multiple data fields to generate a list of incidents. A flexible, intuitive, user friendly mechanism for selecting the criteria will be required, using the data structure as the basis for the design.
The fields displayed in the list should also be customisable, although the format will be constrained by the data structure.
It should also be possible to access the details of any incident from the list by double click or similar.
One particular application of this search/listing facility will the identification of cases that have remained unresolved for an extended period and hence require follow up to facilitate a final decision on their status. This should be a standard report and the Administrator should be able to specify the time period involved.
c) Analytical Reports (Tables and Graphs)
The database should be able to generate analytical reports displayed as tables and simple bar/pie charts and based upon either the full dataset or a subset selected against one or more criteria. A flexible, user friendly report generator should be provided that will allow both Administrators and “Power Reporters” to design their own reports. This is in addition to a list of standard reports which can themselves be customised
The standard reports should include:
Trend Analysis (Monthly or Annual)
Geographical Comparisons (choice of all 3 Admin levels and country)
Violation Comparisons
Perpetrator Comparisons
Monitoring Agency Comparisons
Child Profiles (Sex, Age, Ethnicity, Religion, Refugee/IDP status & Care Arrangements)
Documentation & Verification Profile (status and timescale of documentation – this will be used to identify hot spots and problem areas where additional resources or now approaches are required to resolve a backlog of pending allegations).
The data contained in the reports should be selectable on the basis of the following criteria (individual or multiple):
Time Period
Geographical location
Violation (Abduction Statistics should include “Other Abductions” together with any “Killing & Maiming”, “Recruitment” and “Sexual Violence” that also involved abduction).
Perpetrator/Armed Group
Children’s Characteristics (i.e. age, sex, ethnicity, etc)
Monitoring Agency
Verification Status
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Whether or not the personal details of individual children have been recorded as opposed to a summary for a group (for “individual” violations only – i.e. whether Form 2a or 2b has been completed).
All standard reports should be customisable (i.e. the variable to be displayed) and should include the option of stacked bar charts to display multiple variables and both tables and charts should include the facility for displaying numbers and percentages.
Priority should be given to formatting and design to ensure the maximum impact and accessibility.
Appendix 3 illustrates the format and style required in the standard reports, using the Perpetrator/Armed Group analysis as an example.
d) Map‐based Presentation of Data
The possibility of displaying data overlaid onto a map should be included as a separately costed option, using a suitable GIS Application.
6. Access Levels It should be possible to create a unique account for each user with their own access privileges. The Administrator will give each user one or more of the six “access privileges” listed below depending on their needs (i.e. each user can have multiple privileges).
Administrator ‐ (all) including customising the system – creating new fields – customising screens, etc, setting passwords, etc
Data Entry Operator – Able to enter and edit/amend all incident data except for the verification fields (Verification Date, Verifier ID, Verification Status and Reason Why “Undetermined”).
Verifier – Able to enter and amend verification fields (Verification Date, Verifier ID, Verification Status and Reason Why “Undetermined”).
Enquirer – User able to search the database and view individual records, including lists and case summaries, but not enter or amend data.
Report Viewer – Able to view standard analytical reports only (tables and charts), but no access to individual incident records.
Power Reporter – Able to use the internal report generator facility to create bespoke reports, but no access to individual incident records.
The Administrator will also need the ability to restrict any user’s access to a defined set of data, most likely on the basis of monitoring agency or country (i.e. someone working for Agency X would only be able to see and work on cases that had been recorded by Agency X). This will be essential if the system is implemented on the web, but could be of more general benefit.
7. Security Ensuring the security of the system and the data it contains should be the highest priority.
Security measures should include the following:
Individual passwords for all users that should be of at least 12 digits and contain both letters and numbers. Any passwords that fail to meet this minimum standard should be rejected. The database should have a simple graphical indicator of the strength of the password being set up, so users are encouraged to avoid easily guessed or discovered options (e.g. repeating patterns such as abc1abc1abc1).
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The facility to force users to change their password at regular intervals (e.g. monthly, six monthly or annually). The Administrator should have the ability to activate this feature if it is required.
All data should be encrypted, both in the database itself and during any transfer by email or portable media.
Any web‐based version of the database must be fully protected against hacking and unauthorised access (i.e. SSL – secure socket level).
Access to the database should be denied if the system has been idle for over five minutes and the user should be required to re‐enter their password. This should be independent of any similar security on the workstation itself.
The system should have the facility to generate an audit trail of users who have accessed the system, including the time period and the workstation involved.
A special routine should be included in the software to allow for the emergency deletion of all data by use of single command.
8. Implementation Options The database should be flexible enough to support the following implementation options:
Standalone Computer
Internal office network, but with access to the database through a limited number of workstations.
Web‐based implementation to provide enhanced security (e.g. data can be held outside the country involved) and easier opportunities for data consolidation and analysis. This should be included as a separately costed option
Where the system is deployed on a multi‐agency or multi‐site basis and where data consolidation is required, but web‐based implementation is not possible or desirable, an automated data export/import facility incorporating robust encryption should be provided, so that data updates can be sent by email or using portable media.
There should be a facility for field based monitors, who do not have direct access to the database, to still enter their data electronically, either via a hand‐held device or possibly a computer running Excel, and then being able to upload the data automatically into the database. Security considerations should be paramount in the design of this facility. This should be included as a separately costed option.
9. Software The developer is free to propose the software and development environment to be used is creating the system. The choice should be based on the following criteria:
Flexibility and the user friendliness of the user Interface.
Security capabilities.
Implementation Options – it should be capable of running on standalone PC’s (Windows XP SP2 or Vista), internal office networks or on a web‐based platform, even if this last option isn’t part of the initial phase of development).
Cost/Value for Money.
Provision of support (the global implementation of the database will mean that most high level support will need to be provided remotely).
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It is anticipated that SQL may be the most appropriate option for the underlying database.
Attachment
Appendix 11b – Data Entry Screens & Menus
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APPENDIX 11b MRM DATABASE SPECIFICATION ‐ DATA ENTRY SCREENS AND MENUS
Preliminaries to Creating a New Case Record (or Editing an Existing Record)
i Name of the Country Normally a three digit codeii Monitoring Agency ID Code Normally a three digit code
iii
iv Source of Alert (Initial Report)
iv‐a Date Alert Received Date Formativ‐b Source of Alert Fixed List of Optionsiv‐c UN Eye Witness? Yes/Noiv‐d UN Approved Monitor ID NumberID Number Format
1 Documentation RecordDetails of the sources of information (informants and physical evidence) used to document the incident and the changes to the verification status of the case.
2 Incident DetailsBasic details of the case, including date, location, description, perpetrator details and number of children affected. These details apply to all cases
3 Child Details Profiling details of the child(ren) affected.
4Violation Details ‐ Option 1
Details of the violations, any immediate interventions and any referrals made for support. Option 1 ‐ Incidents where full details about the individual child are available and where the child has experienced one or more of the four "individual" violations.
5Violation Details ‐ Option 2
Details of the violations and any immediate interventions. Option 2 ‐ Incidents involving groups of children or where full details for the individual child are not available and where the child(ren) have experienced one or more of the four "individual" violations.
6Violation Details ‐ Option 3
Details of the violations, any immediate interventions and any referrals made for support. Option 3 ‐ Incidents involving groups of children and where the children have experienced one or more of the two "non‐individual" violations.
Colour Key
Mandatory Field for all IncidentsOptional field depending on circumstances and availability of data.
If and when additional data needs to be entered into an existing record, the case record should be retrieved by entering the Case Reference Number or searching against a range of fields (date of incident, location of incident, etc).
Main Data Entry Menu
The system should also automatically generate a Case Reference Number according to an agreed formula:
Two initial pieces of data will be required when creating a new record
The system should allow the administrator to set both to a default value when the database is being used by one monitoring agency in a single country. Where this is not the case, they should be selectable from a menu of options.
It will then be necessary to enter the basic details of the initial "Alert" or "Source" of the alleged incident and whether a UN staff member or a staff member of a trusted UN partner was an eye witness to the incident.
Once this initial information has been entered, the user will be required to select from the Main Menu's six options (see below) to enter further data. Normally this will start with the Documentation Record followed by the Incident, Child and Violation options.
It is suggested that the Case Reference Number should start with a three digit code to represent the MRM Task Force (CCC) followed by a further three digits to identify the Monitoring Agency involved (AAA), one digit to identify the office or location (L) and finally by a unique, consecutively generated four digit number (i.e. CCCAAAL0001)
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1 Documentation Record
1 Main Menu
1.1 Informant The details of any informants interviewed about the incident
1.2 Physical Evidence The details of any physical evidence observed
1.3 Verification Details of the verification status of the case
1.1 Informant
1.1.1 Date of Interview Date Format1.1.2 Category of Informant Fixed List of Options1.1.3 Eye Witness? Yes/No1.1.4 Sex of Informant Fixed List of Options1.1.5 ID Code of Informant Open Format1.1.6 Consent ‐ Access to Data Fixed List of Options1.1.7 Consent ‐ Contact Again Fixed List of Options1.1.8 Reliability of Informant Fixed List of Options
1.2 Physical Evidence
1.2.1 Date Evidence Observed Date Format1.2.2 Type of Physical Evidence Fixed List of Options1.2.3 Reliability of Evidence Fixed List of Options
1.3 Verification
1.3.1 Date of Verification Decision Date format1.3.2 Verifier ID Code Open Format1.3.3 Verification Status Fixed List of Options
1.3.4 If Undetermined, Why?Fixed List of Options. This supplementary question should only be displayed when the "Undetermined" option is selected for Field 1.3.2 (multiple selections possible).
1. Enter details of Incident (takes user to Menu 2)2. Return to Main Menu
Menu 1 (Documentation Record) must be completed for ALL incidents. Selecting any of the three main options (1.1 to enter details of any informants who provide information about the incident, 1.2 to enter details of any physical evidence observed or 1.3 to enter details of the verification decision) should open a subsidiary window containing the relevant fields listed below. Only one subsidiary window should be open at any point in time (i.e. selecting another item on the Main Menu should close the previous subsidiary window).
All new cases should by default be allocated to the "Pending Verification" status, so these fields will only need to be used when a verification decision is made. If the initial verification decision is subsequently changed for any reason these fields can be updated ‐ there is no requirement to keep a log of these changes..
It must be possible to enter the details of multiple items of physical evidence
It must be possible to enter the details of multiple informants
At the bottom of this window there should be two buttons:
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2 Incident Details
2 Main Menu
2.1 Incident Summary2.2 Perpetrator Details2.3 Child Numbers2.4 Public Summary
2.1 Incident Details2.1.1 Date of Incident Date Format2.1.2 Time of Day Fixed List of Options2.1.3 Place Fixed List of Options2.1.4 Admin Level 1 Customisable List of Options2.1.5 Admin Level 2 Customisable List of Options2.1.6 Admin Level 3 Customisable List of Options2.1.7 Description of Incident Unlimited Free Text
2.2 Perpetrator Details
2.2.1 State/Non‐State Actor Fixed List of Options2.2.2 Armed Group/Force Customisable List of Options2.2.3 Number of Perpetrators Fixed List of Options
2.3 Child Numbers
2.3.1 Number of Children Number Format
2.4 Public Summary
2.4.1 Global or National Case Study Fixed List of Options2.4.2 Public Summary of Incident Unlimited Free Text
1.
2.
3.
4. Return to Main Menu
Add summary details of a Group of Children or an Individual Child for whom Full Details are not available, and who have experienced "Non‐Individual" Violations (takes user to Menu 6)
Add full details of an Individual Child and the "Individual" Violations he/she has experienced (takes the user to Menu 4)
Menu 2 (Incident Details) must be completed for ALL incidents. Selecting any of the four main options (2.1 to enter summary details of the incident, 2.2 to enter details of the Perpetrator(s), 2.3 to enter the number of children affected or 2.4 to enter a "public" summary of the incident) should open a subsidiary window containing the relevant fields listed below. Only one subsidiary window should be open at any point in time (i.e. selecting another item on the Main Menu should close the previous subsidiary window).
At the bottom of this window there should be four buttons:
Add summary details for a Group of Children or an Individual Child for whom full details are not available, and who have experienced "Individual" Violations (takes user to Menu 5)
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3 Child Details
3 Main Screen
3.1 Individual Child Details3.2 Group/Summary Profile
3.1 Subsidiary Window ‐ Individual Child DetailsSelecting Option 3.1 should reveal two buttons:
1. Enter Details for a New Child2. Open List of Children for this Incident (to select a child for editing/adding new data)
3.1.1 ID Number Date Format3.1.2 Sex Fixed List of Options3.1.3 Date of Birth Date Format (pop‐up DOB calculator available)3.1.4 Ethnicity Locally Customisable List of Options3.1.5 Religion Locally Customisable List of Options3.1.6 Refugee/IDP Status Fixed List of Options3.1.7 Care Arrangements Fixed List of Options3.1.8 Consent ‐ Sharing Data Fixed List of Options3.1.9 Consent ‐ Further Contact Yes/No/Don't Know3.1.10 Consent ‐ Referral Yes/No/Don't Know
At the bottom of this window there should be two buttons:1. Enter/Edit Details of Individual Violations (takes the user to Menu 4.)2. Return to Main Menu
3.2 Subsidiary Window ‐ Group/Summary Profile
3.2.1 Number of Children Number Format (offer default figure from 2.3.1 for confirmation)3.2.2 Sex Fixed List of Options3.2.3 Age Range Fixed List of Options3.2.4 Ethnicity Customisable List of Options3.2.5 Religion Customisable List of Options3.2.6 Refugee/IDP Status Fixed List of Options
At the bottom of this subsidiary window there should be three buttons:1. Enter/Edit Summary Details of "Individual" Violations (takes the user to Menu 5)2. Enter/Edit Details of "Non‐Individual" Violations (takes the user to Menu 6)3. Return to Main Menu
Menu 3 (Child Details) is designed to capture profiling data for the children involved. Selecting either of the two main options (3.1 to enter full details for an individual child or 3.2 to enter details for a group of children or summary profile for a child for whom full details are not available) should open a subsidiary window containing the relevant fields listed below. Only one subsidiary window should be open at any point in time (i.e. selecting another item on the Main Menu should close the previous subsidiary window). Option 3.1 must provide the user with an opportunity to record details for an unlimited number of individual children. There should also be a "List" button available to allow the user to access any of the children whose details have already been entered.
Selecting Option 3.2 will open a subsidiary window, which will either be empty or contain data that has already been entered and that can be edited.
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4 Violations ‐ Option 1
4 Main Screen
4.1 Killing & Maiming
4.2 Recruitment
4.3 Sexual Violence
4.4 Other Abduction
4.5 Immediate Intervention (Victim / Survivor / Family / Community)
4.6 Immediate Intervention (Monitoring Agency)
4.7 Release or Departure
4.8 Referral & Response
4.1 Subsidiary Window ‐ Killing & Maiming
4.1.1 Cause Fixed List of Options4.1.2 Participating in Hostilities? Fixed List of Options4.1.3 During or a result of Abduction? Yes/No/Don't Know4.1.4 Circumstances (Legal context) Fixed List of Options4.1.5 Consequences Fixed List of Options
4.2 Subsidiary Window ‐ Recruitment
4.2.1 Was Recruitment "Forced"? Yes/No/Don't Know (this also counts as an Abduction Violation)4.2.2 Contributory factors Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)4.2.3 Re‐Recruitment Yes/No/Don't Know4.2.4 Role in Armed Group Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)4.2.5 Position of Authority? Yes/No/Don't Know4.2.6 Own Weapon? Yes/No/Don't Know
4.3 Subsidiary Window ‐ Sexual Violence
4.3.1 Type of Sexual Violence Fixed List of Options4.3.2 Sexual Exploitation/Transactional Sex? Yes/No/Don't Know4.3.3 Sexual Slavery? Yes/No/Don't Know4.3.4 Forced Pregnancy? Yes/No/Don't Know4.3.5 Involved Abduction? Yes/No/Don't Know
4.4 Subsidiary Window ‐ Other Forms of Abduction
4.4.1 Main Purpose of Abduction Fixed List of Options
4.5 Subsidiary Window ‐ Immediate Intervention (Victim/Survivor/Family/Community)
4.5.1 Raised with Authorities Yes/No/Don't Know4.5.2 Response of Authorities Fixed List of Options
4.6 Subsidiary Window ‐ Immediate Intervention (Monitoring Agency)
4.6.1 Date Date Format4.6.2 Type of Intervention Fixed List of Options
4.7 Subsidiary Window ‐ "Release" or Departure from Armed Group
4.7.1 Released or Left Armed Group? Yes/No/Don't Know4.7.2 Date Date Format4.7.3 How? Fixed List of Options4.7.4 Contributory Factors Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)
4.8 Subsidiary Window ‐ Response & Referral ‐ Mini‐table (4.8.2 ‐ 4.8.4)
4.8.1 Appropriate Existing Provision? Yes/No/Don't Know
4.8.2 Date of Referral Date Format4.8.3 Agency Locally Customised List of Options4.8.4 Purpose of Referral Fixed List of Options
4.8.5 Reason for No Referral Fixed List of Options
At the bottom of this window there should be two buttons:
1. Add another Child (returns the user to Menu 3)2. Return to Main Menu
Menu 4 (Violations ‐ Option 1) is designed for incidents involving children for which detailed data is available and who have experienced one or more of the four "individual" violations. Selecting each of the 8 main option (4.1 ‐ 4.8) should open a subsidiary window containing the relevant fields listed below. Only one subsidiary window should be open at any point in time (i.e. selecting another item on the Main Menu should close the previous subsidiary window). Subsidiary Windows 4.6 and 4.8 (4.8.2 ‐ 4.8.4) must provide the user with an opportunity to record and view multiple interventions/referrals (i.e. mini‐tables).
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5 Violations ‐ Option 2
5 Main Screen
5.1 Killing & Maiming
5.2 Recruitment
5.3 Sexual Violence
5.4 Other Abduction
5.5 Immediate Intervention (Victim / Survivor / Family / Community)
5.6 Immediate Intervention (Monitoring Agency)
5.7 Release or Departure
5.1 Subsidiary Window ‐ Killing & Maiming
5.1.1 Cause Fixed List of Options5.1.2 Participating in Hostilities? Fixed List of Options5.1.3 During or a result of Abduction? Yes/No/Don't Know5.1.4 Circumstances (Legal context) Fixed List of Options5.1.5 Consequences Fixed List of Options
5.2 Subsidiary Window ‐ Recruitment
5.2.1 Was Recruitment "Forced"? Yes/No/Don't Know (this counts as an Abduction Violation)5.2.2 Contributory factors Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)5.2.3 Re‐Recruitment Yes/No/Don't Know5.2.4 Role in Armed Group Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)5.2.5 Position of Authority? Yes/No/Don't Know5.2.6 Own Weapons? Yes/No/Don't Know
5.3 Subsidiary Window ‐ Sexual Violence
5.3.1 Type of Sexual Violence Fixed List of Options5.3.2 Sexual Exploitation/Transactional Sex?Yes/No/Don't Know5.3.3 Sexual Slavery? Yes/No/Don't Know5.3.4 Forced Pregnancy? Yes/No/Don't Know5.3.5 Involved Abduction? Yes/No/Don't Know
5.4 Subsidiary Window ‐ Other Forms of Abduction
5.4.1 Main Purpose of Abduction Fixed List of Options
5.5 Subsidiary Window ‐ Immediate Intervention (Victims/Survivors/Families/Community)
5.5.1 Raised with Authorities Yes/No/Don't Know5.5.2 Response of Authorities Fixed List of Options
5.6 Subsidiary Window ‐ Immediate Intervention (Monitoring Agency) ‐ Mini‐table
5.6.1 Date Date Format5.6.2 Type of Intervention Fixed List of Options
5.7 Subsidiary Window ‐ "Release" or Departure from Armed Group
5,7.1 Released or Left Armed Group? Yes/No/Don't Know5.7.2 How Many? Number Format5.7.3 Date Date Format5.7.4 Circumstances Fixed List of Options5.7.5 Contributory Factors Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)
At the bottom of this window there should be one button:1. Return to Main Menu
Menu 5 (Violations ‐ Option 2) is designed for incidents involving groups of children, or individual children for whom detailed data is not available, who have experienced one or more of the four "individual" violations. Selecting each of the 7 main option (5.1 ‐ 5.7) should open a subsidiary window containing the relevant fields listed below. Only one subsidiary window should be open at any point in time (i.e. selecting another item on the Main Menu should close the previous subsidiary window). Subsidiary Window 5.6 must provide the user with an opportunity to record and view multiple interventions (i.e. mini‐tables).
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6 Violations ‐ Option 3
6 Main Screen
6.1 Attacks on Education Facilities
6.2 Attacks on Health Facilities
6.3 Denial of Humanitarian Access
6.4 Immediate Intervention (Community/Institution)
6.5 Immediate Intervention (Monitoring Agency)
6.6 Referral & Response
6.1 Subsidiary Window ‐ Attacks on Education Facilities
6.1.1 Government or Non‐Government Fixed List of Options6.1.2 Type of Facility Fixed List of Options6.1.3 Sex of Client Group Fixed List of Options6.1.4 Type of Attack Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)6.1.5 Objective of Attack Fixed List of Options6.1.6 Impact on Physical Infrastructure Fixed List of Options6.1.7 No of Children Killed Number Format6.1.8 No of Children Injured Number Format6.1.9 No of Adults Killed Number Format6.1.10 No of Adults Injured Number Format6.1.11 Closed as Result of Attack? Yes/No/Don't Know6.1.12 Reopened (fully or partially)? Fixed List of Options6.1.13 When Reopened? Date Format6.1.14 Any Group Excluded/Disadvantaged? Yes/No/Don't Know6.1.15 On What Basis? Fixed List of Options
6.2 Subsidiary Window ‐ Attacks on Health Facilities
6.2.1 Government or Non‐Government Fixed List of Options6.2.2 Type of Facility Fixed List of Options6.2.3 Sex of Client Group Fixed List of Options6.2.4 Type of Attack Fixed List of Options (multiple selections possible)6.2.5 Objective of Attack Fixed List of Options6.2.6 Impact on Physical Infrastructure Fixed List of Options6.2.7 No of Children Killed Number Format6.2.8 No of Children Injured Number Format6.2.9 No of Adults Killed Number Format6.2.10 No of Adults Injured Number Format6.2.11 Closed as Result of Attack? Yes/No/Don't Know6.2.12 Reopened (fully or partially)? Fixed List of Options6.2.13 When Reopened? Date Format6.2.14 Any Group Excluded/Disadvantaged? Yes/No/Don't Know6.2.15 On What Basis? Fixed List of Options
6.3 Subsidiary Window ‐ Denial of Humanitarian Access
6.3.1 Target (provider or children)? Fixed List of Options6.3.2 Mechanism 2 Fixed Lists of Options (dependent on answer to Question 6.3.1)6.3.3 Assistance Affected Fixed List of Options
6.4 Subsidiary Window ‐ Immediate Intervention (Community/Institutions)
6.4.1 Raised with Authorities Yes/No/Don't Know6.4.2 Response of Authorities Fixed List of Options
6.5 Subsidiary Window ‐ Immediate Intervention (Monitoring Agency) ‐ Mini‐table
6.5.1 Date Date Format6.5.2 Type of Intervention Fixed List of Options
6.6 Subsidiary Window ‐ Response & Referral ‐ Mini‐table (6.6.2 ‐ 6.6.4)
6.6.1 Appropriate Existing Provision? Yes/No/Don't Know
6.6.2 Date of Referral Date format6.6.3 Agency Locally Customised List of Options6.6.4 Purpose of Referral Fixed List of Options
6.6.5 Reason for No Referral Fixed List of Options
At the bottom of this window there should be one button:1. Return to Main Menu
Menu 6 (Violations ‐ Option 3) is designed for incidents involving the two "non‐individual" violations. Selecting each of the 6 main option (6.1 ‐ 6.6) should open a subsidiary window containing the relevant fields listed below. Only one subsidiary window should be open at any point in time (i.e. selecting another item on the Main Menu should close the previous subsidiary window). Subsidiary Windows 6.5 and 6.6 (6.6.2 ‐ 6.6.4) must provide the user with an opportunity to record and view multiple interventions/referrals (i.e. mini‐tables).
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Appendices (required for the full Specification) 1. Data Requirements Document (Appendix 8 from the Consultant’s report)
2. Data Entry Fields and Menus (Appendix 11b from the Consultant’s report)
3. Perpetrator Reports (Appendix 9 from the Consultant’s report)