modern china - quantum history

18
Modern China 中华人民共和国万岁! From the ProQuest History Study Center On October 1, 1949, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman Mao Zedong stood atop Beijing's Gate of Heavenly Peace and proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao's declaration culminated more than two decades of Communist struggle against the rival Nationalist (Kuomintang/ KMT) Party and the Japanese. It also contained great symbolic meaning, for the CCP had succeeded in uniting China after decades of internal disarray and Western and Japanese imperialism. Yet the divergent visions and goals of CCP leaders eventually led to a different kind of disarray and, finally, a retreat from the extremist revolutionary vision of radicals such as Mao. In the first years of Communist rule, the CCP focused on consolidating its power and bringing the revolution to each village and region. Communist cadres won the loyalty of millions of peasants with their relative incorruptibility, land reform practices and dedication to reconstruction and universal education. Under peacetime CCP rule, agricultural production increased and poverty fell for the first time since the anti‐Japanese war. Yet, by the mid‐ 1950s, slowing growth and political fervor spurred the CCP leadership to embrace deeply flawed economic policies in an effort to modernize China more quickly. These policies, together with Mao Zedong's leftist radicalism, undid many of the PRC's early achievements. In 1958, the CCP launched its Great Leap Forward, a disastrous campaign to expand grain production and to catch up to British and American steel production capabilities at the same time. By setting incredibly unrealistic farm quotas and wasting food and labor, Party leaders managed to create a huge man‐made famine that killed about thirty million people. After the Great Leap, the CCP returned to more moderate economic policies under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, while Mao Zedong played a less visible role than previously. Increasingly disturbed over the path these leaders were taking, Mao and his allies in 1965 used an initially obscure literary and historical debate to urge cultural revolution and eventually to purge the Party inner circles of Liu and other moderates. During this period, millions of young people and workers answered Mao's call to struggle against ‘rightists’ in the Party. These ‘Red Guards’ plunged the nation into chaos as their factions, all claiming to be Mao's true representatives, fought bloody battles. Only army intervention stopped these clashes, after which radical leaders sent thousands of students, intellectuals and CCP members to remote rural areas to learn from the peasants. Although the worst disorder of the Cultural Revolution was over by 1969, radical party members remained influential until Mao's death in 1976. Soon after Mao died, former leaders and generals whose claims to legitimacy lay in their participation in the revolution and the Long March pushed the radicals out of power and jailed the Gang of Four. With the support of this old guard, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's paramount leader and began working to reverse the effects of years of chaos and economic mismanagement. He and his allies shifted China's production focus to light industry, encouraged small business and agricultural sideline production and redistributed commune land to individual peasants to farm on their own. The Party also opened certain areas of South China to foreign investment. Such economic policies, which current president Hu Jin Taohas followed and expanded upon, have succeeded in creating relative prosperity across much of China. However, the CCP has proved much less interested in initiating political reform. During certain periods of post‐ Mao political ‘thaw’, notably 1978, 1986 and 1989, workers and students have called for democracy, the rule of law and an end to the official corruption that has accompanied rapid economic development. In each instance, the Party has eventually crushed these movements and the demonstrations they spawned. Demographics and broad social trends in China suggest that larger structural and social changes must eventually occur, however. Greater wealth has created intellectual and cultural ferment in Chinese cities, with urban residents expressing their views more freely than in the past and using the Internet to communicate. Since the 1980s, millions of peasants have also flooded into Chinese cities hoping to take part in the economic boom. Such migrants are no longer under the tight supervision of village leaders in the way they once were. Economic openness and competition have also highlighted the weakness of state‐run enterprises, former backbones of the industrial economy that have become costly liabilities with legions of pensioners and outdated, inefficient equipment and techniques. Shutting down such companies is risky, however, for like the migrants, the urban unemployed comprise a force with destabilizing potential. Since the 1989 worker and student protests, the central government has accelerated economic reforms in an effort to use prosperity to counter such problems. In addition, the government‐run school system has begun instilling students from an early age with an intense, sometimes xenophobic nationalism, a central tenet of which is the indispensability of the Chinese Communist Party to China itself. Causes Beginning in the 1830s, a series of domestic travails and Western colonialist incursions into China greatly weakened the ruling Qing dynasty. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged in 1921 as one of many responses to the chaos and warlordism into which China plunged after the 1911 Republican Revolution and the fall of the Qing. During the 1920s, the CCP worked both alone and with the Kuomintang (KMT) to organize villagers and urbanites in parts of South China. The two parties also collaborated during the 1927 Northern Expedition, during which KMT leader Chiang Kai‐shek succeeded in uniting much of the country under Nationalist rule or sympathetic regional warlords. But after Chiang's forces took Shanghai, they turned on their CCP allies and slaughtered and imprisoned thousands of Communists and suspected Communists. This ‘White Terror’ forced a shift in Communist tactics away from organizing in cities and toward rural revolution, a view that the young cadre Mao Zedong espoused. By 1934, relentless KMT attacks had greatly weakened the Communists and pinned them down in the rural southern base areas to which they had retreated in 1927. The remaining CCP forces succeeded in breaking out of these bases, commencing a costly, year‐long ‘Long March’ to northwestern China. By 1936, growing public anger about the large‐scale Japanese invasion of China forced the KMT to shift its attention to this newest danger. The KMT and the CCP formed a fractious ‘United Front’ against the Japanese, with KMT forces continuing to fight the Communists at

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Page 1: Modern China - Quantum History

Modern China 中华人民共和国万岁!

FromtheProQuestHistoryStudyCenter

OnOctober1,1949,ChineseCommunistParty(CCP)

chairmanMaoZedongstoodatopBeijing'sGateof

HeavenlyPeaceandproclaimedthefoundingofthe

People'sRepublicofChina(PRC).Mao'sdeclaration

culminatedmorethantwodecadesofCommuniststruggle

againsttherivalNationalist(Kuomintang/KMT)Partyand

theJapanese.Italsocontainedgreatsymbolicmeaning,for

theCCPhadsucceededinunitingChinaafterdecadesof

internaldisarrayandWesternandJapaneseimperialism.

YetthedivergentvisionsandgoalsofCCPleaders

eventuallyledtoadifferentkindofdisarrayand,finally,a

retreatfromtheextremistrevolutionaryvisionofradicals

suchasMao.

InthefirstyearsofCommunistrule,theCCPfocusedon

consolidatingitspowerandbringingtherevolutiontoeach

villageandregion.Communistcadreswontheloyaltyof

millionsofpeasantswiththeirrelativeincorruptibility,land

reformpracticesanddedicationtoreconstructionand

universaleducation.UnderpeacetimeCCPrule,

agriculturalproductionincreasedandpovertyfellforthe

firsttimesincetheanti‐Japanesewar.Yet,bythemid‐

1950s,slowinggrowthandpoliticalfervorspurredtheCCP

leadershiptoembracedeeplyflawedeconomicpoliciesin

anefforttomodernizeChinamorequickly.

Thesepolicies,togetherwithMaoZedong'sleftist

radicalism,undidmanyofthePRC'searlyachievements.In

1958,theCCPlauncheditsGreatLeapForward,a

disastrouscampaigntoexpandgrainproductionandto

catchuptoBritishandAmericansteelproduction

capabilitiesatthesametime.Bysettingincredibly

unrealisticfarmquotasandwastingfoodandlabor,Party

leadersmanagedtocreateahugeman‐madefaminethat

killedaboutthirtymillionpeople.AftertheGreatLeap,the

CCPreturnedtomoremoderateeconomicpoliciesunder

theleadershipofLiuShaoqi,DengXiaopingandChenYun,

whileMaoZedongplayedalessvisiblerolethan

previously.

Increasinglydisturbedoverthepaththeseleaderswere

taking,Maoandhisalliesin1965usedaninitiallyobscure

literaryandhistoricaldebatetourgeculturalrevolution

andeventuallytopurgethePartyinnercirclesofLiuand

othermoderates.Duringthisperiod,millionsofyoung

peopleandworkersansweredMao'scalltostruggle

against‘rightists’intheParty.These‘RedGuards’plunged

thenationintochaosastheirfactions,allclaimingtobe

Mao'struerepresentatives,foughtbloodybattles.Only

armyinterventionstoppedtheseclashes,afterwhich

radicalleaderssentthousandsofstudents,intellectuals

andCCPmemberstoremoteruralareastolearnfromthe

peasants.AlthoughtheworstdisorderoftheCultural

Revolutionwasoverby1969,radicalpartymembers

remainedinfluentialuntilMao'sdeathin1976.

SoonafterMaodied,formerleadersandgeneralswhose

claimstolegitimacylayintheirparticipationinthe

revolutionandtheLongMarchpushedtheradicalsoutof

powerandjailedtheGangofFour.Withthesupportof

thisoldguard,DengXiaopingemergedasChina's

paramountleaderandbeganworkingtoreversethe

effectsofyearsofchaosandeconomicmismanagement.

HeandhisalliesshiftedChina'sproductionfocustolight

industry,encouragedsmallbusinessandagricultural

sidelineproductionandredistributedcommunelandto

individualpeasantstofarmontheirown.ThePartyalso

openedcertainareasofSouthChinatoforeign

investment.Sucheconomicpolicies,whichcurrent

presidentHuJinTaohasfollowedandexpandedupon,

havesucceededincreatingrelativeprosperityacross

muchofChina.

However,theCCPhasprovedmuchlessinterestedin

initiatingpoliticalreform.Duringcertainperiodsofpost‐

Maopolitical‘thaw’,notably1978,1986and1989,

workersandstudentshavecalledfordemocracy,therule

oflawandanendtotheofficialcorruptionthathas

accompaniedrapideconomicdevelopment.Ineach

instance,thePartyhaseventuallycrushedthese

movementsandthedemonstrationstheyspawned.

Demographicsandbroadsocialtrendsin

Chinasuggestthatlargerstructuraland

socialchangesmusteventuallyoccur,

however.Greaterwealthhascreated

intellectualandculturalfermentin

Chinesecities,withurbanresidents

expressingtheirviewsmorefreelythanin

thepastandusingtheInternetto

communicate.Sincethe1980s,millionsof

peasantshavealsofloodedintoChinese

citieshopingtotakepartintheeconomic

boom.Suchmigrantsarenolongerunder

thetightsupervisionofvillageleadersin

thewaytheyoncewere.Economic

opennessandcompetitionhavealso

highlightedtheweaknessofstate‐run

enterprises,formerbackbonesofthe

industrialeconomythathavebecomecostlyliabilitieswith

legionsofpensionersandoutdated,inefficientequipment

andtechniques.Shuttingdownsuchcompaniesisrisky,

however,forlikethemigrants,theurbanunemployed

compriseaforcewithdestabilizingpotential.

Sincethe1989workerandstudentprotests,thecentral

governmenthasacceleratedeconomicreformsinaneffort

touseprosperitytocountersuchproblems.Inaddition,the

government‐runschoolsystemhasbeguninstilling

studentsfromanearlyagewithanintense,sometimes

xenophobicnationalism,acentraltenetofwhichisthe

indispensabilityoftheChineseCommunistPartytoChina

itself.

Causes

Beginninginthe1830s,aseriesofdomestictravailsand

WesterncolonialistincursionsintoChinagreatlyweakened

therulingQingdynasty.TheChineseCommunistParty

(CCP)emergedin1921asoneofmanyresponsestothe

chaosandwarlordismintowhichChinaplungedafterthe

1911RepublicanRevolutionandthefalloftheQing.During

the1920s,theCCPworkedbothaloneandwiththe

Kuomintang(KMT)toorganizevillagersandurbanitesin

partsofSouthChina.Thetwopartiesalsocollaborated

duringthe1927NorthernExpedition,duringwhichKMT

leaderChiangKai‐sheksucceededinunitingmuchofthe

countryunderNationalistruleorsympatheticregional

warlords.ButafterChiang'sforcestookShanghai,they

turnedontheirCCPalliesandslaughteredandimprisoned

thousandsofCommunistsandsuspectedCommunists.This

‘WhiteTerror’forcedashiftinCommunisttacticsaway

fromorganizingincitiesandtowardruralrevolution,a

viewthattheyoungcadreMaoZedongespoused.By1934,

relentlessKMTattackshadgreatlyweakenedthe

Communistsandpinnedthemdownintheruralsouthern

baseareastowhichtheyhadretreatedin1927.The

remainingCCPforcessucceededinbreakingoutofthese

bases,commencingacostly,year‐long‘LongMarch’to

northwesternChina.

By1936,growingpublicangeraboutthelarge‐scale

JapaneseinvasionofChinaforcedtheKMTtoshiftits

attentiontothisnewestdanger.TheKMTandtheCCP

formedafractious‘UnitedFront’againsttheJapanese,

withKMTforcescontinuingtofighttheCommunistsat

Page 2: Modern China - Quantum History

differenttimes.Duringthisperiod,MaoZedong

consolidatedhispowerandbecametheacknowledged

leaderoftheCCP.

TheCommunistsusedthewarperiodtorebuildtheir

armies,recruitthousandsofnewmembersandgain

increasinglegitimacyamongcommonChineseasa

patrioticforcefornationalunity.Incontrast,Nationalist

reluctancetofighttheJapanese,generalcorruptionand

economicincompetenceangeredmanyChinese.Afterthe

Japanesesurrenderin1945,theCommunistsusedtheir

newstrengthtopushtheincreasinglyunpopularandweak

KMToutofChinaby1949.

Effects

TheCommunistPartysucceededinunitingand

strengtheningChinaafteralmostonehundredyearsof

weakness,disunityandquasi‐colonialstatus.Inthepast

twentyyears,thePRCgovernmenthasalsoraisedthe

livingstandardsofthemajorityofChineseandhelped

ChinabecomearespectedpowerinAsiaandtheworld.At

thesametime,however,thedisastrouseconomic

mistakesandpoliticalmachinationsofCCPleadersleft

muchofthepopulationcynicalaboutthePartyand

communismitself.Thewidespreadofficialcorruptionof

recentyearshasonlycompoundedsuchsentiments.

Timeline

TheLateQingEra

ThedeathoftheQianlongEmperorin1799signalstheend

ofthe‘goldenage’ofQingdynastyrule,andinternaland

externalproblemsplaguetheempire.Theinadequacyof

Chinesemilitaryforcesandthetechnologicalsuperiorityof

industrializedWesternnationsbecomeparticularly

apparentafterseveralclasheswithBritishandother

foreigntroops.In1905,therulinghouseinitiates

numerousreforms,includingthecreationofaWestern‐

stylearmy,theabolitionoftheoldConfucianexamination

systemforbureaucratsandtheadoptionofaconstitution

withprovisionsforalegislature.ButthetaxestheQing

dynastyleviesforthesereformsangerthepopulace,and

thehaltingpaceofchangedisturbsmanyreformersand

elites.Manyhavebeencontemplatingafuturewithout

imperialruleforatleastadecade.

TheEarlyRepublicanPeriod

RespondingtoQingsuppressionofanationalist

revolutionarycell,troopsmutinyinWuhanonOctober10,

1911.Inthefollowingweeks,moremutiniesoccur

nationwide,culminatingintheoverthrowoftheQing

dynasty.OnDecember29,delegatesfromsixteen

provincialassemblieselectSunYat‐senprovisionalpresidentofthenewRepublicofChina.YuanShikai,chief

militaryleader,rejectsSun'sclaimstothepresidencyand

assumestheofficehimself.Yuannameshimselfemperorin

late1915butstepsdownjustafewmonthslaterafter

nationwideprotestsoverhismove.

Aseriesofcorrupt,inefficientregimesandwarlordsfills

thepoliticalvacuuminChina.Japanlendsmoneytothose

leadersinternationallyrecognizedasthelegitimate

governmentofChina,layingthefoundationsforits

subsequentclaimstosignificantportionsofChinese

territory.BothChinaandJapanenterWorldWarIonthe

Alliedside,withChinasendingthousandsoflaborersto

Europe.AttheVersaillesPeaceConferencein1919,Japan

isawardedGermanconcessionsinChina,basedon

internationalrecognitionofitssustainedinfluencein

China;studentsandintellectualsprotestagainstthe

decision.TheinitialprotesttakesplaceonMay4and

sparkstheMaytheFourthMovementforpoliticaland

culturalreforminChina.

The1920s

In1920,VladimirLenin,leaderofthenewCommunist

regimeinRussia,dispatchesComintern(Thirdor

CommunistInternational)agentstoChina.They

approachLiDazhaoandChenDuxiu,twoleftist

intellectualsinvolvedintheMaytheFourthMovement.

Li,Chen,theagentsandasmallgroupofacquaintances

meettostudyMarxism,thenrecruitothers.Chinese

studentsinEurope,includingZhouEnlaiandDeng

Xiaoping,becomeinvolvedwithsocialistgroups.The

nextyear,thefirstplenarymeetingoftheCCPsecretly

takesplaceinShanghai.Delegates,includingMao

Zedong,electChenDuxiusecretary‐general.

Stillsmallandweak,theCCPallieswiththeKuomintang,

andCominternagentshelpSunYat‐senstrengthenhis

positionandreorganizetheKMT.AfterSun'sdeathin

1925,themoreconservativeChiangKai‐shekassumes

leadershipoftheKMT.Between1925and1927,Chiang's

armiesdefeataseriesofwarlordsandmakealliances

withothers.AfterChiang'sforcescaptureShanghaiin

thespringof1927,theyturnontheirCommunistand

laborunionallies,jailingandkillingthousands.TheCCP

membersslipawaytoremoteareasofJiangxi,Hubei,

Hunan,Fujian,AnhuiandHebeiandattempttosetup

Communistbasesthere.

The1930s

ChiangKai‐shekcontinuestofighttheCommunists

throughouttheearly1930sastheconditionofthe

nationdeteriorates.Japanesetroopsmoveinto

Manchuriain1931andexertinfluenceoverotherareas

ofnorthChina.Theworldwideeconomicdownturn

affectsthecountry,andgovernmenttaxationand

modernizationpoliciescreateresentmentandpoverty.

Officialcorruptionisrife,despiteChiang'sinauguration

oftheNewLifeMovement,whichstressesConfucian

valuesandmorality.Still,theKMTcomescloseto

crushingtheCCP'smainbaseinJiangxi,forcingthe

CommuniststoundertaketheirlegendaryLongMarchin

1934.Chiang'sparamilitarysupporters,modeling

themselvesonEuropeanfascists,targetChineseleftists

inKMT‐ruledareasofthecountry.

By1935,JapaneseincursionsintoNorthChinabecome

increasinglyworrisome,butChiangKai‐shekstillfocuses

onexterminatingtheCommunists.Patrioticstudents

protestKMTpolicyindemonstrationsacrossChina.Late

in1936,ZhangXueliang,thewarlordincontrolofXi’an,

kidnapsChiangKai‐shekandforceshimtomeetwith

Page 3: Modern China - Quantum History

Communistleaders.Chiangfinallyagreestofightthe

JapaneseinsteadoftheCommunists.

1937‐45:TheWarYears

AfterJapaninvadesChinaproperin1937,theCCPandKMT

maintainaUnitedFrontbutfrequentlyclash.TheCCP

createsaloyalfollowing,redistributingincomeandlandin

areasitcontrols,rebuildingitsmilitaryforcesandfighting

theJapanese.Communistsgainareputationforhonesty

andfairnessincontrasttoKMTofficials,whosebrutality

shocksAmericanallies.Neartheendofthewar,the

Americangovernmentconsidersco‐operatingwiththeCCP

butgivesuptheideaafterChiangprotests.

1945‐49:TheRenewedCivilWar

FollowingtheJapanesesurrender,theCCP‐KMTCivilWar

resumes,buttheCommunistsnowenjoysignificant

advantages.TheRedArmyhasgrowntoonemillionmen.

TheUSSRallowstheCCPtocapturesurrenderedJapanese

weaponsandsuppliesinManchuria.Althoughthe

AmericangovernmentsupportstheNationalists,the

UnitedStatesgrowsincreasinglydisillusionedwiththe

KMT,whichsuppressesdissentandsupportsruthless

landlordrepossessionofpropertyinformerlyCommunist

areas.ThroughoutKMT‐ruledChina,rampantinflation

createsgeneralmisery.

TheCommunistsspendmuchof1945and1946

transformingtheirguerrillaarmiesintoaconventional

fightingforce—thePeople'sLiberationArmy—before

launchingattacksontheNationalistslatein1946.ThePLA

movessteadilydownfromthenorthintotheChinese

heartland,assistedbyCommunistagentsinkeycitiesand

generaldissatisfactionwiththeKMT.TheCCPcaptures

muchofnorthernChinain1948andtakesthesouthin

1949.

The1950s:ThePeople'sRepublicofChina

ThePartyredistributestheholdingsofthewealthy(or

unpopular)tothepoorandlandless.Atleastseveral

hundredthousand‘classenemies’and

‘counterrevolutionaries’dieduringthislandreform.Party

campaignseliminateopiumabuseandprostitution.With

Sovietassistance,theChineserebuild,emphasizingthe

developmentofheavyindustry.

In1956,MaodelivershisfamousHundredFlowersspeech

invitingcriticismofthePartybutquicklyrelentsasthe

mountingcritiquesangerotherleaders.Partyofficials

launchtheGreatLeapForwardin1958tosparkChina's

economy(seefig.ofastreetmarketoftheperiod)but

createafamine,whichlastsuntil1961andkillsthirty

millionpeople.AttheLushanPlenumin1959,Peng

DehuaiprivatelycriticizesMao'sLeappolicies.Maopurges

PengandcontinuestheLeap.

IdeologypushestheSovietUnionandChinafurtherapart,

resultinginatotalsplitby1960.Chinaattemptsto

positionitselfasthechampionoftheso‐calledThird

World,sendingaidandtechnicaladvisorstoAfricaandto

Asia;still,thePRCfightsaborderwarwithIndiain1959

andputsdownanti‐ChineseprotestsinTibet.

The1960s

ThePartybacksaway

fromLeappolicies,

shrinkingcommunesand

allowingsmallbusinesses

toemerge.Theeconomy

slowlyrecoversunderthe

managementofLiu

Shaoqi,ChenYunand

DengXiaoping.By1965,

however,Maobecomes

disgustedwiththese

moderates,whomhe

considers

counterrevolutionary

‘rightists’,andlaunches

theCulturalRevolutionto

putChinabackonthe

‘correct’revolutionary

path.SchoolscloseasRed

Guardsandradicals

attempttomake

revolution.Theyfighteach

otherand‘struggle’against‘rightists’,includingcadres,

teachersandotherauthorityfigures,manyofwhomdie

frommistreatment.

TheworstchaosoftheCulturalRevolutionendsby1968

withbloodyPLAintervention.Leftistradicalsalliedwith

MaoandJiangQingretainpower,sendingmillionsof

students,cadresandyoungurbanitestothecountryside

to‘reform’throughlabor.

Aroundtheworld,theChinesemedia'shighlysanitized

versionoftheCulturalRevolutiongainspopularitywith

radicals,anti‐colonialrevolutionaries,intellectualsand

manypeopleofChineseancestry.Soviettroopbuildupson

China'snorthernbordercausethePRCleadershipgreat

concernbythelate1960s.

The1970s

ZhouEnlaimakesoverturestotheUnitedStates,andin

1972,PresidentRichardM.NixonvisitsChina.Maoplays

offleftistsattemptingtocontinuetheCulturalRevolution

againstmoderateshopingtoreinstateorder.By1974,the

leftistshavepurgedDengXiaoping,butprotestsafterZhou

Enlai's1976deathrevealhowintensepopulardiscontent

hasbecome.AfterMao's

deaththatyear,premier

HuaGuofengmoves

againsttheleftists.

DengXiaopingreemerges

topushthemoreradical

Huaoutofpower.Deng

andhiscolleagues

inauguratereformsthat

graduallyopenthenation

toforeigninvestmentand

breakupcommunes.

AlthoughtheCCP

‘rehabilitates’many

Chinesepunishedbetween

1957and1976,most

reformsareeconomic.

Whenstudentsand

workersvoicetheir

discontentinthe1978‐79

DemocracyWall

movement,the

governmentimprisons

thosewhocallforgreater

politicalopenness.

In1979,DengvisitstheUnitedStatesandnormalizes

relations(seefig.).ProtestingVietnam'sgrowing

willfulnessandpersecutionofethnicChinese,PRCtroops

fightabriefwarthere.TheVietnameseprevail,revealing

China'sneedformilitarymodernization.LiketheUnited

States,ChinabacksthemurderousPolPotregimein

CambodiabecauseofitsoppositiontoVietnam.

The1980s

Intheearly1980s,theeffectsofmarketreformsandland

privatizationbecomeapparent.Somefarmerswithready

marketsgrowwealthysellingcashcrops.Othersinpoorer

areasfarelesswell,andmanycadresandpeasantsresist

theretreatfromtherevolution.Surplusagricultural

laborersandtheurbanunemployedsetupsmallshops.

NumerousChinesecitizensareabletopurchasetelevision

sets,washingmachinesandsimilarluxurygoods.Although

theleadershipcontinuestopushmarketreforms,they

simultaneouslyinitiate‘anti‐spiritualpollution’campaigns

tocountertheinfluencesofwealthandWesternculture.

Thecentralgovernmentalsoinstitutesarigorously

enforcedone‐childpolicytokeeppopulationgrowthin

check.

In1986,studentsinAnhuiprotestagainstthe

undemocraticnatureofParty‐controlled‘elections’.A

nationalstudentprotestemerges,butauthoritiessuppress

itinearly1987.DengXiaopingblamestheParty'sreform‐

mindedsecretary‐general,HuYaobang,fortheunrestand

purgeshim.WhenHudiesinApril1989,thousandsof

studentsmarchtoTiananmenSquareinBeijingtolay

wreathsinhismemory,protestingPartycorruptionand

thelackofdemocracyinChina.Aroundthenation,

workers,studentsandothersjointhewideningprotest

movement.Asdemonstratorscallfortheresignationof

DengXiaopingandPremierLiPeng,thecentralleadership

criticisestheprotesters.TheyalsopurgePartySecretary‐

GeneralZhaoZiyang,whoisopenlysympathetictothe

demonstrators(andapotentialDengrival).OnJune4,

1989,PLAtroopsmoveonTiananmenSquareand

surroundingareas,crushingtheprotestsandkillingan

unknownnumberofpeople.Protestersfleeoverseasorgo

undergroundasthepolicecrackdownondissenters.

NumerousnationscriticizeChina'smoveandimpose

sanctions.

1990‐Present

Theearly1990sareaperiodofslowedgrowthand

reducedforeigninvestmentandinterest,duetothe

crackdownandtheensuingconservativeresurgencein

China.ButtheeconomytakesoffafterDengXiaopingvisits

Shanghaianddeclaressupportformarketreformsthere.

Theeconomycontinuestoboomthroughoutthe1990s.

TheUnitedStatesandotherWesternnationsruntrade

deficitswithChina,whichreliesonlow‐costlabortomake

Page 4: Modern China - Quantum History

itsexportsattractive.Althoughhard‐lineleaderssuch

asLiPengretaininfluence,therelativelymoderate

JiangZeminbecomesChina'sleaderuponDeng'sdeath

in1997.

Hugepro‐democracymovementsnowseemathingof

thepast.Thegovernmenthasinstitutedasystemof

limitedlocalelectionsbutmaintainsstrictcontrolover

theentireprocessanditsresults.AsChina'seconomy

becomesincreasinglymarket‐driven,muchofthe

populationfocusesitsenergiesongettingrich—

includingtherecentlyreleasedleadersofthe1989

protests.WithCommunistPartyideologyincreasingly

diluted,millionsofChinesereplacetheirbeliefin

communismwithdevotiontofolkreligionsand

Christianity.Othersworshipmoney.

Asinthe1980s,Partycadresatalllevelsgetrichfaster

thanordinarycitizens,dueinlargeparttotheirpower,

influenceandsusceptibilitytocorruption.A1993study

ofAnhuiProvincereportsthat300,000cadres—or

twentypercentofallofficialsintheprovince—are

involvedincorruption.Throughoutthe1990s,theParty

institutesanti‐corruptioncampaignsandexecutes

thousandsofpeoplefoundguilty.ButleadersinBeijing

findimposingtheirwillonprovincialauthorities—many

ofthemenmeshedinnetworksofcorruption—

increasinglydifficult.Topofficials’childrenand

relativesareinvolvedincorruption,whichis

particularlyembarrassing.Evidenceemergesaswell

thatthePLAisrunningnumerousprofitablebusinesses,

someofthemillegal,throughoutthecountry.

After1989,thePartyharnessespotentnationalismto

divertattentionawayfromthecontinuedlackof

democracyandgrowingofficialcorruptioninChina.

ThereturnofHongKongtoChinain1997sparks

celebrationsacrossthenation.Butnationalismturns

violentin1999,afterNATOmissileshittheChinese

embassyinBelgrade,Yugoslavia;Chinesestudentstake

tothestreetsofBeijingandattacktheAmerican

embassywiththetacitassistanceofthepoliceandthe

authorities.Taiwanremainsamajorissueaswell;with

Taiwaneseofficialsexpressingdecreasedinterestin

reunificationwiththemainland,Chineseleaders

becomemorethreateningintheirrhetoric,evenas

theywelcomegreaterTaiwaneseinvestmentinthe

PRC.

ThefurthestextentofQingpower

ThePeople’sRepublicofChina

LeadershipStruggles

LikeMao,mostofthePRC'searlyleadersjoinedtheChineseCommunistPartyasyoungmen

inthe1920sandrosetocentralleadershippositionsduringthe1930s.Particularly

legendarywerethosewhotookpartintheepicLongMarch,includingMao,ZhuDe,Deng

Xiaoping,LinBiao,ZhouEnlaiandPengDehuai,aswellasthosewhofoughttheJapanese

fromYan’an.After1949,thisgenerationruledjointly,butMaoremainedfirstamongequals,

thefinalauthorityonalldecisions,andthesymbolofPartypowerandstrength.Though

scholarscontinuetodebateMao'sbehaviorduringthistime,FrederickC.Teiweshasargued

convincinglythatwhileMaoexercisedhisauthoritywithrelativerestraintduringthefirst

yearsofthePRC,healsogrewincreasinglylessconcernedaboutcreatingconsensus.The

unifyingthreatoftheKMTarmieswasnowgone,andMao'sassumptionofthetrappings

andresponsibilitiesofpowerlefthimlessaccessibletootherleadersthanhehadbeenin

theYan’anperiod(Teiwes13).

SplitsinthePartyleadershipbecameapparentby1958,afterMaoandotherleaders

endorsedtheGreatLeapForward.The LeapreflectedMao'sbeliefthathuman

willismoresignificantthaneconomic forcesincreatingsocialchange,butasa

policyitwasatremendousfailure. WithLeap‐relatedproblemsgrowing

increasinglynoticeableby1959, Partyleadersconvenedthe

LushanPlenumtorectify Leappolicies.After

GeneralPeng Dehuaicriticized

theLeap,Mao denouncedhim

asa‘right opportunist’.Mao

intensifiedtheLeap ratherthanmoderating

it,andhereplacedPeng withLinBiao.

Eventually,Mao backedawayfromthe

disastrouseconomic policiesoftheGreat

Leap,andashe woulddoinsimilar

situationsforthenext fifteenyears,heturnedto

economicmoderates withinthePartyinan

efforttopromoteretrenchment.By1959,Maohadsteppeddownfromhispostasheadof

state,apositionLiuShaoqiassumed.Duringtheearly1960s,Maoleftmuchofthedaily

workofrunningthenationtoeconomicpragmatistssuchasLiu,ChenYunandothers.At

thesametime,however,LinBiaomovedthePeople'sLiberationArmyinamorepolitical

direction,institutingthestudyofMaoZedongThoughtamongtheranksandcementingthe

growingcultofMao.

By1965,MaohadbecomeincreasinglyfrustratedwiththedirectionoftheParty,whichhe

sawdescendingintoeconomicandpoliticalrevisionismalongSovietlines.Inashrewd

gambit,hecriticizedinanarticleahistoricalplaythatheclaimedpaintedhimasadespotic

imperialfigure.ThedebatethatensuedinprintlaterresultedinMao,hiswifeJiangQing

andtheiralliesdenouncingleadingintellectuals,PartymembersandfinallyLiuShaoqiand

DengXiaoping.MaomovedtoisolateLiuandtopurgeseveralotherleadersfromtheir

positions,afterwhichZhouEnlaiproclaimedthecommencementoftheGreatProletarian

CulturalRevolution.Mao'salliesthenencouragedradicalstudentstoengageinthis

revolutionanddenounce‘revisionist’Partymembers.

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Althoughmanyleft‐leaningWesternintellectualsatthat

timeromanticizedtheCulturalRevolution,mostscholars

nowseeitasamultifacetedstruggleinvolvingconnected

strugglesbetweenleadershipfactionsandlargersocial

classes.Initially,thesonsanddaughtersofPartyofficials

andmembersofother‘red’classesansweredtheMaoists’

calls,formingso‐calledRedGuardunits.Whilethese

groupsviolentlyattackedtheold‘classenemies’and

sometimeskilledthem,moderateleadersattemptedto

containthegrowthoftheCulturalRevolutionmovement.

Maoresistedthisbyintensifyinghiscriticismofhisrivals

andbycallingforawiderCulturalRevolution.Indoingso,

theChairmancapitalizedontheclassresentmentshe

helpedprovokealmosttwodecadesearlier;soon,

membersofthe‘badclasses’organizedtheirownRed

Guardunitstostruggleagainstthe‘conservative’Red

Guards.

AsHongYungLeehasshown,thebattlesthattookplace

withinmassorganizationsandbetweenRedGuardfactions

reflectedthoseofMao,hisalliesandtheireliteopponents,

allofwhommanipulatedsegmentsofthepopulationas

theystruggledforpower.Atthesametime,however,the

outcomeofcitizens’conflictsinfluencedthemovesMao

andothersmadeastheyjockeyedforposition(Lee2‐3).

Eventually,thearmedforcesintervenedtostopthe

widespreadviolencethatcaused,directlyandindirectly,

hundredsofthousandsofdeaths,includingthoseofLiu

Shaoqiandotherdisgracedleaders.

Inhislastyears,Maogrewincreasinglysuspiciousofhis

subordinates,suchasLinBiao,andeventuallychosean

unknownprovincialofficial,HuaGuofeng,tosucceedhim.

AlthoughHuaremainedpremierforafewyearsafter

Mao'sdeath,theLongMarchgeneration,particularlythe

mostrespectedeldergeneralsandcadres,threwtheir

weightbehindDengXiaoping.

Dengrefusedtocultivateapersonalitycultthewaythat

Maohad,butheandotherleadersgrappleduneasilywith

theproblemofmaintainingPartypowerwhilerejecting

themanypurges,campaignsandexcessesthathad

markedCCPrulesince1949.Whilepromotingeconomic

liberalizationandrejectingtheworstpoliciesofthepast,

Dengandotherleadersresistedanyattemptsat

democratization.MuchoftheLongMarchgeneration,

dedicatedtoPartycontrolandrememberingthechaotic

Chinaoftheiryouth,supportedthe1989PLAcrackdown

againsttheworkersandstudentsatTiananmenSquarein

Beijing.Thefewleaders,suchasZhaoZiyang,whoevinced

sympathyfortheprotestersfoundthemselvespurgedand

sometimesjailed.

Thepost‐Dengleadershipconsistsofproponentsofthe

crackdown,suchasLiPeng;politicalciphersinitially

promotedfortheirloyaltytoDeng,includingPresident

JiangZemin;andtechnocratslikeHuYaobangandZhu

Rongji.Thesemen,likethePartyitself,remaincommitted

topreservingCCPauthorityinthemidstofrapideconomic

changeandthesocialdisruptionthatchangehascreated.

BureaucracyandClass

ThetremendoussizeofChina'spopulationhasalways

presentedachallengetothosewhowouldleadthe

country.Inthenineteenthcentury,astaticnumberof

officialsgovernedarapidlygrowingpopulation,leadingto

conditionsthathelpedweakentheQingdynasty'sgripon

power.Provincialandcentralattemptstoextracttaxes

duringthe1920sand1930sledtocorruptionandto

widespreaddisillusionmentwithKMTgovernmentamong

villageleadersandprominentcitizens(Duara249‐51).

WhentheCommunistscametopower,theirauthority

reachedmuchfurtherthanhadthatofanyprevious

regime.TheQingemperorsandtheKuomintanghad

largelyreliedonelitesandthenlocalstrongmentocollect

taxesandimposeauthoritybelowthecountyordistrict

level;Communistcontrol,ontheotherhand,penetrated

rightdownintovillagesandurbanneighborhoods,where

cadrestranslatedthePartylineintoaction.

Inthecities,theCCPin1949initiallyretainedmanypre‐

PRCofficialsandmuchoftheeconomicinfrastructureinan

attempttopreserveorderduringthetransitionto

Communistrule.However,inaseriesofcampaigns

beginningin1951,thePartyworkedtopurgethe

potentiallydisloyalfromtheurbanscene.Initiallyattacking

‘counterrevolutionaries’,thePartyeventuallymovedto

increaseitsinfluenceoverworkersandtodecimatethe

ranksofthebusinesspeopleandcapitalistswhohad

remainedinChinaafter1949.

Asitextendeditscontroloverthecitiesandthe

countryside,thePartybegantodefineChinesecitizensby

theirsupposed‘classbackgrounds’,dividingthemintopoor

peasants,middlepeasants,richpeasants,landlords,

capitalistsandothersimilarcategories.Althoughsuch

labelingoftencorrelatedwithreality,manyChinese

‘capitalists’werealmostaspoorastheirworkersand

numerousvillagescontainednoreallandlords.Sinceclass

strugglehelpedignitepro‐Partyfervor,theCCPpursuedits

labelingcampaigninspiteoftherelativelackofclassesin

manyareas.Intheprocess,cadresandthe‘masses’often

targetedunpopularresidentsdistrustedforreasonsother

thantheirwealth,includingChristians,formerKMT

membersandJapanesecollaborators(Huang114‐18).

Whether‘richpeasants’,‘landlords’and‘capitalists’ornot,

thesenewlyminted‘classenemies’foundthemselvesand

theirchildrenpermanentlylabeled.Despitethefactthat

manytopleaders,includingMao,DengXiaoping,Liu

ShaoqiandZhouEnlai,werethemselvesthechildrenof

intellectualsor‘richpeasants’,Partyleadersparadedout

classenemiesduringeachnewpoliticalmovement,from

theAnti‐RightistCampaigntotheCulturalRevolution.

These‘enemies’hadnorecourseandsufferednotjust

humiliation,butsometimesphysicalharm.Partyyouth

organizationsrefusedtoadmittheirchildren,whothen

hadlittleornoaccesstohighereducation,certainjobsand

decentland.

ThePartyselectedcadresinlargepartbecauseoftheir

classbackground,asystemthatfavoredformerpoor

peasantsandlaborersinthecountryside.Butreplacingthe

rulingeliteinthevillagesandatotherlevelssimply

creatednewpowerstructures.BecausetheParty

eventuallyconsolidatedlandholdingsintocollectivefarms

andcombinedhouseholdsintoproductionteams,team

leaderswieldedsignificantpowerinrationingresources,

fromscarceclothingandbicyclestoworkpoints.Brigade

heads,whooversawgroupsofproductionteams,also

enjoyedsignificantpowerandinfluenceoverthepeasants

(Oi6‐9).

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Theroleofthesecadresasacriticallinkbetweenthe

centralgovernmentandthepeasantryplacedthemunder

significantpressure,however.Inshort,thepenetrationthe

Communistgovernmenthadachievedcompromisedthe

protectivefunctionoftheadministrativestructurethat

pre‐1949regimeshadcreated.Team,brigadeandother

localleadersprovidedharvestinformationtothecentral

government,whichthendecidedontheamountofsurplus

grainthatbelongedtothestate.Whenpoliticsintervened,

reportingprovedcrucial,particularlyaspoliticalactivism

becameacrucialaspectofcadreperformance.Inthelate

1950s,localandprovincialcadrescaughtupinthefrenzy

oftheearlyGreatLeapForwardgreatlyover‐reported

grainproductionfigures.JeanOihasarguedthatsuch

misinformation,whichcadresinitiallyprovidedto

demonstratethe‘red’characteroftheirproductionteams,

ledtothehugeGreatLeapForwardfamine(91).Asthe

famineprogressed,however,localcadresalsohidgrain

fromthestateastheyattemptedtofeedtheirpeasant

teammembers.Eveninlessdiresituations,teamand

brigadeleadersoftenstruggledtotranslatefaultycentral

policiestoskepticalpeasantsandtoconveypeasant

resistancetohigher‐levelofficials.

Increasingeconomicliberalizationsincethelate1970shas

lessenedstatepenetrationand,tosomedegree,the

powerofcadresoverthelivesofindividuals.Peasantswho

migratetocitiesescapethesupervisionoftheirworkunits,

evenastheylosesomeofthebenefits—suchasschooling

fortheirchildren—thatworkunitregistrationbrings.For

theirpart,cityofficialsmindfuloftheneedforcheaplabor

oftentoleratethepresenceofillegalmigrants,sacrificing

statecontrolforeconomicdevelopment.

Still,theinfluencelocalofficialscontinuetowieldhasled

IntellectualsandtheState

OnMay4,1919,studentsatBeijingUniversityandother

new,Western‐styleschoolsinChinaprotestedagainstthe

signingoftheTreatyofVersaillesendingWorldWarI.

AlthoughChinaandJapanhadbothparticipatedinthe

conflictontheAlliedside,thetreatygaveJapanGermany's

oldconcessionsinthenorthernpartofChinaratherthan

returningthemtotheChinese.TheMaytheFourth

Movement,initiallyapatrioticresponsetothisnational

humiliation,soongrewintoliteraryandpolitical

movementsintentonnationalsalvationandcultural

reform.AsanthropologistHelenSiuhasnoted,‘[T]hat

awakeninginthoughtbroughtwithitastrongsenseof

mission,adeepcommitmenttosociety’(2).Whilethis

commitmenttocultural‘enlightenment’andpolitical

renewalhasdefinedintellectualendeavorssincethattime,

torampantcorruptionandprofiteering.Cadreshaveused

theirinfluenceandconnectionstopurchasestateassets

cheaply,tostealtheproceedsofsuchsalesandtoextract

bribesfrombusinesspeopleenteringtheprivatesector.To

compensatefortheirowncorruption,manyhavealso

leviedexcessfeesonfarmers,studentsandtraders,whose

attemptstoprotestagainstsuchpolicieshavebeen

silencedwithpolicepower.Giventhedegreeoflocaland

provincialcorruption,thecentralgovernmenthas

encounterednumerousdifficultiesinquashingillegal

activitiesatthelowerlevelsofthebureaucracy.

Chinesecitizenshaveenjoyedasomewhatgreatervoicein

theirgovernmentthanintheMaoera,however.Although

directelectionsfortownshipPeople'sCongresseshave

takenplaceinChinasincethe1950s,foralongtimethe

votershadnochoiceofcandidatesandnosecretballot.In

1979,thegovernmentintroducedsecretballotsandsome

competitionforseatsandhasmadecountyPeople's

Congressesdirectlyelectedaswell(Jacobs174).However,

themajorityofcandidatesaregovernment‐sponsored,

oftenretiredcadresorrepresentativesofstate

organizations.Thoseelectedtogovernmentofficeoften

findthattheparallelPartybureaucracycontinuestowield

powerandmakeall‐importantdecisions.Official

enthusiasmforelectionsandsupportofthecampaign

processalsovariesfromplacetoplace,reflectingthe

continueddiscomfortofmanycadreswithprocesses

beyondtheircontrol.Inanycase,Chinesecitizensstillhave

nosayintheselectionofleadersabovethecountylevel.

ithasalsocreatedtensionsbetweenoutspokenChinese

andthesuccessionofgovernmentsthathaveruledthem

duringthetwentiethcentury.

AftertheJapaneseinvasion,manyintellectualssought

refugewiththeCommunists,thegroupmostdedicatedto

fightingtheJapanesearmies.Theintelligentsiainthe

northwestreadilyacceptedtheCommunists’callto

embraceruralcultureandtouseittoremakethemselves

andpromotetheCCPcauseamongthepeasantry(Judd

377).Yetthecosmopolitanism,individualismandWestern

orientationofmanyoftheseintellectualsdisturbedParty

leaders,whoadvocated‘nationalproletarianforms’ofart

andliterature(Cheek28).WriterssuchasWangShiweiand

DingLingcalledforintellectualstoserveascriticsofthe

stateandsociety,whileMaoandotherPartyleaderssaw

theirroleasdoingpropagandaworkandcelebratingthe

Partyandthemasses(Cheek30).Duringhisfamous‘Talks

attheYan’anForumonArtandLiterature’in1942,Mao

outlinedthisroleandcommencedhisRectification

Campaignduringwhichheandotherleaderscriticizedand

punishedWang,Dingandotherwritersandartists.

Althoughmembersoftheintelligentsiafellintoline,similar

problemscontinuedtobesettherelationshipbetweenthe

Partyandintellectualsafter1949.Inthenewclasssystem

theCommunistscreated,themost‘red’groupswere

workersandpoorpeasants.Intellectuals,or‘experts’,did

haveaplaceinthisorder—China'sdesperateneedfor

well‐educatedspecialiststoassistinitsdevelopment

ensuredthis—andthousandsofChineseintellectualswho

hadleftthecountryduringitsyearsofchaosreturned

after1949toassistinrebuildingthenation.Atthesame

time,intellectuals'classbackgroundswerenowconsidered

suspect;manyhadcomefromrelativelyprosperous

bourgeoisfamilieswiththeresourcestoeducatethem,

andothershadattendeduniversitiesincapitalistcountries

suchastheUnitedStates.Partypoliciesoftenisolatedand

demoralizedintellectuals,whounderwentintense

indoctrinationinMarxismandMaoistthoughtintheearly

yearsofthePRC.Aspoliticsshiftedleftward,writers,

artistsandother‘thoughtworkers’oftenbecametargets

ofcriticismforpastwork.Thosewhoveeredtoofarfrom

thePartylinesimilarlyfacedpunishmentandfound

themselves‘sentdown’tothecountrysidetolearnfrom

thepeasants.

DifferentfactionsintheCCPdebatedtheroleof

intellectualsduringthe1950s,withseveralPartyleaders,

includingMaohimself,advocatingbettertreatmentof

citizenswithsuspectbackgroundsinanattemptto

Page 7: Modern China - Quantum History

improvedevelopmentandencourageTaiwantoseek

reunification(Spence567).In1956,duringaParty

conference,Maoparaphrasedatraditionalsayingwhenhe

calledfor‘lettingonehundredflowersbloom,one

hundredschoolsofthoughtcontend’—inessence,inviting

PartymembersandotherChinesetocommentonand

critiqueCCPpolicies.Bymid‐1957,intellectualswere

openlycriticizingPartyshortcomingsandcomplaining

aboutunfairbureaucraticpractices,small‐mindedcadres

andharshpolicies.ButtheoppositionofPartyleaderswho

hadneversupportedtheHundredFlowerscampaign

compelledMaotobackawayfromthenewopenness.Ina

swiftlycommenced‘anti‐rightist’campaign,theParty

labeledmorethanaquartermillionintellectuals‘rightists’.

TheCCPsentmanydowntothecountrysideforyearsand

jailedothers,andthe‘rightist’labelthatremainedinthe

filesofallruinedtheircareers.

Forthenation'sintellectuals,theaftermathoftheHundred

Flowerscampaignsignaledthebeginningofaperiodin

which‘red’trumped‘expert’,regardlessofnationalneed.

Leadingintellectualfigures,includingliterarynotableswho

hadsupportedtheCommunistsduringthecivilwar,

becamemajortargetsoftheCulturalRevolution,asdid

traditionallearningitself.RedGuardsburnedlibraries,

destroyedartworkandwreckedhistoricbuildings.Jiang

Qingandheralliesurgedthedestructionoftraditional

cultureandpromoteddreary‘modeloperas’andfiction

thatuncriticallycelebratedthemasses.

Inadditiontodemoralizingandpunishingthousandsof

educatedpeople,Partyleadersalsostuntedthenation's

educationalsystem.Elementaryandsecondaryschools

shutdownforthefirstyearsoftheCulturalRevolution,

whileRedGuardsviciouslyattackedandevenkilledmany

teachers,professorsandculturalworkers.Afterthe

primaryandsecondaryschoolsreopened,Partyleaders

limitedstudents'readingmaterialstoMarxisttractsand

theteachingsofMao.Universities,whichclosedin1966,

remainedshuttereduntilthemid‐1970s,leavinganentire

generationofChinesewithnoaccesstohighereducation.

TheCCPalsosentdownthousandsmoreeducatedpeople

tothecountrysidetolearnfromthepeasantsandleave

behindtheir‘bourgeoisintellectual’ways.

AfterthedeathofMao,theCommunistPartypublicly

rehabilitatedmanyoftheintellectualsvilifiedduringthe

1950sand1960s,includingelderlywritersandartistswho

hadparticipatedintheoriginalMaytheFourthMovement.

DengXiaopingallowedChineseuniversitygraduatesto

travelabroadforfurthereducation,despiterealistic

expectationsthatfewwouldreturnhome.Professorsalso

revampeduniversitycurriculaandremovedmuchofthe

Maoistliteraturethathadbeenastapleoftheschools

sincethe1960s.

Theensuingthawencouragedmanyintellectualsto

critiquestatepolicies,somethingDengandotherofficials

initiallyallowed.Butaswritersandartiststurnedtheir

attentionfromMaoistexcessestocontemporaryproblems

suchascorruptionandlackofdemocracyinChina,they

lostthesupportofthePartyleadership.Atthreepoints—

1979,1986and1989—thestatecrushedtheprotestsof

intellectualsandworkerscallingforgreateropennessand

democracy.

Partyleadershavecontinuedtomaintainatightreinon

intellectualcritiquestheyconsidersuspectandhave

struggledwithdissidentstudentsandintellectuals

attemptingtocastthemselvesaslegitimateheirstothe

MaytheFourthtradition.Morerecently,thePartyhas

workedassiduouslytocontroltheflowofinformationin

Chinesesocietyandtoquietcriticismbyarrestingscholars

andbusinesspeopleonvaguechargesofspreadingstate

secrets.ButtheParty'scommitmenttoinformation

controlhascreatedtensionsbetweencadresand

capitalists,whorequireandexpecttransparencyandthe

freeflowofdataandnews.Alreadypublishersand

newspapersforcedtobeself‐supportinginthemarket

economyhavecreatednewintellectualchallengestothe

authorityoftheParty,ashavenewtechnologiessuchas

theInternet.

MaoZedongfromTheOxfordCompaniontoPoliticsoftheWorld

Byallreasonablestandardsofhistoricaljudgment,MaoZedong

mustbecountedamongthehalf‐dozenmostimportantpolitical

actorsinmodernworldhistory.Maowastheacknowledged

leaderofthegreatestandmostpopularofmodernrevolutions.

Andalmostuniqueamongrevolutionaryleaders,heremained

thedominantfigureinthepost‐revolutionaryregimeformore

thanaquarterofacentury,presidingoverthebeginningsofthe

modernindustrialtransformationoftheworld'smostpopulous

land.Certainlynooneinfluencedmoreprofoundly,forbetteror

forworse,thelivesofmorepeoplethandidMaoZedongby

virtueofhisperson,hispower,hispolicies,andhisthought.

Thesonofarichpeasant,MaoZedongwasborninthevillageof

ShaoshaninHunanprovinceon26December1893.Duringhis

earlyyears,theoldimperialChineseorderwasrapidly

disintegrating,radicalreformistandrevolutionarymovements

wererising,andnewlyintroducedWesternideasandideologies

wereunderminingfaithintraditionalvaluesandbeliefs.

AlthoughtheyoungMaobecamewellversedinclassicalChinese

textsandretainedastrongattachmenttocertainaspectsof

tradition(especiallyhistoricalnovelsandpoetry),hesoon

becamecaughtupintheradicalpoliticalandiconoclastic

intellectualcurrentsthatsweptChinesecitiesintheyears

precedingandfollowingtheRevolutionof1911thatoverthrew

theimperialsystem.Asastudentatthemiddleandnormal

schoolsintheprovincialcapitalofChangshaduringtheyears

1913–1918,MaoeagerlyassimilatedabroadrangeofWestern

ideas,brieflypursuedacareerasateacher,andembarkedupon

hislifelongcareerasapoliticalorganizer,establishingthe"New

People'sStudySociety",oneofthemoreimportantofthelocal

groupsthatweretoprovesopoliticallyandideologically

instrumentalinthemakingoftheradicalMayFourthMovement

of1919.InChangsha,MaobecameinvolvedwithNewYouth

magazine,thatextraordinarilyinfluentialwesternizingand

iconoclasticjournalofthenewintelligentsiathatmoldedthe

ideasofawholegenerationofmodernChinesepoliticaland

intellectualleaders.ItwasinNewYouththatMao'sfirst

publishedarticleappearedin1917,AStudyofPhysicalCulture,

whichcombinedanardentChinesenationalismwithanoless

ardentrejectionoftraditionalChineseculture—inthisinstance

anattackontheConfucianseparationbetweenmentaland

manuallabor.ItwasauniquelymodernChinesecombinationof

nationalismandculturaliconoclasmthatverymuchreflected

theradicalspiritofthetimesandonethatwastoremaina

prominentfeatureoftheMaoistvision.

CommunistChina,1949‐.ProQuest.HistoryStudyCenter.ProQuestLLC.28Aug.2009<http://www.historystudycenter.com/>.

Page 8: Modern China - Quantum History

Inlate1918,MaoZedongleftChangshaforBeijing.

BeijingUniversityhadthenbecomethecenterof

radicalChineseintellectualandpoliticallife.Under

theinfluenceofradicalintellectualsandtheir

activiststudentfollowers,Maobecameincreasingly

politicized.Eventhoughhewasunabletoenrollas

aregularstudent,heworkedasanassistant

librarianattheuniversityandwasfirstintroduced

toMarxisttheoryinthewinterof1918–19asa

memberofalooselyorganizedMarxiststudy

group.ButMaodidnotbecomeanimmediate

converttoMarxism.Helaterdescribedhisideasat

thetimeasa"curiousmixture"ofWestern

liberalism,democraticreformism,andutopian

socialismoranarchism.Itwasonlyafterhisreturn

toChangshainthesummerof1919,underthe

influenceoftheincreasinglyradicalandfiercely

nationalisticcurrentsthenrisinginChina,thatMao

begantobeattractedtothepoliticalmessageof

theRussianRevolutionanditsaccompanying

LeninistversionofMarxism.

YetMarxianinfluencesarebynomeansapparent

inMao'sprolificwritingsandfreneticpolitical

activitiesduringthewinterof1919–20.Rather,

whatismostclearlyevidentisapowerfulpopulist

strainthatcelebratestheorganicunityand

inherentrevolutionarypotentialoftheChinese

people.Alsocelebrated,againintypicallypopulist

fashion,wasabeliefintheadvantagesof

backwardness.AlthoughtheChinesepeoplehad

beenoppressedandmadeimpotentfor"thousands

ofyears,"Maowroteinhismaintreatiseofthe

periodentitledTheGreatUnionofthePopular

Masses,thishistoricbackwardnesspromisedgreat

politicaladvantagesforthefuture—for,ashe

confidentlyputit,"thatwhichhasaccumulatedfor

alongtimewillsurelyburstforthquickly."These

populist‐typebeliefsweretoremainenduring

characteristicsoftheMaoistmentality,profoundly

influencingMao'sreceptionandreinterpretationof

Marxism.

MaoZedong'sactualconversiontoMarxism,

accordingtohisowntestimony,occurredonlyinthe

summerof1920,followingdiscussionswithoneof

hispoliticalmentorsinShanghai.Hethenplunged

intoorganizationalactivities,workingtoestablisha

laborunionforminersinhisnativeprovinceof

HunanandorganizingasmallCommunistgroupin

Changsha,oneofseveralsuchlocalgroupsin

variouspartsofthecountry(andamongChinese

studentsstudyingabroad)whichcoalescedintothe

ChineseCommunistParty.Maowasoneofthe

thirteendelegateswhoattendedtheparty's

foundingcongress,secretlyconvenedinShanghaiin

July1921.

Duringthefirst,urban‐basedphaseoftheparty's

history(1921–1927),andespeciallyduringthe

periodoftheSoviet‐fashionedCommunist‐

Nationalistanti‐warlordalliance(1924–1927),Mao's

populistproclivitiesincreasinglydrewhimfromthe

citiestothecountryside—andfromtheproletariat

tothepeasantry.Maowasnottheonly,northe

first,ChineseCommunisttodiscoverthe

revolutionarypotentialitiesofthepeasantry,buthe

didofcourseprovetobethemostimportant.

Duringtheyears1925–1927,hedevotedthegreater

portionofhisprodigiousenergiestodetailed

investigationsofruralsocioeconomicconditions,to

theorganizationofpeasantassociations,and(under

Nationalistauspices)tothetrainingofapeasant

organizationalcadre.Mao'spopulistimpulsesfound

theirfullestexpressionneartheendofthisperiodin

hisfamousReportonanInvestigationofthe

PeasantMovementinHunan,publishedearlyin

1927.Here,inwhatisperhapsthemostpristine

expressionofwhatlatercametobeknownas

"Maoism,"theyoungMaocelebratedthe

spontaneityofpeasantrevolt,anelementalforce

thathedescribedasatornadoandahurricane,one

"soextraordinarilyswiftandviolentthatnopower,

howevergreat,willbeabletosuppressit."Maonot

onlylookedtothepeasantryasthepopularbaseof

theChineseRevolution;healsoattributedto

peasantsthemselvesallthoseelementsof

revolutionarycreativityandstandardsofpolitical

judgmentthatorthodoxMarxist‐Leninistsreserved

fortheCommunistParty.ForMao,itwasnotthe

partythatwastojudgetherevolutionarycapacities

ofthepeasantry,butratherpeasantswhowereto

judgetherevolutionarysufficiencyoftheparty.

Throughout,thedocumentemphasized,inmost

non‐Leninistfashion,thecreativerevolutionary

worksthatthepeasantswereaccomplishingon

theirownandexpressedhostilitytoallexternal

organizationalrestraints.

The"HunanReport,"sohereticalfromanorthodox

Marxist‐Leninistpointofview,nodoubtwouldhave

earnedMaohisexpulsionfromtheChinese

CommunistPartyhaditnotbeenforthecollapseof

theCommunist‐Nationalistalliancejustweeksafter

thepublicationofthedocument.Itwasinearly

April1927thatChiangKai‐shekturnedhisarmyto

thetaskofdestroyingtheCommunistsandtheir

urban‐basedmassorganizations.Therelativelyfew

Communistswhosurvivedthecounterrevolutionary

carnageweredrivenfromthecitiesandsought

refugeinthemoreremoteareasofthecountryside.

ThetiebetweentheCommunistPartyandthe

urbanworkingclasswasseveredandwastoremain

brokenuntil1949.Theconfinementofthe

revolutiontotheruralareaswastheessential

conditionthatpermittedMao'spoliticalascendancy

intheCommunistPartyandtheemergenceof

"Maoism"asthedominantChineseversionof

Marxism.

TheriseofMaoZedongtopartyleadershipinthe

mid‐1930swasaccomplishedonlyafteralongand

bitterstruggleagainstaMoscow‐supportedfaction

ofChineseCommunists—andindirectdefianceof

Stalin.DuringtheentireStalinisteraoftheworld

Communistmovement,Maowastheonlyleaderof

aCommunistpartytoachieveleadershipwithout

theblessingsoftheSovietdictator.TheChinese

party'sdefactoindependenceofMoscowsowed

oneoftheseedsofthelaterSino‐Sovietdispute.

TheYananera(1935–1945)—socalledafterthe

areainremotenorthwestChinawherethe

Communistsestablishedabaseareatoescape

annihilationbyChiangKai‐shek'sNationalist

forces—wastheheroicand

decisivephaseinthe

historyoftheChinese

Communistrevolution—

anditwasundoubtedly

Mao'sfinesthourasa

revolutionaryleaderand

militarystrategist.Under

Mao'sleadershipand

throughacombinationof

popularnationalistand

socialrevolutionary

programs,theChinese

Communistswonenormous

popularsupport,especially

amongthepeasantryof

northChina,theessential

basisfortheireventual

victoryoverthe

Nationalists.Duringthe

Yananerathedistinctive

ChinesevariantofMarxism‐

Leninism(canonizedas

"MaoZedongThought")

crystallizedasaformal

bodyofdoctrine.Itwasan

ideologymarkedby

powerfulnationalist,

populist,andvoluntaristic

impulsesthatgreatlymodifiedtheinherited

corpusofMarxist‐Leninisttheory.Indeed,

"Maoism"implicitlydefineditself,inlarge

measure,byitsdeparturesfromthemain

premisesofMarxisttheory.Itwasadoctrinethat

rejectedtheMarxistorthodoxythatcapitalismis

anecessaryandprogressivephaseinhistorical

developmentandthustheessentialprerequisite

forsocialism.Accordingly,Maoismrejectedthe

Marxistfaithintheindustrialproletariatasthe

necessarybearerofthenewsociety,instead

lookingtothepeasantryasthetrulycreative

revolutionaryclassinthemodernworld.Further,

MaoisminvertedtheMarxistconceptionofthe

relationshipbetweentownandcountrysidein

themakingofmodernhistory,rejectingthe

MarxistandLeninistassumptionthatthecityis

thesourceandsiteofsocio‐historicalprogress.

AndreflectingthelackofanyrealMarxistfaithin

objectivelawsofhistoricaldevelopment,Maoism

placedadecisiveemphasisontheroleofhuman

willandconsciousnessinmoldingsocialreality.

Suchweresomeoftheessentialintellectualand

ideologicalpreconditionsfortheMaoist‐led

ChineseRevolution,whichtookthehistorically

unprecedentedformofharnessingthe

revolutionaryenergiesofthepeasantryinthe

countrysideto"surroundandoverwhelm"the

conservativecities.Thatuniquerevolutionary

process,withanow‐semi‐sacredMaoZedongas

itsunquestionedleader,culminatedin1949when

theRedArmydefeatedthenumericallysuperior

armiesofChiangKai‐shek'sNationalists—and

peasantsoldiersvictoriouslymarchedintothe

citiesto"liberate"anurbanworkingclassthathad

beenmostlypoliticallypassivesincethedefeatsof

1927.Onthebasisofthatvictory,thePeople's

RepublicofChinawasformallyestablishedon1

October1949,unifyingChinaafteracenturyof

disintegrationandhumiliation.In1949Maostood

highatoptheGateofHeavenlyPeace

("Tiananmen"),appearingasbothnational

liberatorandsocialistprophet.

Page 9: Modern China - Quantum History

MaoZedongdominatedthehistoryofthePeople'sRepublicfor

morethanaquarterofacentury,untilhisdeathinSeptember

1976,justashehaddominatedthehistoryoftherural‐based

revolutionthathadproducedthenewcommunistparty‐state.

Muchofwhatisuniqueanddistinctiveaboutboththegeneral

patternandthespecificeventsofChina'sturbulentpost‐

revolutionaryhistorymustbecreditedto—orblamedupon—the

leadershipofMaoZedong.Rarelyinworldhistoryhasanentire

historicalerabeensodeeplystampedbythepersonalityofa

singleindividual.

InconsideringthethoughtandpoliciesofMaoZedongover"the

Maoera"(1949–1976),oneisstruckbyseveralenduring

themes.First,itisaperiodanimatedbythenotionof

"permanentrevolution."AlthoughtheMaoisttheoryof

permanent(later"continuous")revolutionwasnotexplicitlyset

forthaspartof"MaoZedongThought"until1958,theessential

componentsofthenotionwerepresentfromtheoutset—an

impatiencewithhistorythatexpresseditselfinanambivalent

attitudetowardtheMarxistassumptionthatsocialism

presupposedcapitalism;aburningdeterminationtopass

throughtheMarxian‐defined"stages"ofhistoryinthemost

rapidpossiblefashion;anardentfaiththatpeoplearmedwith

theproperwillandspiritcanmoldsocialrealityinaccordance

withthedictatesoftheirconsciousness,regardlessofthe

materialcircumstancesinwhichtheyfindthemselves,and

indeedatendencytoextoltheadvantagesofbackwardnessas

suchfortheadvancementofsocialism.Thelatternotionwasto

finditsmostextremeexpressioninMao'scelebrationofthe

allegedChinesevirtuesofbeing"poorandblank."

Thisutopianimpulsetoescapetheburdensofhistory

manifesteditselfinthebrevityofthe"bourgeois"or"New

Democratic"phaseofthehistoryofthePeople'sRepublic,

essentiallyterminatedattheendof1952withtheproclamation

ofthebeginningoftheperiodof"thetransitiontosocialism."It

furtherrevealeditselfinthe1955–1956campaigntocollective

agriculture,accomplishedinlittlemorethanayear.Anditfound

itsmostfulsomeexpressioninthedisastrousGreatLeap

Forwardcampaignof1958–1960,whoseutopianideology

envisionedaspirituallymobilizedpopulacesimultaneously

bringingaboutthefull‐scalemodernizationofChinaandits

transitionfromsocialismtocommunismwithinafewshort

decades.

ApopulistmodificationofLeninismisanotherstrikingly

pervasivefeatureofMaoZedong'spost‐revolutionarytheory

andpractice,onemanifestationofwhichwasacontinuous

tensionbetweenthepersonandpersonaofMao,ontheone

hand,andtheinstitutionoftheChineseCommunistParty,onthe

other.Thetensionoriginatedwiththe"HunanReport"of1927

whenMaodrewasharpdichotomybetweentherevolutionary

spontaneityofthepeasantmassesandtheconservative

restraintsthatpoliticalparties(andintellectuals)attemptedto

imposeuponthem.Asimilardichotomyreappearsafter1949,

withMaopresentinghimselfnotsimplyasthechairmanofthe

CommunistPartybutalsoastheembodimentofthepopularwill

strugglingagainsttheconservatismofanincreasingly

bureaucraticizedpartyapparatus.ThistensionbetweenMaothe

leaderandtheinstitutionheleddramaticallyrevealeditselfin

July1955whenMaopersonallyoverrodethecollectivedecisions

ofthepartyleadershipandappealeddirectlyto"thepeople"in

launchingtheaccelerated

campaignforagricultural

collectivization.Itisalso

apparentinthe"Hundred

Flowers"campaignof

1956–1957whenMao

encouragednonparty

intellectualstocriticizethe

CommunistPartyfrom

without.Andthetension

culminatedintheCultural

Revolution,whichbegan

(butdidnotend)withthe

extraordinaryMaoistcall

forthemassestorebel

againsttheauthorityofthe

partyanditsorganizations.

Perhapsthemost

distinguishingfeatureof

thepost‐revolutionary

MaoZedongwashis

historicallyunique(if

ultimatelyunsuccessful)

attempttoreconcilethe

meansofmoderneconomicdevelopmentwiththeendsof

socialism.RejectingtheinheritedStalinistorthodoxythatthe

combinationofrapidindustrializationwithstateownershipof

themeansofproductionwouldmoreorlessautomatically

guaranteeeverhigherstagesofsocialismandeventually

communism,Maoemphasizedthatthecontinuoussocialist

transformationofhumanbeingsandtheirsocialrelationswas

essentialiftheprocessofmoderneconomicdevelopmentwere

tohaveasocialistoutcome.Thissocialradicalismwas

responsible,inpart,fortheadventuresoftheGreatLeapandthe

CulturalRevolution—andMaoZedongmustbearthehistorical

andmoralresponsibilityfortheenormoustollofdeathand

sufferingthatresultedfromtheseextraordinaryevents,

howeverunintendedthoseresultsmayhavebeen.ButMaoist

socialradicalismalsoservedtoforestallthefullyStalinist

institutionalizationofthepost‐revolutionaryorderinChinaand

perhapsservedtokeepalive,amongsome,thehopeforthe

eventualrealizationoftheultimatesocialistgoalsthatthe

revolutionpromised.Itcertainlykeptthepost‐revolutionary

orderinflux,providingMao'ssuccessors,includingDeng

Xiaoping,withconsiderableflexibilityforchartinganewcourse

ofdevelopment.

TheconventionalviewoftheMaoeraisthatMaoZedong

sacrificedmoderneconomicdevelopmentto"ideologicalpurity"

inavainandcostlyquest

forsomesortofsocialist

utopia.Yettheactual

historicalrecordoftheera

suggeststhatMaowas

moresuccessfulasan

economicmodernizerthan

asabuilderofsocialism.

OvertheMaoperiod

(1949–1976),Chinawas

transformedfroma

primarilyagrariannationto

arelativelyindustrialized

one,theratioofthevalue

ofindustrialproductionto

totalproductionincreasing

from30to72percent.

From1952(when

industrialoutputwas

restoredtoitshighest

prewarlevels)untilthe

closeoftheMaoera,

Chineseindustrygrewat

anaverageannualrateof

11percent,themostrapid

paceofindustrializationachievedbyanymajornation

(developedordeveloping)duringthattime.Indeed,Maoist

industrialization,howevercrudetheprocesswasinmany

respects,comparesfavorablywithcomparabledecadesinthe

industrializationofGermany,Japan,andtheSovietUnion,

hithertogenerallyregardedasthethreemostsuccessfulcases

ofmodernizationamongmajor"latecomers"ontheworld

industrialscene.

RapidindustrializationduringtheMaoperiodexactedenormous

humanandsocialcosts,ashadbeenthecasewithotherlate‐

industrializingcountries,andmostofthecostswereborneby

thepeasantry.Agriculturalproductionbarelykeptpacewith

populationgrowth,andlivingstandardsinbothtownand

countrysidelargelystagnatedafter1957asthestateextracted

mostofthesurplusproducttofinancethedevelopmentofheavy

industry.Yetalthoughtheblunders,deficiencies,inequalities,

andimbalancesthatmarkedandmarredtheprocessweremany

andgrave,futurehistoriansneverthelesswillrecordtheMaoera

asthetimewhenthebasicfoundationsforChina'smodern

industrialismwerelaid.

FarmorequestionablethanMao'sstatusasamodernizerishis

reputationasthecreatorofasocialistsociety.Forwhatismost

strikinglyabsentinbothMaoisttheoryandpracticeisthe

elementalMarxistprinciplethatsocialismmustbeasystem

wherebytheimmediateproducersthemselvesdemocratically

controltheproductsandconditionsoftheirlabor.IntheMaoist

system,bycontrast,thecontroloflaboranditsfruitswasleftin

thehandsofaneverlargerandmorealienbureaucratic

apparatus.Mao,tobesure,repeatedlyconductedanti‐

bureaucraticcampaigns,andthereisnoreasontodoubtthe

genuinenessofhisantipathytobureaucracy.Butfromthose

campaigns,hetimeandagainfailedtodeviseanyviablemeans

ofpopulardemocraticcontroloverthepowerfulbureaucratic

apparatusoverwhichheuneasilypresided.AndifMaobroke,at

leastinsomesignificantways,withtheStaliniststrategyof

socioeconomicdevelopment,inthepoliticalrealmtheMaoist

regimeretainedessentiallyStalinistmethodsofbureaucraticrule

andconsistentlysuppressedallformsofintellectualandpolitical

dissentinStalinistfashion.TheMaoerawasthusmarkedbya

deepincongruitybetweenitsprogressivesocioeconomic

accomplishmentsanditsretrogressivepoliticalfeatures,an

incongruitythatprecludedanygenuinesocialistreorganizationof

Chinesesociety.

TheMaoerainthehistoryofthePeople'sRepublicwasoneof

themostturbulentperiodsinmodernworldhistory,andit

remainsoneofthemostcontroversial.Whenthepolitical

passionsengenderedbytheerahavesubsided,mostfuture

historianswilllikelyevaluateMaoZedongmuchinthefashionin

whichheisnowideologicallyportrayedbyhissuccessorsin

Beijing.Firstandforemost,MaowillbelaudedasmodernChina's

greatestnationalist,theleaderofarevolutionwhoseenduring

achievementwastobringnationalunificationandindependence

totheworld'smostpopulousland—afteracenturyofrepeated

internalpoliticalfailuresandgraveexternalimpingements.Mao

willalsobeseenasagreatmodernizerwho,despitemonumental

postrevolutionaryblunders,presidedovertheinitialmodern

industrialtransformationofoneoftheworld'smosteconomically

backwardlands,inauguratingalengthyprocessdestined

eventuallytomakeChinaagreatworldpower.Ultimately,Mao

Page 10: Modern China - Quantum History

Zedong'sroleasapioneerofsocialismwillreceiveless

attentionandwillappearfarmoreproblematicthanhislegacy

asanationalistmodernizer.

Meisner,Maurice.TheOxfordCompaniontoPoliticsoftheWorld‐MaoZedong.2009.16August2009<http://www.oxfordreference.com/pages/samplep02.html>.

BenjaminI.Schwartz,ChineseCommunismandtheRiseofMao

(Cambridge,Mass.,1958).

MaoTse‐Tung[MaoZedong],SelectedWorksofMaoTse‐Tung,5vols.

(Beijing,1967–1977).

RossTerrill,Mao:ABiography,2ded.(Stanford,2000).

MauriceMeisner,Marxism,Maoism,andUtopianism:EightEssays

(Madison,Wis.,1982).StuartSchram,TheThoughtofMaoTse‐Tung

(Cambridge,U.K.,1989).

JonathanSpence,MaoZedong(NewYork,1999).

FromTheOxfordCompaniontoPoliticsoftheWorld

MaoZedong

Hisruthlessvisionunitedafracturedpeopleandinspired

revolutionsfarbeyondChina'sborders

ByJONATHAND.SPENCE

MaoZedonglovedtoswim.Inhisyouth,headvocated

swimmingasawayofstrengtheningthebodiesofChinese

citizens,andoneofhisearliestpoemscelebratedthejoysof

beatingawakethroughthewaves.Asayoungman,heandhis

closefriendswouldoftenswiminlocalstreamsbeforethey

debatedtogetherthemyriadchallengesthatfacedtheirnation.

Butespeciallyafter1955,whenhewasinhisearly60sandat

theheightofhispoliticalpowerasleaderoftheChinese

People'sRepublic,swimmingbecameacentralpartofhislife.

Heswamsoofteninthelargepoolconstructedforthetop

partyleadersintheircloselyguardedcompoundthattheothers

eventuallylefthimasthepool'ssoleuser.Heswamintheoften

stormyoceanoffthenorthChinacoast,whentheCommunist

Partyleadershipgatheredthereforitsannualconferences.And,

despitethepleadingsofhissecurityguardsandhisphysician,he

swamintheheavilypollutedriversofsouthChina,driftingmiles

downstreamwiththecurrent,headback,stomachintheair,

handsandlegsbarelymoving,unfazedbytheglobsofhuman

wasteglidinggentlypast."Maybeyou'reafraidofsinking,"he

wouldchidehiscompanionsiftheybegantopanicinthewater.

"Don'tthinkaboutit.Ifyoudon'tthinkaboutit,youwon'tsink.

Ifyoudo,youwill."

Maowasageniusatnotsinking.Hisenemieswerelegion:

militarists,whoresentedhisjournalisticbarbsattheir

incompetence;partyrivals,whofoundhimtoozealousa

supporteroftheunitedfrontwiththeKuomintangnationalists;

landlords,whohatedhispro‐peasantrhetoricandactivism;

ChiangKai‐shek,whoattackedhisruralstrongholdswith

relentlesstenacity;theJapanese,whotriedtosmashhis

northernbase;theU.S.,aftertheChineseenteredtheKorean

War;theSovietUnion,whenheattackedKhrushchev'santi‐

Stalinistpolicies.Maowasequallyunsinkableintheturmoil—

muchofwhichhepersonallyinstigated—thatmarkedthelast

20yearsofhisruleinChina.

Maowasbornin1893,intoaChinathatappearedtobefalling

apart.ThefadingQindynastycouldnotcontainthespiraling

socialandeconomicunrest,andhadmortgagedChina's

revenuesandmanyofitsnaturalresourcestotheapparently

insatiableforeignpowers.Itwas,Maolatertoldhisbiographer

EdgarSnow,atimewhen"thedismembermentofChina"

seemedimminent,andonlyheroicactionsbyChina'syouth

couldsavetheday.

Mao'searliestsurvivingessay,writtenwhenhewas19,wason

oneofChina'smostcelebratedearlyexponentsofcynicismand

realpolitik,thefearsome4thcenturyB.C.administratorShang

Yang.MaotookShangYang'sexperiencesasemblematicof

China'scrisis.ShangYanghadinstitutedasetofruthlessly

enforcedlaws,designed"topunishthewickedandrebellious,in

ordertopreservetherightsofthepeople."Thatthepeople

continuedtofearShangYangwasprooftoMaotheywere

"stupid."MaoattributedthisfearanddistrustnottoShang

Yang'spoliciesbuttotheperceptionofthosepolicies:"Atthe

beginningofanythingoutoftheordinary,themassofthepeople

alwaysdislikeit."

AfterthecommunistvictoryoverChiangKai‐shekin1949,and

theestablishmentofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,Mao's

positionwasimmeasurablystrengthened.Despiteallthatthe

Chinesepeoplehadendured,itseemsnottohavebeentoohard

forMaotopersuadethemofthevisionaryforceandpractical

needfortheGreatLeapForwardofthelate1950s.InMao's

mind,theintensivemarshalingofChina'senergieswoulddraw

manualandmentallabortogetherintoafinalharmonious

synthesisandthrowabridgeacrossthechasmofChina'spoverty

tothepromisedsocialistparadiseontheotherside.

InFebruary1957,MaodrewhisthoughtsonChinatogetherin

theformofaramblingspeechon"TheCorrectHandlingof

ContradictionsAmongthePeople."Mao'snotesforthespeech

revealthecuriousmixtureofjocularityandcruelty,ofutopian

visionsandblinkeredperceptions,thatlayattheheartofhis

character.Maoadmittedthat15%ormoreoftheChinesepeople

werehungryandthatsomecriticsfelta"disgust"withMarxism.

Hespoketooofthehundredsofthousandswhohaddiedinthe

revolutionsofar,butfirmlyrebuttedfigures—quotedinHong

Kongnewspapers—that20millionhadperished."Howcouldwe

possiblykill20millionpeople?"heasked.Itisnowestablished

thatatleastthatnumberdiedinChinaduringthefaminethat

followedtheGreatLeapbetween1959and1961.IntheCultural

Revolutionthatfollowedonlyfiveyearslater,Maousedthearmy

andthestudentpopulationagainsthisopponents.Onceagain

millionssufferedorperishedasMaocombinedtheruthlessness

ofShangYangwiththeabsoluteconfidenceofthelong‐distance

swimmer.

Rejectinghisformerpartyallies,andanyonewhocouldbe

accusedofespousingthevaluesofanolderandmoregracious

Chinesecivilization,Maodrewhissustenancefromthechanting

crowdsofRedGuards.Theironyherewasthatfromhis

youthfulreadings,MaoknewthestoryofhowShangYanglate

inlifetriedtowooamoraladministratortohisservice.Butthe

officialturneddownShangYang'sblandishments,withthe

wordsthat"1,000personsgoing'Yes,yes!'arenotworthone

manwithabold'No!'"

Maodiedin1976,andwiththeyearsthoseadulatorycriesof

"Yes,yes!"havegraduallyfaded.LeadersMaotrained,likeDeng

Xiaoping,wereabletoreverseMao'spoliciesevenasthey

claimedtoreverethem.TheygavebacktotheChinesepeople

theopportunitiestoexpresstheirentrepreneurialskills,leading

toastonishingratesofgrowthandacompletetransformation

ofthefaceofChinesecities.

Arethesechanges,thesemovestowardanewflexibility,

somehowMao'slegacy?Despitetheagonyhecaused,Maowas

bothavisionaryandarealist.Helearnedasayouthnotonly

howShangYangbroughtharshlawstotheChinesepeople,

evenwhentheysawnoneedforthem,butalsohowShang

Yang'srigorshelpedlaythefoundationin221B.C.ofthe

fearsomecentralizingstateofQin.MaoknewtoothattheQin

rulershadbeenbothhatedandfearedandthattheirdynasty

wassoontoppled,despiteitsmonopolyofforceandefficient

useofterror.Butinhisfinalyears,Maoseemstohave

welcomedtheassociationofhisownnamewiththesedistant

Qinprecursors.TheQin,afterall,hadestablishedaunitedstate

fromauniverseinchaos.Theyrepresented,likeMao,notthe

bestthatChinahadtooffer,butsomethingruthlessyetcanny,

withthepowerbrieflytoimposeasinglewillonthescattered

emotionsoftheerrantmultitude.Itisonthatgrimlystructured

foundationthatMao'ssuccessorshavebeenabletobuild,even

astheystruggle,withobviousnervousness,tocontainthesocial

pressuresthattheirownmoreopenpoliciesaregenerating.

SurelyMao'ssimplewordsreverberateintheirears:Aslongas

youarenotafraid,youwon'tsink.

JonathanSpenceteachesatYaleandistheauthorofseveral

acclaimedbooksonChina

Spence,Jonathan.TimeMagazineTop100.2009.16August2009

Page 11: Modern China - Quantum History

CIVILWARINCHINA

TheuseoftwoatomicbombsbytheAmericansagainstJapaninAugust1945endedthewarsoonerthananyoneinChinaexpected.ChiangKaishekreturnedintriumphtoNanjinginthefallof1945,butsoontheebullientmoodinChinawasmutedbywhateveryoneknewwasonthehorizon:thefinalshowdownbetweentheNationalistsandtheCommunists.

ForatimetheAmericanstriedtomediateinChinaandpreventcivilwar.This,however,turnedouttobeanimpossibilitybecauseeachsidewasdeterminedtodefeattheotherandwasnotsincerelyinterestedinanysortofreconciliation.Atthesametime,however,bothsidesattemptedtocurryfavorwiththeUnitedStatesandtriedtohumortheidealisticAmericandiplomatswhosoughttoreconciletheNationalistsandtheCommunists.TheU.S.governmentwassympatheticwiththeNationalistsforthesimplereasonthatChiangKai‐shek’sregimewasalmostuniversallyrecognizedasChina’sgovernmentatthetime.

ImmediatelyafterJapan’ssurrender,AmericandiplomatPatrickHurley,acantankerousandapparentlyprematurelysenileman,triedtogetthetwosidestogethertoconductdiscussions.YieldingtoU.S.pressure,ChiangKai‐shekinvitedMaotoChongqing,butMaobalkedbecausehefearedaKMTtrap.AfterHurleygavetheassurancesoftheU.S.governmentthattherewouldbenotrap,MaoboardedanairplaneforthefirsttimeinhislifeandflewfromYan’antoChongqinginmid‐August1945.Sixweeksoftalksyieldednopracticalresults,however,andMaowentbacktoYan’andeterminedtoprepareforall‐outwarwithChiangKai‐shek.HurleyreturnedtotheUnitedStatesadiscouragedanddisillusionedman,buttheAmericanswerenotyetreadytogiveuponChina.InDecember1945theUnitedStatessentanotherenvoytoChina,GeneralGeorgeC.Marshall,theoriginatoroftheMarshallPlanforthepostwarrecoveryofEurope.BecauseofMarshall’senormousprestige,theNationalistsandCommunistscametothenegotiatingtableoncemoreinearly1946andfeignedatentativesettlementoftheirdifferences.ByMarch,however,bothsideswerefightingonceagain.“Talk,talk,fight,fight”wastheguidingprinciplefortheCommunistsatthistime,anditmightaswellhavebeenfortheNationalistsaswell.MarshallfinallyleftChinainJanuary1947,thoroughlydisgustedwiththerefusalofbothsidesintheChinesecivilwartoengageinpeacetalksingoodfaith.

AfterMarshall’sdeparturefromChina,civilwarflaredupinManchuria.AmericanmilitaryadvisorshadencouragedChiangtomaintainhisholdoversouthernChinaratherthanspreadhisforcestoothinintheCommunist‐dominatednorth.Chiang,however,stubbornlyrefusedtoheedtheiradviceandhadtheAmericanmilitaryairliftthousandsofNationalisttroopstoareasthroughoutnorthernChina.Chiang’sinsistenceonattemptingtorecapturethenorthwassimplefromtheNationalists’pointofview:ManchuriaandotherpartsofnorthernChinahadbeenoccupiedbyJapaneseinvadingforcessince1931,andonemajorreasonforChina’swarwithJapanwasovertheseveryareas.Strategically,however,Chiang’smovesagainstthenorthwerequitefoolish,andhiscampaignsturnedoutjustasAmericanmilitaryadvisorshadfeared:hiswidelyspreadforceswereeventuallyoutmaneuveredandoverwhelmed.Bylate1947hisarmiesinManchuriahadbeenlargelywipedout,andinDecember1948Beijing(thenstillcalledBeiping)felltotheCommunists.

NanjingitselffelltotheCommunistsinApril1949,andonOctober1,1949,MaowasconfidentenoughintheCommunists’ultimatevictorythatheproclaimedinBeiping(nowrenamedBeijing)theliberationof

ChinaandthefoundingofthenewPeople’sRepublicofChinatojubilantthrongsofcelebrantsinTiananmenSquare.HeannouncedtoChinaandtheworldthatChinahadstoodup.Meanwhile,theremnantsofChiangKai‐shek’scorruptgovernmentanddiscouragedmilitaryfledtotheislandofTaiwan,whereithasremainedeversince.

ThefallofChinatotheCommunistswasbemoanedintheUnitedStatesduringthe1950sbySenatorJosephR.McCarthyandotherfarrightextremistswhosoughtascapegoatforAmerica’s“loss”ofChina.Inreality,ofcourse,ChinawasneverAmerica’stoloseinthefirstplace.ChiangKai‐shekandhisgovernmentlostmainlandChinabecauseofcorruption,incompetence,andutterignoranceofthecountryside.TheNationalistswereoverwhelminglycityorientedintheirthinking.ChiangKai‐shek’seconomicadvisorshadbeeneducatedatIvyLeagueuniversitiesandknewtheinnerworkingsoftheeconomiesofindustrializednations,buttheyhadonlythefaintestideaofhowChina’soverwhelminglyruralsocietyanditspeasantmassesreallyworked.ManypeopleinChiang’sgovernmentwerecorruptandcynicalmanipulatorswhosawinChina’sturmoilachancefortheirownenrichment.TheCommunists,ontheotherhand,basedtheirpowerandinfluenceonthesupportofChina’speasantry,andthismadethemunstoppable.PeasantarmieseventuallyoverwhelmedChiang’sfortifiedcitiesandsenthisgovernmentpackingtoTaiwan.

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:CivilWarinChina."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐604&bc=>.

NATIONALRECONSTRUCTIONEFFORTS,1949–1956

TheendoftheKoreanWarbroughtsomestabilityandnormalcytoChinaforthenextfewyears.Ultimately,however,MaobecameconcernedbecauseChinawasgettingdowntothepracticaltasksofpeacetimereconstructionandrationaleconomicplanningandseemednolongertopossesstheideologicalfocusandrevolutionaryardorofpreliberationdays.LongingtoseeChinarealizehisrevolutionaryobjectivesbeforehisowndeath,MaoattemptedtopropelChinaquicklyalongtherevolutionarypathtosocialism.Inthishewasexcessivelytheoreticalandidealisticandignoredthereal‐worldon‐the‐groundconsequencesofhisadventurism.Asaresult,Chinawasplungedintotwodecadesofchaosandturmoil.From1956untilhisdeathin1976,MaomoreorlesshadhiswaywithChinaandsetthecauseofmodernizinghiscountrybacktwentyyears.InretrospectitisclearthatMaowasafinefighterandtheoreticianbutlargelyafailureasapracticalpeacetimeleader.Mao’scontributionstoChinaessentiallyendedwithliberationin1949.

ThefirstdecadeofthePeople’sRepublicstartedoutwellenough.TheKoreanWarwasabriefbutsignificantinterruptiontoChina’splansfordomesticreconstructionandpoliticalconsolidation.EvenduringtheKoreanWar,however,somereformsproceeded.Positivereformsincludedthelandreformprogramofconfiscatingallfarmlandandredistributingittolandlesspeasantsandreformofmarriagelaw,whichoutlawedconcubinageandpolygamyandmadeiteasierforwomentoobtaindivorces.Negativedevelopmentincludedanationwideroundupandexecutionofmorethan500,000“counterrevolutionaries”(basicallyanyonedeemedhostiletothenewCommunistregime,includingformerNationalistofficialsandpeoplewhohadvoiced

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disapprovalofwhattheCommunistsweredoing)andnew“reformthroughlabor”techniquesthatemployedbackbreakingphysicallaborandsubtlepsychologicaltorture.Theobjectofreform‐through‐laboreffortswastochangethethoughtpatternsofpeopledeemedhostiletothenewstatebutnotdeservingofthedeathpenalty.

ThePeople’sRepublicusedSovietmodelsandfive‐yearplanstoachieveitssocialisttransformation.Foritsfirstfouryears,thePeople’sRepublicofChina,orPRC,focusedoneducation,industrialization,andhealthcare.ThefirstformalSoviet‐style‐five‐yearplan,whichextendedfrom1953to1957,continuedeffortstoimproveeducationandhealthcare,butitwasconcernedprimarilywithimprovingheavyindustrialandagriculturalproduction.Industrialoutputsteadilyincreasedduringthisperiod,thankslargelytotheassistanceofSovietindustrialexperts.Agriculturewas,however,adifferentstory.MaoandthemoreidealisticoftheChineseCommunistsenvisionedanagriculturalcollectivizationschemeunderwhichChina’speasantswouldcombinethemselvesintoagriculturalproducers’cooperatives(oftenabbreviatedAPCs)ofbetween40and300households.Thesecooperativeswould,theyanticipated,poollaborandcreatemuchmoreefficientagriculture.Inpractice,however,theresultsofcollectivizationweredisappointing,andmorepracticallymindednationalleaderssoughtthedissolutionoftheAPCs.Thepracticalcampeventuallyprevailedovertheidealisticcamp,andby1955severalthousandAPCshadbeendisbanded.

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:NationalReconstructionEfforts,1949‐1956."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐619&bc=>.

THEHUNDREDFLOWERSCAMPAIGN

Maoandhisideologicalcolleaguesviewedthesedisbandmentswithalarmbutforatimecoulddonothingaboutthem.Maowascarefulanddeliberateinconductingwarfare,butwhenitcametopeacetimenationalreconstructionheprovedtobeanimpatientandimpetuousman.Hesawtherelativepeaceandprosperityofthe1950sasastepawayfromtheoldrevolutionarycommitmenthehadknownintheLongMarchandYan’andays.HesatandstewedatthedissolutionoftheAPCsbutcoulddolittleaboutitbecausehewasoutvotedinthePolitburo.Butvoteswerenoteverything,andMaoknewquitewellthathewasstillthedominantpersonalityoftheCommunistpartyandhadanenormousreservoirofesteemandgoodwillamongthecommonpeople.Inearly1957hepublishedanimportantessayentitled“OntheCorrectHandlingofContradictionsAmongthePeople”inwhichheurgedthosewhodisagreedwithhispoliciestocomeforwardandofferconstructivecriticismsandsuggestions.“Letahundredflowersbloomandahundredschoolscontend”washis

message,anditeventuallybackfiredonhim.

ThemagnitudeoftheresponsemighthavesurprisedMao.ThousandsofintellectualstookMaoathiswordandcriticizedtheSovietUnion,Mao’simpetuosityintheagriculturalcollectivizationmovement,andevensocialismandtheCCPitself.SomepostersputupbystudentsinBeijingwerealmostfreneticintheirdenunciations.ByMay1957Maoannouncedthatcriticismsofsocialismandthepartywouldnolongerbetolerated,andadistinctionwasdrawnbetween“fragrantflowers”and“poisonousweeds.”Thosewhohadalreadyuttered“poisonousweeds”weretrackeddownbythehundredsofthousandsand“sentdown”tothecountrysideforbackbreakingagricultural“reformthroughlabor.”

DidMaoplanallofthisfromthestartandusetheHundredFlowersmovementasarusetosmokeouthiscriticsandthencrackdownonthem,ordidhestartthemovementwiththebestintentions,onlytobetakenabackbythemagnitudeofthenegativeresponse?Manyscholars,aswellasmanyChinesepeoplewholivedthroughthisperiod,disagreeontheanswertothisquestion.

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:TheHundredFlowersCampaign."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐623&bc=>.

GreatLeapForward(GLF)TheGreatLeapForwardmovement(GLF)wasstartedin1958asanambitiouseconomiccampaign,butendedin1959asaneconomicbankruptcyaccompaniedbyafamineofamagnitudethatwasunprecedentednotonlyinChina'shistory,butalsothroughoutworldhistory.About20

to30millionpeople,mostlypeasants,diedofhungerduringthefamine.Someputthenumberat40million.Theexactdeathtollmaynevercometolight.

MaoZedong,thenthetopleaderofChina,initiatedtheGLF.DespitethesmoothcompletionoftheFirstFive‐YearPlanin1957withhelpfromtheSovietUnion,MaobecameimpatientwiththeRussianmodernizationstrategy,whichemphasizedbureaucraticplanning,capitalaccumulation,andtheheavy‐industryandurbansectors.Asamanwithabigegobutlittleknowledgeofeconomics,Maobelievedthathecouldusesomeofthe

principlesdevelopedduringtheguerrillawarperiod,suchasmassmovement,tobettermobilizeChina'spopulationforeconomicgrowth.Heputforwardanew“GeneralLineforSocialistConstruction”thataimedatgreatlyacceleratingeconomicgrowthbyorganizingthepeopleintovariouskindsofquasi‐militaryunitsandinstitutions,suchasmilitiasandcommunes,sothathecouldeasilydrivethemtofulfillhighproductionquotas.

MaowasabletolaunchtheGLFwithoutmuchopposition.In1957,MaohadjustcrackeddownondissidentintellectualsintheAnti‐RightistCampaign.Inearly1958,heforcedsomeofthetopleaders,includingthenpremierZhouEnlai,tomakeself‐criticismsonbeingtooconservativeinmakingproductionplans.ThusMaosetthestageforthetragedybysilencingallpublicopinionthatdisagreedwithhisradicalideas.Governmentsatalllevelswerecompetingtoreportonemiracleoutputafteranother.Thegreatlyinflatedoutputswerethenreportedinnewspapersorbroadcastbyradiosnationwide,leadingthewholenationtobelievethatChinawasmakingagreatleapinproductionandwascatchingupwiththeWesterndevelopednationsrapidly.

ToMao,theoutputsofiron,steel,cotton,andgrainweretheultimatesymbolofanation'seconomicandmilitaryprowess.Underhispressure,theChinesegovernmentfrequentlyupwardlyrevisedproductionquotas.Thefulfillmentoftheironandsteelquotaswasviewedasthewholenation'sresponsibility.Homemadefurnaceswereerectedinschoolplaygrounds,governmentofficecompounds,residential

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backyards,andvillageopensquaresacrossthenation.PeopleweredriveneitherbytheirblindtrustinMaoandtheCommunistPartyorbyfearandpeerpressuretoworkdayandnightwithoutabreak.Mostoftheironandsteelproducedbytheseso‐calledbackyardfurnaceswasatotalwaste.Inmanyruralareas,century‐oldtreeswerecutdownandusedasfuel.Inmanyurbanareas,steelgates,fences,doors,windows,andothermetalframeworkweretakenoffbuildingsandhousesasinputs.Theybecametotallyuselessafterbeingmelted,althoughtheywerereportedaspartoftheironandsteeloutputs.Theruralecologyandurbanlandscapingsufferedtoagreatextentasaresultofthismassmovementofbackyardsteelproduction.

IftheGLFmovementmainlycausedgreatmateriallossesanddisordersinurbanareas,inruralareasitresultedinbothmaterialandhumanlossesofanunprecedentedmagnitude.Thehard‐hitprovinceswereSichuan,Henan,Anhui,Shandong,Qinghai,andGansu.AlloftheseregionsexceptforShandongarelocatedinland,andlittlenewsaboutthetruesituationintheseremoteareasleakedtotheoutsideworld.

Intheearlyspringof1959,Maolearnedthroughclassifiedreportssenttohimfromvariouslocalitiesthatafoodshortagewasdevelopinginsomepartsofthecountry.Realizingthathemustdosomethingtocontrolthesituation,inearlyJuly1959,MaoconvenedasummitmeetinginLuMountain,asummerresortlocatedinnorthernJiangxiProvince.Tobefair,MaooriginallyintendedtocooldownthefanaticatmosphereoftheGLFbyreducingtheoutputquotasandbysofteningsomeoftheradicaleconomicpolicies.However,whenanumberoftopleaders,representedbyPengDehuai,thenthedefenseminister,openlyquestionedthecorrectnessofMao'spolicies,Maofeltthathisundisputableauthoritywasseriouslythreatened.HeaccusedPengandhissupportersofbeingopportunistsandtraitorsanddemandedthatallthemeetingparticipantskeeptheirdistancefromPengandhissupporters.MaovehementlydefendedhisideasabouttheGLFandurgedthePartyandthenationtoadhereevenmorecloselytothegoalsoftheGLF.ThemeetingendedwiththehumiliationanddemotionofPengandhissupporters.Meanwhile,thefaminespreadanddeepened.ChinathuslostagoodopportunitytocontrolthedamageoftheGLFatitsinitiallevel.Mao'sresponsetoPeng'swell‐groundedcriticismclearlyrevealedthedarksideofhispersonality.Heviewedhispersonalreputationandauthorityasfarmoreimportantthanthetruthandthewelfareoftheordinarypeople.ThedisasteralsoclearlyrevealedtheseriousflawsintheChinesepoliticalsystem:therewasnoaccountability,andthemosthonestandoutspokenpoliticiansgotweededoutfirst.

Manyfactorswerelistedaspossiblecontributingcausestothisdisaster:unwieldinessofthehugesizeofanaveragecommune,reducedareassownwithgrain,misleadingreportsaboutinflatedgrainoutput,thecollapseofgrainproduction,overprocurementofgraininruralareas,badweather,communaldininghalls,andphysicalexhaustioncausedbythenonstopmassproductionmovement.Themajorcausesofthefaminearestillsubjecttodebate.

TheChinesegovernmentneverofficiallyadmittedthatafaminetookplaceduringtheGLFperiod.However,thegovernmentadmittedthatChinawasexperiencingafoodshortagewhenitbecameclearthatboththesummerharvestandthefallharvest

of1959notonlyfellfarbelowtheplannedgoalsforthatyear,butalsobelowthoseof1958.Theculpritfirstwasbadweather,laterthemainculpritbecametheSovietUnionwhentheideologicalsplitbetweenChinaanditsmainallybecamepublicin1961.TheChinesepeopleweretoldthatmuchofthegrainwasshippedtoRussiabecausethelatterdemandedthatChinapaybackitsdebtsimmediately.

Ithasnowbecomeclearthatbadweatheranddebt‐serviceobligationcouldnotbethemaincausesofthefamine,norcouldthefaminehavebeentriggeredfirstbyproductioncollapse,assomeearlierstudiestriedtoprove.Theweatherin1958wasveryfavorable,andthefallharvestinthatyearwasarecordhigh.Itistruethatthecommunesystemdeprivedpeasantsofincentivestoworkhard,butduringtheperiod1961–1984,whenthecommunesystemwasstillthedominantruralinstitution,Chinaneversawanyfamineagain.Heavyprocurementcouldbeafactor,buttheprocurementsin1958and1959werecomparablewiththoseofsomeyearsintheearlier1950s.Therefore,procurementalonecouldnotbethemaincauseofthefamine.Sinceexportscamefromthepoolthatwasprocuredbythegovernment,theywouldnotfurtherreducethegrainstockcontrolledbythecommunaldininghalls.Theindustrialmassmovementwasmostlyconcentratedinurbanareas.Giventhefactthattheabnormaldeathrateinurbanareaswasmuchlowerthanthatinruralareas,physicalexhaustioncouldnotbethemaincauseofthehighabnormaldeathratethatwasobservedinruralareas.Afterthesefactorsareexcludedasthemainfactors,thecommunaldininghallsloomlargeasamoreplausiblemaincauseofthefamine.

Underthecommunaldininghallsystem,foodwascontrolledcompletelybythecommunaldininghalls.Peasantswerenotallowedtoeatathome.Fooddistributioninthesedininghallswasnotbasedoncontributionsofacommunemembertoproduction,butonhisorhermembershiponly.Atfirst,thesedininghallswerepopularbecausetheyletpeasantseatasmuchastheywantedforfree.Thispolicyledtoabigdemandshockandcausedasignificantamountofgrainstocktobeconsumedorwastedwithinashortperiodoftimebeforethesummerharvestof1959wasready.Whenthefoodshortagedevelopedinthespringof1959,theegalitariandistributionoffoodinthesedininghallsledtorampantshirkingandfree‐ridingbehaviorthatinturnledtothecollapseofproduction.Assoonasthecommunaldininghallswereabolishedinmid‐1961,allthefoodwasdividedupandallocateddirectlytoindividualhouseholds.Despitethefactthatthelevelofpercapitagrainconsumptionwasstillloweratthistimethanthatin1959,thefamineended.

SeealsoCentralPlanning;GreatCulturalRevolution(1966–1976);People'sCommunes/HouseholdResponsibilitySystem.

Bibliography

Ashton,Basil,KennethHill,AlanPiazza,andRobinZeitz,“FamineinChina,1958–1961,”PopulationandDevelopmentReview10,no.4(December1984):613–645;Chang,Gene,andGuangzhongJamesWen,“CommunalDiningandtheCausationoftheChineseFamineof1958–1961,”EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange,October1997,1–34;Yang,DaliL.,CalamityandReforminChina(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,1996).

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:TheGreatLeapForward."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐627&bc=>.

THELULLBEFORETHESTORM

MaowasanunpopularmaninChinaintheearly1960s,andheknewit.In1961aplaycalledHaiRuiDismissedfromOfficebecamequitepopularandwasperformedinBeijingbeforeselloutaudiences.TheplotoftheplaywasanobliquehistoricalcondemnationofMao’sroleintheGreatLeapForwardandacelebrationofPengDehuai’scourageincriticizinghimoverit.ThehistoricalHaiRuiwasaloyalanduprightofficialduringtheMingdynastywhobluntlycriticizedaMingemperor’spoliciesandwas,asaresult,dismissedfromofficeindisgrace.AnyonewhosawtheplayandhadafingeronthepulseofpoliticaldevelopmentsinChinaknewthatthecharacterHaiRuiwasthehistoricalandliterarycounterparttoPengDehuai,whilethestubbornandobtuseMingemperorwhofailedtoheedtheloyalminister’sremonstrationswasnoneotherthanMaohimself.JiangQing,awomanwithliteraryandculturalinterestswhohadbeenMao’swifesinceYan’andays,quicklycaughtontothisandurgedMaoforyearstodosomethingaboutit.

Maomadeonlyonepublicappearancein1962.Duringthisyearhewasangryandhurtaboutthewaypracticalofficialshadmoreorlessshuntedhimasideandregardedhimasa“deadancestor.”HefearedthatbureaucratsandgovernmentalcogswerenowincontrolofChinaandthatthecountrywasslowlywateringdownMarxist‐Leninistdogma.InhisyouthhehadacceptedMarxism‐

Leninismandsawclassstruggleasthedrivingforceofhistory.Now,inthewakeofattemptstorecoverfromtheGreatLeap,therewaslittleevidenceofcontinuingclassstruggle,andthistroubledhim.

OnesegmentofChinesesocietythatwasnotcriticalofMaowasthePeople’sLiberationArmy(orPLA),ledbyLinBiao.LinknewthatthebasisofhispowerandauthoritywashisloyaltytoMao,andduringtheearly1960sheflatteredMaoandwasobsequiousinhisbehaviortohim.WhenotherscriticizedMaofortheGreatLeapcatastrophe,LinpraiseditandglorifiedMaoforattemptingit.LinfosteredapersonalitycultcenteredonMaointhePLA,andheprintedandcirculatedamongPLAtroopsthefamous“LittleRedBook,”orQuotationsfromChairmanMaoZedong,whichheencouragedofficersandmentoreadandmemorizereverentially.Maowaspleasedwithallthisattentivenessandby1965wasencouragingChinatolearnfromthePLA’sideologicalzealandpersonaldedicationtohim.Maoencouragedtheformationofapersonalitycultcenteredaroundhimself,partlyforhisownglorificationbutmainlyforthemassdedicationtohisideologythatitmightproduce.

Bylate1965Maowasonceagainconfidentenoughinhisownleadershiptofireasalvoathiscriticsanddetractors.HefinallyunleashedthefuryofhiswifeJiangQingandherultra‐leftistcroniesagainstthosetheyregardedasimpedingclassstruggleinChina,andinNovembertheyhadnewspapersinBeijingandShanghaipublishatiradeagainsttheHaiRuiplay.BytheendoftheyearMaohadconvenedameetingwithtopChineseofficialsabouttheplayandlashedoutathiscritics,questioningtheirdevotiontotherevolutionarycause.InFebruary1966hetoldLinBiaoandthePLAabouthisvisionofa“greatsocialistculturalrevolution”thatwouldfundamentallychangeChina’sculturebyrootingoutthevestigesofoldorfeudalways.Withthisdone,Maobelieved,hiscriticswouldfinallybesilencedandChinacouldproceedfartherandfasteralongtherevolutionarypathtowardtheultimategoalofpurecommunism.

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:TheLullBeforetheStorm."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐635&bc=>.

CHINAGOESMAD:THECULTURALREVOLUTION,1966–1976

MaowasintenselydedicatedtothetaskofseeingtherevolutionthroughinChinaduringhislifetime.Ratherthanseehisrevolutionderailed,hethrewChinaintoadecadeofchaosandturmoilthatwould,hehoped,maintainChina’srevolutionaryardorandkeepthenationontracktoachievesocialisminhislifetime.MaoplungedChinaintooneofitsdarkestdecadesofthetwentiethcenturybecausetherevolutionaryidealsandgoalsofhisyouthremainedunrealized.Hewas,ashisphysicianwroteinthe1990s,dedicatedtosocialismforsocialism’ssakeandcaredlittleaboutthepracticalconsequencesorreal‐worldhumansufferingthathisattemptstorealizehistheoreticalidealsentailed(Li1994,377).

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FrustratedthatthemajorityoftheChinesegovernmentwasapparentlyabandoningChina’srevolutionarycharterandfollowingamorerevisionistpathsimilartotheSovietUnion,Maoessentiallythrewatempertantrum;hewentovertheheadsofthegovernmentandappealeddirectlytothepeopleforsupport.MaotappedintoavastreservoirofyouthfuldiscontentinChinaandtoldagenerationofChineseyouththatitwasacceptableforthemtorebelagainstauthorityfiguresinfamilies,schools,workplaces,andlocalandprovincialgovernments;manypersonnelintheseorganizationswere,afterall,revisionistorcounterrevolutionaryanddeservedcontemptandcensure.Thatwasallthatagenerationofangryanddisenchantedurbanyouthneededtohear,andbythesummerof1966Chinawasinthethroesofanationwideupheavalthatwouldlast,toagreaterorlesserextent,untilMao’sdeathinSeptember1976.

May1966wasabigmonthinthedevelopingmomentumfortheCulturalRevolution.Mao’smostprominentcriticsweredismissedinMay,andthissamemonthLinBiaoassertedthatthesecriticswerepartofa“blackline”inthepartythatwasouttorestorebourgeoisinterestsinChinesesociety.OnlyathoroughhousecleaningwithinthepartyandanintensifiedrevolutioninChinesesocietyandculturecouldreversetheseominousdevelopments.Sensingwhichwaythewindwasblowing,Mao’slongtimeassociateZhouEnlainamedthedevelopingmovementtheGreatProletarianCulturalRevolution.AlsoinMay,anultra‐leftistphilosophyprofessoratPekingUniversity(Beida)placed“big‐characterposters”throughoutthecampuscondemningtheuniversitypresident’spoliciesforbiddingstudentprotestmovements.Mao’sdiscoveryandapprovalofthepostershadtworesults:thedismissalorassailingofmanyprofessorsandadministratorsatPekingUniversityandthepopularizationofbig‐characterposters(largeposterswrittenwithboldChinesecharacters)asameansofairingopinionsandattackingideologicalopponents.

InJune1966theanarchyinChinabegan.ManyyoungstudentslefttheirstudiesandjoinedtheexcitingnewmovementtoprotectChairmanMaoandhisThoughtfromrevisionists,thestandardbogeymanlabelforanyonewhodaredvoicedisagreementwithMao.Revisionistsweremembersoftheover‐thirtygeneration;howcouldyoungpeopleeverdareresistthesmilingChairmanMaowhowastellingthemthatitwasacceptabletorebelagainsttheoldergenerations?InAugustMaopubliclyandapprovinglydesignatedhisnewyoungsupportersthe“RedGuards”andheartilyapprovedoftheirslogan“torebelisjustified.”Andrebeltheydid,inthenameofapersonalitycultcenteredonthethought,andtheperson,ofChairmanMao.MaotookhisfamousswimintheYangtzeRiverinJuly1966toannouncetoChinaandtheworldthathehadtherenewedpoliticalandphysicalprowessnecessarytodirecttheturmoilhewasabouttounleashinChina.(Inreality,theswimasafeatofphysicalfitnesswasquiteunremarkable;Maosimplyletthecurrentcarryhimalongashefloatedonhisback,supportedbythebuoyancyofhisconsiderablestomach.)

Mao’ssycophantsandflatterersinthePLAwereproudoftheroletheyhadplayedinstartingthemovement.HappytobeincludedinMao’svisionofculturalrevolutionandideologicalpurificationinChina,thePLA’sLiberationArmyDailypublishedthefollowingpieceinitsAugust1,1966edition:

ChairmanMaowantsustorunourarmyasagreatschool.Workingmainlyasafightingforce,itconcurrentlystudies,engagesinagriculture,runsfactories,anddoesmasswork;itcarriesonandfurtherdevelopsthefinetraditionsofourPartyandourarmy,andtrainsandtempersmillionsofsuccessorstotheproletarianrevolutionarycause,sothatourpeople’sarmyofseveralmillioncanplayastillgreaterroleinthecauseofsocialistrevolutionandsocialistconstruction.Itisagreatschoolforthestudy,implementation,dissemination,andsafeguardingofMaoZedong’sThought.(SchurmannandSchell1967,623)

InthissamepiecetheLiberationArmyDailyingratiateditselfwithMaobylashingoutathiscriticsatLushan:

The…bigstruggletookplaceatthesametimeasourParty’sstruggleagainsttheRightopportunistanti‐Partycliquein1959.Takingadvantageoftheimportantpoststheyhadusurpedinthearmy,theprincipalmembersoftheanti‐Partyclique—whowereexposedattheParty’sLushanConference—madeagreatefforttodoawaywiththeParty’sabsoluteleadershipoverthearmy,toabrogatepoliticalwork,torejectthearmy’stasksofparticipatinginsocialistconstructionanddoingmasswork,andtoabolishthelocalarmedforcesandthemilitia;inthisway,theytriedtocompletelynegateChairmanMao’sthinkingonthepeople’sarmyandthepeople’swar.Theyvainlyhopedtorefashionourarmyaccordingtothebourgeois,revisionistmilitarylinesothatitwouldbecomeaninstrumentfortheirusurpingleadershipofthePartyandthegovernment,andforrealizingtheirpersonalambitions.TheEnlargedSessionoftheMilitaryCommissionheldaftertheParty’sLushanConferencethoroughlysettledaccountswiththeminregardtotheircrimesanddismissedthemfromoffice.ThiswasagreatvictoryforMaoZedong’sThought!(625)

OnAugust5,MaoeggedtheRedGuardsonbypostinghisownbig‐characterpostersaying“Bombtheheadquarters!”atthedooroftheCommunistPartyCentralCommitteeHeadquarters.Unnerved,theCentralCommitteegaveintoMao’stacticsbydismissingmoderatesandrecruitingradicalMaoistsintoitsranks.

OnthedawnofAugust18,1966,MaopropelledhisnewpersonalityculttoafrenzyamongtheRedGuardswhenhespoketoonemillionofthematarallyinBeijing’sTiananmenSquare.Hemingledandchattedwiththecrowdsforseveralhours,andthenextdaynewsoftherallywassplashedalloverChina’snewspapers.ThisproducedacrazeforRedGuardralliesatTiananmenSquareformuchoftherestoftheyear.Thelastrally,heldinNovember1966,wasthelargest,withmorethan2.5millionpeopleattending.

ThesehugeRedGuardrallieswerepossiblebecausestudentsalloverChinasimplyquitschoolandadventurouslytraveledalloverChinato“makerevolution”anddoquixoticbattleagainstthephantomcounterrevolutionariesandreactionaries.TheyweregivenfreepassageonChina’strainandbussystemtojustaboutanywhere,whichenabledtheRedGuardgenerationtoseemoreofChinathananyothergenerationinChinesehistory.TheultimatedestinationformillionsofRedGuardswas,ofcourse,Beijing,especiallyafterthenewsmediareportedthatMaohimselfwasknowntoreviewtheralliesatTiananmenSquare.ThefondestdreamofanyRedGuardwastolayeyesontheChairman,evenifonlyforafewfleetingandfrenziedseconds.LiangHeng,ayoungstudentwhotraveledallthewayfromHunaninsouthernChinatoattendaRedGuardrallyatTiananmenSquare,conveysinhismemoirstheintensityandflavoroftherallies:

Iftherewasanysinglethingthatmeantecstasytoeveryoneinthosedays,itwasseeingChairmanMao.EversinceIhadbeeninPeking[Beijing],thepossibilityhadbeeninthebackofmymind,and,likeeveryotherRedGuard,Iwouldhavelaiddownmylifeforthechance.

ChairmanMao’scarwasfirst,aPeking‐brandarmyjeep.Asinadream,Isawhim.Heseemedverytalltome,magnificent,trulylargerthanlife.Hewavedhishatasthejeepdroveslowlythroughthethrong.Thesoldiersformingthepassagewaystoodatattention,butthetearspoureddowntheirfacesinrivulets.Neverthelesstheymanagedtosniffletheirrefrain,“PleasekeepRevolutionaryorder!PleasekeepRevolutionaryorder!”

Iwasbawlinglikeababy,cryingoutincoherentlyagainandagain,“Youareourhearts’reddest,reddestsun!”Mytearsblockedmyvision,butIcoulddonothingtocontrolmyself.ThenChairmanMao’scarwaspast,andPremierZhou’sfollowed.

Thepeopleinfronthadn’trealizedwhathadhappened,andwerestillchanting.“WewanttoseeChairmanMao!”withtheirbacksturnedtoalltheaction.Astheydiscoveredhimintheirmidst,however,theynearlymobbedthecar,obstructingitspassagecompletely….ItwasonlywhenthecrowdwastoldthattheChairmanwantedtoclimbthegate‐towertoseethefireworksthattheyseparatedandletthecargothrough.

WhenitwasallovereveryonerantothepostofficetotelegraphthegoodnewstotheirfamiliesalloverChina.Iwaitedmorethan

twohourstotraceoutthetremblingwords,“Thiseveningat9:15Ibecamethehappiestpersonintheworld.”Iknewmyfatherwouldneednofurtherexplanation.(LiangandShapiro1983,121,124–25)

ThethrongsofRedGuardscollectedMaomemorabilia,woreredarmbandsemblazonedwiththreecharactersmeaningRedGuard,sangsongsinpraiseofChairmanMao’swisdomandbenevolence,andaboveallreadhisworks,especiallytheLittleRedBookorQuotationsfromChairmanMaoZedong.Mao’sQuotationswerecarriedbyeverygoodRedGuardwhereverheorshewent.TheoriginaleditionoftheQuotations,issuedbythePLAinacheap,redplasticcover,had270pagesoftextandmeasuredabout5×3½×3¾inches.AgenerationofRedGuardsreverentiallyporedovertheQuotationsandknewthemlargelybyheart;manyevencommittedtheentirebooktomemory.(TheQuotationsachievedpopularitywiththe1960shippiegenerationintheUnitedStatesandCanada.)Stridentlyanti‐American,theQuotationscontainedfrequentandshrilldenunciationoftheUnitedStates:

Peopleoftheworld,uniteanddefeattheU.S.aggressorsandalltheirrunningdogs!Peopleoftheworld,becourageous,daretofight,defydifficultiesandadvancewaveuponwave.Thenthewholeworldwillbelongtothepeople.Monstersofallkindsshallbedestroyed.(Mao1976,82)

Maowassupremelyconfidentintheultimatevictoryofthesocialistrevolutionallovertheworld:

Thesocialistsystemwilleventuallyreplacethecapitalistsystem;thisisanobjectivelawindependentofman’swill.Howevermuchthereactionariestrytoholdbackthewheelofhistory,soonerorlaterrevolutionwilltakeplaceandwillinevitablytriumph.(24)

Itismyopinionthattheinternationalsituationhasnowreachedanewturningpoint.Therearetwowindsintheworldtoday,theEastWindandtheWestWind.ThereisaChinesesaying,“EithertheEastWindprevailsovertheWestWindortheWestWindprevailsovertheEastWind.”IbelieveitischaracteristicofthesituationtodaythattheEastWindisprevailingovertheWestWind.Thatistosay,theforcesofsocialismhavebecomeoverwhelminglysuperiortotheforcesofimperialism.(80–81)

Theultimatevictoryofthesocialistandcommunistrevolutionswouldbeaccomplishedthroughbruteforceofarms:

EveryCommunistmustgraspthetruth,“Politicalpowergrowsoutofthebarrelofagun.”(61)

…onlywithgunscanthewholeworldbetransformed.(63)

Weareadvocatesoftheabolitionofwar,wedonotwantwar;butwarcanonlybeabolishedthroughwar,andinordertogetridofthegunitisnecessarytotakeupthegun.(63)

Revolutionwas,infact,abrutalandmessybusiness,andinwhatwasprobablythemostfamousstatementofhislife,Maotoldhisfollowersthattheyshouldnotexpectittobeotherwise:

Arevolutionisnotadinnerparty,orwritinganessay,orpaintingapicture,ordoingembroidery;itcannotbesorefined,

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soleisurelyandgentle,sotemperate,kind,courteous,restrainedandmagnanimous.Arevolutionisaninsurrection,anactofviolencebywhichoneclassoverthrowsanother.(11–12)

TheCulturalRevolutionwasanexcitingtimefortheRedGuardsandotherperpetrators,butforitsvictims(variouslycalledcounterrevolutionaries,reactionaries,revisionists,capitalistroaders,andthelike)itwasatimeofenormoussufferingandhardship.Maodetestedintellectualsbecausetheythoughtforthemselvesanddidnotalwaysreverentiallylapupthedogmahepouredouttothem.Ithadbeentheintellectuals,afterall,whohadspokenoutmostvociferouslyagainstMao’spoliciesduringtheHundredFlowerscampaign.Alwaysconsciousofhisownlackofformaladvancededucation,Maowasespeciallysuspiciousofanyintellectualwhohadstudiedabroad.DuringtheCulturalRevolution,thousandsofpatriotic,foreign‐educatedChinesewhohadreturnedtoChinaafterthe1949revolutionwerehunteddownandsenttothecountrysideforbackbreakingreformthroughlaboronfarms.Hundredsofphysicistsandotherscientistswerereducedtodemeaningtaskssuchasshovelingpigmanureandcleaninglatrines.Intellectualsingeneralwerereferredtoasthe“stinkingninthcategory,”ninthbeingthelastofalistofundesirablesinChinesesocietywhichincludedcriminalsand“badelements.”RedGuardstookspecialdelightinburstingintotheirteachers’homesinsearchofanythingthatcouldpossiblyprovethemantagonistictoMaoorpro‐Westernintheirtastes:books,music,paintings,andevenWestern‐styleclothing.PeoplewhoarousedtheslightestsuspicionoftheRedGuardsweretakenoutand“struggled,”orverballyandphysicallyabusedbeforelargecrowdsofaccusersanddetractors.ChinesewriterJungChangrecallshowherfather,anintellectual,wastormentedbutremaineddefiantduringtheCulturalRevolution:

Astandardopeningwastochant:“Tenthousandyears,anothertenthousandyears,andyetanothertenthousandyearstoourGreatTeacher,GreatLeader,GreatCommander,andGreatHelmsmanChairmanMao!”Eachtimethethree“tenthousand”sandfour“great”swereshoutedout,everyoneraisedtheirLittleRedBooksinunison.Myfatherwouldnotdothis.Hesaidthatthe“tenthousandyears”washowemperorsusedtobeaddressed,anditwasunfittingforChairmanMao,aCommunist.

Thisbroughtdownatorrentofhystericalyellsandslaps.Atonemeeting,allofthetargetswereorderedtokneelandkowtowtoahugeportraitofMaoatthebackoftheplatform.Whiletheothersdidastheyweretold,myfatherrefused.HesaidthatkneelingandkowtowingwereundignifiedfeudalpracticeswhichtheCommunistswerecommittedtoeliminating.TheRebelsscreamed,kickedhisknees,andstruckhimonthehead,buthestillstruggledtostandupright.“Iwillnotkneel!Iwillnotkowtow!”hesaidfuriously.Theenragedcrowddemanded,“Bowyourheadandadmityourcrimes!”Hereplied,“Ihavecommittednocrime.Iwillnotbowmyhead!”

Severallargeyoungmenjumpedonhimtotrytoforcehimdown,butassoonastheyletgohestoodupstraight,raisedhishead,andstareddefiantlyattheaudience.Hisassailantsyankedhishairandpulledhisneck.Myfatherstruggledfiercely.Asthehystericalcrowdscreamedthathewas“anti‐CulturalRevolution,”heshoutedangrily,“WhatkindofCulturalRevolutionisthis?Thereisnothing‘cultural’aboutit!Thereis

onlybrutality!”(Chang1991,331)

ByNovember1966MaowastakenabackbytheviciousnessoftheattacksagainstteachersandotherauthoritiesandtriedtoremindtheRedGuardsthatnotallpeopleinauthoritywererevisionistsorcapitalistroaders.Hedidnot,however,reininthemovementatthistime,andthingssteadilyworsened.SeveralhighofficialsinChina’sgovernmentwerehauledoutoftheirhomes,struggled,andmoreorlessforcedtoadmittotrumped‐upaccusationsagainstthem.Duringthesummerof1967,mobsbrokeintoPengDehuai’shouseanddraggedhimouttoastrugglesession.AmobbrokeintotheBritishembassyinBeijing,terrorizedBritishdiplomats,andburnedapartoftheBritishembassycompound.AnarchyprevailedinseveralmajorChinesecitiesasrivalgroupsclaimingtobethemostloyalofChairmanMao’sRedGuardsfoughtandmurderedeachother.OneChineseintellectualremembershowuniversityandurbanlifewasviolentlydisruptedasthecityofHefeiinAnhuiprovincedescendedintolawlessness:

Attheuniversity,thesixteen‐year‐olddaughterofColonelLi,stillinjuniorhigh,madeherselffamousbybeingoneofthosedaredevilRedGuardswhopridedthemselvesontheirbloodlineage.Shesportedadaggerwithéclat,becausebothofherparentshadservedintheearlyRedArmy.Oneday,whileroamingthestreetswithabandofteenagersofherfaction,shesawateenageboycomingtowardthem.

“Whoisthat?Friendorenemy?”sheaskedhercompanions.

“Ihavenotseenhimbefore.Enemy,Ibelieve,”oneoftheboyssaid.

“Thenwhatarewewaitingfor?Let’sgethim,”sheurged,walkinguptothesolitaryyouth.

“Stop!Whoareyou,kid?Whichfaction?”

“Youhavenorighttostopmeoraskmequestions.Letmegoby.”

“Here’sforyourimpudence,youdog!”Herdaggerwentstraightintotheyoungster’sheart.Hercompanionsweredumbfounded.“Comeon!”shesaidcheerfully.“I’lltreatyoutoice‐suckerstocelebrateourheroicdeed.”Leavingtheyoungsterdyingonthestreetinapoolofblood,shewalkeduptoamanpeddlingice‐suckersandclenchedthebloodydaggerbetweenherteethwhileshefumbledinherpocketsforchange.“Tenice‐suckersforChairmanMao’strueRedGuards!”shesaidproudly.Thepeddlerwassofrightenedthathedarednottakemoneyfortheice‐suckers.Thedeadboyturnedouttohavebelongedtothesamefactionasthekiller.(Wu1993,206–7)

Thingsbecameevenmoreominousinthesummerof1967whenentireshipmentsofweaponsdisappearedandmobruleprevailedinthesouthernChinesecityofGuangzhou.WhenitappearedthatthePLAitselfmightalsobeslidingintochaos,MaofinallyconcludedthathisCulturalRevolutionhadgonetoofarandtriedtorestrainit.WhenhetouredtheprovincesinSeptember,hewasappalledattheextentofthesocialdisruptionhesaw.MaoalsoreinedinJiangQingandhergroupofwriters,buthekepttheminreservetouseasattackdogsagainsthispoliticalopponentswhenitsuitedhim.OrderinChina

wasnotquicklyrestored,andinJuly1968MaohadtoinstructthePLAtorestoreordertoChina’scitiesthroughallthenecessarymeans,includingmilitaryforce.ThatsamemonthhesummonedstudentandRedGuardleaderstoadiscussionandmoreorlesstoldthemthatthepartywasovernow.OnewaytogettheRedGuardsoutofthecitieswastosendthemouttothecountrysidetolearnfromthepeasants.Thishedidin1969,andmillionsofstudentswenttoworkonfarms.Somewentwillinglyandenthusiastically,butmosthadtobecompelled.InthecountrysidetheylearnednothingbutbitternessforMao,whoseemedtohavenoconcernforthemnowthattheyhadoutlivedtheirusefulness.

Thefallof1968wastheendoftheCulturalRevolutionproper,anditwasofficiallydeclaredoverinthespringof1969.Itslingeringeffects,however,continuedtoreverberateuntilMao’sdeathin1976.After1969movementsreminiscentoftheCulturalRevolutionflaredupoccasionallybutwerenotgiventhefullreintheyhadin1966and1967.MaoknewthathisCulturalRevolutionwas,likehisGreatLeapForwardofthelate1950s,amonumentalfailure,butthistimehemadesurethatnobodylikePengDehuaiwoulddarecomeforthandcriticizehim.Thistimetheoddswerestackedinhisfavor;thehighestlevelsoftheCCPwerepackedwithhisallies,andhealwayshadJiangQingandhergroupofliteraryhatchetmenreadytosliceupanypotentialcritics.

MaocontinuedtobeconcernedaboutthestateoftherevolutioninChina,butbythelate1960sandearly1970shewasbecomingpreoccupiedwithanothermatter,thegrowingSino‐Sovietsplit.Maobecameconvincedduringthistimethatthegreatestthreat

toChineseandinternationalsecuritywasnottheUnitedStatesbuttheSovietUnion,whichhaddistanceditselffromChinainhorrorafterthelunacyoftheGreatLeapForwardandtheCulturalRevolutionandhadbegunmenacingChinaalongtheSino‐Sovietborders.

TheCulturalRevolutionwasacomplexphenomenon,andmakingsenseofitisnotaneasytask.Indeed,severalscholarswhohavedevotedtheircareerstoplumbingitsdepthshavenotbeenabletocometofullgripswithitscausesandthecourseofitsdevelopment.TheCulturalRevolutionwasmoreorlessofficiallylaunchedinmid‐1966,butafterthatitseemstohaveassumedamomentumandmeaningallitsown,quiteapartfromwhatMaooriginallyforesaworintended.ItendedwiththedeathsofmorethanonemillionChineseandmassivedisruptionsinthelivesofalmostallofChina’surbanpopulation.(Disruptionswerelessextensiveinthecountryside.)PerhapsweneverwillfullyunderstandtheCulturalRevolution,butatpresentitappearsthatitwasmoreorlessafailedattemptbyMaoandhisideologicalsupporterstoseetherevolutionthroughtocompletion.Mao’sappealtoChina’sangryyoungpeoplewasanattempttoharnesstheirenergyandrestlessnessfortherevolutionarycause,butinsteadoffurtheringtherevolutiontheyplungedChinaintosocialandeconomicchaos.

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:ChinaGoesMad:TheCulturalRevolution,1966‐1976."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐640&bc=>.

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ChronologyofthePeople'sRepublicofChina

1949

ThePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC)isfoundedonOctober1inBeijing.TheNationalistgovernmentwithdrawstoTaiwan.MaoZedongdeclaresthe“People'sDemocraticDictatorship.”MaoisappointedchairmanoftheCentralPeople'sGovernment;ZhouEnlaiisnamedpremier;andZhuDebecomesgeneralcommanderofthePeople'sLiberationArmy(PLA).

1950

TheSino‐SovietTreatyofFriendship,Alliance,andMutualAssistanceissignedinMoscowbyMaoZedongandJosephStalin.InJune,MaodenouncesAmericanaggressioninKorea.InOctober,theArmyoftheChinesePeople'sVolunteerspubliclyentersKoreainsupportofNorthKorea.Alsointhisyear,theMarriageLawispromulgatedbythecentralgovernment,togetherwiththeTradeUnionLawandtheAgrarianReformLawofthePRC.

1951

TheKoreanWarprogresses,withChinesetroopstakingSeoul.MaoZedong'sson,MaoAnying,iskilledinKorea.Domestically,theAgreementoftheCentralPeople'sGovernmentandtheLocalGovernmentofTibetonMeasuresfortheLiberationofTibetissignedinBeijing;theagreementrecognizesTibetaspartofChinaandgrantstheregionautonomousstatus.

1952

TheThree‐AntisCampaignislaunchedinJanuary;ittargetscorruption,waste,andbureaucratism.InFebruary,theFive‐AntisCampaignisstarted;ittargetsbusinessoperationsandiscommonlyviewedastheprecursortoaloomingdeprivatizationcampaign.DengXiaopingbecomesdeputypremier.

1953

ThearmisticeendingtheKoreanWarissignedonJuly27.TheFirstFive‐YearPlan(1953–1957)starts.DengXiaopingbecomesfinanceministerforoneyear.

1954

ZhouEnlaiandIndianprimeministerJawaharlalNehrusignajointcommuniquéthatbecomesthefirst

internationaldeclarationtoincludethePRC's“FivePrinciplesofPeacefulCoexistence.”ThefirstNationalPeople'sCongress(NPC)convenes.DengXiaopingbecomesdeputychairmanoftheNationalDefenseCouncil.

1955

ZhouEnlaiattendstheAsian‐AfricanConference(BandungConference)inBandung,Indonesia;theconferenceseekstobuildaunitedfrontofAsianandAfricannationsagainstcolonialismandracism.DengXiaopingiselectedtothePolitburo.TheChineseLanguageReformCommitteereleasesthefirstbatchofsimplifiedChinesecharacters,whicharefirstusedinnewspapersinBeijingandTianjin.

1956

InApril,MaoZedongdelivershisinfluentialspeech“OntheTenMajorRelationships.”InSeptember,theEighthPartyCongresselectsMaoPartychairman;LiuShaoqi,ZhouEnlai,ZhuDe,andChenYunareelecteddeputychairmen;andDengXiaopingiselectedassecretary‐generaloftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP).InMay,MaoZedongcallsforgreaterartisticandacademicfreedomwiththeslogan“letahundredflowersbloom,andahundredschoolsofthoughtcontend.”

1957

MaoZedongdelivershisspeech“OntheCorrectHandlingofContradictionsamongthePeople.”InJune,thePeople'sDailystatesthatrightistsaretryingtooverthrowtheCommunistParty,andanAnti‐RightistCampaignislaunched.

1958

InMay,theGreatLeapForwardislaunchedwiththephrase“more,faster,better,andmoreeconomicallysoundly”asitsgeneralguidingprinciple.InAugust,atthePolitburo'sBeidaiheConference,thepeople'scommunesplanisendorsed;theplanresultsintheorganizationof26,000communesinlessthantwomonths.

1959

InMarch,theStateCouncilappointsthePanchenLamatochairthePreparatoryCommitteefortheTibetanAutonomousRegion.Democraticreforms

startinAprilinTibet.InApril,LiuShaoqireplacesMaoZedongaspresidentofthePRC,withSongQinglingandDongBiwuasdeputies.DuringJulyandAugust,anextremelyseriousdroughthitsvastareasofChina,affecting30percentofproductionfromtheland.RebellioneruptsinTibet.LinBiaoreplacesPengDehuaiasdefenseminister.

1960

InJuly,theSovietsnotifyChinaoftheirwithdrawaloftechnologicalsupport.WiththeexceptionofXinjiangandTibet,seriousfamineoccursacrossChina,causingtensofmillionsofdeaths.

1961

WuHan'scontroversialplayHaiRui'sDismissalispublishedinJanuary.TheTwenty‐sixthWorldTableTennisChampionshipstakesplaceinBeijing,withtheChinesewinningboththemen'sandwomen'ssinglestitles.

1962

InOctober,ChinesetroopslaunchmajoroffensivesontheSino‐Indianborder.Acease‐fireisdeclaredinNovember.MaoZedongstepsupemphasisonclassstruggle.

1963

InMay,MaoZedonglaunchesthesocialisteducationmovementinruralareas.

1964

InJanuary,ZhouEnlailaunchesanextensivetourofAfrica.InAugust,theUnitedStatesbombsNorthVietnam.InOctober,Chinacarriesoutitsfirstnucleartest.

1965

InMay,Chinacarriesoutitssecondnucleartest.InJune,theWenhuibaonewspaperdenouncesWuHan'sdramaHaiRui'sDismissalasananti‐Partypoisonousweed,therebysignalingthecomingoftheGreatCulturalRevolution.TheTibetanAutonomousRegionisformallyinauguratedinSeptember.

1966

InMay,thePolitburosetsuptheCulturalRevolution

GroupandcallsforattacksonallrepresentativesofthebourgeoisiewhohaveinfiltratedtheParty,government,army,andculturalworld.InJuly,MaoZedongswimsintheYangziRiveratWuhan,refutingtherumorthatheissick.InAugust,MaoZedong,LinBiao,andZhouEnlaipresideataCulturalRevolutionrallyinTiananmenSquareatwhichRedGuardsmaketheirfirstappearance.TheGuardssubsequentlybegindestroyinghistoricalrelics.ChairmanMao'sQuotationsarefirstpublishedintheformofthe“LittleRedBook.”DengXiaopingisoustedfromhisoffices.

1967

InJune,Chinatestsitsfirsthydrogenbomb.ByDecember25,Chinahasdistributed350millioncopiesofMao'sLittleRedBook.

1968

Thearmytakescontrolofgovernmentoffices,schools,andfactories.Millionsofyoungpeoplearesenttothecountrysidetoreceivere‐educationfrompeasants.

1969

InMarch,ChineseandSovietforcesclashatZhenbaodaoIslandintheUssuriRiver.Moreclashesoccurinthefollowingmonths.InJuly,theUnitedStatesliftsrestrictionsontraveltoChina;theUnitedStatesliftsitspartialtradeembargoofChinainDecember.LiuShaoqidies.

1970

InApril,Chinalaunchesitsfirstsatellite.

1971

InApril,theU.S.Ping‐PongteamvisitsChinaandisfollowedbyU.S.secretaryofstateHenryKissinger,whocomestoBeijinginJuly.InOctober,ChinaisadmittedtotheUnitedNations.

1972

InFebruary,PresidentRichardNixonvisitsChina,wherehesignsthejointShanghaiCommuniquéadmittingthatthereisbutoneChinaandthatTaiwanisapartofChina.InSeptember,ChinapurchasestenBoeing707civilianjetairlinersfromtheUnitedStates.

1973

DengXiaopingbecomesvicepremierinAugust.The

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UnitedStatesandChinaannouncetheirintentiontoestablishliaisonofficesineachother'scapital.

1974

InApril,DengXiaopingaddressestheUnitedNationsanddenouncestheworldhegemonyofthetwosuperpowers,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.

1975

InJanuary,DengXiaopingiselecteddeputychairmanoftheChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC).

1976

AhugeearthquakeinTangshan,acitynearBeijing,killsmorethan250,000people.PremierZhouEnlaidiesinJanuary,andMaoZedongdiesinSeptemberatageeighty‐two.Mao'sdeathendstheGreatCulturalRevolution.Theradicalgroupcalledthe“GangofFour,”ledbyMao'swidowJiangQing,isarrestedbyHuaGuofeng,Mao'shandpickedsuccessor.

1977

Universityadmissionsbasedoncollegeentranceexaminationsstart.Enrollmentbasedonrecommendationsends.DengXiaopingispoliticallyrehabilitated.

1978

The“Dengera”begins.DengXiaopingemergesasakeyleaderandsetsaboutrepairingthedamagecausedduringthelastyearsofMaoZedong'srule.Deng'smarket‐orientedreforms,embodiedinthemaxim“togetrichisglorious,”sparkmorethantwodecadesofphenomenalgrowththatliftshundredsofmillionsofpeopleoutofabjectpoverty.InDecember,theCoca‐ColaCompanyreachesanagreementwithChinatosellitssoftdrinksinthecountryandopenupbottlingplants.Inthesamemonth,theThirdPlenumoftheEleventhChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC)shiftstheParty'sfocustomodernization,whichisalsoseenastheonsetoftheeconomicreforms.

1979

InJanuary,DengXiaopingvisitstheUnitedStates

andresumestheSino‐Americandiplomaticrelationship.FromJanuarytoFebruary,ChinesetroopsinvadeVietnameseterritoryanddestroylogisticsfacilities.InJuly,theFifthNationalPeople'sCongress(NPC)announcestheCriminalLawandtheOrganicLawoftheLocalPeople'sCongressesandLocalPeople'sGovernments.Specialeconomiczonesareopened,includingShenzhen,Zhuhai,Shantou,andXiamen.InSeptember,thePartycriticizesMaoZedong'sCulturalRevolutionasilljudgedandcalamitous.InOctober,politicaldissidentWeiJingshengissentencedtofifteenyearsinprison.

1980

InFebruary,theNPCStandingCommitteedeclaresregulationsonissuanceofacademicdegrees.InDecember,thePeople'sDailydeclaresthatMaoZedongmadegreatmistakesduringhislastyearsandthathisGreatCulturalRevolutionwasadisaster.

1981

DengXiaopingiselectedchairmanoftheMilitaryCommission,andHuYaobangreplacesHuaGuofengaschairmanoftheChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC).BothZhaoZiyangandHuaGuofengareappointeddeputychairmen.ThetrialoftheGangofFourisheld.

1982

InSeptember,BritishprimeministerMargaretThatcherarrivesinBeijingtostartdiscussionswithregardtothefutureofHongKong.

1983

TheSelectedWorksofDengXiaopingispublishedinJuly.Sino‐BritishtalksoverHongKong'sfuturebegin.

1984

InOctober,theThirdPlenumoftheTwelfthChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC)adoptsadecisiononreformoftheeconomicstructure,shiftingthefocustourbanenterprises.MeasuresaretakentostrengthentheTibetaneconomy.FourteencoastalcitiesandtheislandofHainanareopenedtoforeigninvestment.ASino‐BritishdeclarationonHongKong'sreturnissigned.

1985

InMay,theChineseCommunistPartyCentralCommittee(CCPCC)releasesitsDecisionontheReformoftheEducationalSystem.

1986

InSeptember,DengXiaoping,duringa60MinutesinterviewwithMikeWallaceofCBS,endorsesMikhailGorbachev'sreformsintheSovietUnionandindicatesthatChina'seconomicreformsarenotinconflictwithcommunism.InSeptember,theShanghaiStockMarketreopensforthefirsttimesince1949.TheBankruptcyLawisissuedinDecember.InMayandDecember,studentsinlargecitiesstagedemonstrationsdemandingmorerapidreformsandmoredemocracy.

1987

Facedwithrisingdemocraticpressures,theChineseCommunistParty(CCP)reiteratesitsdeterminationtosticktothe“FourCardinalPrinciples.”HuYaobangresignsinJanuary.WriterLiuBingyanisexpelledfromtheParty.ZhaoZiyangisappointedgeneralsecretaryoftheCCP,replacingHuYaobang.Studentunrestoccursintwenty‐twoChinesecities.InNovember,DengXiaopingremainsincontroloftheCentralMilitaryCommission.InDecember,ZhaoZiyangresignsaspremierandisreplacedbyhard‐linerLiPeng.InOctober,2,000TibetanmonksdemonstrateinLhasainfavorofTibetanindependence;thedemonstrationsleadtoclasheswithChineseauthorities.

1988

Chinaslidesintoeconomicchaostriggeredbyrisinginflationthatpeaksatmorethan30percentinthecities.Publicdiscontentsetsthestageforprodemocracydemonstrationsin1989.Hainanisapprovedforprovincialstatus.ThefirstnudepaintingsexpositionisopenedinBeijinginDecember.

1989

OnMay16,DengXiaopingandMikhailGorbachevmeetandannouncethenormalizationofSino‐Sovietrelations.OnJune4,afterweeksofprotestsbystudentsinBeijing'sTiananmenSquare,troopsbackedbytankscrushthedemonstrations,allegedlykillinghundredsofpeople.Theeventonceagain

isolatesChinaontheworldstage.OnJune5,PresidentGeorgeBushsuspendshigh‐levelrelationswithBeijinginprotestagainstthemassacre.OnDecember10,U.S.nationalsecurityadviserBrentScowcroftmeetsDengXiaopinginBeijing.Afterthecrackdown,DengplucksJiangZeminfromrelativeobscurityinShanghaitobethenewCommunistPartychief.JiangreplacesZhaoZiyang.

1990

InJanuary,almost500studentswhoparticipatedinthedemonstrationsofthepreviousyeararereleasedfromdetention.InApril,PresidentYangShangkunpromulgatestheBasicLawoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegion(SAR)adoptedbytheSeventhNationalPeople'sCongress(NPC).ThelawisscheduledtotakeeffectonJuly1,1997.Campaignsthataimatstrengtheningpatriotismanddisciplinearelaunchedateducationalinstitutions.

1991

ThefirstpartialdirectelectionsareheldinHongKong.

1992

DuringhistourtoHainanandcoastalcities,DengXiaopingreiterateshisdeterminationtocontinueChina'seconomicreforms.BeijingestablishesdiplomaticrelationswithSouthKorea.

Wright,DavidCurtis."China:CivilWarinChina."TheHistoryofChina.SantaBarbara,CA:Greenwood,2001.DailyLifeOnline.ABC‐CLIO.5Oct2009.<http://dailylife.greenwood.com/dle.aspx?k=4&x=GR0940&=p=GR0940‐604&bc=>.

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DavidWrightanalysestheuseofpoliticalslogansinChina,thearticlefirstappearedinSACU'sChinaNowmagazine1989.

TheChineseCommunistPartyhasalwaysseenpropagandaasofgreatimportance,andtheslogan(kouhao)isonemethodofachievingtheaimsofthepropagandist.Itisusuallyshort,easytoremember,andneatlyencapsulatesaparticularlyimportantideaorcalltoaction.TheChineselanguagelendsitselfwelltosuchconciseexpressions,aseachcharacterrepresentsawordoridea.Soafour‐charactersloganmaywellrequireatleastsixormoreEnglishwordsinordertoexpressthesameidea.[Seealsoproverbs]TheslogansusedatvariousperiodssinceLiberationin1949showthechangingpoliticalimperativesandpoliciespromotedbythecentralgovernment.

为人民服务 Weirenminfuwu:Servethepeople

Atimelessslogan,firstusedinthe1940s,andoneofthefewwhichmaystillbeseentoday.

百花齐放,百家争鸣Baihuaqifang,baijiazhengming:Ahundredflowersbloom,a

hundredschoolsofthoughtcontend

Thisslogan,usedduringtheHundredFlowersperiodof1956‐57,harkedbacktothedistantpastduringtheWarringStatesperiod(476‐221BC)whenmanydifferentschoolsofphilosophyexistedinChina.Themodem'HundredSchoolsofThought'werethecriticismsoftheCommunistPartywhichMaoinvitedinlate1956,partlyinresponsetotheHungarianuprising.TheferocityandscaleofthediscontentwhichtheHundredFlowerscampaignrevealedseverelyshookthePartyleaders,andin1957manyofthosewhohadofferedtheircriticismswerepunishedaspartoftheAnti‐RightistCampaign,setinmotiontoeradicatethe'poisonousweeds'whichhadsprungupinsuchalarmingnumbers.

敢想敢干Ganxianggangan:Daretothink,daretoact

AsloganoftheGreatLeapForwardof1958‐60whenChairmanMaowasencouragingthepeasantstoformcommunesandtoincreaseproductiontounheard‐oflevels.Communismitselfwasthoughttobeimminent,andinafewyearstheindustrialcountriesoftheWestwouldbeovertaken.

农业学大寨NongyexueDazhai:Inagriculture,learn

fromDazhai

DazhaiisavillageinShanxiProvince,north‐westChina.In1964itwasheldupasamodelofwhatcouldbeachievedbyself‐relianceandcollectiveeffort.Fromthenuntil1979itwasoneofthemostfamousplacesinChina,andbrigadeleaderChenYongguitravelledallovertheworldtalkingaboutthespiritofDazhai.After1979Dazhai'sexamplewasrepudiated,andsince1983Dazhaihasbeenprivatised.

造反有理Zaofanyouli:Torebelisjustified

ARedGuardsloganoftheearlyCulturalRevolutionperiod(1966‐68).ChairmanMaohadencouragedattacksonvirtuallyalloftheexistingpartyapparatus,andthisrebellionextendedtoallformsofauthority:parents.,teachers,doctors,scientists,musicians,artistsandintellectualsofeverykindweretargetsofattack.Manycommittedsuicide,manymoreweresenttoworkonthelandinremoteareas.

批林批孔PiLinpiKong:CriticiseLinBiaoand

Confucius

ThecampaignagainstLinBiaostartedafterhis1971attempttoassassinateMao,andhisowndeathinaplanecrash,weremadepublic.AtfirstLinwasaccusedofbeingultra‐leftist,butlaterhewas(somewhatbizarrely)labelledasultra‐rightandin1974linkedwithConfucius,thesageofancientChina.ThecampaigntocriticiseLinBiaoandConfuciuswasreallyacovertattackonZhouEnlaiandhispolicies,viewedaspro‐modernisationandasless'radical'thanthosepromotedbyMaohimself.

实事求是Shishiqiushi:Seektruthfromfacts

Thiswasthecredoofthereformerswhofrom1977onwardsbegan'tosetthepoliticalagendaforChinaafterthedeathofMao.Itmeantthatfactsratherthanideologyshouldbethecriterionofthe'correctness'ofapolicy;thepolicyhadtoworkinpractice.DengXiaopinghimselfhadsaid,'Itdoesn'tmatterwhetheracatisblackorwhite,aslongasitcatchesthemouse.'Mouse‐catching(expertise)wasnowatamuchhigherpremiumthanpoliticalcolouring.ThisofcoursecontrastedcompletelywithMao'ssuspicionofhard‐headedempiricism.ForMao,theFoolishOldMan(acharacterinanancientChinesefableretoldbyMaotoencouragepeopletocontinuetostruggledespiteenormousdifficulties),hadshownthat'humanwillconquersheaven'andhadrefutedthescepticismoftheso‐calledexperts.

实现四个现代化Shixiansigexiandaihua:

AchievetheFourModernisations

TheFourModernisationsarethemodernisationofscience,industry,agricultureanddefence.ThereformersseemodernisationofChinainallthesefieldsastheprimarytaskfacingChinainthelatetwentiethcentury.Science,ratherthanmassmovementsandideologicalupheaval,isseenasthemeansbywhichChinawillachievesocialism.

只生一个孩子好Zhishengyigehaizihao:Itisgoodtohavejustonechild

SinceMao'sdeath,theproblemofrapidpopulationgrowthhasbeentreatedwith

Cultural Revolution Slogans greatseriousnessbytheChinesegovernment.On14thApril1989Chinamarked1.1billionpopulationdaywithexhortationstostrengthenfamilyplanning.Predictionsofseverehardshipandevenstarvationiftherateofgrowthisnotstemmedhavebeenreinforcedbycampaignstoencouragetheone‐childpolicy.Thishasnotbeencompletelysuccessful,partlybecauseitisdifficulttoimposesanctionsoncouplesinthecountrysidewhohavemorethanonechild.

Eventodayslogansdostillariseandwillcontinuetoappear,asgovernmentsofanypoliticalcolourneedtogetmessagesacrosstothepopulation,andslogansareaconvenientandeffectivewayofpackagingideas.ThehugeroadsideboardsinBeijingandotherbigcitiesusedtobecoveredwithquotationsfromMao,Marx,EngelsandLenin;nowforthemostpartthesehavedisappeared,replacedbycommercialadvertisementsandgovernmentpostersofalesspoliticalkind:promotinghealthcampaignsorbirthcontrol.Yetslogansarestillverymuchpartofpoliticallife.

©CopyrightSocietyforAnglo‐ChineseUnderstanding(SACU)2001reprintedfromSACU'smagazineChinaNow131,Page22.