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MODELS OF CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Edward Hall (60’s): The iceberg( ) gHampden-Turner & Trompenaars (90’s): The fifth dimension2000-:

Inglehart: WVSChokar: GLOBE Chokar: GLOBE

WORLD VALUES SURVEY97 countries90% f ld l90% of world populationwww.worldvaluessurvey.orgInglehart: Economic convergence does not equal cultural one

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WORLD VALUES SURVEY

WORLD VALUES MAP

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THE GLOBE PROJECT

170 researchers from 61 countriesNine dimensions based on Hofstede model and othersOrganization of 60 countries in ten countries in ten different clusters

THE GLOBE PROJECT

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THE GLOBE PROJECT

The GLOBE CLUSTERS

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Lewis Pyramid

Lewis Pyramid

Linear-Active: Introvert, calm, silent, single-task, planning,methodical punctual logic statistical data not very emotionalmethodical, punctual, logic, statistical data, not very emotional.Does not accept favours, fixed schedules, scarce body languagerarely interrupts, separates family and work, delegates.

Multi-Active: Extrovert, impatient, loquacious, gregarious,multitask, unpunctual, lack of planning skills, emotional, looksfor favours, interrupts, impulsive, extensive body language,delegates on the basis of relationship, mixes family and work.

R ti I t t l il t tf l d li tReactive: Introvert, calm, silent, respectful, good listener,punctual, holistic perspective, avoids confrontation, does notinterrupt, delegates on those he/she trusts, connects family andwork.

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Geert Hofstede

Mechanical Engineer (Delft University)Phd in Social Sciences (Groningen)Dtor. Research Centre RRHH IBM Visiting Prof at IMD, INSEAD.Doctor Honoris Causa by 11 yUniversitiesBooks translated into over 12 languages

HOFSTEDE’s MODEL

Research: From 1981 to 200474 countriesProblems vs Answers

A DIMENSION = VARIOUS PHENOMENANATIONAL CULTURES=HYBRIDS

POWER DISTANCEINDIVIDUALISM VS COLLECTIVISMINDIVIDUALISM VS COLLECTIVISMMASCULINITY VS FEMININITYUNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCECONCEPT OF TIME (Trompenaars)INDULGENCE VS RESTRAINT(2010-Minkow)

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Criticas a G. HofstedeCRÍTICA

Las encuestas no son una forma conveniente de medir las diferencias l lculturales.

Las naciones no son las unidades apropiadas para estudiar las culturas.Un estudio de las subsidiarias de una compañía no puede proporcionar información sobre la cultura de una nación.Cuatro o cinco dimensiones no son suficientes. Los datos de IBM son antiguos y, por lo tanto, obsoletos.

RESPUESTALas encuestas no son la única forma de medir las diferencias culturales, aunque eso no significa que no sean válidas.Pero es la única unidad disponible.Pero es la única unidad disponible.Cualquier conjunto de muestras funcionalmente equivalente puede proporcionar información sobre las diferencias entre culturas nacionales.Probablemente no, por lo que serán bienvenidas todas aquellas investigaciones que describan dimensiones adicionales estadísticamente independientes.Se asume que las dimensiones encontradas tienen un arraigo de cientos de años. Además, el autor con posterioridad realiza una réplica que publica en 2001 y que corrobora las dimensiones obtenidas.

McSweeney (2002) critics Sample: employees of IBM. Can their responses reflect national average?Hofstede argued that occupational cultures as national ones are early imprinted and difficult to change.The questionnaires were not designed for this study. They were developed to improve senior management interventions, so questions may not be suitablequestions may not be suitable.IBM data were restricted to the workplace. Other national populations such as unemployed , students, home-workers and others were ignored.

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POWER DISTANCE (I)

INEQUALITY: Physical or IntellectualQ yPower # Wealth # Status

Examples:

POWER DISTANCE (II)

LARGE PD CULTURES:Inequality is existentially accepted (Father-

children; Teacher-Student; Subordinate -Boss)SMALL PD CULTURES:

Low acceptance of inequality

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POWER DISTANCE (III)

IMPLICATIONS AT THE WORKPLACEHierarchical organizationsStrong supervision (employees like being told what to do) = Centralization of DecisionsStrong gaps in retribution systemB Old t li ti F thBoss = Old paternalistic FatherSymbols of status appreciated : cars, office...

PD: Symbols of Status

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PD: Respect for authority

Chinese LeadershipNobel Prize for Peace in China

POWER DISTANCE & ETHICS

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POWER DISTANCE

3,63,75,96,57

3

10

0

Oceania Américadel Norte

Europa Asia AmericaLatina

Africa

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P.D.: The Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International)

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3456789

012

Fin UK Ger Fr Sp It Che Pol Rus

COLLECTIVISM (I)

Most countries are collectivistCollectivism = Power of the Group = WE = Our identityIN - GROUP DEPENDENCE & LOYALTY: Extended Family (vs Nuclear); School group; Nuclear); School group; Professional Group; Friends Group; Religious community

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COLLECTIVISM (II)Recruitment (nepotism = reducing risks)P l l ti t th k lPersonal relations at the workplace.Promotion from inside based on seniorityPrivate life affectedRetribution not linked to performancePreferential treatment expectedT t l i l titiTrust people vs impersonal entitiesCommunication ( High context- Collectivist. Eg: Japan - Indirectness; Ambiguity; Body language)

CULTURAL COMPETITION

(IMARK CD – Vídeos de Inca Kola y de Cola Turka)

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COLLECTIVISM:PERU

COLLECTIVISM: TURKEY

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COLLECTIVISM: SAUDI ARABIA

COKE STRATEGY (Expansión.2 Oct.2006)

Coke launches special drinks for Moroccan and Ecuatorian inmigrants gin Spain

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MASCULINITY (I)

Biological Differences:AbsoluteGender Roles: Statistical & Cultural : Men can behave in a feminine way and the opposite- Eg Holland-Nurses / Russia-Doctors)Masculine Cultures: Distinct roles (social/job )(social/job..)Feminine Cultures: Feminine values are dominant

MASCULINITY (II)

“A society is called masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertiveare clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life”Hofstede (2005; pp.120)

WORK GOALS

Masculine: recognition; advancement; challenge; decisive manageriaEarnings; stress on results; competitive negotiationmanageriaEarnings; stress on results; competitive negotiation styleFeminine: Good relationships at work; cooperation; Living area; employment security; stress on process and consensus; conciliatory negotiation style

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UNCERTAINTY (II)

Human beings need to deal with guncertaintyControl Uncertainty= Low anxiety

Religion: control of personal futureLaw: control of unpredictable behaviour

Technology: control of natureTechnology: control of nature

Uncertainty = subjective experience (Eg: Masai / speed limit )Nonrational : Incomprehensible for others

Mario Vargas Llosa (El País 28 Agosto 2011)

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UNCERTAINTY (II)

High Anxiety vs Low Anxiety

Emotional vs InexpressiveRisk-taking attitudes (Car Speed)Attitude to Rules (written vs respected)Process vs Strategy (implementation vs planning)Emotional resistance to changeLow job movementPreference for large organizationsFear of failure vs hope of successFear of failure vs hope of successSpecialist career vs interdisciplinary knowledge

TIME

Long-Term = Polychronic Cultures (Portugal)

Multiple Times= Several tasks ( Move back & Forth) = Acceptance of changesShort- Term = Monochronic Cutures (USA)(USA)

Time is divided into segments and measured by the clock. Each task = one segment. Deadlines & completion of tasks

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Indulgence vs Restraint (i)

Indulgence vs Restraint (ii)

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Indulgence vs Restraint (iii)

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El País. 14/02/2012

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The wrong strategy of Latinamerican firms

-“Lack of LTO”-“Relationship+business is not common”p

- Embraer, Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A (Brasil) Factory built but withoutauthorization since April 2010. “China purchases components from any supplier ready to shareknow how, as URSS did; / Associated to local producer AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China). DilmaRousseff had to intervene with no success

- IMPSA. Industrias metalúrgicas Pescarmona (Argentina). “Asia is still an interesting marketthat we attack from Malasia, but not the home chinese market” “China will never give us permission toproduce there unless we give them our know-how, which we have painfully gained for over the last 100years”. Alliance with chinese Shangai Zhenhua Port Machinery (SZPM) for constructing cranes in Hong-Kong.Later SZPM became its main competitor with financial and tax help from the government.

- MADECO (Chile). Joint venture with the government: Beijing Cooper Tube (1987). They sold it in 1991.“ It is a pity; we should have been more patient”

- Mining Co. VALE (Chile)“They do not answer NO but they postpone the reply for too long. Time goesby and one desists”. (Carlos Martins, Marketing Manager)

F1

Diapositiva 44

F1 No consiguen vender más que materia prima. grandes dificultades, no entienden los tiempos ni el guanxi

1. la tercera del mundo detras de boeing y airbus. regulaciones, permisos y gestiones políticas que lahan mantenido al file del cierre definitivo. Joint venture con AVIV aviation industry corporation of china. Harbin.Su eterna rival , la canadiense BOMBARDIER en los jets regionales, su representante en China Jianwei Zhang consigue que ciere acuerdo con Commercial Aircrat, lo que la otra no fue autorizada y aunque parecía un negocio absurdo, sin beneficios GUANXI EN ESTADO PURO, realmente le interesaba metro y ferrocarriles.

2. iMPSA un brazo industrial. se establecieron en Hong Kong para poveer de gruas al puerto de Shanghai. Empezaron con un subcontratista chino, pero problemas y empezaron a competir con él que finalmente se convirtión en Shanghasi Zhenhua Port Machinery: subsidios del estado, le regalaron un puerto, 10 barcos,....

3. Tb. una joint venture, pero malos resultados económicos para arcas d eempresas chilenas, vendieron su parte en el 91 al gobierno chino.

PARA CHINOS LA PRESENCIA COMERCIAL DE OCCIDENTALES TIENE EL SIGNO DE LA FUGACIDAD., LATINOS NO TIENE LA PACIENCIA PARA LLEVAR LOS TRÁMITES QUE ELLO IMPLICA"

pollo campero, mayor cadan lationamerina. 2006 entra en shanghai, calculaba en 2007 tener cuatro locales. hoy cero. debia operar dos años antes de vender franquicias

Nos pedian dos años de gracia, los chinos a los que vendiamos franquicia. no vimos guanxi solo que nos querian robar la receta. KFC 10 AÑOS PAR ENTRARBURGER Y PIZZ NUNCAFlowana; 12/03/2012

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The wrong strategy of Latinamerican firms

-Brightstar (Bolivia). The most global co. of latinamerica. Marcelo Claure, president and founder. He ishyperactive and cannot stand up with their time management.hyperactive and cannot stand up with their time management.

- Buses Marcopolo S.A (Brasil). No problem in Egypt and Southafrica. “We cannot produce buses.Only parts and components. Why aren’t we allowed the same authorization than local manufacturers? Ourcompetitive advantage is volume and here we are not allowed to gain it” (Rubens de la Rosa)

-Pollo campero (Guatemala) 300 restaurants in Latinamerica; 100 in USA, Spain, Middle East,Indonesia and India. It broke into China in 2006. The forecast was 300 restaurants in 5 years. By themiddle of 2007 they had just four. Today none. They had to wait for 2 years before starting the franchisinggrowth. “The state participates in everything; they are the owners of the land, interfere with suppliers,and are constantly supervising the business development; to keep an adequate flow of customers themenu should be changed not every month but every week” (Juan José Gutierrez. CEO) The main reasonto leave China was that , after waiting for 2 years, the first franchisee asked for 2year-period withoutto leave China was that , after waiting for 2 years, the first franchisee asked for 2year period withoutpaying for the brand or products. “We had the impression that they just wanted to learn the recipes to goon alone in the business”. KFC needed º10 years to succeed in China; Burguer King and Pizza Hut werenever successful. Campero decided to leave China and invest those resources in new markets such as USAand Europe. The Pollo Campero outlet in Walt Disney is very successful and 38% of the customers areChinese¡¡¡.

F3

The right strategy in China

Bombardier (Canadá) “ Relationships are crucial in China. To be successful in the long term you need a l f ” ( d ) h d h h ’ h h dlot of patience”. (Pierre Beaudoin. CEO). They entered China in the 50’s with MAO. They signed an agreement with the Chinese Commercial Aircraft Corp (COMAC) to produce small aircraft. This is not part of their core business. It is a technique to create guanxi. Their interest is in the profitable Railway business in China, where they have 4000 employees and have built the subway in Ghuanzhou and Shenzen, the train line to Beijing airport and high speed trains

-ALSA (Spain): 6 years to obtain the exclusive agreement.

-Compañía sudamericana de vapores (Chile): The president built a strong guanxi with Deng Xiao Ping

-BIMBO (Méjico). Bought a Spanish operation in China.

F2

Diapositiva 45

F3 No consiguen vender más que materia prima. grandes dificultades, no entienden los tiempos ni el guanxi

1. la tercera del mundo detras de boeing y airbus. regulaciones, permisos y gestiones políticas que lahan mantenido al file del cierre definitivo. Joint venture con AVIV aviation industry corporation of china. Harbin.Su eterna rival , la canadiense BOMBARDIER en los jets regionales, su representante en China Jianwei Zhang consigue que ciere acuerdo con Commercial Aircrat, lo que la otra no fue autorizada y aunque parecía un negocio absurdo, sin beneficios GUANXI EN ESTADO PURO, realmente le interesaba metro y ferrocarriles.

2. iMPSA un brazo industrial. se establecieron en Hong Kong para poveer de gruas al puerto de Shanghai. Empezaron con un subcontratista chino, pero problemas y empezaron a competir con él que finalmente se convirtión en Shanghasi Zhenhua Port Machinery: subsidios del estado, le regalaron un puerto, 10 barcos,....

3. Tb. una joint venture, pero malos resultados económicos para arcas d eempresas chilenas, vendieron su parte en el 91 al gobierno chino.

PARA CHINOS LA PRESENCIA COMERCIAL DE OCCIDENTALES TIENE EL SIGNO DE LA FUGACIDAD., LATINOS NO TIENE LA PACIENCIA PARA LLEVAR LOS TRÁMITES QUE ELLO IMPLICA"

pollo campero, mayor cadan lationamerina. 2006 entra en shanghai, calculaba en 2007 tener cuatro locales. hoy cero. debia operar dos años antes de vender franquicias

Nos pedian dos años de gracia, los chinos a los que vendiamos franquicia. no vimos guanxi solo que nos querian robar la receta. KFC 10 AÑOS PAR ENTRARBURGER Y PIZZ NUNCAFlowana; 12/03/2012

Diapositiva 46

F2 No consiguen vender más que materia prima. grandes dificultades, no entienden los tiempos ni el guanxi

1. la tercera del mundo detras de boeing y airbus. regulaciones, permisos y gestiones políticas que lahan mantenido al file del cierre definitivo. Joint venture con AVIV aviation industry corporation of china. Harbin.Su eterna rival , la canadiense BOMBARDIER en los jets regionales, su representante en China Jianwei Zhang consigue que ciere acuerdo con Commercial Aircrat, lo que la otra no fue autorizada y aunque parecía un negocio absurdo, sin beneficios GUANXI EN ESTADO PURO, realmente le interesaba metro y ferrocarriles.

2. iMPSA un brazo industrial. se establecieron en Hong Kong para poveer de gruas al puerto de Shanghai. Empezaron con un subcontratista chino, pero problemas y empezaron a competir con él que finalmente se convirtión en Shanghasi Zhenhua Port Machinery: subsidios del estado, le regalaron un puerto, 10 barcos,....

3. Tb. una joint venture, pero malos resultados económicos para arcas d eempresas chilenas, vendieron su parte en el 91 al gobierno chino.

PARA CHINOS LA PRESENCIA COMERCIAL DE OCCIDENTALES TIENE EL SIGNO DE LA FUGACIDAD., LATINOS NO TIENE LA PACIENCIA PARA LLEVAR LOS TRÁMITES QUE ELLO IMPLICA"

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They remember that there are just 200 years inhuman history when China and India were notthe worldwide driving forces.

They have seen Dutch, British, Portuguesemerchants come and go, and therefore theyperceive western presence as transitory innature. From their point of view,Latinmultinationals are only beginners that haveto learn a lot from other companies that haveto learn a lot from other companies that havebeen operating in China for longer.

“Long-term commitment is crucial” MichaelDavid. Senior Consultant Boston ConsultingGroup.