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MISSION SAFETY EVALUATIONREPORT FOR STS-39

Postflight Edition

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Safety Division

Office of Safety and Mission Quality

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546

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https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19920011935 2018-07-26T14:20:08+00:00Z

MISSION SAFETY EVALUATIONREPORT FOR STS-39

Postflight Edition: August 30, 1991

Safety Division



Washington, DC 20546

MISSION SAFETY EVALUATION

REPORT FOR STS-39

Postflight Edition: August 30; 1991

Prepared by: _e__

Space_huttle Safety Project _

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William C. Hill

Space Shuttle Safety Project

Vitro Corporation

Concur by:

Approved by:

/Seyr_ur I. Finkel

Manager, Space Shuttle Safety Project

Vitro Corporation

G

,-//71 Lc_o,,-;_Z__ ........Je'?ry F. Moore, PE

Manager, Space Shuttle Safety Program

Safety Division


Director

Safety Division


STS-39 Postflight Edition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After a delay of approximately two months due to a rollback from the pad to

replace the External Tank door lug housing, Space Shuttle Discovery was launched from

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at 7:33 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 28,

1991. STS-39 was the first unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) Shuttle mission.

The purpose of this mission was to test sensors and tracking devices for the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI). The amount and quality of Air Force/SDI data collected

significantly exceeded expectations.

On April 28, countdown proceeded normally through the T-20 minute hold. No

significant problems were encountered except for the Operations Sequence (OPS)-2

recorder starting unexpectedly; it was stopped by an uplink command. The T-9 minute

hold was extended to evaluate the OPS-2 recorder anomaly. It was determined that

there was no problem with the Orbiter's computers. The countdown was then resumed,

and Space Shuttle Discovery was subsequently launched.

STS-39/OV-104 ascent performance was nominal. However, approximately

15 minutes after Main Engine Cutoff (MECO), Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) #2 Fuel

Pump (FP)/Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) coolant system "A" Flow Control

Valve (FCV) was not pulsing as commanded. Coolant system "B" was selected, and

nominal cooling occurred. Coolant system "A" was not used during entry, and therefore

did not impact entry operations.

Payload operations were very successful. However, the sun sensor used for

alignment of the Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS) deployed on Flight Day (FD) 3

repeatedly swung SPAS into the wrong attitude. The cause of the original sun sensor

anomaly was not determined. The SPAS was redeployed on FD 4, with no problems

experienced. Discovery performed 60 rocket firings at various distance from the SPAS

over a 36-hour period.

Discovery landed on KSC runway 15 at 2:55 p.m. EDT on May 6, 1991. This was

the second time in 6 months that the Space Shuttle was diverted to KSC for landing

because of high winds at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. This was also the

seventh of 40 Shuttle missions to land at KSC in the history of the Space Shuttle

Program. The Main Landing Gear (MLG) outer right tire shredded 3 of the 16 cords

due to either an uneven landing or a maximum-force breaking test during rollout.

Contributing factors to the tire cord shredding were the development of last-minute

crosswinds and reluctance of the ground controllers to distract the Shuttle pilots with

warnings of the low flightpath. As a corrective action, communication procedures will be

modified for future flights to allow ground controllers more latitude to talk to the crew.


FOREWORD

The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document that

is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission

Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space Shuttle

flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change,

or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board

(PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk factors

impacting the STS-39 flight were also documented prior to the STS-39 Flight Readiness

Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and the STS-39 Launch Minus Two-Day (L-2) Review

(L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety risk

factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.

The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is

updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in

final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

APPENDIX A

INTRODUCTION .......................................

1.1 Purpose ...........................................

1.2 Scope ............................................

1.3 Organization .......................................

STS-39 MISSION SUMMARY ..............................

2.1 Summary Description of the STS-39 Mission ...............

2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data ..................................2.3 Miscellaneous Items of Interest for the STS-39 Mission .......

2.4 Payload Data .......................................

SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BYSTS-39 ANOMALIES ....................................

RESOLVED STS-39 SAFETY RISK FACTORS ................

STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES ...........................



BACKGROUND INFORMATION ..........................

LIST OF ACRONYMS ..............................

1-1

1-1

1-1

1-2

2-1

2-1

2-3

2-5

2-6

3-1

4-1

5-1

6-1

7-1

8-1

A-1


SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office

of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with

the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the

Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects

Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some

changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their

significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which

were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis

process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptancerationale.

1.2 Scope

This report addresses STS-39 safety risk factors that represen t a change from

previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and

factors that are unique to this flight.

Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the

potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for

discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as

issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower

level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is

assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not

appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential

concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length

and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System

(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specificallyidentified as such.

Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE

data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)

and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center

(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add

items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document

performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.

- 1-1 STS-39 Postfiight Edition

1.3 Organization

The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:

Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,

and organization.

Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-39 mission,

including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and

landing sites, and other mission- and payload-relatedinformation.

Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved

or not a safety concern prior to STS-39 launch, that wereimpacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-39flight.

Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were consideredresolved for STS-39.

Section 5 Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed

during the STS-37 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.

Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-41

mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle (OV-103).

Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-39

mission. Those IFAs considered to represent a safety risk will

be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle flight.

Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,

problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3

through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the

MSE, but is available upon request. It contains presentation

data, white papers, and other documentation. These data were

used to support the resolution rationale or retention of openstatus for each item discussed in the MSE.

Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.

1-2 STS-39 Postflight Edition

SECTION 2

STS-39 MISSION SUMMARY

2.1 Summary Description of the STS-39 Mission

After a delay of approximately two months due to a rollback from the pad to

replace the External Tank door lug housing, Space Shuttle Discovery was launched from

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at 7:33 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on April 28,

1991. STS-39 was the first unclassified Department of Defense (DoD) Shuttle mission.

The purpose of this mission was to test sensors and tracking devices for the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI). The amount and quality of Air Force/SDI data collected

significantly exceeded expectations.

On April 28, countdown proceeded normally through the T-20 minute hold; no

significant problems were encountered. When countdown was resumed at the end of the

T-20 minute hold, the Operations Sequence (OPS)-2 recorder started unexpectedly; it

was stopped by an uplink command. Countdown then proceeded to the T-9 minute

hold, which was extended to evaluate the OPS-2 recorder anomaly. It was determined

that there was no problem with the Orbiter's computers. The countdown was then

resumed from the T-9 minute point, and Space Shuttle Discovery was subsequentlylaunched.

STS-39/OV-104 ascent performance was nominal. However, approximately

15 minutes after Main Engine Cutoff (MECO), Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) #2 Fuel

Pump (FP)/Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM) coolant system "A" Flow Control

Valve (FCV) was not pulsing as commanded. Coolant system "B" was selected, and

nominal cooling occurred. Coolant system "A" was not used during entry and, therefore,

did not impact entry operations.

With the exception of one malfunction, the Quadruple Ion-Neutral Mass

Spectrometer (QINMS) cover did not move when first commanded, all payload

operations were nominal on Flight Day (FD) 1. However, the QINMS cover was

commanded to move a second time, and operation was normal. The OPS-2 recorder

that had unexpectedly gone to "record" prior to launch performed nominally.


On FD 2, the Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for Shuttle (CIRRIS)data acquisition quantity wasabove expectation;9 of the 17CIRRIS experimentswerecompleted. By the end of the mission,the CIRRIS infrared telescopecompleted 15ofthe 17CIRRIS data takes; overall CIRRIS data acquisition was 150% of the plannedpre-mission data.

On FD 3, the Infrared Background SignatureSurvey (IBSS) was releasedusingDiscovery's Remote Manipulator System (RMS). The Shuttle Pallet Satellite (SPAS) was

also deployed successfully. However, the sun sensor used for the SPAS alignment

repeatedly swung it into the wrong attitude; this delayed the associated experiments for

about 9 hours. The SPAS was redeployed on FD 4, with no problems experienced.

Discovery performed 60 rocket firings at various distance from the SPAS over a 36-hour

period. The cause of the original sun sensor anomaly was not determined.

On FD 5, the Chemical Release Observation (CRO) experiment "B" was deployed,

and CRO activities were successfully completed on FD 6. The SPAS/IBSS payload was

reberthed and placed on Orbiter power via the Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical

(ROEU).

Discovery landed on KSC runway 15 at 2:55 p.m. EDT on May 6, 1991. This was

the second time in 6 months that the Space Shuttle was diverted to KSC for landing

because of high winds at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. This was also the

seventh of 40 Shuttle missions to land at KSC in the history of the Program. During

landing, the Main Landing Gear (MLG) right-side tires contacted the runway before the

MLG left-side tires; 168 feet from the threshold for the right tires and 383 feet for the

left tires. The MLG outer right tire shredded 3 of its 16 cords due to either the uneven

landing or a maximum-force breaking test during rollout. Rollout lasted for 56 seconds;

braking pressure was applied for 36 seconds of this time. Contributing factors to the tire

cord shredding were development of last-minute crosswinds and reluctance of the ground

controllers to distract the Shuttle pilots with warnings of the low flightpath. As a

corrective action, communication procedures will be modified for future flights to allow

ground controllers more latitude to talk to the crew.


2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data

• Launch Date: April 28, 1991

• Launch Time: 7:33 a.m. EDT

• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A

RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility

TAL Site: Zaragosa, Spain

Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain

Landing Site: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 15

Landing Date: May 6, 1991

Landing Time: 2:55 p.m. EDT

Mission Duration: 8 Days, 7 Hours, 22 Minutes

Crew Size: 7

Inclination: 57.0*, Direct Insertion

Orbit: 140 x 140 Nautical Miles

Orbiter: OV-103 (12)Discovery

ET-46

SRBs: BI-043

RSRM Flight Set #15

MLP #2


ENGINE #2026 #2030 #2029

POWERHEAD #2030 #2015 #2027

MCC* #2104 #2026 #4012

NOZZLE #4014 #4013 #4015

CONTROLLER F19 F17 F22

FASCOS* # 11 #26 #28

HPFTP* #4012R1 #4011R2 #2126

LPFTP* # 2025 R2 # 2027 # 2029

HPOTP* #2226R3 #4506R 1 #4008R3

LPOTP* #2224 #2020 #2121

* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.


2.3 Miscellaneous Items of Interest for the STS-39 Mission.

This was the second mission with the new AP-101S General Purpose

Computer (GPC) in all 6 GPC positions (5 active, 1 spare).

This was the second mission using the OI-08F software release for the

Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) and the Backup Flight Software

(BFS). This was also the second mission using the AR-02 software release in

the Main Engine Controller (MEC).

The Hydrogen Dispersal System was installed on Mobile Launch Platform

(MLP) #2 prior to the first STS-39 pad evolution in February 1991.

The 31 pounds per square inch gage (psig) Gaseous Oxygen (GO2) Flow

Control Valves (FCVs) were shimmed to the step #1 FCV configuration;

93% in high flow and 55% in low flow.

During the first STS-39 pad evolution, an anomaly occurred with the Right-

Hand (RH) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Range Safety System (RSS)

Automatic Gain Control (AGC). The AGC signal level was reported to be

6 decibels (dB) below normal, but not out-of-specification. Troubleshooting

could not be scheduled prior to rollback of STS-39 to the Vehicle Assembly

Building (VAB). During the second pad test evolution, no problems were

encountered with the RSS AGC. Troubleshooting performed to recreate the

earlier anomaly was unsuccessful. A special open-loop test was also

conducted with the RSS transmitter in the launch configuration (in the high-

power, omni-directional mode). All RSS receivers responded properly during

this test. This anomaly was dispositioned as unexplained; the Eastern Test

Range Safety Organization concurred. No postflight anomalies were reported

for this system.


2.4 Payload Data

The STS-39 mission was the first unclassified Department of Defense (DoD)

dedicated Space Shuttle mission, highlighted by around-the-clock observations of the

atmosphere, gas releases, Shuttle engine firings, subsatellite gas releases, and the

Shuttle's orbital environment encompassing a wavelength range from infrared to the farultraviolet.

The Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) was flown for the first time

on STS-39/OV-103. The ROEU provides a capability for remote separation (or

connection) of electrical services between the Orbiter and the payload. System control

(mate/demate process) is performed from the Orbiter aft fight deck. Active elements of

the ROEU were incorporated in the Orbiter-mounted portion of the system located on

the payload bay longeron.

Payload Bay:

Air Force Program-675 (AFP-675) -- collected infrared data to support the

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Program. AFP-675 is an experiment support

system consisting of the Shuttle and 5 sensing instruments. The sensinginstruments included:

Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for Shuttle (CIRRIS) --

obtained simultaneous spectral and spatial measurements of airglow andauroral emissions.

Far Ultraviolet Camera (FAR UV) Experiment -- used for imaging and

photometry of natural and man-made far ultraviolet emission

phenomena.

-- Uniformly Redundant Array (URA) -- studied astrophysical sources of

x-ray radiation.

-- Quadruple Ion-Neutral Mass Spectrometer (QINMS) -- determined ion

and neutral contamination species identification for CIRRIS.

Horizon Ultraviolet Program (HUP) -- demonstrated the capability to

measure spatial and spectral characteristics of the Earth's horizon as

observed in the ultraviolet wavelength region and to analyze Shuttle

contamination.


Infrared Background SignatureSurvey (IBSS) --was composed of 3 separate

elements: the Shuttle Pallet Satellite-II (SPAS-II), the Critical Ionization

Velocity (CIV) package, and the Chemical Release Observation (CRO)

experiment.

The SPAS-II element incorporated a liquid-helium-cooled infrared

sensor, the Arizona Imager/Spectrograph (A/S) multispectral sensor,

2 low-light television cameras, and various support subsystems. SPAS-II

was deployed from the Orbiter using the Remote Manipulator System

(RMS), and gathered spectral and spatial data during several

experiments.

The CRO experiment collected infrared, visible, and ultraviolet time-

resolved radiometric data associated with the release of liquid rocket

propellants in near Earth orbit. The CRO consists of 3 subsatellites and

associated launcher systems. Each satellite was loaded with a different

chemical: Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH) -- CRO A, Unsymmetric

Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH) -- CRO B, and Nitrogen Tetroxide (N204)-- CRO C.

The CIV package investigated the interaction of neutral gases with the

ambient weakly-magnetized plasma. The CIV element included

4 compressed gas canisters (xenon, neon, carbon dioxide, and nitrous

oxide) that released plumes of gas out of the Orbiter bay upon crew

command. The SPAS-II and the CIV monitor system observed the gas

as it was released.

Space Test Program-01 (STP-01) -- consisted of 5 experiments, including

instrument electronics and control systems mounted on a Hitchhiker-M cross-

bay carrier.

Advanced Liquid Feed Experiment (ALFE) -- studied zero-gravity

performance of liquid collection systems. The ALFE provided the first

spaceflight demonstration of an electronic pressure regulator and a series

of ultrasonic propellant-level and flow-sensing systems that are key

components of an advanced spacecraft propulsion system.

-- Ascent Particle Monitor (APM) -- measured particle activity in the

payload bay during the immediate prelaunch period and during ascent.

Ultraviolet Limb Imaging (UVLIM) Experiment -- studied the

composition of the atmosphere using measurements of the ultraviolet

airglow.


Data SystemExperiment (DSE) -- evaluated the performance of the MIL

VAX computer and Erasable Optical Disk (EOD) in a microgravityenvironment.

Spacecraft Kinetic Infrared Test (SKIRT) -- measured the atomic o_gen

glow effect in visible, infrared, and ultraviolet spectra. The SKIRT

consisted of 2 separate and independent components: the Gaseous

Luminosity of Optical Surface (GLOS) and Circular Variable Filter

(CVF).

Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister (MPEC) -- is a modified Get Away Special

(GAS) canister containing an ejectable experiment.

Ultraviolet Plume Instrument (UVPI) -- obtained imagery and/or signature data

of the Orbiter for space-based ultraviolet sensors on the UVPI satellite.

Middeek:

Cloud Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems (CLOUDS)-IA-1 -- is a hand-

held 35 mm camera for use by the crew to take a series of high-resolution

photographs of cloud formation, dissipation, and opaqueness.

Radiation Monitoring Equipment (RME) III-03 -- measured the rate and

dosage of ionizing radiation to the crew at different locations throughout the

Orbiter cabin. The hand-held instrument measures gamma ray, electron,

neutron, and proton radiation, and calculates the amount of exposure.


SECTION 3

SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-39 ANOMALIES

This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety

concern) for STS-39 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or

related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-39 flight (see Section 7). The list

indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item

is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description

of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.


Section 4:

Orbiter 5

ITEM

Resolved STS-39 Safe_ Ri_k Factors

Potential for lube oil leak

on STS-39/OV-103

Auxiliary Power Unit

(APU) #2, Serial Number

(S/N) 301, gearbox.

COMMENT

STS-39/OV-103 APU #2, S/N 301, was

observed with signs of lube oil around

the gearbox seam. This observation was

made during lube oil drain operations.The exact source of the oil was

unknown; oil was presumed to have

leaked from the gearbox. Initial

troubleshooting included wiping the

gearbox seam clean and pressurizing the

gearbox to 50 pounds per square inch

absolute (psia), greater than 2 times the

gearbox operating pressure. Post-

pressurization inspection found slight

traces of lube oil. The gearbox was

serviced and again pressurized to 50

psia. Inspection found no new signs of

lube oil; however, a minor pressure

drop was noted during this period (less

than 2 psia). This pressure drop was

believed to have been due to pressure

released through the seal cavity drain

vent. The APU gearbox condition was

reviewed by the Material Review Board

and approved for flight "as is".

During STS-39 entry, APU #2,

S/N 301, lube oil outlet pressure was

low, reading 25 psia; nominal outlet

pressure is 40 to 50 psia (IFA No.

STS-39-V-11). Postflight visual

inspection of the aft compartment atKSC showed no indication of a leak.

This was the first APU lube oil

pressure-low anomaly in the Program.Previous lube oil anomalies were

related to high lube oil outlet pressure.It was concluded that the low oil

pressure was due to low oil quantity,

which occurred prior to flight during the

Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) ullage

check processing.


ITEM

Section 4: Resolved STS-39 Safety_ Risk Factors

SRM 2 Inner Boot Ring (IBR)

bond line separation on

STS-38 Right-Hand (RH)

Solid Rocket Motor

(SRM).

COMMENT

No SRM IBR anomalies were reported

on STS-39. Postflight inspection of

STS-39 did, however, identify 11

circumferential areas of erosion/

washing and wedgeouts in the nozzle

cowl/Outer Boot Ring (OBR) (IFA No.

STS-39-M-01). A trend assessment

performed using Redesigned Solid

Rocket Motor (RSRM) historical flight

data indicated no general trend of

degraded performance or increased

wedgeouts or washouts. The trendassessment also determined that the

STS-39 RH cowl wedgeouts represented

the worst case to date for a flight motor.

Relative to the OBR, the trend

assessment illustrated a small decrease

of the mean margin of safety; however,

no violation of the safety factor

requirements was indicated.


SECTION 4

RESOLVED STS-39 SAFETY RISK FACTORS

This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered

resolved for STS-39. These items were reviewed by the NASA Safety Community. A

description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety

risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings

resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review

(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special

panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with

actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve

each specific problem.

Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section arelisted beneath the risk factor title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the

risk factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure

classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HRlisted.

The following risk factors in this section represent a low-to-moderate increase in

risk above the Level I approved hazard risk baseline. The NASA Safety Communityassessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated increase

was acceptable.

Integration 1

Integration 2

New Criticality 1 and 1R2 failure modes have been identified for

the Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid RocketBoosters.

Upgrade of Engine Interface Unit loss of output Critical Items List

to Criticality 1/1.


ELEMENT/

SEQ. NO.

SECTION 4 INDEX


RISK

FACTOR PAGE

INTEQRATIQN

1

2

3

New Criticality 1 and 1R2 failure modes have been identified for the

Rate Gyro Assemblies on the Orbiter and Solid Rocket Boosters.

Upgrade of Engine Interface Unit loss of output Critical Items List toCriticality 1/1.

Backup Flight Software can hang in a "wait" state failure mode.

4-4

4-8

4-9

ORBITER

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

OV-102 20-psi helium regulator leak. 4-12

STS-39/OV-103 pilot-side Display Driver Unit Attitude Direction 4-14Indicator ball hesitation.

STS-37/OV-104 Auxiliary Power Unit #3, Serial Number 307, 4-16

uncommanded Gas Generator Valve Module Shutoff Valve motion.

Lack of weld penetration on STS-39/OV-103 Reaction Control System 4-18thruster R3A, Serial Number 218.

Potential for lube oil leak on STS-39/OV-103 Auxiliary Power 4-20

Unit #2, Serial Number 301, gearbox.

New Data Processing System failure could lead to a Criticality 1/1 4-21condition.

Potential for new General Purpose Computers to erroneously 4-23overwrite memory.

Cracked lugs in STS-39/OV-103 Orbiter/External Tank umbilical 4-26door mechanism.

Cabin pressure bleed valve anomalies on OV-105. 4-30

Main Propulsion System 3-way helium solenoid valve failed leak tests 4-32on OV-102.

Gaseous Hydrogen Flow Control Valve weld crack found on OV-103. 4-36

New General Purpose Computer, AP-101S, failure mode. 4-38

STS-37/OV-104 short touchdown on Edwards Air Force Base lakebed 4-39

runway.


SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED


ELEMENT/

SEQ. NO.

RISK

FACTOR PAGE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

SRM

3

4

5

6

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump first-stage turbine disc cracking.

High-pressure fuel duct flange radius cracking.

Suspected contamination of engine #2029 High-Pressure Oxidizer

Turbopump.

Pogo standpipe thermal insulator may have been inadvertently

removed during final engine assembly.

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump coolant weld leak.

Engine #2011 found with a leak in the Main Combustion Chamber

Augmented Spark Igniter.

Potential for pad abort caused by purge check valve seat leakage.

Potential for loss of Space Shuttle Main Engine controller redundancy.

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump second-stage turbine blades found

rubbing coolant jet tubes on Unit Number 6009.

Engine #0213 G-15 seal failed during ground testing at Stennis Space

Center.

Test and Evaluation Motor-7 fixed housing ablative liner debond.

Inner Boot Ring bond line separation on STS-38 right-hand SolidRocket Motor.

Room-Temperature Vulcanizing was found past the primary O-ring of

nozzle joint #5 on disassembly of Test and Evaluation Motor-7.

Thermal Protection System damage on STS-39 right-hand Solid

Rocket Booster forward assembly.

STS-39 right-hand Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control

hydraulic reservoirs bottomed out in fill direction during Shuttle

Interface Test hydraulic power-up.

STS-37 Right-Hand cowl bond line blowpaths.

4-43

4-45

4-46

4-47

4-48

4-50

4-51

4-53

4-54

4-55

4-57

4-58

4-59

4-61

4-62

4-63


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SECTION 5

STS-37 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES

This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the

STS-37/OV-104 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly

described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided. Orbital

Manuvering System (OMS) pod RP03, last used on STS-38/OV-104, has been installed

on STS-39/OV-103. The STS-38 IFA relating to the thruster anomaly on RP03 isaddressed in this section as Orbiter 1.

Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are

listed beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the

anomaly, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure



ELEMENT/

SEQ. NO.

SECTION 5 INDEX


ANOMALY PAGE

ORBITER

1

2

3

4

5

6

Thruster R1U showed low Chamber Pressure on RP03/STS-38.

(IFA No. STS-38-V-07)

Reaction Control System primary thruster R1U failed off during

External Tank separation maneuver.

Water Spray Boiler #2 did not cool Auxiliary Power Unit lube oil

while under operation of controller "A".

Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Oxygen manifold valve #2failed to close when commanded.

Indications of low Chamber Pressure on primary thrusters L1U and

L1L during interconnect operations.

Backup Flight Software navigation initialization anomaly.

5-3

5-5

5-7

5-8

5-9

5-10

SRB

1 Left-hand forward skirt skin panel buckling. 5-12


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SECTION 6



STS-41/OV-103 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle. Each anomaly is

briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.

Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each anomaly in this section are



classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR

listed.


SECTION 6 INDEX

STS-41INFLIGHT ANOMALIES

ELEMENT/SEQ. NO. ANOMALY

INTEGRATION

1

2

3

System Management Nominal Bus Assignment Table General Purpose

Computer #2 assignment anomaly on STS-41.

Aft compartment hydrogen concentration high during ascent.

Left-Hand Solid Rocket Booster aft strut separation device NASA

Standard Initiator detonator separated from the pressure cartridge.

PAGE

6-3

6-4

6-7

ORBITER

1

2

3

4

5

6

Auxiliary Power Unit #1 Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater system "B" 6-10

failed "on" during STS-41.

Inertial Measurement Unit #1 experienced Z-axis accelerometer 6-13transients.

Backup Flight Software backup cabin delta pressure/delta 6-15

temperature alarm was triggered at Main Engine Cutoff.STS-41 Commander's Left-Hand Attitude Direction Indicator rate 6-16

scale switch failure.

Orbiter/External Tank Liquid Hydrogen aft attach/separation hole 6-18

plugger failed.

STS-41 Left-Hand Rotation Hand Controller trim inhibit switch 6-19

indicated a contact miscompare.


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SECTION 7



STS-39/OV-103 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance

information and rationale are provided.

Hazard Report (HR) numbers associated with each risk factor in this section are





SECTION 7 INDEX


ELEMENT/

SEQ. NO.

RISK

FACTOR

INTEGRATION

Abort Region Determinator indicated different abort boundary times

than expected.

PAGE

7-3

ORBITER

1

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

Flash Evaporator System feedline "A", system #2, heater failure.

Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Fuel Pump/Gas Generator Valve Module

coolant system "A" valve did not open.

Reaction Control System vernier thruster F5R fuel injector

temperature biased low.

Operations recorder #2 uncommanded configuration before launch

[potential Multiplexer-Demultiplexer hybrid circuit failure].

Supply water dump nozzle temperature drop.

Auxiliary Power Unit #2 lube oil outlet pressure was low.

Right-Hand outboard Main Landing Gear tire excessive wear.

Loss of communications during entry.

The Pilot's Rotation Hand Controller bottomed-out during entry.

SSME

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump secondary seal cavity pressure

sensor failure on STS-39, engine #2029.

SRM

Right-Hand Solid Rocket Motor nozzle cowl/Outer Boot Ring

erosion/washing.

7-4

7-5

7-6

7-7

7-8

7-9

7-10

7-11

7-12

7-13

7-15


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SECTION 8

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors

and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to

provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.


APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AP

ADI

_B

_P-675

AGC

mS

_CA

_FE

ampAOS

_M

_U

AR

ARD

ASI

An

BFS

C

CA

CAR

CAV

CCP

CEI

CIL

CIRRIS

CIV

CLOUDS

Crit

CRO

CRT

Delta Pressure

Attitude Direction Indicator

Air Force Base

Air Force Program-675Automatic Gain Control

Arizona Imager/Spectrograph

Aft Load Controller Assembly

Advanced Liquid Feed Experiment

Ampere

Acquisition of SignalAscent Particle Monitor

Auxiliary Power Unit

Accepted Risk

Abort Region Determinator

Augmented Spark Igniter

Automatic Test Equipment

Backup Flight Software

Backup Flight System

Controlled

California

Corrective Action Report

Captive Air VentCarbon Cloth Phenolic

Contractor End-Item

Critical Items List

Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation for Shuttle

Critical Ionization Velocity

Cloud Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems

CriticalityChemical Release Observation

Cathode Ray Tube

A-1 STS-39 Postflight Edition

CTICVFCWS

DARdBDDUDEU

DoDDPS

DRDSE

EAFBEDTEIUEODET

FFAR UVFASCOSFCSFCVFDFDAFESFIDFMEAFMEA/CILFOSFPFRFRIFRRftft/sec

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED

Charlton Technologies, Inc.

Circular Variable Filter

Caution and Warning System

Deviation Approval Request

Decibel

Display Driver Unit

Data Entry Unit

Display Electronic Unit

Department of Defense

Data Processing Software System

Data Processing System

Discrepancy Report

Data System Experiment

Edwards Air Force Base

Eastern Daylight Time

Engine Interface Unit

Erasable Optical DiskExternal Tank

Fahrenheit

FAR Ultraviolet Camera

Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System

Flight Control SystemFlow Control Valve

Flight DayFault Detection and Annunciator

Flash Evaporator SystemFault Identification

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List

Factor of Safety

Fuel Pump

Flight RuleFlow Recirculation Inhibitor

Flight Readiness ReviewFeet

Foot Per Second


APPENDIX A


GAS

GG

GGVM

GH 2GLOS

GN&C

GO2GOAL

GOX

GPC

GSE

H 2

HAC

HCF

HGDS

HPFTP

HPM

HPOTP

HPU

HR

hr

HSL

HUP

I/OIBR

IBSS

ICD

IFA

IMU

INTG

IPL

ispIUS

KSC

kt

Get Away SpecialGas Generator

Gas Generator Valve Module

Gaseous Hydrogen

Gaseous Luminosity of Optical Surface

Guidance, Navigation and Control

Gaseous Oxygen

Ground Operations Aerospace Language

Gaseous Oxygen

General Purpose Computer

Ground Support Equipment

Hydrogen

Heading Alignment Cone

High-Cycle Fatigue

Hazardous Gas Detection System

High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump

High Performance Motor

High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump

Hydraulic Power Unit

Hazard ReportHour

Huntsville Simulation Laboratory

Horizon Ultraviolet Program

Input/Output

Inner Boot Ring

Infrared Background Signature SurveyInterface Control Document

Inflight AnomalyInertial Measurement Unit

Integration

Initial Program Load

Specific Impulse

Inertial Upper Stage

Kennedy Space Center

Knot


L-2

lblbf

LCC

LCF

LH

LH2LLCO

LO2LOS

LOX

LPFTP

LPOTP

LPSLSFR

MCC

MDM

ME

MEC

MECO

MET

min

MLG

MLP

MMH

MMU

MPECMPS

MRB

ms

MSA

MSE

MSFC

N204

NASA

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS. CONTINUED

Launch Minus 2 DayPound

Pounds ForceLaunch Commit Criteria

Low-Cycle FatigueLeft-Hand

Liquid HydrogenLow-Level Cutoff

Liquid Oxygen

Loss of Signal

Liquid Oxygen

Low Pressure Fuel Turbopump

Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump

Launch Processing SetLaunch Site Flow Review

Main Combustion Chamber

Mission Control Center

Multiplexer-Demultiplexer

Main EngineMaster Event Controller

Main Engine Controller

Main Engine Cutoff

Mission Elapsed TimeMinute

Main Landing GearMobile Launch Platform

Monomethyl Hydrazine

Mass Memory Unit

Multi-Purpose Experiment Canister

Main Propulsion SystemMaterial Review Board

millisecond

Marshall Spray-On AblativeMission Safety Evaluation

Marshall Space Flight Center

Nitrogen Tetroxide



APPENDIX A


NBAT

NDE

NSI

NSRS

02

OBR

OMRSD

OMS

OPF

OPS

OSMQ

OV

P/NPAR

PASS

PcPF2

PFS

POR

ppmPRCB

PRSD

psi

psia

psid

psigPSN

QD

QINMS

RCS

RGA

RH

RHC

RI

Nominal Bus Assignment Table

Nondestructive Evaluation

NASA Standard Initiator

NASA Safety Reporting System

Oxygen

Outer Boot Ring

Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document

Orbital Maneuvering System

Orbiter Processing Facility

Operational Sequence

Operations


Orbiter Vehicle

Part Number

Prelaunch Assessment Review

Primary Avionics Software System

Chamber Pressure

Payload Forward 2

Primary Flight System

Power-On Reset

Parts Per Million

Program Requirements Control Board

Power Reactant Supply and Distribution

Pounds Per Square Inch

Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute

Pounds Per Square Inch Differential

Pounds Per Square Inch Gage

Purge Sequence Number

Quick Disconnect

Quadruple Ion-Neutral Mass Spectrometer

Reaction Control System

Rate Gyro Assembly

Right-HandRotation Hand Controller

Rockwell International


APPENDIX A


RM

RME

RMS

ROEU

RSRM

RSS

RTLS

RTV

S/NSAIL

sccm

SCCS

scfm

scim

SDI

see

SEL

SEM

SII

SIT

SKIRT

SLF

SM

SMS

SOV

SPAS-II

SpecSRB

SRM

SSC

SSME

SSRP

SSV

STP-01

Redundancy Management

Radiation Monitoring Equipment

Redundancy Management System

Remote Manipulator System

Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical

Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor

Range Safety SystemReturn-to-Launch Site

Room-Temperature Vulcanizing

Serial Number

Shuttle Avionics Integration LaboratoryStandard Cubic Centimeters Per Minute

Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second

Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute

Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute

Strategic Defense Initiative

Second

Select

Scanning Electron Microscope

Solid Rocket Motor Ignition InitiatorShuttle Interface Test

Spacecraft Kinetic Infrared Test

Shuttle Landing Facility

System Management

Systems ManagementShuttle Mission Simulator

Shutoff Valve

Shuttle Pallet Satellite-II

SpecificationSolid Rocket Booster

Solid Rocket Motor

Stennis Space Center

Space Shuttle Main Engine

System Safety Review Panel

Space Shuttle Vehicle

Space Test Program-01


TAEMTAL

TDRS

TDRSS

TEM

TFL

TPS

TVC

U/NUDMH

URA

USBI

UVLIM

UVPI

VAB

WSB

WSTF

APPENDIX A


Terminal Area Energy Management

Transatlantic Abort Landing

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite SystemTest and Evaluation Motor

Telemetry Format Load

Thermal Protection System

Thrust Vector Control

Unit Number

Unsymmetric Dimethyl Hydrazine

Uniformly Redundant Array

United Space Boosters, Inc.

Ultraviolet Limb Imaging Experiment

Ultraviolet Plume Instrument

Vehicle Assembly Building

Water Spray Boiler

White Sands Test Facility


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