mission impossible: the european union and policy coherence for development

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Mission Impossible: the European Unionand Policy Coherence for DevelopmentMaurizio Carbone aa Department of Politics , University of Glasgow , Glasgow, UKPublished online: 16 Jul 2008.

To cite this article: Maurizio Carbone (2008) Mission Impossible: the European Union andPolicy Coherence for Development, Journal of European Integration, 30:3, 323-342, DOI:10.1080/07036330802144992

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European IntegrationVol. 30, No. 3, 323342, July 2008

ISSN 07036337 Print/ISSN 14772280 Online/08/030323-20 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/07036330802144992

ARTICLE

Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for

Development

MAURIZIO CARBONE

Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UKTaylor and Francis LtdGEUI_A_314665.sgm10.1080/07036330802144992Journal of European Integration0703-6337 (print)/1477-2280 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & Francis303000000July [email protected]

ABSTRACT The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a contentiousdebate in the European Unions external relations, though discussions have been limitedmainly to its foreign policy and its ability to speak with one voice in the internationalarena. Despite being institutionalized in the Treaty of Maastricht, policy coherence fordevelopment (PCD), which implies taking into account the needs and interest of devel-oping countries in non-aid policies, failed to make headway in the EU, remaining theunheeded concern of some NGOs and a small group of member states. A change indirection occurred in the early 2000s when the European Commission, taking advan-tage of a number of favourable conditions and using an astute strategy, managed to setan ambitious agenda for the EU. This article, nevertheless, shows that promoting PCDrisks being a mission impossible for whoever attempts it due to the interplay of variousissues and interests, the different commitment to international development of themember states, and the EUs institutional framework.

KEY WORDS: Policy coherence, EU development policy, foreign aid, Millennium Development Goals

Introduction

The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a contentious debatein the external relations of the European Union. These discussions, however,have been limited mainly to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP),where, without indulging in linguistic sophistry, coherence is used inter-changeably with consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997; Tietje 1997;Duke 1999; Smith 2001; Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005).1 In line with the

Correspondence Address: Maurizio Carbone, Department of Politics, University of Glasgow,Glasgow, G12 OEG, UK. Email: [email protected]

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324 Maurizio Carbone

Single European Act (SEA), which called on the EU to act as a cohesive forcein international relations (Article 30.2[d]), the Treaty of Maastricht estab-lished that the The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of itsexternal activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security,economic, and development policies (Article C).2 While previously greateremphasis was given to the relationship between the member states and theUnion, the Treaty of Maastricht gave more prominence to consistency acrosspolicies. Moreover, it introduced a single institutional framework to coverthe three pillars of the EUs activities, with both the Commission and theCouncil sharing responsibility in ensuring consistency in the EUs externalactivities. The aim was that the EU would not only speak with a single voice,but would also be able to assert its identity on the international scene(Duke 1999, Gauttier 2004).

Policy coherence for development (PCD) which according to a widelyaccepted definition means taking account of the needs and interests of devel-oping countries in the evolution of the global economy (OECD 2003, p. 2) has been largely absent from this debate. This scant attention is rathersurprising if one considers that PCD is included in the EUs constitutionalcharter it was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht and strengthened inthe Treaty of Lisbon, an exceptional case among international donors andthat its scope reaches several hard policies, such as trade, agriculture, fish-eries. True, very little progress was achieved throughout the 1990s, includingwithin the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which attemptedto further the discussion without much success (Forster and Stokke 1999a).The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), following theMillennium Summit of September 2000, changed the parameters ofthe debate (Payne 2005, Grieg et al. 2007). Specific targets were set, and theinternational community was forced to face up to the widening gap betweenthe rich and the poor. This led to a renewed focus by most donors on foreignaid and, in fact, the amount of development assistance increased enormously,from 52 billion in 2000 to 104 billion in 2006 (DAC 2008; see also Riddell2007). But to achieve the MDGs, it eventually became clear that foreign aidwas not enough, but better synergies between aid and non-aid policies neededto be explored. The European Union this time took the lead and, in May2005, in the context of the Millennium + 5 Summit and as part of a pack-age that included a significant boost in its foreign aid, it agreed on an ambi-tious agenda on PCD (Council 2005). Even the DAC, which had always beencritical of EU development policy, acknowledged that the EU has activelycontributed to the growing international consensus on policy coherence(DAC 2007, p. 16), is clear about its desire to help shape a broader inter-national approach (ibid.) and that the Commission has performed itscatalytic role in selected areas of policy coherence with the support of a smallnumber of Member States (ibid., p. 19).

This volume analyses the evolution of policy coherence for developmentfrom the EUs perspective. The aim is to shed new light on the EUs policy-making process, by looking at the nexus between various policy sub-systems,and on the role that the EU wants to play in the international arena, by looking

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The EU and Policy Coherence for Development 325

at the impact of its policies on international development. In fact, the EU, withits 27 member states, not only is the largest provider of foreign aid in the worldbut it is also the venue in which a large number of policies affecting developingcountries are decided. This introductory paper presents the concept of policycoherence for development and the debate since its institutionalization in theearly 1990s. The remainder of the volume concentrates on the linkagesbetween aid and various non-aid policies. Following Hollands paper, whichprovides an analytical overview of the new aid initiatives in the EU and theirimpact on the global development agenda, the first group of papers deals withthree common economic policies namely trade, agriculture and fisheries.Elgstrom and Pilegaard show that the existence of value competition anddifferent priorities within the EU have significantly challenged policy coher-ence during the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states.Matthews argues that, despite successive reforms of the common agriculturalpolicy (CAP), which have reduced the distortions that it generates on worldmarkets, further elimination of export and production subsidies couldcontribute to higher economic growth in developing countries if these coun-tries did not have to abide by the EUs ever-stringent health and environmentalstandards. Bretherton and Vogler look at the adoption of the new fisheriespartnership agreements, which, despite the promises, demonstrate that theEUs economic interests take precedence over its commitment to promoteboth sustainable development and poverty eradication. The second group ofpapers examines socio-political policies. Youngs looks at the commitment tolink security and development, claiming that the EU, besides some rhetoricalcommitments, has achieved little on the balance or direction of causalitybetween these two policy goals. Lavenex and Kunz investigate the EUs migra-tion policy and show that the development-focused approach promotedby various international organizations has not yet fully replaced the EUsdominant security-orientated approach that focuses on the repression ofunwanted immigration. Finally, Orbie and Babarinde start from the role ofthe EU in promoting the social dimension of globalization to demonstrate thatthe direct impact of the EUs internal social policies has been limited, whilean indirect impact has occurred through its trade and development policies.

Understanding Policy Coherence for Development

Before discussing it in the context of development policy, it is useful to reflectbriefly on the general concept of policy coherence. Three preliminary consid-erations must be made. First, the existing literature often refers to policycoherence within states, in which two or more domestic policies may push indifferent directions. With globalization, not only has the distinction betweeninternal and external policies become blurred, but the interplay betweendifferent policies also involves the regional and global level. Besides the EUsdistinctive institutional arrangements, a central difference with conventionalstates is that the resolution of cases of incoherence in the EU is conductedin the full glare of publicity, and through mechanisms which are not only

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imperfectly developed, but reflect diverging views about the proper form ofEuropean governance (Nuttall 2005, p. 93). Secondly, policy coherence canbe explored as an outcome (what is achieved) and as a process (how itis achieved) (Di Francesco 2001). In the first case, it implies the absence ofincoherencies between and the mutual impairment of policies adopting anegative approach or the interaction of policies with the aim of achievingoverriding objectives using a more positive approach (Ashoff 2005, p. 11).In the second case, the focus is on tools and mechanisms, often considered apre-condition for achieving policy coherence. Thirdly, to offer a meaningfulanalysis of policy coherence, it is fundamental to identify the beholdersperspective: the same decision may be coherent from a trade perspective butincoherent from a development perspective. This means that claims to perfectcoherence are unrealistic and that a certain degree of incoherence is inevita-ble in pluralist political systems (Koulamah-Gabriel 1999). The taskfor policy makers is to avoid unnecessary incoherence, which implies thatwinwin solutions are possible, whereas necessary incoherence, which resultsfrom the aggregation of legitimate conflicting interests, is more acceptable(Hoebink 2004, Picciotto 2005).

Rationale for and Obstacles to Policy Coherence

Traditionally, a distinction is made between two types of policy coherence.Horizontal coherence refers to the potential problems raised by the interac-tion between various policy areas; more specifically to development policy,it refers to the consistency between aid and non-aid policies in terms of theircombined contribution to development. Vertical coherence refers to the rela-tions between the member states and the EU; more specifically to developmentpolicy, it refers to the consistency between different policies across variousmember states in terms of their combined contribution to development. Inaddition to these two types, internal coherence refers to the consistencybetween the objectives of a given policy; more specifically to developmentpolicy, it refers to the consistency between purposes of aid (e.g. promotingdonor or recipient interests), channels (e.g. aid to states, aid to non-stateactors, aid to multilateral organizations), functions (e.g. budget support, aidto the private sector, aid to the social sectors). Donorrecipient coherencerefers to the interaction between policies adopted by the industrialized coun-tries and those adopted by developing countries. Multilateral coherence refersto interaction between international organizations, such as the UN and theInternational Financial Institutions, which often promote incompatible goals(Hoebink 2004, Nuttall 2005, Picciotto 2005). The focus of this study isprimarily on horizontal coherence, though other types particularly verticaland internal coherence unavoidably enter the discussions.

Policy coherence is both a political imperative i.e. avoiding being seenas inconsistent by political competitors or by the citizens and, in the case ofEU external relations, avoiding undermining the credibility of the EU as anactor in international politics and international development and aneconomic imperative i.e. avoiding wasting scarce resources (Di Francesco

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2001). But, as mentioned earlier, a certain degree of incoherence is inevita-ble in a pluralist society because of the fragmentation of policy systems.May et al. (2006) argued that policy coherence depends on the interplay ofissues and interests: a policy that has greater issue focus and is dominatedby few interests is likely to have stronger policy coherence. However, theargument runs, even very crowded policy areas can still cohere if theycontain integrative properties that glue issues and interests, such as a clearset of goals, a compelling policy image, a well-defined targeting, and thestrong involvement of the executive agency.3 Forster and Stokke (1999b)maintained that coherence depends on dedication of the political andadministrative leadership at the centre, particularly relevant in the EUwhere a not-too-strong centre must co-exist with various centrifugal forces.Politics is compartmentalized; each sub-subsystem has its own logic reflect-ing perceptions, interests and values. To avoid incoherencies, the variouspolicies need to be coordinated. Coordination, and consequently coherence,is not easily achievable when policy sub-systems relate to each other hori-zontally and there are only weak hierarchical coordination mechanisms.Ashoff (2005) listed a number of potential causes for policy incoherence.He noted that in the area of societal and political norms the pursuit ofpolicy coherence may be sacrificed to legitimate interests, whereas in thearea of political decision making coherence may be made more difficult byglobalization, the impact of external forces on policy making, and by decen-tralization, due to the increased number of negotiation levels to be takeninto account. In the area of policy formulation and coordination, coherenceis less likely when strategy, goals and objectives are unclear. In thesecircumstances the structure and process of policy coordination do not workeffectively, and there is a shortage of information.

In light of these considerations, pursuing policy coherence for the promo-tion of international development and, more specifically, in the context of theEU, is a sort of mission impossible for whoever attempts it. First, over thepast decade the number of issues to be included within the remit of interna-tional development has significantly increased. Development policy no longerentails only the transfer of financial resources for economic and social devel-opment, but also involves other economic means (such as trade preferencesand foreign direct investment) as well as political considerations (such as thepromotion of human rights and democracy assistance). Nor is developmentpolicy the exclusive preserve of state-to-state activity since it engages anincreasingly large number of actors (e.g. civil society, decentralized actors,national and international corporations). Secondly, development interestsoften succumb to other interests. The development constituency, made of aidbureaucracies and the community of development NGOs, is often too weakvis--vis agriculture groups, domestic firms, multinational corporations andother organized interest groups. This implies that, for instance, when the econ-omy is under pressure, not only is the aid budget the first to be cut, butmeasures aimed at promoting international development indirectly, such astrade preferences or liberal migration policy, are less acceptable to the public.Some commentators have argued that while allocating development assistance

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is politically palatable because the costs are shared among a large numberof tax payers, measures that affect an economic sector concern a small butpowerful group, which can easily mobilize opposition (Grieg-Gran 2003).Others, however, have pointed out that a significant correlation can beexpected between high levels of development assistance and policy coherencefor development, perhaps because the median voter in these countries (orpoliticians seeking their votes), will have a heightened concern with tax moniesspent for that purpose (Kapstein 2004, p. 19).

Thirdly, the real commitment to international development of the variousmember states varies significantly. The commitment to development index(CDI), introduced by an American think-thank, shows that not only foreignaid, but also other policies have an important role in affecting the pace ofdevelopment in poor countries.4 Going beyond the criticism of the arbitrarychoice and weight of the various sectors (Picciotto 2005), the CDI offers anindirect measure of policy coherence across member states. The conventionalwisdom is that good performers in foreign aid are also committed to policycoherence for development as also shown by the number of policy state-ments and mechanisms they have adopted over the years (ECDPM and ICEI2006, ECDPM et al. 2007). The three states that score highest in the foreignaid index (i.e. Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) score only about averagein four of the remaining six policy areas. Those countries that perform poorlyin the foreign aid index (i.e. Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) performjust below average in most of the other policy areas. The big three (France,Germany and the UK) score around average in almost all the indexes. Ingeneral, while the gap between countries in the foreign aid index is remark-able, it is less so in other indexes; the bottom line, therefore, is that allcountries could do much more to spread prosperity (Roodman 2007, p. 7).

Finally, some considerations should be made on the impact of the EUspolicy framework which, according to Nugent (2006, p. 389), can hardlybe said to display a clear pattern or coherence. Two broad methods ofdecision making co-exist in the EU, though this difference is now questioned(Stetter 2004). In the case of supranational policies such as trade, agricul-ture, fisheries decision-making processes are based on the interactionbetween the three key institutions, with the European Commission spearhead-ing the efforts to promote policy coherence. In the case of intergovernmentalpolicies e.g. foreign and security policy the European Commission andthe Parliament play a less relevant role than the Council, and the Presidencyis the key advocate of coherence. In areas of mixed competence, the decisionto grant authority to the European Commission to represent them is in thehands of the member states. For instance, in the case of environment, climatechange, transport, energy (if linked to the internal market), information soci-ety, research, migration, and social policies, the initiative rests mainly withthe Commission, though national policies also exist and external action isusually member-state led (Egenhoher 2006, pp. 67).5 Because of these insti-tutional arrangements, various commentators have argued that achievingpolicy coherence in the EU is extremely difficult, but we will return to thispoint in the last section of this paper.

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The Global Context of Policy Coherence for Development

The efforts to promote policy coherence for international development are arelatively recent phenomenon. The integration of various goals and objec-tives into development policy has, however, been a concern for industrializedcountries for a long time. In the 1960s, the idea of comprehensive planningimplied accelerating development by focusing on strategic economic sectorsand by adopting a national development plan produced through a bureau-cratic process involving economic expertise in various ministries. In the1970s, integrated development was the answer to the ineffectiveness ofproject aid and rivalry between agencies, as it brought together under a singleinstitutional umbrella not only planning and design but also implementation.In the 1980s, most donors took a common stand and coerced developingcountries into adopting structural adjustment programmes aimed at reform-ing their macro-economic framework, followed in the 1990s by an even morerigorous programme aimed at implementing political reforms (Hydn 1999,pp. 6473).

The first official discussion on policy coherence for development as suchwas held in a High-Level Meeting of the DAC in December 1991. The DACconcentrated on how non-aid policies (like macro-economic policies, trade,exports credits, tied aid, foreign direct investment, agriculture, environment,migration, arms trade, and drugs) could increase the effectiveness of aid. Thepromotion of PCD was also sold as part of a strategy that contributed tomanaging a number of challenges in the upcoming decade and implied alsothe need for effective participation by developing countries in the global deci-sion-making process (Forster and Stokke 1999b). In 1996, the DACpublished a much-quoted report, Shaping the 21st Century, in which it urgedindustrialized countries to ensure that their policies do not underminedevelopment objectives with the aim of increasing effectiveness of aid. In2001, it published the Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, which contained asection on policy coherence and another section on institutional require-ments for policy coherence (Ashoff 2005). Finally, since 2000, it hasincluded a separate chapter on coherence in the peer reviews that it conductson the development policies of its members. This new instrument hascontributed to raising awareness on best (and bad) practices, but at the sametime has failed to deliver rigorous assessment of PCD performance at thecountry level because it is not governed by clear and uniform standardsconnected to explicit PCD objectives (Picciotto 2005, p. 319).

While the DAC tried to play a leading role in furthering the PCD agenda some talk also of institutional entrepreneurship or institutionalsurvival, which implies that some international organizations launch newideas and become their promoters to justify and preserve their existence,engaging in a sort of competition with other organizations to set the interna-tional agenda (Forster and Stokke 1999b) the issue of policy coherencehas been dealt with in other international settings. At the level of the UN, thedecade of conferences on environment and development (Rio deJaneiro 1992), social issues (Copenhagen 1995), gender equality (Beijing

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1995) which preceded the Millennium Summit held in New York inSeptember 2000, contributed to a better and wider understanding of devel-opment. The subsequent adoption of the MDGs marked a change of direc-tion for the international community (Greig et al. 2007). In particular, theinclusion of MDG-8 (Develop a global partnership for development)acknowledged the need to go beyond development cooperation in otherpolicy areas, notably the development of an open trading and financialsystem committed to good governance, development and poverty reduction,and measures to address the special needs of least-developed countriesthrough tariffs and quota-free access for their exports (Grieg-Gran 2003).The Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. World Bank and IMF) and the WorldTrade Organisation (WTO) have apparently played a secondary role in thepromotion of PCD. Nevertheless, in addition to the structural adjustmentprogramme of the 1980s, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)reflect the principles of comprehensive development, ownership, partnershipand results-orientated development (Picciotto 2005). The WTO has been thekey venue for discussions on the links between trade (but also agriculture)and development. The adoption of the Doha Development Agenda in 2001seemed to start a new era in global politics. However, the failure of the WTOround in Cancun, particularly on the issue of cotton, showed how difficult itis for developed countries including the EUs member states to reformtheir trade and agriculture policies (Grieg-Gran 2003).

Policy Coherence for Development in the European Union

The origin of the debate on policy coherence for development in the EU canbe traced back to the Treaty of Maastricht, which officially introduced apolicy in the sphere of development cooperation among the activities of theEU.6 The new legal framework included three principles for the functioningof development policy, the so-called 3Cs: complementarity, coordinationand coherence (Holland 2002). Complementarity means that the memberstates and the EU share competences in development policy, which must beexercised alongside each other. Coordination implies that member states andEU should coordinate their policies and consult on their aid programmes,including in international organizations and during international confer-ences. Coherence entails that the EU shall take account of the objectivesof its development policy in the policies that it implements which are likelyto affect developing countries. These provisions on policy coherence weregenerally considered weak. First, the word coherence was not mentionedbut was replaced by a less categorical takes into account. Secondly, theattention was placed on the process rather than results, which means thatdevelopment policy, a soft policy, has been vulnerable to more powerfulinterests, notably those of trade, fisheries and agriculture. Thirdly, the coher-ence article applied to supranational policies, which partially left unan-swered the question of the coherence between intergovernmental policies anddevelopment policy (Hoebink 1999, Koulamah-Gabriel 1999). In reality,the Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the principle of consistency,

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which referred to all external policies, thus including foreign and securitypolicies.

A Decade of Non-decisions

The discussion on the operationalization of the three Cs started before theTreaty of Maastricht came into force, when the European Commissionpublished a communication on the future of development policy (entitledHorizon 2000). However, the European Commission concentrated on coor-dination and the shortfalls of the implementation of a truly coordinatedpolicy; less attention was given to coherence (Loquai 1996). A majority ofmember states seemed to be more ambitious and, in the Development Councilof November 1992, urged the European Commission to prepare a study andto report within a year on the practical consequences of the coherenceprinciple. The European Commission failed to do so, lamenting inadequatestaff levels and a dismissive attitude of some member states (Hoebink 2004).European NGOs tried to fill this policy void by launching a number of publiccampaigns. One of the most visible was in April 1993 against the EUs meatexports in West Africa, which were not only incoherent with the developmentassistance aimed at supporting the meat industry in the region, but alsocontributed to disrupting local markets. Other important campaigns werecarried out by NGOs during the 1990s, such as that of May 1996, againstthe overcapacity of the EUs fishing fleets and for disregarding the impact ofits fisheries agreements on poor countries, and the 1997 campaign against thechocolate directive, which penalized cocoa-producing countries to the advan-tage of the chocolate industry (Koulamah-Gabriel and Oomen 1997).

The combination of the first NGO campaigns and the pressure of somemember states forced the European Commission to publish a report in May1994, in which it finally acknowledged the presence of incoherencies betweenthe CAP and development policy. It should, however, be noted that the Euro-pean Commission itself was cautious, pointing to the fact that reconcilingdifferent interests was extremely difficult. In the ensuing meeting of the Devel-opment Council in June 1995, a number of member states were favourableto the idea of better coherence between development, trade and agriculture.Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, the most active among the memberstates, proposed setting up mechanisms to raise cases of incoherence, such asfor example cross-sectoral meetings within the Council. This idea wasrejected by France and Germany, and progress on this issue stalled (Loquai1996). Considering all these disagreements, it is not surprising that theconclusions of the Council were very weak, simply asking the Commissionto continue its work on this issue (Council 1995). A similar outcome wasproduced in 1997, when, thanks to initiatives of the Dutch Presidency (andlater also Luxembourg), supported by Denmark and Sweden, the Counciladopted a generic resolution covering links between development and fourthemes: peace building, conflict prevention and resolution; food security; fish-eries; and migration. The European Commission was once again verycautious about linking development with trade and agriculture. In the final

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resolution, the Council invite[d] the Commission to present regularly, pref-erably on an annual basis, a report to the Council on questions related tocoherence in connection with development cooperation and to raise anypossible case of negative effects [on development policy] as arising fromunintended incoherence of policies (Council 1997). The European Commis-sion was very slow and circulated a non-paper only in May 1999, in whichit proposed a categorization of various types of coherence, but failed toadvance innovative proposals (Hoebink 2004, pp. 203204).

In the new Commission appointed in November 1999, the DevelopmentCommissioner Poul Nielson, who had been very active as Danish Ministerfor development policy, made coherence a central issue of his mandate. InFebruary 2000, DG Development issued a paper Towards improved coher-ence between the Community development policy and other Communitypolicies, in which it was far more critical than in the past, focusing particu-larly on the trade, agriculture and fisheries policies. It also proposed anumber of institutional mechanisms, to be set up within DG Development.The document, however, was considered too critical and a watered-downversion was adopted by the College in April 2000 and then discussed in theCouncil in May 2000 (Hoebink 2004). A symptomatic conclusion of thisperiod is the first statement on EC development policy, jointly adopted bythe Council and the Commission, which, like ten years earlier, simplyproposed to ensure that Community development policy objectives aretaken into account in the formulation and implementation of other policiesaffecting the developing countries. In sum, despite its institutionalizationwith the Treaty of Maastricht, the principle of coherence for developmentfailed to make headway in the EU during the 1990s. Throughout the decade,the issues of the implications of trade, agriculture and fisheries policy fordeveloping countries were neglected, not only because the EU placed itsinterests before those of developing countries, but also because of theassumption that the needs of developing countries were taken care ofthrough development assistance.

A New Ambitious Agenda

With the beginning of the century, a new season opened in EU developmentpolicy (Carbone 2008). This era was characterized by an extensive reform ofboth the management which essentially means delivering aid better andfaster and the content of the policy which implies the elevation ofpoverty reduction as the guiding principle of all the Community externalassistance programmes. This process culminated in the adoption of the Euro-pean Consensus on Development (signed in December 2005 by the EuropeanCommission, Parliament and Council) and the Code of Conduct on Comple-mentarity and Division of Labour (adopted by the Council in May 2007),which commit the member states and the EU institutions to a common viewon the promotion of international development and a common implementa-tion strategy. Meanwhile, in view of the Financing for Development confer-ence held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 and thanks to the leadership

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of the European Commission, the EU adopted a number of commitmentsaiming at boosting the volume of aid and enhancing its effectiveness (the so-called Barcelona commitments). More significantly, by acting as a unitaryactor, the EU had shaped the global agenda on development policy. The Euro-pean Commission also managed to play a leading role in the post-Monterreyperiod and used the monitoring reports not only to follow progress on theBarcelona commitments but also to launch important initiatives (Carbone2007). In view of the Millennium+5 Summit planned for September 2005, theEuropean Commission proposed a comprehensive package consisting ofthree different proposals: a new ambitious target for EU aid; more aid toAfrica; a new initiative on policy coherence (European Commission 2005a).7

The first communication ever on policy coherence for development startedfrom the idea that the committed additional volume of aid is important, butin itself is not sufficient to enable developing countries to reach the Millen-nium Development Goals (p. 3). The European Commission thereforediscussed the impact of various non-aid policies, either directly or indirectly,on the achievement of one or more MDGs. In particular, it argued that theEUs policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries, transport and energy have adirect impact on the ability of developing countries to generate domesticeconomic growth, which is the basis for progress towards all the MDGs. TheEUs policies on migration, through the role of remittances; research, for itsrole in improving access to health and education; and security, by creating aconducive environment for business, play an indirect yet significant role inthe attainment of various MDGs. Finally, the EUs policies on the environ-ment and climate change affect global progress towards environmentalsustainability (which is MDG-7). Against this background, the EuropeanCommission identified eleven policy areas (trade; environment; security;agriculture; fisheries; social dimension of globalization, employment anddecent work; migration; research and innovation; information society; trans-port; and energy) and, for each of these priority areas, established specificcoherence for development commitments. It also pointed out that existingtechnical mechanisms to promote policy coherence, often limited to thefield of development cooperation, were insufficient and that the real chal-lenge would be at the political level. Finally, it proposed to monitorprogress on PCD through the publication of a biannual report (EuropeanCommission 2005b). The General Affairs and External Relations Council(GAERC) of May 2005 confirmed the eleven priority areas identified by theEuropean Commission and added a twelfth one, climate change. It alsodecided to examine the Councils procedures, mechanisms and instrumentsin order to strengthen the effective integration of development concerns inthe decision making procedures on non-development policies and, at thesame time, invited member states and the European Commission to do thesame (Council 2005).

The crystallization of policy coherence for development into the newEuropean Consensus on Development (ECD) confirmed the ambitions of theEU in this area. Jointly agreed by the European Commission, Council andParliament in December 2005, the ECD established a common vision on

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development policy, in which policy coherence for development found acentral space. In the absence of a new Treaty, which would update the legalframework for development, the ECD established that PCD was no longeronly about supranational policies, but was also to be extended to all EUpolicies.8 It also mentioned that the European Commission fand the memberstates would prepare a rolling work programme as a new tool for followingup on the twelve priority areas, which would propose priorities for action,define roles and responsibilities of Council, Member States and Commis-sion and serve as a reference point for all levels of decision makinginvolved in the implementation of the PCD commitments (Council, MemberStates and Commission) and to integrate PCD commitments into the exami-nation and discussion of Commission proposals and EU standpoints ininternational fora where relevant (Carbone 2007). The rolling workprogramme, proposed by the European Commission, became a joint tool ofthe Commission and the Council to identify common priority actions; thiswas confirmed by the Council in April 2006, which invited each Presi-dency, at the beginning of the Presidency and with the help of the CouncilSecretariat, to engage with the Commission to identify which prioritiesneed to be updated.9

The first biannual report on PCD was adopted by the European Commis-sion in September 2007 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b).10 Contraryto general expectations, the European Commission produced a critical report.In general, it acknowledged that awareness of PCD has increased not onlywithin EU institutions but also across the member states, but is still belowthe ambitious agenda initiated two years earlier. The promotion of PCDworks better within the European Commission than in the Council, and thisis attributed to the presence of effective mechanisms (i.e. Impact AssessmentSystem; Inter-Service Group; CSPs).11 Within the Council, some progress hasbeen achieved thanks to the initiatives of individual Presidencies, but theprinciple of PCD is not well institutionalized in the decision-making process.The European Parliament has started to engage in this debate through reportsand resolutions. At the level of member states, despite some notable excep-tions such as Sweden and Denmark, who adopt a whole-of-governmentapproach the picture is less optimistic, with progress being hampered bythe low political commitment of non-development ministries, insufficientcapacity and knowledge among officials, and the belief that achieving policycoherence is simply too difficult and it is an either/or choice between devel-opment and domestic interests.

The findings of the European Commission need some further explanations.In general, achieving policy coherence is easier within the European Commis-sion where decisions are taken by the Commission as a whole, if necessary,compromise at the level of the College of Commissioners than in theCouncil. In the case of the latter there is more dispersion in light of the nineministerial formations and the sector logic at lower levels. The Presidency isan important source of leadership, but its achievements in promoting coher-ence depend on the goodwill of individual member states. At the level of theCouncil, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) should play

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a central role in ensuring coherence across policies. In reality, it makes finaldecisions on a small number of issues (15 per cent), whereas the majority ofproposals (about 70 per cent) are agreed in the Working Groups, in whichthe sectoral logic prevails. Only rarely do members of the DevelopmentWorking Group attend meetings of other Working Groups and, if they do so,as in the case of the 133 Committee during the EPA negotiations, they playa marginal role.12 The division of tasks between Coreper I (addressing theinternal market, industry and energy) and Coreper II (who address externalrelations, economy and finances and justice and home affairs) does not help.At the Ministerial level (where the remaining 15 per cent of proposals areagreed), Ministers have more in common with their sectoral colleaguesthan with their colleagues in the national cabinets. The GAERC, which is incharge of coordinating the work of the various Council formations, is theo-retically supposed to ensure coherence. However, over the last decade it haslost a substantial part of its coordinating powers due to the increased amountof time it spends on the EUs external relations (Egenhofer 2006). At the levelof member states, the debate on PCD started in the mid-1990s, thoughprogress has been slow, with some differences. A first group of countries(Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia) does not make referenceto PCD in their official policy documents. A second group (Belgium, Estonia,Greece, Italy, Poland and Slovak Republic) have adopted policy statementsbut have not translated this commitment into institutional and administrativemechanisms to promote PCD. A third larger group (Austria, Czech Republic,Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Nether-lands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the UK) has operationalized and put intopractice mechanisms to promote PCD (ECDPM et al. 2007).

Overview of the Volume

The biannual report of the Commission discusses in detail the progress madewithin the EU in improving the integration of the twelve PCD commitments,showing that even policies generally perceived as having only an internaldimension also have a strong external component that can directly or indi-rectly affect the development process. In general, progress has been slowerthan anticipated since the promotion of European interests and the identi-fication of partner countries own concerns must be balanced, with a view tofinding winwin solutions (European Commission 2007a, p. 10). Thepotential synergies between development and various EU policies arediscussed in detail in the papers that follow this introduction. However, somepoints can be made on policies that for reasons of space are not covered inthis volume. For instance, climate change will hit developing countries hard-est and earliest; in this sense, the EU climate policy aimed as a long-term goalto limit climate change to an average of 2C as compared to pre-industriallevels, will directly and indirectly significantly benefit developing countries.The provision of an effective and efficient infrastructure system, which is akey element underpinning competitiveness and economic development, is acentral element of all EU development programmes, as shown by a number

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of recent initiatives (e.g. EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication andSustainable Development, EUEI; the EUAfrica Infrastructure Partnershipand the EUAfrica Energy Partnership). Other polices have great potential fordevelopment but they have failed to produce significant results. In particular,EU research and ICT policies should contribute further to creating context-specific knowledge and building capacity in developing countries, with theaim of bridging the knowledge and digital gap between the North and theSouth (European Commission 2007a, 2007b).

The remainder of the volume covers the links between development andsix policy areas trade, agriculture, fisheries, security, migration, and socialpolicies. These chapters are preceded by Hollands paper on the widercontext of international development and the role that the EU has played inshaping it. Holland shows that while in the 1990s there was a loss of interestin development (exemplified by the declining volume of aid and doubts aboutthe real impact of aid), at the beginning of the 2000s the internationalcommunity began to construct a new agenda to address global inequalities.The EU has been a core partner sometimes with a leading role of alarger movement that includes the UN, the World Bank and various interna-tional activists. This new aid agenda revolves around the MDGs, thoughincreasingly the initial optimism has become subdued by the realization thatmost of the targets set for individual MDGs will not be reached. The EU hascontributed by boosting its volume of aid, including a special focus on Africa,and by addressing the lack of coordination among its member states, whichtoo often leads to duplication of efforts. Despite these commitments, somecritics have pointed to the issue of real aid more than half of the aidprovided by developed countries is absorbed by over-pricing, inefficientcooperation or used to fund programmes that are not strictly associated withdevelopment. Moreover, the exclusion of technical cooperation and food aidfrom the DAC Recommendation on untying aid shows that much still needsto be done in the area of internal coherence.

Elgstrom and Pilegaard look at the coherence between trade and develop-ment, arguing that the evolution of the process of European integration hasproduced a highly compartmentalized system, with autonomous sectors eachreflecting different logics, which makes policy coherence difficult to achieve.This natural inclination towards incoherence is tempered by external obliga-tions primarily the principles of trade liberalization and reciprocity spon-sored by the WTO and by the fact that the European Commission is thesole actor in charge of conducting international trade negotiations. Thisstruggle for coherence is explored in the context of the negotiations of theEPAs between the EU and the ACP group. While previously the competencefor trade with the ACP fell within the competence of DG Development, withthe Prodi Commission it moved to DG Trade. This new organizationalarrangement, which resulted from a fight against perceived ineffectiveness inthe EUs external relations, implied not only that the EPA negotiations wereframed as trade negotiations but also that DG Trade was in charge ofconducting the negotiations on behalf of the EU. However, the existenceof different values among the member states not only the traditional

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divisions between free trade and development-leader Northern member statesand protectionist and development-laggard Southern member states andinside the European Commission with tensions between DG Trade and DGDevelopment has contributed significantly to challenging policy coher-ence. The eventual conflict between the official EU stance and the heterodoxpositions taken by some member states and by the European Parliamentshowed how difficult it is for the EU to produce coherent policy outcomes.

Matthews explores one of the most controversial policies in the EU, theCAP, asking whether the criticism that the CAP is incoherent with develop-ment policy is still valid. The conventional view is that EU-subsidized exportscompete unfairly with developing country production and that the presenceof high tariff barriers prevents developing countries from exporting theiragricultural products into the EU. Various reforms started in the early 1990shave progressively reduced the distortions on world market that the CAPgenerates; however, their impact on developing countries varies: while theCAP hurts those countries that are net food exporters, the situation is less clearfor net food importers. Moreover, further reforms of the CAP may producenot only winners but also losers among developing countries. For instance,the elimination of export subsidies to rice and cotton, and the removal ofprotection to meat, diary products, fruits and vegetables would generallyproduce benefits for many developing countries. By contrast, the reform ofthe sugar and banana sectors would be borne by relatively vulnerable low-income economies. Finally, the CAP is not the only obstacle to agriculturalproducts coming from developing countries, which in fact must face ever-stringent sanitary and phyto sanitary (SPS) and environmental standards.

Bretherton and Vogler look at the implications of fisheries policy fordevelopment policy, within the context of the EUs promotion of sustainabledevelopment. In particular, in the 1980s and 1990s the EUs fisheries policyconstituted a serious threat to the marine environment due to overexploi-tation of fish and other marine resources and to the health, livelihood,social cohesion and economic development of coastal communities in devel-oping countries. The adoption of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements(FPAs) in the early 2000s was meant to demonstrate the EUs commitmentto sustainable development and to address the increased calls for policycoherence with development policy. In reality, not only have the negotia-tions of the various FPAs resulted in EU monologues (rather than theannounced dialogues), but they may have also contributed to delayingfurther the economic and social development in developing countries. Struc-tural problems in the fishing sector in most developing countries, combinedwith problems of access for processed fish products into the EU market,such as the restrictive rules of origin and other technical barriers, imply thatdeveloping countries have no other choice than agreeing on the conditionsset by the EU. The case of fisheries policy, in sum, has revealed a number ofunresolved incoherencies at the horizontal (between the EUs fisheries anddevelopment policies) and vertical levels (between the approach of the EUand that of various member states), and has also shown a gap between theEUs claims to promote sustainable development and the practice.

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Youngs examines the links between security and development, particularlyin light of the rise in international terrorism. Following the 9/11 events, thegeneral assumption, especially among European governments, was that theroots of international instability lay in economic and political under-devel-opment; the consequent expectations were that security concerns couldunlock additional resources for development. Not all member states acceptedthis kind of approach, pointing to the fact that such resources generallytargeted middle-income countries rather than the poorest developing coun-tries. In reality, no mass diversion of aid resources has occurred, thoughincreases in resources have often reflected approaches that have little do towith development. More generally, Youngs shows that the EU has not onlymade modest progress in promoting synergies between security and develop-ment, but has also failed to clearly spell out a vision on the balance anddirection of causality between these two policies. In fact, while the EuropeanSecurity Strategy expresses the view that security is a precondition for devel-opment, the European Consensus on Development refers to a two-waylinkage: development is necessary for security and security is necessary fordevelopment. Evidence of progress in both directions of the developmentsecurity link shows that development-related decisions in the security fieldsreceive little input from development circles, while some progress has beenachieved in making development funding more security-aware one of theexamples being the African Peace Facility, set up with resources coming fromthe European Development Fund (EDF).

Lavenex and Kunz explore the developmentmigration nexus in the exter-nal activities of the EU. While, for many years, migration was considered theoutcome of lacking or failed development, since the early 2000s the linkbetween migration and development has been promoted actively by interna-tional organizations in an attempt to maximize the gains for developingcountries. However, the broad variety of institutions involved in the debategenerated tensions over two competing ways of framing the issue: a right-based frame (sponsored by the International Labour Organization, ILO, andthe International Organization for Migration, IOM), focusing on protectingthe rights of migrants and harnessing the potential development impact oftheir return to the country of origin; a money-based frame (sponsored by theWorld Bank), emphasizing the value of remittances as an important sourceof development financing. These debates have influenced the EU, where,following the incidents at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in theautumn of 2005, various initiatives proposing a closer coordination betweenmigration and development policies proliferated. The proposed GlobalApproach which implied facilitating the flows of remittances, engagingwith countries of origin, mitigating the negative effects of brain drain proved too ambitious: the existing prevailing securitarian-frame, based onthe repression of unwanted immigration and on getting countries of originto sign re-admission agreements, has not been yet been substituted by thedevelopment-based approach.

Orbie and Babarinde explore whether and how the EU has integratedsocial policies into its relations with the developing world. While their direct

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impact on developing countries is negligible, the EU has promoted socialgoals through its trade and development policies. Proposals for a socialclause in trade relations were discussed in the early 1990s, but by the 2000it became clear that the integration of labour considerations into its relationswith developing countries was unsuccessful. The explanations that focusingon the reluctance of developing countries to accept clauses that would hideprotectionist intentions of EU countries should be supplemented by explana-tions that focus more on the EU. Not only have member states often failedto take a common stance but, more significantly, the commitment of the EUitself has been ambiguous, with labour considerations being overshadowedby other priorities. Similarly, the new ambitious initiative to promote decentwork is still at an explanatory stage. Conversely, the European Commissionhas played a proactive role in stimulating the international promotion of thecorporate social responsibility, meant to encourage companies to integratesocial and environmental corners into their operations.

Conclusion

The issue of policy coherence for development emerged at the beginning ofthe 1990s. The Development Assistance Committee played an important rolein attempting to drive this agenda forward without much success. Within theEU, the debate started with the Treaty of Maastricht in the context of the so-called 3Cs (complementarity, coordination and coherence) but, for variousreasons, limited progress was made for the rest of the decade. The incoherenceof the EU in its approach to international development was questioned by theNGO community which, in turn, carried out a number of public campaignsmainly against the EUs common trade, agriculture and fishery policies. Anumber of member states, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden andthe UK, were also active on the coherence issue. This coherence gapreflected negatively on the credibility of the EU in the international arena andon its stated commitment to international development. The era of passiv-ism ended with the beginning of the new century, when the EuropeanCommission, taking advantage of a number of favourable conditions andusing an astute strategy, managed to set an ambitious agenda for the EU. First,it rallied the principle of PCD around the MDGs, indicating how each PCDcommitment served the purpose of meeting one or more MDGs. Secondly, itproposed PCD within a package deal, which included an additional volumeof aid and concentration of efforts in Africa. In this sense, the EuropeanCommission showed that the MDGs would not be achieved if the interna-tional community and, more specifically, the member states and the EU, didnot take concrete initiatives on the issue of policy coherence for development.Thirdly, it linked the issue of PCD to the new role of the EU as a single actorin international development and to its ability to shape the global agenda.

The adoption of the PCD communication and the subsequent Councilconclusions marked a significant change in the EU, as confirmed by a leadingofficial in DG Development: Even though the concept of policy coherence fordevelopment was enshrined in the Treaties a long time ago, the issue has never

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made it all the way up to the Commission Things have changed, however,since the adoption of the MDG package; development is not always losing anymore.13 The central question is the implementation of the commitments. ThisSpecial Issue tries to suggest that, although it is not an easy task, achievingbetter policy coherence for development is no longer a mission impossible.However, it is not simply a matter of designing mechanisms. It is also, if notmainly, a matter of commitment at the highest political level. In the future, onemay anticipate a further politicization of this issue, which may also entail thatthe call for better policy coherence for development will be intertwined furtherwith the role that the EU wants to play in international politics. The new globalagenda on quantity and quality of aid shows that, by acting as a unitary actor,the EU is able to shape the pace of international development. The EuropeanConsensus on Development and the Code of Conduct on Complementarityand Division of Labour indicate that there is a change of course whereby themember states are more committed to improving the effectiveness of EU aid,the visibility of the EU in international development, including its ability toshape the global agenda. Similarly, more member states have started toacknowledge that their domestic policies must take due account of the interestof developing countries. In sum, only by combining its significant efforts inforeign aid with non-aid policies will the EU be able to make an indent in bridg-ing the widening gap between the rich and the poor.

Notes1. The various translations of the Treaty of Maastricht show that the English version speaks of consis-

tency, whereas the French (but also the German, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese) speak of coherence.Tietje (1997) preferred to use the term coherence rather than consistency because the two wordsmean different things: Consistency in law is the absence of contradictions; coherence on the otherhand refers to positive connections. Moreover, coherence in law is a matter of degree, whereasconsistency is a static concept (Tietje 1997, p. 212). Similarly, Gauttier (2004, pp. 2526) saw thetwo concepts not as interchangeable but as mutually reinforcing: horizontal coherence encompassesboth the absence of contradictions within the external activity in different areas of foreign policy(consistency), and the establishment of a synergy between these aspects (coherence) The requirementof consistency forms therefore the first degree of horizontal coherence.

2. In reality, calls for consistency had started already in the late 1960s and continued with the EuropeanPolitical Cooperation (EPC), though the word consistency made its first appearance in EU texts inthe Paris Summit of December 1974. On this, see Duke (1999) and Nuttall (2005).

3. May et al. (2006), who discuss American politics, argued that greater coherence is linked to policydomains for which there is greater concentration of committee involvement in holding hearings.

4. The CDI ranks industrialized countries on a number of issues, notably foreign aid; openness to devel-oping country exports; policies that promote investment; migration policies; environmental policies;security policies; support for creation and dissemination of new technologies. See www.cgdev.org[Accessed 15 January 2008].

5. For a detailed analysis of the issues of competence in EU external relations, see Eeckhout (2004). Fora detailed analysis of the policy-making process, see inter alia Wallace et al. (2005).

6. However, it should be noted that the quest for coherence, which implied the involvement of devel-oping countries in the EU development policy, was present in the Yaound Convention and the LomConvention (Picciotto 2005).

7. In March 2002, the EU set a collective target of 0.39 per cent of its combined Gross National Income(GNI) to be reached by 2006 (and an individual target of at least 0.33 per cent) and in May 2005 acollective target of 0.56 per cent to be reached by 2010 (and an individual target of at least 0.51 percent for EU-15 member states and 0.17 per cent for EU-10 member states).

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8. These views on policy coherence are also included in the Lisbon Treaty, which kept development asan independent policy: Union development cooperation shall have as its primary objective thereduction, and in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of theobjectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affectdeveloping countries (Article III 316-I).

9. A proposal was also made to use the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) to detect and implement policycoherence at the country level. The first generation of CSPs, however, show that policy coherencehas been dealt with inadequately. The sections in the CSPs are, in fact, rather short, superficial andgenerally too optimistic (Hoebink 2005).

10. The Commission report was based on the answer to a questionnaire sent to the member states inJanuary 2007.

11. The Inter-Service Group on PCD, set up in 2006, comprises members of relevant DGs, the Secretariat-General and the Legal Service. The Impact Assessment System allows the evaluation of consequencesof major policy proposals and the assessment of alternative options. The Inter-service Consultation,although not specifically set up to promote coherence, ensures that DG Development raises develop-ment issues when other DGs draft policy proposals.

12. See Heynes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006).13. These words are those of Bernard Petit, deputy Director General of DG development, expressed in a

meeting of the European Parliament. See www.eucoherence.org [Accessed 15 January 2008].

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mission impossible: the european union and policy coherence for development

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