michener- world bank presentation -april 5 2011
TRANSCRIPT
Surrendering Secrecy: Explaining Strong Freedom of Information
Reform in Latin America Background on Freedom of Information Current Projects Underway Research Question and Background Gap in the Literature on Freedom of Information The Argument Measurement Alternative Explanations The Evidence Case Study Examples: Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Freedom of Information Practitioners
Journalists ~10%Time issues, “informational jealousies”
NGOs ~10%All rights based groups: human, environmental
Others ~20% (citizens, public sector officials,
open-data “hackers”, archivists)
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Freedom of Information Practitioners
Business ~40-60% of requestsProcurement regulatory processes Selling products to governmentInvestingTargeting markets
My current initiative in Brazil
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Current Projects
• Research on Business Use and Support for FOI: OSI application
• Brasil Aberto• Article XIX Report on FOI Enforcement
Mechanism• Paper on Open-Data Movement• Global Conference on Transparency at
Rutgers, May 17-20, 2011• Book for Cambridge University Press
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Freedom of Information Laws Around the World
…and in Latin America
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Research Question and Background
What conditions lead to strong FOI laws?
Methods Qualitative: interviews, archival
Quantitative: basic, content analyses
Field Work 2003 Mexico
M.A. in Latin American Studies, 20032005 Argentina, Uruguay2006 Mexico2007 Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay2008-10 Brazil, and interviews via skype in Chile, Guatemala, Uruguay, among other
countries.Ph.D. Defense, May 2010
Gregory Michener [email protected] 3er Seminario Internacional de la Transparencia y los archivos: el derecho al acceso a la información pública--TEPJF
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Why look at Face Value Legal Strength of FOI?
One of the best indicators of a law’s effectiveness.
Current Initiatives:
1. Article XIX, London, in conjunction with FUNDAR, Mexico.
2. Centre for Law and Democracy, in conjunction with Access Europe.
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Scholarship on Transparency and Access to Information Reform
Legal Descriptions (Banisar 2006; Basterra 2006; Coronel 2001; Kranenborg 2005; Mendel 2003, 2009; Neuman and Calland 2007; Suominen 2002; Pasquier 2006; Torres 2009)
Normative implications (Ackerman and Sandoval 2005; Bennett 1997; Cramer 2009; Dick 2005; Islam 2002b, 2006; Stiglitz 2003; Bovens 2002; Banisar 2006; Blanton 2002; Florini 2007; Coronel 2001)
Operation of Laws (Gill and Hughes 2005b; Open Society Justice Initiative 2006; Roberts 2006, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006; Tavares 2007; Fox, Haight, HofBauer, and Sánchez Andrade 2007; Lindberg 2006; Lord 2006; S. E. Martin 2008; Robertson 1999; Alianza Regional para la Libertad de la Expresión e Información 2009; Mutula and Wamukoya 2009; Cuillier and Davis 2010)
Statistical Correlations of Adoption and country characteristics (Balan 2010 (forthcoming); Bennett 1997; Dorhoi 1999; Relly 2006; Rosendorff 2004)
NGO Activist Single Case Studies (Dick 2005; Farmelo 2003; Florini 2007; López Ayllón 2005; Obe 2007; Pasquier 2006; Singh 2007; Uceda 2003a; Villanueva 2003; Escobedo 2002; Luna Pla 2008; Archibald 1993; Blanton 2003; S. E. Martin 2008)
NGO “kitchen sink” approach Gregory Michener [email protected] 3er Seminario Internacional de la Transparencia y los archivos: el derecho al acceso a la información pública--TEPJF
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Argument
1. Degree to which Presidents possess Negative Agenda-Setting Powers.
2. Degree to which the news media set an Agenda for Reform
The U.S. as the Ideal-Typical Case (until Obama!)
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Original Index 35 Questions, an Ordinal Scale
1=Unsatisfactory 2=Satisfactory 3=Strong
Evaluation of legislation by category:1. Scope (8 questions)2. Procedures (7 questions)3. Promotion and Duties to Publish (4 questions)4. Exceptions (7 questions)5. Appeals (6 questions)6. Protections and Sanctions (3 questions
Benchmarks
1.0—1.4------------------1.5—1.9-----------------2.0—2.4-----------------2.5—3.0
Weak Moderately Weak Moderately Strong Strong
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Findings: Legal Strength
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Considering Alternative Explanations to Explain Variation in Strength of
Laws• Bureaucratic Capacity, Professionalism of Legislators
• International or Regional Integration• Ideology• Age of Laws• CSO Advocacy• Leadership
Presidential Negative Agenda-Setting Power
Legislative Control of CongressConstitutional Powers
―Exclusive rights of introduction―Agenda control over scheduling
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Minority Majority
Country ScoreControl of
the Chamber of Deputies %
Control of the
Senate %President Party
Mexico 2.7 41 40 Vicente FoxPartido Acción Nacional (PAN)
El Salvador 2.637
(unicameral)Mauricio Funes
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
Nicaragua 2.438
(unicameral)Daniel Ortega
El Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
Chile 2.3 48 47Michelle Bachelet
Concertación de Partidos para la Democracia
Guatemala 2.330
(unicameral)Álvaro Colom
Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE)
Peru 226
(unicameral)Alejandro Toledo
Peru Posible
Honduras 1.950
(unicameral)Manuel Zelaya
Partido Liberal
Brasil 1.8 68 N/AInácio Luiz
Lula da SilvaCoalição Partido Trabalhador e outros
Ecuador 1.7 9Lúcio
GutiérrezPartido Sociedade Patriotica
Panama 1.7 54Mireya
MoscosoUnión para Panama
Uruguay 1.7 52 52Tábare
VásquezFrente Amplio
Dominican Republic
1.5 52 82Hipólito Mejia
Partido Revolucionario
Colombia 1.4 41 43Belsário
BittencourtPartido Conservador Colombiano
STRENGTH OF LAW LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
Electoral Timing of Reform
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Argentina: Scheduling privileges in the Chamber of Deputies
Brazil: Exclusive Rights of Introduction.
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Examples of Constitutional Negative Agenda-Setting Control
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
What Accounts for Varying Levels of Coverage?
Working Hypotheses:1.Presidential Control and Checks on Power– Control over 5 ‘R’s: region, regulation, revenue,
repression, relationship– Region: territorial control– Revenue: ‘oficial advertising’– Regulation: media reform– Repression: varies with ‘checks’ on power– Relationships: levers of information, “the loop”– Indexing Theory: voice of opposition
2.News Media Ownership Concentration, Centralization
Strength of News Agenda
Strength of Law, Score
_/3.0
National Population (millions)
City of Largest
Publication (millions)
Centralization : City as % of
Total Population
Four-Firm Market
Ownership Concentration
Dominance: % Market Share Top
Press OutletMexico Strong 2.7 110 18.1 16% 45% 10%
Guatemala Strong 2.4 14.7 1.2 8% 41% 27%Chile Strong 2.3 16.5 5.2 32% 75% 26%
Nicaragua Strong 2.4 5.9 1.4 24% — —Peru Strong 2.0 29.2 7.4 25% 32% 20%
Average for Countries with Stronger Laws
Strong 2.3 16.6 3.8 21% 49% 21%
Honduras Weak 1.9 8 1.5 19% 61% 19%Brazil Weak 1.8 196 17.7 9% 33% 11%
Ecuador Strong 1.7 14 1.5 11% 32% 11%Panama Weak 1.7 3 0.9 27% 72% 24%Uruguay Weak 1.7 4 1.3 37% 94% 38%
Dominican Rep. Weak 1.5 9 2.1 23% 92% 46%Colombia — 1.4 45 6.8 15% 65% 31%Argentina Weak — 41 12.4 31% 63% 35%
Average for Countries with Weaker Laws,
Excluding Decrees
Weak 1.7 40 6 22% 64% 27%
AVERAGE Weak 2.0 40.5 12.4 31% 59% 35%
Newspaper Ownership Concentration and Market Centralization
No data on media ownership concentration could be obtained for Nicaragua
MexicoBecause of the recent political changes in our country there is an opportunity
to effect some legislative change. If done properly, a legal obligation to inform would effectively bind Mexico’s government offices and public companies to make information available to citizens much in the same manner as the US.
-Alejandro Junco de la Vega, Owner and Director, Grupo Reforma, to Larry Faulkner, President of the University of Texas at Austin.
I had all the memoranda from Finance and went to see [Secretary] Gil Diaz to ask why he was putting up such resistance. He didn’t react, because he didn’t know what I was talking about. I thought to myself, ‘this is the bureaucracy who is doing this, the Secretary doesn’t even know’…
-PAN Senator, Javier Corral, personal interview, Mexico City, 2007
A deputy who would not sign on to a document that an editor of a national newspaper was proposing— that politician would risk never being covered again... –Issa Luna Pla, member of Grupo Oaxaca, personal interview, Mexico City, 2007
Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in Brasilia, April 2011
Argentina“These questions are very nice for seminars, but if you allow me the intellectual
indulgence...from a more Machiavellian perspective, these are laws presented by people who will never reach a position of power.”
—Juan José Álvarez, Minister of Justice under Argentine President Eduardo Duhalde (2002-03), personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2007.
“Professional advantage is thought to be accentuated by the absence of an access to information law. The media consider it like a competition; the access that everyone would have [with an access to information law] is for them their value added; he who has more access has more power in the media.” -Martin Etchevers, Director of Public Relations for Clarín, personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2007.
“Once we were told through a third party that if we changed our editorial line, the government would give us official advertising.” -Franco Lindner, Politics Editor at Editor Perfíl, personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2005.
“Everything that has to do with transparency or accountability is perceived as if it comes from the international realm.” –Robert de Michele, Anti-Corruption Office, personal interview, Buenos Aires, 2005.
Brasil 2003 Proposal presented by a Deputy from the
governing PT, Reginaldo Lopes
2006 Presidential Campaign Promise, Inácio Luiz Lula da Silva
2009 (April) International Seminar Organized by Civil Society Organizations (ABRAJI, Artigo 19)
2009 (May) Executive presents project to Congress
2010 (April) Approval in the Chamber of Deputies
2010 (November) The government announces it will not open the archives as it had previously promised (1964-85)
2011 (Current) Being revised by Technology commission. Itamary
(foreign affairs) yesterday declared it preferred the original law sent to Congress.Gregory Michener [email protected] Presentation to the World Bank in
Brasilia, April 2011