media and traditional communication in afghanistan

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Political Communication, 19:155170, 2002Copyright 2002 Taylor & Francis1058-4609/02 $12.00 + .00DOI: 10.1080/0195747029005542 0

Modern Mass Media and Traditional

Communication in Afghanistan

SHIR MOHAMMAD RAWAN

This article explores the bipolar structure of communication in Afghanistan, where

the latest technological advancements in media coexist with a complex system oftraditional communication. After 22 years of civil war and the destruction of most

modern media facilities, Afghanistans traditional channels of communication have

become even more significant. This article examines the history of the press in Af-ghan politics and society and asks what roles modern and traditional communication

systems and values may play in the future.

Keywords Afghanistan, Jergah, journalism, the press, traditional communication,tribal council

The various layers of communication in Afghanistan have a bipolar structure. On the

one hand, there are media based on the latest technological advancements which appeal

above all to those segments of the population that orient themselves toward the industri-

alized West. On the other hand, there is a complex system of mass communication

along the lines of native traditions. This system is to a large degree defined by face-to-

face relationships and the standards of social life governing the country (Rawan, 1992,

p. 44). Contrary to modern mass communication for which the industrialized society

was the basis and from which journalism developed as a necessary building block, tradi-

tional communication usually comprises smaller groups within a limited territory (Roschani-

Moghaddam, 1985, p. 120).

Because the country has been in a constant state of civil war for 22 years and most

modern media facilities now lie in ruins, Afghanistans traditional channels of commu-

nication have become even more significant. Moreover, the media have been used as

propaganda instruments and exploited by whoever was in power for the sole purpose of

keeping that power. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the more than 100 opposi-

tion publications in existence in 1985 could not take on a decisive role as carriers of

information with regard to the organization and mobilization of Afghan resistance againstthe communist central power and the Soviet Army. Since the majority of Afghanistans

population as well as the followers of the various parties were illiterate, they could not

participate in the discussions held in the various media. According to Grevemeyer (1985),

This article was translated from German into English by Michael Davidson-Schmich.Shir Mohammad Rawan is Adjunct Professor in the Communication Department at the Uni-

versity of Leipzig.Address correspondence to Shir Mohammad Rawan, Obere Eichstdtstr. 18, 04299 Leipzig,

Germany. E-mail: [email protected]


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156 Shir Mohammad Rawan

this resulted in the development of institutions and procedures on the local level that

allowed ordinary people such as farmers and soldiers to participate at least to some

extent in military and political decision making processes (p. 23). Oral propaganda,

institutionalized discussions, as well as one-on-one explanations of facts by teachers,

clerics, and propaganda officials appointed by the parties played a significant part in the

dissemination of information and official goals to the largely illiterate population (Greve-

meyer, 1985, p. 23).

One of the most important institutionalized political organizations of the Afghan

refugees has been the Jergah, a council that discusses everyday questions as well as

military issues and also promotes relief measures for refugees (Janata, 1983, p. 125).

For the majority of the Afghan population, particularly those living in the countryside,

the traditional centers or channels of communication include tribal and village meetings,

mosques, bazaars and markets, as well as family gatherings, which are organized in

accordance with the inherent needs and necessities of the local population. All of theseoccasions and many others provide the opportunity to exchange information, point out

problems, make complaints, solve conflicts, or contribute to the formation of opinions

and find answers to questions which are of common interest to individuals, groups, or

society in general (MacBride & Abel, 1984, p. 48).

Contrary to the common belief held by Europeans, Afghanistan enjoyed periods of

enlightenment of considerable length toward the end of the 19th century. Between 1919

and 1929, there was a period of modernization under King Amanullah Khan. During

that period the democratic forces of the country passed the first Afghan constitution.

People, at least to some extent, had freedom of opinion, and the king tried to institution-alize the principles of constitutionality. There was also a time of democracy between

1963 and 1973 under King Zaher Shah, who now lives in exile. During this time there

were opposition newspapers, and women had the right to vote.

The Afghan Press: Between Censorship and Freedom

Throughout the countries of the Middle East, the development of the media is intricately

linked to the development of colonialism and decolonization. Western style newspapers

had not been in existence previously. The first newspapers developed as a result of thenewly established colonial powers during the 19th century and their administrative need

to instruct the local population in the mechanisms of control and dominance (Freund,

1988, p. 264).

A historical analysis of the general situation at the end of the 19th and beginning of

the 20th century reveals that the development of the first weekly newspaper, the Shams-

al-Nehar(Sun of The Day), in 1873 was not predominantly a result of the socioeconomic

structures at the time. Instead, responsible for the development of the Shams-al-Neharwere

a few individual members of the intellectual elite who had been influenced by the modern

ideas of various Islamic states as well as Europes scientific and technical advancementsand who now advocated and pressed ahead with the development of modern media.

One of the members of this elite was Jamal-al din Afghani. He was politically connected

to the court of Emir Sher-Ali Khan and initiated the publication of the Shams-al-Nehar

at the end of the 19th century (Rawan, 1992, p. 58). Afghani, considered to be one of the

most important reformers of the Islamic world of his time, argued that Islam would remain

static as long as religious hierarchies and intolerance prevailed and as long as the Muslim

world failed to acquire the body of knowledge that had been developed in Europe in the

areas of natural sciences and the humanities (Rawan, 1992, p. 55).


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Traditional Communication in Afghanistan 157

The Shams-al-Neharcovered mainly issues dealing with the importance and neces-

sity of the press, official and unofficial government announcements, local news and

news from abroad, and scientific and cultural topics. Moreover, in articles focusing on

national ideas and issues, Shams-al-Neharinfluenced by Afghanis pan-Islamic ideas

took on the cause of pointing out to the ruling upper class and the religious circles in

the country the causes and consequences of Afghanistans backwardness (Ahang, 1970,

p. 12). With the beginning of the second Anglo-Afghan War (18781880) and the forced

exile of Emir Sher-Ali Khan, however, Shams-al-Neharceased publication. Because of

its fight for national independence, Shams-al-Nehar could no longer publish under the

Emir Abduurahmann (18801901), who was a de facto pro-British ruler and had aban-

doned Afghanistans basic national interests (Ahang, 1970, p. 17).

It was not until 1902 that the situation of the press changed. Responsible for this

transformation was Mahmud Ber Tarzi. He was a patriotic reformer and considered by

many to be the founder of the Afghan press. After spending considerable time in exilemainly in Europe and TurkeyMahmud Ber Tarzi, upon his return to Afghanistan in

1902, founded Jawanan-e-Afghan (Young Afghans), a reformist movement representing

liberal and religious forces opposing Emir Habibullah Khans pro-British regime. Since

publishers ofJawanan-e-Afghan were well aware of the power the printed word could

provide for the spread of their ideas, they edited their first lithographed newspaper in

January 1906, called Seradj-ul-Ahkbar (Luminary of Chronicles). Because it supported

the total national independence of Afghanistan, it was immediately prohibited by British

authorities (Habibi, 1985).

Only in 1911 did Mahmud Tarzi again succeed in publishing a bimonthly news-paper, Seradj-ul-Ahkbar Afghanieh (Luminary of Afghan News). He could do so not

least due to his family ties to the court (Rahin, 1988, p. 42).

The publication of the Seradj-ul-Ahkbar Afghanieh not only formed the basis of

modern media in Afghanistan, but the political views expressed in the paper also formed

the basis Afghanistans journalism for decades to come. The importance of Seradj-

ul-Ahkbar Afghanieh cannot be underestimated. It not only provided the first ethical

justification for the modernization of Afghanistan, but it also attempted to link modern-

ization, patriotism, and Islam together as indivisible and intrinsic elements of Afghan

society (Rawan, 1992, p. 65).In order to overcome the cultural isolation of the country, Tarzi and his newspaper

advocated a spiritual and cultural rejuvenation of society. The idea was to transform the

traditional and outdated educational and value systems so that they would meet the

needs of modern times. This was to be achieved through the mediation of developed

countries and the adaptation of their fundamental ideas. In order to overcome Afghan-

istans political stagnation and its isolation, the newspaper promulgated the idea of a

national consciousness which was meant to convey to the people of Afghanistan a sense

of unity and solidarity. In Tarzis view, the division and dissention of the Afghan people

as well as the prevailing outdated concepts of law and freedom were among the histori-cal factors that had contributed to the state of the Afghan nation up until that time.

According to Seradj-ul-Akhbar, the misfortune of the division of the Afghan people

was that cities and villages were fighting other cities and villages, tribes clashed with

other tribes, and even members of the same family turned against each other. This divi-

sion was condemned not only on the basis of Islamic rules, which decree that all believ-

ers are brothers, but also according to the laws of reason, which held that a society

functions best when its members are united and help each other. Afghanistans divided

state in 1911 is reminiscent of the current situation (Vartan, 1967, p. 350).


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After Afghanistans independence in 1919, traditional socioeconomic notions and

values as well as religious fanaticism slowly started to change. Responsible for these trans-

formations was a class of secular intellectuals who became a major power factor in society.

The representatives of this class opposed conservative elements and religious fanatics,

advocating the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. For King Amanullah and

his government, the first prerequisite for an all comprising societal reform was a spiritual

and cultural revival of Afghanistan and its society. The educational system and the press

were considered to be instrumental in achieving this goal (Moltmann, 1982, p. 12).

During King Amanullahs reign (19191928), the quantity and quality of Afghan

journalism changed. For the first time in Afghanistans history, Article 11 of the 1923

Constitution provided the legal basis for the right to free speech of every Afghan citizen

(Schwager, 1932, p. 10). At the same time, a total of 23 state-owned and private news-

papers and magazines appeared in Kabul and some provincial cities (Grevemeyer, 1987,

p. 99). Also among them was the first womans magazine,Erschad-al-Nasswan (Instruc-tions for the Women), published in Kabul by Queen Soraja in 1922 (Yussufi, 1977, p. 92).

The majority of the published articles were about European science, culture, and

civilization as well as about Turkey, a relatively developed country. These articles had

an impact on Afghanistans intellectuals and, as a consequence, strengthened the power

of Amanullahs government. However, the press had no direct impact on the majority of

the population. The main reason for the relatively minor impact of the media and the

ultimate failure of King Amanullahs reforms, however, was not their objectives. The

problem was that the majority of the reforms, which mainly had been adopted from

modern Turkey and Europe, contradicted not only the socioeconomic and cultural struc-ture of the population but also the peoples traditional and religious notions (Rawan,

1992, p. 84). Yet, the historical feasibility and lasting impact of Amanullahs education

and media policy were later confirmed when, in 1929, Nadir Shah readopted the main

concepts of Amanullahs policies.

Up until the 1940s, Nadir Shahs (19291933) press policies and those of his son

Sahir Shah (19331973) were defined by two basic characteristics. First, there was an

emphasis on the historical and cultural identity of Afghanistan. Second, they empha-

sized the development of a uniform national consciousness among the various Afghan

nationalities. Moreover, journalism now represented more of a reasonable compromisewith the clerics, which it had not during Amanullahs reign (Rawan, 1992, p. 128).

The creation of the first Afghan news agency, Bakhtar, in 1939 represented an

important step toward Afghanistans integration into the international information sys-

tem. This not only created the possibility of exchanging information with the provincial

media outlets and Kabul, but also with foreign news agencies such as Reuter, AP, and

AFP. In addition, with the help of German technicians, Radio Kabul was expanded in

1940 (Rawan, 1992, p. 194).

In the wake of Shah Mahmuds politics of liberalization, a middle-class opposition

developed starting in 1946. With the formation of this opposition, called Wish-Zalmian(Awakened Youth), a new period for the state-controlled media also began; it now could

enjoy new democratic liberties. Domestic political issues were given broad coverage. As

a result of this new course and pressure from the opposition, a new media law was

pushed through parliament on January 1, 1951. By and large, the new law abolished

precensorship of the press. During 1951 four opposition newspapers appeared, repre-

senting the official organs of the political groups that had evolved out of Wish-Zalmian.

The significance of these press organs was that they called for citizen participation in

the political life of Afghanistan (Rawan, 1992, p. 154).


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In 1953, Mohammad Daud, a cousin of Zahir Shah, was appointed Afghanistans

new prime minister. An ever increasing number of educated specialists and graduates

led to an increased interest in technical knowledge as well as an interest in current news

on foreign events and domestic reform measures (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 307).

For one thing, Daud recognized the existing need for information among Afghanistans

intellectuals, which led him to the speedy development of newspapers, magazines, and

radio broadcasting. On the other hand, Daud was considered to be the first Afghan

politician who consciously used journalism to reflect his economic and foreign policies.

Between 1953 and 1963, 31 new trade journals were edited and disseminated by various

ministries, state institutions, and educational agencies. Accordingly, the government started

to train people in journalism (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 310).

In 1963, for the first time the appointed prime minister came from a middle-class

background. Yussuf introduced a new domestic policies course as well as new media

policies. These new policies expanded the concept of free speech, extending it far be-yond past policies. The decrees of the new constitution, modeled after the French

constitution, and the new laws governing the media, ratified in 1965, represented a con-

tinuation of the political development abandoned in 1952. The understanding that the

press of a given country should also reflect existing differences of opinion led to private

initiatives of editors and publishers (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 312).

That the governments media policies were about to change could also be seen in

the fact that, for the first time, there was an attempt to extend these policies beyond

the capital to the provinces. To integrate the population living outside Kabul into the

communication system, the government strived to extend the modern means of commu-nication and to provide guidance in regard to the interpersonal and traditional communi-

cation of this part of the population. In order to achieve this, the Modiriat-e Konferenzha

(Department of Conferences) was founded in 1964. Its main task was to organize con-

ferences and meetings at provincial centers and villages with the objective of increasing

the level of information and adding to the local populations enlightenment concerning

various societal issues (Grevemeyer, 1987, p. 316).

The media policies introduced by Prime Minister Yussuf in 1973 had positive

effects on Afghanistans media not only in Kabul but also in the provinces. At the end

of the monarchy, Afghanistan had a total of 70 different dailies, weeklies, trade pub-lications, and tabloids; 16 of these were daily newspapers. The total volume of all pub-

lications was approximately 220,000 copies. According to Ahang and Siddiq (1972),

who researched the history of Afghanistans journalism, one copy of a given publication

was shared by four different readers. Accordingly, it can be assumed that in 1970, out

of a total of 13.5 million Afghanis (Prakke, Lerg, & Scholke, 1970, p. 12), 880,000 read

these publications (Ahang & Siddiq, 1972, p. 41).

There was no considerable transformation of the media or of the governments me-

dia policy during the military putsch under Mohammad Daud Khan in 1973 and the

consequent proclamation of the Republic of Afghanistan. However, the structural andpolitical dimensions of Afghanistans mass media changed after the military takeover

of the country in 1978 by the Democratic Peoples Party of Afghanistan (DVPA), which

in 1990 changed its name to Hezb-e-Watan (Party of the Homeland). After the take-

over, the DVPA was eager to propagate its political and ideological views. Especially

during the 1980s, the DVPA started with the technical improvement of the press, in-

creased circulation of the various publications, and, at the same time, took over and thus

controlled the majority of media outlets (Rawan, 1992, p. 200).

Up until Najibullahs pro-Soviet regime was overthrown in 1992, there were 4 national


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daily newspapers in Afghanistan (Anis, Hewad, Payam, and The Kabul News Times) with

a total of about 111,200 copies; 8 central weekly papers with a total volume of 235,000

copies; and 18 provincial newspapers with a total of 600,000 copies published in Pashtu

and Dari, the two official languages of Afghanistan (Khaydary, 1994, p. 64).

After 1992, the press basically collapsed. A few newspapers and magazines were

published irregularly and had a new political and religious profile. Some of the former

newspapers, for example the Anis, Hewad, and The Kabul News Times, continued to be

published under Taliban rule. However, with only four pages each, the quality was at

best modest, and they resembled flyers more than newspapers.

RadioThe Most Widespread Informational Medium

The basis for Afghanistans radio broadcasting system was laid by Amanullah Khans

government in 1925 with the purchase of two radio broadcasting systems. After thesystems had been imported and a broadcasting studio had been established in Kabul, the

first station was ready to transmit its program in 1928 with a 360-m wavelength and a

total power of 200 W, allowing the programs to be received as far as Kandahar. The

second transmitter was supposed to be installed in Kandahar. However, most likely due

to emerging unrest and the failure of Amanullah Khans government, it never material-

ized (Yussufi, 1977, p. 143).

In 1963, the Supreme Council for the Industrialization of Afghanistan decided to

purchase a medium-wave band transmitter from Germany with a total booster wave

capacity of 20 kilowatts. At the same time, officials in charge pushed ahead with theconstruction of the transmission facilities in Yakatut, a small village 5 km south of

Kabul, and a building housing the future broadcasting studio Pul-e-Bagh-e-Umumi in

the center of Kabul. A few students were also trained in radio technology. In 1939, the

two transmitters were finally imported from Germany, and, after they had been assembled,

the first program was broadcast with the help of German technicians on August 23,

1940, at 7:30 a.m. Whereas previously programs could only be broadcast on an irregular

schedule and also were limited to the Kabul area, Radio Kabul now possessed the tech-

nological means to transmit its programs all over Afghanistan (Malyar, 1977, p. 2).

The program of Radio Kabul consisted of news from Afghanistan, the most impor-tant world news, agricultural recommendations, government and other official announce-

ments, as well as Oriental and European music (the latter, however, only sporadically). The

program was broadcast both in Pashto and Persian. The newly created and independent

Office for Media Affairs was responsible for the format of the program by Radio Kabul.

The Ministry of Postal Services was responsible for the technical aspects up until 1945.

After that the Public Relations Office took over responsibilities (Stegmann, 1941, p. 25).

Under the government of Mohammad Daud (19531963), radio broadcasting saw

improvements in its technology and its range of listeners. Daud tried to utilize radio

broadcasting as a means of propaganda for his domestic and foreign policy. With that inmind, Radio Kabul improved its technical facilities and also its program. To serve its

domestic listeners, a 10-kilowatt Siemens transmitter was installed in 1958, followed by

a 50-kilowatt transmitteralso made by Siemensinstalled in Kabul a year later. Pro-

gramming time thus could be increased from 6 to 14 hours. In addition, Radio Kabul

started daily programs of 30 minutes each in English, French, Arabic, Russian, German,

Urdu, and Balutschi (Rawan, 1992, p. 187).

These program additions extended the narrow scope that broadcasting stations had

provided since 1939. For this reason, Dauds government included in its 5-year plan the


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construction of radio studios in Ansariwat, a village near Kabul. They were completed

in 1964 and consisted of seven recording studios, two concert studios, and a large audi-

torium. In the same year, Radio Kabul was renamed Radio Afghanistan (Khaydary,

1994, p. 66).

Yussufs government also considered radio broadcasting an important vehicle for

propagating and explaining its program of democratization. Accordingly, attempts were

made to revamp radio broadcasting in Afghanistan along the lines of the governments

new social and political course. In the governments opinion, the old radio programs

did not do justice to this new course. During the opening ceremony for the new studio

in Kabul in 1964, Yussuf criticized the technical backwardness of the various radio

programs and consequently demanded that the Ministry for Culture and Informational

Services and all other ministries strive for better cooperation among themselves and

improve the broadcasting programs (Rawan, 1992, p. 198).

In the following year, the Ministry for Culture and Informational Services estab-lished the mission of the broadcasting system. The core of this mission was to spread

national ideas, to enlighten peoples critical thinking, to satisfy the need for information

according to the educational levels of the various classes of society, and, last but not

least, to entertain the listeners (Rawan, 1992, p. 189).

In order to extend educational programming and to improve transmission to all

parts of the country, a 100-kilowatt mid-wave transmitter, a 100-kilowatt shortwave

transmitter, and a second 25-kilowatt mid-wave transmitter started to broadcast from

Kabul in August 1966. Programming time now increased from 15 to 16 hours, and new

programs were broadcast (Mokhtar Zadah, 1972, p. 122).During the mid-1980s, the former USSR handed over a total of 27 TYP RoB 10

transmitters and amplifiers to the Afghan government, which guaranteed the broadcast-

ing of radio programs all over the country. Moreover, these new technical devices now

formed the basis for the development of local radio stations in the provinces (Khaydary,

1994, p. 67).

In 1990, Radio Afghanistan was the only state-owned radio station in the country

broadcasting with a total of 50 programming hours. These programs were free of charge

all over Afghanistan and could also be received abroad. According to some estimates, in

1990 there were about 5 million listeners across the country and a total listening audi-ence of 10 to 12 million (Khaydary, 1994, p. 68).

In the 1990s, radio was also used for political and ideological propaganda purposes

by the various mujahedin groups in Kabul and the provincial cities. Under the reign of

the Taliban, Radio Afghanistan was renamed Radio Shariat. On November 18, 2001, it

resumed its previous name Radio Afghanistan.

Similar to many developing countries, radio broadcasting in Afghanistan was con-

sidered the only mass media. However, owing to the fact that it was controlled and

administered by the government, it lacked credibility.

To obtain credible information, Afghans intellectuals and the people in the country-side very often listened and continue to listen to radio programs in Pashto and Dari on

BBC, Voice of America, and Deutsche Welle, as well as to the radio stations of neigh-

boring countries such as Pakistan and Iran. There have been no polls to measure which

foreign radio stations have the most listeners in Afghanistan; however, judging from my

own experiences, the most popular probably are the programs in Pashtu and Dari of Radio

BBC and Voice of America, followed by those on Deutsche Welle. At the moment, the

Afghan people consider these radio programs the most important informational sources

concerning the events on and after September 11 and the countrys development in general.


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TelevisionRebuilding After the Taliban

TV has only been in existence since the early 1970s. Plans to develop an Afghan televi-

sion system were first established under the government of Prime Minister Daud, and in

1975 a Japanese company began implementation of a PAL-system (Rawan, 1992, p.

201). At the start of operations, the television center in Kabul had two studios, editorialoffices, a graphics department, and a small video library. All of the studios technical

equipment and that of the transmitter stations were made in Japan, including cameras;

several video recorders; 16-mm film projectors; recording, copying, and control equip-

ment; and the equipment for the master control room and the cutting rooms. Up until

1978, there were merely broadcasts for testing purposes. At the end of 1978, daily 1-

hour broadcasts were started in Kabul (Khaydary, 1994, p. 70). At the beginning of the

1980s, Kabul TV had increased its broadcasting time to 6 hours daily. About 2 million

people in and around the capital were able to receive these programs. In 1982, with the

support of the Soviets, the satellite station Shamshad was put into place, enabling KabulTV to exchange programs with countries abroad using the Intersputnik system. More-

over, the satellite station formed the basis for a 2-hour program by Kabul TV broadcast

to 11 provincial cities during the mid-1980s. Among the cities with local TV stations

were Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Farah, Khost, and Fayzabad. Parts of the broad-

cast were also produced at these local stations (Rawan, 1992, p. 201).

In 1992, the total daily broadcasting time of the central station in Kabul was 6

hours. There was an additional program between 9 p.m. and 12 a.m. on Fridays. On

January 1, 1978, there were between 30,000 and 35,000 TVs in Afghanistan. By Janaury

1, 1987, the number had increased to 800,000, of which 250,000 were color TVs, most

of them in Kabul (Khaydary, 1994, p. 72). After the fall of Najubullahs government

and once the mujahedin (freedom fighters) had taken over the capital of Kabul, the

broadcasting of TV programs was anything but regular. And as soon as the Taliban

conquered Kabul in 1996, they prohibited watching TV in accordance with their strict

interpretation of Islamic law.

As is common knowledge, the orthodox followers of Islam in general condemn the

graphic representation of living beings. Accordingly, up until the early 1960s religious

scholars deemed photography unacceptable. Then and now, they consider photography

a reproduction of human beings, and all those who imitate Gods creations will be se-

verely punished by Allah on judgment dayeven though the Koran does not explicitly

forbid the portrayal of human beings. To a certain degree, todays clerics still condemn

the graphic depiction of humans. Even today, ultra-religious Muslims in rural regions of

Afghanistan refuse to pray in rooms that are adorned with man-made depictions of liv-

ing beings. They argue that angels will never enter a room decorated with a human

tswr(picture) (Mhlbck, 1988, p. 95). This orthodox interpretation was put into prac-

tice by the Taliban in that they forbid TV and photography.

After a 5-year break, broadcasting in Kabul began again on November 18, 2001,albeit on a provisional basis. Most of the transmitters either have been destroyed or are

totally outdated. Currently, the daily 3-hour program for Kabul consists of news, cul-

ture, and entertainment.

Whereas foreign radio stations enjoyed a fair number of Afghan listeners, the ma-

jority of the Afghan people do not watch TV stations such as CNN or Al-Jazeera. For

one thing, satellite dishes were illegal under the Taliban government. In addition, house-

holds in most parts of the country were not hooked up to the electric grid. Moreover,

language barriers exist, with the majority of intellectuals unable to understand either

English or Arabic.


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It has been established that the development of journalism during the last decades

has been influenced mainly by the socioeconomic development of Afghanistan. This is

true for all of the various governments that have used journalism as a means of enforc-

ing their policies. On the positive side, we find that every government, and this is espe-

cially true for the post-WWII period, pushed for the development and proliferation of

journalism. Unlike the European press, the media in Afghanistan considered its primary

mission and objective the publication of educational, instructional, and technical and

scientific material. The immediate political and ideological reverberation of modern me-

dia (print, radio, and TV) was mostly limited to a small class of intellectuals. For the

majority of the population, the most important sources of information have been and

still are the traditional means of communication.

JergahPolitical Communication of a Different Kind

For centuries, there has been the tradition of advisory bodies called the Jergah. There

are two types ofJergahs, one being the Quawmi-Jergah (the council meeting of the

tribe) and the other the Loyah-Jergah (the large council meeting).

The Quawmi-Jergah functions as an advisory or mediating body concerning impor-

tant affairs of the village, the clan, parts of the tribe, or the entire tribeeverything

except family matters. One member of each family or community, most of the time an

experienced Spinziri (Elder), sits on the council. Usually, the Jergah takes place on the

village plaza in front of the mosque. The affair to be decided upon has already been

discussed before the meeting, and political alliances play an important part in thosediscussions. The actualJergah then is merely an exchange of opinions. And even though

each member of the Jergah has the right to present his individual opinion to the as-

sembled council, the usual procedure is that the Khn/Malek or Spinziri presents an

opinion that has been arrived at by the group prior to the Jergah. Decisions in the

Jergah are made not by a majority vote but through consensus, reached when there are

no more objections by any of the attendees (Kortenbusch, 1994, p. 76). According to

Frembgen (1990), these characteristrics are a reflection of the Pashtuns notions of equality

(p. 109). In addition to solving conflicts within its tribe, the Jergah also maintains rela-

tionships between the Pashtun tribe and other nationalities or ethnic groups as well asthe government. Each new development reaching the tribe from outside is spread within

the tribe by theJergah. Then the council decides whether to reject or to adopt it. Once

the Jergah has arrived at a decision by consensus, it is irrevocable, and violators are

threatened with severe punishment. Quite obviously, with its power to mediate conflicts

and pass judgments, theJergah still functions today as a court of law within the Pashtun

tribes, even though the physical and material penalties differ from one Pashtun area to

the next.

Usually, theLoyah-Jergah (large council) is made up of tribal leaders and represen-

tatives of all ethnic and religious groups in the country. The role played by conveningtheLoyah-Jergah is not new but has a long tradition. Most recently, with the end of the

Taliban rule and the confirmation of the future government of Afghanistan, the function

of the Loyah-Jergah has become the frequent focus of Western media. What was the

political significance of theLoyah-Jergah within the history of Afghanistan?

The Loyah-Jergah is deeply embedded in Afghan history. Whenever a united front

was needed to solve a problem or conflict, the Loyah-Jergah was convoked. In 1747,

the ruler of the country was murdered, which caused a severe conflict within the country

over succession. In order to solve this conflict, Nor Mohammad Khan, a high military


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official, suggested the convocation of theLoyah-Jergah. The council consisted of mem-

bers from the most important ethnic groups in Afghanistan: the Pashtuns, Tadjiks, Uzbeks,

Turkmen, and Hazaras. A representative of the clergy was appointed chairperson of the

Loyah-Jergah. It was also decided that all of the ethnic groups of the country had to

obey the decision of the Loyah-Jergah. Thus, the first king of Afghanistan was elected

in 1747 by the Loyah-Jergah, which had united the tribes of the Pashtuns, Tadjiks,

Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazaras. It was also the first time that a king was made head of

state in a peaceful process by the decree of the Loyah-Jergah (Ghubar, 1967, p. 559). In

the same year, the country was named Afghanistan.

During the first Anglo-Afghan War (18391842), the Loyah-Jergah convened in

1841 to decide on a successor for Dost Mohammad in order to organize the resistance

of all Afghan nationalities against the British colonial power. Dost Mohammad had

been deprived of his powers by the British and was then deported to India. At the

Loyah-Jergah convention, Sardar Akber Khan was appointed leader of the army andwas also appointed to lead the countrys resistance against the British. In 1842, the

rebellion/uprising organized by the Loyah-Jergah was successful, and the British were

defeated (Ghubar, 1967, p. 355). With the outbreak of WWI in 1914, Afghanistan had

to make up its mind about its role in this war and its stance toward Great Britain. To

this end, Emir Habibullah convened the Loyah-Jergah in 1915. Participants, however,

were mainly clerical leaders of the country, who had been chosen by the Emir himself.

During the Loyah-Jergah, Habibullah was declared the absolute ruler of the country.

This decision by the Loyah-Jergah, which was forced and did not reflect the interest of

the wider population, was controversial among those tribal lords who had been excludedfrom the Loyah-Jergah. Those opposing Habibullah argued that the people of Afghani-

stan could have more easily achieved their independence, since the British had been

weakened by their engagement in the war (Ghubar, 1967, p. 737). In February 1919,

Habibullah paid for his pro-British policy with his life.

In contrast to his father, Habibullahs son Amanullah started to implement a more

progressive political course in 1919. His objective was to fundamentally reform and

modernize the country, and again the Loyah-Jergah was one means to this end. More-

over, tribal Jergahs were convened across the country with the objective of uniting all

forces against the British colonizers. Both institutions, the Quawmi-Jergah (tribal coun-cil) and theLoyah-Jergah, played an important role in the organization and mobilization

of the tribes against the British colonial power. After Afghanistans independence was

recognized in 1919, King Amanullah retained these traditional institutions in support of

his domestic and foreign policies (Ghubar, 1967, p. 799).

In order to define and strengthen his position on foreign policy, Amanullah in 1921

convened yet another Loyah-Jergah, whose members consisted of tribal representatives

and clerics from Afghanistans provinces. At this time the Loyah-Jergah passed the

Russian-Afghan agreement on good neighborly relations. One year later, Amanullah

submitted to theLoyah-Jergah the first written constitution and his plans for reformingthe country; both were confirmed by theLoyah-Jergah. TheLoyah-Jergah had an active

role not only in the ratification of Afghanistans first constitution in 1923 but in the

ratification of subsequent ones in 1939 and 1964. The Loyah-Jergah also determined

and supported Afghanistans politics of neutrality during WWII (Rawan, 1992, p. 49).

During the course of its history, resolutions and decisions by the Loyah-Jergah have

always been final, because these decisions are reached by the personalized, traditional

process of opinion formation among members of the public. This means that important

decisions have not been dispersed by the various mediawhich the majority of the


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population would not be exposed to anywaybut above all through interpersonal

communication by individual tribal representatives or the representatives of the various

ethnic groups. The persuasive power of personal communication thus grew, a fact that

encouraged the publics support of government policies. Even today, a Loyah-Jergah

could help to overcome the political, religious, and ethnic differences of the various

rival groups in Afghanistan.

Mosque and BazaarThe Most ImportantChannels for Information

Traditional Islamic society has always considered the mosque and the bazaar as the

most important pillars of traditional and interpersonal communication. This is not only

the case in rural areas. Here the cities have their common meeting point, here you get

in touch with others, here relationships grow stronger and deeper or they break. Here,people negotiate with each other, they pray to God, they exchange information (Naficy,

1993, p. 13).

During the time when there were no modern mass media in Afghanistan, the mosque

was not only the center for spiritual communication, but up until the end of the 19th

century it also represented the countrys only institution of learning. To some extent, the

mosques have retained this dual function to the present, especially in the countryside. In

terms of the development of Afghan society, the communicative significance of the

mosques can be compared with the role of the church in medieval European society.

Biblical events were used to explain the real world; religion justified societal norms;the church was the absolute and dominant ideological power. The priest, acting as a

spiritual herdsman for the residents of villages or the cities, guided their daily lives by

pronouncing the churchs doctrine. The priest was the central figure in societally inte-

grating communication in feudal society (Poerschke, 1988, p. 17). This also applies to

the predominantly feudal structure of Afghan society, since the Islamic religion, as the

dominant worldview, is deeply rooted in all Afghan social strata.

The considerable influence of the Mullah along with that of the Khn/Malek(tribal

lords) in rural communities is also based on the numerous other duties that he performs,

for example, at official ceremonies at the mosque, at the five daily ritual sermons, aswell as at the Friday sermon and all other religious festivities (Snoy, 1972, p. 170). He

is responsible for the spiritual life of the villagers, helps them solve day-to-day prob-

lems, andafter the prayer in the mosquetalks about the conflicts in the village and

the region (Ahang, 1970, p. 3).

After the sermon, especially the Friday sermon, the Mullah provides the village

people with the latest news. Government agencies also take advantage of this gathering

to pass on to the villagers administrative decisions and any other pertinent news. These

religious meeting places provide an opportunity for the population to exchange informa-

tion and news from the city and the countryside. Up to the present time, the role of themosque as the traditional center for communication has changed little. On the con-

trary, to this day the most important political decisions of the Afghan clergy both in

Kabul and in the provincial cities are usually announced after the Friday sermon in front

of hundreds of people. Only then are they broadcast on the radio and published by

the press.

The Oriental bazaar (Persian bzror Arabic sq), usually situated in the center of

the town, represents the traditional business district of the Islamic town. Moreover, it

consists of solid building facilities serving mainly economic needs and, except for some


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holidays, is open daily. Aside from its economic function, however, the bazaar also has

political and religious significance and an important role as a place for entertainment.

For city and town dwellers alike, the bazaar represents the dominant center of communi-

cation and the point of crystallization of the public life of the community and surround-

ing areas (Grtzbach, 1979, p. 153).

Aside from the Oriental bazaar, we find the so called market days in the rural

regions of these countries. Their function is primarily economic, yet they also provide

opportunities for entertainment, meeting new people, and the exchange of information.

In contrast to the bazaar, the Oriental market is a large open-air area without solid

structures or buildings in place. Moreover, it is used (on certain days) by the population

of the surrounding region for the purchase and sale of goods. In general, market days

and periodic markets tend to take place either once or twice a week. In northern and

northwestern Afghanistan, for example, market days are twice a week. In most regions

of the South and Southwest, on the other hand, market days are only once a week. InAfghanistan, the day ofJumaa holiday in Islamic countriesis a favorite market

day. Once the market closes down for business, visitors can visit the mosque for the

main Friday sermon. At a traditional market, the doors usually open between 7 and 8

a.m., and all trading activities cease during the midday hours. Afterward, people who

visited the market may go to one of the numerous tea houses and small restaurants

where they can catch up with the latest news, discuss communal affairs, and negotiate

weddings, contracts and the like (Fischer, 1984, p. 221).

Owing to the recent military conflicts and the consequent destruction of the techni-

cal media equipment and facilities, the importance of the bazaars as centers for com-munication has increased. Foreign journalists have confirmed this: When they asked

people in northern Afghanistan whether they knew about the events of September 11,

2001, the most common answer was that they had heard about them at the bazaar.

Opinion Leaders and Traditional Communication

Traditional and religious opinion leaders, such as the Khn (tribal lord), theMlek(tribal

leader) and the Mullah, all play a decisive role in the formation of opinion within Afghan-

istans traditional communication framework. The only difference between them is thatthe Khn usually owns more land. In general, there is no difference in their political

position or in their influence on political decision making. The Khn/Mlek is the de-

clared holder of authority within a given group. The Khns power is based on his

personal qualities, above all on his economic dominance and on his followers. Second

in the line of opinion leaders is the Mullah, the village cleric in the Pashtun community.

He is paid by the village, and in some communities he is on the same pay scale as

mosque barber, tender of the parish, and musician (Steul, 1981, p. 70).

As members of the upper class, and due to their material, religious, and traditional

standing, Khn, Mlek, and Mullah are the dominating spokespeople within their re-spective communities. They come from established families, are well connected and

oriented beyond their region, and are also in contact with other members of their class

outside their region. Thus, they hold leadership positions at the local as well as the

regional level. Because of their prestige within the hierarchical society, the majority of

the people seek their advice in all sorts of matters. The informational behavior of these

opinion leaders is also based on sources beyond the regional level. In part, their infor-

mation comes with the job and the position they hold, comparable to trade or religious

information (Wiebe, 1978, p. 190).


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There are numerous examples that substantiate the significance of traditional opin-

ion leaders within the communication process, in both the dissemination and hindrance

of new ideas and technologies. To list them all in full detail would go beyond the scope

of this article. An empirical study by Frhlich (1969), an expert on Afghan history and

ethnography, carried out at the end of the 1960s on the role of Radio Paktia in a re-

gional village revealed that the population was not supportive of the governments pro-

gram for political and economic renewal broadcast over the radio. The government had

failed to take into consideration the influence of the traditional opinion leaders, such as

the Mleks, the Mschrs (Eldest), and the teachers. The reasons for this, according to

Frhlich (1969), were a patriarchically organized tribal structure, on the one hand, and

the concentration of village radios among the opinion leaders, on the other (p. 205).

Even today, the traditional opinion leaders are considered the dominant forces in the

opinion forming process of the tribe or village.

I can corroborate the general significance of the opinion leader within the commu-nication process. During field studies in northwestern Pakistan in 1995, participants were

questioned about the reliability of information disseminated by the media. It turned out

that with regard to political decision making processes the opinion leaders were more

trustworthy than the modern media.

Thus, the role of religious and traditional opinion leaders in Islamic countries should

not be overlooked in research on traditional communication processes. On the one hand,

they simply must be taken into account when it comes to developmental improvements

and the organization of a modern state. On the other hand, the majority of the popula-

tion will not be able fully to understand and to comprehend information that is dissemi-nated by mass media alone. In the near future, people will therefore be dependent on the

opinion leaders and their interpretations, and it is fair to say that their interpretation will

have priority for years to come.

Based on my experience in rural Afghanistan, even radio broadcasting, which most

communication researchers consider extremely important in the implementation and

development of a political system within developing countries, is not necessarily an

adequate means for mass communication. For one thing, the majority of the population

cannot afford to buy a radio. In 1982, there were 1 million radios for 17 million Afghans

(Rawan, 1992, p. 201)most of them in the cities and some in rural areas owned by afew wealthy people. Aside from financial considerations, and quite incomprehensible

for Europeans, intellectual communication problems pose a serious obstacle. Since the

radio programs are mostly in Pashto or Dari, they are basically incomprehensible to

other ethnic nationalities residing in Afghanistan, among them the Baluchi, Uzbeki, and

Turkmen. Moreover, the Pashto and Dari spoken in Kabul differ from the respective

dialects spoken in the countryside. And the standard language spoken in Kabul, with

its intellectual nuances, goes way over the head of the common listener (Grevemeyer,

1985, p. 33).

Prospects

In the opinion of the author, the basic challenge of developing Afghanistans com-

munications has to be seen in the formation of adequate media structures and media

content, while strictly considering traditional, economic, ideological, and communicative

structures. In order to transform Afghanistans political, social, and economic fabric,

those responsible for the media should be well informed about and understanding of the


14/16


political culture of the areas to be developed. Unless new cultures are slowly integrated

into the existing culture, media policy has but a slim chance. Most important, people

must be given a chance to participate in this process. This can be achieved only if

every attempt is made to bring together the differing cultures to forge a forward-looking

community.

The development and the future tasks of Afghanistans modern media are based on

the current state of Afghanistans society, which is mainly characterized by ethnicity,

language, religion, family relations, settlement forms, social and economic strata, and

value systems. Because of this, the modern media should be concentrated not only in

the capital but also in the various regions of Afghanistan. The proliferation of the indi-

vidual media should be done in stages. Moreover, the main criteria must center around

the question how much information the population of a given area or region can pro-

cess. At present, this approach would involve the development of radio broadcasting as

a first step, followed by the press and finally television. Within the scope of the threemain tasks of media (information, entertainment, and the dissemination of knowledge),

regional media should always reflect ethnic and cultural peculiarities as well as various

languages and dialects. However, coverage of national and international news should

not dominate on the regional level, since the average person living in the countryside

has still little interest in national political affairs or, for that matter, in any foreign sig-

nals that do not correspond with his or her needs. As society develops, however, local

media have the possibility of increasing coverage of national topics by tying them in

with regional topics and thus increasing peoples national awareness. Past and present

events in the multinational state of Afghanistan show that the lack of a uniform identitynot only hinders the development of Afghan society but also the proliferation of a state-

wide communication system.

At the same time, local media have to make use of the traditional means of com-

munication and, with citizens rights and duties in mind, have to contribute jointly to

education and knowledge as well as to the uncovering of social and economic inequali-

ties. Change can be achieved more easily if we observe and respect habitual modes of

behavior and ways of thinking, traditional ideas as well as traditional/folk wisdom. In

addition, we have to take into consideration existing leadership structures.

The dissemination of modern ideas vis--vis the traditional value system and reli-gious ideals of Afghan society is considered to be a decisive factor in the effectiveness

of media contents. This goes all the way to the journalistic tradition of Afghani and

Tarzi, who saw the development of society intricately linked with national ideas such as

patriotism, Islam, and modernization. Nationalist flare-ups must be avoided, and, fol-

lowing Afghanis and Tarzis ideals, Islam should be viewed as a cultural force able to

integrate and to create identity rather than an ideology for political power, a view held

by the Taliban.

The technical knowledge and journalistic experience of the industrialized states can

be of great help for the development of Afghanistans national media. As part of theplan to rebuild Afghanistan, the industrial countries should do all they can to support

the various media outlets as soon as possible. The development and proliferation of

modern mass media is not only a decisive factor in the modernization process of Af-

ghan society but must also be viewed as a major contributing factor for the proliferation

of economic and cultural cooperation on the international level. However, the only way

Afghan media will be up to such a task is if they are guaranteed the same freedoms that

the media usually enjoy on the international level.


15/16


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