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MAOISTS SURGE AHEADThe Nation Under Siege

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MAOISTS SURGE AHEAD

- The Nation Under Siege

Contents

At the Threshhold - Six Questions .... 5

1. Real Objectives of Maoists’ War .... 9

Principal Targets - National Unity and Indian Army .... 10

Right of Self Determination of Nationalities .... 11

“India an Imperialist Power” .... 12

Charu Majumdar’s Thesis .... 12

2. Strengths and Capabilities .... 16

Maoists’ advance in Nepal .... 17

Strategic alliance with Jihadis .... 17

Arming the PLGA .... 19

Flow of Funds .... 22

Propaganda Blitzkrieg .... 22

3. PLGA to Peoples’ Liberation Army .... 24

Stages of Guerrilla War .... 24

Tactics of Guerrilla War .... 24

The Central Military Commission .... 26

Forces - Base, Secondary, Main .... 27

Battles - Guerrilla, Mobile, Positional .... 29

4. Brutal Killings, Genocide and Destruction of Infrastructure .... 30

Bihar .... 30

Chhattisgarh .... 33

West Bengal .... 37

Jharkhand .... 41

Maharashtra .... 42

Orissa .... 44

Andhra Pradesh .... 46

Madhya Pradesh .... 48

5. Security Forces Targeted .... 49

Bihar .... 49

Uttar Pradesh .... 51

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Chhattisgarh .... 52

West Bengal .... 58

Jharkhand .... 59

Orissa .... 60

6. Public Face of CPI (Maoist) .... 63

Civil Liberties and Human Rights Platforms .... 63

Revolutionary Writers Associations .... 65

Academics and Intellectuals .... 67

Media .... 70

7. The Political Response .... 73

Unified Command .... 74

Avaoidable Debate .... 75

Political Class in Frankenstein Mode .... 76

Appendix

A. Resolution on Nationality Struggles .... 82

B. Resolution against Hindu Fascism .... 83

C. Front Organizations of Maoists .... 84

D. Naxal Insurgency : Major Developments since 1967 .... 86

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The Maoists had ambushed and completely wiped out an entire battalion of CRPF on 6 April2010 at Chintalnar in Chhattisgarh. Even before the nation could recover from the shock theystruck again on 29 May. Their diabolic explosion on the railway track at Khemshuli in WestBengal rammed the Mumbai bound super-fast express (Gnaneswari) into a goods train crushing todeath 148 innocent passengers including women and children. Over 190 injured. These were notisolated incidents. They were part of a grand strategy to use terror as a political weapon for captur-ing the Indian State.

Two powerful naxal groups, the Peoples’ War (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre(MCC) operating in non-overlapping geographical regions merged together to form CPI(Maoist).The Union Home Ministry and various intelligence agencies haven’t studied in depth the implica-tions of this merger. Firstly, naxals attained an all-India status. The arrival of new political jargon,namely, ‘Pasupati to Tirupati’, ‘Red Corridor,’ etc was but a reflection of this newly acquiredstature. Secondly, an improbable had happened. Terrorist outfits, all over the world, generally split,do not unite for various reasons. Added to these developments, the Insurgency got further boostbecause of the rapid advance of fraternal Maoists to the central stage in neighboring Nepal almostabout the same time.

Ever since the merger new areas came under Maoists’ influence. A decade ago, there was hardlyany presence of their activity in West Bengal. But now, thanks to Singur and Nandigram, thedistricts of Medinipur, Bankura and Purulia have come under their grip. By 2006, the MaoistInsurgency has pushed the cross-border terror in Kashmir to second position. Look at the follow-ing figures:

At the Threshold - Six Questions

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No.killed during 2006-2010

Maoists’ War KashmirInsurgency

Civilians 2237 661

Security Forces 1297 511

Maoists / Militants 1200 1880

The above figures should not be viewed as mere crime statistics. These were not just ordinarymurders. The impact of killing a security person would be different from killing a civilian. Eachfatality on the side of security forces, leads to the elevation of another militant as guerrilla becausea new weapon was added to the armory.*

The above table also conveys that the Peoples’ Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) is expandingrapidly. Not just that. As the Union Home Minister, Chidambaram, admitted recently, the Maoistsare in the process of converting PLGA into Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA). This developmentimplies that the Maoists are getting ready to take on the security forces, even outside their zone ofinfluence. The Maoists claim that they have begun ‘mobile wars’ in Andhra-Orissa Border zone.Some areas are totally under Maoist control, inaccessible to the Indian State. In hundreds of vil-lages of Malkangiri dt of Orissa only Maoists’ writ runs. The kidnapping of the Collector ofMalkangiri in February 2011 amply unfolds the situation. In Abuzmarh of Chhattisgarh, theMaoists run a parallel government. They enforce conscription to strengthen guerrilla units. Forover ten months in 2008-09 State withdrew itself from Lalgarh and Salboni area of West Bengal.Fifteen police stations were closed.

This huge set back, in the first place, was due to the intellectual dishonesty on the part of thepolitical leadership. The Centre and the states futilely search for the solution in development alone.Development is the primary responsibility of the Governments in all regions irrespective of thepresence of Maoists. One should not be oblivious to the reality that the Maoists do not allowdevelopmental activities in areas under their domination in order to maintain supremacy. Develop-ment at best serves as supplementary measure to insulate unaffected areas from the Maoist virusand to wean away future recruits. But it would not stem the rising tide of insurgency.

The Maoists consider the State as their enemy. ‘Enemy’ is the epithet that they use in theirliterature and speeches against the government. As such they treat the State’s property as enemy’sproperty. They do not hesitate to destroy State’s or people’s assets such as railways (trains, engines,tracks, stations and communication equipment), telephones, roads, culverts, buses of public trans-port corporations and even schools and hostels. They do not view road as a means for developmentbut as a facility for quick movement of enemy’s forces. They view school as a facility for stationingenemy’s troops. Look at what they have done to public properties in Chhattisgarh during the pasttwo years.

* A Maoist document titled Post Election Situation-Our Tasks of 12 June 2009, claimed that they had killed 2000 securitypersonnel including Central Para-military Forces, injured about 2000 and snatched away 2,500 weapons, one lakhrounds of ammunition since the PLGA was founded on 2 December 2000.

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Public Assets Destroyed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in 2008-9Public Assets Destroyed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in 2008-9Public Assets Destroyed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in 2008-9Public Assets Destroyed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in 2008-9Public Assets Destroyed by Maoists in Chhattisgarh in 2008-9Schools 96Roads 71Other Public Assets 400

(The Hindu, Editorial, 19 May 2010)

According to UNISCEF Report, the Maoists have either blasted or set on fire 300 schools inBihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa during 2006-09

They had destroyed Railway properties worth crores of rupees in Jharkhand, Bihar, and WestBengal besides Chhattisgarh during the past decade under one pretext or other. Their growth wasdependent on creating terror. Nation’s unguarded assets constitute soft targets for Maoists’ explo-sions. In Andhra Pradesh, during 1980s and 1990s, they had destroyed 94 assets of railways, 300telephone exchanges, 500 government buildings and 1500 state owned buses. In 2010 there hasbeen a spate of such attacks in other states. In April 2010 schools were blasted in Bihar. Tatanagarbound express was fired upon in West Medinipur dt. in May 2010. During the same month, abomb went off under a train carrying oil through Bihar: 14 freight cars caught fire. On May 19,Maoists bombed a freight train near Jhagram. In February 2010, Railways were targeted 11 times

In this context the following observations of Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute of Con-flict Management, New Delhi, are candid enough: “…Development cannot be a counter-insur-gency strategy. It is the duty of the government to carry out developmental activities. But it is amuch-longer-term programme than counter insurgency”.

“People who are talking about this are basically saying that good health is a solution to disease.But when you look at India demographically and its cumulative developmental deficits, 836 mil-lion people (77 per cent of the population) are living on less than Rs.20 a day. More than half ofthem live on less than Rs.10. They are living on the edge of survival and are you telling me that thegovernment has the capacity to bring this section to middle-class prosperity in 18 months?”

“The model of development here is also not unidirectional. Even as it is benefiting many, it isactually harming many people. Rural distress has increased in the past decades. Why don’t youdevelop your areas where there is peace? In Delhi, the Maoists are recruiting students, retailersaffected by the ceiling drive and multinational retail companies, people displaced or affected bySEZs, unorganized workers. If you have cancer, you have to treat it first. I cannot tell a cancerpatient to go home and try to be in good health.” (Frontline, 6 November 2009)

The inadequacies and poor responses felt in the political front were far more pronounced thanthe reverses in the security front.

The Maoists and their pseudo-intellectual fellow-travelers are very clever people. They juxta-pose the failures of the system against their path of violence. They raise questions that the dumb,poor and marginalized, would like to ask the insensitive administration.

The social unrest that erupted in several pockets across the country because of the Special Eco-nomic Zones and mega projects in power, steel, mining and coastal corridor sectors by the corpo-rate houses, wasn’t the creation of Maoists. Lakhs of acres of land was forcibly taken away from themarginalized farmers and tribals to pass on to the corporate giants in the name of industrial devel-opment. Not only Nandigram (Indonesian Chemical Company Salem), Salboni (Jindal),

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Lohandiguda(Tatas), Durli (Essar), Nagarnar and Dilimili (NMD), Raoghat, Kalinga Nagar havebecome synonymous with the deprivation of the livelihood of the poor. The callous approach ofthe governments towards these so called growth projects has opened up new avenues for the Maoiststo expand. Any comprehensive strategy to defeat the Maoists in their war cannot ignore the con-cerns of the poor. Whatever success that the security forces might achieve in this war, need to beconsolidated by policy corrections in the economic front.

The Political leadership has been committing a serious blunder in another aspect as well. Theylook to the other way when it comes to taking on Maoists ideologically. Maoists skillfully exploitthe rivalries among the political parties and groups within them. Since 1982 onwards, the opposi-tion party in Andhra Pradesh whoever it were, unabashedly soft towards naxals. Sympathisers ofnaxals got elected to the Assembly alternately on TDP and Congress tickets. In the end it onlystrengthened the pernicious ideology.

A major section of the media and journalists have been the biggest alleys of Naxals. Mediareports on Maoist attacks were always biased.. They might not endorse the violence explicitly, butnot a single editorial was written without riders giving respectability to the naxals. In this age ofpaid news, it not difficult for the Maoists to get the events published the way they want.

Six Questions

People of this country raise the following six questions in the context of Maoists’ rapid advance inseveral states:1. Misery and underdevelopment in rural areas might be the root cause for Maoist Insurgency. Butdoes economic development alone wipe out this scourge from the body politic of the nation?

2. The naxal insurgency has been in existence for the past four decades. How could it survive solong? How could it survive the collapse of Leninism in Europe and the advent of market economyin Mao’s China?

3. Can a political ideology be made ineffective without a public debate? Why the Indian politicalclass is so shy and reluctant to take on the Maoists politically?

4. Why the intellectual sections in considerable numbers, be they academics, poets, writers, artists,and film directors lean towards Maoist ideology? Why the role of state-funded institutions such asJNU in spreading this pernicious ideology was not discussed in public domain?

5. Why large sections of the media eulogize Maoists? Was it because of the influence of Westernmedia which has been consistently anti-India?

6. Why our intelligence organizations were so apathetic vis e vis Maoist Insurgency? Was it becauseof lack of proper orientation and training or because of the lack of political direction? Is ourintelligence apparatus free from the ideological influences of Maoists? Is it free from infiltration?

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The CPI(Maoist) has explicitly stated in its Strategy and Tactics of the IndianRevolution (One of the five documents adopted at the merger conference of the Peoples’ WarGroup and MCC in September 2004) that it wants to seize power state by state througharmed struggle. They haven’t minced words:

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Real Objectives of Maoists’ War

* To seize power state by state

* Principal Targets: National Unity and Indian Army

* “India an Imperialist Power”

“The unevenness of development in Indiaindicates that it is not possible to stage asimultaneous revolution (i.e., an armed in-surrection) throughout the country and thatthe line of area wise seizure of powerthrough the strategy of protracted people’swar has to be adopted basing on the rela-tively backward and strategic areas of thecountryside. This means revolutionary warhas to begin in those regions that are rela-tively more backward and where the socialcontradictions are sharp. The strength of thearmed forces of the reactionaries is quite in-adequate in the vast countryside of Indiaand the inadequacy of the transport andcommunication system and other infrastruc-ture makes it inconvenient for the quick move-ment of the enemy forces. The people’sarmed forces - the people’s army and thepeople’s militia, on the other hand, can ad-vance and retreat easily, according to theneeds of the struggle, in the vast country-side, that is, there is enough room for theirmanoeuvre in face of a big military offensiveby the enemy’s armed forces.”

“Thus the vastness of the countryside,

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the inadequacy of the transport and communication system and the isolation of theremote countryside from the military centers, and above all, the inadequacy of thereactionary armed forces in comparison to the vastness of the country and the popula-tion, if all these are taken into consideration, the military strength of the reactionaries isrelatively weak in the countryside compared to that in the cities, and hence from themilitary point of view, the vast countryside is the most advantageous for the revolu-tionary people’s army to strike at the enemy. Hence, we can transform the vast tracts ofthe countryside into red resistance areas, guerilla zones, guerrilla bases and liberatedareas by making use of the favourable terrain which is abundant in some regions of theIndian countryside. Liberated areas can also be established in the plains when thedomestic and international situation becomes more favourable and the people’s armybecomes powerful i.e., when the revolutionary war is at a high peak.” (The Central Taskof Revolution – Seizure of Political Power by Armed Force, Chapter 6) *

“Indian Army – A Paper Tiger”

The ideologues of CPI(Maoist) rouse the morale of their cadres by creating false images such as“Indian Army is only a paper tiger”. They put forward a perverse logic that Indian Army’s interestsare different from the interests of the people. Argues the above mentioned document:

“It should, however, be noted that the enemy is superior only from the tactical point ofview. In the strategic sense, enemy’s armed forces are only paper-tigers. Their interestsare diametrically opposed to the interests of the broad masses and hence cannot getany cooperation from the people. Their morale and combat capacity are quite low prima-rily because of their mercenary nature; and the contradiction between officers andsoldiers also contributes to it considerably. Moreover, since the vast majority of themare peasants in uniform, the influence of the agrarian revolutionary war will have a deepimpact on them.”

* To a specific question “If you really have a pro-people agenda, why insist on keeping arms? Is your goal tribal welfareor political power?” by Tehelka, Mallojula Koteswar Rao alias Kishanji replies: “Political power. Tribal welfare is ourpriority, but without political power we cannot achieve anything. One cannot sustain power without an army andweapons” (Tehelka, 21 November 2009)

And hence the Maoists theorize that it is possible to overpower the Indian Army:“However strong the enemy’s military power may be and however weak the people’smilitary power, by basing ourselves on the vast backward countryside-the weakestposition of the enemy-and relying on the vast masses of the peasantry, eager for agrar-ian revolution, and creatively following the flexible strategy and tactics of guerrillastruggle and the protracted people’s war, - as a full meal is eaten up mouthful bymouthful, exactly in the same way, - by applying the best part of our army (a force fewtimes stronger than that of the enemy) against different single parts of the enemy forcesand following the policy and tactics of sudden attack and annihilation, it is absolutelypossible to defeat the enemy forces and achieve victory for the people in single battles.It is thus possible to increase the people’s armed forces, attain supremacy over the enemy’s forces and defeat the enemy decisively. (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

Principal Targets - National Unity and Indian Army

One of the important strategic considerations of CPI(Maoist) was based on the assuption thatdispersal of Indian Army units to meet the challenges posed by insurgency movements in variousparts of the country is imperative. This was again based on the fundamental ideological plank thatIndia is not a national at all, but a conglomeration of nationalities kept together by the Indian

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“the irreconcilable contradiction between the various nationalities and the Indian rul-ing classes leading to incessant armed confrontation - contributes greatly to weakenthe enemy and helps the advance of the revolutionary movement.”

“This circumstance arises from the fact that the unfinished democratic revolution inIndia has left the national question unresolved and it is the Party of the proletariat thatshould take up the historic task of solving this problem from a class perspective. A largepart of the remote countryside, most advantageous for the establishment of red liber-ated areas form the geographical and military point of view, are being inhabited mainlyby the discontented and agitated nationalities and tribes, who are engaged in a bitterarmed confrontation with the Indian state. Hence, it becomes imperative for the enemy’sarmed forces to be deployed in large numbers in ever-wider areas to contain the armedstruggles waged by the various nationalities.”

“Lakhs of enemy’s armed troops have been deployed since long in Kashmir and theNorth Eastern states alone. More and more nationalities may come into armed confron-tation with the reactionary Indian state that is keeping them in a state of subjugationand oppression and denying them their right to self-determination. As a considerablepart of the enemy’s armed forces will inevitably be engaged against the growing tide ofstruggles by the various nationalities, it will be difficult for the Indian ruling classes tomobilize all their armed forces against our revolutionary war. If our Party can lay downthe correct basis to win over the nationalities and tribes through our policy of guaran-teeing self-determination for the nationalities and political autonomy for the tribes andforge a powerful united front against the common enemy (i.e. imperialism, CBB andfeudalism) with these forces we can spread the flames of armed struggle to almost all thestrategic regions in the country.” (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

“Right of Self Determination of Nationalities – A Pillar of Revolution”

The CPI(Maoist) considers the right of self determination of nationalities as one of the twomain pillars of its revolution, the other being land problem. It did not mince words:

Army. It is very eloquent on this pernicious theory. What Mao formulated in 1930s, in the contextof China, the CPI(Maoist) wants to adopt in case of 21st century India. They argue:

“Our country is a prison-house of nationalities where some nationalities are engaged inbitter struggles against the Indian state to achieve their right to self-determination.”(The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

In an exclusive resolution specially adopted on the issue, the 9th Congress of the CPI(Maoist),January 2007, says:

“India is a country of many nationalities at various phases of development. They havebeen struggling in different forms against the repressive and expansionist policies ofthe Indian ruling classes. Kashmiris and different nationalities of North-East India suchas the Assamese, Nagas, Manipuris, Tripuris, etc., have been long since waging armedstruggle against the Indian Government for their right to self-determination, includingthe right to secede from the so-called Union of India. The Indian ruling classes and theirimperialist masters, particularly US imperialism, have been suppressing these strugglesmercilessly. They are being crushed under the boots of the Indian Army stationed invarious states of the north-east and in Kashmir. In Kashmir alone, the Indian militaryand paramilitary forces have murdered over 70,000 people in the last 16 years. A yearago, the Indian Army along with the Bhutanese Army killed hundreds of activists andsupporters of the ULFA, Bodos and the KLO. However, even these most cruel repres-sive actions by the Indian Government could not stifle the voice of the strugglingmasses of these nationalities. They still continue to wage armed struggle and carry out

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their attacks, striking blows at the Indian armed forces.” (see Ap pendix-A)

“The exploitation and control of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism, are not con-fined to the sphere of economy alone; with the help of the weapon of neo-colonialismthey have established their own influence, exploitation and control over military poli-cies through various means, such as, military “aid and co-operation”, employment of“advisers”, etc., and are strengthening their positions day by day through variouskinds of military pacts. All these are going on under the various signboards of the“national defence”, the “defence of the country”, etc., etc. This army is being used notonly to suppress the revolutionary movements and national liberation struggles inIndia but also in other countries.”

“Creation of Bangladesh, forced annexation of Sikkim, interfering in the internal affairsof the neighbouring courtiers, sending army to Sri Lanka and Maldives etc. are theexamples of the expansionist activities of Indian State backed by the super powersduring the decade of 1970s and 80s. Today it is pursuing the policies of intervention,blackmail, meddling and subversion in the affairs of Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, SriLanka etc., with the same backing of the various imperialist powers, particularly the USsuperpower.” (The Central Task... Ibid., Chapter 6)

Every theoretical document of naxalites emphatically says that Kashmir is not an integral part ofIndia. Naturally that was music to the ears of Pakistan and the terrorist Laskar e Toiba. Maoistsnever condemn terrorist attacks such as 26/11.

Charu Majumdar’s Thesis

The resolution also hinted that the CPI(Maoist) would form a separate organization to take upthe nationality issue.

“India an Imperialist Power”To attract various insurgency movements into its fold and forge a strategic alliance against the

Indian nation, systematically the naxals have been unleashing vituperative propaganda depictingIndia as an imperialist power.

The ideology of Maoists was rooted in KarlMarx’s Manifesto, Lenin’s State and Revolutionand Mao’s Red Book.

As such the armed rebellion is an embarrass-ment to the CPI(M); the Maoists use the sameflag, same symbols and the same jargon. All thefounder members of the insurgency were asso-ciated with CPI(M) in the past.

Charu Majumdar wrote eight articles dur-ing 1965-67, which might constitute the basicideology of naxalism. The theme could be sum-marized as below:

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(1) Indian economy is semi-feudal and semi-colonial. The state andruling class represents the interests of big landlords and bureau-cratic-comprador capitalists. The ruling class is a pawn in the handsof the U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. Therefore,the basic objective of any democratic revolution has to be “to over-throw the rule of feudalism, comprador-bureaucratic capitalism,the U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism.”

(2) There is no alternative to armed struggle. Other forms of politicalactivity – public meetings, mass struggles for solving people’s prob-lems - amount to revisionism. Parliamentary institutions shouldbe discarded.

(3) The conditions for waging armed struggle in India are ripe.(4) The main force of the democratic revolution emerges from the

peasants and landless poor. They should be brought to the fore-front of the armed struggle.

(5) The primary stage of the revolution would be annihilation of classenemies one by one. Each act of annihilation would create a base.These bases would facilitate the free movement of guerrillas, whicheventually lead to the formation of liberation army.

(6) The revolutionary army would liberate the rural areas one afteranother and ultimately encircle the towns and cities.

(7) The leadership of the revolutionary movement in India would besubordinate to the Chinese Party.

Charu Majumdar resorts to over simplification and trivialization to make his arguments appeal-ing. “Once inspired”, exhorts Majumdar, “with the revolutionary theory, that is, Mao Tse-tungthought, men turn into spiritual atom bombs which are more powerful than thousands of atombombs.”

He gave a call to make 1970s ‘the decade of liberation.’ Writes Majumdar: “When I say ‘make70s the decade of liberation’, I cannot think beyond 1975. The idea of today’s armed struggle wasfirst born in the mind of one man. That idea has now filled the minds of ten million people. If thenew revolutionary consciousness, born only in 1967, can permeate the minds of ten million peoplein 1970, why is it impossible then for those 10 millions to rouse and mobilize the 500 millionpeople of India in a people’s war? “ A day dreaming indeed!

Charu Majumdar did not live to see for himself the fate of his predictions. Red flag did notflutter over Red Fort by 1975 as he pronounced. Luckily he was also spared from the distress ofwatching the crumbling of communist oligarchies in East Europe and in the USSR. He was alsospared from the spectacle of Maoism giving way for market economy in China after Mao departedfrom the scene. His death (1972) preceded the death of Mao (1976) by four years.

The naxal leadership that succeeded Charu Majumdar was clue less over the demise of commu-nism in Europe and the long-march of China along the capitalist road. Significantly, it was asuicide committed by the system, which was assiduously built by Lenin, Stalin and Mao andvigorously defended by the Marxist intellectuals for over seven decades.

Lenin’s Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Red Flag was pulled down from Kremlin on 23August 1991. On 29 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet outlawed the Communist Party of the

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Soviet Union. Nevertheless it took 14 years for the PWG to realize that the adage ‘Leninist’ was aburden and no more useful.

Why the USSR collapsed?

After capturing power in Russia in October 1917, Lenin took several measures to put Marxisminto practice including the following:

1. Entire private property was abolished. The management of agriculture, industry, trade andcommerce was taken over by the state itself.

2. All political parties were outlawed and only the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU) was allowed to function.

3. All class enemies were eliminated. Simultaneously, Lenin propounded a new theory that repression was still required even after

the revolution. He did not explain where was the need for repression once the revolution hadwiped out the class enemies. This theory, the hallmark of communist regimes of 20th century,wrought havoc with the lives of millions of people not only in the USSR but also in East Europe,China, Cambodia, Vietnam and North Korea. A new legal system was brought in and millionswere forced to write their own death sentences. Millions were deported to concentration camps.None of the communist states eschewed repression as a state policy.

In the party, in administration and in all other spheres, the proletariat exclusively got the oppor-tunities to usher in Socialism. These persons, after climbing the upper echelons turned despots andemerged as a new class. The phenomenon was not properly analyzed by naxals. There is no guaran-tee that tomorrow after coming to power, they too might transform into another new class.

Equality and Equal Rights

Caught in a web of contradiction between ‘equality’ and ‘equal right’ the regimes could notachieve even a semblance of equality. ‘Equal right’ assumes that products (wages) would be deliv-ered according to the work performed. “But different people are not alike; one is strong, anotherweak; one is married another not; one has more children another less” (Lenin: State and revolu-tion). Hence if equal right was imposed, families which have to spend more save less, and familieswhich have to spend less save more. Consequently, over a period of time inequality would set in.Marx was aware of this contradiction. And hence he condemned “equal right” as bourgeoisie rightand suggested: “In order to avoid all these defects, rights instead of being equal, must be unequal.”*A tall order indeed! Lenin was not prepared to abolish “equal right.” If implemented, a truck driverwith one child must be paid less than another with two children. Also there should not be anydisparity between the salaries of a truck driver and an aircraft pilot.

Abolition of private property created insurmountable problems for Marxist dictatorships. Thestate has become new kulak. Agricultural production declined year after year. Ukraine (USSR) andAnwai (China) suffered severe famines. USSR’s dependence on food imports from capitalist coun-tries increased year after year. There was no improvement in the living standards of commonpeople even after a long wait of seven decades.

* This analysis was in fact the basis for: “Each according to his own ability and to each according to his own need.”

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Marxism, although projected as humanism, finally gave way for the worst type of tyranny. Thetyranny was needed, because the ruling minority i.e., the New Class, wanted to preserve its privi-leges. Secret police emerged as its unavoidable alley.

The Chinese Communist Party had the additional advantage in that the Soviet experience ofover three decades was before it. Unlike Lenin, who passed away within six years of the OctoberRevolution, Mao lived longer, 26 years, to implement his revolutionary programme. Despite suchdistinct advantages over the USSR, the Chinese experiment too fared no better. Interestingly, Chi-nese communist leaders discarded the socialist path earlier than the Russians. Den Xiaoping, whoknew Mao better than our Maoists and who participated in the Long March, stated on 16 April1984: “Socialism does not mean poverty. Without developing the productive forces and improv-ing people’s living standards, you cannot say you are building socialism. In two decades, 1957-78,China was plunged by Left ideology and as a result, the country’s productive forces had beenseverely damaged.” (The Hindu, 16 April 1984). On 7 December 1984, Peking Daily editoriallycommented: “Marx died 101 years ago. His works were written more than 100 years ago. Therehave been tremendous changes since his ideas were formed. Some of his ideas are no longer suitedto today’s situation, because Marx never experienced these times, nor did Engels or Lenin.”

Beyond the physical neighborhood, man always possesses certain core instincts, avarice, jeal-ousy, lust, arrogance, anger etc. There is nothing in Marxism to restrict the power and play of theseinstincts. Marx scrupulously avoided probing into the enormously wide field of human nature,lest he had to give credence to religion or ethics. Religion or no religion, the baneful characteristicsof human nature do exist. A Marxist might argue that in a classless society these urges would ceaseto be effective. But the pertinent question is whether these instincts would ever allow a classlesssociety to usher in? That was exactly what had happened in the USSR and in East Europe. Wher-ever the ends justify the means baneful instincts bury ethics.

No Legitimacy

What was the legitimacy of Maoist party to impose its world-view and programme on thenation? They insist that parliamentary democracy is a big hoax. They say that bourgeoisie partiesbuy votes and manipulate majority. Fine. But what about their party? Who have given them themandate? There is no tangible evidence to claim that majority of people have endorsed either theirphilosophy or programme or their means. Maoist Party aims at establishing their hegemony underthe garb of socialism without the concurrence of the people. Power without legitimacy has beentheir sole objective.

Maoists do not spell out the details of their model, economic as well as social. They do not havea blue print. All the conceivable measures to bring in socialism were exhausted by the USSR andChina.

The Maoists act in secrecy because they have chosen violence as their means. Nevertheless,secrecy always widens the gap between precept and practice. Since the CPI(Maoist) Party cadreswere not bound by any constitution or rule of law, they remain unaccountable for their deeds.Party leadership, view the crimes of its cadre exclusively from the point of view of partisan interestsand not from the view of natural justice.

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Strengths and Capabilities

The merger of PWG and MCC on 21 September 2004 has com-pletely changed the internal security scenario in the country. A formi-dable insurgency outfit, CPI(Maoist), came into the fore threateningthe democratic polity of the nation. Two naxalite affected regions,namely, Eastern U.P., Bihar, Jharkhand on one side and West Bengal,Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,on the other were forged into one “Compact Revolutionary Zone”(CRZ).

Merger of PWG andMCC

21 September 2004

Merger Conference of PWGand MCC Chhattisgarhforests

* Strategic alliance with Jihadis* Arming the PLGA* Propaganda Blitzkrieg

17

Very significantly, the CRZ touches the coastline in north AndhraPradesh and south Orissa. LTTE’s strategic strength was Jafna coast.

The notion of CRZ has successfully created an illusion in the mindsof bureaucracy and political analysts that the CPI(Maoist) concen-trates only in tribal areas of Central India. But the fact is entirelydifferent. It is fast spreading its tentacles in almost all states. Its activi-ties are going on in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, Delhi,Uttarakhand, Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerala as well.

The LTTE had created an international model in terrorism by rais-ing a full-fledged army, that too in an island nation, and by waging athree-decade war. PWG’s links with LTTE dates back to Indian PeaceKeeping Force (IPKF) days of mid 1980’s. “Many LTTE innovations,such as explosive belts, vests and bras, the use of female suicide bomb-ers, and water borne suicide attacks against ships, have been copied byother terrorist groups.” (Secretary of State’s report on terrorism to the USCongress, 2006) In some areas of Bihar, the Maoists are forcing oneyouth from each family to join their ranks adopting the recruitmenttechniques of LTTE.

Even though the LTTE was wiped out in 2009, its remnants whofled, are now in close contact with the Maoists and helping the latterwith arms in exchange for safe haven. Government of India informedthe Delhi High Court that the pro-LTTE operatives are engaged inprocuring explosives, detonators, chemicals and ammunition. (TheHindu, 2 November, 2010).

The Nepal Maoists rode to power in just ten years (1996-2006).Signifi cantly Prachand (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), Chief of Nepal Maoists,had learnt his first lessons in guerrilla warfare from the PWG. Hespent a few months in 1994-95 in Nizamabd district of Andhra Pra-desh. In the April 2008 elections, the Maoists have got 32% vote andcaptured 220 seats in the 601 strong Constituent Assembly. Prachandabecame Prime Minister in August 2008. It was a different matter thathe stepped down in May 2009 on the issue of sacking the Army Chief.The Maoist Army in Nepal still remains intact and formidable.

The spectacular advance of Maoists in Nepal is a great source ofstrength to CPI(Maoist) from several angles. Katmandu-Lhasa road isnow easily accessible to Indian Maoists.

The illegal infiltration from Bangladesh is viewed by Maoists as asource of enormous strength. Bangladesh serves as a sanctuary toMaoists as well. They are also fully exploiting the strategically situatedChicken Neck for moving freely into Nepal and Bangladesh.

The LTTE Factor

Maoists’ SpectacularAdvance in Nepal

Strategic Alliancebetween Maoists andJihadis

18

In an interview published in The Times of India (15 May 2007),M.Laxman Rao (Ganapathi), General Secretary of CPI (Maoist), hadnot minced words about the alliance between Jihadis and Maoists. Hesays: “There is a peoples’ upsurge against globalization all over theworld and Islamic upsurge is an integral part of the worldwide people’supsurge against imperialism, imperialist globalization and war. In es-sence, we see the Islamic upsurge as a progressive and anti-imperialistforce in the contemporary world. It is wrong to describe the strugglethat is going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian territory, Kashmir,Chechnya as a struggle by Islamic fundamentalists or as a clash ofcivilizations.”

According to West Bengal police, the Maoists have close links withthe Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) of Manipurincluding in training and supplying of arms. It is believed that PREPAKmembers conducted training for Maoist cadres in the forests ofJharkhand in exchange for arms and ammunition. (The PREPAK wasfounded in 1977 with the objective of “expulsion of outsiders” from Manipur.)

The ISI supplies arms to northeast insurgents and asks them to sell thesame in turn to naxals at cheaper rates. Chhattisgarh police chiefViswaranjan revealed in November 2010 that Lashkar e Toiba opera-tives attended a meeting of naxalites some time in April or May 2010.The meeting was intended to provide weapons to Maoists. HomeMinistry sources say that Shailen Sarkar, a leader of Bangladesh Com-munist Party was engaged in training naxal funded camps inBangladesh.

On 1 July 2001, PWG and MCC of India, MCC of Nepal andsome insurgent groups of Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Bangladesh formeda Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations ofSouth Asia.

Taking the cue from LTTE regarding the advantage of overseassupport, the PWG made determined efforts to enlist the support ofIndians settled abroad who have a soft corner for Maoist ideology(Political Construction – a PWG document in Telugu, March 2001,p.62). The JNU faculty has been playing a key role in this strategicarena, by making their worldwide contacts available to the Maoists.Several students of JNU, who joined Berkeley campus, University ofCalifornia, formed a cell of CPI (Maoist) in the US. This cell is pro-viding the logistical support in establishing linkages between CPI(Maoist) and other International Maoist groups.

The PWG is in regular contact with the following Maoist organi-zations of various countries:

AKP (Norway), CPP (Philippines), PTB (Belgium), PCP (Peru),LPD (Germany), FACMLN (Mexico), TKP(ML) (Turkey),MLO (Senegal), JCP (Japan)

Links with InternationalGroups

19

The Maoists say that “Enemy’s armoury is our armoury”. It was nomere boasting if one look at the Dantewada massacre of April 2010.The PLGA could fully arm one battalion with the arms looted.

The aforesaid dictum implies that they would attack with inferiorweapons and snatch superior arms. The disadvantage in the quality ofweapons would be overcome by superior strategy and motivation.This was the main reason for frequent attacks on security forces inrecent years. “During the last decade the Maoists snatched away 2,500weapons and lakhs of rounds of ammunition.” (The Hindu, 5 De-cember 2010)

Landmine was the most powerful and devastating weapon in thearmoury of Maoists to ambush and take on the security forces. Thefirst landmine went off more than two decades ago at Ambatpalli,Karimnagar dt., Andhra Pradesh, killing six BSF jawans. Most of thecasualties of security forces during the past 20 years were due tolandmine blasts. Each landmine blast added few more weapons to thearmoury of Maoists.

Landmine emerged as the major weapon because the materials re-quired are easily available and it is easy to fabricate. Gelatin togetherwith nitro glycerin compound is highly explosive. Gelignite or blast-ing gelatin is a stable substance that can be transported with relativeease when paired with a detonator cap.

(Sixty-one trucks carrying explosives from Rajasthan Explosives andChemicals Ltd. at Dholpur to a trading company at Sagar in MadhyaPradesh between April to July 2010 disappeared)

The Maoists do not manufacture or import these materials: theyjust seize them from mining companies and civil contractors. In aninteraction with Aman Sethi of The Hindu, one Ganesh an under-ground Maoist leader revealed: “We loot gelatin by raiding miningcompanies and teaches militant members how to fabricate improvisedexplosive devices.” He further said: “In February 2006, for instance, acompany of Maoist fighters attacked the National Mineral Develop-ment Corporation depot in Hirali in Dantewada and made off withtones of gelatin-based explosives intended for the mining industry.”Another Maoist leader, Ravula Srinivas revealed in the same inter-view: “Once our company killed eight CISF guards, over a thousandvillagers helped us carry away the explosives throughout the night.”(The Hindu, 13 June 2010)

It was indisputable that the Maoists get an uninterrupted supply ofAK-47 rifles, SLRs, ammunition and grenades. Possibly they get fromexternal sources such as Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan throughother insurgency outfits apart from internal sources such as BSF, CISF,Army Depots through smugglers.

From the video clippings and from the police catches, it was evi-dent that their arsenal contains India made assault machine guns and

Arming the PLGA

20

carbine that fire 5.62 mm, NATO ammunition of the AK 47 thatfire 7.62 mm and even Israeli made sniper rifles.

Not only procurement, even transportation is full of risks. Yet theway Maoists are managing this supply chain of weapons indicates thecallous attitude of the security apparatus.

The investigations carried after the Dantewada massacre of 6 April2010, exposed the hollowness of the CRPF. The Hindu reports, “Ac-cording to police sources, the arms and ammunition, allegedly siphonedoff from the armoury of the Central Reserve Police Forces’ 62 Battal-ion Group Centre in Rampur and Police Training College inMoradabad, were being supplied to naxalites and anti-socials througha ‘contact’ in Allahabad.” (The Hindu 1 May 2010) * There weresimilar allegations against the Provincial Armed Constabulary of U.P.in the past.

On 29 April 2010, the Special Task Force (STF) seized 8-10 bagsin Rampur from three persons containing 5000 live cartridges, 16magazines of INSAS (Indian Small Arms Systems) and 245 kg ofused cartridge shells. The raids conducted in Moradabad, Kanpur andJhansi revealed the involvement of retired police officers and CRPFpersonnel in smuggling the weapons.

Like other insurgents the Maoists too anticipate heavy losses oftheir weapons in combat operations and police raids. That is why theygo in for procurement of arms eight times more than what was re-quired. A third of their extortions are being spent on arms.

A Peoples’ War documents reveal that it had acquired the capabili-ties to attack helicopter gun-ships in 2000 itself.

The PWG formed a technical unit in Dandakaranya in 2000 formanufacturing shotguns, grenades, grenade launchers, magazines, clay-more mines and pipe-guns. It had also set up facilities for repairingsmall weapons. Hundreds of guns were repaired. (Political Construc-tion in Dandakaranya (Telugu), 4th plenum of Dandakaranya SpecialZone held in September-October 2006)

From this primary stage they moved on to the stage of manufac-turing sophisticated weapons.

They copy manufacturing technologies from Internet. They hadalso obtained manuals of armed forces. They had sliced plastic gre-nades and developed their own. This is some kind of reverse engineer-ing. Telescopes are being attached for 51 mm mortars for greater accu-racy. Designs of rocket launchers were also recovered from BhaskaraEngineering Works, Bhopal in January 2007. More such units en-gaged in producing lethal hardware somewhere outside the Red Cor-ridor couldn’t be ruled out.

* 2nd Battalion headquarters in Rampur was attacked by LeT in December 2007

Manufacturing Arms

21

In September 2006, latheworkshops and foundriesmanufacturing rocket shellsand rocket launchers wereunearthed in the suburbs ofChennai (Padi, Koratturand Mogappir). These rock-ets are capable of hittingtargets at 300 to 800meters.

In January 2007, the MadhyaPradesh police raidedBhaskara Engineering Worksin Bhopal manufacturingarms and ammunition.

Bhaskara Engineering Worksin Bhopal: Drawing of aRocket Launcher

22

Clearly the Maoists have been anticipating that sooner or later theIndian Army would be deployed against them. These arms manufac-turing programmes are clear indications in that direction. The Ple-num of Dandakaranya Special Zone (2006), refers to the urgent needfor artillery capable of hitting fortifications, 200 to 300 metres away.

Maoists have their informers in media, in educational institutions,in government offices and even in police. They also join as drivers,cooks to keep a watch on VIPs. They have prepared detailed manualson the techniques of gathering intelligence.

For instance, they knew every thing about the Jungle Warfare Schoolat Kankar, the plans for the construction of a military airport atMahasamund and up-gradation of Nagpur and Raipur airports to re-ceive Air Force planes. A Maoist document says: “The scanning of theentire area by satellites is almost on the verge of completion and thesatellite images and the concrete topographical map of entire Maadwill be ready in another month. Based on this map complete with allhamlets, forest tracks, water points, etc the police and central forceswill carry out their operations.” (Post-Election Situation – Our Tasks,12 June 2009)

Wars require enormous resources. Guerrilla wars are no exception.The funds raised by political parties were no match to the extortionsof the naxalites. They impose levy on whole villages. They get ondemand huge ransoms from contractors, builders, businessmen, doc-tors and those who want to sell or buy lands. As per Home Ministrysources their annual extortions exceed Rs.2,500 crores.:

(Rs. Crores)Jharkhand 1,000 Andhra Pradesh 100West Bengal 500 Maharashtra 78Chhattisgarh 500 Orissa 57Bihar 200 Tamil Nadu 35

(Eenadu, 15 December 2010)

Maoism survives on half-truths, lies and myths. Since the argu-ments have to be loaded and facts have to be distorted, Maoists re-quire a powerful propaganda machine.

Apart from the astounding support that the Maoists get from themedia, they maintain their own periodicals. From Abuzmud alonethey publish as many as 25 magazines, some of them in tribal dialectsof Koya and Gond in Hindi script. Some of these periodicals:

Intelligence Gathering

Unlimited Flow of Funds

Propaganda Blitzkrieg

23

Apart from periodicals they also run an FM Radio in Dandakaranya.Maoists also use the latest technology and gadgets in their bid to

strengthen their armed struggle. They are producing documentarieswith live coverages of their ambushes and attacks on police stations.The Hindu reported in detail on one such documentary made avail-able to the media in July 2007: “It not only shows the preparations ofthe PLGA fighters but also live footage of the raid on the Murkinagarpolice outpost in Bijapur district on April 16, 2006. During the raid,seven policemen and 10 Special Police Officers were killed, and 49weapons, including a light machine gun and thousands of bullets wereseized by the Maoists. The footage shows the ease with which thePLGA fighters mounted the attack and overran the police camp amidgunfire and the crackle of wireless sets used by them to coordinate themovement of their assault teams. Explosion of hand grenades, rapidfire from an LMG, orders being shouted (mostly in Telugu) for ad-vancing towards the camp and firing….the documentary captures ev-ery detail, just like the war movies. The documentary also dwells onthe endurance and fitness modules, and weapons and combat trainingof the PGLA men.”

“The documentary would certainly appeal to the youth. As itprojects an extraordinary positive image of the Maoist rebels. It seekto drive home the message that the Maoists are in no way inferior tothe security forces.” (7 July 2007)

The Dantewada massacre of 62 Battalion of CRPF was vediographedand was released to the media.

A video grab from the Maoist documentary released tothe press in July 2007

Prabhat Sangharsh Rath Midangur Peoples’ WarViyakka Jhunkar Moilgudrum Lal PatakaVadivarapollo Pituri Bhumkal Awami Jung

24

About 2,600 naxalites died in police encounters in Andhra Pradeshalone. Since 1995, the MCC and PWG have lost on an average 200cadres every year. Among those killed were central committee mem-bers. Yet, the organization was able to move ahead with remarkableskills.

There are three stages in Maoist guerrilla tactics. During the first orpreparatory stage, there will be no violence at all. The militants movein villages like any other political activists, talk about burning issuesand enlist the support of the students, women, and downtrodden.They take up issues related to dalits. When Kherlanji incident tookplace, it was the Maoists who first reacted. No violence is seen at thisstage and the state perceives that there is hardly any threat. The teach-ers, journalists and writers with Marxist leanings would be involved atthis stage. This is a stage of “non-kinetic operations”.

In the second stage, a two-member squad goes into action, prima-rily to confuse the state. They fire at a target and run away. For a singleround of ammunition expended by the guerrillas, the police use 50rounds in response and seek more forces. The states, where there wasno naxal activity at all, suddenly feel shaken. In a panic reaction thesestates would dump additional forces to face an evading enemy. Whenthe additional forces arrive, guerrillas lay in wait with landmines. Allthis happens at the secondary stage.

In the third stage the guerrillas attack police stations and other tar-gets in full combat formations.

Tamil Nadu and Karnataka have all along been assuming that they

3

PLGAto

Peoples’ Liberation Army

Stages of Guerrilla War

25

were not affected by leftwing extremism. These and some other stateswalked into the trap of naxals. The Maoists keep a low profile inthose states until they are fully ready. Now they have moved into thesecond stage in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. These states too were in suchslumber till recently. When Andhra naxals made Koraput as their sanc-tuary after operations, the DIG of that area suggested action. But thethen government in Orissa ignored the warning. Now the state is pay-ing the price.

When a house catches fire, the neighbours instinctively take mea-sures to protect their own houses. Such a common sense was not dis-played by the states neighboring Andhra Pradesh, where the flameshave been raging for over three decades.

The Maoists are not hiding the tactics of their guerrilla war. They say:“Our revolutionary war is a new type of war-a people’s war; it must be a war inwhich we recognize that the enemy is strong and we are weak, that the enemy isbig and we are small, and in which therefore we fully utilize the enemy’s weak-nesses and our strong points and fully rely on the strength of the masses forsurvival, victory and expansion.”

“Our PLGA should concentrate and deal heavy blows on the weak points of theenemy forces that are ready for attack against our forces with the aim of causingdamage to the enemy. The tactical counteroffensive against the enemy shouldbe carried out in the form of small and big military actions. When the concentra-tion of the enemy forces in a given place becomes dangerous to our existence,we should temporarily retreat our guerilla forces to a strategically favourableplace with the aim of carrying on the war for a long time. When the chances forenemy attack are more the guerilla squads and platoons should take the neces-sary precautions to remain secret and concentrate on smashing the enemy at-tack at the opportune moment. In this way by protecting the PLGA, the Partyand the movement from enemy attacks. we should acquire the skill in conduct-ing tactical counteroffensives.”

“Not resorting to fighting when the enemy is strong but conducting attackswhen the enemy is weak; dispersing the guerilla forces at one time and concen-trating the forces at another time; retreating at times and destroying the enemyat other times; being ever prepared to confront the enemy anywhere-such arethe methods of guerilla warfare.”

“The essence of guerilla war is -when the enemy advances, we retreat; when theenemy camps, we harass, when the enemy tires, we attack; when the enemyretreats, we pursue.”

“Seen from a strategic perspective guerilla war creates many losses and difficul-ties for the enemy. His morale will be broken and will become tired. The sum totalof victories in several small battles render impotent the manpower of the enemy.The dispersed battles will develop into a more centralized war. For destroyingthe enemy troops on a large scale and to establish the Base Areas the guerillawarfare has to transform itself into mobile warfare.” (The Central Task of Revo-lution – Seizure of Political Power by Armed Force, Chapter 10)

The merger of Peoples Guerrilla Army (PGA) of PWG (foundedin December 2000) and Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)

Tactics of Guerrilla War

Merger of PGA andPLGA

26

of MCC (founded in April 2003) were brought under one commandwith effect from 2 December 2004.

The Central Military Commission (CMC) is their mobile ‘ArmyHeadquarters.’ It looks after:- Military Training- Procurement and manufacturing arms- Fixing targets and giving directions to the PLGA- Deployment of units of PLGA in different guerrilla zones“The CMC provides the politico-military leadership to the PLGA on behalf of theCentral Committee (CC). It guides the military affairs. All the Party committeesfrom the CC to the lower levels do not form part of the PLGA. The first thing is toestablish the firm leadership of the Party over the PLGA. The basic leadershipsystem consists of the Party cells and branches in the PLGA and the collectiveleadership of the Party committees under which the commanders carry out indi-vidual responsibilities. PLGA carries out principally guerilla warfare. Hence therewill be unified strategy and independent activities. This means that the CC andSCs/SZCs decide the general plans while the lower level commands (Regional/Sub-zonal, Zonal/district/divisional, Area commands) draw up the correspond-ing operational plans. In the PLGA both military commanders and political com-missars are the leaders of the military units. Distinct work division exists be-tween them. While the military commanders shoulder the responsibility of imple-menting the orders and instructions related to military matters the political com-missars bear the responsibility of carrying out the tasks related to political mat-ters.” (Ibid., Chapter 10)

Military training of PWG began in 1984 in Andhra Pradesh. Re-tired officers of the Indian Army and military experts of LTTE wereinvolved. The preliminary training schedule generally is spread over 3

People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA)

Central Military Commission (CMC)

Regional Military Command

State Military Commission (SMS)

Sub-Zonal Military Commands (SZMC)

Divisonal Commands (DVC)

Main ForceBattalions

Companies PlatoonsSAT

Intelligence Unit

Secondary Force

LGSs/LRGSsLOSs/LROs

Basic Force

(People’s Militia)GRDs, ARDs

LGS: Local Guerilla Squad; LRGS: Local Revolutionary Guerilla Squad;LOS: Local Organisation Squad; LROS: Local Revolutionary Organisation Squad;GRD: Grama Raksha Dalam; ARD: Area Raksha Dalam; SAT: Special Action Team.

27

weeks. Based on the experiences of guerrilla wars in Sri Lanka, Philip-pines and Palestine, the PWG prepared its own war manual.

All details about weapons, their historical development, individualparts, functioning, firepower and range, positions to be taken whileusing different weapons are being taught. Every detail is explainedwith diagrams.

The syllabus refers to four types of grenades – screaming, seizing,incendiary and gas. It also refers to grenades of German No.36 frag-mentation variety with range 10 to 20 meters, US M25 variety andGerman DM5 with nitro-penta explosive. Nitro-penta is deadlier thanthe RDX.

The guerrillas engaged in an ambush are divided into four groupsnamely, scouting, assaulting, commanding and reserve. The positionsof the groups are explained. The syllabus also includes:

- How to escape if the squad was caught in an ambush- How to resist the enemy in an encounter- Different formations of platoons like single line, triple line, ar-

row angle, U formation- A platoon in an encounter

People’s militia is the base force in the structure of the PLGA.“This will be extensive numerically. Without the people’s militia it is not possiblefor the PLGA to develop as it is the principal recruitment source for the other twoforces. Efforts should be made to arm the militia and to impart politico militarytraining so that it becomes a militant fighting force and harass the enemy forcescontinuously without a let up.”

Base Forces

People’s Militia at village level:- Self Defense Squads (SDS)- Village Defense Squads (GRD) – Grameena Raksha Dalam- Area Defense Squads (ARD)

28

“The secondary forces operate in a specific area. The weapons of the secondaryforces are of relatively inferior quality compared to those of the Main forces. Wehave to improve them further. Although these are less in number than the baseforces, they are better at fighting. They lure the enemy forces into small guerillaactivities, harass and tire them and destroy the enemy forces by using guerillatactics.”

- Local Guerrilla Squads (LGS)- Special Guerrilla Squad (SGS)- Platoons and District/Division Action Teams“Though the Main Forces are relatively less in number than other forces theyare better in terms of political consciousness, quality of arms and fighting skills.

Secondary Forces

Militia

PLGA

Hence it is the backbone of the PLGA. Without this force it will be difficult for theother two forces to survive.”

- Action Teams- Platoon (PL) (33 guerrillas)- Company (3 platoons with 15 at Headquarters = 123 guerrillas)

29

- Battalion (5 companies with 25 at Headquarters = 640 guerrillas)The PWG adopted these formations following the pattern of guer-

rilla campaigns in Sri Lanka and Philippines.Intelligence agencies estimate that the main and secondary forces

constitute around 3000 fighters, the number of people’s militia couldbe 30,000. (The Hindu, 5 December 2010)

20,000 - According to Philip Bowring (Quoting sources fromRAW): International Hereld Tribune14,000 - 16,000, Accroding to GOC, Central Command

The battles are categorized as:- Guerrilla battles- Mobile battles- Full scale battles

“Guerilla war by itself cannot win a revolutionary war as an all-independentform. The guerilla war will continue to develop until the guerilla army growsgradually and acquires the features of a regular army (PLA). After the develop-ment of the PLA, victory will only be possible when the enemy is destroyed bydeveloping the guerilla warfare into mobile and positional warfare and is wagedin co-ordination with them.” (Ibid., Chapter 10)

“The mobile warfare is a war, a regular army wages by concentrating its forces ina vast area with fluid battle-fronts and deployments and often changing fromone place to another. It will have the mobility of attacking the enemy at hisrelatively vulnerable spots and withdrawing quickly and the potential for chang-ing tactics when the conditions change.”

“Fight when you can win, move away when you can’t - this is the real essenceof mobile warfare.”

“This mobile warfare which possesses the elementary features of regular war-fare, will have the ability to annihilate the enemy forces in a big way. By thuswiping out the enemy forces on a big scale, this will serve as a key strategy togain the upper-hand over the enemy and for transforming the war from the stageof strategic defensive to the stage of strategic stalemate or equilibrium and fromthe stage of strategic equilibrium to the stage of strategic counteroffensive.”

“Positional warfare is a war waged face to face with the enemy, from fixed posi-tions either to capture or to retain a territory. The positional warfare primarilydepends on the theory that retaining of a territory will ultimately lead to victory.Commencing the war with guerilla warfare and then going through the forms ofmobile and positional warfares will resolve the question of state power.” (Ibid.,Chapter 10)

According to the CPI (Maoist) Congress held in January 2007, theInsurgency is now ready to wage mobile battles.

Strength of PLGA

Types of Battles

Mobile Warfare

Positional Warfare

30

4

Brutal Killings, Genocideand

Destruction of Infrastructure

* Mayhem of Civilians

* Assassnations of Political Leaders

* Destruction of Schools, Roads, Railways, Buses, Telephone Exchanges

* Blasting Factories

The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) began its violent activitiesinitially in Jahanabad dt. and later spread them to Gaya, Aurangabad,Bhabhua, Rohtas, Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Bettia, Patna, Nalandaand Sitamarhi.

The violence of MCC took the turn of caste conflicts in the middleof 1980s. On 7 October 1986, in Darmia village (Jahanabad dt.) theMCC had massacred 8 Rajputs including five women. On 29 May1987, the Yadav activists of MCC slaughtered 42 Rajputs in Baghaura

Brutal Caste Killings

Maoist Violence in Bihar (no. killed)

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists

2004 166 5 12005 72 24 202006 40 5 62007 45 22 22008 35 21 152009 37 25 162010 54 24 29

449 116 89

BIHAR

31

and Dalelchak villages in Jahanabad dt. Prakash Singh, for DGP, U.P.,narrates: “The womenfolk were made to place their necks on an im-provised chopping block and were beheaded with country made axes.The menfolk were either shot or had their throats slit. After the car-nage, the mob torched the Rajput houses and threw the bodies intothe fire. The flames could be seen for miles around but there was nosuccor.” (The Naxalite movement in India, 1995. p.152)

After the Baghaura and Dalelchak massacres, the State Govern-ment imposed a ban on the MCC.

On 12 February 1992, the MCC massacred 37 Bhumihars at Baravillage in Gaya district. Hindustan Times reports: “They called theyouths and aged male persons to accompany them to a nearby place.Once they were herded together near an adjacent canal their throatswere slit open one after another and the whole place bore a tell-taletestimony to the gruesome incident with patches of the blood pre-senting a devastating sight.”

These violent incidents led to the formation of armed groups –senas – by Bhumihars and Rajputs. Ranbir Sena of Rajputs andBhumihars indulged in retaliatory violence. On 1 December 1997, atBathelakhmanpur, 61 supporters of Naxals including 33 women and11 children were massacred by Ranbir Sena.

On 18 March 1999, 35 persons were massacred by the MCC inSenari village of Jehnabad district. On 16 June 2000, the Ranbir Senagunned down 35 people belonging to Yadava community at Mianpurvillage in Aurangabad district.

The MCC also targeted fraternal naxal groups. In 1997, it killedeight cadres of Party Unity in Palamau district (now in Jharkhand)and virtually drove away the CPI(ML)-Liberation from its strong-hold, Chatra district (now in Jharkhand), by brutally killing two ofits leaders in public. On 2 August 2000, four members of MCC werekilled by the CPI(ML) Liberation in Mahuagoan village, Jahanabaddistrict. In retaliation the MCC abducted 10 activists of Liberationand killed two of them. On 19 October, it eliminated three activistsof Liberation in Jahanabad district.

In 2002, MCC killings took place in Bhojpur, Patna, Rohtas,Jehanabad districts. About 111 civilians and 6 police personal losttheir lives against 22 casualties on MCC side.

On 1 April 2003, MCC blasted the railway track in Patna-Gayasection.

On 24 April 2006, Maoists ambushed the convoy of a candidatefor Zilla Parishad election in Aurangabad district. Six persons includ-ing the candidate Ashok Singh lost their lives. Maoists set fire to ve-hicles and threw the dead bodies into the flames.

Elimination of OtherNaxal Groups

BIHAR...

32

17 February 2010

Maoists massacred 12 girijans ofKora sect in Kasari village,Jamui dt. They entered the vil-lage at night and set fire to sev-eral houses and resorted to indis-criminate firing. Three womenand a child were roasted alive.The others fell to the bullets. An-other eight seriously injured.

Massacre of Girijans

November 2005Landmine Blast

23 March 2010

Rajadhani Express derailed inGaya dt.

On 22 April 2009 they bombed a Block Development Office inAurangabad dt. On 13 October 2009 Banni Railway Station(Lakhisarai dt.) was set on fire.

BIHAR...

33

Bastar is separated from the Naxal strongholds of Andhra Pradesh,namely Karimnagar and Warangal districts by river Godavari. In factBastar was part of Nizam’s territory until Curzon incorporated it inBritish India in 1903. Forests are dense on either side of Godavari.People in Bastar, mostly tribals, speak Telugu. There was little devel-opment there since Independence. The tribals of Bastar were the mostexploited in Godavari valley. It was no surprise that naxals could get astrong foothold there with little effort.

In the early years of Naxal insurgency in A.P. the extremists used tocross Godavari at Mahadevpur and Kantanapalli and take shelter inBastar. Gradually the PWG spread its network in Bijapur, Bastar,Dantewada and Kanker districts and started its violent activities. InSurguja district, adjoining Jharkhand, the MCC has spread its net-work.

In 2002, forty six civilians and 9 police personnel lost their livesmostly in landmine explosions. The Maoists also targeted the SamriAluminum plant of Hindalco in Sarguja dt. and Hindalco’s bauxitemines in Balarampur area.

Prakash Singh writes: “They (Naxalites) opposed the worship ofLord Ganesha and Goddess Durga at some public places in parts ofBastar division and even damaged some pujamandapams. A fewtemples were also vandalized including a Sun temple in Kohkameravillage of Narayanpur PS of Bastar district.” (The Naxalite Movementin India, p.176)

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists

2004 75 8 15

2005 121 47 32

2006 304 84 74

2007 171 196 66

2008 35 67 66

2009 87 121 137

2010 72 217 102

865 740 492

Maoist Violence in Chhattishgarh (no. killed)

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Massacre of tribals at Erraboru

On 28 February 2006, twenty-seven tribals were massacred bythe Maoists by exploding a landmine at Erraboru (near Kunta), inDantewada district. They were traveling in a lorry to attend a SalwaJudum meeting. Actually only two died in the blast. The throats ofthe injured were cut by the Maoists in a beastly manner. They havealso torched four other Lorries. Several women and children were in-jured.

28 February 2006

Errabore blast

27 tribals massacred

Engine blasted : Bhansi Railway Station

Destruction of railway track

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17 July 2006

Another Errobore blast

28 tribals killed

The Erraboru Salwa Judum camp was torched by the DandakaranyaMilitary Platoon of Maoists on 17 July 2006. Twenty-eight support-ers of Salwa Judum were killed and 40 injured. Some tribals wereburnt alive. Youth who attempted to flee were either shot dead orhacked to death. The Maoists also kidnapped 28 others including somewomen. They razed to the ground all the 120 houses built by thegovernment for Salwa Judum activists. Before launching the attack,the naxalites laid siege to the nearby camp of the CRPF and confinedthree platoons to their base. Two days later they have killed six of thekidnapped tribals by torching them in most inhuman way. Those reel-ing with burns were hacked to pieces.

On 18 March 2007, Maoists assassinated BJP leader, SomaramSodhi near Kirandole railway station. Soddhi contested twice in as-sembly elections from Dantewada constituency.

On 5 June 2007, the Maoists triggered a landmine and blasted avehicle carrying Electricity Board employees at Kaspi in Narayanpurdt. Three employees died in the blast. The victims were going to re-pair the three Electricity towers blasted by Maoists earlier.

On 26 September 2007 the Maoists shot Tansen Kasyap, youngestson of Baliram Kasyap, BJP MP from Bastar. Baliram Kasyap’s threesons, Tansen, Dinesh and Kedar visited Dorguda village to participatein Astami Puja (Dasara). Maoists moving around as villagers, openedfire on Kasyap brothers. Tansen died on the spot.

Despite the presence of a sizable CRPF and state battalions, 108villages in 23 pachayats in Dantewada dt are inaccessible. The observa-tions made by the District Magistrate, Reena Kangale were candidenough. She says that the tribal people are in distress and need theactive support of the state. “The tribal population has a deep and in-grained sense of injustice here…They ask for food, medical care anddrinking water. The definition of development needs a relook in the

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context of Bastar. The local elites should be prevented from exploit-ing the tribal people.”

The Planning Commission’s expert group suggested that there is aneed to implement effectively protective laws such as Scheduled Tribesand Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights)Act 2006, which secures for Adivasis their rights on forest land andforest dwelling.

10 June 2008

Railway Engine derailed afterthe track was blasted atKirandole, Dantewada dt.

17 May 2010

Thirty-five people – 24 tribalsand 11 Special Police Officers– were killed when Maoists blewup a bus using a powerful IED.The blast took place onDantewada-Sukhma road.

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Naxal violence in West Bengal, though subsided by 1973, rearedits head again in the tribal belt of Purulia, Bankura and West Medinipurdistricts by 2002.

On 9 July 2005, three CPM leaders and a policeman were killed intwo separate attacks in Bankura and Purulia districts. On 31 Decem-ber Rabindranath Kar, CPM leader and his wife were killed by Maoistsin Purulia district.

The Maoists became more aggressive with the flare up of NandigramSEZ issue in November 2006. The attacks by the CPM cadre onBhoomi Uchhed Prattorodh Committee (BUPC), the brutal firingby the North East Frontier Rifles in March 2007 paved the way forMaoist upsurge in the area. Since most of the farmers in Nandigramwere Muslims the issue also took communal form and turned moreaggresive. On !4 November, over a lakh of people including writersand film personalities like Mahasweta Devi, Arundhati Roy, MedhaParkar, Rituparno Ghosh, Gowtam Ghosh, Aparna Sen, BibashChakravarty demonstrated in Kolkata against the violence inNandigram. In Singur, the Maoists got another opportunity to ex-pand their base and penetrate.

In February 2008, the West Bengal police arrested Himadri Sen-Roy, the Bengal State Secretary of the CPI(Maoist).

On 13 April 2008, Maoists gunned down three activists of CPMwho were supervising rural employment programme in Salaboni area.

Honiran Murmu, a doctor working in the Laboni area, was killedalong with staff nurse Bharati Majhi and driver in October 2008,after an IED went off under their car. Maoists offered no explanationfor this beastly act.

Adivasis had been protesting against setting up of a Rs. 35,000crore mega Jindal steel plant at Salboni as it would displace a largenumber of them. The government parted away 4,500 acres forest landfor the plant. Another 500 acres were acquired from private holdings.The tribals objected that the government has no right to take awaythe forest land which is their source of livelihood. The government’sadamant attitude led to unrest. This people’s anger provided a handleto the Maoists. Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharjee and UnionMinister for Steel, Ram Vilas Paswan narrowly escaped on 2 Novem-ber 2008 when a powerful IED was exploded at a place 4 km fromMedinipur. The leaders were returning from Salboni after attendingthe foundation laying ceremony of Jindal Steel Works.

Following the attack on the Chief Minister, the police raided sev-eral villages and resorted to repression. In a clash in the village Chhoto

Nandigram and SingurExploited

Chief MinisterBuddhadevBhattacharjee targeted

Lalgarh under Maoists’Control

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38

Pelia, fourteen women were injured. One Woman lost her eye. Thismindless highhanded behavior of the police led to the formation ofPolice Santrosh Birodhi Janashadharaner Committee (PSBJC) (PeoplesCommittee against Police Atrocities) by the Maoists in November2008. Trinamool Congress covertly extended its support to PSBJC.

Towards the end of November 2008 the government came roundthe view that further confrontation with PSBJC be avoided. WestBengal police has withdrawn 15 police posts and camps from Lalgarh.This led to the complete collapse of the state administration in Lalgarh,Salboni, Jamboni, Belapahari etc. The Maoists had declared these ar-eas as ‘liberated’ and started more raids from these bases.

Sudhir Mandal, a respected leader of traditional adivasi commu-nity opposed to PSBJC, who organized a massive anti-Maoist rally inDecember 2008, was shot dead. In February 2009, Maoists fired onthe funeral procession of the assassinated CPI(M) leader, Nandalal Palkilling three. Five more CPI(M) supporters were killed in April 2009.Three bodies of CPM workers were found in Dharampur on 14 June.

On 22 March the Maoists blasted the railway track betweenMidnapore and Godapiasal.

On 17 June 2009 CPM activists - Abhijit Mahato, Anil Mahatoand Niladhar Mahato - were executed by Maoists in the Jhargram areaabout 20 km from Lalgarh. Most of those killed by the Maoist deathsquads came from the ranks of the rural poor and tribals.

15 June 2009

In Lalgarh area CPI(M) officewas torched by the Maoists andsupporters of PSBJC.

Joint Operation

Adivasi leader shotdead by Maoists

On 18 June 2009 the Central forces and State police started jointoperations in Lalgarh area to crush the Maoists Five police personnelinjured in a landmine blast triggered by the Maoists at Kadasol, about22 km from Lalgarh. The Hindu (9 June 2009) narrates the real situ-ation: “Using the neighbouring State of Jharkhand as the base, theyestablished a reign of terror and drove out security personnel andCPI(M) workers and sympathizers. With tribal folk as a human shield,

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39

they have now sought to create “liberated zones” in the district. The offensive,timed to take advantage of the electoral debacle of the CPI(M) in the recentlyconcluded Lok Sabha election, would not have been possible without the sup-port of the main opposition party, the Trinamool Congress”

Lalgarh police station was taken back by the security forces on 20 June 2009.It was under Maoists’ control for eight months. Ramgarh was taken back on 27June after ten days of operation. Kantapahari, 7 km from Lalgarh, was reclaimedon 29 June.

On 22 June 2009 CPI (Maoist) was banned by the Central Government.On 11 August 2009 exchange of fire between the security forces and Maoists

took place in Lalgarh and Salboni. A day before Maoists killed Paritosh Mishra,a CPM leader at Dheura village, 130 km west of Kolkata.

On 21 September 2009 hundreds of supporters of the Police Santrash BirodhiJanahadharaner Committee and armed Maoists laid siege to the CPIM) officein Inayatpur, about 10km from Midnapore and opened fire at the occupants ofthe office. Several CPI(M) cadres have been camping at the office for the pastfew months. They retaliated and heavy gun battle ensued. Some Marxists losttheir lives. However the police denied any such retaliation by Marxists. Thepolice want to cover up the encounter. Otherwise the issue of CPM holdingguns would be exposed

On 12 October 2009 Kanai Murmu of Jharkhand party was abducted andkilled by Maoists in Ergada village in Paschim Medinipur dt. At Ghathera inPurilia dt. Maoists ransacked the house of a local CPI(M) leader and shot andinjured a member of the village resistance committee. On 20 October one sub-inspector was gunned down and the officer –in-charge of Sankrail thana (80km from Lalgarh) was abducted in Paschim Medinipur dt. The PS was ran-sacked and several fire arms, including rifles, revolvers and pistols, were lootedfrom the armory. The officer Atindranath Datta was released on 22nd onlyafter theWest Bengal Government released 19 tribals from custody, concedingthe Maoists’ demand.

On 26 October 2009 the Maoists shot dead CPM leader Pratap Nayek atSinghpur near Lalgarh. On 29 October two CPM leaders, Dilip Mahato ofMidnapore Kotwali and Tapan Mandi of Binpur-Raghunathpur of WestMedinipur dt were shot dead by Maoists.

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists

2005 5 1 -2006 9 7 42007 6 - 12008 19 4 12009 135 5 92010 262 34 47

436 51 62

Maoist Violence in West Bengal (no. killed)

40

28 May 2010

Maoists have triggered an explosion on the track and derailed Mumbai bound Howrah-Gnaneswari Express near Sardhiha station in Paschim Medinipur dt. Home Ministry officiallystated that 148 innocent passengers including women and children died and a large numberinjured. Whereabouts of 25 passengers were not known. The incident occurred at midnight 1.30a.m. when passengers were asleep. A goods train ramed into the Express. 13 coaches jumped thetrack.

On 9 November 2009 they shot dead CPM leader JagannathMahato.

On 26 November 2009 the Maoists shot dead a school teacherand seriously injured a non-teaching staff member at Baghmundi inPurulia dt.

On 13 May 2010 they killed a CPM supporter at Pathardihi inPurulia dt. The victim Srikanta Mahato was dragged out from hishome and shot dead. Next day they abducted and killed 5 CPM sup-porters of Chandahilla village, Bijapur block near Lalgarh. The bulletridden bodies of the victims were thrown on State Highway, betweenSilda and Belpahari.

Kolkata-Mumbai Gnaneswari Express Sobataged: 148 perished

The Hindu editorialy comments: “Maoist groups see the death ofever-larger numbers of civilians as an acceptable part of the macabrewar they have inflicted on large swathes of central and eastern India.”(29 May 2010)

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On 27 February 2004, the MCC blew up BSNL exchange atHarhargunj in Palamau dt. On 21 October they blasted a railway sta-tion in Latchar dt.

On 12 November 2001 they blew up the Railway track betweenKarkara and Untari stations in Palamau dt.

Maoist struck severest blow in Jharkhand on 4 March 2007 whenthey shot dead Sunil Kumar Mahato, M.P. of Jharkhand MuktiMorcha, his two bodyguards and his party colleague Prabhakar Mahato.The ghastly mayhem took place at Bakuria village in East Singbhumdt. Sunil Mahato went to the village to be present at a football matchas chief guest. On 7 April 2007, about 300 Maoists attacked the po-lice at Bhasmahal coal project in Bokaro dt. killing two policemenand four civilians. They have looted weapons.

The losses incurred by the railways in 2009 were heavy. They blewup railway tracks at several places – at Jharandh in Dhanbad division,at Tukbhera Goan in Latchar dt. etc. They had also bombed Untanrailway station in Palamau dt.

4 March 2007

Sunil Kumar Mahato,JMM, MP shot dead

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists

2004 128 41 20

2005 92 27 7

2006 81 43 20

2007 149 8 13

2008 74 39 50

2009 74 67 76

2010 71 27 49

669 252 235

Maoist Violence in Jharkhand (no. killed)

26 June 2007

A goods train derailed after therailway track was blown nearChetar Railway Station

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42

22 April 2009

The Utari Road Railway Sta-tion in Palamau dt. was blownoff.

8 November 2010

Satbahani railway station inPalamu dt., was blasted

Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Bhandara and Gondia districts inMaharashtra are affected by Naxal insurgency. The PWG spread itsoperations from adjoining Adilibad and Karimnagar districts of AndhraPradesh. Gondia is a major transit point of arms supplies to Naxaloutfits. Gadchiroli district has large tribal population, about 40%.

On 10 February 2002, the PWG killed Malu Kopa Bogami (ST),district president of Congress, Gadchiroli. On 18 September 2002five police personnel were injured in a landmine blast at Koti, nearBhamgarh, in Gadchiroli dt.

On 21 February 2003, two police personnel were killed in a

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landmine blast in Chichgarh police station limits, Bhandara dt. On29 August 2003 five police personnel were killed and two others in-jured in a landmine blast near Tadgaon village under Bhamargarh PSlimits, Gadchiroli dt. On 4 March 2004, the naxals burnt downMokadi railway station in Chandrapur dt.

Maoist Violence in Maharashtra (no. killed)

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists

2004 9 6 2

2005 29 24 3

2006 42 3 19

2007 22 3 5

2008 2 5 7

2009 12 52 23

2010 22 15 3

138 108 62

On 22 February 2005, Maoists blasted a police vehicle underBhamragarh PS limits killing 7 police personnel. On 30 May 2005,seven police personnel and one civilian were killed in a landmine blaston the Deori-Chichgad road in Gondia dt. The police were deployedto give protection to the officials supervising the construction ofKadvanda dam.

On 16 May 2006 twelve people of a marriage party fromChhattisgarh were killed when the PWG triggered a land mine be-tween Halewara and Petha villages in Gadchiroli dt. The victims in-cluded three women and two children. On 16 June the PWG be-headed an adivasi, Alal Lagatu Kantigal (42) branding him as policeinformer near Savargaon in the same district.

After the ‘Unity Congress” of 2007, a separate military commandwas formed for Gadchiroli district as part of the Dandakaranya subzonal committee. Weapons such as SLRs, LMGs, AK 47 rifles werebrought into Gadchiroli in large quantities. All this led to the resur-gence of violence and greater causalities of security forces.

On 1 February 2009 Maoists ambushed a police party at Savarvillage. In the fierce encounter that followed 15 policemen includingone SI and 5 maoists died. One police constable and girl of 12 weregunned down by Maoists at Koppela in Sironcha taluq. On 6 April2009 three c-60 commondos were killed at Mungur, Gadchiroli dt.On 8 October 2009 Maoists ambushed a police party at the Laherioutpost killing 18 police personnel.

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On 26 September 2002. The PWG naxals thrashed to death anactivist of Bharatiya Janata Party in Malyamkunda village, Malkangiridt.

On 31 July 2003, the PWG killed a panchayat samiti member inthe same district.

During general elections, on 24 April 2004, the PWG killed anindependent candidate, Daku Majhi and injured his two brothers atMuniguda forests in Rayagada dt.

Naxal attack on UdaigiriJail, Gajapati dt.

On 12 April 2009, Maoists raided an explosives storage facility ofNational Aluminum Company in Koraput. Ten Central IndustrialSecurity personnel lost their lives.They have also burnt down theNarayanpatna railway station.

23 June 2009

A Celluler tower nearKakirguma Railway Station,Koraput dt. was blasted.

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28 November 2010

5 innocent people including achild were killed when theambulence of Gadhapur villagehealth centre was blasted by theMaoists. (Kandhamal dt.) Theambulence was returning afteradmiting a pregnant women ina hospital.

Year Civilians Security-men Maoists

2004 4 4 0

2005 13 1 3

2006 6 4 15

2007 15 2 7

2008 24 76 32