maketu cultural impact assessment
TRANSCRIPT
KuamamaetengakauTheheartishurt.
A report on the cultural impacts of the 2011 Rena Oil Spill
on Maketu/Te Arawa ahi kaa.
Son of Tangaroa, raranga, work in progress
by Alixene Curtis.
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KuaMamaeteNgakau
TheHeartishurt
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Hekarakia
Unuhia, unuhia ko te pou mua, ko te pou roa, ko te pou te wharaua
He aturangi mamao, hekeheke iho i runga i o ara Takikiwhara te ara o Ngatoro, he ara whino ki te po
Ko te po nui, ko te po roa, ko te po matirerau, ko te po whaiariki
E ko taku waka ko Te Arawa, Ngahue i te Parata Eke, eke, eke Tangaroa, eke panuku
Hui e! Taiki e!
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NgaHuaoRotoTable of Contents
HekupuTuatahi
KuaMamaeteNgakau 5HeMihi‐‐Acknowledgements 6HeTaongaMatauranga‐IntellectualProperty 7
WahangaTuatahi
HeTahuhukorero‐‐Background 9TeKaupapa‐‐ContractDetails 10HeKupuArataki‐‐Introduction 11TeHuarahi‐‐Methodology 12NgaTuhinga‐‐LiteratureReview 13INgaWaoMua‐‐KaitunaDiversionandOtherImpactsPre‐Rena 15NgaTuhingaEVOS‐‐ExxonValdezImpactsLiteratureReview 16HeKoreroRangatiratanga‐‐DiscussiononRangatiratanga 19
WahangaTuarua
NgaPanga‐HetirohangaWhanaui‐‐ImpactsOverview 22NgaPanga‐‐Impacts 23Kuaohotemauri‐‐InitialReactions 23HeToiKupu‐‐Rangatiratanga:Positiveaspectsofthecleanupmanagement 25HeToiHeke‐‐Rangatiratanga:Negativeaspectsofthecleanupmanagement 26Taiao,mauri,kaitiakitanga,mahingakaimoana‐TheEnvironment,thelife‐force,obligationstocarefortheenvironment,thegatheringofseafood 30Orangatangata,orangawhanau‐‐PersonalandWhanauWellbeing 33Herongoaitemate‐‐ResolutionofImpacts 35HeiWhakakapi:TereooNgatamariki‐‐InConclusion:TheVoicesofOurChildren 37NgaHuaotePurongo‐‐ReportOutcomes 39NgaTaunakitanga‐‐Recommendations 41
AppendixA 43
AppendixB 45
AppendixC 46
Translations 48
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KuaMamaeteNgakau
Kua maemae te ngakau: our moana is suffering after years of sustaining our well beings our wairua, whanau, tinana, hauora, its our life‐force, our provider of good health, we look after it, it looks after us ‐the taitamawahine is taking a battering, kei te tangi te tai, kei te tangi hoki ahau.1
1 Interviewee Male‐whanau (2012) – text he sent out to contacts on his text list (and retained a copy of ) when he saw the oil on the beach at Papamoa.
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HeMihiAcknowledgements
The Maketu Rena Clean Up Committee was disestablished in 2012. The Rena recovery phase necessitated taking an iwi approach as opposed to a Maketu approach, and so some tangata whenua members of that committee reformed as the Maketu/Te Arawa Iwi Rena Recovery Committee. They worked on iwi Rena recovery issues using established Maketu organisations (Maketu Taiapure and Ngati Makino Heritage Trust) as accountable administration centres This report, Kua Mamae te Ngakau, came under the Ngati Makino portfolio. It investigates the cultural impacts of the oil spill on Maketu/Te Arawa tangata whenua. The Maketu/Te Arawa coast is one of four oil‐affected areas with a dominant tangata whenua population. This cultural impact report was commissioned by the Bay of Plenty Regional Council on behalf of the Ministry for the Environment. There has not been an opportunity to publicly acknowledge the support shown to the Maketu
community during that stressful clean up time. Hinemoana Associates acknowledges the
people and organisations who were not our Maketu volunteers, but whose assistance greatly
enabled the extraordinary Maketu community response to the Rena oil clean up. In retrospect,
another major learning from the Maketu clean‐up has been the importance of networks and
relationships in resolving a sustained environmental crisis situation.
He mihi aroha ki:
Kataraina Belshaw, Eddie Grogan, John Cronin, and Pim de Monchy, the rivers and drainage team and their manager, Ken Tarboton all of the Bay of Plenty Regional Council; Chris Battersill of Waikato University, and Carlton Bidois of Ngati Ranginui. BOP Seafarers Trust; Downers; Te Arawa Lakes Trust; BOC; Seeka, AFFCO, Ridley‐Smith &
Wong, Maketu Taiapure, Bunnings –Rotorua, Farmers Auto‐Village, Subway Te Puke,
Farmlands, Maketu Motors, Fulton Hogan, Fonterra, ROCK FM, Auto One, Te Puke New
World, Maketu Pies, Kirikiriroa Health, Maketu School, Maketu Surf Club, Maketu Community
Board, Maketu Markets, Ngati Makino Heritage Trust, Ngati Pikiao Environmental Society.
Gus Cantlon, the late Carol Poihipi, Jason Taylor, Justine Beckett, Harmon Williams, Paddy
Butler, Henry & Pete, Judy & Tere, Rachel Dargaville, Lucy and Robyn, Rama and Dobn, Donna
Clarke and the many, many anonymous donors.
He mihi poto tenei ki nga ringa raupa who cleaned our beaches without compensation but for the love of our environment. To the many Pakeha people who helped, we extend our aroha and manaaki to you and your whanau. To the Maori women who carried the load, na koutou te taumaha ka hiki. Ma nga atua, ma nga tupuna, ma nga mokopuna o mua mai. He mihi hirahira tenei ki a koutou. Mana wahine, mana motuhake, tuturu whakamaua ki tina! Ki te moana Ongatoro, whiti atu ki te nohonga ano o Ngatoro ko Otaiiti, ki te moana nui a Kiwa. Hui e, Taiki e!
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HeTaongaMataurangaIntellectual property
Hinemoana Associates support the rights of Indigenous Peoples to their intellectual property.
We refer the reader in particular to the Mataatua Declaration of Indigenous Peoples Rights
(1993).
Part of the pre‐amble:
Affirmed indigenous peoples' knowledge is of benefit to all humanity.
Recognised indigenous peoples are willing to offer their knowledge to all humanity provided their fundamental rights to define and control this knowledge is protected by the international community.
Insisted the first beneficiaries of indigenous knowledge must be the direct indigenous descendants of such knowledge.
Section 2 of the Declaration asked States, National and International Agencies to:
Recognise that indigenous peoples also have the right to create new knowledge
based on cultural tradition.
Accept that the cultural and intellectual property rights of Indigenous peoples are
vested with those who created them.
Accordingly, Hinemoana Associates, retain the intellectual property of this report. This report
is also subject to Copyright laws and cannot be reproduced in whole or part in any form
without the written permission of Hinemoana Associates.
Hinemoana Associates
27 Otimi St
Maketu
R.D. 9
TE PUKE 3189
AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND
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WahangaTuatahiSection One
TeTahuhukoreroBackground
By all accounts, the Maketu/Te Arawa oil clean up was a complete success. This was due to the commitment of both volunteers and their supporters who donated equipment, food and cash to the effort. The combined, sustained voluntary effort, measured by the resulting cleanliness of the coastal edges, sand and rocks, was outstanding. There has been little institutional recognition of the Maketu voluntary effort. No one came to say thank you, neither Maritime NZ or any other government agency or Council. Maketu is a place over which others (not just institutions) feel they have the authority to make decisions. Maketu is easily overlooked when it comes to allocating resources. The Rena disaster was an occasion when being overlooked was to the benefit of our environment. By the time the authorities arrived to help, we had already organised ourselves and were running quite smoothly. For a short, intense space in time we were in charge of our destiny. We experienced and demonstrated the best that empowerment from rangatiratanga can unleash. The following timeline of events was included in the report provided voluntarily to the Te Arawa Lakes Trust AGM pf 2012 and provides an outline of the oil clean up:
9th October ‐ Slick seen (reported by Maketu people living on Okurei) heading inshore to the coast at Maketu and Papamoa.
10 October ‐ MNZ: Oil has now been found on the beach near Tay St (Mount). Stay away from the water. Do not touch anything with oil on it – it is toxic and should not be in contact with skin. We have identified the most sensitive sites. These include the Maketū estuary and there are no reports of oil there yet
11 October ‐ Training, initiated by Pia, undertaken by Pia and Tane at Papamoa, from NZ Army on cleaning beaches
12 October ‐ Public hui Maketu Fire Brigade (MTNZ, BOPRC, WBDC, WAIKATO UNI) 13 October ‐ Pia trains people outside surf club. Trained volunteers start
cleaning Maketu beaches 14 October ‐ Maketu cleaning hub establishes at Whakaue marae During the clean up phase, the committee:
trained 463 volunteers collected 2855 bags of oil pollution coordinated 3358 hours of volunteer cleaning provided 697.75 volunteer hours of marae HQ coordination received and dealt with an average of 40 cell phone calls per day made an average of 25 sell phone calls per day spent 178 hours at Incident Command Centre (ICC) travelled 970 km started cleaning 13th October and continued for 50 days was responsible for approx. 80 kms of beachline area, including 2 estuaries
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initiated and carried out a world first rock cleaning of oil using environmentally neutral resources around Okurei point
cleaned areas graded by Maritime NZ (MNZ) from heavy, moderate to light kept all volunteers and Te Arawa informed with a nightly newsletter reported back to the whole Maketu community at a meeting at Whakaue
Marae reported back to all Te Arawa iwi along the coast and at both the 2012 and
2013 Te Arawa Lakes Trust AGMs. The two main, Maketu‐appointed coordinators donated their MNZ lump sum payments to the Maketu/Te Arawa Rena Committee. Those funds have been used to purchase capital items and to develop capabilities of Maketu youth.
TeKaupapa Contract Details
Through a contract with the Bay of Plenty Regional Council, The Ngati Makino Heritage Trust contracted three entities (Maketu/Te Arawa Iwi Recovery committee, Hinemoana Associates and Maketu Taiapure) to:
Identify and assess the cultural impacts of the Rena grounding on tangata whenua (Maketu/Te Arawa)
Identify sites of significance for cultural maintenance and integrity Develop recommendations that reflect learnings from this incident for the
future. This document reports those findings.
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HeKupuArataki Introduction
Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) is this morning responding to an incident near Tauranga Harbour, after the 236m cargo vessel Rena struck the Astrolabe Reef around 2.20am. Wednesday, 5 October 20112
The chronology of events from the Maritime NZ website doesn’t mention anything being done for the welfare of tangata whenua, especially Motiti Islanders. Except for Mt.Maunganui/Papamoa, the highly oil‐impacted areas are all Maori communities: Motiti, Matakana Island and Maketu. Wildlife are specifically mentioned. Large amounts of resources were committed to their welfare with special contingency plans. There were no contingency plans for Motiti Islanders or any of the other communities. Despite this, subsidies were quickly organised for businesses “within or near the maritime exclusion zone”.3 The order of priority for New Zealand authorities was clearly the birds, animals and then business people. The lack of consideration of possible impacts on tangata whenua is an ongoing issue for Maketu and has been expressed similarly to the Maketu Rena Committee by both Matakana Islanders and Motiti Islanders. “If we didn’t have dotterels here, they wouldn’t have worried about us.”4 And from a Motiti kuia: “The birds get more attention than the people.”5 These comments are similar to those made by the native Alaskans in the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS)
Within a month of the spill, the village of Tatitlek requested $40,000 from Exxon to provide adequate childcare in the village [while parents worked on the clean up]. Exxon did not respond to this request despite efforts of state officials. "It was pretty incredible that Exxon would spend eighty thousand dollars to save an otter but they weren't willing to spend any money on the children" (Tatitlek administrator)6
In the analysis of literature perused for this report, the EVOS research provides an incredibly valuable insight into understanding the impacts of the Rena oil spill as they affected tangata whenua. Despite the differences of quantum between the two disasters (11 million gallons of oil from the Exxon, 1,733 tonnes from the Rena), both sets of indigenous peoples’ reactions to the disasters are strikingly consistent as direct quotes from interviews reveal.
2 Maritime NZ Press Release 5 October 2011, www.maritimenz.govt.nz 3 On 2 November, Social Development Minister Paula Bennett announced help for small businesses and sole traders impacted by the Rena grounding. To be eligible for the subsidy the business must operate within or near the maritime exclusion zone. They will also need to be able to show they have already used any insurance cover and are unable to relocate their operation The $500 subsidy for full‐time staff and $300 subsidy for part‐time staff will be available for sole traders and small businesses (with less than 20 employees) The Tauranga Chamber of Commerce have advised they believe there is a maximum of 120 employees affected. The fund is currently capped at $360,000 which is enough to cover 6 weeks support for those 120 employees. The size of the fund will be addressed if the scale of the disaster changes. 4 Matakana Islander Clean up committee member Matakana 2012 5 Motiti Island kuia at Tahuwhakatiki marae Nov 2011 6 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL From The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. (Dubuque, Iowa, 1997), pp. 167‐187.
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TeHuarahiMethodology
We compared our data (generated through interviews and local in situ information) with EVOS cultural impacts reports. The literature review critically informed our approach. Contributors to this work were mainly tangata whenua involved in the Rena oil clean up in Maketu. As active participants of our communities, we have an intimate knowledge of their socio‐cultural make‐up. We constructed two questionnaires7; one for children and another for adults. The differences between the two allowed us to frame questions age‐appropriately while eliciting analogous responses. A power‐point presentation accompanied the kura kaupapa questionnaire. We conducted two group interviews; one with an extended whanau and the other with senior students of a Kura Kaupapa Maori [Primary] school8. The adult questionnaire was emailed to 10 adults and 6 were received back. The 10 had been chosen because of their representativeness and reliability. They were all either beach cleaners or close family of beach cleaners. We also conducted personal interviews with 4 adults. When added to the questionnaires returned, this created a sample of 10 individual responses.9 We aimed to get feedback from a cross section10 of all Te Arawa iwi associated with Maketu. Our focus within that range was ahi kaa known to actively engage with the moana. As the interviews progressed it became obvious that we needed to interview the co‐ordinators of the clean up as a separate group. We did so. In a small village, maintenance of confidentiality is a particular challenge. For protection of their identity, we asked interviewees to provide nom‐de‐plumes. When specific response information, made anonymity vulnerable, we provided an additional nom‐de‐plume within the quotes. We were solely responsible for choosing who to interview. It should be mentioned that when compared with past research reports that have been commissioned on Maketu, our knowledge of “community and whanau cultural nuances” has enabled an investigation of a far greater depth. Whether the term “participatory research” adequately describes the process is a discussion for another day. Finally, we have deliberately quoted whole texts of information instead of the academic small
phrases. Our reason for this is to ensure that our people have access to information in context
that they do not find easy to access. This is our way of ensuring the report information moves
from the ownership of academics, institutions, power‐holders and bookshelves and goes some
way to informing the ahi kaa. Also, by quoting more extensively we hope to avoid bias.
7 Refer at appendix A and B 8 There was no response to requests to the local school to interview ahi kaa children. 9 It was observed that those who replied, seemed to need to write about their experiences. Those who were interviewed needed to be interviewed. We took the way they responded as giving them the opportunity to unload frustrations in the way that best suited them. 10 In terms of gender, age, hapu/Iwi and depth of Maori cultural awareness and connectivity.
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NgaTuhingaLiterature Review
The following documents were of significance in our literature review:
1924 letter to A T Ngata from Maketu ahi kaa
victim impact report (VIR) prepared in regards to the Rena disaster and associated hearings
WAI676 evidence regarding the socio‐cultural effects of the Kaituna river diversion at Te Tumu
The Akwe: Kon Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments
1924letterIn March, 1924, a letter was sent to the Honourable A T Ngata from Maketu11, signed by the adult ahi kaa. Written entirely in Maori, it identifies the values associated with the takutai. The main theme of the Maketu ahi kaa letter is protection of their mana whenua/mana moana, or rangatiratanga. The first reason they give is that it is a part of the coast that is very significant to Te Arawa and is the landing place of the Te Arawa waka. Other reasons are:
He urupa no matau tupuna iho tai mai ki naia nei Ko etahi wahi o taua takutai, he mahinga orange mo matau mo nga Maori, ara, he paru mahinga ika, mahinga pipi, mahinga kutai,(kuku) paua, kina, a, he paru mahinga tuna hoki. A, ko etahi wahi atahua kua meinga hei wahi takorotanga mo nga ahua iwi e tai mai ki konei I nga wa o te Raumati12.
VictimImpactReport(VIR)The Rena Maketu/Te Arawa committee prepared a victim impact report for the sentencing hearing of the Captain and First Mate. It was subsequently slightly amended13 for the visit of the ship’s owners to Maketu. The VIR was an organic response on behalf of ahi kaa in Maketu. It expresses the distress felt at the time and lists the consequences of the oil spill as experienced by Maketu ahi kaa. There are similarities with the 1924 letter. The VIR refers to the kai moana and sustenance provided by the sea. It acknowledges the atua of the sea, effects upon sacred areas, and the sacrifices made by children and adults alike. It also talks about relationships with the sea and effects of oil spill on socialisation patterns between generations which were affected. This VIR was constructed before the EVOS literature was reviewed. The obvious parallels between these statements and those of the indigenous peoples of Prince Williams Sounds are significant.
WAI676evidenceThis responds to the socio‐cultural effects of the Kaituna river diversion at Te Tumu. The Waitangi claim seeks the return of the Kaituna River through Ongatoro.
11 See pages 545, 546, 547, WAI 46/275, supporting papers to the evidence of David Armstrong VOL II pp329 original sourced from National Archives Head Office, Wellington 12 See translation at appendices
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During a Mauri wananga held at Maketu post Rena, we recognised a need to set a database against which to assess cultural impacts. This would enable us to include reliable tangata whenua information on cultural impacts on the estuary pre‐Rena. The wananga was held after the interviews for this report. The Kaituna diversion impacts are referred to in the VIR. They were not included in the original scoping for this report, but have now been integrated into our findings.
TheAkwe:KonVoluntaryGuidelinesThese Guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments14 derive from Article 8j of the Convention on biological diversity. As stated in its introduction, they are intended to provide “guidance to Parties and Governments on the incorporation of cultural, environmental and social considerations of indigenous and local communities into new or existing impact‐assessment procedures.”15 The guidelines are a valuable checklist. They are also useful for political reasons as they add weight to the legitimacy of cultural impact assessment reporting. The Guidelines define cultural impact assessment as:
a process of evaluating the likely impacts of a proposed development on the way of life of a particular group or community of people, with full involvement of this group or community of people and possibly undertaken by this group or community of people: a cultural impact assessment will generally address the impacts, both beneficial and adverse, of a proposed development that may affect, for example, the values, belief systems, customary laws, language(s), customs, economy, relationships with the local environment and particular species, social organization and traditions of the affected community;
MaketuLiteratureReviewfindingsFrom this literature, we identified key cultural issues which might make up the checklist for impact assessment:
rangatiratanga
kaitiakitanga
mahinga kai
manaaki tangata
papa takaro
cultural identity
wahi tapu
indigenous knowledge
rahui
tikanga
kawa
subsistence way of living
whanaungatanga. All these issues were referred to by interviewees. In the EVOS situation, the stress of the accident and clean‐up activities gave rise to socio‐cultural impacts which affected people’s wellbeing and way of life. We therefore designed our questions to evoke wellbeing issues which could then be compared with the EVOS impacts. The EVOS literature is reviewed further on in this report as a separate section.
14 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity http://www.biodiv.org 15 Akwe:Kon Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity http://www.biodiv.org page 3
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INgaWaoMuaKaituna Diversion and Other Impacts Pre‐Rena
A cultural impact report which has at its core the environmental impacts of an event in the past, must include a baseline of conditions which existed pre‐the event. It is revealing that in the VIR, a quickly constructed document, the Maketu /Te Arawa Rena Iwi committee, say:
For Maketu, the diversion of the Kaituna river out through the Te Tumu cut, has been a worse environmental disaster [than the Rena]16
Between 1924 and 2011, Maketu sustained dramatic cultural and environmental changes due to two government‐promoted schemes. The first was the consolidation of lands in Maketu and the second was the diversion in 1958 of the Kaituna river from its natural flow through Ongatoro. These impacts were exacerbated by fisheries legislation which limited Maketu residents’ income earning and subsidising ability.17 The land consolidation had the effect of appointing winners and losers among tangata whenua and the loss of the history of the ahi kaa to those lands. Title to many of these lands also ended up with the Te Arawa Trust Board, now the Te Arawa Lakes Trust. In the the Kaituna diversion situation, unlike the consolidation where impacts were not forseen, the government knew that the diversion would dry out the estuary. The scheme involved provision of generous subsidies via the taxpayer, to flooding and drainage schemes in an effort to bring marginal, privately owned lands into farming production. There was no consideration of either the environment or tangata whenua or their relationship to their environment, including their economic, social and cultural wellbeing. This is the basis of the WAI 676 Ongatoro claim. During this period, from 1958‐2000, the subsistence economy of the ahi kaa declined from fully to minimally subsistent. Western Bay District Council works pandering to non‐tangata whenua continue to negatively impact tangata whenua today, including extending a road six metres into the estuary18, and an unaffordable sewage scheme19. The latter was being installed as tangata whenua cleaned the beaches of the Rena oil. Given the changes to the Maketu/Te Arawa environment, comfort should not be taken that impacts of Rena on Maketu/Te Arawa coast are less than anticipated. The information we are highlighting is that in comparison to Motiti and other indigenous peoples’ environments affected by oil spills (e.g. Natives of Alaska), a large part of the Maketu coastal environment is not “pristine”, certainly not the estuary. With the anthropogenic‐induced environmental changes, the estuary has lost substantial flora and fauna, which had been a part of the normal diet and culture of tangata whenua. The sand dunes have been eroded and no longer afford any protection from tsunami for example. Traditional knowledges, relationships and protocols, have also been severely compromised. As the subsistence resources slowly disappeared so too did much of our culture. The Rena disaster further impacted a community already impacted culturally, socially and environmentally. The Maketu pre‐Rena situation is consistent with the range of post Exxon –Valdez cultural impacts as reported in the EVOS reports.
16 Para 19, Victim impact report Appendix C 17 Some whanau in Maketu would accompany weekend recreation fishers as guides and fishing tutors 18 BOPT Times 14.03.97 “Meeting over tapu rocks” 19 BOP Times, 12.12.03 “Row over Maketu plan”
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The point we wish to highlight here is that the ahi kaa were already at the same place as the Exxon Valdez victims prior to the Rena event. When the oil hit the Maketu beaches, the environment and tangata whenua were in a vulnerable state due to the accumulated effects of the past. The Kaituna diversion consequences are succinctly captured by the EVOS oil spill literature:
… By disrupting traditional patterns of subsistence production and distribution, exposure to oil spill had greater cultural significance for the Natives because these activities dominate the social relations and cultural framework of Alaskan Native communities. … it was also perceived to be a threat to the continued survival of Native culture and the individual identity that derives from it.20
The Rena disaster opened up old wounds and the EVOS research explained why the pain was still there some 50 years later. It elucidated the effects of the technological disaster of the Kaituna diversion. This curious situation could have been the reason so much passion and energy was exerted by ahi kaa over the Rena spill. Tangata whenua had a history of being overlooked and let down by the Crown and others and were not about to let anyone have a second go at wrecking the Maketu environment.
NgaTuhingaEVOS Exxon Valdez Impacts Literature Review
The Exxon Valdez disaster generated an array of productive and, for indigenous peoples, ground‐breaking research, including detailed and longitudinal studies on the social and cultural effects of the spill. It provides evidence that disaster trauma and stress can induce long‐lasting psychological illness, particularly in “natural resource communities”. This is a relatively fresh research path. As Picou and Gill, prominent among social science EVOS researchers note:
The EVOS provides a case study of a technological disaster for evaluating emerging theoretical issues in disaster research21
Disaster research historically and even in the recent Rena situation generally focussed on fiscal impacts. Most of the EVOS social and cultural effects investigations take either a psychological theoretical approach or an anthropological approach. However neither of the conclusions are surprising to us:
Disengaging from coping efforts and other avoidant strategies has been associated previously with adverse psychological outcomes after disasters, including oil spills (Arata et al. 2000; Silver et al. 2002). 22
The EVOS research identifies that in Cordova (18% Alaskan native population with a history of
both commercial fishing and subsistence activities), “perceptions of uncertainty, ambiguity
20p292 Ethnic differences in stress, coping, and depressive symptoms after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Palinkas, Lawrence A.; Russell, John; Downs, Michael A.; Petterson, John S. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol 180(5), May 1992, 287‐295. doi:
21 Picou, J. Steven and Gill, Duane A. (1996) The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Chronic Psychological Stress first published in American Fisheries Society Symposium 18:879‐893, 1996. 22 The Early Psychological Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill on Florida and Alabama Communities Lynn M. Grattan,1 Sparkle Roberts,1 William T. Mahan Jr.,2 Patrick K. McLaughlin,1 W. Steven Otwell,2 and J. Glenn Morris Jr.3,41Department of Neurology, School of Medicine, University of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Florida Sea Grant Extension Program, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA; 3Department of Medicine, College of Medicine, and 4Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA
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and continuing disruption generate patterns of long‐term community stress.”23 They suggest
a deeper examination of subpopulations more vulnerable to long‐term negative social
impacts.24
Palinkas25 et al. addressed the lack of research on the role of cultural differences in coping with technological disasters. They acknowledge that Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) affected both Native Alaskans and Euro‐Americans. They show however, that significantly more Natives participated in the clean up, and reported effects to commercial fisheries and subsistence activities. The cultural impacts differentiate the native from the other Alaskan communities because of their relationships with the environment.
Furthermore, by disrupting traditional patterns of subsistence production and distribution, exposure to oil spill had greater cultural significance for the Natives because these activities dominate the social relations and cultural framework of Alaskan Native communities.… It was also perceived to be a threat to the continued survival of Native culture and the individual identity that derives from it.26
This scenario could also describe the effects of the Kaituna diversion technological disaster. The EVOS research validates that psychological effects can be ongoing in response to trauma, confirming what indigenous peoples with their experience of colonialism have always known. It provides evidence that indigenous peoples suffer psychologically at a greater rate than non‐ indigenous from technological disasters involving their environment27.
Palinkas et al. (1992) assessed the levels of depressive symptomathology between two groups, one of indigenous people (N = 188) and another one of Euro‐Americans (N = 371),.. The results of these authors suggested that cultural differences played an important role in the perception of the psychological damage produced by this disaster, which was related to the cleaning work in which the people were involved and also the damage to fishing grounds, the main sustenance of these communities... These results emphasize the role of cultural differences in the perception of and capacity to overcome the psychological impact.28
Gill and Picou (1998) monitored the impact of the Exxon Valdez spill on the affected populations by means of a 4 year (1989–1992) longitudinal study of social disruption and psychological stress. Their data revealed the chronic nature of stress.
23 Picou,J.S.Duane Gill, C.L. Dyer, E.W. Curry (1992) Disruption and stress in an Alaskan fishing community: intial and continuing impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Page 239 Industrial Crisis Quarterly Vol. 6. No 3 24 p253 Picou,J.S.Duane Gill, C.L. Dyer, E.W. Curry (1992) Disruption and stress in an Alaskan fishing community: intial and continuing impacts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Page 239 Industrial Crisis Quarterly Vol. 6. No 3 Ethnic differences in stress, coping, and depressive symptoms after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 25 Ethnic differences in stress, coping, and depressive symptoms after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Palinkas, Lawrence
A.; Russell, John; Downs, Michael A.; Petterson, John S. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol 180(5), May
1992, 287‐295. doi:
26 p292 Ethnic differences in stress, coping, and depressive symptoms after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Palinkas, Lawrence A.; Russell, John; Downs, Michael A.; Petterson, John S. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, Vol 180(5), May 1992, 287‐295. doi: 27 See also Palinkas et al (1993) Community Patterns of Psychiatric Disorders after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. American Journal of Psychiatry. 150:10, October 1993 28 Francisco Aguilera,a,b,c Josefina Méndez,b Eduardo Pásaroa and Blanca Laffona* Journal of Applied Toxicology 2010; 30: 291–301
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Finally, Palinkas et al. (2004) confirmed the prevalence of PTSD associated with ethnic differences.29
Social disruption studies of the Exxon disaster also provide proof that the Native Alaskans endured more negative impacts than non‐natives as a result of the effects on their relationship to the environment and subsistence culture. James Fall30 reported that in 1998, ten years after the spill, that 68% of people interviewed said their communities’ traditional way of life had not recovered.
This is a key finding for this report: in technological disasters affecting their environment, indigenous peoples suffer more than non‐indigenous. This sort of impact was reported in the WAI 676 research, and has been expressed in many iwi submissions to various authorities (including the Foreshore and Seabed legislation and its later versions). To our knowledge it has never been appropriately received by the same authorities. The EVOS research validates all those prior tangata whenua submissions.
In a culture where tradition plays a large role, this interruption of tradition has a drastic effect. Elders are very much respected in most Native communities… This Native tradition was greatly affected, as contractors would give young adults high status jobs in which their responsibility was to supervise the older residents of the cleanup. This caused serious problems since it was against many cultural values, such as the valuing of elders…Not only were young people hired to supervise their elders, women were also hired to higher positions then men, which too was against the Native cultures, and played a significant role in the depression found in many men, following the disruption (Palinkas et al. 1992: 293).31
In the Oiled Mayors Study, exposure to the oil spill and participation in subsequent cleanup was significantly associated with reported declines in traditional subsistence activities…hunting, fishing, and gathering, …the amount of harvested resource foods shared with others and with elders, the amount of harvested resource foods received from others, number of household members engaged in these activities, and opportunities for children to learn hunting, fishing, and gathering (Palinkas, Downs,et al., 1993 ).32
Historical ongoing trauma is also a consequence of colonisation which has affected indigenous peoples’ health in a similar way. This premise is now accepted internationally and locally. The eminent psychologist and academic, Professor Mason Durie, gives the following description:
Several writers have also drawn a link between colonisation and poor health. They argue that loss of sovereignty along with dispossession (of lands, waterways, customary laws) created a climate of material and spiritual oppression with increased susceptibility to disease and injury. At one end are ‘short distance’ factors such as the impacts of abnormal molecular and cellular processes, while at the other end are ‘long distance’ factors including governmental policies and the political standing of indigenouspeoples. Values,
29 Francisco Aguilera,a,b,c Josefina Méndez,b Eduardo Pásaroa and Blanca Laffona* Journal of Applied Toxicology 2010; 30: 291–301 30 Fall, James 1999 Subsistence, Restoration Notebook, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Trustee Council. 31 Whetstone, Steven L. The Psychological and Social Impact on Human Communities of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill:15 Years Later http://www.alma.edu/departments/polsci/alaska2004/index.html 32 (Palinkas et al. 1992: 293). Palinkas, Lawrence A., John Russell, Michael A. Downs, and John S. Petterson. 1992. “Ethnic Differences in Stress, Coping, and Depressive Symptoms after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill”, The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 180, 5: 287‐95.
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lifestyle, standards of living and culture, so important to clinical understandings, lie midway.33
Other academics sustain and extend this view34 35 36.37
There is another kaupapa within this impact report that the EVOS literature alludes to: the links between the negative health status of the Alaskans and Maori and the loss of sovereignty. To be indigenous includes the state of being colonised. For this reason, the discussion on rangatiratanga which follows is essential to this report.
HeKoreroRangatiratanga Discussion on Rangatiratanga
‘Rangatiratanga’ encompasses the principle of self‐determination for Maori. In the Treaty of Waitangi, “tino rangatiratanga” is guaranteed in Article 2 and translates as “absolute authority”. The foremost authority, the Waitangi Tribunal, refers
The Māori version of article 2 uses the word 'rangatiratanga' in promising to uphold the authority that tribes had always had over their lands and taonga. This choice of wording
emphasises status and authority 38
Local historical and contemporary submissions of Maketu ahi kaa in relation to the environment, emphasise rangatiratanga39.40 41 This is particularly true of the March, 1924, letter referenced in the literature review.
DeFur et al. make a critical point which aligns with Maketu experiences.42 They say that resilience and vulnerability mechanisms play a key role in individual and community ability to cope with stress conditions. One of the most “robust moderators of the negative impacts of risk factors among children and adults is a sense of control or belief in self‐efficacy”43. The other point which concurs with the Maketu experience is the “social capital” resource.
33 Durie, Mason (2004) An Indigenous Model of Health Melbourne 27 April 2004 18th World Conference on Health Promotion and Health Education Promotion Massey University New Zealand 34 Moeke‐Pickering, T. (1996). Maori Identity Within Whanau: A review of literature. Hamilton: University of Waikato 35 Historic Trauma and Aboriginal Healing Prepared for The Aboriginal Healing Foundation by Cynthia C. Wesley‐Esquimaux, Ph.D. Magdalena Smolewski, Ph.D. 36 Amy Bombay, MSc, Institute of Neuroscience, Carleton University, Kim Matheson, PhD, Department of Psychology, Hymie Anisman, PhD, Institute of Neuroscience, Carleton University Intergenerational Trauma: Convergence of Multiple Processes among First Nationspeoples in Canada National Aboriginal Health Council (NAHO) Canada Carleton University Journal of Aboriginal Health, November 2009 37 Keri Lawson‐Te Aho and James H. Liu,,(2010) Indigenous Suicide and Colonization: The Legacy of Violence and the Necessity of Self‐Determination Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand International Journal of Conflict and Violence urn:nbn:de:0070 ‐ijc v‐20101108 IJCV: Vol. 4 (1) 2010, pp. 124 – 133 38 See http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi‐tribunal/treaty‐of‐waitangi 39 Submission to The New Zealand Government Consulting Group on the Foreshore and Seabed: Submission on behalf of the descendants of Raiha Tapihana and Ropata Curtis of the Ngati Whakaue and Ngati Pikiao nations, MAKETU, presented on the 05 September 2003, at Whakaue Marae, Maketu by Raewyn Bennett 40 7th January 2005 :Opening submissions for Ngati Makino; Ngati Hinekura; Ngati Tutaki a Koti Ngati Tutaki a Hane; Ngati Rangiunuora; Ngati Rongomai and Te Takere o Nga Wai of Te Arawa mandate claims (wai 1150) 41 22 November 2004 Submission to Professor Rudolfo Stavenhagen Special rapporteur UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Tamatekapua, Papaiouru Marae Rotorua 42deFur, P.L. et al. 2007. Vulnerability as a function of individual and group resources in cumulative risk assessment. Environ. Health Perspect. 115 (5): 817‐824. 43 deFur, P.L. et al. 2007. Vulnerability as a function of individual and group resources in cumulative risk assessment. Environ. Health Perspect. 115 (5): 817‐824.
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Social capital has emerged as a multifactorial resilience resource that can enhance health and buffer the negative impact of exposure to a variety of stressors. The term is used to capture community capacity and empowerment with an emphasis on social networks, trust, and political participation44 45
The association between social capital and vulnerability or resilience in the face of environmental hazards, has been outlined in a comprehensive model through which processes of community empowerment can be mobilized in the face of local environmental hazards. Using a case study the authors show how a partnership approach to community decision making can minimize the negative impact of environmental hazards in the life of the community.46
These concepts are consistent with rangatiratanga. They also validate Maketu’s ahi kaa stance to be independent of the Te Moana a Toi forum and Te Arawa ki uta as well as Te Puni Kokiri and other Maori and Non‐Maori government representative bodies. That is, their wish not to have anyone else purport to speak for them or manage the disaster in their area. The attempts to declothe them of their rangatiratanga is ongoing even though the emergency is long over and no excuse can be sustained.
Maketu’s experience is that their stress was compounded by others speaking for them and in effect misrepresenting or obstructing rangatiratanga. In all cases others were not au fait with the Maketu kaupapa and lacked capability. They assumed to know the environment and did not have the capability to do best by it. Collectively, they had no general kaitiakitanga experience that Maketu could see, let alone in the domain of Tangaroa. The identity of Maketu ahi kaa is founded in their relationship to the moana. In Maketu’s eyes, the emergency was no excuse for non‐adherence to tikanga or expectations that they should submit to an oblique form of neo‐colonisation. Indeed their experience was that tikanga is critical to providing stability in a sustained emergency situation.
Maketu committee members had long established working relationships with scientists and Councils and Ministries. “Why would we want to be subjects of others with less knowledge and capability?” was the message from interviewees and the Committee co‐ordinators. For example the key concept of “mauri” included in the official MFE Rena Recovery plan came from the Maketu submission to the MFE led Recovery plan. They knew what needed to be done, they had the essential human resources and they know their beaches, moana and community.
A process that respects rangatiratanga will promote horizontal collaboration. It is therefore essential to a sustained voluntary effort.
Rangatiratanga is also a key component of kaitiakitanga. As Ko Aotearoa tenei, the WAI 262 report says:
Our final statement of issues …included a revised definition of kaitiakitanga that placed kaitiaki obligations in the context of the concept of tino rangatiratanga. Indeed, it identified the two as inseparable – tino rangatiratanga as the right and kaitiakitanga as the corresponding obligation towards taonga. It defined tino rangatiratanga in this context as including the
44 deFur, P.L. et al. 2007. Vulnerability as a function of individual and group resources in cumulative risk assessment. Environ. Health Perspect. 115 (5): 817‐824. page 820 45 7th January 2005 :Opening submissions for Ngati Makino; Ngati Hinekura; Ngati Tutaki a Koti Ngati Tutaki a Hane; Ngati Rangiunuora; Ngati Rongomai and Te Takere o Nga Wai of Te Arawa mandate claims (Wai 1150) 46 deFur, P.L. et al. 2007. Vulnerability as a function of individual and group resources in cumulative risk assessment. Environ. Health Perspect. 115 (5): 817‐824. page. 821
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right of kaitiaki to make and enforce laws and customs in relation to their taonga.47
The literature shows that affected communities should play a central role in the risk assessment process as well as research and other strategies. “This requires movement away from the hierarchic nature of the current expert‐based risk assessment approach to one that includes collaboration, partnership, and respect for flexible, multi‐disciplinary approaches.”48
Asserting tino rangatiratanga also meant that some probable (based on the Exxon experience) negative cultural impacts were avoided. For example the issues over who got paid and who didn’t were always going to be potential exacerbators to social relationships among tangata whenua. The EVOS literature identifies this as a major cause of breakdown in whanau and community relations. Funds received after the Maketu oil impact clean‐up were donated back to a pool to assist with after‐effects and any new disaster preparation. So many of these issues never eventuated in Maketu to the Alaskan extent. Neither were cultural issues over gender, youth or elder employment relationships having to be attended to as was the case in the Exxon situation. Many of the cultural issues which plagued the Exxon situation early on and seemingly worsened other negative cultural impacts never arose. We maintain this to be the result of the extent to which we were able to assert tino rangatiratanga. Issues of ‘corrosive’ community descriptors as occurred in EVOS, are difficult to prove as being tied to solely to the oil clean up stresses, given the accumulated impacts scenario in Maketu. There are records of abusive emails to coordinators, from a local runanga, from lawyers and other iwi leaders attempting to assert control. Inter‐ and intra‐tribal tensions exacerbated by the Rena still affect relationships today. Being in charge of our beaches and cleaning up in a different legal environment to EVOS, has seemingly worked to mitigate the long‐term corrosive social relations that developed in Alaska. Interviewees all directly or indirectly referred to issues around self‐determination locally, nationally, and particularly inter‐tribally. However despite the inter‐ and intra‐iwi conflicts, the most damaging long‐term effects have their source in the unequal power relationships between Maori and the Crown and the entrenched mono‐cultural nature of its laws and processes.
47 2011 Ko Aotearoa tēnei : a report into claims concerning New Zealand law and policy affecting Māori culture
and identity. Te taumata tuarua.(Waitangi Tribunal report) p 8 www.waitangitribunal. Govt.nz
48 Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 110 | SUPPLEMENT 2 | April 2002 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241171/pdf/ehp110s‐000259.pdf page 263
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WahangaTuarua Section Two
Note that the quotes from the EVOS situation are in bold font.
NgaPanga‐Hetirohangawhanui Impacts Overview
It has been difficult, as a participant observer researcher, to maintain the focus on the Rena Oil impacts, given the impacts of the Kaituna diversion in the same community. The EVOS literature has provided unchallengeable evidence that support the claims made by the Maketu ahi kaa about the importance of Ongatoro to their cultural well‐being. The long‐term EVOS cultural impacts correlate with the Maketu‐Kaituna experience of the last 50 years. This excerpt from Gill and Picou demonstrates succinctly the reasons why the Maketu ahi kaa relationship with the estuary is essential to their well‐being and was severely eroded by the Kaituna diversion.
The cultural loss from subsistence disruption should not be underestimated. The meaning of such activities to participants identifies the core cultural relevance of subsistence behaviour. In a 1992 follow up study of Alaska Natives in Cordova, 80 percent agreed that sharing subsistence food reminded them of their childhood, 71 percent agreed that sharing subsistence food reminded them of times spent with grandparents, and 77 percent agreed that sharing subsistence brought them closer to other people and reminded them of what was good about life (Picou and Gill 1995). Further, over 80 percent of the Alaska Natives agreed that collecting local foods was an important activity for them and 84 percent wanted their children to have the opportunity to participate in subsistence harvests (Picou and Gill 1995)49
Advice from Akwe Kon50 is that in scoping cultural impacts, the following should be considered:
Possible impacts on continued customary use of biological resources; on the respect, preservation, protection and maintenance of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices; Protocols; on sacred sites and associated ritual or ceremonial activities; on the exercise of customary laws and respect for the need for cultural privacy.
No cultural impacts assessment was made in Maketu 1957. The guidelines do give an indication of how ahi kaa culture of Maketu has been impacted by the Kaituna diversion. The EVOS research also reveals the psychological damage from the EVOS impacts as well as ‘social disruption’ and ‘corrosive communities’ and it is safe to assume the Kaituna diversion had a similar effect. Severing the relationship of ahi kaa with their environment, as the EVOS experience has shown, has shocking consequences.
In the VIR51, the committee (without benefit of the EVOS literature) pointed out that:
49 THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL; Duane A. Gill and J. Steven
Picou From The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. (Dubuque, Iowa, 1997), pp. 167‐187. 50 Akwe: Kon Voluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact assessments. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity http://www.biodiv.org 51 See VIR in appendix, Te Wahanga āpitihanga
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For Maketu, the diversion of the Kaituna river out through the Te Tumu cut, has been a worse environmental disaster. The NZ Government did that to us, but they have not pleaded guilty or offered a remedy or restoration and it’s ironic that they can put so much blame on these two men [Rena Captain and first mate].
It is important to note that the committee were not aware of the EVOS literature at the time of the VIR construction. Neither were any interviewees aware at the time of their interviews. As we progress through this analysis, we note the overwhelming similarities in responses between the ahi kaa of Maketu and the indigenous peoples affected by the EVOS. It is difficult to not to also draw parallels with the Kaituna diversion.
Ngapanga Impacts
The Maketu/Te Arawa Oil Clean up committee52, say that the successful response in Maketu was due to tangata whenua being in control of the clean‐up. They also say that they would have been unlikely to have let anyone else take charge in Maketu. They relished asserting rangatiratanga. It included the fullest expression of their being Maori and was not just about being in control. The marae base with its unwritten laws of respect, order, manaaki, korerorero, tikanga, provided instant stability and calm in an emergency situation and ensured the smooth running of the clean‐up.
Many of the cultural impacts identified are disproportionately tied to rangatiratanga challenges. These challenges include Issues with ICC, other iwi, Te Arawa iwi, other Maori, and bureaucracy. There are lessons to be learned about organising and sustaining a voluntary emergency response in a dominant Maori community. However, apart from a successful oil clean up, one of the main cultural outcomes has been management, mitigation, or complete avoidance of potential issues (identified through EVOS research) through assertion of rangatiratanga. In hindsight that makes perfect sense. Why would negative cultural impacts arise if the “culture” is in charge? The interviews have been arranged under headings which incorporate the cultural values identified previously. The voices have been minimally edited. Each section has direct quotes interspersed from the EVOS literature. This is to highlight the similarities in reactions by two different indigenous peoples. Kuaohotemauri Initial Reactions
Initial reactions to the disaster were predictable. They confirm the intensity of the relationship between the ahi kaa and their environment; in this case the moana of Te Arawa and Ongatoro. They also indicate anxieties which have not been wholly alleviated a year later. Initial reactions reveal the emotional connectedness of tangata whenua with their taiao. Interviewees reported initial disbelief and shock quickly followed by anger and blame upon hearing news of the ship on the reef. Nearly half expressed some xenophobia, blaming Asians, Philipinos and foreigners for the accident. Some referred to the papa takaro (playground or recreation values), something highlighted in the 1924 letter. The Port of Tauranga was also singled out as a contributing cause of the accident with their profits being associated with Pakeha values.
52 The committee comprised a mix of pakeha and Maori.
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March 24, Good Friday. As I listen to the early morning news, I couldn’t believe my ears. “Tanker on Bligh Reef, oil spewing from its broken hull. No, not us, dear God, not our incredibly beautiful Prince William Sound”. These words of Belle Mickelson of Cordova, Alaska echoed the cry of all Alaskans on March 24, 1989.53
First I cried, and then I was mad and then cried. It was just really mixed (Alaska Native quoted in APRN 1991).54
I couldn’t look at the mess, at the oil. I only saw pictures. Even then I could hardly look. I did not go to the beach. Poor Motiti, poor Papamoa, poor Maketu. I got angry at the same time, so angry that when I sat still and thought about it I cried. I cried from anger and I worried what would happen to Maketu. 55
I was really upset, I was over in……… for a week and a half [at the time]. I initially wanted to come back and help and dreading coming back. My gut reaction was dread. I was thinking how affected is the beach and where I live. It was a stomach wrenching feeling made worse because I couldn’t come back and do anything and see what had actually happened.56
when I returned home from work my husband took me to a point on our lawn and pointing out towards Motiti said “there’s the ship that’s hit … the reef”. Disbelief and faith that it would somehow be re‐floated – surely! Things like this don’t happen in NZ particularly here in Maketu! God what are we going to do about this! Maketu will never be the same. We’ve lost our piece of paradise. The kai, the wild life, the beautiful environment.57
Astonishment that such a ship could hit Otaiti. Anger that this could happen to our beaches and sadness for the moana.58
Disbelief, Mamae (Pain/hurt) & sick – physical and spiritual (sick wairua); deep sadness;59
I was stunned. In shock. Fearful. I remember saying when told, “but Otaiiti sticks out of the water, how come they never saw it?” I was glad that no one was hurt. I did not expect the mess that followed. As the days went and nothing seemed to be happening [in regards to the ship] I started getting worried. So I was stunned and anxious at the same time. It was like waiting for World War 3 to be declared. 60
I wondered what had we done to bring this calamity on us? It was a tohu, I thought that maybe the atua thought we had not been looking after the moana. That’s what I thought. Our punishment for abusing Tangaroa.61
53 The Day the Water Died Compilation of the 1989 Citizens Commission Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. National Wildlife Federation P. 16 54 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997)THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ
OIL SPILL. Fm The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al.
(Dubuque), pp. 167‐187. 55 Mara 56 Sine 57 Barefoot 58 Ra 59 Pipi 60 Mara 61 Rongo
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….then, I dreaded a ban on kaimoana again.62
Shock, absolute shock sent text to all my friends. Firstly not too fazed, not too fazed, but later, I did not know full effects till later on – then I was worried63
Worried. How the hell am I going to keep kids entertained? Actually I thought about my baby, I was pregnant at the time ‐ oh my god is baby going to be able to experience going to the beach? Being in the water and the toxins – what – will they affect ‐ 64
First not too fazed, then when I saw effects – thought, I was worried – then I felt angry against Asians.65
Didn’t think much at first, but when I realised that I wasn’t going to be able to swim for ages, I got a negative attitude against Filipinos – teenagers gave Filipinos a bad time at college. 66
I sat there, and visualised it on the beach and what would happen to the kaimoana. I remember what Maketu was like before those – bloody foreigners – then you think about you just able to go and get pipis then you can’t because of the oil, disgusting. And when I saw the booms crossing the harbour – couldn’t comprehend it – as kids you just hopped in the water.67
All interviewees have been quoted here. Their initial reactions give a good indication of what potential impacts may be. Some reactions are obviously culturally Maori, while others may be generic; that is, it would be difficult to assign them as being exclusively Maori without a cohort study of non‐Maori Maketu residents.
HetoikupuRangatiratanga: Positive aspects of the clean up management
The committee identified the positive aspects of having control of the clean up. They referred to seeing the commitment of coastal Te Arawa whanui working together and the support from relations all over N.Z. and younger ones, ”Wally ma” and the kaumatua support from Te Ariki Morehu. They were buoyed by their own capabilities and being allowed to operate culturally as Maori.
[We were successful] Because we knew what we were doing. The different skill
sets, but underlying all that, we ran from the marae. We had that cultural base
we had Iwi supporting us, compared with surf clubs, we had a cultural
foundation, manaakitanga, whanaungatanga, whangai – feed – all at the
marae. It was the ideal situation – all equipment – toilets, showers , parking68
“…we know who they are, the key players in our community, makes it easier to
manage, who you can rely on, their idiosyncrasies, who to ring and tell them to
come and help, whanaungatanga, looking after volunteers, manaakitanga.
62 Kuia – this kuia was referring to previous bans on collecting kai moana due to toxic alage 63 Male‐whanau 64 Anon 65 Female‐Whanau 66 Rangatahi‐Whanau 67 Kuia 68 Paua
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Focus was on clean up and not on your own personal whatever. Happy to do
things voluntary for the good of Tangaroa69
They say the focus on their cultural‐environmental objectives got them through rather than
being diverted by the politics which seemed to affect other iwi.
It’s your cultural responsibility as mana whenua70
…it was that basic whakapapa to Tangaroa ‐ therefore there’s more
commitment 71
I was unwilling to let others take charge of our beaches because I did not trust
them to clean them up as we wanted… I think we did OK72
Hetoiheke Rangatiratanga: Negative aspects of the clean up management (by group)
MaritimeNZ,ICC(IncidentCommandcentre) Challenges to rangatiratanga by from the Incident Commend centre (ICC) were not unlike
some of the criticisms made by the Alaska Natives of the EVOS organisers.
Another frustrating aspect of the cleanup was that the Natives' local knowledge of the area and the water currents were completely ignored by authorities, most of whom were in the area for the first time73
Exxon came to clean up the spill and ignored Native traditions and our knowledge of the Sound. They think they know everything. But they know nothing. They could not survive one winter in my village74
Our people know the water and the beaches, but they get told what to do by people who should be asking, not telling (Meganack 1989)75
Sad the authorities didn’t value local knowledge and people and processes;
…Frustrated at other iwi people who came out of the woodwork and who knew
nothing about the tikanga of the moana and made things worse,76
Many of them [iwi members] hold vast amounts of local ecological knowledge.
None of these people and the localised knowledge they have on Maketu
environs was afforded any value. In fact, it was completely ignored.77
69 Paua 70 Nui 71 Paua 72 Rongo 73 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ
OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al.
Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 74 Picou, J. Steven (2000) The Talking Circle as Sociological Practice: Cultural Transformation of Chronic Disaster Impacts in Sociological Practice: A Journal of Clinical and Ap plied Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000 p.88 75 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 76 Nui
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The interviewees expressed frustrations with the incompetencies of people having charge
over them and the attempts to ignore their local knowledge and tikanga Maori. They referred
to the political interference of local councillors, national politicians, and ICC personnel.
Maritime NZ, that central base, ICC because they were detached from reality – from the extent of the impacts in our area – they had a helicopter view, fly‐over with a helicopter – what the hell can you see with a helicopter?78
Sending people out who didn’t know our environment, basic stuff like sending out people to do the work at high tide! 79
...an MP wanted me to use the surf‐club, she was quite insistent… I said no, we are taking it back to the marae... it was election time. She must have thought she would get more votes from the surf club.80
I truly resented them, Iwi, ICC appointees, turning up at our marae when we had meetings. Did they ask how we were paying for the marae? Did they ever ask how they could help? Totally uninvited, why did they think they could come as of right? Spying? ….Bringing no resources81
The process for re‐opening the beach was another blow. They send out the mayor, some top nob from Maritime NZ and a Maori liaison person, we tell them our beaches are not clean enough yet. We had never seen any of them during the clean‐up. Ridiculous… They agree to work in with us [as to when the Maketu beaches will be opened]. Next day the big public announcement all the beaches are open, including Maketu. Money that’s what that was about. The cleaners at Maketu were treated like nobodies. Our knowledge didn’t count when money and politics were the game. They wanted to open them before the summer tourism season. The Press release was pre‐constructed. Disgusting. I’ll never forget that.82
Then there was a lack of cultural awareness from another group, DOC. I told them, well their bosses, not to come back [ to help with the cleaning].83
OtherIwiandMaori: The interviewees were critical of other iwi interferences. The committee had to deal with ongoing pressures from other iwi claiming Maketu in their areas of mana. The committee had the skills, knowledge and experience needed or were able to quickly fill any gaps in the clean‐ up through their contacts within the community or wider.
They were still organising themselves [in Tauranga] and we were already organised, trained and cleaning our beaches ourselves. We were fully operational.
Whats our strategy for this? We are in a better place than these fullas I think, especially with achieving things on the ground. I just dont want them talking for us or organising us. I dont think we even need them ‐ they havent done
77 See VIR in appendix, Te Wahanga āpitihanga 78 Paua 79 Nui 80 Ra 81 Mara 82 Rongo 83 Kahawai
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much for us so far except create layers of process and call meetings twice a day. We cant be expected to attend two hui in Tauranga everyday. Its ridiculous but they dont get it. This hui today is right on low tide at Maketu when our cleanup crews will be on the beaches. I want to be here not at a meeting but I think I will go to make sure no‐one talks for or over us or is elected to speak for us without us knowing them or approving. Our plan is falling in to place nicely here. I dont want it to be upset or delayed by process created by ignorant outsiders84
We are invaded by the oil companies offering jobs, high pay, lots of money. We are in shock. We need to clean the oil, get it out of our water, bring death back to life.…So we take the jobs, we take the orders, we take the disruption, we participate in the senseless busywork.85
Have trouble with …… and others getting paid as Iwi liaison people. And making our lives harder. If they made lives easier, no trouble with that. But they weren’t… 86
Those Iwi people in there didn’t help one bit. In fact they were obstructive.87 I was really, really brassed off with ….[and] other Iwi trying to challenge my kaitiakitanga and others who were trying to get political advantage on the backs of the beach cleaners. You know that they sent Maori who weren’t Te Arawa to check our beaches? See what happens when money is involved, tikanga goes out the window. They don’t even know the tikanga. They don’t know our beaches. Do you think that was tikanga? Taking the pakehas money and acting as kaitiaki of our beaches? The people who were appointed by others. Both other Maori and Pakeha thought that they could rule us. It was a challenge to our mana. Our rangatiratanga.88
TeArawa: These quotes identify issues specifically relating to Te Arawa internal impacts from the Rena clean up:
We start fighting. We lose control. We lose trust for each other, we lose control of our daily life. Everybody pushing everyone. We Native people aren’t used to being bossed around. We don’t like it, but now our own people are pointing fingers at us.89
Some of our own Te Arawa people were a problem. They were trying to play their own politics while we were cleaning the beaches. Do you think they could have organised a clean up?90
84 Email from Pia Bennett morning of 14 October to all coastal Te Arawa and Nga Potiki who had a forum established which initially had discussed working together. This was seeking advice on an email invitation to a hui at Waikari Marae, Tauranga. There was no response and it became obvious Maketu had to do its own thing. Ngati Makino Iwi alone provided ongoing support to the Maketu clean up committee. 85 Meganack , cited in Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 86 Mara 87 Ra 88 Rongo 89 Excerpt from The Day the Water Died: A Compilation of the November 1989 Citizens Commission Hearings on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. testimony submitted by Walter Meganack. Meganack is the traditional Village Chief of the Port Graham Native Village on the tip of the Kenai Peninsula. 90 Paua
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We had just fed and cleaned up after our volunteers and we had to feed them! They should have been in the bloody kitchen cooking or on the beach picking up the oil. 91
GEEZ I was wild. That was when they were trying to organise a Te Arawa coastal thing, each one with their different agendas, no understanding of the mahi we were doing, pretty bloody thoughtless the lot of them, all the blah, blahs. Quite devious lot as it turned out. Could they offer anyway to make the load lighter…? That’s the difference between ahi kaa in Maketu and the rest of Te Arawa. Ahi kaa got to stand up and stop allowing themselves to be run over by these claimants.92 Te Arawa Kotahitanga not doing anything. The company that gets all the iwi funding for fisheries, not giving anything towards the response, that was f. terrible.93 She was saying to drop some containers off to block Waihi estuary – how dumb can you get – dropping steel containers there is as bad as the Rena hitting the rocks. And her post‐clean up antics, and the stupid, stupid, idiots who listen to her. She said her runanga didn’t want anything to do with the clean up after that and then later puts forward a rep to our Recovery committee!94 Iwi organisations are unsafe. Too much personal power issues cloud acting in best interests of all. They haven’t the variety of skills to be able to cover all situations. They have Councils’ ears but Councils want the easiest tick off. They are all racist politicians anyway.95 ......…. saying there was no problem, and that women shouldn’t be doing the job!! We wish! Problem is that the ones his age are too dumb and too kore. Including him.96 There were the take, take, take people, no reciprocity to the moana, giving back in its time of need. We know who they are. Adopted the old recreation fisher attitude – take, take, take.97 Then you had …., [local Maori male] he didn’t think there was a problem. 98 Within our own community the biggest hurdle were people acting as individuals, instead of for the group. Grandstanding. Speaking for himself. Not expressing a collective Iwi position. Narrow focus. My, my, my and I, I, I. ……got a lot of publicity but could not work in a group. I am the king, you are the servants. …. he was there for the birds, not the people or anything else. He didn’t even know what oil looked like though he had the ear of authorities…And then he was talking about cultural sites. Told the ICC workers in front of tangata whenua, mana whenua – there are no cultural sites here we
91 Mara 92 Nui 93 Rongo 94 Kahawai 95 Mara 96 Kahawai 97 Nui 98 Paua
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had an archaeological survey done!! Talks like he owns the place, puts his fences up all over the place. 99
Taiao,mauri,kaitiakitanga,mahingakaimoana The environment, the l ife‐force, the sacred mantel of guardianship, the
harvesting of seafood.
I saw all the old ahi kaa families attend, day after day. That is kaitiakitanga100.
The following quotes speak to tangata whenua relationship with their taiao. They address the safety of kai and the wellbeing of the environment, which are important facets of kaitiakitanga for Maketu. There are some lingering doubts and anxieties held by most interviewees on these issues, and anger pervades. As could be expected, views range from conservative traditional to less traditional. All participants referred to Tangaroa and many referred to the relationship of mutual respect with the atua. These are passionate expressions of kaitiakitanga, confirming a relationship to the taiao with pride and responsibility. There are glimpses of indigenous knowledge with keen observations of changes to kaimoana and the environment. While there are doubts about the recovery of the environment, there is also surprise expressed at nature’s ability to heal itself. A traditional world‐view still permeates the responses: Ngatoroirangi, Tangaroa, Hinemoana, ancestors’ approval, personification of the moana as Tangaroa. There are poignant statements about needing closure and the need for rituals and karakia, even rahui, to help the healing process and resolve lingering anxieties. There is certainly knowledge about what is culturally appropriate in the healing process which links people with the Taiao.
We walked the beaches, but the snails and the barnacles and the chitons are falling off the rocks, dead.101 You go down to the reef and you pick bidarkies (chitons), you pick seaweed, you eat snails, you taught your kids the way life used to be ... this summer you couldn't do that (Alaska Native quoted in Palinkas et al. 1993:7).102
Kaimoana, I don’t eat as much…. I don’t think its back to normal yet, the kai and the beach. I go quite a bit . Seaweed areas are quite barren, nothing there, sands and rocks are clean. Open area is obvious, the area facing oil, no kina and paua there. They are more in close to Newdicks. More seaweed there now. 103 Last month I went quite a few times just for an exploration to see where it [kaimoana] is, how it is. From Newdicks walking back this way. A few friends say mussels are not in the usual places, used to be closer to shore, they don’t seem to be there. Left side, the Waihi side, the rocks have some. On this side the rocks don’t. I was out there today, there are none.104
99 Kahawai 100 Rongo 101 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 102 Ibid 103 Sine 104 Sine
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Regret that we didn’t protect Tangaroa me Hinemoana me a raua tamariki;105
We always say 'the tide goes out, the table is set.' But anymore, you're going to have to be really picky and choosey when the table is set. What's all this oil going to do to our food; our supermarket out there (Alaska Native quoted in APRN 1991).106
I have friends who have been out of work for a while. In coming to the beach you will never starve. Beach supplements household cupboard, it always has been kind. I would hate to lose that, the ability to go to the beach and get a feed.107 I go to the beach more than I used to now that I have developed a new appreciation of what was almost lost… alarms me to still see “Rena rubbish” – oil stained plastic bottles, bits of wood etc and also the familiar foil food packets. Even still traces of oil on my walking shoes.108 In relation to my kaitiakitanga for Maketu, and the moana, I am still angry. In my opinion the disaster brought out the best of the ordinary, flax roots people, the real kaitiaki.109 … The kaimoana? Concern for any long‐term impacts. Seems to taste the same. Seems to look much the same. Sadness for Tangaroa, unable to offer manaaki to manuhiri.110
Tino rangatiratanga, kaitiakitanga, taking care of future generations – in 10‐15 years time I want my children and grandchildren – to go to the beach and get kinas – into the future111 I think people would get sick without [Native foods]. I would. I get so hungry for them. I keep looking for some clams to satisfy the old stomach. I told my cousin I was starving for clams (Alaska Native elder in Cordova quoted in MMS 1993a:216). 112 A part of our lives would be missing. We'd be craving something we can't get.113 Without those things, a part of us is missing. Because we were raised that way (Alaska Native in Cordova quoted in MMS 1993a:222)114.
105 Pipi 106 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187 107 Sine 108 Barefoot 109 Mara 110 Ra 111 Sine 112 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL From The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187 113 Ibid 114 Ibid
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I feel deeply about it. It was our father – firstly our kaumatua need their dosage of kaimoana. Its for them, for their health, they need it and tikanga coming up to Xmas – may be affected.115 Hard on old people, a catastrophe. They need kaimoana as a staple food: crabs, kina. Paua, pipi, titiko, pipi, tuangi. They never had any.116 I tried to get some kaimoana before the oil arrived but it was too rough. Just overnight I couldn’t get the boat out. Overnight the oil blanketed the coastline. I had been nurturing a spot for Xmas and I thought better get them paua now before they get killed by oil but overnight...117 You can't have a scientist in a white coat come up and tell you everything is safe. Its going to take a long time to feel comfortable again. its going to take a long time even if they give us a clean bill of health. We're still really wary and unsure about a lot of things. The big question mark is still there (Alaska Native quoted in APRN 1991).118 I feel it is not as good, its healing and I think we could help by leaving the kaimoana alone and stopping anything happening which would prevent the healing. I don’t think we should be taking kai, leave everything to heal.119 Out today, there are none [mussels] I saw three guys, rape and pillage the kai. I go all the time. I gather and eat kinas all the time and hey not there now. I more aware now, I am slowly working around by myself. Something I won’t give up.120 Would be worried, would be worried – you don’t know for sure even though I see people out there.121 I don’t eat as much; it doesn’t look any better or worse but it’s the unseen things in and about the kaimoana that we don’t know enough about.122 I haven’t eaten any pipi or kutai since the disaster or kaimoana. I haven’t had a feed of whitebait this year. I have seen the pipi, it looks alright… I need to try a pipi.123 Tikanga of the sea has been abused.124 I still hunger for clams, shrimp, crab, octopus, gumboots. Nothing in this world will replace them. To be finally living in my ancestors' area and be able to teach my kids, but now its all gone. We still try, but you can't replace them
115 Male‐whanau 116 Koroua 117 Male‐Whanau 118 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 119 Rongo 120 Sine 121 Kuia 122 Pipi 123 Rongo 124 Male‐whanau
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(Chenega Bay resident quoted in Fall and Utermohle 1995:IV‐1 6). I really miss my Native foods after the spill. 125 I was brought up by my grandmother – she would take us to Papamoa to dive for pipis for dinner‐no matter what the waves were like ‐ too bad the waves were like going over your head – too bad for you – had to have pipis.126 What – nothing can make me eat as much as I used to – its going to take time to work thru – it – because I live here – people picking bags of pipi today – they don’t live here – they are not from here – they didn’t see people cleaning up the crap – there will be nothing that can make me eat them they way I used to.127 Tikanga affected – and secondly the manaaki to hau kainga of Motiti – they have had that big fat ugly thing sitting on their back door‐ imagine that at Maketu…. my tikanga is along the lines of aroha, manaaki in terms of our whanau at Motiti.128 They [the Port of Tauranga] have done nothing [in regards to the Rena disaster]. Sitting there going under the radar, nothing. They announce a month later that they are going to allow bigger ships. Can’t pakeha make a connection? Between profits and risks – another spill?” 129
Orangatangata,orangewhanau
PersonalandwhanauwellbeingThroughout the interviews, the dominant theme is anger and blame. Responses address the cultural and economic need to gather and eat kai moana as well as the use of the beach as a recreation facility for rangatahi and children. Another issue raised was rangatahi not being allowed to help with the clean up. Some interviewees were appreciative of being interviewed for the therapeutic value. Given these interviews were 12 months after the event, there is obviously a lot of anger still being held by Maori. When asked if they could identify any wellbeing issues two said that they didn’t think they had any. One of those respondents however also reported daily monitoring of the beach, something that she had not done before the spill.
The spill and cleanup activities also disrupted Alaska Native families, especially those with children. Similar to other impacted communities, many children received less attention and care as parents worked on cleanup crews or conducted other spill‐related activities130
125 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON
VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 126 Sine 127 Tuanuku 128 Male‐whanau 129 Male‐whanau 130 Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187
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Yes I think my wellbeing was affected and is not back to healthy yet. Yesterday I saw some footage of the debris field around the wreck site. I felt like my wairua took another hit when I was watching it.131 I think because I was heavily involved in the response and in the recovery, my wellbeing is still being affected. I don’t get to forget about what happened. I carry it around with me daily. The work involved takes up most of my days to the point where sometimes my kids suffer because their mum hasn’t enough time in the day to spend quality time with them. That might not be a direct affect but it is an indirect one that is a direct result of the Rena. 132
I haven’t thought a whole lot about my behaviour and whether it has changed. I think in some respects it has. I am sick of the bureaucratic world. I am sick of the Crown doing deals so as to recover costs. I am sick of tangata whenua not being treated as an equal Treaty partner. I am angry that tangata whenua have to fight fight fight every step of the way and yet birds and non‐maori who have been here for 5 minutes get more attention and better treatment. I am sick of the disrespect to Papatuanuku and Tangaroa. I am sick of pakehas telling me how I should “manage” the environment. I am sick of having to educate pakehas about cultural values and cultural norms, tikanga etc.133 My kids, nan, mother, nephew and niece all suffered from the disaster. They suffered in ways that others did not have to suffer. We suffered more and in different ways because we are Maori – connected to the land and moana and Otaiti through whakapapa. And we have responsibilities unlike non‐Maori to protect our taonga. When our taonga are damaged, then so too will our tangata mauri be damaged and unwell. Until the mauri and respect are restored, we as a people will continue to be unwell.134 My health was affected at the time of the cleaning. Not directly because of the oil so much. I was ill because I did not look after myself during the clean‐up, stress and run down generally. It was hard work, you would do a full day [of your normal job] and then you would help at the marae. It was go, go, go. I did not want to take time out for myself while others were still working. I know one other who actually ended up in hospital with pneumonia, same reason.135 Family life was also disrupted by added strain and stress caused by the spill and cleanup 136 I think that they are still angry [my whanau], because it seems anything can start them going. They want to blame someone…. Actually they are quite political about it, so I know they are still angry. We need a proper karakia.137 I hope I still act normal. I hope I haven’t got …….. Don’t know yes or no yet long term. In another couple of years perhaps, depends on how much I eat. Not long enough to judge long term effects ‐ after just a year.138
131 Nui 132 Pipi 133 Nui 134 Pipi 135 Rongo 136Duane A. Gill and J. Steven Picou (1997) THE DAY THE WATER DIED CULTURAL IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILLFrom The Exxon Valdez Disaster: Readings on a Modern Social Problem, ed. J. Steven Picou et al. Dubuque, Iowa., pp. 167‐187. 137 Rongo 138 Sine
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Cleaning up gave a chance to get rid of anger – same with interview – gives a chance to get rid of anger.139 Health affected? Yes. Behaviour, yes. Grumpy as. Imagine someone like Uncle ‐….we wouldn’t hear the end of it. In essence we are pretty powerless, nothing much we can do about it. [Treat of Waitangi]. We put our trust in the Crown to look after Maori, do they – NO.140
HerongoaItemate
Resolutionofimpactsfrominterviewees Participants identified the following ways of resolving the impacts for their community:
I believe Maketu needs to be considered more, by the powers that be, for ongoing support (financial and otherwise), to be better prepared for any future disasters. I am amazed at how often Maketu is overlooked even in the smallest things.141 Highly frustrated by the stupidity of those who hold the power. Sad, angry then motivated to bring about a positive change – a better world.142 We have control without having to having to keep going to other organisations for tick off.143
Capability, develop our community capability. Locals.144 Blow up the cut, key to restoring the estuary. Block it off. Its bigger than just the Rena it’s the actual accumulated impacts over the years when it comes down to it that’s the big issue.145 Get the wreck off the reef – should not have to go to the environment court to keep fighting that.146 Need the money to enable us that’s a given.147 A coastal research centre that will allow us to keep monitoring for years. Access to scientists whenever we need them without bowing and scraping. Need people to be doing these things instead of another voluntary ongoing job.148 [Going forward] I think every individual needs to play the part of kaitiaki.149 No‐one knew anything about how to conduct traditional karakia pertaining to whale strandings.150
139 Female‐whanau 140 Male‐whanau 141 Barefoot 142 Barefoot 143 Mara 144 Nui 145 Kahawai 146 Ra 147 Paua 148 Pipi 149 Barefoot 150 Pipi
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There hasn’t been any restoration or rituals/ceremonies in accordance with tikanga and the wreck is still insitu. Things can’t be right until it’s gone.151 Tangata whenua need to undergo a traditional ceremony; we need proper karakia and proper leaders leading that. We need the wreck gone and we need the mauri returned and enhanced. We need to be treated as partners on all future environmental matters pertaining to the moana. The Port needs to apologise and front with some $$ to assist with restoration; Tangata whenua need to declare Otaiiti a waahi tapu.152 They (tupuna] would have done the tikanga/kawa stuff as well and done it properly.153 When our taonga are damaged, then so too will our tangata mauri be damaged and unwell. Until the mauri and respect are restored, we as a people will continue to be unwell.154 I need to have a karakia/church with the tohunga I think before I will feel safe. I feel unsettled, uncomfortable. I think we should acknowledge Tangaroa and Hinemoana and see if we get a message? Have a church. I don’t know.155 I think there should be a rahui, to give Hinemoana and Tangaroa time to heal.156 Restoration to be honest a value needs to be put on – beach needs to be given a chance to heal – should be a rahui – a ban put on kai out there – a ban that’s enforced.157 If we had tino rangatiratanga, would make shipping lanes compulsory. Charge port users. Port is a big fat money organisation in Tauranga, they don’t care about anyone else, look at Whareroa, about time they started giving back fat cat profits. They are a law unto themselves at our expense158 I wish we could decolonise our community and just concentrate on empowering the women. Don’t wait for the men, too kore. All show.159 I actually read a lot about Ngatoroirangi and the Te Arawa waka. I thought about it as part of when it would be ok to eat the kai. It could be utu for what they – equal value for what they lost. We are too used to letting Pakeha get their way, our people are now part of the problem. Just don’t get it some Maori. Some have a link and some just don’t. Uninformed. Just believe everything the white man tells them.160
151 Kahawai 152 Kahawai 153 Nui 154 Pipi 155 Mara 156 Rongo 157 Tuanuku 158 Male‐whanau 159 Rongo 160 Tuanuku
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HeiWhakakapi:TereooNgatamariki161 In conclusion: The voices of our children
The children’s views tell their own story and in doing, sum up the report. They validate what the adults have said. Their responses are reproduced here unedited.
Just scraped on rocks and the oil came out and killed all the fish. Kaimoana was killed Tangaroa was sad, sick, unhappy, angry We were sad and angry John key went to the rugby game I told me dad and my nan. My nana got angry‐she told her son he went to the beach straight away‐ he was angry‐he helped clean up he couldn’t go and fish Boys felt sad Tangaroa was mauiui, na te mea kua paru ia It looked ugly, paru, soggy, black, yuk, sticky, greasy, blobby, needed a clean, sick polluted The kaimoana was yukky You felt sick It was disgusting I wanted to help but couldn’t Sad to see the birds all dead and oiled Couldn’t get kaimoana Angry because wildlife was dying Angry with captain and ships crew, he should pay for it He should have cleaned it himself Sad I couldn’t get anything for my nan I was hot, couldn’t swim Felt like jumping in the sea Dumb couldn’t swim
161 Senior students of a kura kaupapa Maori (primary) school
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Angry I couldn’t Weird – had to swim a pools, not right to swim at pools People are getting sick Can’t clean it up in a short time Kaimoana smells like oil We got some this weekend, it tastes nice Paua is nice, kutai Kaimoana is the same Not the same yet Whanau get more We go to little Waihi Nan wont let me go to the beach.
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NgahuaotePurongo Report outcomes
In making recommendations we turn again to the EVOS literature. The impacts of the Exxon oil spill and cleanup on Alaska Native culture did not end after 1989. Erikson reported ongoing problems with subsistence activities, chronic psychological stress, and continued social disruption including fall outs from litigation; a “secondary disaster” 162. Natives reported a significantly greater decline in social relations with spouse, children, relatives, friends, neighbors, co‐workers, and people from other communities163. Palinkas reported significantly more conflict with outsiders and friends164 while Picou and Guill indicated on‐going social disruption in family, future plans, work, and the community as a result of the oil spill (Picou and Gill 1995)165
The oil spill and its subsequent contamination disrupted culturally‐based subsistence harvests and produced emotional responses and long‐term psychological distress within Alaska Native communities. These impacts have continued and have been viewed as "the most lingering—and measurable—of the spill" (Piper 1993:106). Participant responses have affirmed parallels between short and medium term impacts on the indigenous populations of Maketu and Prince William Sound. We cannot then ignore the likelihood that longer term outcomes reported in EVOS literature will also apply to some extent in Maketu. Our recommendations are a conservative representation of those identified by the interviewees. We have constructed them in practical ways that impacts can be resolved, particularly taking into account the concept of self‐determination. It would be extremely difficult to justify a decision not to resource a follow‐up report assessing ongoing emotional and psychological impacts on Maketu ahi kaa especially given the existing accumulated impacts stresses. Is their long term wellbeing affected and if it is, does this need some strategy for resolving? The resource consent process is problematic and can be described as a secondary impact that is likely to antagonise unresolved negative impacts. The disaster highlighted strengths and weaknesses in Maori leadership, in kaitiakitanga, in relationships between and within Maori communities, in lack of expertise within Maori society, in tikanga moana. Notwithstanding that the committee have always seen a need to complete rituals to help resolve these impacts on Maori, the timing needs to be right. With a resource consent process, a full ritual process can be months, even years away. The resolution of these impacts looks to be an ongoing, equally challenging affair as the oil‐clean up phase.
162 Erikson K. (1994) A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Trauma, Drama and Community. New York. W.W. Norton 163 Palinkas, L. A., J. S. Petterson, J. Russell, and M. A. Downs. 1993. Community patterns of psychiatric disorders after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. American Journal of Psychiatry 150:1517‐1523. Palinkas, L. A., J. Russell, M. A. Downs, and J. S. Petterson. 1992. Ethnic differences on stress, coping and depressive symptoms after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 189:287‐295. 164 ibid 165 Picou, J. Steven and Duane A. Gill. 1995. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Alaska Natives in Cordova: A User's Guide to 1991 and 1992 Survey Data. Draft report to the Regional Citizen's Advisory Council. Mississippi State University: Social Science Research Center.
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NgaTaunakitanga Recommendations
The contract required Identifying and assessing the cultural impacts of the Rena grounding on tangata whenua (Maketu/Te Arawa), which has been done. It also required us to identify sites of significance for cultural maintenance and integrity, which has not been done. This is an exercise in itself and unlikely to ever be ever achieved for the Te Arawa coastline due to the numerous hapu and iwi who have or claim a relationship with the coast. Councils are required to do this exercise through their normal planning functions. The last task was to develop recommendations that reflect learnings from this incident for the future. This requirement does not properly align with a cultural impact report. A cultural impact report is about identifying impacts and resolving them. This is what we have done. The co‐ordinators have offered to make themselves available to provide advice to authorities on how they can better manage sustained environmental disasters in Maketu in future drawing on some of the cultural impacts reported here and their personal experiences of the co‐ordination task. This was an unusual assignment and the journey has opened up many doors. Some doors open inwards towards us, the ahi kaa of Maketu/Te Arawa. The other doors open outwards towards non‐Maori, power holders and decision makers, the majority culture.
We are unaware that any other investigation into Maori well‐beings have been carried out contemporaneously following a technological disaster in New Zealand. Historical treaty claims refer to past actions of the Crown and its agencies, which breached the Treaty. They were incidents from the past, the pain and stories have been related mostly by descendants of rather than the initial sufferers or victims. We are therefore limited in our understandings of the negative impacts upon them personally and the reasons for their decisions in any post incident strategies.
The interviews which have been generated by this report may contribute to Matauranga Maori. This begs the question then, what should be done with this information. There are some new inquiries that arise and the question of intellectual property is only a part of the uncertainties. Recommendations would normally follow the analysis. The analysis is not a job that just anybody can do, to interpret these interviews requires a person culturally attuned to the ahi kaa who provided the stories.
Likewise what happens to the recommendations? Are they to be submitted to the critique of non‐culturally attuned persons for their re‐interpretation? Will reading this information actually empower them over the ahi kaa, will their positions of authority over Maori be strengthened by having access to this information and being paid to interpret and discuss and digest these contests. Does this new information increase their experience and qualifications in regards to “cultural awareness”? Does the process of reporting to non‐Maori institutions create another “cultural impact?”
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Recommendationsforresolvingimpacts:
1. The Crown must recognise that the Kaituna diversion was a technological disaster the long‐
term effects of which are similar to the long‐term effects of the EVOS disaster and that the ahi kaa whanau of Maketu need to be acknowledged and engaged in the provision of remedy.
2. There are actions that tangata whenua could initiate to resolve impacts. One of those should
be the establishment of relationships with EVOS impacted communities. Some issues which may be explored that may mutually benefit both peoples include prevention of future pollution from shipping and other disasters, environmental restoration projects, cultural mitigation programmes and building resilience of the environment and the communities. There is also the issue of Maori male leadership.
3. There needs to be recognition that resolving impacts will require resourcing, both financial and human.
4. That the assertion of Rangatiratanga needs more space to exist and be expressed in order to
prevent cultural erosion as well as maintenance of community, whanau and hapu well‐being. Although the case is established for leading in environmental matters, there should be other situations where rangatiratanga can provides a process for less damaged and more positive tangata Maori outcomes. In the Maketu Rena situation, there was total control of the clean‐up by the ahi kaa. We are questioning here whether or not other initiatives that claim to make space for rangatiratanga really do as they may claim. If they did, given the Maketu experience, there would be better outcomes for Maori. E.g. Health, education.
5. A case exists for Government departments and Councils to establish better relationships with
the key tangata whenua players in case a need for a sustained emergency response ever arises again. These will not necessarily be through kaumatua or runanga, certainly not in Maketu’s case. The key players would need to have experience in working with volunteers and promoting whanaungatanga. Wahine Maori of the ahi kaa whanau need to be given prominence.
6. Government departments and Councils need to recognise the lack of capabilities which
contribute to the make‐up of disadvantaged community decile ratings. Not all old people necessarily constitute “leaders” with unlimited capacity for dealing with every “Maori” situation. There should not be that expectation of elders put on by communities. “Dial‐a‐kaumatua” is the colloquial description. Neither should the authorities only deal with “safe” Maori i.e. those tangata who may not have a critical understanding of “rangatiratanga” and are unlikely to know how to deliver such a process. Authorities need to “feel the fear” in deciding who and what to engage with for best outcomes.
7. A case is established for better recognition of Maori women’s capabilities, by both national
and local government, and a deeper analysis of the key ingredients, including personnel and physical resources, needed for successful community initiatives. This approach, involving key women, could also work to stop cultural erosion.
8. It is critical that on environmental issues, especially emergency situations, that the ahi kaa are
recognised. In Maketu’s case, with approximately 10 Iwi claiming ancestral connections by way of treaty settlements over Maketu, none of these Treaty or council recognised
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organisations were able to organise or contribute to the clean‐up, except Ngati Makino. In Maketu it is the ahi kaa status, not their Iwi/hapu entity status that counts. Only ahi kaa have the intense relationship with their environment that is encapsulated in “kaitiakitanga” and evidenced in a willingness to devote sustained labour and other resources to the restoration of their environment. These may not be the “corporate” entities the Crown favours.
9. Given the accumulated impacts from the Kaituna diversion and the anger and anxieties which
are revealed in the Rena interviews, there should be a follow up cultural impacts report (s) on the Rena impacts in Maketu. 12 months after the event [oil spill] is not sufficient time to establish whether there are long‐term effects. The EVOS situation has shown that impacts can negatively affect indigenous peoples’ well‐beings longer and with more negative impacts than non‐indigenous citizens.
10. Linked to the recommendation at 9, there needs to be at least some investigation of whether
a process needs to be instituted to address anger and anxiety issues given the proof of anger still existing some 12 months later and the proven long‐term psychological effects on indigenous peoples from technological disasters. In Maketu’s situation, unresolved accumulated impacts from the Kaituna diversion, another technological disaster, have compounded the probability of longer‐term impacts.
11. There should be provision for wananga or other processes to support some long‐term positive
outcomes from the disaster. That is, a process for building on the positive outcomes of the oil impacts and learnings from the disaster as a resolution of impacts taking the EVOS “Talking circle” example. In identifying any resolution, the ahi kaa women need to be engaged.
12. A case is established for some urgent progress in development of appropriate environmental
resilience for Maketu. For example, in addressing impacts upon the ahi kaa of their relationship to the moana and mahinga kai moana, restoration projects which work towards re‐establishing health kaimoana populations can build resilience in case of other technological disasters or natural disasters in the future. Indigenous knowledge systems urgently need to be restored and strengthened having been identified as critical to cultural well‐being and identity. Environmental resilience will also act as a buffer against impacts on culture, indigenous knowledge, capabilities, and kaitiakitanga.
13. There needs to be official recognition of rahui process as an appropriate tool for increasing
environmental resilience.
14. A solution to many of these impacts maybe addressed though developing an indigenous environmental institute or equivalent in Maketu. A feasibility study should be progressed to assess the potential and possibilities.
15. There needs to be a strategy for dealing with future shipping accidents, starting with a
shipping risk assessment in the Bay of Plenty. Ports need to be made more accountable for shipping accidents; it is their customers we are discussing, who are putting at risk ‘public’ resources.
16. There has been insufficient support offered to the main co‐ordinators of the Maketu response. The work they voluntarily carried out contravened all employment laws in this country. Given the findings of this report, and the continued stresses from being unable to resolve completely the cultural stresses due to the incompletion of rituals, it is strongly recommended that they be given special attention by the authorities in resolving and alleviating any lingering stresses they may personally carry.
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Appendix A
QuestionnaireemailedandusedforpersonalinterviewsontheimpactsoftheOil spillinMaketu01/11/12 Nga mihi.
I am writing a cultural impact report for Te Arawa/Maketu about the Rena disaster. The report has been commissioned by MFE. Can you write down your thoughts on how you feel the Rena disaster has affected you ? What you write is entirely over to you, but I would appreciate it if you would include/cover the questions below in your narrative. That would enable an easier comparison of your thoughts with other researchees for the report. I am looking for your inner most thoughts. On page two I am seeking personal information about you. This will again aid the research by allowing comparisons between age groups and genders. Also it will enable me to protect your identity by having you nominate the name you wish me to use should I quote anything directly from your narrative. None of the information you provide will be identifiable back to you. I undertake to treat it with utmost respect. Your personal details are confidential to me. If you would email your story back to me, it would be most appreciated. Pai marire.
1. What did you feel when you first heard about the disaster?
2. What did you feel when your saw the state of the beaches and moana with oil on and in them?
3. How do you feel about the state of the beaches and the moana now?
4. What do you think about the kaimoana? Do you eat as much now? Does it taste the same, better or worse? Does it look the same better or worse?
5. Do you go to the beach as much as you used to? Does it look as good now as it did before the disaster?
6. What are the things you feel deeply about over the Rena disaster in relation to your tikanga and Te Taiao?
7. Do you feel that the environment is as good now as it was before the disaster? If not, why not?
8. If the environment is not as good now as it once was, what needs to be done to restore it? How will you know that restoration has been successful?
9. How do you think your ancestors would feel about the disaster?
10. Do you think your health has been affected? Or your behaviour?
11. Do you want to make any comments about how you think the disaster has affected any of your whanau?
Maketu/Te Arawa Rena Cultural Impact Report. Narrators personal details
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Name: Age: Gender: Nom de plume:
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Appendix B
Questionnaire guide to Kura Kaupapa Maori senior students 3 Dec 2012
Introduction:
Powerpoint presentation of Rena pictures to start. Narrative:
I want to talk to you about how the Rena ship affected you and your whanau, and I am going to ask you questions about how you felt then and how you feel now. Can you tell me who is the god of the sea? Does anyone know who Ngatoroirangi is?
Q: So when the ship Rena ship crashed into Otaiti, what do you think happened?
On the beaches To the fish and kaimoana To Tangaroa
Q: How did you feel about what happened at that time (were you sad, or angry) (what
made you sad / angry etc)
Q: How do you think Tangaroa felt?
Q: What did the beach and rocks look like when it was covered in oil?
Q: What did you feel like when you saw it?
Q: What did you feel like when you were not allowed to go swimming, surfing or get
pipis? Or even go on the beach?
Q: Do think all of the oil is gone now?
Q: Before October 2011 do you think the Kaimoana was better, the same or worse than
after the Rena had crashed into the rocks (probe more)
Q: Do people and your whanau get more kaimoana or less since the Rena crashed at
Otaiti?
Q: Do you do the things at the beach that you used to do? As often?
Q: When you go swimming now do you think about the Rena and all the oil that spilled
out?
Q: Do you see any traces of oil around the diving board?
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Appendix C
Victim Impact Statement of Maketu (Te Arawa) prepared for marae justice hui, to confront the Captain
and first mate of the Rena, Tahuwhakatiki Marae, 13 April, 2012.
1. Maketu estuary, Ongatoro, [Te Awanui o Ngatoroirangi], is the final resting place of the Te Arawa
waka. Maketu has a rich and complex history. The Te Arawa iwi who have affiliations to Maketu
include: Ngati Pikiao, Ngati Makino, Waitaha, Tapuika, Ngati Whakaue, Ngati Tuwharetoa, Ngati
Rangitihi, Ngati Rangiwewehi and Tuhourangi. Our traditional coastal boundary extends from Wairakei
ki Te Awa o Te Atua.
2. We of Maketu are seafaring people, indigenous to the lands and coastal environment that were
heavily impacted by the Rena grounding. Our association with the sea is unique, even compared with
other indigenous peoples’ standards. This relationship with the sea was cemented before the time our
ancestors sailed from Polynesia to Aotearoa. The ocean connects us with all Pacific Peoples, te ara a
Tangaroa. [The highway of Tangaroa)
3. The Maketu Coast is about 13.5 nautical miles west of Otaiiti. When the Rena hit Otaiiti, the full
extent of the impacts on Maketu (Te Arawa) Iwi were unknown. Although the oil did not reach us until
the 6th day following the grounding the cultural impacts had already started to take effect.
4. The worst impact from a Maketu (Te Arawa) perspective as a direct result of the grounding was the
injury done to Tangaroa me Hinemoana me a raua tamariki. That is to the children of Ranginui and
Papatuanuku who have mana over the sea environs and their children. It is an impact that is
immeasurable and for which the resulting impacts on us as tangata whenua are yet to be completely
experienced.
5. As tangata whenua and kaitiaki, we are expected to protect the domains of atua Maori and live by
their directions. As coastal people, the responsibility to actively protect Tangaroa and Hinemoana sits
with us. In the normal circumstances they would give us signs about our environment which we need
to take notice of. “Whakarongo ki a Tangaroa. He tohu”. We were unable to fulfil our duties of active
protection. We feel we let them down by this disaster happening. This impact will remain imprinted in
our hinengaro for many years to come. Culturally, there is no quick solution to remedy the nature of
this impact.
6. We rely on the sea to provide us with food. Our bodies are used to eating kaimoana. We were not
able to collect and provide kaimoana – sustenance ‐ to our families, marae and old people. Our
physical health as coastal people was compromised.
7. This relationship to the atua Maori and their bounty, for us coastal people, is central to our culture.
Through kai moana we teach our children respect, how to nurture and manaaki and we role model
those things to our children. We were not able to take our children to the beach and do this, or collect
kai moana.
8. There is much tikanga around the moana and kohi kai and hi ika. The example of rahui which even
non‐Maori in New Zealand are familiar with, is about respect and mana. Rahui used at sea is about
respecting that the rahui has been placed for a reason of safety, physical or spiritual.
9. It was difficult to rationalise this rahui which in our history was the first needing to be imposed
through oil pollution. The unknowns of this oil pollution therefore were very unsettling and depressing
for our people at Maketu. In terms of adjusting to the tikanga imposed by oil pollution for such a long
time was traumatic.
10. The oil hit many tapu (sacred) parts of our coast. Okurei is the Rocky Peninsula at Maketu. The full
name is Te Okureitanga o te ihu o Tamatekapua meaning the nose of Tamatekapua who was the
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Captain of the Arawa waka. This place is extremely important to us. We cleaned those rocks with
reverence.
11. Te Tumu was a place heavily impacted by the oil. Te Tumu is where the biggest battle between Te
Arawa and Ngaiterangi occurred and where many lives were taken. The area at the Te Tumu cut is a
wahi tapu.
12. Ngatoroirangi was a very tapu man. Our estuary is an awa‐tupuna. A deity and we revere it. The
estuary was impacted by the oil. We picked up oil right in front of the marae mid‐way up the estuary.
13. Otaiiti is a traditional fishing ground of Maketu (Te Arawa) people. Otaiiti was given its name by
Ngatoroirangi. What has happened is devastating to us. What is worse still is that through the
grounding – the mana of Ngatoroirangi has been disrespected ‐ the impacts of this can only affect his
descendents. Our people could get sick, some may die. Some did get sick, some have died. This is our
reality. Only we have to live with it.
14. We are saddened by the knowledge that the physical impacts of the grounding on the environment
will take years to recover. We are saddened that the authorities are arguing over who pays and that
there has been a focus on economic aspects right through the disaster. This is disrespectful to our
Maori atua.
15. Many of our iwi members gave up their jobs to volunteer with the oil clean‐up. They felt like it was
their duty and they are right. Many of them hold vast amounts of local ecological knowledge. None of
these people and the localised knowledge they have on Maketu environs was afforded any value. In
fact, it was completely ignored. This was an indirect impact of the grounding that again, undermined
the mana of the people.
16. The financial impact might be felt for some time. The effects of cultural and spiritual impacts will be
longer lasting.
17. Our kids suffered. Ongatoro is their playground. In summer they are normally in the water every
day. Through the older children looking after younger siblings and relations, they learn responsibility
and the tuakana‐teina relationship which is necessary for social order in our Maori world. They were
left in limbo. They couldn’t swim; they couldn’t help clean‐up the places they know so intimately. This
left them confused and their needs were ignored. The adults were busy trying to get on top of the
mess.
18. The bans on access to our beaches meant that our connection to these places was severed.
19. We take this opportunity to acknowledge the guilty pleas given by the Captain and the First Mate.
We are people of good faith and see this as an act of good faith also. We think our ancestors would not
want us to be vengeful. We are pleased that the Captain and First Mate took ownership of their
mistakes. We recognise that this was an accident and we wish to not inflict any further blame or
persecution towards the Captain, First Mate and their families. We recognise that in the scheme of
things, they are only a small part of this catastrophe and are easy targets. For Maketu, the diversion of
the Kaituna river out through the Te Tumu cut, has been a worse environmental disaster. The NZ
Government did that to us, but they have not pleaded guilty or offered a remedy or restoration and it’s
ironic that they can put so much blame on these two men. These men have families who depend on
them. We accept their guilty plea as acknowledging the mistake. We do not support a prison sentence
being issued.
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Translations
Refer page 13, 1924 letter to Apirana Ngata:
a. it is the burial ground from the time of our ancestors and has remained so up to the present
b. certain places on the coast were places that provided sustenance for
us Maori, those being the mudflat fishery, pipi beds, mussel rocks, paua, kina and eel fishery as well.
c. Certain areas, noted for their beauty, cater for Iwi social activities,
during the warmer months. General text:
ahi kaa people who keep the fires burning; continuous occupants of land and place
atua Maori god(s)
hapuku choice fish species
hauora health, well‐being
Hawaiki homelands from whence Maori originated
he karakia sacred chant, prayer or church service
he mihi greeting, introduction
kaitiaki special guardian of people or resources
kaitiakitanga the act of being a guardian as above
kaumatua elders (men or women)
kaupapa the agenda or main theme or purpose
kia kaha, haere tonu. a saying meaning be strong and persevere
ko Aotearoa tenei this is Aotearoa. Aotearoa is the Maori name for New Zealand.
kore useless, void
kua mamae te ngakau the heart is hurt
kuia female elder
kura kaupapa maori Maori language immersion school
mahinga kai moana the act of gathering seafood
kai moana seafood
mana respect, power, prestige
mana muncher a term of disrespect, meaning someone is doing something for the wrong reasons, to make themselves look good
mana whenua/mana moana whanau (family) or hapu (sub‐tribe) with occupation rights to an area, having mana over land/seas, sometimes an iwi (tribe) also
manaakitanga to host
Maori indigenous peoples of Aotearoa; normal; ordinary
mauri the essential life force
moana the seas or expanses of water (can include lakes)
Ngati Makino the tribe named after their ancestor Makino
Pakeha Non‐Maori. Usually used to refer to a New Zealander of European or white heritage
Papa‐tū‐ā‐nuku One of two main atua: the earth mother
paru dirty, polluted
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rahui a ban, usually temporary, usually imposed out of respect e.g. because someone has drowned, or to prevent over‐exploitation of a resource
rangatahi teenagers, young people
rangatiratanga self‐determination; tino rangatiratanga meaning absolute authority
Ranginui One of two most important atua: husband of Papa‐tu‐a‐nuku
taiao Maori environment
taiapure a government recognised organisation for managing tribal customary fisheries
takutai the coast
taitamawahine the eastern coast of Aotearoa – the western coast being taitamatane. Taitamawahine is the more peaceful, calmer.
tamaraiki children
Tane‐mahuta Maori god of forests, things that live within the forest, and mankind; son of Papatuanuku and Ranginui
Tangaroa Maori god of the sea and all things in it; son of Papatuanuku and Ranginui
tangata whenua people who belong to the land
tauparapara ancient proverb of introduction
Te Arawa ki Tai Te Arawa tribes at the coast
Te Arawa ki Uta Te Arawa tribes inland
Te Moana a Toi Mataatua tribes’ name for Bay of Plenty seas
Te Puni Kokiri Ministry of Maori development
Te Reo Maori Maori language
tinana body
wahanga chapter or section
wairua spirit
whanau extended family