m5110, part 1a land tenure and land policy

M5101: Prof. Heidhues + Tom

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Universität Hohenheim, Institut 490a 1

M5110, Part 1ALand Tenure and Land Policy

Definitions, Theory, Objectives

Prof. Franz HeidhuesDr. Andreas Neef


Land Tenure and Land Policy: Prof. F. Heidhues and Dr. A. Neef

Structure of the lecture

IntroductionAgrarian reform and land reformLand reform and structural policyLand allocation modelObjectivesPart I1. The concept of land tenure and types of tenure regimes – Definitions2. Land tenure, natural resource management and agricultural development – Theory and evidence3. Land conflicts – Problems and solutionsPart II4. Land reform – registration redistribution, resettlement5. Rights of women and tenants – Discrimination or empowerment?6. Land policy – Principles and instruments


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Rural institutional framework

Land tenuresystem

Legal and social framework

Agricultural andrural services

Propertyregimes

Rental/Leasingsystems

Examples-Inheritance-Gender roles

Examples:- rural finance- marketing- extension



Agricultural Policy Instruments

Structural policies

Aimed at fundamental changes in property rights and access to resources

Marginal policies

Aimed at improving use of resources, efficiency of resource allocation and income distribution


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Allocation Effects of Land Distribution

BL1 BL0 Land LandBM0 BM1

Large Scale Farm Sector(Latifundia) Small Scale Farm Sector

(Family Farms)O

utpu

t

Out

put



Land reform – registration, redistribution, resettlement?Possible goals of land reform

1.Political goals• Adjust village social and power structures• Reduce the inequality of landholdings, partition of large farms• Satisfy smallholders, leaseholders and landless people• Redistribute existing land

2. Agrarian policy goals• Promote family-based farming• Reorganize the farm size structure

3. Economic goals• Intensify agricultural production, mobilize the agricultural production

potential• Diversify agricultural production, colonize new land• Create additional employment opportunities

4. Social goals• Distribute income and capital of the rural population more equally• Improve the social status of the rural population

Growth

Equity


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Types of tenure regimes (I)Four major types of property regimes can be distinguished:

1. Private property regimes• Private owners have the right to undertake socially acceptable use

of their property• Private property rights include the right of transferring the object to

somebody else and the right to exclude others from the use (i.e. sell, rent, use if as collateral inherit.)

• Share cropping

2. Common property regimes• The owners („management group“) have the right to exclude non-

members of the group from use• Individual members of the management group have both rights

and duties with respect to use rates and maintenance of the thing owned.

• Transfer rights are often restricted and subject to decision of group leaders or the group as a whole.

• In case of leaving the community, rights fall back to the community



Types of tenure regimes (II)Four major types of property regimes can be distinguished:

3. State property regimes• State property regimes have often resulted from the nationalization

of common property regimes (e.g. some Sahelian countries) or private property regimes (e.g. Vietnam)

• Rights of groups and individuals are determined by controlling agencies (e.g. Dept. Of Land Administration of Forest Administration).

• Users have the duty to observe use and access rules formulated by state law and controlled by these agencies.

4. Open-access or non-property regimes• Open-access regimes result from the absence or the breakdown

of a management and authority system whose purpose it was to introduce and enforce a set of rules among the potential users of a certain resource.

• Open-access regimes have often been confused with common property regimes

• Open-access frequently results from the undermining or collapse of customary (common) property regimes.


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Evaluation Criteria for Agricultural Reforms or different tenure regimes

use of common property, tragedy of the commons (Hardin)internalization of

costs

Access to land marketsAccess to other

markets- product markets- input markets- financial markets- extension

Efficiency of resource allocationPromotion of innovation

- incentives- risks- durability of use

Optimal farm sizeEmploymentStability

Conservation of Natural Resources

Distribution Objective

Growth Objective



Figure: Land registration and farm productivitySupply of land titles or land use

certificates by the state

increased willingnessto invest in naturalresources

maintaining andconservingnatural resources

increased stabilityof natural resourcebase in agriculture

enhanced land security

increased willingnessto invest, efficientcropping choices

development of a land market

increased abilityto use land as collateral

development of formal credit markets

efficient allocationof land resources

improved abilityto invest

increased productivityand capital accumulationin the agricultural sectorSource: based on Platteau 1992

Improvement of access to resources, productivity and income of the poor


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Figure: Land titling and farm productivityTitled land

More security to farmer

More demandfor investment

More securityto lender

More supply of long-term credit

More long-term investment

More demand forvariable input

More supply ofshort-term credit

More variable input use

Higher output per acre

Higher land prices Higher farm income

Source: Feder and Noronha 1987; GTZ 1998



Success of agricultural reform is depending on:

Rapidity of change

(revolution with instability versus evolutionary change)

Preparation and training of the new owners, promotion of the school system

Socio-economic infrastructural and institutional support framework

(conducive price policy, supply with inputs, marketing, credit, extension)

Existence and Profitability of an innovation package

Functioning of land market

(requires clearly formulated land laws and regulations)

Adequate financing


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Causes for failures of land reforms

unsatisfactory financing of ambitious land reform programs

unclearly formulated land laws and regulations

uncertainty about existing land rights

unsatisfactory competence of administration for the implementation of reforms

Lack of enforcement of land reform laws (weak government)


M5110 Part 1 BLand Tenure and Land Policy

Tenants and land rights



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Tenant‘s land rights

Leasing contracts are often not done on a written basisTenant‘s use rights are often short-term (tenure insecurity)Tenants face several restrictions to land use (e.g. no perennialcrops)Sharecroppers often lack incentives to invest (return must be shared with the owner)Tenants often get fields with low soil fertility and/or far fromsettlementTenants do not have incentives to increase soil fertility (fear of losing the land)



Table: Land use systems and land tenure status of different minority groups in Song Da watershed, Son La province, northwestern Vietnam

Ethnic groupValley based systems Upland based systems

Paddy based system

Diversified system

Medium attitudes

(<800 masl)

High attitudes

(>800 masl)Thai 93% 73% 48% 1%

Hmong 0% 0% 0% 99%

Other ethnic groups 7% 27% 52% 0%

Land tenure status

Red book certificate/permitted tenure

48% 66% 25% 5%

Without permits 51% 34% 73% 95%

rented 1% 2% 2% 0%

Source: SFDP 1994


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Table: Impact of land tenure on crop yields in Southwest Niger and Southern Benin

P-level=0.018*345.2650.0

Average yield of corn in kg per ha (Southern Benin)

P-level=0.001**205.2376.3

Average yield of millet in kg per ha (Southwest Niger)

Analysis of variance (ANOVA)

Tenant-operated fields

Owner-operated fields



Table: Impact of land tenure on number of planted trees/perennial crops per ha in Southern Benin

6.326.0212.8Number of planted trees per ha

Fields cultivated by non-owners (short-term use rights)

Fields cultivated by non-owners (medium-term use rights)

Fields cultivated by land owners (long-term use rights)

Analysis of varianceANOVA P-level=0.0445*

Source: Neef 1999


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Table: Strategies of farmers to secure land rights in two villages situated in a reforestation area of northern Thailand (sample of 30 households per village)

8%Construction of fences

13%Applying erosion control measures

22%Abandoning fallow systems

22%Converting rainfed fields into paddy fields

15%Planting of other perennial crops (e.g. tea)

85%Planting of fruit trees

Percentage of respondentsStrategies to secure land rights

Data from Knüpfer 1997


M5110 Part 1CLand Tenure and Land Policy

Legal Pluralism and Land Conflicts



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Common property or open access regimes

Rules and mechanisms for the internal governance of common property regimes

• Clear boundaries and membership of groups• Clear definitions of rights and duties of members• Clear rules of resource use• Monitoring mechanisms• Sanctions in case of misbehavior• Conflict resolution mechanisms• Incentives for group members to work and to invest

Source: Ostrom, 1990 Wachter 1992



3. Land Conflicts – Problems and Solutions

Land conflicts arise primarily if

Land resources are extremely scarceLand rights are not clearly definedDifferent users compete for the same resourceLand distribution is extremely unequalLand laws and regulations are contradictory and inconsistent

Possibilities for conflict resolutions

Out-of-court reconciliation of interests (“settling before judging”)Use of traditional conciliation structures on local levelEducation and training of governmental and private mediators

Source: GTZ 1998


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Figure: Pluralism of use rights on an „individually“ owned field in South-West



Figure: Dependency of land rights in distance from field to farm (case study from Niger, West Africa)

Source: Neef 1999


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Frequent problems with resettlement measures (different farming and cropping systems, space problem)

• Appropriate selection of settlement sites

• Assessment of land suitability and environmental impact

• Financing of the settlement projects

• Financial share to be paid by the settlers

• Minimum farm size

• Support services (extension, credit, infrastructure, etc.)

• Existing rights of indigenous groups

Alternatives to resettlement

• Intensification of agriculture (more output per hectare)

• Development of off-farm activities (processing, trade, eco-tourism)



Resettlement programs

Potential of goals of resettlement programs

• Reduction population pressure

• Even out of regional disparity

• Enable landless to have access to land

• Settling nomads

• Enable victims of natural catastrophes to find economic alternatives

• Securing and increasing food production

• Developing new land

• Securing border regions

• Creating new employment opportunities

• Integration of ethnic groups

Source: GTZ 1998


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Figure: Land concentration in Southwest Niger (West Africa)



Figure: Relationship between population density and land distribution


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5110 Part 1DLand Tenure and Land Policy

Land rights and gender



Land Tenure and Land Policy: Prof. F. Heidhues and Dr. A. NeefRights of women and tenants – Discrimination and empowerment?

Opportunities for women to gain access to land vary strongly from region to regionIn general women are in a weaker position than manIn most rural societies women are excluded from the right of inheritanceWomen‘s land rights are often only indirectly defined (e.g. through their husbands)Women‘s use rights are often granted on a short-term basis onlyWomen are usually disadvantaged by land registration programsIn case of land conflicts, women usually have problems in enforcing their claimsWomen develop a variety of strategies to gain access to landWomen search for alternatives to land access in the non-agricultural sector

Woman‘s land rights

Source: GTZ 1998


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Gender-specific differences in durability of land property and use rights (Niger, West Africa)

100.0%100.0%Total area

68.2%14.2%Short term use rights

17.9%33.8%Medium term use rights

14.0%52.0%Long term property and use rights

Fields under control of female household heads

Fields under control of male household heads



Figure: Gender specific differences of traditional and improved rice production systems (Niger, West Africa)

Source: Neef 1999


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Table: Impact of access land on women‘s income in Southwest Niger

P-level=0.70754,56344,06258,539Total average income(in FCFA)

P-level=0.022*52,64684,975207,693Average gross margin per hectare (in FCFA)

P-level=0.005**45,05741,50618,564Average income from crop


>0.6 ha0.3-0.6 ha<0.3 ha

Source: Neef 1999



Table: Impact of access to land on women‘s income in Southern Benin

P-level=0.70744,06258,539average income from agro-processing (in FCFA)

P-level=0.005**41,50618,564Total average income (in FCFA)


Women without access to land

Women with access to land

Source: Neef 1999


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LiteratureBromley, D. 1989. Property Relations and Economic Development: The Other Land Reform. World Development 17(6): 867-877.

Deininger, K. 2003. Land policies for growth and poverty reduction. A World Bank PolicyResearch Report. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Washington, D.C.

Feder, G. and R. Noronha 1987. Land rights systems and agricultural development inSub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank Research Observer 2(2): 143-169.

GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation) (ed.) 1998. Land tenure in developmentcooperation: Guiding principles. Universum Verlagsanstalt, Wiesbaden.

Meinzen-Dick, R. et al. (eds.) 2002. Innovation in natural resource management: The roleof property rights and collective action in developing countries.

Neef, A. 1999. Auswirkungen von Bodenrechtswandel auf Ressourcennutzung und wirtschaftliches Verhalten von Kleinbauern in Niger und Benin. Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M.

Neef, A. & R. Schwarzmeier 2001. Land tenure and rights in trees and forests:Interdependencies, dynamics and the role of development cooperation – Case studiesfrom Mainland Southeast Asia. GTZ, Eschborn.



Literature (cont’d)Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Ostrom, E. 2001. The puzzle of counterproductive property rights reforms: A conceptual analysis. In: de Janvry, A., Gordillo, G., Platteau, J.-P., Sadoulet, E. (eds.) Access to land,rural poverty and public action. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Wachter, D. 1992. Land titling for land conservation in developing countries? DivisionalWorking Paper No. 1992-28. The World Bank Environment Department, Washington, DC.

m5110, part 1a land tenure and land policy

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