MERIDIAN

Crossing Aesthetics

W~rn~r Hamacher

& David E. Wdlbery

EdiroTf

Translated by

Elizabeth Rottenberg

Stllliford

U"il!n'Jiry

17m

Stfll1[ord

ui/iforni(l

LESSONS ON

THE ANALYTIC

OFTHE SUBLIME

(Kant'S 'Critique ofJudgment,'§§2J-29)

}ean-Fran,ois Lyotard

'~U~I)')

'Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime'

wa'I originally publi5hnl in Frenchin 1991 under the ride

'~ns sur I'analytique du sublil1\C','01991, Ediliom Gali\b:

Assisrma for diu lr.msU()on

wu pm\idcd by the FrmchMinisn)' of Cullurc.

SI:lllford Unh'cn:iIY PressStanford, California

C 1994 by the Board ofTnlslC('S oflhcLeland Stanford Junior Univcl'$ity

['rimed in Ihe United StaId of Amcric:l

CIP danl appear at the end of Ihe book

Original prilliing 1991l.ut figure below indiaotes ye;u- of this printing:

G.4 OJ 01 01

Contenrs

P~fac~

Abbrevi.arions

§ I AesthC!:(ic ReAectio5)'Jtcm :lnd Fcding II Sengtion asTau~ 81 The~Subjectivc~ IS I ACSlhn:ic;: Tcmporalil)' 19/ TheHeuristic 16 I Anamnesis}2 I Rcfleclion and CaITryin the Theoretical and Practical Realms }6/ RcRcctionand Category in the Tcrrilory of {he Aesthetic 43

§ 2 Comparison of the Sublime and TasteWhy an Analydc of the Sublime? so I The Beautiful

and the Sublime Compami in lhe- Quality and

Quantity ofJudgmr'OI 56/ Animalion 60 / The

Beauliful and Iht Sublime Compared in the- Rdadon

(Finality) and Mod.aIity ofJudgmeOl 67/ Continuity

and DUcominuity fkt"'ttTl Beautiful and Sublime 7J

§ j Categorical Examination of the SublimeQuanlity and Magnilude n I From Quanlity lO

ModalilY Through Rdalion 81 I Mathemalical and

Dynamical 89/ QualilY. Once: Again 96

§ 4 The Sublime as Mathem:uical Synthesis~Compl"(hemion~ Is Measumi 981 ~Composilion~ [s

Infinile 10; / The Infinile [s Not ~ComprehensibJe"as

ox

5°

77

Colltr1ltS

Index 243

This is nOt a book bUI a collection oflessons. Or rather a file of

nOtes in preparation for the oral explication of the Analytic of theSublime (Kant'S Critiqu~ ofJudgmmt, §§23-29). This book doesnot exempt one from reading Kant's text; on the contrary, it re­quires one to read it.

These notes have nor recdved thdr final "polish." and in a sense

the professor will never be finished with his class. From this twO­fold negligence the~ comes a twofold f.ilUlt: the writing ~t2ins theheaviness and the repetition of the oral explication, which followsKant'S rext step by step; but at the same time. the whole is far from"covering" the text-! am not speaking of the "content," which isinexhaustible; it cannot even "cover" the text according to the "let­ter" of the text.

These lessons have only a modest scope. They used to be calledtxplicntion d~ rau, in which one of the rules was to find the expli­cation of the text in the text, with no outside resource. This iswhat I have done. although I have extended the references to allthree Critiqlus, as the Analytic of the Sublime forces one to do.

Why publish these notes in this state? The question always ex­ceeds what the "author" can advance by way of reasons or excuses.Here are a few. He imagines that these notes will be helpful inavoiding certain errors in the reading of Kant's text, that they willbe helpful in discussions, bt.-gun and to come, with his colleagues

Preface

'47

"3

§ 8 The Communication ofTaste 191Demand for a Universal Communicalion 191 IDemand for a Necessary Communication 1981

Hcsilation About the D~mand lOll Localiution of

lhe Prindpk Behind Ih~ Demand lOS I Solution 10 rhe

Aminomy ofTast~ lCYlI Limit-Ideu 1101 The

Supcrseosibl~Subslnle ItS I Th~ Procedure of

Communicuion 118

§ 9 The Communication ofSublime Feeling 214A Medializcd CommuniCltion 114 / Th~ Olh~r

Feeling 116 I Th~ Olher Objcct IJI I Thc Acslheric

Fcding Inspired by Manl Judgmem 1}4

§ 6 A Few Signs of HeterogeneityResisran<2 1471 Negali\'~ PrtKnl:llion ISO I

Emhusiasm IS} { Simpliciry IS6

§ 7 Aesthetics and Ethics in the Beautiful

and the Sublime 159Delighl IS91 Th~ Beautiful, Symbol of lh~ Good 16} IThe Analogy ofth~ Bc2utiful wilh Ih~ Good as It IsLogically Argued 1M I The Nerve of th~ T~ical

Argument 1711 "Facuhary-lntCTesr and Primacy of the

Pnaicall7} I The Family SIOry of Ih~ Sublime 179 ,

Tdcology in rhe Be:autiful :md rh~ Sublime 181 I The

Sublime Sacrifice 187-

a Wholr. F~r 1091 Th~ Inli.nil~ Is Think.abl~ as a

\'Cfhok: whalion liS

§ 5 The Sublime as Dynamical SymhesisAll~mpl 10 Rcsolv~ Ih~ Differcnd Through Elhical

Medialion II} { AltCmpllO Resolvc lhe Differend

Through a "DiaICClic" 117/ Dynamical Symhcsis of

Ih~ Cause and rhe Condilioned III / Neccssiry of Ih~

Symhesis of ScOS'llions in Sublime Feeling 1}7 /

Hctcrogcneiry of th~ Sensarions ofTime in lh~

Sublimc Synlhesis loll

Vllt

Abbreviations

ANTH Ambropo/Qgrfrom a Pragmatic Point ofVit'w. Ed. and ttans.Mary J. Gregor. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1974.

KPV Critiqllt'ofPraetical Rtason. Trans. Lewis WhiTe Beck. NewYork: Macmillan, 1956. Kritilt tlt'r pralttisclml Vtrnunft.Hamburg: Meiner, 1974.

KRV A. B Cn'tiqut OfPU" &awn (A: 1781; B: 1787). Tr;;ms. N. KempSmith. New York: 51. Marrin's Press, 192.9. Kritilttltr rtinmVtrnunft. Hamburg: Meiner. 1956.

leU Kimts Critiqut' ofJudgtmmt(I790). Trans. J. C. Meredith.Oxford: Cbrmdon Press, 1952.. Kritilt dtr Unnlskraft. Ham·burg: Meiner. 1974.

ORlEh'T MWhat is Orienlatton in Thinking" (1]86). In Kants PoliticalWrititlfS- ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge.Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1970. pp. 2.}7-49.

FI "Firsl Inlroduetlon to the Critiqut' ofJudgmmt" (1]89). InCriNlpH ofJudgmnll. mns. Werner 5. P1uhar. Indianapolis:Haden. 1987, pp. }8}-441.

N.B.: For the Ihree Critiqut's. reference is made first to the Englishtranslation and then to the German edition (in italics). All references thatarc not preceded by an abbreviation refcr to the Critiq/lt ofJlldgmmt. Theabbreviation ",.01." following a reference to the English trnnslation indi­cates ,hat the French translation has been modified in Lyotard's text. AUEnglish spelling including quorations conforms to the standard adoptedby Webstn"s Ninth New ColI.tgiau Dictionary. Unless otherwise noted, theuse of italies for emphasis reproduces such uses in the French version.

Earlier versions of Chapters I and 7 have appeared in the ReVile J

InUmfltiOllnle de plJilosoplJie 4, no. 1975 (1990), and in the eollee·tion 011 sublime (Paris and Berlin, 1988), respectively. I wish to

thank the editors of these publications.

x

who an: philosophers. He is also convinced that this book. once: ithas lx:en published, will lighten the load of the onC' that is inprogress. He would also like for the visible marks oforal presenta­tion, which remain, to turn this file into something of an awk­ward homage, and a farewell, [Q this Strange "profession": one"(Clches philosophy" only by learning how to philosophize. JUStas it is, I dediClte this collection to the students who for years have

endured irs working and reworking.If onc had to summarize in a few words what is here said. one

could say that these: lessons rry [Q isolau: the analysis of a differendof feeling in Kam's t('Xl, which is also the analysis of a feeling of

differend, and to connect this feeling with the transport that leadsall thought (critical thought included) [Q irs limits.

LESSONS ON

THE ANALYTIC

OF THE SUBLIME

,

§ I Aesthetic Reflection

System and Feeling

The taSk assigned to the CritiqIH ofJuLigmmt, as its Introductionmakes explicit, is to res(orr unity to philosophy in me wake of thesevere "division" inAieted upon it by the lim twO Critiqurs. Onereading. correct but overly confident in the letter, sees this taSk ac­complished in the r~lati~ Idea of a finaliry of nature that is in­troduced in the second pan of the third Criti'lUL. This Idea, in ef­fea, serves as the soughHfter "brid~"~n the theoretical andthe practical, spanning the gulf prniously created between theknowledge ofobjects according to the conditions of possible expe­rience and the realization of freedom under the: unconditional ofmoral law. In the opening of this passage, the critique ofaestheticjudgment fulfills, according to the aforesaid reading, an ~ntially

preliminary function: taste at least, if not the feeling of the sub­lime, offers the paradox of a judgmenl that appears, problemati­cally, {Q be doomed to particularity and contingency. However,the analytic of taste restortS to judgmenl a universality, a finality,and a necessity-all of which are, indeed, subjective-merely byevincing its status as reflective judgment. This status is then ap­plied to teleological judgment in order, precisely, {Q legitimate itsuse. In this way, the validation of subjective pleasure serves {Q in­troduce a validation of natural teleology.

This reading would seem fully justifit.x1 by the way reflection is

presented in the Introduction to the: third Critiqllt. The faculty ofjudging is said to be "simply rtfkcriw" when "only the particular isgiven and the universal has to be found" (l8i 15). This is what the

Anthropo/Qgy (§44) calls Wirz, ingmiuln, or "discovering the uni­versal for the panicular," finding an identity in ;Ii multiplicity ofdissimilar things. If reRection is, therefore, assigned the taSk of re­unification. it is bttausc= oritS heuristic function: although the fac­ulry of pure judgmem may not have "a special authority to pre­scribe laws," it may well have "a principle pttuliar to itself uponwhich laws are sougtu" (IS; 12). In the terminology of judicialspheres of inAuence employed in paragraph II of this Inuoduc­tion (11-12.; 9-10), although the faculty of judging will have "nofield of objects appropriate to it as its realm" in which it legislatesin an autonomous fashion, itS peculiar principle does apply to

"some territOry." Precisely because it does nOt legislate, this princi­ple can supplement the determinant legislations of undemandingin itS theoretical realm and of reason in its practical realm, andconsequently n:concile the two. The "weakness" of reRection thusalso constitutes its "strength."

The weakness of the principle peculiar to n:Aection is manifestin that it is a principle that is "merely subjective a priori" (IS; n).This principle does not concern itself with the deu:rmination ofobjects, such as the world for undemanding, or frttdom for rea~

son. Still, it must be n:membered that the objects thus determinedwere nor determined by the twO preceding Critiqun except as be­ing possible a priori. Reflective judgment conctrns itsdf with theseobjects in their particularity, as they are given. h judges them as ifthe rules that determined their possibility a priori were not suffi­cient ro account for their particularity. It endeavors to "discover" agenerality or a universality in them which is not that of their pos­sibility but of their existence. The critical qucstion is thus to de­termine the principle by which reAection is guided on the parh tothis discovery.

A problem is posed by this qucstion, for the principle of judg~mem can be found neither in the realm of theoretical understand~

ing nor in the realm of practical reason. It cannot be borrowed

JAmhuic &j/«tion

from any other authority save the farulty of jU'dging ilSdf. It "canonly give as a law from and to itself"' a "transcendQItaI principle"(19; 16). Such is the "subjectivity" of the principle: the faculty thatexercises it is the 8me l2cu1ty that inventS it. This principle, the re­i"uh of art rather than reason, which can only be applied with an,cannot have the same objective validity as the categories for un­derstanding or the law for pt3ctical reason, which are deduced by

argumentlluon.The principle of judgment is, as we know, the principle of a

Ieleology of nature for frttdom. In judging according to this prin­ciple, knowledge permits itself to think the "particular naturallaws" as forming a "system of experience" such that our faculty ofcognition in genet3l (that is, knowledge itself) might have deter­mined "for [its] benefit" (Ztt1n Helm! uns~rrr Erk~mlmiJwnnjjgen:

t9; 16). An Idea that is merely regulative, and not legislative, thusunites the separate realms of natun: and freedom, without losing

any of their heterogeneity.There can be no question, therefore, of reRection being sum~

moned at the opening of the third Critique men:ly in its heuristic

capacity: it invents its own principle, finality, and lets itself beguided by this principle in deciphering the empirical laws of na~

tun:. For the project of unifying philosophical knowled~with it~

.s«=lf, this is sufficient, as the finality of natun: can only be knownanalogically, 1UlCh tier AnIlWgie (IS; 12-1J), with the finality of rea­son in its practical usage, where finality is causality by way of theIdea. It is proper, then:fore, to introduce the faculty of n:Rectionbetween understanding and reason in order to provide the indis­

pensable supplement for this project.However, the rext of the Introduction does not stOp here. It in­

vokes "a further ground" for linking the theoretical and the prac­tical. And the connection that one may expect on this ground "ap­pears to be of even greater importance" than the one previouslymentioned. The latter is "logical" (lSi n) in the transcendentalsense of determining realms of jurisdiction and territories of legis­lation. The former, judged "of even greater importance," is con­cerned with "the faculties of the soul" (ibid.). One might say that

Anth~tic&Ike/ion2

it belonged to transcendental psychology were it not thai this ex­pression do~ly resembles that of "rational psychology," and theparalogisms of me first Critiql« clearly show that rationaJ psychol­ogy "owes irs origin simply to misundersranding" (KRV 8, 377; 415).

This is not the place ro debate the distinction, enigmatic as it is,betw~n the (logical) faculties of knowledge and the "faculties ofthe soul generally"; the famous rable U9; J6) at the end of the In­troduction sro th~ fueuIties in a parallelism that can only be "un­even." The distinction, and the paralJelism it implies in tum, are,however, so importtnt that they contain perhaps the whole K'Crt[

of the problem of reRection. For "logically" reflection is calledjudgment. but "psychologically," if WI:: may be permitted the im­proper usc of this term for a momem, jt is nothing bm me feelingofpleasure and displeasure. As a faculry ofknowJedge, it is devOl·ed to the kuristic. and in procuring "sensations," the meaning ofwhich will become clear, it fully discloses itS tnultgorica/ dutaaer,a term by which I designare thC' remacka.blC' fact thai plC'2Sure anddisplC'2Sure are at ona: both a "state" of thC' soul and mC' "infor·mation" collecred by the soul relative to itS StatC'. This it does insuch a way that one cannO[ C'2Sily distinguish, at fim, the role thatthe aesthetic will play-that thC' anal}'5is of thC' a priori conditionsof mese "subjectivC''' sensations will play-in thC' gr:rnd Stt;l:teg)' ofsupplC'mC'nration.

Pat;l:graph VII of thC' Introduction does, indC'C'd, set Out to justi­fy the aesthC'tic. However, it is no coincidenCe' that the force of theargument consists in referring the pleasure of taste as faculty ofthe lou/back to the agreement (to "the harmonf [dit' Angnnrol"n­fuit]: )2; 27). most certainly subjective. of the twO faculties o[Imowkd 'l" that are a1wa s brou hr into play in an r '0 an~ect: the facuI f resentation n f cone ill,Ima ination, and underslandin . The grounds for pleasure, thepsyc ologi state par exee lence. are converted into a very log­

ical harmony. There is thus a finality to be found even for pleasure,in the relation of objects-according only to their forms (for plea­sure never becomes an element of cognition)-Io the faculrics ofknowledge. The relation o'f the faculties of knowledge ro eaeh orh-

sAmhl"lic Rrfketion

cr gives raste the authority to lay claim to universality (see Chapter8). A very subjective claim indC'C'd, yet one that is neve["J:heless uni­versal, for the intet;l:ction of understanding and imagination re­garding the form ofan object suffices, "without any referenCe' to aconcept" (ohnl" RiUltJicht auft'inl"n &griff: )0. t.m.; 2tJ. 10 arousein thought the plC'2Sure that the affinity of these twO faculties ofknowledge gives il in general Ut; 28-29).

The subjective finality found in aesthetic plC'2Sure seems of litdeimportanCe' to the general projecr as Stated in the Introduction tothe third CritiqlU. where aesthetic reRea:ion is declared to be sim­ply "a special faculty" that judges things "according to a rule. butnot according to conCe'ptS· (J6; ]2). The teleological faculty. onthe orner hand. "is not a special faculty. but only general rdlectivejudgment" (ibid.). And the reason. surprising at fim. for this em­inenCe' is that the teleological F.lcu1ty procC'C'ds, "as it always does intheoretical cognition,· "according to conceptS" (nach &griffin:ibid.). This can only be the concept of finality or. in other words.a causality of the end. The teleological faculty merely uses thisconcept of finality as it proceeds. "with respect 10 Ce'rtain objectS ofnature. following special principles" U6; ]2). These principles are

" rhemselves "of a judgment that is merely rdlea:ive" (ibid.). Thisfaculty prescribes that finality be employed. in effect. as a regula­tive and nor as a legislative Idea. The faa remains that as Idea. fi~

nality is a conCe'pl. And this is enough 10 place teleological reRec·lion on the side of knowledge-"it belongs to the theoretical partof philosophy"-whereas aesthetic reRection, which "contributesnothing [nichu bt'trdgtl to the cognilion of its object ... must onlybe allocated [gl"Zdhlt] to the critique of the judging subject" (ibid.,r.m.). The argument concerning the aesthetic thus ends with thefollowing statement: "A critique [of the judging subject] ... is thepropaedeutic of all philosophy" (ibid.).

A classical reading of the third Critiqut' that puts the accent onteleology is, as we see, firmly roored in the letter of the Introduc·tion. Even when the Introduction sees in aesthetic pleasure some­lhing of great "importance." ir does so only in order to show howaesthetic pleasure relates ro Ihe faculties of knowledge. that is, to a

Amh~tic &./kerioll4

subjective finality. Moreover, the subjective quality of this finalityallows the "importance" of the aesthetic ro be imm<..-diarely limited

to that of the propaedcutic. Conversely, the conceptual, thereforeexpoundnbk (211-12; 201-2) use of teleology and its application roobjects of namre (even when teleology finds itself attached ro "asif" clauses or to the "regulative" employment that is reflection's"peculiar principle") earn teleology the place of honor in the srrac­egy of unification. The strength of reflective weakness can be C'<­

plained by the heuristic function of reflection; the t3megorical aes­thetic shares in the weakness of this strength.

I would argue that an importance of an entirely different ordermay be accorded the "Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment," that of be­ing a propaedeutic ro philosophy, a propaedeutic that is itself, per­haps, all of philosophy (for "'we can at most only learn how to phi­losophize [hiichstms nur pbilosophierm lernm)," but we cannotlearn philosophy: !CRy. 657. Lm.; 752). One must be able ro see be­yond the strictly thematic reading that I have evoked and thatKant's text strongly encourages. The thematic reading remainsfuithfUl to the concern for a syStem that haunts the Introduction to

the third Critique. However, aesthetic judgment conceals, I wouldsuggest. a secret more important than that ofdoctrine, the secret ofthe "manner" (rather than the method) in which critical thoughtproceeds in general. The manner (modus otithnitus) "possesses nostandard other than the fieling of unity in the presentation," themethod (modus logicm) "follows definite principles" (I82; 174)."Fine art ... has only ... a manner (modu.s)" (226; 215) and not amethod. The mode of critical thoughr should by definition bepurely reRective (it does not already have rhe concepts it seeks to

use); moreover. aesthetic judgment reveals reRection in its most"autonomous" state, naked, so to speak. In aesrhetic judgment, re­Rection is, as we have seen in rhe text of the Introduction, strippedof its objective, releological function, even, one could say, of itsheuristic fUnction in general. because aeslhetic judgment, consid·ered from the point of view of the "soul," has no claim to knowl­edge and because, as pure pleasure, it has nothing other than itselfto pursue. It perpetuates itself: "The conremplation of the beauti­ful ... strengthens and reproduces irself. The case is analogous (but

7Aestbetic Rr.fkction

analogous only) to the way we linger i Vmut'i1ungJ" on an attF.!ctiveobject, on an object that renders the mind "passive" (64; 61).

Before an inquiry into the a priori conditions of judgments canbe made, critical thought must be in a reRective state of this SOrt. ifit docs !lot want-and it must nm want-these a priori condi­tions to be in any way prejudged in its investigation. Otherwisethe huter will be nothing but delusion, and its discoveries meresemblances. Thought must "linger," must suspend its adherence to

what it thinks ir knows. It must remain open to what will orientateits crirical examination: a feeling. The critique must inquire intothe "dwelling place" of a judgment's legitimation. This dwellingplace is constituted by the set of a priori conditions of possibilityfor the judgment. Yet how does it know that there is a dwellingplace, and how docs it know where to find it. if it has not alrtadybeen informed of its address? Even informed of the address.thought would still need ro orientate itself in order to find thatdwelling place. Yel orientation, for thought as for the body. re­quires "a feeling." To orientate myself in unfamiliar places, even ifI know the astronomical points of reference (the points of thecompass), I must, in concrete terms, "necessarily be able ro feel a

" difference wirhin my own subject. namely. that berween my rightand my left hands" (ORJENT, 2)8). Otherwise, how would I know,for example, that when I mce sourh the Orient is to the left? Kantdraws attention to this point: "I call this a fitling because theserwo sides [right and left] display no perceptible difference as fur asexternal intuition is concerned" (ibid.). Consequently, "I orientatemyself geographically purely by means of a subjective distinction"(ibid., 2)9). (Can a feeling. which guides a manner, be called aprincipk, which commands a method? Bur it is subjective.)

Transposed into the realm of thought. the question is rhus oneof a "subjective distincrion" that allows "reason" to determine itsFt"inuahrbaltm, namely, how it is that reason can regard as trlle anobject of thought in the absence of "objective criteria of knowl­edge" (ibid., 240). The problematic of the empirical use of con­cepts that are "already" determined (here, the points of the com­pass) is indeed the problematic of a pure reflection. Kant will re­spond to this problematic, in the article that I quote, by appealing

Amhetic &fkction6

Sensation as Tautegory

Let us turn now to the distinction between the two kinds of op­erations that are delegated to reRection and not easily articulatedwith one another: guidance operations that I have called heuristic

9Anzlmic Rrjl«rioll

for the transcendental activity of thought, and "sensations" thatinform thought of its "state." The difficulty here resides in thecombination of the twO dispositions. The following two-part qu~rjon, admittedly a bit summary, would be right on the mark: Howcan feelings orientate a critique? Why should the latter have anyneed for them?

We mwt first examine feeling irsdf. In the third Critiqur. as weknow. the term "aesthetic" is subject to an important semantic dis·placement in relation to its~ in the first Cn·tiqur. I must passover these indeed primordial questions that are associated with thissmall revolution. The revolution docs. in any case, prohibit onefrom free:ly transposing questions rai~ by the pure It priori formsofsensibility to the analysis of judgments on the beautiful and thesublime.

Initially, as regards the question of the conditions of knowledgein general. "aesthetic" meaw to grasp the givens of sensible intu­ition in the It priori forms ofspace and time. In the third Critiqur,the term designates reRective judgment, only insoF.tr as it excitesthe interest of the "&cuIry of the soul" that is the feeling of plea­sure and of displeasure. K2nt insists that the term "sensation" mat,is "a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure ... isgiven quite a different meaning (rtwas gllnz IIndnnj" from the sen­sation that is "the represenration of a thing" (45, t.m.; 42). Sensa­tion is an indispensable block in the "building" of the conditionsof possibility for objective knowledge in general, the essential ar­ticulation ofwhich consists in the subsumption ofan intuitive giv­en, already synthesized by a schema, under the synthesis of a judg­ment by concepts for which understanding is responsible. In theanalytic of taste, sensation no longer has any cognitive finality; itno longer gives any informarion about an object but only aboutthe "subject" itsel£

According to this second meaning, sensation informs "themind" of its "state." Let us say thar the "state of mind," the Gnniits­zlUl4nd, is a nuance. This nuance affects thought as it thinkssomething. The affection occupies a position in a range that ex­tends from extreme pleasure to o:rreme displeasure; affections oc·

Aestlmic Rrjketion8

to the "feeling ofa nudthat is inherent in reason" (ibid.). Howev.cr, his response is itselforientated by the Stakes of the discussion towhich the anide is devoted, the "controversy" over pantheism be.tween Jacobi and Mendelssohn. As regards aesthetic reflection. the·subjective distinction" should only be the feding of plClSUrc anddispleasure. It alone can give or refuse to give the: wtiif«ii to ft·

flection, d~nding on the orientation reflection chooses to take.and this jt does immediatdy, "subjectivdy," in the ab~na:= of anyobjective criterion. Even so, this pleasure and its opposite must be"pure." for otherwise they proceed necessarily from the satisfac­tion of another facuJty. meorerie:.tl or practical, rather man frompleasure or disple2Sure. or from a simple, empirical enjoyment.Thus they J~ all value of disc.r:rnmenr for reflection, and, aboveall. they arrest that me legislations. yet to be discovem::l, already ex·ereise their criteria of satisfaction on the knowledge that seeks tohouse: them. Thought would not have truly lingered..

We will Stt that Kantian thought cannot escape this finalprMicament (of the type you would not look for me if you hadnot already found me), nor can the predicament ~ avoided. How­ever. not being able to escape it is one thing. and knowing what toescape is another. This ideal "knowledge" is given to reflection inaesthetic judgment because reflection finds in aesthetic judgmentthe most autonomow model for itS "manner." The reading that Iadvocate---without at all contesting the legitimacy of the otherreading--consequendy admits that if the third Critiqur fulfills itsmission of unifying the field of philosophy, it does so, not primar.ily by introducing the theme of the regulative Idea of an objectivefinality of nature. but by making manifest, in the name of the aes·thetic. the reflexive manner of thinking that is at work in the crit­ical text as a whole.

represenration, but of the object rather than the "subject." Thus itis a ·'knowledge." Despite the immediate presence of the slate ofthought it signals or perhaps because of it, sensation is not theknowledge of a subject. In the passage quoted above. it is not saidthat sensation is present every time there is "representation," thaiis. conscious representation. But we will se<' in the "deduction" of"common sense" in paragraph 11 of the third Critiqu~ (se<' Chapter8, pp. 198-101) that such must be the case jf aesthetic judgment isnot to be reduced to a particular opinion tied to a simple empiri­cal agreeableness (48-50; 46-48). We encountered the same argu­ment in the Introduction (p; 2t), where the argument rested onthe universality of the a priori conditions of knowledge in general(of thought) and was used to legitimate taste's claim 10 universality.

Any aa of thinking is Ihus accompanied by a feeling that signalsto thought its "state." But this state is nOlhing other than the feel­ing that signals it. For thought, 10 be informed of its state is to feelthis state---to be affected. The sensation (or the feeling) is boththe state of thought and a warning to thoUghl of its state by thisstate. Such is the first charaaeristic of reflection: a dazzling im­mediacy and a perfect coincidence of what feels and whal is felt.

'This is true to such a degree that even the distinction between theactive and the passive nature of this "feeling" is improper to feel­ing. for it would introduce the beginnings of an objectivity andwith it a knowledge. I call this a matter of reAection because sen­sation refers solely to the criterion of differentiation bern'een plea­sure and displeasure (and not at all to the distinction between trueand false or just and unjust). The faculty oftht sou/that is respon­sible for this difference is the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, 10which the simple "faculty of judgment" corresponds on the side ofthe said cognitiw faculties U9; 36). Yet in its purest mode, the lat­ter is reflective. Pure reAection is first and foremost the ability ofthought to be immediately informed of its State by this state andwithout other means of measure than feeling itself.

In paragraph 9 of the third Cri,iqlt~, Kant introduces sensation.The question is to know how in a judgmenr of taste we become

"AmlJ~tic &jl«tion

cupya position similar to that of the right and the len in pure re­Aective thought. Sensation, the au,hisu. signals where the "mind"is on the scale ofaffective tints. Ir could be said that sensation is al­ready an immediate judgment of thought upon itSelf. Thoughtjudges it to be "good" or "bad" given the activity in which it isengaged. This judgment thus synthesizes the aa of thinking that israking place before an object. with the affection that this aa pro­cures for it. The affection is like the inner repercussion of the act,its "reAection."

From this brief localization of sensation there follow two re­markable charaaeristics, both of which relate to the aesthetic sub­ject and to aesthetic time. The first is that seJlS300n is always there.I would nOI 53y thai it is permanent, knowing the problem thatIhe idea of permanence raises for critica.l thought especially whenapplied to a "subject." I will come back to this. By "always there" Imean only that it is there "every time" there is an act of thought,what Kant c:ills "knowledge" or "representation." The term "aaof thinking" presents its own difficulties. We an hope to lessenthese difficulties by limiting its scope to the notion of actualthought as opposed to active thought. or occurring rather thanperforming: "for, itl so far lIS ir is colltaini!d in a singk momnlt [ineinem Augenblick enthalten] no representation can ever be any­thing (mrmais i!twm l1'1uum] but absolute unity (ais abso/uu £in­Mt)" (UV A, 1)1, t.m.; 14]; emphasis in the text).

The occurrence ofsensation accompanies all modes of Ihought.whatever the nature of thought may be. To use the terms that Kanthimself employs to place them in the "serial arrangement" of rep­resentations (KRV, )14; 354), whether one "intuits" or "conceives."whether one forms a "notion" or an "idea." there is always sensa­tion. The dichotomy with which this classification begins concernsour question dirtttly. It distinguishes perceptions that are repre­sentations "with consciousness," knowledge £rJrmnmis (cognit;o).objective perceptions. from sensations £mpji"dul1g (muatio) orperceptions "which relate ... solely to the subject as the modifica­tion of its state" (ibid.). Intuition. like sensation, is an immi!diau

con~ious of the agreement of the facuhics (of knowledge) thatare In fr« play, whether it is by sensation or uinrellecrually." Theanswer to the question is argued in the following way;

1£ Ihe given n:presenr:uion occasioning me judgment of taste ~rc aconcept that united understanding and imagin:uion in the eSlimalrIlku".t:ilung) of the object so as to give a cognition of the object. IheconscKlusncss of Ihis relation would be intellectual (25 in the objttti\,cschcmarism of judgment dah ",~th in Ihe critique). BUllhcn. in th:ucase, I.he judgment ...."Quld nOl be laid down with fe5IXCl 10 pka5urcand dlspl(aSurr, and so would not be a judgment of taste. BUf now,the judgment of taste dClcnnines thc objttt, indept:ndcntly of con­ttpLS, as regards delight 2nd the prediCllC ofbeaury. There is, there-­fore. no ~,hcr w.ly for the subjcetivt' unity of Ihc relation in question10 make ltsdf kno,,'tl [/unnrlim nuuhrn] man by Sl."nsalion. Cs9-60;,,)

'3AmIJ~ti( &JI«Iiol1

to draw attention to the remarkable disposition of reAection thai Icall fllut'K0rical The term designates the idemiry of form and con­lent. of "law" and "object," in pure reAective judgmem as il is giv­en to us in the aesthelic.

The effect of sensalion's recurrence with every occurrence of(conscious) thought is Ihat thinking "knows" the st3te (withoutcognizing ii, but sensation is a represent3tion with consciousness, aperception) in which it finds itself in fhit occurrrl1U. Sensation isthus able [Q pass through the differem spheres of thought that thecritique distinguishes. Sensation is thert on the OCCLSion of anyobject that thoughr can think, whemrer it may be in the "field" ofpossible knowledge. For sensation never takes place except on theoccasion of a thought. The differences (hat have allowed a hierar­chy to exist berween the simple "dwelling place" of an object ofthought in relarion to a "territory" in which itS knowledge is pos·sible, and a "realm" in which thought legislates It priori (l2-1,};

~10), do not prevent thought &om bring able to [«I ilHlfon everyoccasion. Thought must still be able to feel itself as it relates to ob­jectS in the "unbounded ... field" (I,}; II) of the supersensible,~nif one only finds in it Ideas of reason about whose: objectS one canhave no theoretical cognition (ibid.).

One might contend that this transitiveness is assured from themoment that one has presupposed on~ mind, on~ thought, on~ sub­ject, and mat, therefore, reAection is nothing more in the end thanthe predicare ofone of these emities. So that the ICCUrrence ofsen­sation would only translate, in succession, the permanence of asubstrate. This objection raises nothing less Ihan (he question ofthe subject in Kamian thought, We will come back [0 this. But as[Q the presupposition ofa substrate "bearer" ofsensation. (he refu­t3tion ofsuch a hypothesis is simple. If there is a substrate in Kam­ian thought, it exists as the regulative Idea, for Ihe substrate is thesupersensibJe about which we have no knowledge (213-15; 203-5).

The idea that we have of it cannOl even be unique, for it must besuited to each of the antinomies proper to the three highest facul­ties that arc the object of the critique. To represem Ihis subStrateone needs nOl one bur three Ideas: Ihat of the "supersensible of

,

Am/mit: Rql«tion"

Further (§,}6), whe~ he proceeds [Q the "deduction" of judgmentSof taste by answering the question How are judgmentS of tasrepossible~, ~nt distinguishes this question &om the question aboul~h~ POSSIbIlity of judgmentS of knowledge in (he following temu:m Judgme~tS ~f t~(e in COntrast 10 judgmentS of knowledge, thefac.ul~ 0'£ Judgmg has not merely (0 subsume (the givens] underobjectIve conceptS of understanding ... and does not come undera law, but rather ... it is itself, subjectively, object as well as law[Qg~mlmld sowoIJI als Gdnz itt)" (145, em.; tj8).

In this last passage in particular one begins to detect the othercharacteristic of reAection, namely, a capaciry that I will call adomi~iling capaciry. Thinking can defer to the power of under­standmg for a knowledge of the object. For the tasle it has for anobject, however, it relies on its own competence, its Mlaw" rhe~subjective pri.nciple".we have already encoumeroo, Thollgh~ onlyJudges a,ccordlllg to liS state, judging whal it finds pleasurable.Thus thIS state, which is the "object" of its judgment, is the verysame pleasure thar is the "law" of this judgment. These two as.peets of judgment, referentialiry and legitimacy, are but one in theaest~etic. By m~ving the tcrm "aeslhetic" away from Schelling'sparticular use of It (although the problem is a similar one ), I mean

nature in general," thai of a "subjective finality of nature for ourcognitive F...culries," and that of a finality of freedom in accordwith the finality in the moral sphere (215; 20). ~ Chapter 8, pp.215-18).

It is striking that little mention is made ofa subject in the glO.(majority of Kant'S texts that touch on reRection. In general the ex­ceptions are to be found in me Introduction. Whatever me casemay be, the notion of a "subject" in its subst2ntive form does norseem necessary [Q the understanding of what n=Recrion is. The no­tion of actual thought (in the sense evoked above) is sufficient.On the contrary, the adjectival or adverbial forms, "subjective,""subjectively," abound in these texts. They do not designate an in~

srance, subjectivity, to which sensation refers. They allow onc todistinguish the information that sensation provides thought fromthe information that a knowledge of the object brings thought.We have read (59; 51) that Kant places sensation in a kind ofsym­metry with the schema. The parallel is quickly abandoned, for theschema makes knowledge possible, whereas sensation provides noknowledge at all. However. something of the symmetry may bepreserved: just as the schema unites the TWO faculties. imaginationand understanding, in order to make knowledge of an object pos­sibl~n the side of the object, so to speak-so sensation is thesign of their union (pleasure) or of their disunion (displeasure),on th~ occmiot/ of an object and on the side of thought. In bothcases, it is indeed a relation between the same faculties. It is never­

theless a faCt that Ihe schema is determinant of the object ofknowledge, and the sensation is a simple sign for thought of thestate of thinking this object. The sign provides an indication ofthis state every time that thought thinks. One could say thatthought is reAected there, on the condilion that one accept a re­Aection without representation in the modern sense of the word(Freud, for example. conceives of affect as a ~reprcsemative" with­out rcpresemation).

In order to aCCOllnt for this disposirion, Kant introduces the no­tion of a supplementary faculty-rather neglccted until now, espe­cially in itS ~t:lutegorical" aspecr-the simple capacity to feci pJea-

'5AmJmic &ft«tiot/

sure or displeasure. It has no more need than do the OIher facultiesof referring back to a substantial "subject." In critical thought,Ihese OIher faculties are, after all, or should simply be sets of con­ditions that make synthetic judgmentS possible a priori. As to itSlogical implication, a faculty can be reduced to a group of "pri­mary" propositions that are a priori conditions: the definition of

Ihinkable objectS, the axioms of the syntheses that can be ~r­

formed on them. What Kant calls the "territory" or the "realm" of

the faculty corresponds to what the logician calls the domain ofapplication ofa set of axioms (mutatis mutat/dis . .. ).

"Subjective" always determines a state of thought (of "mind,"

one could say, although the Gnniir of GnniitszlIstn"d is more of asentimental mode than it is a Cdst). The term "subjcctive" forcesthe critique to question what thinking feels when it thinks andwhat it cannot fail to fccl in every case or, as Kant writcs, on all oc­casions. If one can speak of the occurrence of sensation in all of the

uses of thinking, let there be no mistake: this occurrence is butthe insistence of a shadow thrown by a cettain actual thought onitself. and not the persistence ofa substantial predicate attached to~thinking." In sensation, the faculty of judging judges subjectively,that is, it reAects the state of pleasure or displeasure in which actualthough! feels itself to be. This almost elementary characteristic onwhich me deducrion of [he subjective universality of taSte will lean

comes to light in aesthetic judgment. This is btta~, in the c:asc: ofaesther:ic judgment, judgment has no objective validity, and thefaculty of judging has, in effect, only to judge a stale of pleasure orofdispleasure, which is by this time already the judgment.

The "Subjective"

The second observation relates to what the first implied as to thenature of an aesthctic Temporality. I can only begin to outline ithere. for the latter certainly merits a study of its own. An indis­pensable clcmcnt of this study lies in rhe analysis of the pleasureexperienced in taste from the perspective of the faculties of knowl­edge in general. There is a certain minimalism to the a priori con-

,

Antlmic Rll«tioll'4

The quantity and the modality thus defined depart notablyfrorn whal they would have to be if they were categories of under­standing. Thcy admit restrictive clauses rhat turn them into some­thing like logical monSlers. But one must see precisely in thesedistortions the sign that we are dealing with "places" of the reflec­rive IOpic that are subjective modes of synthesis, provisional orpreparatory to the cuegories as they are described in the Appendixto the analytic of the first Cririqu~ entitled "Amphiboly of Con­cepts of Reflecrion" (KRV, 176; 309). 0 return to this below. To fa­cilitate maners I will refer to this ten simply as the Appendix.) Inplace ofwhal will be the quantity of a determinant judgment, re­flection can already compare givens under the "heading" (Tiul) oftheir identity or their difference, and in place of what will be themodality ofa determinant judgment, it can compan= givens underthe "heading" of their determinability or determination (nv, 2n,281-81; po, 315-16). The distortion or the monstrosity that affectSthe categories by means of which the analysis of taSte proceeds,results from the fact thar here the movemenr of reflective anamne­sis works from the objective to the subjective. If the categories were

applicable to taste JUSt as they were, taSte would be a dererminantjudgmenr. (However, it is true, and we will try to understand whyit is, that this judgment that is not determinant must be analyred

by means of the categories in order to appear paradoxically assuch.)

This judgment is reflective, and thus it is singular or particular,but it nonetheless involves a double claim to the univcrsal and thenecessary. Is this claim legitimate? It is, given the condition of aprinciple authorizing it. This principle is obviously a "subjective"one. It "determines ... by means of feeling only and not Ihroughconccpts" (~IcJJN flM dureh Gifii!JIzwd flich, dureh 8t"griffr . ..bmimmt": 81; 19). It can be formulated: there must be aGemt"imiflll, a "common sense." This sense is not at al/ an Mexlernalsense" (an allusion, pcrhaps, to the computing of a sixth aestheticSense by Dubos and by Hutcheson), but "I he effcci arising ftomlhe free play of our powers ofcognition" (8J; 80). This is thc sameprinciple that was presupposed in paragraph 8 under the name"universal voice" (dit" nllgml~i,,~ Srimmr. 56; 54). Thc tcrm Srimmt"

'7Am/mic &jl«tion

,

Am/mic &jkc,ioll

dition of pleasure provided by the beautiful: "Now the concepts in

a judgmelH constitute irs contem (what belongs to the cognitionof the object). But the judgment of taste is not determinable bymeans of concepts. Hence it can only have irs ground in the sub­jective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjectivecondition of all judgments is the judging faculty itself, or judg­

ment" (1'43; 136--37). Here we see why the "deduction" of the judg­ment of taSte is "so easy": "It is spared the necessity of having to

justifY the objective reality ofa concept" (147; hll). This minimal­ism on the side of the faculties of knowledge prevents pleasurefrom being anributed to a subject. On the contrary it leads to ananalysis of the part played by the tWO other faculties. imaginationand understanding, in the "state" of thought that is pleasure. Thenuance o/this state or that in which this state consiSts is to befound in the relation of these faculties to one another outside ofany cognitive aim.

The analytic of the judgment of taSte makes this clear under thedouble heading of quantity and modality. We will come back tothe use ofcategories in this analysis (see pp. 4J-49 and Chapter 2).If taste is nor to lapse into the particularity and contingency of adetermined empirica.l agreeableness, one should be able to discov­er in it.a universality and a necessity. despite its wholly "subjective"nature. We know the solution given to this problem by the ana.lytic: a judgment of the beautiful is not immediately universal. burit immediately "imputes" (iimu . .. an), "waits for" (~rwartt't).

"promises itself" (siclJ wrrpriclJt) (56--57 (.m.; $4) a subjective uni­versality in the name of a GnndngiiltigJuir, of a universal validity

h4; ,52). This for irs quantity. For its modality, the judgment oftaste unites, in a necessary way, the "favor" (Gunu: 49. 47) thatdistinguishes it from other delights with the form judged Ix:autiful:this form cannot fail to please. But this necessity cannot bedcmonSlrnted, nor can it be anticipated by a reasoning. It is said tobe "exemplary" (ex~mpillriscb; 81; 78) becllIse judgment, in the sin.gulariry of irs occurrence on the contingcm occasion of an object'sform, only gives the "cxample of a univcrsal rule that onc cannotformulate [dit" m(/n l1idu tmgt"bm .hum]" (ibid., r.m.). This formcalif/or F.til to pleasc.

appears very rarely and perhaps just once in the text of the thirdCritique. Srimme is quite differem from the French voix; it evokesthe accord of voices, and the mood of a soul (Stimmlmg), and thebeginnings of irs determination as destination (&stimmung). The[CTm leads one directly (Q the analysis of Gnneiminn. What is inaccord in the Latter are the voices of understanding and imagina­tion, the faculties of knowledge taken only in their respective dis­positions, the one to conceive and the other to present, taken thusprecisely "before" they operate in a determining way.

The interpretation to be given to this common sense has pro­voked much debate. I will ancmpt to show how its riltio mendiconsists not in the assent that empirical individuals give one an­other in regard [0 the beauty of an object but-insofar as it makesthe a priori feeling of aesthetic pleasure possible-in the unisonin which the two ~voices" of the faculties are [0 be found: the "pro­ponionate accord" (proportionni~ru Stimmung: 60; 58), "accord"(Stimmung), "proponion" (Proportion) in which their ~ratio" (Vn'­hiilmis) is "best adapted" (zutriiglichJt~: 83; 80). This argument willbe elaborated funher (see Chapter 8). For the moment I will sim­ply support it with the following passage from paragraph 31: "Nowif this universality [of taste] is not [0 be based on a collection ofvotes fSrimmmsammlungJ, a recollection of voices and interroga­tion of others as [0 what son of sensations they experience, but isto rest, as it were, upon an autonomy of the subject passing judg­ment on the feeling of pleasure (in the given representation), i.e.,upon his own taste., and yet is also not to be derived from con~

cepu" (135-36, [.m.; 130). This text in particular, in which theproblem of the universality of taste is posed, should be enough to

discourage all sociologizing and anthropologizing readings of aes­thetic common sense, although other passages of rhe third Cri­tiqueseem to lend themselves to it (150-P; 144-45). I am thinkingin particular of Hannah Arendt's reading, but she is not the onlyone. The "autonomy of the subject" here invoked by Kanl can benothing other than what I call the reRective tautegory. It leads usback to our question about aesthetic time.

The pleasure of the beautiful promises, demands, gives the ex-

'9Amlmic &.fkction

ample of a communicated happiness. There will never be proofrhat this happiness is communicated, even when individuals orcultures empirically agree to recognize forms given by nature oran as beautiful. There can never be proof of this because a judg­ment of taste is nm determinant and the predicate of beauty is nmobjective (41-42, 50-51; 39-40, 48-49). However, if taste involvesthis demand it is because taste is the feeling of a possible harmonyof the faculties of knowledge outside of knowledge. And as thesefaculties are universally and necessarily required in any thinkingthat judges in general, so must their greatest affinity be in anythinking that judges itself, that is, that feels itself Such is, in sum­mary, the "deduction" of the principle of common sense, the ar­gument of which paragraph 21 (83-84; 8(}-81) gives an outline (ad­dressed in §9; 57-58; 55-56). The deduction rests on the "faCt,"provided by the pleasure of taste, that there is a degree of optimalagreement between the two faculties. This degree of optimal agree­ment exists even when the faculties are released from the con­suaints of knowledge and morality, and have no way of graspingwhat it is that provides this pleasure, i.e. the form of the object:"free play" (frde Spid: 58; 55), "quickening" (Bekbtmg: 64, 143; 61,·137), "stirs" krweckr), "puts" (incites; vmetzt: 154; 147; see Chapter2, pp. 60-67).

Thus this unison only mkes "place" whenever the pleasure oftaste is experienced. It is only the ~sensation" of this unison hereand now. It releases a horizon of unison in general but is itself sin­gular, tied to the unpredictable occurrence ofa form. The union offaculties is felt on the occasion ofa certain sunset, on the occasionof this particular Schubert allegro. Universality and necessity arepromised bur are promised singularly every time, and are only JUStpromised. There could be no gre:ner misunderstanding of judg­ments of taste than to declare them simply universal and necessary.

I consider this unison to be singular and recurrem and always asif it were occurring anew, as if it were something that appeared

Aesthetic Temporality

,

Amhi!tic R1/i!ction,8

every time for the firn time, like the outlines of a Msubjea." Eachtime a form provides the pure pleasure that is the feeling of thebeautiful, it is as if the dissonances that divide thought, those ofme imagination and the concept, were on the wane and left theway o~n. if nOl [0 a perfect agreement, then 10 a peaceful conju­gality or at least (0 a benevolent and gentle emulation resemblingthe aoC' uniting fiances (see Chapter 7). The subject would be theperfect unity of the faculties. 8m taste does not mult from thisunity. In this sense it cannot be felt by a subject. 1r results from the"engagemenrn of the two faculties and thus announces the hoped·for binh ofa unit~ couple. There is nOI one subjectivity (the cou·pie) that experiences pure feelings; r:uher. it is the: pure feeling thatpromises a subject. In the aesthecic of the beauliful the subject is ina state of infancy.

It finds itself in this state each time pleasure arises from thebeautiful. h does nOt rrmilin in infancy. For it to remain so, thesynthesis with its "promises of unity" would have to be possible ina unity mat persisted idential to iudfover time. For the conditionof persim:n«: is one that must be found in the concept of a sub­ject. We see, however, that the condition is contradictory: if a uni­ty of promises were possible, promises of unity would be impossi­ble or fallacious. The aesthetic would be merely a muddled logic.

Yet even logically, the condition for the unification of the di­versity of repr~nt:ltions in a subject encounters great difficulty.This synthesis is attempted in the second edition of the first Cri.liq~ under the heading "Transcendental Deduction of the PureConcepts of Understanding." Whether or nOt this deduction (inthe critical sense: KRV A, 120; 126) misses its object or nor will notbe discussed here. I will only remind the reader that "the principleof the synthetic unity ofapperception," also ailed the klJ dmJu orthe '"u:lf as identical" (KRV 8, 153, 155; 140, /4n, which the deduc­tion establishes or claims to establish whatever its intrinsic ground,refers only to a thinking thai knows objects objeclively. In arguingto legitimate this principle (KRV D, §19), Kant insists on this to

such an extent thar he makes it the force of the said deduction: forwant of being bound to the a priori principle of this S,lbJJ, judg-

21AnrJxtic &j/«tion

menU about objects merely have a "subjective validity" (ibid., 159;154)' arc "only subjective" (ibid., 159; 154-55) as in the case of "per­cepdon~ and "association~ (ibid.).

Without going into me intrinsic difficulties of this deduction. itwould be wrong to look for me aesthetic "subject" in a synthesissimilar to that of me Ich dmJu. me sole purpose of which is toguarantee the objectivity of judgments. I would venture funher. Areading, even one like Heidegger's, endeavoring, not without rea·son, to demonstrate that in rhe end the authentic principle of thesynthesis is nOt the .. , think" bur time-such a reading is valid (ifit is valid) only for knowledge and ern only refer to determinanttheoretical judgments. It is clear mat morality (for example), ifonly because of the supposition of an unconditioned causality thatescapes by hypothesis the serial time of the conditions ofdetermi­nalion-a supposition that must be made in order to deducemorality-requires a notion of time or of temporality more het­erogeneous than that required by knowledge (see Chapter 5, pp.131-37). This is all the more true for aesthetic time. Judgments oftaste determine nothing of their object. To be synmesized witheach other in succession and eventually in a subject, they them­Stlves must nevertheless be taken as objects for this synthesis. Thisis always possible. But by its very nature this synthesis is the onethat unites the diversity of judgments of taSte under the concept oftheir determination and under the schema of their succession. It isthus theoretical and objective, like me a priori unity ofappercep­tion, and not aesthetic and subjective.

One needs to venture further still. The first edition of the firstCriri'l'u, in its Preliminary Remark or more precisely the vorliiuJig~

Erimlt'rungthat constitutes the body of the second section of medl-duction (KRV A. 131-33; 141-47), focuses on the mrtt elemen­tary syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition(ibid., 132-33; /4(1-4.1) that apply to the givens upon which under­Standing makes its judgmenrs of knowledge. These syntheses, Kamwrites, "point to three subjecrive sources of knowledge that makePOssible understanding itself-and consequently all experience asits empirical product" (KRV A. 131; 14/). A few lines earlier Kant

J

AmlNtic &Jkaion20

'J

responds clearly, that is, negatively, to the question of the possibil­ity of a subject and an aesthetic temporality (both sublime) con­slituted according to the model of the Ich dmk~ and the tempo­rality required for theoretical thinking. There seems to be no ques­tion that the most elementary conditions (the syntheses of time)for the synthesis of a &/bsr are lacking here.

Yet this failing does not in the least prevent the feeling of thesublime from being a feeling, that is, a "sensation" by which athought, reflective in this case, is made aW2re of its state. This Slateis cenainly complex, ambivalent as to the quality of the judgmentIhat is made ahout the object, for thinking says both "yes" and~no" 10 the latter, according and refusing the object its "favor":thinking is both "attracted" (angnogm) and "repelled" (abgm~n:91; 88). It remains that "the judgment itself [that is, the sublimefeeling] all the while stC:l.dfasdy preserves ils aesthetic character,because it represents, without being grounded on any definite con·cept of the object, merely the subjective play of the mental po~rs"(107; 103). I conclude that the properties thar prevent the deduc·lion of a sublime subject are the same ones that allow the sublimeto be maintained in the order of the "subjective. n

'The "subjective" can and must persist as the sensation of itselfthat accompanies any act of thinking the instant it occurs. This itmust do even when the most elementary synthesis required byknowledge, thaI of a minimal apprehension of the givens in a sin·gle instantaneous grasp, is no longer assured by the imagination,the faculry whose responsibility it is to ensure this apprehension.In such a case where this synthesis is wallling in the order of de·termination, the lncJtof synthesis is fclt just as strongly in the orderof reAection. This is the case because the only synthesis relevant for

. reAeaion is the synthesis that puts the faculties at work in thinkingin contact with C:l.ch other. If imagination succumbs in its duelwilh reason, it is signaled in and as a "state" of thought; it is feh. Itis a displeasure.

When it is a matter of taste, the relation between panners isgood, well proportioned, and "free" because it is nm subject to thelegality of undemanding that constrains the imagination by

J

already notes thaI these sources are "subjective," when he indicatesthaI they "form Ihe a priori foundation of the possibiliry of expe­rience" that comes to fill in the categories of undersranding. The"objective realiry" of the categories of understanding finds suffi­cient aurhorization in the proof that one cannOt think withoutthem. Bur "more than" (m~hr ab) the unique power of thinking asunderstanding is at stake here. What is at stake is understandinginsofar as it knows objectS. The "subjective sources" (the syntheses)establish the transcendental possibility of the knowledge of ob­jects.

These syntheses are ofcrucial importance to aesthetic judgmentsin their relation to time. In the third Critiqlt~ it is no accident thatfrom a "mathematical" point of view, the "Analytic of the :Sub­lime," under the cuegory ofquantity, or under the "heading" of itssubj«tiwanalogue, focuses almost entirely on the "apprehension"(AufflUJung) and the "comprehension" (ZUlIlmmm[lUJlmg), alsocalled the compnlumio a~tlm"cll (99, 102, 107; 95, 98, 104), of theelements of a given form (see Chapter 4, pp. 102-9). The analysisis conducted from the perspective of space, but it is easy and in·teresting to carry it over to the form of time. The painful charavter proper to the sublime feeling procteds notably from the apor­ia of the judgment it involves from a quantitative point of view(see Chapter 4). Tra.!lSposed into time, this aporia signifies an in­ability to synthesize the givens by containing them within"a Jingkmommt" (in einem Augenblick: KRV A, 131; 143). If in apprehen­sion, consequend)', [he intuition, limited here to its JUbj~ctjlJ~ sta­tuS because it is not a question of knowing the object, is thwartedif not impossible (.see Chapter 5, pp. 141-46), one must ask oneselfhow the synthesis of "reproduction in imagination" that is "insep­arably bound" to it (KRV A. 13}; 148) can take place at all. Not tospeak of the third synthesis, the "recognition in a concept." More­over, one does not see how in the absence of the elementary syn­theses, "subjective sources" that "make possible understanding,"the unity of a subject (here, the subject of the sublime feeling)could be deduced.

I have chosen the example of the sublime judgment because it

Ae$thnic &j{mion

schematism and principles to prepare the givens for rheir sub­sumption under concepts. This freedom is manifest in the gende,reciprocal emulation between the faculty ofconcepts and the fac­ulty of presentation, wirhout the former taking over with its "sur_feited" excess (89; 85) of order (of geometry, for example), or thelarrer with a fantasy so uncontrolled it would escape all subjectivefinality (85-88; 82-84). This euphonic disposition (to rerurn ro themotifof Stimmt) is examined in the analysis of taste from the per­spective of the relation, which, here, is finality (6t-~h; 58-77). Thisfinality is subjective in that it puts the components of the thinkingof me beautiful, that is, of imagination and understanding, to­gether in such a way as to suggest their accord. Thus it is, I repeat,that ant "subject," a subject, that is, ant' is promised.

To say on the COntrary that me relation of the faculties in ques·tion in me sublime feeling-imagination and reason-is cacopho­nous does not change the general disposition that places any aes·thetic on the side of the "subjective" or reflective judgment. Itseems the feeling must be the opposite of what it is in taste, forwhat is felt in the sublime is not the proper proportion in the freeplay of the twO faculties that are being exercised, but their dispro­portion and even their incommensurability: an "abyss" (Abgrund)~parates them. An abyss that repels and attracts an imagination(107; 103) is enjoined to present the absolute. The paradox ofKant's analysis (which here, no matter what he says, clo~ly fol~

lows Burke's analysis of iklight) is that it discerns in this cacopho­nya seem: euphony ofsuperior rank (see Chapter s).

However, the partners have also changed; reason has been re­placed by understanding in the challenge to imagination, and bt­(dUSt ofthis another finality is revealed in the ruins of the agree­ment of the faculties that made the beautiful pleasurable. Due tothe change of imagination's partner, a conflict, which at first ap-­pears to be merely "mathematical" in the antithetical sense of thefirst Critiq~, rums into a "dynamical" conRict. From a conflict inwhich refleCtion dismisses both parties with its double "no": nei·ther of you, neither one nor the other, has any legitimacy to claimwhat you claim-we move to a conflict in which it credits both of

,

[hem with a double "yes": imagination is justified in trying to pre­sent the unpresentable and in not being able to succeed; reason isright (Q demand that it make this vain effort, because reason hereis practical and the Ido to be presented is unconditioned causali­ty. freedom, which constitutively requires its present realizationbut also constitutes the supreme "destination

nof the mind (see

Chapter 7, pp. 171-73).Thus the question of whether the subject of the sublime is the

same as the subject of the beautiful makes no sense. There cannotbe a subject as synthesis, as rontainer, or as agent ofsublime feelingany more than there can be a subject of taste. To say that the sub­lime feeling is subjective means that it is a reflccrive judgment andas such has no claim to the objectivity ofa determinant judgment.It is subjective in that it judges the state of feeling, and judges ac­cording to the state of feeling, in a tautegorical fashion. A5 withtaste, the filtering of the analysis of this aesthetic judgmentrhrough the categories allows one to determine a concept of this"state.n The procedure reveals the degree to which the unity of thefaculties is precarious, lost almost-this is the component of an­guish in this feeling. The -aptitude" for Ideas of reason must be de­veloped in order for the perspective of a unity to reemerge fromthe disaster and, 10 say it simply, for a sublime feeling to be possi­ble. This is its component of elevation that makes it similar tomoral respect. Taste promises everyone the happiness of an ac·complished subjective unity; the sublime speaks to a few of an­other unity, much less complete, ruined in a sense, and more "no­ble" (tikI: 125; 120). By recalling these various predicates, one ispainting shades, the nuances of feeling; one is not constructing asubject. In the singularity of its occurrence, aesthetic feeling is puresubjective thinking or reflective judgment itself.

For Kant, what one calls the subject is either the subjective as­pect of thinking, and as such consists entirely in the tliIutegory thatmakes feeling the sign, for thought, of irs state, thus the sign offeeling irself because the "Staten of thinking is feeling; or else thesubject is only a ground zero where [he synthesis of concepts issuspended (in the first Critiqut) or is the ever receding horizon of

The Heurinic

'7Amb~/ic&f/«Iion

know it? One would need to have at one's disposal a "topic" thatcould distinguish in advance not only me "places" {ibid., uh; j/J}

in which the syntheses could precisely take "place" bUl also theconditions in which me application of these syntheses was legiti­mate and those in which it was not. The "logical topic" (ibid., 1.81;

j16). which has itS sourcc in Aristotle, disringuishes the different"headings" (ibid., 281-82; jI5-16) under which a plurality ofgiven"representations" can be assembled. But this determination revealsa "dOCtrine" kiflt'l1brt: ibid., 281; 315) that already confuses these"headings" wim logical C2tegories as if any synthesis were legiti­mate from the moment that it obeyed a rule of understanding, amistake perpetuated by imellecrualism.

The preliminary question to a logical topic is thus me following:How is the use of these "headings" determined? How are they dif­ferent from categories? This is the question of the "transcendentalIOpic." It does not prejudge the "headings" it distinguishes as beingapplicable to things themselves. What is presented in the "head­ings" is only "me comparison of the representations mat is prior tothe concept of things" (ibid., 281; jl6). These "headings" regroupthe spontaneous ways of synthesizing givens. One might say that

.. they all respond to the question, What does this (iliis given) re­mind us of? They are always comparisons. But one may compareaccording to various "headings." Kant thus enumerates four waysof comparing, four "headings" that he discusses in the first part of(he Appendix: identity/difference (Vmchi~dmluir), agreement/op­position (Widml"it), inner/outer. determinable (or maner)/de­tcrmination (or form).

How are they different from scbemas when they seem to occupya similar intermediary place? The function of me scbematism is, let

me repeat. to make possible the modes ofsynthesis already definedand attributed, respectively. to the unifying power given in theforms of sensibility and to the unifying power proper to the cate­gories of understanding. The schemas are in "third" rank, so to

sJX:ak, as intermediary oper:Hors in the transcendental elaborationor the conditions of possibility for knowledge in [he strict sense.Ilowever, the various reRexive "headings" that put representationsin relation to each other are "places" "in a Sla[e of mind" (ibid.,

Amh~tic&fin/ion,6

the faculties' synthesis (in the third Cn"tiqul). In both cases it is an

Idea the paraJogisms of which the first Critiqut' enumerates andthat ~Aaivdy 3U3Ch themselves to a transcendental appearance ifone is not careful (KRV. 328-8); J7tr4j6). It is precisely through re­Aection, using the subjcctive Stale as a guide for thinking, using thefeeling that accompanies it in all its acts, that onc can Joane thisappearance and restore all proper domiciliations. And when theact of thinking is dirccted at the subject, it is with reAcetion again

that onc can critique the notion ofsubject.

We will now examine me consequences for critical thinking and. for the critical rext of the other trait that characterizes reAection,

the one I have called heuristic. It docs nO[ amoum (Q very much to

say that reAection, as sensation, accompanies all acts of thinking: itguides thcm. Nor to say that it passes through me topic of me fac­ulties' spheres of inRuence: it elaborates me topic. Nor does itamount to very much to say mat reRection is itself elaborated in atransparent manner in the aesmetic insofar as the laner is subjec­tive: reRection is the (subjecrive) laboratory of all objectivities. Inits heuristic aspect, reRection mus seems to be the nerve ofcriticalthought as such.

Kant introduces. reRecrion in its heuristic aspect starting withthe first Cririqlu, in the Appendix to the analytic of principles(KRV, 276-94; 309-JI). He calls reRection, Okrkgung, "that state ofmind in which we first set ourselves to discover lallsfindig zumacbm] the subjective conditions under which we are able to ar­rive at concepts" (ibid .• 276; 309). To a great extent the text is de­VOted to me critique of intellectualist philosophy, to the philoso­phy of Leibniz in particular. Faithful to the inspiration that rules

the transcendental aesthetic. Kant reminds us here that phenome­na are not objects in themselves and that a certain use of "con­cepts" that Leibniz mistakenly anrihUles to understanding alonemust be repatriated to the territory thar belongs to sensibility.

The question concerns the domiciliarion of rhe syntheses. Notevery synthesis is the doing of understanding. But how do we

'9

of these "headings") are to be objects, whether for pure under­standing or for sensibility" (ibid., 281; p6).

An example: under the "heading" identity/differen«, two ob­jects whose predicates are all identical are logically indiscernible,according to Lt:ibnit.. However, if they are intuited in different re­

gions according to the forms ofspace and/or of time. though it beat the same exact instant, it is necessary to think them as twO dis­tina objects. "Certainly, if I know a drop ofwater in all its internaldeterminacions as a thing~in-itself, and if the whole concept ofanyone drop is identical with that of ev...ry other, I cannot allow thatany drop is different from any other. But if the drop is an appear~

ance in spa«, it has its location not only in understanding (underconcepts) but in sensible outer intuition (in space)" (ibid., 283;JIB). Leibniz's principle of indiscernibles is thus no more than "ananalytic rule for the comparison of things through mere concepts"(ibid., 184; JIB).

It is not only the critique of intellectualism that is operative inthe text of the Appendix. The Appendix is already the detection ofthe "transcendental appearance" (expounded a few pages later) thatmakes one believe that only the purely conceptual determination

'Ofa relation between phenomena (their identity) is valid; yet ph...~nomena are given in a spatiotemporaJ intuition (that preciselymakes them phenomena) and admit ofother relations that may bein contradiction to the first. Although logica.lly indiscernible, two

objects can be aesthetically discernible (in the sense of the: firstCriti'lw).

In th... Appendix to the analytic of principles this confusion isstill but a "transcendental amphiboly" (ibid.• 182; p6), that is, aconfusion of address: the drops of water are identical if they aredomiciled in understanding, different if they are addressed to sen~

sibility. This is because thinking has a sensible intuition of thedrops ofwater. Thus it is not a matter here as in the transcenden~

tal "appearance" (KRV. 197-307; 334-47) of a finitude of the fiacul~

ty of presentation forgetting itself in the use of concepts, but ofnegligence in the topical reRection on the conditions of knowl~

edge of objects that are effectively knowable.In face of the "illusion" that pushes thought to grant the same

278; )10). The relations they enable look for their "right determin- .ing" (ibid.) of their assignment to a fuculty, either understandingor sensibility. Once domiciled, the syntheses that these relationsindicate only"subj«tiwlj (ibid.) are legitimized in their objec­tive, cognith'e usage. The "headings" are thus not even "conceptsofcomparison" (ibid.), as one might be tempted to call them, butonly places of provisional and preparatory localization. They canbe compared to the topoi that for AristotJe and the rhetoricians(ibid., 281-82; 315-16) support an argumentation ofopinion. withthe difference that the critique will retain "no more than theabove~mentionedfour" already cited (ibid., 181; 316) and that itwill not grant them any cognitive validity. These places are imme­diate. lt is up to the reRection that detects them to turn them intoauthentic conditions for the possibility of syntheses, into tran­scen~enrallocations, into forms or categories. This expected trans­formation is what allows them to be called "concepts of reRection"(ibid., 288; 324).

lt is subjectively through reRection that they first become pres­ent to thought as possible syntheses filt by thought "before" think­ing turns them toward the knowledge ofobjecrs. It is again reRec­tion, reRection alone that will assure their "right determining" bydomiciling their use with one of the twO faculties. For reflection is.writes Kant, "the consciousness of the relation ofgiven representa­tions to our different sources of knowledge" (ibid.• 276; j09). InKant'S text the term "consciousness" generally includes reRection:thinking is conscious insofar as it is aware of its srate, that is. inso­fur as it feels itself. ReRection thus does not only feel thinkingspontaneously synthesizing in such or such a mann...r-four all to­gether-it also subjectively feels that a «rrain mann... r or a certain"heading" of synthesis belongs to sensibility, another to under~

standing. Thus it is that "we fif$[ set ourselves to discover the sub­jective conditions under which we ar... able to arrive at concepts"(ibid.), as we have read. This is how the "transcendental topic" op­erates, entrusting to reRection the determination of faculties inwhich every synthesis whatever its "heading" finds its legitimatedwelling place: "We must first resort to transcendental reRection inorder to determine for which cognitive fuculty they [the objects

Ant/Ntic Rrf/«tion

cognitive value [0 concepts of reason (without me correspondinginruition) as it does to those of understanding, which are legjrj.matdy associated with sensible inruitions, rI~Aea:ion is up against

much more than me ignor.mct: of the amphiboly mentioned inthe Appendix. For this "logical precept !that pushes us} .. _to ad·vance towards completeness by an ascent to ever higher condi·tions" (ibid.• j07; 346) reflectS "a narural and unavoidable dialecticof pure reason"' (ibid., }oo; 337). The appearance of logic that givesrise to the: amphiboly can be dispelled. and the intellecrualism thatis irs victim and representative refuted. But one cannot avoid the:

transcendental appearance (ibid.• 298-300; 335-37). The u:mscen­dental dialectic can only prevent the "natural dialectic" of reason

from abusing us without, however, being able to do away with it.It is in fact the "actual principles [wirkljcb~Grmuhiitu] that incite

us [0 tcar down all those boundary fences" (ibid:, 299; 336) that"the critiquc" opposes to the use ofconcepts outside of experience.

However, the question raised in these conditions by appearanceand illusion for the transcendental dialectic cannot be elaborated,let alone resolved, except by reRective work. Meditating on the

notion of appearance and taking sensory appearance for his mod·e1, Kant assimilates the erroneous judgment it contains to a "diag.onal," "the diagonal berwec=n rwo forces ... that determine thejudgment in different directions that enclose, as it were. an angle"(ibid.• 298; )Jr). This complex dfttt must be decomposed into theeffects proper. respectively, of the rwo forces in question, sensibil·ity and undernanding. for the illusion to be dispelled-this is whatmust be done "by transcendental reAection" "in the C3S(' of pure il

priori judgments" (and no longer in perceptive empirical judg­ments: ibid.). Its function we are reminded ("as we have alreadyshown": ibid.• that is, in the Appendix) is to assign "every repre­sentation ... its place in the corresponding faculty of knowledge"(ibid.). Thus the heavy task, the infinite task of distinguishingspeculative syntheses from cognitivc syntheses, which is one of the

most important tasks of the dialectic of the first Critique, also be­longs [0 reReetion.

We must conclude the following: it is based on the feelingthinking experiences while it proc«ds ro the elementary syntheses

)'Amlmic &jkction

called "headings" or "concepts of reRection" that thinking "first"

(ZUt'Nt: ibid., 276; )09) guides irself in determining the dwellingplace or places of the faculties that authorize each of the syntheses.Only in a certain realm can a particular synthesis legitimately take~place" because it will have been localized and circumscribed bythe conditions of possibility of its tutelary faculty. But this domi­ciling requires that thinking have the faculty of being able to ori·entate irse!( The relative uncertainty. the amphiboly of the reRee·tive "headings" leaves room for hesitation as to the proper address.whereas the determination ofsyntheses under the categories of un­derstanding presupposes on the contrary a legitimate dwelling

place already known and occupied.This conclusion must be corroborated with other remarkable

moments of the critique, the moments when the critique circum­scribes the "territories" and the "realms" of validity of judgments.In particular for ethical judgment. and ofcourse for aestheric judg.ments. We will only be able to present some of the restimonies.However. judging by the AppendiX to the analytic and the Inuo-­duction to the dialectic, rwo related texts that constitute the turn­ing point of the first Critiqu~, we can already diagnoK: the follow­ing: with reRection. thinking see:ms to have at its disposal the crit­ical weapon itsel( For in critical philosophy the very possibility ofphilosophy bears the name of reRection. The heuristic power toundertake a critique, Uruilslmtfi. is the power to elaborate theproper il priori conditions of possibility. that is. the legitimacy ofan a priori synthetic judgment. But this elaboration (analysis and"deduction") itself requires synthetic judgments ofdiscrimination.Thus the power to critique must have the enigmatic capacity tojudge the proper conditions of judgment "before" being able to

make use of, before having the right to make use of these condi­tions in judging whether they are the proper ones. Yet reRection is,as we have said. rautegorical in that it is nothing but the feeling.pleasant and/or unpleasant, that thinking has about itself while itthinks, that is, judges or synrhesizes. The operators of the synthe­ses that it produces are ~first" reRected or reflexive, under the~hcadings"or "concepts of reRection," as spontaneous assemblagesof "representations," as blurred "comparisons" that have nOt yet

Amlmic R4I~ctioll)0

JJ

basis of subjective comparisons in order to "exist." Besides the faCtrh:H. strictly speaking, they have never existed and will never exist,they arc "always already" what must be called upon (Q legitimate ajudgment's claim that it knows its object. In the Appendix thequestion is (Q know how their legitimate use can be discovered andnot how they are produced. This is why reflection, in assumingrhis task, fulfills a function that is not constitutive bur, instead,"heuristic." Much more than a genealogy, one should see in the re­flexive momenr a kind of tllla1IUUsisof critical thought questioning

itself about irs capacity to discover the proper use of the transcen­dental locations determined in the "Transcendental Doctrine ofElements" formed by the Aesthetic and the Logic. One is rhus led(Q calculate that the further critical thought moves from the safe

places of synthesis that are the forms of intuition and the cate·gories of understanding (with schemas), that is, the funher itmoves from the examination of tl priori conditions of knowledge,

the more manifest the tautegorical aspect of reRection becomes.There are signs of it in the more frequent occurrence of operatorssuch as regulation (in the "regulative Idea" or the "regulative prin­ciple"), guidance (in the guiding thread), and analogy (in the "as

.,jf"), which are not categories but can be identified as heuristic

tauregories. Because of these curious "subjective operators," criticalthought gives itself or discovers processes of synthesis that havenot received the imprimatur of knowledge. Knowledge can onlydraw on them reflexively, inventing them as it does according to itsfeeling, though it may have to legitimate their objective validity af­terward. If this assessment is correct, one could say that followingthe theory of the elements of the first Critique, the anamnesic toneof the Kantian text is bener heard the closer critical thought comesto objects as little knowable (stricto sensu) as the Ideas of theoreticalreason, moral law, taste and the sublime feeling, and last the his­

torical, political judgment. For the laner objects ofcritical thought,the act of dispelling an amphiboly occasioned by a failing in thedomiciling faculty is not enough to discover the proper use of their11 priori conditions of possibility.

From this first observation rhe second naturally follows; with

been domiciled, that are pre-conceprual, feh. And it is preciselybecause these "headings" are felt and not yet determined in theirobjective use (having only "subjective" value) that reflection can le­gitimate or delegitimate their use according to the faculty thattakes hold of them.

The reader of Kant cannot fail [Q wonder how me critical think­er could ever ntnblish conditions of thought that are n priori. Withwhat instruments can he formulate the conditions of legitimacyof judgments when he is nO[ yet supposed [Q have any at his dis­posal? How, in shon, can he judge properly "before" knowingwhat judging properly is. and in order to know what it might be?The answer is that critical thinking has at irs disposal in its reflec­tion, in the state in which a certain synthesis not yet assignedplaces it, a kind of transcendental pre-logic. The laner is in realityan aesthetic, for it is only the sensation that affects all actualthought insofar as it is merely thought, thought feeling itself think.ing and feeling itself thought. And because thinking is judging,

feeling itself judging and judged at the same time. In this subjec­tive presence of thought to itself there is the domiciling gesturethat sends the spontaneous syntheses (under their "headings") (Q

their tutelary faculties thus limiting their use and establishing theirlegitimacy.

Such is the aspect of reRection that I have called heuristic. To.gether with the tautegorical aspect, it transforms the apparent apo.­ria of thinking, of a critical thinking that can anticipate its tl pri.ori's, into a legitimate patadox. Critical thought thus seems able toescape many of the objections made to it, in particular from theperspective of speculative thought. But I will not get into this.

)2

Anamnesis

I will insist instead upon twO observations. The first is that thereflexive "moment" should not be understood as if it had its placein a genealogy. The tl priori conditions, the categories of under­standing, for example, or the forms of intuition are strictly tl priori;they did nor wait for reRective thought to produce them on the

ings.~ as theY:llre enumerated and examined in the Appendix tothe first Critiqur, are still overly affiliated with or connected to thec.llegories of undemanding. then the critique must lind a WliIIy tobre:tk this subjection and leave the proper domiciling of the "head­ings" (the "heading'l" of reflective thinking reducm to itsdf, m:llt is.to sensation) ro the purely t:llutegorical reRection that aestheticjudgment alone engages. Sensation is in itself the whole of taSteand of the sublime feeling from the perspective of the faculties of

the soul.Yet critical thought does not take this path. The "Analytic of

the Beautiful" and the "Analytic of the Sublime" are ind~ in­volved in correcdy domiciling these twO :lIesthetic judgments andcircumscribing their exact legitimacy-tautegorical reRection. Butthey cannot accomplish this without the help of the categories ofunderstanding. One might say that the analysis of purely taute·

J gorical. "reflective" judgments (for taste, at least) cannot take"place" without recou~ to the principles of legitimation discov·ered for determinant judgments in the first Cririqur. An abruptend is thus put to reflective anamnesis at the precise momentwhere, with taSte. it seemed that anamnesis would be forced to re·Ae~ivcly reveal the depths of reflection. It seems that we are neverto know more about the ~headings" and the "places" of pure re·Aective synthesis than what we can know by means of the pureconcepts of understanding. Did the Introduction not say the fol·lowing about taSte: "Here, now, is a pleasure that-as is the casewith all pleasure or displeasure that is not brought :lIbout throughthe agency of the concept of freedom ... no conceprs could everenable us to regard :lIS necessarily connected with the representationof an object.... It must always be only through reflective percep-­

. tion ,hat it is cognized :lIS conjoined with this representation" UI.l.m.; 28). Can the critique, then, not speak the language of this"reRective perception" upon which. according to all indications, itceaselessly orientates itself? Or perhaps this "reflective perception"has no language at all. not even the voice of silence? What is atstake here is the relation of the tautegory to the category. of the reoflective to the determinant.

J5AmlKru RrJketion

the aesthetic (I set politics aside. it having not b«n the object of aCritiqu~) one must lx very far advancm in the anamnesis of criti·cal thought. The "object" of the critique of the aesthetic faculty ofjudging is in fact nothing other than reRective judgment itself. inits purest ml.Ie. Yet what does "pure" here me2n? That it is the"sensation" that refers thinking to itself and in so doing informs itof du: "sentimental" state, the pleasure or displeasure in which itfinds itself, because this "sensation" is this stare. It follows that themovement of critical thought must reverse itself here if we com·pare it to what it was in the first Critiqll~.

In the latter. as we saw when we examined it in the Appendix tothe principles. the interest of reflection consisted mainly in itsheuristic function. It was a matter of showing how critical thoughtcould distinguish among the spontaneous comparisons to whichthinking proceeds when it redisuibutes them to the competentfaculties for the faculties to legitimate. I have not yet studied therole that the categoties play in this redistribution. I wiU do so. butit cannot escape the reader of the Appendix that everything hap-­pens as if the four important. pure concepts of understanding­quality, quantity, relation. and modality---exerted their controlfrom high and from afar, but did this through the anamnesis inwhich reRection discovers in itself the four "headings" under whichthinking subjectively feels the comparisons (0 be possible. Thisteleguidance of reRection by the categories of understanding canperhaps be explained here by the fact that reflection. in irs heuris­tic aspect. has only to discover the proper use of the categories ofunderstanding for knowledge Jtricro JmJU.

AJ for :lIesthetic judgments, which are only sensations consid­ered to be judgments :lind which must be analyzoi as such, thetautegorical function of reRection must on the contrary win outover irs heuristic function. for in this case sensation does not andshould not lead to anything but itself. Furthermore, sensation doesnor "prepare" thinking for any possible knowledge. The locationsof legitimacy that sensation discovers must remain ;u locations,norhing more than the "headings" under which thinking feels thecomparability of the givens to be. And if it is [rue that these "head·

Amh~ticJ?4kction

37Amlxti€ RrJkction

ori still to be found already controlled the search by subordinating[0 itself what should have bec:n a reA«tive a priori.

Invoking the fact that thinking's knowledge of itself is subja:tedo the same a priori conditions as any other knowledge and that

:ansequently one should find in it the same formal conditions asin the knowledge of objectS does nothing to justify this inversion.This argurn~t carries no ~ight beause reAc=aion is not a form ofknowledge. "I do not know myse:lf through being conscious ofmyself as thinking." we om reminded in the paralogism.of the fir.stCritique (KRV 8, )68; 377-78). It is true that the consciousness Ifi

question in this passage: is more logical (the "I" is a concep~) ~an

it is rc=Aective. BU[ the conclusion is all the more true a ftrnon forrdlc=aive: consciousness, which is immediate and withoU[ concept,without c=ve:n the concept of an "I think": it is a sensation or "aperception that relares soldy to the subject as modification of itsstate" (KRV, )14; 354).

To justify reflective anamnesis being predetermined by the con·ditions ofobjective knowledge, we could invoke what ~ have ~.

ready said: that reAection does not produa undersranding. It dIS­cove:rs in itself modes ofsynthesis that om similar to those of un·

" demanding. The laner om always already me:re to nuke knowledgepossible. As for the reflexive "headings" that do not entide reAec­tion to a consciousness of itself, one: might say that they were re­

Aexive "manners" ofcomparing give:ns, although in thought thesemanners would only be the subjective echo of the use ofcategories.

If we confine: ourselves ro this answer, we give up the: he:uristicfunction of reAection. The search seems eve:n to work in the op­posite direction: because of the categories, reAection is able to rc=­veal spontaneous modes of comparison about itself, which are onlyapproximate figurations of pure: conce:pts. Yet there had ro havebeen a reflc=aive heuristic act because the critique was able: ro writeitself; the transcendental can be constitu(ed on the: basis of theempirical It would be more correct ro say that the: reAexive "head­ings" operate as principles ofsubjective distinctions similar in theirrole to the role ascribed ro the differc=nce between right and left in

Let us re:turn for a moment to what the: Appendix of the: firstCritique has [Q say about this relation. The: "headings" unde:r whichthe: purely subjective: syntheses are regrouped, the "comparisons"made by simple: reAc=aion, are: four in number. as we have .s«n:ide:ntity/difference, agrec=ment/opposition, inne:r/oute:r, de:termin.ablddete:rmination (nv, 277-96; jID-j3). These "headings" mayseem somewha~ enigmatic. But Kant explains the:m, leaving nodoubt as to their function. Thus the: comparison of a set of repre­sentations under the "heading" of id~tity is the: subjc=aive move­me:nt of thought that wiU lead it [Q a universal judgme:nt; if thecomparison is made: under the "heading" ofdifTe:rence, the:n it willnot be possible to regroup all the: represent2tions unde:r the: sameconcepr and the judgment that can be made will be a panicularone:. It is clear that the reAexive: "heading" ide:nrity/difTerence: isthe: subja:tive: "threshold" through which a comparison passeswhe:n it goes to place: itself under the catc=gory of quantity. Simi­larly for quality, agrec:me:nt and opposition subja:tivdy indicate:affirmative: and ne:g:uive: judgments. The: "heading" of inner pre­pares for the: calq;Ory of inherence (or subsistence), that of outerfor the catq;ory of causality (or dependence:), both being cate.gories of relation. Finally me determinable (or maner) gives rise toproble:matic judgments, the detetmination (or form) to apodicticjudgme:nts. A translation of a merely dete:rminable subj«t into thetetminology of modalities is as follows: I do not judge it impossi­ble to attribute: this predicate to this subject; and of a subj«t ofthat is fully dete:rmined: I judge it impossible nOt to attribute thispredicate to this subject.

From this exposition, which is bolstered by the many critiquesthat Kant directs against Leibniz's intellectualism and which mayseem to make: it somewhat obscure, we see that the reAexive "head.ings" are almost reduced to being merely the subj«tive reAectionsof the: categories of understanding. A little as if the cognitive a pri.

Reflection and Category in the Theoreticaland Practical Realms

"What is Orientation in Thinking" (ORIENT, 239). It is not enoughto have the four poinrs of the compass 10 orientate oneself inspace; one also needs the subjective non~congruence of the rightand the left (first elaborated in "Concerning the Uhimarc Foun.dation of the Differentiations of Rcgions in Space"). The CltegOry

is not enough to orientale onese1fin thinking. Thinking also needsa principle of differentiation that has only subjective value butwith which the use of the category is made possible and legiti.mate. What I have called domiciling consim precisely in rhis. ThereAexive "headings" guide domiciliation toward suitable dwellingplaces.

Therefore in rhe lext of the Appendix the critique of Leihniz'sthought is anached to the exposition of the "concepts of reflec~

tion." What the critique of intellecrualism-which slips into theexplanation of the "headings" of reflection-in faCt shows is thatby itself the category is blind. The category applies its mode ofsynthesis and thus authorizes the judgment that results from it onall the givens with which it is presented without distinction. Thejudgment that attributes a predicate to the totality of a subject,which is universal, has for its only condition the complete enu­meration of the logical properties that define the subject. Thusrwo drops of water will be identical for understanding becausethey arc logically identical. But guided by its identity/difference"heading," which is not the category of quantiry. reflection re­marks, however. that they are not absolutely identical, for they arelocalized differently in space. Consequently these "same" objects ofthought require different syntheses, depending on whether theyarc thought logically or aesthetically (in the sense of the first Cri­tique): identifying synthesis in the former, disjunctive synthesis inthe laner. The heuristic function of reflection is so important thatit discovers a "resistance" of the forms of intuition to their unwar~

ranted assimilation into the categories of understanding. This dis-­covery dispels the confusion proper to intellectualism and legiti~

mates the modes of synthesis according to the dwelling place oftheir fucuhies. Reflection is certainly discriminating, or critical, forit is opposed to the ill-considered extension of the concept outside

39Aesthetic ReJkctiOll

its realm. It domiciles the syntheses with the faculties or, in whatamounts to the same, determines the transcendenta.ls that the fac­ulties are by comparing the syntheses each can effect on objectsd13t appear to be the same: the rwo drops ofwater are and are not

identical.As we have said, the same separating power of the reflective

heurisric act enables one to locate the transcendental appearanceand denounce the illusion resulting from ir. I will cite the particu~

lady diStinguished case of the antithetic of the fitst Critique herebecause it has a decisive impact on the reading of the "Analytic of[he Sublime." I will call it the act (in the sense of enacting andnot acting) of the procedure (KRV, 461-64; JIJr22). We know thatwith the first rwo conflicts reason has with itself in regard to thecosmological Ideas of the beginning and the simple element. re­flection dismisses both parties merely by showing how these con­cepts have no corresponding intuition in experience and that thedifferend is undecidable in the realm of knowledge's competencethrough undemanding. The conflicts are about the quality andquamity of phenomena that belong to the world. The syntheses ofgivens effected in the name of these categories-their being placed

In regressive series toward the simple and tOward totality. tespec~

tively (ibid., 387-88; 44.l-43}-are said to be "mathematical" (ibid.,462.; 520) because they combine "homogeneous" elements (ibid.,463; 521). The condition ofa phenomenon must be a phenomenonthat is itself conditioned; a parr of a composite must in turn becomposite. With these terms we see the inability on the part ofunderstanding to rule on questions (if there is something calledthe simple, if there is a beginning in the world) that imply theIdea of an absolute (undecomposable. the unconditional). whichbelongs to speculative reason.

But we know the opposite is also true, that when a thesis andantithesis present themselves on the subject ofcausality. i.e., a cat­egory of relation (either there is or there is not a free causaliry inplay in the phenomena of the world), reAection recognizes thathoth positions are acceptable on condition that they are domiciledin different faculties: the first in speculative reason, which admits

Amh~ticRifkctioll38

.'Amhnic RrJketion

causality. is thus subject to far morc than a limitation. It undergoesa reorientation of such great importance that what results from it,the Idea of the unconditioned cause, ceases to be assigned to therealm of understanding in order to pass into that of reason.

We can be sure that reflection is what accomplishes the work ofdiscrimination if we look at the chapter emitled "Incentives ofPure PraCtical Reason" (ibid., 74--9}; 84-104)· The concept of in­centive "presupposes the sensuousness [feeling] and hence the fini·tude of ... beings" (ibid., 79; 89). It requires that thinking, in mo·rality, be immediately informed of its state by way of the sensationthat it has of this state, and which is this state itself, i.e., feding.Thus reflection in its tautegorical aspect shows that respect is theonly moral feding. Respect alone is the "heading" of a subjectivesynthesis that corresponds to the "logical" demand for a causalityor for an empty or merely formal legality. For respect is not "theincentive to morality" but is "morality itself, regarded subjectivelyas an in~ntive- (ibid., 78; 89). When mor.l!ity is thought of aspure obligation, Achtung is the feeling. Here the pure taUtegory offeeling confers upon the feeling its heuristic value. Re8ecrion iso­lales respect unro itHl[ by comparing it to other possible incen-

" tives as the only subjective "state" suitable to pure law.The text fully acknowledges that this discovery takes place

through reflection, as a "manner" rather than as a "method," whichallows one to remark that the inversion of the relation betweencontent (the good) and form (the law as duty) is indeed a proper"method" (ibid., 65, 66; 74, ln, bm that this method is not with­our "paradox" (ibid., 65; 74). Yet what is a paradoxical method ifnot a manner? And how could it be. otherwise, especially given thechapter on incentives where, as we have ~n, morality's "aesthetic"is examined from the angle of feeling? As in the instan~ of thedrops of w:uer, one must depart from a logical application of thecategories to morality-the "method" proper (see the table ofcat­egories offreed.om: ibid., 68-69; 78)-and this departure, throughrhe paradoxes it discovers and that it uses, suffices to ensure thatthe heuristic proceeds, rather, as a "manner" (modw a~tlJ~ticus).

This manner allows one to explain "the enigma- (dar RiitHl) of

of the Idea of unconditioned causality; the SttOnd in knowledgethrough understlmding where every cause is itself an effect. The d­emems synthesized here in the name of the causal rdation are het­erogeneow (the conditional and the unconditional) and their syn­thesis is said to be "dynamical" (ibid., 462.-6}; 520-21). "The suitmay [thw] be settled [wrg/Uhm wmim kann] to the satis&ction ofboth parties [with) a procedure" (ibid., 462.; 52/). UnderstlUlding isjwtified in accepting only the conditional in the explication, andreason only the unconditional, which under the title of freedom isan apriori condition of morality. Yet this solution is presented as ajurisprudential supplement: ..the ju~ [supplementing] ... what islacking in the pleas" (tin RUhtn" tim Mang~1 tks &chtgriindL . .•ngiirw: ibid.). If reflection can rhw supplement the category, itmwt have at irs disposal a principle of subjective discriminationthat belongs to no faculty, but that enables it to restore thelegiti­mate limits of the faculties by exploring the confines they dispute.The act of procedure is thw an example of the reflective heuristicaa in its domiciling function. We see here: that the rc:lation of therdlccrive act to the category docs not involve a subjccrion of theformer to the latter, but rather the opposite.

It would not be difficulr to show that the same is true in theCritiqu~ ofPractical &ason. In the search for the "concept of anobjccr of practical reason" (KPV, 59-74; 68-&t), the critique canonly rc:fine the doctrines of the good by determining the limit thatreflection imposes on the use of the category of causality in therealm ofmorality. In judgment, this category is indeed ncces.sary inmaking possible the synthesis of an act with the moral cause (theIdea of the good) ofwhich it is the effect. But reflection dissociatesthis causality from a causality applicable to the knowledge of ob-­jeers of narure, to which actions regarded empirically also belong.The cause mwt remain without coment if the act is to be some­thing other than the dfcct of a natur.l! determination (interested).Thw reflection retains only the notion ofan empty legality of thetheoretical use of pure concepts (as '"type": ibid., 70-74; 79"-84) byprohibiting the content of what reAection brings together frombeing determined. The use of the category (of rdation), i.e.,

the critique (ibid., 5; 5) that "renouncelsl the objective reality ofthe supe~nsible use of the categories" while it gr.mts objectivereality to them when it is a question of the "objectS of pure practi­cal reason" (ibid.). The inconsistency is only apparent. Knowledgeconcerns ilSelf with phenomena to which the categories must beapplied for them to be determined. But morality rests on a "fact"(~in Filktum: ibid., 5; 6), the faa of a supe~nsible causa.lity. orfreedom, which can only be "thought of" (blojf gulacht: ibid.)without being determined, the way causality must be in iu cogni­tive usage. The use of the categories is "different" kinm tl,~n

~brauch) in the theoretical and in the practical. Yet what is mepower that estimates their proper use, that orientates them, if notreflection? ReAection is "consistent" thinking.

With this same paradoxical manner of proceeding, so removedfrom a "systematic construction" proper to the constitution of aseiener (ibid., 7; 6), one shouJd associate the term used for it inme prefaer to the second Critique to legitimate the accumulationof paradoxes or of "inversions" that surprise the reader of the cri·tique. This term is Ito~qunlte DmkunlJllTt, a consistent mannerof thinking, a consistent manner in thought.

This term reappears in the third Critique in the episode devotedto the "maxims of common sense" (153; 146). It designates thethird of these maxims, "always to think consistendy" (mit Jich ~lbrl

rinItimmig tknltnr: 152; 14P, as "the hardest of attllinment" (l53;146) because it requires that the twO preceding maxims also beobserved, "to think for oneself" and "to think from the standpointof everyone else" (152; 145), and because to be "attllinable" it re­quires a "repeated observaner" (narh tin" iifinm &folgung: 153,t.m.; 146). The spirit of a systematic topic pushes Kant to at­tribute---but only in a problematic manner ("we may say": ibid.)­me first maxim to understanding thus charged with emancipationin relation to prejudices, the second maxim to the faculty of judg­ing, which thus finds itself entrusted with the supervision ofa uni­versality not yet guaranteed by a conerpt, and the third maxim toteason. It seems to me more faithful to the thinking of the tran­scendental topic to ascribe all three maxims to reflection, and in

articular the last one. For in the first place a manner that cannOtl:e acquired, but whose "attainment" is acquired through "tqJCatedobservance." which Clnnot be learned ("siner learning is nothingbUI imitation"; 169; 161), resembles a "judgment" (having judg.menl) far more than it does reason. It could even characterize thegenius in art (§§46-49). If this manner is nonetheless attributed toreason we must be reminded oner again that "philosophy" itself,while it is a "rational sciener," can "never" be "learned": "as re·gards what concerns reason [and not its histOryl, we can at mostlelfn to phiwIOphw" (nv, 657; 7P). The third "maxim of com·man sense" calls on this reason, which counts only on itself, a re·fleaive heuristic reason. This reason makes the "rationalism" ofthe Critiques a critical rationalism. But, above all, what could itmean "always to think consistently" if not to listen to a fret reflec·tive capacity in order to guide thinking and the syntheses it ven­tures according to the fec:ling that thinking has of itself in the veryact of thinking?

Amhnic RrJkction

Reflection and Category in the

Territory of the Aesthetic,In light of what precedes, we wiU perhaps be able to see more

cindy the reason for the categorical "paradoxes," which are JUSt asplentiful in the third Critique as they were in the second. The dis­tonion undergone by the concepts of understanding seems so vio­lent that one might justifiably ask oneself what the filtering of theaesthetic analytics through the categories can bring to our under­standing of aesthetic judgments. After all, as I have shown withthe aesthetic-the examination of pure sensation-reRection seemsto be in sensation as it is nowhere else. In irs innermost aspect astautegory it is exempted from every taSk, even a heuristic one. Itdoes nm even have to search for its own condition of possibility.The laner. as has been previously nOled, is only Mthe subjective for­mal condition of a judgment in general ... the judging faculty it­self, or judgment" (143; 137). With the aesthetic, reRection seemsonly (0 need the Cl.pacity to reReer in order to judge reAexively. Its

AnJhnic Rrflmion4'

apriori condition is logically reduced to something called a "facul.ty," being here the Faculty to feel, that is, to judge im-mediately. Wefind a simpliciry, a meagerness in the a priori condition of aesthet­ic judgment, and perhaps even a lack. This minimalism shouldmake a "method" of analysis useless and even harmful when it isgoverned by the categories of understanding.

Is evidence of a "forcing" through the categories in the analyticof taste not provided by the proliferation of negarive or privativeclauses that follow one another and neutralize the determination ofthe judgment of taste under the heading of each of the four cate­gories? It is qualitatively affirmative (it says "yes" to pleasure-it isa delight), but with no motive. For quantiry, it is singular butclaims to be universal. As for relation, it is final but of a perceivedand nOt conceived "finaliry" (80; 77). Finally modality is apodictic.but its necessity is not demonstrable; ir is "exemplary" (81; 78).The blurring is constant, and obvious. There is no reason to besurprised, it seems, for it stems from the application of the deter­minant to the reRective. What is surprising on the other hand isthat the determinant must be applied to a manner of judging fromwhich it is excluded.

There is a polemical purpose to this paradox. The Appendix tothe first Critiqut affirmed thar a reflective topic was necessary toavoid the mistake of intellectualism. Symmetrically, the use, di­verted in the extreme, of the categories of understanding to analyzethe aesthetic feeling would aim 10 make manifest the uselessness oftheir direct application. We recall that in a note to the first Cri­tiqUt, Baumgarten's "attempt" "to bring the critical treatment ofthe beautiful under rational principles" was declared "fruitless"(KRV. 66-67; 64-65). The paradoxical inversion that the reflectivecritique introduces is thus announced: these principles or rules,which are in fact empirical, "can never serve as determinant a pri­ori laws by which our judgment of taste must be directed. On thecontrary, our judgment is the proper test of the correctness of therules" (ibid., 66; 65). The categorical filtering (or "forcing") wouldonly suggest in the end a eOlltrnrio the necessity of introducing a

Amhetie Refketion

principle o~"sllbjective distinction" allowing for the proper use oflhe categories.

Moreover, it is difficult to see which principle ofsubjective dis­crimination the aesthetic feeling might need in order to domicileitself, because it is, as we have already seen, this principle; aesthet­ic feeling discriminates between the beautiful and the ugly throughthe "favor" or "disfavor" it bestows on the form, without media­tion. It is no accident that quality takes the place ofquantity at thehead of the categorical analysis of taste: the "yes" and the "no" offeeling are not a simple logical properry of judgment contained bythe feeling; they determine whether or not t~ is beauty. They be­long to a kind of "existential" determination, similar to the dis­tincrion between right and left in the sphere of perception.

Perhaps, though, because it is a maHer of pure reflective judg­ment, understanding simply has no competence in rhe judgmentwhatsoever? Would the "proper test" not lie solely in aesthetic feel­ing, after all? And should one not conclude thar reflection, whenleft to itself, can only say, ") feel, I feel" and "1 feel that I feel"tamegorically? Just as genius in art "cannot indicate scientificallyhow it brings about its product" because it "gives the rule as na­fU"" (168; r6r)? Must one consent in the end (or at the beginning)thai the "consciousness" that pure reflection is, i.e., sensation, isunconscious like "narure"?

I think the trial is far enough along for the moment to havecome to judge. Pure aesthetic feeling does not have the means ofconstructing the a priori conditions of its possibility, by definirion,because it is immediate, that is, without a middle term. It cannoteven search for itself, as we said, and, moreover, it is missing evenIhe "places" of comparison that reRection can put under irs "head­ings" or provisional "concepts" when thinking undertakes to know.Even the pure feeling of respect, which is tautegorical, is only pureinsofar as it "says" at once a state of thought and the otlur ofrhoughr, the transcendence of freedom with its "complete incom­prehensibility" (KI'V, 7; 8). The pure feeling is the ethical "manner"in which transcendence can be "present" in immanence (ibid., 49;

Amh~tie &/ketion44

.' I thought, of thought in general and of ctitical thought inetlllCa . . .articular: domiCiling.

p F' Ily and above all, we must ask ourselves how the reversallila •

that we point to is possible, after having attempted [Q understandits nec~sity. \Xfh~ or what proceeds [Q the paradoxical.anamnesisb which logic discovers analogy? It can only be reflection. In the~XnalytiC of the Beautiful," thinking persisrs obstinately in reflect­ing through what in general it determines. Although it employsconcepts under which the givens must be subsumed in order to ar~

rive at knowledge, thinking maimains that these concepts are notsuitable, as they stand, in determining what it seeks to determinewith them, i.e., taste. Reflection is thus revealed as an excess ofdetermination, in the presumption of this impropriety.

There is much evidence of this to be found in the text. Let usexamine, for example, the antinomy of taste in the "Dialectic ofAesthetic Judgment" (§§56-57). The antinomy only admits of

Jpure feeling, leaving no room for any dispuuuio (thesis: 106; t97),because it is immediate, yet it would require an ~positio (antithe~

sis; 106. 109-11; 197, 200-202) devoted to establishing its univer~

saliry and necessity objectively, that is, by means of arguments andby c~ncepts. The first trait reflects the scntimental tautegory. Thesecond presupposes a heuristic (taste looks to be communicable).We have shown how the heuristic aspect of reflection is absent inpure aesthetic feeling, which seeks nothing. The "promises," the"expec[ations," the "exigencies" of universality and necessity thatthe analysis reveals in aesthetic feeling should be thought of as im­mediate, purely "subjective." At most they indicate the "headings"of possible comparisons from the point of view of reRection. If~ne were to go by the verdier reached by understanding on the,udgment of taste by means of its categories, the judgment is de­termined in all logic as particular (or singular) and merely asser­toric. An exposition and discussion conducted by concepts willn~t fail to show this. They will always conclude by saying: to eachhiS Own taste.

However. this same use ofcategories ofquantity (particulat) and

47Ambetic ReflectionAesthetic Reflection

57). But with tasre (in this regard the sublime feeling muSl beapart) the reAexive immediacy docs nOl refer to any objectivity,ther world to know or a law to realize.

The roles here must thus be reversed. Thinking undertakesheuristic act of reflection by means of the categories. The cagorics openly serve (J would say bluntly) as "principles of discriinarion" to orientate thought in the muteness of pure feeling.means is not fruitless, and the filtering of feeling throughquadrangle of understanding is not a forcing of feeling by unstanding. Rather, we see an opposite effecr: the pure concepts 0

apply to feeling on the condition, a reflective condition, as itthar they bend [Q feeling's resiSlance and that they distOrtstraight symheses authorized in their realm in order to rem'faithful to feeling. Thus it will be shown four rimes that taste 0

lets itself be undetSlood by the category on the condition that itcape the category's logic. The judgmem it comains has a "distcd" quantity, quality, relation, and modality, and these it has mly by analogy. What arc thus discovered arc the reflexive "hings," the pre~categories of rhought. But this time thinkinglonger thinks objects, as in the Appendix to the first Cdtique,does it think acts, as in the second, but thinks only states of iThe paradoxical anamnesis of reRection, conducted by meanslogic, discovets the analogic in a recurrent way.

Thus the pure concept of understanding fulfills the functiona principle of discrimination in discovering the "subjective." Sis the reversal.of roles that where one expected "manner" itsclf asheuristic procedure, one instead finds "method." The inatten .reader therefore suspects some forcing. Bur in truth, if indeedcategories can and must be thus employed to domicile the ap .conditions of taSle, the dwelling place sought after is nOt undstanding, for none of these conditions perfectly satisfies irs con .tions. Nor is it reason, even in the sublime (see Chapter 7). If thereis a dwelling place, it would have to be called, as we know, the I'C'"

Rective faculty of judging. But one may doubt whether this dotlindeed constitute a dwelling place, for it is the very heading, ill

detcrminalion ("form," in fact) in the Appendix to the first Cn'­

tiqJl~·These procedures are paradoxical only from the point of view of

understanding for an intellectualist philosophy. They are legiti­mate when one sees that the categories are maneuvered by reRec­tion in a heuristic function that exceeds the dererminant functionof the categories, nonetheless indispensable to the analysis. ThereReaive heuristic is at work in the texr of the analytic of rasre, andit discovers a latent heuristic (the claims of raste) in a feeling that,s«rnS devoid of any rasre. But the mediation of the categories isnecessary for the discovery 10 be possible. The result is a twistingof the dfecrs of determination that were expeaed from the appli­cation of rhe calegories. This twisting thar the reRective act exer­cises upon what is dererminant produces or invents the logicalmonsters that we know: a delight withour incentive or motive. asubjecti\'C' universality, a IXrceived finality, an exemplary necessity.Designations borrowed from the logic of undersr:rnding but di­verted by unexpecred epithetS as works of art. mC'S(' names are, inproper method or rather in prOlXr manner, those of the "places"thai the reflective heuristic discovers, ('Yen in rautegory, by means

-.of the category.We will tackle the reading of the "Analytic of the Sublime,"

keeping in mind the principle of this reversal that is demanded ofreRection by the aestheric. ThC'S(' reRective places reveal themselvesin sublime feeling, again by means of the categories. But we willsee that this occurs only with a further twisting of the categories.i.e., a dislOrtion. The price is the one that pure teRmion forces de­lerminant judgment lO pay in Kant'S text in order that determi­nant judgment derermine rhe reRective more effecrively rhan thereRective would be able lO if left lO itself:

49ANthttic &Jftction

modality (assertoric) reveals and awakens at the heart of the im­mediacy of feeling the "headings" ofcomparison or the "reRectiveconcepts" under which feeling lays claim. no less immediately. toopposing properties. Let us recall thai in the Appendix to the firstCritiqu~. the "heading" identity/difference is the reRective ana­logue of quantity and that the "heading" determinable/determi­nation that of modality. When raste "demands" or "promises" matthe beauty it attributes to the present form ~ attributed to itselfabsolutely, mat is. quantitatively. in (Otality. it prevents other aes­thetic judgments made on mis form from ~ing justified in refus­ing it beauty under any other aspect. The reflective judgment oftaSte would remain particular if it included a restriction implyingthat. in another aspect, the form judged beautiful does not inducethe immediate feeling of a subjective harmony. But the "state" ofthought that corresponds (0 raste remains, on the contrary. idmti·(alto itself. It persists; it does not allow for diffnma in Judgmentupon the beautiful. Logically evaluated. this quantitative propertycould ~ called universality. But the logical quality of a judgmentremains panicular (or singular). Thus it is only by subjective com­parison under the "heading" of identity that a universality emerges.a universality consequently that we will call "subjective."

The smle is true for modality. For understanding, the judgmentof taste is, at best, assertoric: a form is beautiful because it pro­vides a pleasure connected to beauty; this is a faCt. But here again,the reRective demand, at work even in the use of categoriC'S. re­vivC'S, in the immediacy of the sentimental assertion. an opposite"heading." the one that pmJt:nts the form from not b~ing feh, thatis, judged beautiful. This demand for the absolute necessity ofjudgment, present in subjective feeling, calls for the communica­tion of the subjective feeling by everyone, And here again thisclaim thwarts the validity of simple assertion that logic must at·tribute 10 it (because this judgment does not have the means todemonstrate irs own necessity), Thus the analytic docs not ac·knowledge the judgment of taste as having an apodictic necessityin irs immediacy. Instead one finds a pre-modal "heading" underwhich reRection can group irs comparisons, and which is called

Aeslh~ric Rdketion

66; oJ), He will only read the E"qlliry into tbl' Origin ofOur Ideasoftill' Subliml' and thr &autiftl (1757) in Garve's German transla­tion (1773)· In rhe third Critique he places "rhe enquiry" under therubric of "psychology" or "empirical physiology" (130--31; 125). Itdescribes correctly and even cleverly the kinds of delight that thergo, body and soul, experiences when it judges an object ~utifulor sublime. But such an exposition is incapable of accounting forthe demand to be communicable that the aesthetic feeling imme­diately entails. The empirical description has no access to this de­mand, or else it attributes it ro a desire for "sociability," thw losing:u1 specificity of aesthetic feeling. The empirical description doesnot have, by hypothesis, the means ofelaborating an 11 priori prin­

ciple to justify the fact mat the ego, in experiencing the ~utiful

(and perhaps the sublime; see Chapter 9), requires that the Illlt'rex­perience it too (1.30--.32; 125-27). 11 does not have the means, inshort, of elaborating a transcendental critique of the communityalJed for by me aesthetic.

This, brieRy, is me immediate COntext and pla~of the AnaJyticof the Sublime in the text. As for the textuaJ completeness thatthe analysis of the sublime would enable, the feeling of the naive

~der is, r:uher, the opposite: the AnaJytic of the Sublime creates abreach, nm to say a break, in the examination of the aesthetic fac­ulty of judging.

In truth the question-Why an anaJytic of the sublime?-is it­self naive. What does "why" mean? The analytic is cert2inly nm"inrroduced," if we are to go by the "surface" of the text. Its ne­cessity is not "deduced" in the critical sense. The same can be said

for the beautiful. the analytic of which also begins t'X Ilbrupto.However, the criticaJ, philosophical function assigned to 12ste, asaesthetic reAective judgment in view of the unification of the the­oretical and the practical, has been well argued in the Inrroduction(beginning with §III). Its function was legitimared at that time:the pleasure provided by the beautiful, in narural forms or quasi­natural (artistic) forms, presupposes, as Idea, an affinity of namrewith reAective thinking that Kant calls a "subjective finality of na­ture for our cognitive faculties" (115; 205). This affinity will be ex~

tended to the Idea ofan objective finaJity of nature for freedom, an

5'Comparison oftbe Sublime and Tasu

5°

Why an Analytic of the Sublime?

The textual organiution of me "Analytic of the Sublime," ofwhat Kant caJls its Ema/ung, its subdivision. destrves cloS(: aneo.tion C9J; 90)· This partition is of grrou significance to the "con·tent" of the analytic. and at times ~en acero.s it.

The analysis ~ins with a transition, an OlNrgang(§2J),leadingthe reader from the capaciry of estimating (fkun~;[ung) the bou·tiful to dlat ofestimating the sublime. There art not twO faculties

of judging but two powers that the faculty of judging has of esti·mating aesthetically. and that proettd in different ways. Both feel·ings, that of the bouriful and that of the sublime, belong to thesame family-that of aesthetic reRection-but not to the samebranch of the family.

Why the transilion to the examination of the sublime? Kantdoes nor explain it. Is he concerned with saturating the analysis ofaesthetic feeling? Is it to make a place for himself in the disputethat had raged throughout Europe for a century over the sublime?Does it h~ve an intratextual mmive, a contextual motive? The im­pact of the laner was evident in his Oburvntions on til' Fuling oftbe Beautiful and Ill' Sublime, published in 1764. Kalll had readBaumganen's Aestbetica (1750), which he rejected, as we have seen,in a note to the first Critique as an "abortive efron", to bring thecritical treatment of the beautiful under rational principles" (KRV,

§ 2 Comparison of the

Sublime and Taste

[he exposition of the project of unification. Or [hat he wants it to

~ forgonen in recalling i[ so summarily. The First Introductionwas more explicit on the subject of [he sublime (FI, 437-41).

Moreover, and to return to our "transition" from the beautiful to

the sublime, Kant makes no mystery of the incongruity of this an­alytiC when he concludes the aforementioned transition with theaporctic form of the following assessment: "Hence we see that theconcept of the sublime in nature is far less important and rich inconsequences than that of its beauty. It gives on the whole no in­dication of anything final in nature itself, but only in the possiblemlployme1Jt [Cebrauchl of our intuitions of it in inducing a feeling[fiiMbarl in our own selves of a finality quite independent of na­ture.... This is a very needful preliminary remark. It entirely sep­arates [gatl.z abtrennt] the ideas of the sublime from that of a fi­nality of lIature" (92-93; 90). This is why, he adds, "the aestheticestimate of the finality of nature," the "theory" of the sublime, is "amere appendage" (einen bwJ?en An/Jlmg: ibid.).

What is added [Q nature finalized aesthetically is, in shorr, theloss of its finality. Under the name of the Analytic of the Sublime,a denatured aesthetic, or, better, an aesthetic ofdenaturing, breaksthe proper order of the natural aesthetic and suspends the functionit assumes in the project of unification. What awakens the "intel­lectual feeling" (Geiswgefiihl: 33; 29), the sublime, is not nature,which is an artist in forms and the work of forms, but rather mag­nitude, force, quantity in its purest srare, a "presence" that exceedswhat imaginative thought can grasp at once in a form-what itcan form.

The "mere appendage" [Q the critical elaboration of the aesthet­ic by natural finality thus takes a menacing turn. It indicates thatanother aesthetic can be not only expounded but "deduced" ac­Cording to the rules of the critique. This other aesthetic appears tobe "comra-final" (zweckwidrig: 92; 88). The feeling that is ana­1}7.ed is indeed aesthetic, for it immediately informs rhinking of its"subjective" state. But the quality of rhe "state" of thought is pro­vided by pure quantities that defY the imagination.

A negative aesthetic, one might say. Bur the word is vague. Taste

53Comparison oftiN Sublinu and Tastt!Comparison oftb~ Sublim~ alld Tasu

Idea that is the object of the second part of the third Critiqu~.

Thus, critically speaking, the compatibility (no more) is made p0s.­

sible between the Idea of nature as mechanism, subject to the leg_islation of undersranding that consrittltes experience (firsr Cri­tique), and the Idea of nature as arr rhat authorizes and even callsfor, as its end, as its horizon, the supernatural works of freedom([Parr II] 97; 302). This compatibility is announced subjectively,minimally, so to speak, in the simple pleasure of the beamiful.

We will see that the same cannO[ be said for the sublime feding.The relation of thinking to the object presented breaks down. Insublime feeling, narure no longer "speaks" to thought through the"coded writing" of i[S forms (160, tom.; 153). Above and beyondthe formal qualities rhar induced the quality of raste, thinkinggrasped by the sublime feeling is faced, "in" narure, with quantitiescapable only of suggesting a magnitude or a force rhat exceeds itspower of presentation. This powerlessness makes thinking deaf orblind to natural beauty. Divorced, thinking enters a period ofcelibacy. It can still employ nature, but to irs own ends. It becomesthe user of nature. This "employment" is an abuse, a violence. Itmight be said rhar in the sublime feeling thinking becomes impa­tient, despairing, disinterested in anaining the ends of freedom bymeans of nature.

Following this, it is hard to see how the analysis ofsublime feel­ing could contribute to the projecr of philosophical unificationthat inscribes rhe whole of the critique and in parricular the ,sec­

tion on the aesthetic. The Introducrion, devoted to expoundingthe project, makes no mention of the sublime, save in a shorr pas·sage at the end of paragraph VII U3; 29). There it is said that if aes-­thetic pleasure is possible it is nOt only because the object can offera finality ro reAective thinking (as in the beautiful, which is nature"in" thought) but also because, conversely, thinking can feel itsown finality on the occasion of a form, "or even formlessness"(ibid.): this is the case in the sublime, which is "the subject" with­out nature. There is nO[ another word in the Introduction aboutthis reversal of finalities, however remarkable it is. One might saythat Kant almost forgOt to mention the Analytic of the Sublime in

is also negative; it denies understanding the capacity to resolve inconcepts the feeling of the beautiful and the judgments that con_stitute it. The Analytic of the Beautiful proceeds according to the

categories bur can never get to the bottom of taste by categoriesalone; it must partially deny their power (see Chapter I, pp.43-49). The sublime denies the imagination the power of forms,and denies nature the power to immediately affect thinking withforms.

The Analytic of the Sublime is negative because it introducesan aesthetic wimom nature. We can call it modern in the way thatRabelais or Hamlet is modern. I would even venture to say that, inview of this analytic and everything in Western thought that hadbeen building toward it-the Christianity insistent in Longinus'streatise-the aesthetic in general, which is the modern thought ofan (which takes the place of a poetics of the natural order tharhad become impossible), contains from the moment of its appear­ance the promise of its disappearance. Despite the effortS of spec­ulative thought and Romanticism, at the end of the nineteenthcentury, confidence in natural forms was shaken, and beyond

forms or in their very depth, thought was made liable, ~mpfiinglich.

fOf something that did not speak to it in good and due form.Thus historically speaking. the Analytic of the Sublime is not in­

congruous: it comes from afar and it goes far. Critically speaking.it is an enigma. "Fallen in an obscure disaster," if one were to speakwith pathos. What we are looking at today is how the critical pro­cedure enables one to determine the place of this aesthetic feelingof the an~aesthetic in the play of faculties, in their "economy" andtheir dynamic. The result of the critical elaboration of the sublimeis not insignificant for us today. This effon does not conuibutcto the general project of reconciling nature and freedom, that is, of

unifying philosophy. In the second pan of the third Critiqut, tele­ology also will not make use, at least explicidy, of the results ofthe analysis of sublime feeling. It is not hard to understand whythis is. Sublime violence is like lightning. It shorHircuits thinkingwith itself. Nature, or what is left of it, quantity, serves only toprovide the bad contact that creates the spark. The teleological

55Comparison oft/)r Subiimt and Taste

machine explodes. The "leading" that nature with its vital lead wassupposed to provide for thinking in a movement toward its final il­IUlllination cannot take place. The beautiful contributed to the

. Enlightenment, whidl was a departure from childhood, as Kantsays. But the sublime is a sudden blazing. and without future.Thus it is that it acquired a future and addresses us still, we whohardly hope in the Kantian sense. But this is still only history.

Seen in critical terms, the Analytic of the Sublime finds its "Ie~

gitimacy" in a principle that is expounded by critical thought andthat motivates it: a principle of thinking's getting cartied away. Asit is expounded and deduced in its thematic, sublime feeling is an­alyltx! as a double defiance. Imagination at the limits of what itcan present does violence to itself in order to ptesent that it can nolonger present. Reason, for its part, seeks, unreasonably, to violatethe interdict it imposes on itself and which is stricdy critical, theinterdict that prohibits it from finding objecrs corresponding toits concepts in sensible intuition. In these twO aspectS, thinkingdefies its own finitude, as if fascinated by itS own excessiveness. Itis this desire for limitlessness that it feels in the sublime "state":happiness and unhappiness.'It is all tOO obvious that this desire fOf limitlessness is useless,

that it should be relegated to inevitable illusion, that the critiquemust finally place the sublime dose to insanity, showing it to haveno moral value, that in the end the analysis of this feeling must begiven over to the aesthetic with the simple title of appendage,without significance. However, this stage comes "second" and is, ifI may say so, reactive. What is "first," active, and what motivates

these protective measures is the outburst of imaginative and ratio­nal thought. If the cfitique multiplies the reminders of what is"permitted" or "legitimate," it is because thinking is irresistibly

tempted to overStep them.In this regard the sublime feeling is only the irruption in and of

thought of this deaf desire for limitlessness. Thinking takes "ac­tion," It ~acts" the impossible, it subjectively "realizes" its omnipo­

lcnce. It experiences pleasure in the Real. I ask the reader to forgiveme for using terms of the idiom of Freud and Lacan to situate this

J

Comparison ofthe Sublime and Tasu54

£rhabmt iibnTin: 90; 87) on certain points, but also present uim_porrant and striking differences" (namhafu Untmchitth: ibid.).Both the former and the lantr are dimibuttd according to the cat·egoripl quadrangle.

On the side ofagree:ment, thtre is quality: the beautiful and thesublime please "on their own account"lfur Jich g!bJt: ibid.). Thtdelight they provide. or, rather. that they are. is independent ofallinlerest, whether empirical or rational, inclination or concept. Wewill see that things are not so simple for tht sublime (sec Chapttr7). As with tasle, the sublime pleasure is providtd by prc:sentation.The faculty of presentation, the DarruUungrwrmogrn. which c1tar­ly designates the imagination here, is in Einrtimmung, in harmony,with the faculty ofconcepts in general, whether understanding orreason, "in a given intuition" (bti tina g~g~ben~AnJ(lJauung: 90;81). Bm it is specified further: imagination is in harmony with thefaculty of conctpts. understanding or reason" ah &ftrthrung thrktzuren" (ibid.). Philonenko translates this last expression as "to

the benefit of the latter," i.e., reason. However. because it is also aquestion of the beautiful, I would read it as follows: "as assistanceto these," the concepts, both of understanding in the case of thebe3utiful, and of reason in the case of the sublime. Wt will Stt

how the beautiful also involves an excitation of understandingthrough imaginative prc:senution (Stt pp. 60--67).

On the side of agreement thtre is also quantity. Both fee:lings an=singular judgments, but both profess to be universally valid. Thisuniversality is nOl objective; it does nOl amibutt a prtdicue tothe concept of the given obj«l of pleasure. It is only concemtdwith Ihe "anribution" ofa Statt, delight, to thinking when tht lat·ttr relates to the beautiful or sublime object. It is subjective.

Following these concessions to the agreement of the twO aes·thetie feelings-most of which will be invalidattd by the subse·quem analysis-the differences art not long in coming. They aremany. After all, if such were not tht case, there would be no needfor a "transition."

These differences are Umiking" (90; 87). The first appears to in­volve a simple difference in accent. Kant returns 10 the quality and

CompariJon ofth~ Sub/im~ and TaJU

violence. I am not the fim to do it. But I do not intend to PUlSUtit in this W2y. There is plenty to designatt this state in the criticallanguagt itseJ[ What critical thought does, in short, is to look forthe a priori condirions of the possibility of judging the true, thejust, or the beautiful in tht rttlms of knowltdgt, of morality, andin the territory of tht aesthttic. The projm Sttms modest and rea­sonable. Ho~er, it is motivattd by tht same principle of furythat the critique restrains. A priori conditions of possibility must.by hypothesis, be unconditiontd, or else they would not be a pri­ori. Yet if the critical txamination can estdblish them as such, itmust be ablt to Stt tht nothingness of tht condition that is "be­hind" them. In other words, reRection pushes the analysis of itsOwn conditions as far as it can. in accordance with the demand ofthe critique itself. ReRection thus touches on the absolute of itsconditions, which is none other than the impossibility for it topursue them "further": the absolute of presentdtion, the absolute ofspeculation. the absolute of morality. All thought is a being putinto relation-a "synthesis," in the language of Kant. Thus whenthinking reaches the absolute. the relation reaches the without·relation. for the absolute is without relation. How can the without·relation be "present" to relation? It can only be "present" as dis-­avowtd (as metaphysical entity). forbidden (as illusion). This dis­avowaJ, which is constitutive of critical thinking. is the avowaJ ofits own fury. It forbids itself the absolute, much as it still wants it.The consequena: for thought is a kind ofspasm. And the Analyt·ic of the Sublime is a hint of this spasm. The significance of this"appendage" thus significantly exceeds the explomion of an aes-­thetic feeling. It exposes the "state" of critical thought when itreaches its extreme limit-a spasmodic stdte.

The Beautiful and the Sublime Compared in theQuality and Quantity ofJudgment

Let us return now to the "transition" that leads from the beauti­ful to the sublime. Kant's manner here is almost Scholastic. Thebeautiful and the sublime Uagr~" (daJ Schiin~ Itommt . .. mit dnn

J

CompariJon oftht Sublimt and TaJu 57

definition forbidden presentation and there is no presentationwithoul form.

This difference becomes clearer when we examine the passage inthe ·Firsl ConRict of the Transcendentalldeas" expounded by theDialectic of the first Cn'rique (nv, 396--402; 454--58). The questionis to know if the world is limiled or unlimited in space and time. IIcannOt be unlimited because a spontaneous totality (space) or asuccessive totality (time) of states of things cannot be gium in theforms ofsensibility if totality is infinite. Nor can it be limited, forthen one must presup~ an empty space: beyond the extension ofthe finite world, or beyond the extension of an empty time beforethe beginning of the finite world, and no sensible intuition canprovide objects that correspond to this supposition.

The critique concludes from this aporia that the question can­not be resolved in a determin~ way, that is. by understanding.for what is missing in the determination in both the thesis andme antithesis is the sensible intuition corresponding eimer to theunlimit~ or to what me limit~ leaves "outside" of itself (in spa«and time). Both claims are rhus nonsuit~, at least as theses of un­derstanding. Nonemeless, the very concept of the limit persists,even when it can only be speculative. The limit is the object ofanIdea of reason, a "being of reason."

Thus the differen« between the beautiful and the sublime islinked to the difference between the limited charaaer of the objectand the without-limit of the object. The difference is not restria­cd to a diffe.ren« between understanding, which would involvethe limited character of the object, and reason, which would takecharge of the unlimited. It is the limit itself that understandingcannot conceive of as its object. The limit is only conceivable withan outside and an inside. The limit, that is, immediately impliesboth the limited and the unlimited. However, there is no deter­tninable concept of the unlimited. Moreover, the limit, the limited,and the unlimited, (aken as objects, can only be objectS of theIdeas of speculative reason. The limit is not an object for under­Standing. It is its method: all the categories of understanding arethe Operators ofdetermination, thai is, of limitation. Furthermore,

'9CompariJon ofthr Sublime and Tmu

,

Comparison ofthe Sublime and Tmte

quantity of bQlh judgments. Taste, which is a judgment of thebeautiful, is induced by the form of the objecr. The sublime fed­ing "can also refer (0 an object even devoid of form" [an eine17lfonnksm GegenstamuJ (ibid., I.m.). Bm what is a form? A lim­itation, a Begrrnzung. The without-form is, on the contrary, thewithout-limit, Unbegrrmheit (ibid.).

Thus the argument is the following: because the fec=ling of thebeautiful results fTom a form, which is a limitation, its affinity lieswith undemanding. The affinity of sublime fec=ling. which is orcan be provided by the without-form, lies with reason. There is in­deed a similarity betwec=n both cases in that the presentation ofthe given should be able 10 be thought by a con«pt but, in bothcases, is not. This is why me concept of undersranding, like that ofreason, remains "indeterminate.-

But this common tr:Ut must not allow one 10 forget the differ­ence in narure betwec=n a concept of understanding and a conceptof reason. The limitation of an intuitive given in a form does notin the least p~ent a concept from being applied to ii, fTom sub­suming the given, and mus being determined by the inruition thatcorresponds 10 it. This limitation in form is, on the COntrary, acondition ofdetermination in the con«pt, and such is indeed thecase when it is a matter of knowing me object through inruition.But when thinking must fec=1 pleasure on the occasion of a given,such is not the case (in the fec=ling of the beautiful). In the case ofsublime feding, on the other hand, what p~ents apriori any con­CCpt from applying to the given that provides this feeling in a de­termining way is that the given is unlimited or quasi-unlimited.The difference between the rwo aesthctic fedings in this regardcan thus be correctly articulated. For taste, form arouses activity.only regulative and not determinant in effect, but this activity is[he activity of understanding, the faculty of dctermining. This ac·tivity must nOl be able to succeed in determining the given, but,rather, mllst only make the anempt. Ifit were to succeed, the plea~

sure of taste would give way to the objectivity of knowledge. In mecase of the sublime, the without-form immediately suggests a con~

cept of speculative reason, for the object of stich a concepl is by

Animation

What goes by this name in Kant's aesthetic has to do with a"dynamic," a theory offorces, in the almost Freudian sense of theterm, or what came closest to it at the time, the Burkean psychol­ogy of tendencies. The dynamist interpretation is made explicit inthe first paragraph, which attempts 10 identify the delight that a

61CompariJon o/liN Sublimr aM Taslr

repr~ntation provides for thought: representation is then "re­fern=d wholly to the subjea, and whal is more' 10 its feeling of life:1lt'i11n ulxmgiftihl]-under the name: of the fetling of pleasure' orofdispleasure" (42; 40). As in any doctrine (or metaphysics) ofen­ergy, pleasure is made a metaphor for the vital force of the ~sub­

jeet" and displeasure fo~ the reduct.ion o~ this f~rce. The principlethat increases the force IS called Gmt, which Phllonenko translatesas soul (dmt': n.) because its function is precisely 10 animate (1]5;

167): the life vein of thinking.The reader might be muck by this abrupt recourse to vitalism--­

along w1th the confusion in the use of the terms Gmt, GnniU, andS«k (ibid.), not to mention Subjt'lu. Does the critique nm recog­nize that this is one of the metaphysical dogmas to which it is try­ing to pur an end (KRV A, 7-16; I-f))? Does it need to put itself indle hands of a "vital principle" in order to explain the quality ofaesthetic feeling? Is aesthetic feeling not an actual state of one ofthe faculties of the mind discerned by the critique, the faculty off«ling pleasure and displeasure, to be found with the twO otherf.tcuhies of the mind, knowing and desiring? Is aesthetic fedingnot simply a uansundental name 10 designate the a priori condi·tion discovered by critical reReaion, on the basis of empiricallyobservable aesthetic feelings, to dcduer the possibility of these fed·ings? In making G~isl the principle: of growth of the vital force~in" the subject-the result of which is the pleasure that the sub­ject feds-the critique seems to give in to the transcendental iIlu·sion that hypostasizes in a transcendental reality what is merelythe condition of possibility of a judgment of taste from the pointof view of its quality.

We must examine how the critical analysis of the feding of thebeautiful comes 10 invoke a vital force. At the end of the exposi·tion of aesthetic reR«tive judgme:ms and before proceeding totheir deduction, Kant devotes twO or three pages, as if paremheti·C3l1y. to a discussion of Burke (130-32; 125-27). He has no diffi·Cully conceding to Burke the vitalism (he Enquiry needs to explore'~hc realm of psycho-physiological realiries. "There is no deny­Lng ... that as Epicurus maintained. gracifiCltion and pain ... are

Comparison oftlJ~ Sublim~and Tam

the: faculties of intuition or of p~nr.nion,sensibility and imagi­nation, respectivdy. also proceed, in their order, by means oflim.illnions: schemas when chese limitations work for knowledge. andfr~ forms when they work toward the pleasure of the beautiful.This is precisely what the Preliminary Remark 10 the deductionof pure conceptS of understanding in the first Cririqllr shows (KJlVA, 131; /41): understanding cannot be "deduced~ in the criticalsense, that is. legitimated in claiming to know the givens of intu­ition by determining them through conceptS, if the concepts hanot b«n ddimhed beforehand, mat is. put into dementary foby me three syntheses of apprehension, reproduction. and recos­oirion. This is where the limit first o~rates, making all presenlion possible.

Thus we see that the difference between the sublime: andbc=autiful is not one of emphasis. It is a transcendental diffcrenThe ~transition" from one to the other signifies to imaginatithat its "facultary" panner will change. Thinking feels a sublifeeling when it comes up against the aporia expoundc=d in the 6antinomy, but in the order of presentation rathe:r than ofconYel it must still be pushed or anracted by an almost insanemand of rosan.

The: differentiation thus made explicit in the text modifiesapparent agreement between the feelings of the beauriful andsublime as to the quality and quantity of the aesthetic judgmenthat are in play in these respective fedings. To this transcendenheterogenc=ity, Kant adds yel another diffe:rence that conc<=rnsquality of ddight in both feelings, but this time from the perstive of the "animation" that deljght provides for thought.

60

. 1 of works of art because in genius the "production" rather,nOI

.. f b· . h· C I· G· .the "reception 0 0 }ects occasions t IS lee mg. emus IS,h,n ··"h I·" ( }-h .h s dt'Clared 10 conSist III a appy rc allon t79; 172 appy IIIth

U sense thai we speak of a bonJmlr d'ncprmioll, the joy of hittingt e~,he expression" (dt>r Ansdrllck) that is suited to "find out ideas,:f the imagin3rionl for a given concept" (ibid.), but above all aneX ression by means of which "the subjective mental condirion

[l~... lUbjt>ktiw G,:;,/iiWtimmung) thus in~uced .. '"may be c~~­munic:ated to others (I80, t.m.; 172). I say above all bcca~ It ISthis "latter ralent" (tim kwi't? Tttkm) that is "properly" kigouliclJ)termed "soul" (Qi.Jt). The soul is the power "to get an apressionfor what is indefinable in the mental Sl'3te [das Unlln",bl11'~ in dnnGnniitszustalld~] accompanying a particular representation (bioitin" troJUsm \.1InuUullg) and to make it universally communica­ble la/Igmrn" mitt~i/barl" (I80. t.m.; 172).

This paragraph on genius is like a labof2tory where the trans­mutation of elements, prejudged by dynamic anthropology, takesplace. These elements are turned into the a priori conditions thatresult from the analysis of the critique. Yet the secret of this chem­~uy ~longs to the heuristic power of reRection. The laner de­composes rhe "vital force" into itS vectors and houses the compo­nents thus isolated with the "faculties of knowledge" (illl the broadsense) that are in play in aesthetic pleasure.

How docs the animating principle. the G~i.Jt, "animate" think·ing? By supplying material. Stoff as we have seen, to the facultiesof knowledge-pure capacity to regulate. pure capacity to present.This throws them, swings them toward one another and againsteach olher. in "play": "i" Sthw/lng ... d.i. ill ~in solc/;n SpirL. wrlch­t1 sich von s~lbSl ahiilt limo a play that is self-mainrainingl" (175;167). This play of the facultics is commandcd by a "linality"(zlWckmiijlig: ibid.). The end pursued by [his linality is not con­:eived, the finality is "perceived" in the object judged beautiful.rhis Simple perception is what precisely characterizes the judg·~enl of laste as i, was charactcrized in the category of rclation:finll/iry in an object ... perceived in it 11m ihml Ilpart from rbt' rep~

rrsrllttlrion O[IIJI end" (80; 77).

6)Comparison oftl)t' S/lb/il1lt! Imd "iw~Compari;oll oftb~ SlIblim~ Illld TlUt~

always in the last res<lr( (z/l/~tztl corporeal. since apart fromfeeling of the bodily organ, life would be merely a consciousnessone's existence. and could not include any feeling of well·beingof the reversc, that is, of the furtherance or hindrance of the viforces. For, ofi(SClf alone, the mind [Gnll;;t] is uniquely and copletely life (a/kill ganz ubm] (the life principle iudf)" (131, t.

126). Kant himsclf will nm hesirale 10 make usc of Ihis vital p .ciple in "empirical anthropology" (ibid.). h is even 10 ~ found'a lext as late as the third "ConAia of the Faculties," which opphilosophy to medicine. The critical refutalion merely insiststhe €let thai vitalist realism prevenu aesthetic pleasure fromdislinguished from a delight with only "t'goi.Jtic" validity (132; tVil'3list realism ignores the demand, inscribed in singular t2St~

~ing universally communicable without mediation. It endthe feeling provided by the beautiful within a contingent idilacking the authority to ~ an "example" for othcrs and thethorit)' to "promisc" a community of tastc.

Thus the question of animation in Kant's text lies not so min the presence of the vitali$( motif derived from anthropologyin the way the critique draws the specifically transcendental uairaesthetic pleasure from the metaphysical motif. that is, itS imdiale demand to be universally communicable. The paragraphvoted to genius (§49) shows the critique at work. More: thanother passage in the third Critiqll~, it begins by fully deployingvitalisl reading of genius in art: '''SOlII' [GeiSt) in an aesthsense, signifies the animating principle (dar bt>kbmdt> PrinzipJthe mind lim Gtmiit]. But that whereby this principle anima[bt/t>bt] rhe psyche [St-t'/t]. the nmerial [Stoff) which it cmplfor that purpose is that which SCts the mental powcrs into athat is linal [WIU dit Gt'1niit;kriifi~zw~ckmiijfig in SclmJlmg vmt't%l1

(175, em.; 16;).However. this same paragraph, begun under the aegis of the

n:unic, ends with the trait to which only the critique has access, .taste as in genius. Only the cririque has access 10 the demand tocommunicable inherent in rhe feeling of the beautiful. The [shows thar the same demand is immediately inscribed in the c

idr,pM (175, r.m.; 167)· Faculty of presentation is the name forimagination in the third Cririq~ (76,89; 73, 86). But imaginationis ,S3id ro present forms. and to present them by forming them.I.k~ it ~ms it is responsible for presenring Ideas. Yet how couldit present an Idea when the Idea is defined as having an object ofwhich there is no possible pr~nllltion (KRV, 327-28; 368-69)? Buthert' we are speaking of aesthetic Ideas. Moreover, they are like thesymmetrical reverse, the "counterpart (pendant)" (Cdgmstiklt: 176;168), of the Ideas of reason. the negative property of which we areawa~. The aesthetic Idea is a representarion of an object such rhatthere is no corresponding property in the conupl of this objecr.The rational Idea is the concept of an unpresentable object; theaesthetic Idea is the presentation of an "object" that escapes theconcepr of this object, the presentation ofwhal Kant calls dnJ Un~

nmllbo", the "indefinable" (180; 1J2). It is the indefinable nor ofrhe object ilSelf (the form) but of the state that the objecr providesfor rhinking.

Why call this presentarion an Idea? Because ir exceeds expcri.ence JUSt as the Idea of reason exceeds experience. Furthermore.~use reRection can find in experience an "analogow" presenta~

tion for the object ofa Tarionalldea (221-23; 2JI-I2), the imagina­lion can by "analogy" also "remodd" an object of experience andpraent an object that is not present in the laner (176; 16S) when.for example. experience is felt to be "roo commonplace" (ibid.).Wilh this characteristic excess or replacement. the aesthetic IdeaCt'a.Sa: to be thought of negatively. It adds expression to the con­cept. II adds to the representation of the object the "material" thattxCttds ilS determination by underst2Ilding. and rhat induces "sole­lyon irs own such a wealth of thought (rovi~1 zu tkn/un IImmlaflr]as would never admit ofcomprehension l.euutmmnifiwml in a def­inite concepr" (ibid., Lm.). This material is indeed provided bythe imaginarion, that is, by one of the partners in play. It borrowsfrom "actual nature," but ir creates a "second nature" out of thell1aterial (ibid.).

lhis remodeling is achieved by an operarion. consritutive ofKant's thought when it is seen as reflexive. rhe analogy. The anala-

6,Comparison oftlx Sublim~and TasuComparison oflh~ Sublim~ and Tasu

The faculties play with each other bUI are not guided by theconcept of an end that would be the aim of their play: this Q_

plains the persistence of aesthetic pleasure. It is essential for it to"dwell" (wdm: 64; 6/), [0 ·prN1'Wa rolllinU/ln" (in demsdben 2q

erhalten] of Ihat sr:ue [of the subject]" (61; 58), as this is essentialto all pleasure. This is true to a such a degm: that the Vmurilu,,&the "way we linger"- a lingering that the play of the faculties im.jX)se:5 on thinking that judges aesthetically-puIS thought into astate "analogow" to the passivity (wob~i tim GmJiil plZSSiv ist: 6,.;61) it feds when it is attracted to an object. Analogous but notidentical: the attraction paralyzes the faculties, the beautiful throwsthem into play.

In the passage 10 which I refer-the "Third Moment" of the"Analytic of the Beautiful," the moment that precedes the analysilof taste through the category of relation and that isolates the final­ity without end proper 10 aesthetic judgment (61-62; 58-5P)-thetext marks the outlines, by no means comprehensive, of a tempo.­rality inherent in the feeling of the beautiful. The two importantcharacteristics of cognitive time, which allowed one to "dedua:­the "I think" in the first Critiql«'-succession and the affectionthe sdfby itstlf-are here suspended. As ..the subjective" remaintnothing orner than ilS state almost passively. the "I think" forgcaitself as the thought of the object turned toward experience bymeans of the forms of coexistence (space) and succession (time).The time of the aesthetic lingering is also the lingering, the pauseof diachronic time. The sensation provided by the fret" play of thefaculties instirutes a manner of being for time that cannot involvean inner sense.

I rerurn to the material, the Stoff, which the soul provides tothe twO faculties ofknowledge. imaginalion and understanding, insuch a way that they compete for it. one by thinking according toform, the other according 10 concept. This material-the word.for K:ml, always connotcs the manifold without order-is the aes-­thetic Ideas. The principle of "animation," the soul, that pUIS themforward in the play of the faculties thus finds its true name in thecritique: it is "the faculty [Vtormiigm] of presentation of a~/JuJi£

The Beautiful and the Sublime Compared in the

Relation (Finality) and Modality ofJudgment

Let us begin again with the comparison between sublime de­light and the delight provided by the beautiful according to thecategories of quality and quantity (900-91; 87-88). The delight inthe beautiful is felt "directly" as a "furtherance of life" like the de­light arising from an "attraction" (although such is nor the case

Comparisou ofthe Sub'im~ and Taste

argued that words themselves have, over other aesthetic materials.(he privilege of engendering a limitlessness, a "horiwn" resonant

with Benjamin's aura.This defiance offered by the free imagination comrols the play

in which undemanding is taken. This play is in turn the reason forthe "animation" in which the pleasure of the beautiful consists. Astorm of Ideas suspends ordinary time in order to perpetuate itself.There is no need, in the end, for the vitalist metaphor, or for themetaphysics of enetgy. to understand that the letter, "language as amere thing of the letter" (mit tkr Sprache als bwjftm Buc/JStabm:179; 171), is in genius, and analogically in taSte, exceeded by thesoul (G~iJt), the life vein of thought. It is enough for the critiqueto introduce, as one of the a priori conditions of possibility fortaste, a power of presentation that exceeds the power it has estab­lished as one of the a priori conditions of possibility for knowl­edge. The imagination, this power, can present givens, that is, syn­thesize them in forms beyond what understanding can know, i.e.,beyond what it can synthesize in concepts. Because this capacityfor a production that exceeds simple reproduction is an a priori

,condition for aesthetic judgment (as the capacity for reproductionis for determinant judgment), it must be universally communica­ble. This is why, when it is exercised even singularly, it is legitimatefor it to require that the unlimited space it opens up for thoughtand the suspended time in which its play with understanding issustained, be accessible to any thinking faced aesthetically with thesame singular circumstance. This is something that the meta­

physics of forces has great trouble establishing.

CompariJofl ofthr Sublime and Tam

gy transforms, commutes, a given by making it jump from onerealm of legislation or one territory of legitimacy to another. Itcrosses the entire field of possible objects of thought, carrying arelation of representations from one socm! to the other, but me re-.larion must be transposed according to the rules in effect in thesector in which it arrives. The analogy allows the relation to cmi­gr:HC, and then acculturates it.

The imagination that operates aesthetically is thus productive.and not only "reproductive" (mnesic), as it had [Q be for me pur­poses of theoretical knowledge. It takes liberties wirh the posrulatelofempirical thought in general and in particular with me analogicaof experience, which are permanence, succession, and coexistence

(KAV B, 208-44; 229-72), in a word with everything that Kantrefers to as "the law of association," which belongs to the empirical

employment of the imagination (176; 168). The imagination c~ates another nature, which has to do not with thinking by conceptbut with the derivatives connected with the concepts, the "sec.

ondary representations" (N~bmvorst~Uungm), the constituent ele­mentS of which are not attributed to it logically, but are nevenhe­less "(aesthetic) attributes" (177; 169). It is not the logical determination of the concept of the all-powerful that contains therepresentation of an eagle with lightning in itS claws. This repsentation is an aesthetic Idea. It gives thought an "incentivespread its wings over a whole host of kindred representations" (1m169), a host of representations that "provoke more thought [mttknkm lassenl than admits of expression in a concept determinby words" (ibid., em.). For the concept muSt be "definitely for~

mulated in language" (mithin in ~in~m bmimmre Sprachausdrucltr.178, tom.; 170). No language determinant of itS object can remainafloat before the tide of aesthetic Ideas. The tide carries away the

words of concepts. It should be understood that even in poetry orliterature where there are indeed words, these are the words of

analogy that engulf the words of definition. The latter, "openingout" in "unbounded expansion" (177; 169) are lost in "a field ofkindred representations kin tmabuMiclm hid] ... stretching be­yond its ken" (177-78; 169). We are reminded here of Burke, who

66

becall~ the delight in the beautiful is disinterested) (64-65, 68;Ot-62, OS). This delight participates in the play through imagina.tion. The delight provided by the sublime on the other hand aris-­es "indirectly" as a feeling with fWO conAicting momenlS: the "vi­tal forces" experience a momenl2ry check, Htmmung, an inhibi_tion; mey are held back, repressed. When they are rele:ued, they"discharge"-mis is the Ergitflunrall me more powerfully in thefollowing moment (ibid.). Because of this tr.msitory anguish, thesublime emotion is not like play. In it the imagination is seriouslyoccupied. Contf2.ry to taSte, the sublime feding is an emotion, aRuhrung, that alternates between an affective "no· and "yes" (68;05-66)· There is no analogy possible with attraction. Thought isnot only "attr.leted" (angaogm) by the given circumstance, it isalternately "repelled" (abg~UJjIm) in an uncert:l.in, incessant move­ment <91; 88). Compared to the pleasure of me beautiful, me plea­sure of the sublime is (so to speak) negative (this is why Burke dis­tinguishes it as dtlighl). It involves a recoil, as if thinking came upagainst what precisely amaas it. Kant'S text anticipates me subse­quent analyses by assimilating this negative pleasure to an "adme.ration" (lkwundtrung) or to a "respect" (Arhtung), which are alsosupposed to hold back before releasing and to hold back again(;b;d.).

One might wonder what me "thing" is that arouses such am~

bivalence. Thus one progresses (Q the comparison of the beautifuland the sublime feelings according to the category of relation (6~

nality). Beginning with Mallarme, and perhaps even with JeanPaul, the aesthetic negatives, the thinking about writing, the re­Acetion on modern art, have pUt forward the thing before whichthinking retreats and toward which it races. What is certain is thatwith the sublime, the "happiness" with which creative imagina­tion opens thinking to the unlimited field of aesthetic Ideas hasdisappeared. Gone is the superabundance, the supplement to nat­uralness that had come with an analogizing talent (Q extend "actu­al nature" and overwhelm the thinking of this nature.

However, the "transition" through finality sees this right away:taste presupposes the affinity of natural forms, even those en rap-

Comparison oftlx Sublimt and Tastt

lUred by the free imagination, with the faculty of judging in ilSmost elementary exercise-the aesthetic judgment of the feeling of[he beautiful. If the stupor we have remarked upon does fall with­in sublime feeling, if in the object or the circumstance there issorne "thing" that leaves mought dumbfounded even as it exaltsthought, this object is nm one of natu~, or, rather, ilS nature is notthat nature, the "writing" (Chiflinchrifi: ,60, t.m.; [51) of whoseforms is able to be immediately "read" by the feeling of the beau­tiful. The "thing" cannot belong ro a nature that lets the imagina­tion of genius search its "writing" for something further withwhich to present more forms than me writing presents, and withwhich to form another natur't. Sublimity pUIS an end to the ap­proval, the BnfaU <91.; 89), that nature gives to mought throughtaSte. No object ofcoded nature is sublime <91--91.; 88---89). A feel­ing is sublime insofar as ..the thing" that arouses it goes againstthe affinity exhibited in taSte and genius, insofar as it is feh to be·contra~6nal" (ZW«kwiJrig: 91; 8t) to direct aesthetic judgment,"ill-adapted" (llnangtmmm) to the imagination, and an "outrage"(uwii/ttiitig) to the latter (ibid.).

... Thus as -the thing" does not belong to nature, it must be of"the mind." This, at least, is "all that we can say" (ibid.). Perhapswe can say a lime more. If a sensible form cannot conta.in "thething." then the latter has some relation to the Ideas of reason, forthe objects of these Ideas precisely never give an adequate presen~

ration of themselves in a form that would be adapted, angnnmm.to them. However, even in the case of this unpresent3bility of prin­ciple, what remains presentable for the objeclS of rational Ideas isthe inadequacy, the Unangnnmtn~;t, the de~mensuration of allpresentation. Presented in the sensible to and through the imagi­nation, this "discrepancy" reminds the mind of the Ideas that arealways absent to presentation and thus revives them. For example,t~e raging ocean is simply hideous, grdjf/ich, when taken percep­liVely. !fit arouses a sublime emotion, it does so insofar as it refersthought negatively [0 a higher finality, that of an Idea (91.; 89)·

This gesture of thought that avertS the "horror," as Burke wouldsay, the hideousness of the present, that subvertS it and turns it

Comparison oftht Sublimt and Tastt68

Comparison ofth~ Sublime and TflStl'

f ille Beautiful," judgment of the beautiful is always posited as~ecessary. We also know thar this necessity of judgment is neither'1 reed upon nor "apodictic" bur "exemplary" (o:emplnrisch: 81-83;'~-79)' Is the same true for the sublime? The answer is not given~nril paragraph 29, which is devoted ro the modality of the judg­ment in sublime feeling. Ahhough rhere is still some confusion.Sublimiry is said to be necessary, like beauty. But a slight difference

persists as to the ~t~tuS of the nece~sity of s~bli.mc judgm~nt. It isnOI cerrain that Ir IS the same as In raste. rhls subde differencewill be of great significance when it comes rime ro determine thenature and the extension of the "communicability" of sublime feel­

ing (see Chapter 9)·However, I have intentionally ami ned the programmatic word

used for the modality of sublime judgment in the exposition enri~

tied "Subdivision of an Investigation," which treats this feeling to

which paragraph 24 is devoted (93-94; 9D---9t): "The delight in thesublime, just like jebensolUohJ ak] that in the beautiful, must ... bemade representable [vorsu/lig machm] ... in its subjective finality,in its relarion, and represent this finality as necessary in irs modal­

...iry~ ~3, r.m.; 90; I do not rake into account a "correcrion" made byErdmann). The parallel between the twO Analytics and their re­spective conclusions is thus strongly emphasized. But not wimoutseeming a little forced. The difficulty comes from the expressionvorstellig milchm, to make representable, which applies both to thesubjecrivity of finality (which is a case of relation) and to the ne­cessity of its assertion (which is a case of modality). That bothshould be "representable" is not self-evidenr. Let us recall, for ex­ample, the end of [he "Third Moment" of the "Analytic of theBeautiful" where it was concluded that beauty is "the form of fi~

nality in an object, so far as it is perceived in it [an ihm] apanfrom the representation ofan end [olm~ Vorsu/lung dn~s Zw«kes]"(80, [.m.; 77). Without returning to the relation and modality ofajudgment upon the beautiful, we willlimir ourselves to examininghow the necessary finality of sublime judgmem (considering thelarrer according to the caregories of both relation and modaliry)

Can be shown to be "represented."Here we must defer to the nomendamre explicated in the sec-

Comparison oft!J~ Sublime nnd Taste7°

into admiration and respect for an unpresenrable Idea-this ges­(ure is calk-d "subreption" (Subreption: 106; /02). In canon law su~

reptio refers [Q the act of obtaining a privilege or a favor by dis­simulating a circumstance that would conflict with irs 3nainment.It is an abuse of authority. What in the sublime is the favor ob.mined at the price ofsuch an abuse? A glimpse of the Idea, the ab­

solute of power, freedom. Why docs thinking not have a right toit? Because in rhe given circumstance and by principle there is,strictly speaking, no presentation of the Idea in narure. What hasbeen dissimulated in order to be gramed this favor? The power.

lessness of rhe imagination to present rhe object of reason. In whatdoes the subreption consist? In obtaining or in extracting a qlJalipresentation of the object, which is not presentable, in the pres.­ence of a magnitude or a natural force that is "formless."

This is how thinking employs (G~bralll:h) presentation (93; 96).For Kant, let me repeat, there is in the word G~braucha sense ofabuse, ofcrime, of sin almost, which is also present in subreption. Itis the sin of modern man. Heidegger will say that with technique.Being gives itself as the "funds" that one has at hand, from whichone can draw withom having to understand ir. Indeed, Kant'S <Jcr..brauch has a similar purpose: the denaturing of being that makesthe poem obsolere and permits the means. I will not pursue thiIline of argument further, though it might lead one to an under­standing of the affinity of aesthetic sublimes with an era of tech­mque.

In conclusion, if nature contributes [Q sublime emotion it is cer~

minly nor through its forms, as in the feeling of the beamifuL It is.as we have seen, only when nature "gives signs of magnitude andpower" 02, cm.; 89), of raw quantity, and in an inverted final re­lation. The quantitative is final for rational thought, but it is not fi­nal for the imagination. The differences between the beautiful andthe sublime far exceed, it seems, their kinship as aesthetic feelings.

One lasr word on the "transition" from the beautiful [Q the sub-­lime. There is a temarkable absence in the system of comparisonsbetween the twO feelings. Whether the comparison involves simi­larity or difference, it is not conducted under the category ofmodality. We know that in the "Fourth Moment" of the "Analyric

determining ground [zum &stimmunpgrumuj" (101, em.; 97).Thus the absolute is not conceived ofas an Idea but only felt. Thenature of the representation implied in the sublime makes it acousin of taste. But only a cousin. bec2usc= it presupposes both acap2ciry to conceive of the absolute and a sc=nsibility of the "pres­ence:" of the absolute-something of which the feeling of the beau­

tiful is unaware.

7JComparison oft," Sublim~and Taste

Continuity and Discontinuity BetweenBeautiful and Sublime

The kinship between the (WQ aesthetic feelings-which does notadude a reading attentive to the differt=nces, a reading of discon~tinuity, like the one that wiU be attempted here--pc:nnits a readingof continuity, which would emphasiu= the "tension- and the in­stability mat characteriu= both fedings. One feels the beautiful.one fecols the sublime, insofar as the relation betwee:n the power ofpresentation and the po~r ofconcepts relative to an object is nOlfix~ by a rule.

Pleasure in the beautiful occurs when Ihe powers of imagina-.. tion and understanding engage with each other, according to a

suitable "ratio" (8)i 80), in a kind of play. A play because they com~

pete with each other, one with forms, the other with concepts, inan effort to gt2Sp the object. But it is also play bec2use they are ac·complices in not determining the object, that is, in nOl grasping itby form and concept as they do in objective knowledge. The resultis thai the ratio suited to procuring the delight mat is called plea~

sure in the beautiful is not itself determined; delight signals it. Thetension between the twO powers is also necessarily unstable (seeChapter 8).

We have seen that the imagination is the most responsible forthis instability. It is employed in proliferating the NtlmllJorrul/lIng­nI, the "secondary representations" (177; 169); it proliferates aes­tht:tie Ideas. Yet when the imagination opens and reopens the fieldof "aesthetic attributes" (ibid.) it discovers around the object, is itPossible that the object ceases to be recognizable by imagination's

CompariJon oft," Sublim~and Taste

tion entitl~ ."The Ideas in General" in Book I of the dialectic ofthe firsl ~r:ttqt« (KRV, 308-14; 348-$$). This section is responsiblefor the entlque of the vague use that empiricism makes of the term

"Idea: ~d for inscribing"it within the legacy of a Platonic lISagIe.The. sen~ arrangement of representations comes to dispel allpossible mLSunderscrnding. Given that all thought is represmta .(I will not discuss this here, although the bias of Canesian mphysics should be recognized), one must be able to distinamong perceptions, all of which are representations with CO

sciousness, those that refer ro the "subject"' alone as modificatiof its state without providing any knowledge of the object,are called Empfindungm, sc=nsations (KRV, )14; 3U). Insofar as s~ime feeling is a subjective rdlective judgment, the necessaryIty that characterizes this judgment musl belong to the familysubjective perceplions, thai is, of sensations; in this respect

sublime feeling is similar to t2Ste. But insofar as mis sublime sjective state is necessarily related 10 the "presence" of a concept~n, me absolute, sublime judgment must involve a representlon from an entirely different fiunily, which in the "serial arranment" is precisely called an Idea (ibid.).

Would the finalization ofsublime fee:ling by the absolute reqw.the representation of the absolute by an Idea? Or e1sc= is thesolute in sublime feeling an object for thought that can alsorepresented by an Idea, in the use made of it by speculative reason.but that here is only felt, that is, "present" here only as the sensa-­tion of a necessary finality? Since we are referring to a reAecriYejudgment. the second hypothesis must be correa. This is why 1speak of the "presence" of a concept of reason; the o.bject of thisconcept, the absolute. is felt without it being represented by aD

Idea. It is like sensation only in that it is present in sublime feelingand that it exerts its necessary finality. If the absolute were repre­sc=nted in sublime judgment by an Idea. the judgment would ceaseto be aesthetic and would become speculative; "If it is to be ae5"thetic and not to be tainted with any judgment of understandingor reason" "a pure judgment upon the sublime must ... have nOend belonging to the object [gar k~inm Z,V«k d~ Obj~ktsJ as ill

7'OJmpariJon ofIlu SlIblimt and Tastt

beautiful, lacking as it does a ratio suited to both powers) leadsdlClhe antipodes of sublime disturbance. And we readily give it

%r name of geniw. However, genius is not in the least sublime forritical analysis; it is crazy with forms and crazy about forms,

:.hrreas sublimity originates from their "absence."However, sublime feeling can be thought of as an extreme cast

f thr beautiful. Thus it is through the faculty of concepts that~r aesthetic feeling becomes unbound. One can imagine, in ef~feet. that by dim of opposing the power of forms with conceptsthat are mon:= and more "e:xrn:=me" in order to put this power-theimagination-in difficulty, the power ofconcepts determinable byintuition, undemanding. passes its "hand" (in thjs play) to me~ ofconcepts of reason's unpresenrable objects (stt Chapter 4.pp. 109-15). The filculty ofconcepts no longer requires the imagi­nation to give a rich and pleasant presenration to the concept of

J domination, in the traits of the master of Olympus, for example,to which it em add a thousand other "aesthetic attributes," but tothe Idea of the all-powerful itself. But the object of this Idea is notpresentable in intuition. The imagination cannQ( "create- a fonnthat would be adapted to it, for all form is circumscription (76; 74)and the all-powerful is conceived ofas an absolute that excludes alllimiu.tion.

The proliferation of forms by an imagination gone wild makesup for this powerlessness of principle, but then creativity is nolonger in free play, pleasant, even fortuitous; it falls prey to aregime of anguish. This is what mwt be understood in the Ernst,the ·seriousness," with which Kant qualifies the activity of meimagination in the sublime. It is the seriousness of melancholy,the suffering of an irreparable lack, an absolute nostalgia for form'sonly always being form, tnat is, limiration, Btgrtnzung (ibid.).Even as it deploys an unlimited field of proliferating forms beforethought, tne imagination remains a slave to its finitude, becauseeach of the forms it invents and adds to the others remains limitedby definition.

In genius the power of presemation strains its relation with un~

dcrsranding almost to the breaking point; their ratio ceases (Q pro-

Comparison oflhe Sublime and Tmu74

panner, understanding? One could even go so far as to imagine: (10to speak) that the object thus elaborated escapes nor only irs iden­tification by underst:u1ding but "recognition" in the: strongest 5enIethat the: Deduction of pure concepts gives to this term in the: 6,.Critique (KRV A, 1J}-)8; 149-60). In the fullest sense because it ismatter of nothing less than the constitution of the "inner sense,·that is, of the lime implicated in all knowledge (ibid .• 1)1-3142-43). This constitution requires thar mrec: demeotar}' syn

be performed upon me pure diversity of givens in order tothe manifold representable (ibid.). The first consists in uoithe ev2.ne5«nt diversity in an intuitive "apprehension" (ApP"sion), [h~ s«ond in repeating it in a "reproduction" (&ption), thar is. the work of me imagination (ibid.• 1)1-3}; 142-4"Recognition" (&kognition) is the third synthesis of time, andconcept performs it: "If we were nOt consciow [&wufiirnnlwhat we think is the same as what we thought a momentall reproduction in the series of represenrations would be ust:

(ibid., 133; 149). I will nOt pursue this demonstr.nion funher (Chapter 4, pp. 102-9). It suffices to imagine. as a result of theduaive imagination in taste and geniw, a proliferation ofsemations grafted upon a single given such that the concepconsciousness that is supposed to make these represenrations "ognizable," that is, to situate mem in one singular series of ahensions of reproductions of me manifold, is missing.

The hypothesis is as follows: in me excess of its productivewith forms or aesthetic Ideas, the imagination can go so fur as •prevent the recognition by concept, to dis-concert the "conscioutoness" that is dependent upon understanding, the faculty of coD­

cepts. This fury evokes the "excesses" of the baroque, of manner­ism or of surrealism, bur is also always a potential disturbance isthe "calm" contemplation of the beautiful. The Gtist, the life veinof "animation," can always exceed the "letter," force it to give in, to

resign, and the ~happiness" of writing can thus turn into a deliri·urn through an overabundance of "images."

We must remember, however, that this kind of disturbance(which Kant would certainly not sec as providing the pleasure of

Comparison oftiN Sub/im~ lind Tam

vide a feeling of the boutiful, and the object, which occasionsfeeling, Sttms in the end unrecognizable to the concept. In slime feeling the tension works in the opposite direction. Thecepr places itself out of the reach of all presentation: the ima .tion founders, inanimate. AU of its forms are inane befo~ mesolute. The "object" that occasions sublime feeling disap"nature as sinking into insignificance before the Ideas of rease(105; JOI).

Thw two aesthetics can be described on the lnsis of thesetensions, two aesthetics mat are always possible, that always then an, periods, genres, and schools whatever they may be, a 6al aesthetic of the "much tOO much" that defies the concept,an abstract or minimal aesthetic of the "almost nothing" that dform. To assimilate the twO because both suppose a tension wbe to abandon all critical rigor and to succumb to the t..,,,,,,"dental iJIwion mat confuses understanding with reason. BothStill aesthetics. Furthermore, one could not move into anafumily, nor could one localize mem in anomer Faculty's territory, .ethics, for example, save through another illusion. I say thiscause many readers of the "Analytic of the Sublime" thinkdiscern in sublime feeling a kind ofethical atavism, a shadowby moral feeling on presentation (thw obliterating it). Kant h'self invokes Aclmmg, respect, which is the result of moral law,designate the relation that thinking has with "the thing" in sUbl'.feeling. No doubt, but he also writes "admiration" <91; 88), whis not a rerm rhat belongs to a moral terminology. We will cxpthis case further (see Chapter 7).

§ 3 Categorical Examinarion

of the Sublime

Quantity and Magnitude

I come now ro the subdivision of the "Analytic of the Sublime"J discuss«! in paragraph 24. The analysis of this feelingp~ a~.

cording to the table of categories, like that of the boutlful. I Willnor go over this paradoxical but Strictly critical p~ure acco~­

ing to which reflective judgment is put to the rest of Its ~ete~l­

ntrion and called upon to ahibir its differena: and even Its reslS·ranee (see Chapter I, pp. 43-49). Thw the sublime proceeds asdoes the boutiful. However, twO additional provisions upset theparaJlel between the two Analytics.

The first .seems relarively unimportant: in the sublime one mustbegin with the qlW1tiry ofjudgment rather than its quality as w:udone wirh the beautiful. Kant refers to the method followed 111

paragraph 13. The analysis of t2Sre begins with the q~ality of,iudg.menr (it is a disinterested delight, not directed by an Interest 111 theexistence: of the object) because what awakens the fee~ing of ~ebeaUtiful is the form of the object alone, and thw this aesthetiCpleasure is disrinct from any other pleasure in its specific quality.Form. presented by the imagination, prevents thinki.ng~m ~vi~g;l,ny objective determination by concept, for the Imagmatlon ~s

busy defying understanding by multiplying the number of~I'olttd forms. But above all the privileging of form protects thmkingfrom any interest in rhe -marerial" of the objea: and consequendy

77

•

identity/difference corresponds to the altegory of quantity in un­derstanding. Referring as il does to the reAcctive judgment ofsub­lime feeling. this manner can be glossed in the following way:when I judge "this" IO be great. do 1 experience the sensation ofone greatness among others (difference) or that of greatness plainand simple. ofgreatness itself (identity)? (I say "I" to facilitate theformulation. It is not the feb dmk~ that speaks. for reAection doesnot need it [see Chapter I, pp. 15-191. bUl, rather. it is the "subjec­ti\·(''' of sensation that speaks.) Tautegorically speaking, is "this"fdt to be great, or more or less grC2t~ Answer: "this" is felt to begreat, absolutely.

Thinking only reflexively compares "this" to other greatnessesunder the "heading" ofidemity/dilttrence. and it feels (this is the-quantity" of sensation) "this" IO be great absolutdy. It will notadmit of any comparison with other greatnesses (differentt). "If.however. we call anything not aJone grC2t but wimout qualifica­tion, absolutely [rc!Jkc!JthinJ. and in every respttt (beyond all com~parison) great, that is to say. sublime. we soon perceive that forthis it is not permissible to seek an appropriate st2ndard outside it~

~If, but merely in itself It is greatness comparable to itself aJone"<97. I.m.; 93)·

The formulation is dear. However, it requires a correction. For"the things of nature" are phenomena intuited in experience. andintuition constitutes them immediately as "aggregates" by synthe­Sizing their parts. The axioms of intuition discussed in the firstCritiqtl~ (KRY A, 5, 197-201; 2IJ-20) are the 0 priori conditions ofthe extensive magnitudes of phenomena. "I cannot represent aline, however smaJl. without drawing it in thought. that is. gener~ating from a point all its pans one after another. Only in this waycan Ihe intuition be obtained. Similarly with all times, howeversmall" (ibid .• 198; uS). In the constitution of objects of experi­ellCe the axioms of intuition thus seck "the synthesis of apprehen­sion in intuition" necessary a priori to the constitution of the timeof knowlcdge in general (KRV A, 131-32; 142-43). The conccpt ofeXlcnsivc magnitude. or of quant/on, adds to this immediate syn­thesis the consciousness of this synthesis. It is the "consciousness ofthe Synthetic unity of the manifold [and] homogeneous in intu~

79Caugoricol Exam;natimt ofth~ Sttblim~Cnugoricnl Examination o!tb~ Sub/btu

from any interest in ilS reaJ presence. Desire or need does notlinger over forms.

In the sublime, on me contrary (as we have seen in Chapter 2,

pp. 56--60), form plays no role at all. In faCt form conAicts withthe purity of sublime delight. If one is still permined to speak of"nature" in this feeling, one can speak only in terms of a "rude na4ture" (di~ roM Nomr: 100; 97), "merely as involving magnitude­(bloff ro!"" Ii~ Groff' ~flI!Jiilt: ibid.). This magnitude is rude andarouses sublime feeling precisely because it escapes form, because itis completely "wanting in form or figure" (j'rmnlor odn ungesudt:134; 128). It is this "formlessness" (FonnIoJigk~it) that Kant evokes[0 begin the anaJysis of the sublime by quantity C9}; 90).

However, the terms "magnirude" and "quantity" lead to a cer­tain, overall confusion thal reigns in the AnaJytic of the Sublimeand renders itS reading and interpretation chaJlenging-the sameconfusion induced by me terms "mathematical" and "dynamicar(see pp. 89-96 and Chapters 4 and 5). For "magnitude" designataa property of the object, and "quantity" is a category ofjudgmenr.One has trouble seeing why the magnitude of narure. or what ~mains of it when it has been suipped of its forms, providesaesthetic judgment that it occasions with any property wha""'......whether universal or panicular, in itS logical quantity. Yet this iIwhat is at stake: to show that when. in feeling the sublime. rdlc:o­tion judges that "this is great," the judgment, which is singular bo­cause its subject "this" is unique, is aJso universal in itS quantity bo­cause the predicate "great" applies to the totaJity of the logical sub­ject.

In the first Critiqu~. Kant concedes that it is undoubtedly.property ofsingular judgments to be treated logically as universallfor the reason that we have just State<:! (KRV. 107-8; 1ft). But thedifficulty does not lie herc; it lics, rather, in the fact thal sublimejudgment, like taste, belongs to rcAection. The logical categoriesthat govern understanding or determinant judgmcnt. must not beapplied to sublimc judgment. What must be applied to it instead.as we have already seen, are the "headings" of reAection (see Chap­ter I, pp. 26-}1.). or "places" in a "state of mind" (KRv. 277; po). InreAeetion, a manner of comparing objects under the "heading" of

Cnt~orica/ Examination ofth~ SubHm~

Frorn Quantity to Modality Through Relation

The analysis that I have outlined constitutes the essence of para­graph 25 entitled "Definition of the Term 'Sublime'" [DefinitionnOntinal!.' du sublime: cr.] (94-98; 91-94). In it the object is to un-

b·ect. likc any phenomenon, of an apprehensive synthesis in in-oJ. " . d ···'Th·idao that gives It an extenSive magDitu e, a qunntu"r. at gIves~uan ~aesthetic" and not "mathematical" magnitude, a magnitude

~t'n mere intuition" (by the eye. nnch tUm AugmmnJf~). and not~~ means of concepts of number" (Zahlhq;riffi: 98; 94--95)? The~:easure" (of the eye) evoked here for estimating a magnirude isalso made without comparison; it is the extension of the manifoldthat can be "apprehended" intuitively at once, in the same breath.This measure can be called "first" or "fundamental" (98; 95) be­cause its unit is that of the synthesis of apprehension.

We will return to this crucial question later on (see Chapters 4and 5). The answer will be that sublime magnitude is absolute notbecause it coincides with this fundamental measure of apprehen­sion but because it "almost" exceeds it; it is a little beyond its lim­it-let us say, at the limit. Consequently the sublime thing is notaacdy a phenomenon: "Nothing ... which can be an object ofthe senses is to be termed sublime when treated on this footing"(sll, Lm.; 94). The conclusion of this discussion adds the promisedcorrection: "It is the use to which judgment naturally puts partic~

""Iar objects on behalf of this latter feeling, and not the object ofsense, thaI is absolutely great [lchkchthin grojf], and every othercOntrasted employment small" (ibid., l.m.). Sublimity does notpredicate the thing but the G~istmt;mmung, the disposition of

thinking lhat experiences or reAects on itself when it representsthe thing to itself:. Use, disposition: we recognize the twO traits,heuristic and tautegorical, that characterize reRection. Tautegorical:

this is judged absolutely great beouse the thought that judges thisfeels itself to be great absolutely. But what is the absolute magni~tude of a Slate of thought? Heuristic: its absolute affinity with a fi­nality in itself that it discovers on the occasion of this feeling (secChapler 4, pp. 109-15).

Caugorical Examination oftlu Sub/im~80

irion in general, insofiu as the representation of an object first be.comes possible by means of it" (KRV B, 198; 2I;).

"We may at once cognize from the thing itself" that the Phe­nomenon is a quantum: "no comparison with other things is re­quired" (95; 92). One must simply be conscious of the unity olthe manifold pans that compose ir. Bur this "innc=r" synthesis 0(

the thing cannot make one aware of"how ~at it is" (ibid.). Forthen the question is not to apprehend it as quantum but to mea­sure its quantitas. Quantity is not magnitude (nv, 198--99; 211).but the number of times the same unit is contained in the ext

sive magnitude. It must be measured in relation to a unit, that·

by comparing it [0 another magnitude taken as a unit of measwt.This unit is in rum chosen after being compared with mhernirudes (95; 92). Unlike the quantum, the quanhuts is thus not pvided with an a pn"on synthesis in intuition. It requires a "n

ica.l formula" (KRV A, 199; uB) that works a posuriori on the giobject. The quantitas does not involve an axiom of intuition.the use of a concept of understanding: number.

Since the magnirude of the sublime thing is estimated as be'absolute without possible comparison, it is therefore not mable as a quantity. A new term must be introduced to designate'

greatness. magnitudo: "to be great and to be a magnitude aretirely different concepts (magnitudo and quanlilas)" (94; 91).sublime magnitudtJ is not the predicate of a "mathematicallyterminant" judgment but of "a mere reRective judgment upon'

[the object's] representation" (96; 93). A quantity cannot besolute; on the contrary, it can be estimated as infinitely small or .

finitely great according to the chosen unit of measure {96-97; W'In reality the absolute greatness attributed to the sublime object. illmagnitudo, signals "the disposition of the mind evoked by [durdlla panicular representation engaging [b~schiiftigtTub] the &culry ofreRective judgment" (98, t.m.; 94). We will see (see Chapter 4) lDwhat this "occupation," given to the &culty by representation. con­sists.

Here we are speaking of quantitas. The sublime thing cannothave a measurable quantity because it does not admit of any corn­parison. But is the sublime thing at least a phenomenon? Is it the

Cnugoricnl ExAminntion oftlu SlJblim~

. ition of the term wsublime." One remarks that a slippage occurs,I~C same slippage as in the "Analytic of the:: Bc=autiful," by whichCni\'crsality and necessity are:: confused wilh each other in their~nction and eve::n in their nature, as if the category ofquamity towhich universality belongs were not a1toge::ther distinct from thalof modality to which necessity belongs. If one:: were to take:: the::cac~ories literally. the universality (or the:: singularity) of a judg.menC would signify that the predicate:: of magnitude was amib.Uled to the totality of the subject of judgme::nt "this" or, in theph.~ quorc=d, to "that man." The necessity of the:: same judgmentwould signify mat the:: judgment itSelf could not be "posed" omer­wist than it is; the modality of a judgmem. in e::ffect, "contributesnothing to the coment of the judgme::nt ... but concerns onJy mevalue of the copula in relation to thought in ge::ne::raI" (nv. t09;tIJ-14). From these two logical values. me:: quantitative:: unive::rsa1

J and the modal necessity, how does one:: draw the:: following consc=·quenee that one would be re::mpted to call "pragmatic" in the:: sc=mi·one and linguistic sen~that every person should in dfc=ct judge-this (or that man) to be great"?

The economy of this slippage:: is expounded in par2graph 8 of,the wAnalytic of the Beautiful" (s3-57; 51-54). BO[ beforc: turning tothe argument, let us first notice:: in this same:: paragraph a precious-note" relative to universality. The:: note provides proofof the slip­page we arc: discussing. "First of all we have here to note that auniversality that docs not rest upon concepts of the:: object (eventhough these af(' only empirical) is in no way logical. but aesthet­ic, i.e.• does not involve any objective:: quantity of the judgment,but only one that is subjective" (54, em.; 52). Thus we mUSt dis·tinguish between an objeclive universal validity and a subjectiveuniversal validity. Subjective universal validity quantifies "the ref~

erenee of a re::presentation ... to [he fe::e1ing of pleasure:: or displea­sure" while objective universal validity quantifies the reference of arepresentation "ro the cognitive faculties" (ibid.). We will not cre·ate further difficulties for this last expression: following the gener.al table of faculties [hat concludes the Introduction to our Crj~

tiqlt~. "cognitive fuculties" refers to undcrsrnnding. But one cannot

Cnugorical Examination oftIN Sublim~8,

derstand the term "great," which is used to characterize me slime. The elucidation is "'nominal" in mat it does nor rake theof the faculties of knowledge in the sublime judgment intosideration (or does so only very little). What it esK:mially does .stead i.s to .dispel th~ confus~on of this "great" with a quantityextenSIon In the object, whIch is conceptual, or with the "6measure of apprehension. which is intuitive. The true namesublime greatness is magnirude. Magnitude is a subjectivetion reserved for the faculty of reflective judgment.

In assigning the estimation of magnitude to reRection,analysis is already far along in one of the esK:miaI objectives ofAnalytic of Aesmerk Judgment. The analysis subtracts thethetic judgment from the aporia in which an anthropologicalscription (like Burke's) CUlnOt help confining it: left to itslarity. aesthetic judgment has no right ro be universally oommcable. On me COntT21f, "me judgmems: 'That man is beau .and 'He:: is tall' [this is an allusion to §17 devotc=d to the idc=albe2utyJ do not purport to speak onJy for the judging subjc=ct,like:: theoretical judgme::nts, mc=y de::mand me:: assent of eve::<95; 92). The dc=ducrion of me Ic=girimacy of this claim of=hedjudgment to be universally communicable:: is made in the:: ..lytic of the Beautiful" (in §§20 and 21; sc=c= also Chapte::r 8).quOtc=d phfaS(: pUts the sublime on the same level as the be2u .in mis claim. We will sc=c= that things a.rc= not quite:: so simple (Chapter 9). Nonetheless. if aesthetic judgment can justifiablyOland a unive::rsa1 agreemem, it is because the reflc=ctive fucultyuniversally communicable. In fact the reflective fuculty is nother than thinking itself insofar as it is affectc=d by the fuct of'thinking. Whe::rner the reRective fuculty thinks the::oreticallypr.actically. it always feels itself subjectively at the same time. \liesay that the reRective fuculty thinks aesthetically when it relatclthe object that it thinks to the sensation (nisth~is) with which theobject provides it. The "universality" and "necessity" of aesthetJ;:judgments are thus assured (the quotation marks remind us thatthey do not refer to categories in the strict sense).

This said, there is a point mat arrests one's anention in the def-

•

•

Categorical Examination ofthe Sublime

by opposing aesthetic judgment as Refkxiolugmhmack (the taSte ofreAcerion) 10 the judgment associated with the empirical delightdue to the senses, the Simletlgesclunaclt (the taste of sense), on theone hand. and to the determinant judgment by concept on theother. The laner can be universal in a stricdy logical sense. Be­cause of me aforementioned slippage. we will accept mat everyonemUSt necessarily accept it. The raste ofsense, according to me samereasoning. refers [0 "judgmentS merely private" (Privaturuik: 54;9) and does not demand the assent ofomers and cannot mereforedaim universality. What this means, according to me same ·con­fusion," is that it is not necessary for the delight I take in eatingspinach, for example, to prevent omers from not sharing in myddight.

The same is nor true for the raste of reflection. Unlike a deter­minant judgment. this taste judges without concepts; and yet, un­like the taste of sense, it can he universal, or at least claim to he.What could the quantity of a subjective judgment, ofa subjectivequantity be? either the subject nor the predicate of this judg­ment being a concept, one has trouble s«ing how one might

... quamify the application of one to the other. One barely daresspeak of attribution in these conditions. One might risk sayingthat the object that provides the aesthetic delight is the subject ofthe judgment of taste and that its attribute is me delight itself.~This is beautiful" would then be glossed in me following way:~Givcn this, there is pleasure" (the conditions of which muSt bespecified). Let us say: "This is pleasant." The equivalent of rheuniversal quantity for a judgment of this kind would be that~pleasant" applies to the [Otality of "this" without remainder andwithout reserve: "This is entirely pleasant." The capacity to pro­vide pleasure "saturates" the object.

However, if one were limited to this notion of subjective quan­lity, one would nOt be able to distinguish the pleasure of thesenses. the agreeable, from aesthetic pleasure, the beautiful, nor~ould one be able [0 distinguish the delight related [0 "indina­lIOn" (Nrigllng) from that which is related to "favor" (GllllSt: 49;17). In olher words (I would refer Ihe reader to the discussion in

Gtt~oricnl Examination oftlu Sublime

help being surprised by the displacement imparted [Q universaJiry.Instead ofquantifying the relation of the predicate [Q the subjea ofjudgment (the judgment is universal when the predicate appHQ[Q a subject in its rotality, and particular when the attribution isvalid only for a pan of the subject of judgment), the quantity in­voked by the note refers to rhe relation of the judgment itself tothe faculty mat judges. me undersranding or feeling of pleasureand displeasure. But. as we know, this relarion belongs to the cat­

egory of modality.Let us begin again with the opposition between objective and.

subjective. Universality, or. more precisely. universal validity, •called AUgmuingiilrigJuit in logic: the predicate is valid, giiltit> forthe whole, gnnein. in itS totality. aU, of the subject of judgment.Playing with the composition of me term that designates objee:m.universality, Kant proposes to call subjective universaJ validityGemnngiiltiglteit. a validity for the whole. But the use of the word.gnnein implies a Strong sense of community. of something that.put in common. The Gnneinschafiis opposed to me Gne!JKhaftaa spontaneous community of feelings, of practices, of mores tharbelong to a formally organized society. to an association by con­tract provided with rules and goals. In our Critique, the Gonei.giiltiglttit points to the allgnneine Stimme (s6; H), the "universalvoice," a universality of voices or suffrage, which is constitutivelyclaimed by the singular judgment of taste. From this constitutivedemand, the principle that founds it, Gemeinsiml. common sense,sensus rommunis, in Kam's Latin (82-8); 79-80), will be deduced illparagraph 28. Owing [Q this play on the word ~universality," thesignification of universality leads us from the quantity in judg·ment to the modality of judgment. A subjective judgment is saidto be universal when the duty to feel the same delight as the judg·ing "subject" ~is imputed to everyone" (jedennann amitme: 53; 5I)given the same object. This is a modal and not quantitative char·acterisric: a different state of thinking is not deemed possible. Oneshould say that the delight is thus not universal but necessary.

Let us return to the exposition that argues for this subjective~universality" in paragraph 8 (53-57; 51-H). The argument begins

Cmq,oricaL &nmination oftlJ~ Sllb/im~

s the (final) cause of these motives. This is what the psycholo-~ .. h . .. ,~call motivation: w at purs In motion.glS ~

Yet what fills Kant with wonder, and what constitutes an essen-tial point in the critique of aesthetic judgment, is that an affinitywith the objcct, a final relation to the object, is fclt by thought al­though thought is moved by the object in question according tono determinable motivation. "Finality ... may exist apart from anend insofar as we do not locate the causes of this form in a will"(61; 59). Of course, Kant adds, if one wanted to aplAin why theform of the object arouses delight in thought, one would have tofind the will that conceived the form in such a way as to render itplClSlflI. This form would men be mought of "as an effect: {that} isthought to be possible only through a concept of it," which is "toimagine an end" (6t; 58). "The represent2tion of the effect is herethe determining ground of itS cause and takes the lead of it"(ibid.). Insofar as the faculty of desire is "determinable onlythrough concepts. i.e., so as to aet in conformity wim me repre­sentation of an end," then it is precisely the will (6t; 59)·

As we see. such an explanation of an object's aesthetic affinitywith thinking would force this affinity OUt of the aesmetic territo­f)', for the explanation would introduce both concept and will.Thus even though the critique mUSl found this affinity on the ac·tion ofa ~supersensible" principle (see Chapter 8, pp. 215-18), meprinciple will remain an indeterminable concept, and its end. ofwhich the affinity is one of the effects, will remain unknowable.There will be no question of will. As for the taste of reAection,?nc must rccogni2e in it a "finality of form ... without resting onIts end (as the material of the lI~xm finn/is)" (62; 59). The sensationof pleasure that the judgment of the beautiful "predicates" on theobject is "immediate," for it does not result from the mediation of~ determinable end by a concept. One would not say thar the ob­Ject pleases because its form is "perfect" in relation to an "Ideal" ofbeauty_this is what is explained in paragraph 17 (75-80; 72-78).No causality-and not simply no final causality-is applicable 10

tastc. One could not even say that pleasure is [he effect of the

CnugoriCll/ Examination ofrbi'Sublil1ll'86

paragraph 14) the pleasure provided by (he "marcrial" ofsensat'(supposing that it can ever be isolated from its form) or even ::intercsted pleasure tied to a personal, "private" preference forgiven (orm, Cln "saturate" me {Orality of the respeaive objects~arouse them, such that one would have to concede to the jumenu implicated in mese tastes of sense a universal validiry.exceprion made in this regard for the (aste of reRection, foraesthetic pleasurc=, would no longer have a reason for being. It .pucisely to avoid this consequence that reflective universality rnbe understood differently from the way in which we have jWl

plained it and for this feason can be assimilated to:l necessityauthorizes a principle of unanimiry.

Once 3g2in. rhe transition from quantity ro modality does.sec."m (0 be justified anywhere. Let me remind me reader thating prevents a panicular judgment (from the point of viewquantity) from being posed as necessary (in its modality):"some animals are quadrupeds" can be affirmed as n=="Yconclusion [0 a demonstration, for example). Conversely, aversal judgment can be posed "problematically," that is, aspressing a simple possibility (as when one establishes a hypam •The missing link between the modality of aesthetic judgmentnecessity that justifies its demand to be communicated) and'quantity (its universality, which would be the saturation ofpk-asure-producing object) is me category of relation, which isobject of the "Third Moment" of the "Analytic of the Beautiful

That an object that one is anached to because of an inteshould provide pleasure when it is there (existent), a completelight (one that is universal in me sense we have JUSt read), indithat there is an affinity between the object and thinking. Forample, we say that the object satisfies a desire, a need, an inclint"rion, a "taste. n Thus the "capacity [0 desire" ([0 speak like K1ndwas already determined by an end that the objcct satisfies. If tbeobject satisfies these motives (whatever they may be), it is becauteit is "final" in relation to them. These motives saw the objL'Ct as themeans to their end; or the absence (the nonexistence) of the objcd

GlUgorica/ Examination oftlu Sub/im~

Mathematical and Dynamical

At the end of paragraph 24 the text introduces the second orig­inal provision of the sublime thar disrupts the categorical orderfollowed by the Analytic of the Beautiful. Disrupts or, rarher, com­~lica,('S or. better yet: ovcrdetermines. The examination of the sub­IUlle according to the four categories will be divided between thetwo "fumilies" of the mathematical and the dynamical, which re­spectively regroup the first twO categories, quality and quantity,and the second two, relation and modality.

the individual who judges. The pleasure of rhis play reveals ana/li.nit}' between the faculries thar is transcendental and nor origi­nally empirical. It is the affinity of rhought with itself despite the

keterogcneity of its capacities. But the heterogeneity of thought'sC2pacities reveals this affinity. We will explore this analysis funher

(set' Chapters 8 and 9)·Thus we see why the judgment of the beautiful is posed as nec­

cssar)'. One cert2inly cannot demonstrate that all other aestheticjudgments upon the object are impossible: the argument on thesubjecr of the beautiful is without conclusion, for lack ofconcrprs.The judgment of the beautiful immediatdy attesrs to the inner fi­nality of thinking in relation to thinking. The thought that pre­snIts is final with regard to the thought that conceives, and viceversa. Taste discovers the secret of the "art concnled in the depthsof the human soul" (u.v, 183; 200) that Ihe schematism conceals

J and cannot reveal when the po~rsof Ihought are absorbed in the·serious" matters of knowledge. Taste, on the other hand. allowsthe powers of thought fitt I'2J1ge and thinking feels that it is hap­py. The form of this inner finality. thus linked to the apriori con­dirions of all thought (irs faculties, heterogeneous. but capable ofuni'iy), suffices to legitimate the demand thai the happiness of thebeautiful be accessible to all thinking, given the same object_ Thusthe transition from the universal quantity of rhe judgment uponthe beautiful to irs necessary modality is made possible by the finalrelation.

CItt~oriclJl Examination Ofl"~ Subfjm~88

beauty we anribute to me object. "To determine 11 priori theRection of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure as an effect, wisome repre5(:ntation or other (sensation or concept) as irs cause •utterly impossible" (63; 60). One muS( say that the conscious •of the object's subjective affinity with thinking "constirutes­[hetic pleasure (ibid.).

in refen;ing back ro me differenl "headings" mal guide rdJand that are called "concepts of reflection" (only by analogyunderstanding), we observe thai in reflection the "compar'procedure of the "inner and the Durer" corresponds to the cary of rdation (nv, 2n, 279--80. 284-85; J/o, )1)-14, JI~2D;Chapter I, pp. 26--32). The subjective finality of aesthetic jmem, consideml in the place of relation and rq>laced in thesandentalropology of reflection. is a pure inner finality. Thesure of raste is altogether internal in that the sc=:nsation of fithat constitutes it does not depend on any oternal cause, whfinal or not, subjective or objective.

This reflective finality is made accountable to the "faculty ofmind" (GnniiuWTmOgm) thar is the f«ling of pleasure andpleasure. II is made more oplicit when the critical analysisines the play of the "faculties of knowledge" in tlSte. The ination and understanding are in a relation ofemularion withother in relation to the object, not in order to know it. but in

a way as to arouse and perpetuate a happiness in thought: thicomes and goes from the present:uion to the concept of the ab'We are better able to see how the "form of finality," which is

of the judgment of the beautiful, consists in this play of com'and going-all inner in effect-belWeen rhe powers at the dispot"al of thinking, the power of showing and rhe power of concepa.The object is but the occasion for play; it lends itself to it, througltirs form. Yet this play, in turn, shows rhe affinity of the twO pcrN'"ers with each other, a pure affinity, nor subordinated ro a specific:task, to tell the trurh or to do righ£. This unity. which is neverstable and always indeterminate-the Eimtimmfl1lg required and

promised by the judgment of the beautiful-is the unity of thefucultics before being rhe unison required of other individuals by

9'Cnr~oricnlExam;,uuio11 ofrht Sublime

•

riori determination of appearances according to the cnegories"fand J will re:rmit myself to add: according to the forms of intu­ition. Kant himself observes that the principles regulate the rela­

. don of understanding to "inner sense," which is time, the univer­~ form of intuition). But the division into mathematicaJ and dy­namical merely involves a difference in the "certainty" (G~iff1Jeit)

provided by the principles. All the principles provide thought witha "complete" (viiUig) certaimy as regards the result (the object ofoperience) obtained by the symheses performed according tothese principles. How~er, the certainty provided by the first rwo,the axioms and the amicip.:uions, is "imuitive," whereas the cer.ain!)' resulting from the other two, the analogies and the posru.btes, is "merely discursive" (ibid.).

What this means is that thinking an be intuitively cenain thatany phenomenon is an extensive magnitude (through the axiomsof intuition), and that all sensation that makes mought aware ofaphenomenon has an imensive magnitude, a degrec= (through meanticipations of perception). However, thinking is only certain-discursively" and not mrough an immediate intuition of a phe­nomenon's being necessarily linked to another phenomenon intitile. whether it be according to the principle of permanence, ofsuccession, or ofcoaistence (that is to say, according to me antic·ipations of perception). The same is true for the posrulates ofem.pineal thought.

This difference in certainty, which authorizes the cleavage be­tween the mathematical and the dynamical, nonetheless remainsdifficult to grasp. What "discourse" does an analogy of experiencenttd for it to be accepted as cerrain (altogether certain, in everycase) that a phenomenon either persists as such in time or else suc­~ds another, or else coexists with it? A note from the second edi­tion added to the passage I am discussing here makes things clear­~r by Specifying the nature of the syntheses-rather than the kindof certainty with which they provide thought-in play in thern~',ht:rnatical and dynamical principles (KRV H, 197-98; 216).

Jhe mathematical synthesis is called compo!itio. ZII!{WWlnlUtz­

4ng, a term that will playa role in the analysis of the sublime (sec

CIIugorical Examination o/tht Sublimt

I have said that these terms may be confusing. They do not sit­nilY that thert are fWD kinds ofsublime. the one mathematicalthe other dynamical, as me French translation of the:: section tide.might suggest: "Du sublime marhemariquc" (The mamem:uisublime), "Du sublime dynamique de la narurc" (The dynamOsublime in nature). Thl:' German is less equivocal: the aprest"vom Mat~ml1ris<h·£rhabfflm and 110m Dynl1much-ErhabmmNarurindicate that the sublime (of nature) is on the onc handsidered "mathematically" and on the other "dynamically" (orcording to the order of the c:uegories already mentioned). Her, the insistence on regrouping the categories in mathematicaldynamical "families" d~rves attention. The Analytic of the

tifuJ did not mJuire: this additional classification.The division into dynamical and mathematical is introduced

the text by an addition in the second edition to the commeoon the table of categories explained in the Critiqur ofPurr(KRV 5, IIS-18; 121-22). But the division is already made in wedition of this same CritiqlU, a linle later, on the subject ofsynthetic principles of pure understanding (nv, 196--97iThest principles are the a priori rules that understanding 0

in constituting not experience in ~ner.ll but the objects ofence or in experience. Like forms of intuition, the categoriesunderstanding are the conditions of the possibiliry of experiencegener.l!. Following this, one must establish the conditions ofpossibiJiry of objects as they are found in experience. If thesejeas did not satisfy principles ofconstitution that were compawith the a priori syntheses. which are the forms of space and .and the categories, the objects would remain unknowable.could be no real knowledge of the objects, but only a possiknowledge of possible objects.

By dividing the four principles (axioms of intuition, antici~tions of perception, analogies ofexperience, postulates of empiricllthought in general) into mathematical and dynamical, Kant et.­plains that he does not intend to present the first rwo as "principldof mathematics" and the other rwo as "principles of general ph,..,.ical dynamics" (ibid.). In both cases he is concerned with the ..,

9°

required (for a "reason" that remains to be determined) to providean immediate intuitive apprehension of it. The mathematical syn­thesis thus creates a problem, not in itself once again, but becauseit is supposed to be doubled by an "aesthetic" synthesis: the pre­sen[;lIion of the infinite. If we were to ask why such a challenge isput to lhe imagination's capacity of apprehension, we will discov­er a finality in the judgment of the sublime thar is very differentfrom that of the beautiful.

Let us rerurn to the note added to the presentation of the syn­thelic principles of pure understanding in the second edition ofthe first Critiqu~. The dynamical synrhesis is nor a compositionbur a lUXUS, a Verkniipfimg, the "connection" of elements, whichare thus linked a priori and nor "arbirraril{ (as the triangles were,by rhe tracing of the diagonal) but which are heterogeneous. thatis, they do not involve the same faculty of knowledge. The neces·sary synthesis of what is heterogeneous is thus dynamical. For ex·ample, an accidenr cannot be conceived of withom the substanceit affects. nor can the effect without the cause of which it is theresult: their unity is necessary a priori. However, the accident andthe effect are phenomena given in experience by inruition and theprinciples of understanding, whereas substance and cause arc theobject of pure ooncepts and have no possible inruitive presenta­tion in experience. They are heterogeneous according to the termsby which they are necessarily united (KRV B, 198; 217).

In the sublime considered dynamically we will find the sameheterogeneity ofelements united by the symhesis and the necessi­ty of the synrhesis. The elements are on the one hand the objecrlhal provides the imagination with difficulty in presenrarion, the"colossal," "rude" object (100; 97), "devoid of form" (90; 87), andOn the other the Idea of the infinite, of the absolute whole or ab­SOlule cause (IOS-6, 109-11; 102, 106-7). The Idea has no corre­sponding object presentable in intuition (except by analogy). ThefaCUlty of presenration can nor apprehend an extensive magnitudethaI exceeds its "first" measure. The synrhesis of these heteroge­nl'ollS dements, their lUXUS, consiscs in bringing the without-form,

93Categorical Examination ofth~ Sublim~Categorical Examination ofth~ Sublim~

Chapter 4, pp. 102-9). It consistS in unifYing several elements"do not necessarily belong to one another" on the one handare "homogeneous" on the other, that is, they involve thefaculty of knowledge. Thus the twO triangles imo which a squatl!divided when one draws its diagonal are united by a "comtion" of a mathematical nature: they are homogeneous bthey are both given according to the axioms of imuition butnot necessarily belong to the same unity, for they must bemerated in order to produce this unity (the number two)."numerical formula" is not an axiom of imuition, but consimthe a posteriori "aggregation" of extensive magnitudes (he~.

triangles: KRV, 198-200; 218-19). The same would be true for·tensive magnitudes, i.e., phenomena considered acoording toquality of sensation they provide. Understanding regulatesappearance in existence by the a priori principle called amiciof perceprion, but the unification of their respective inrensithat arc homogeneous consistS here again in a mathematical "position" a posteriori, which Kant distinguishes from the"tion" of their extensive magnitudes under the name coalitionintensities (KRV B, 197-98; 216).

If we relate this dcfinition of rhe "mathematical" symhesisthe Analytic of the Sublime, we find in paragraph 26, whichbe studied further (see Chapter 4), that the tension and evendispleasure inherent in the sublime feeling oome precisely andmost from the mathematical "composition" required by thenirude of the object called sublime. This is not of course tothat the Zusammensnztmg(102; 98) presencs a difficulty in itsdfunderstanding or for the faculty of presentation, for it is a pripIe of composition of phenomena as extcnsive magnitudes; itan axiom of inruition. But the rmdt of composition becomespresentable for the faculty of presentarion, the imagination;result cannot be "oomprehended" at once as a whole, according

the fundamental (aesthctic) measure of imagination. This """""Iwhen the mathematical composition of the units that make up .object achieves very great magnitudes, and the imagination is still

95Ctltt'goricnl Examilltltiofl oftbe Sublime

Ie: in "intension"). The conclusion is easy ro give: they cannot~. Any object ofexperience is constituted according to these prin­cipleS. Furthermore, the only knowledge that understanding can

gi\'c (with the help ~f sensi.b.le intuition) consists in discoveringhow a phenomenon IS condHloned by other phenomena in its ex­tension and intension. These other phenomena, the conditions,;lfe subject in turn to the same conStitutive principles and to thesame explication. Should one therefore conclude mat the world isindeterminate in extensive magnitude and infinite in intensivemagnitude, that there is neither an outer nor an inner limit? No,not this either. The indeterminate in extensive magnitude and theinfinite in inrensive magnitude are not phenomena. What is inde­terminare is the regression in the series of conditions, and what isinfinire is the progression in the decomposition into pans (KRV,

449-54; 5Q4-1O)· This property results from a regulative principleimposed on knowledge by reason; this property does not providean)' knowledge of magnitude of the world, eilher extensive or in·tenSI\·c.

In the third and fourth anrinomies (if the world admits of a firslcausaliry in rclation, and if its existence should be posed necessar­

'ily in modality), the reCOUfse to the dynamical synrhesis allows fora very different solution. This recourse is possible because causali­ty, or rhe relation of an effect to its cause, does not unite two ho­mogeneous elements: the effect is a phenomenon, the cause a con­cepr, whose object cannot have an intuition. The elements are het­erogeneous, but their union is necessary: one cannot think onewirhollt the other. Nothing, moreover, prevents the same phe­

~omenon, which is the object of a mathematical synrhesis (when itIS placed in a contingent series of conditions thar are homogeneous[0 it as extensive and intcnsive magnitudes), from "also" (auch:KRV. 463; pt) being considered, with regard to its existence, the cf~

fect of a cause that is by definition unconditioned-freedom­and also from being combined with an element that is heteroge­neous [0 ir in a dynamical synthesis.

From rhis solution we will conclude thar mathematical synthesisand dynamical synthesis do not exclude one another, and we must

Categorical Examinafion of/he Sublime

barely apprehended in narure, m the "presence" of the Idea of~son. Thus the powerlessness of the imaginadon becomes the siof the omnipotence of reason.

This synthesis is necessary a priori, for the twO terms that'unites could not be united by an arbitrary decision (such as draiog the diagonal of a square). Paragraph 29 explains this necessithe "colossal" is only felt to be sublime if thinking can reprthe absolute to itself at the same time, if it is "susceptible" (11111) to the Ideas, if it has an Empflinglicbkeit for them.

This mathematical/dynamical operator. or meta-operator, isful for critical thought as a whole, in particular for unifYing mesuhs of the first Critique with those of the second, i.e., in resol .the antinomies that speculative reason comes up against whenseeks [0 form the concept of the world or of the cosmos (

384-484; 437-548). It appears [0 be demonstrable that theshould have a limit in time (a beginning) and space, but thatdoes not is also demonstrable. Similarly one can demonstratein the world composite substances are formed of simple sstances, and that they are not. One can demonstrate that theof conditions that unite the phenomena of the world need acause (which is not conditioned), but also that such a causebe admitted. Or, finally, one can demonstrate that me existof the world requires the existence of a necessary being (inworld or outside of it) ro be its reason, but also that the exisof this being can never be deduced from the existence of the \YO

How can reason escape these aporias? This is where the rna

matical/dynamical meta-operaror becomes crucial. One recin the syntheses in play in the first nvo antinomies the verytheses that were operative in the first tWO principles of unstanding. They serve in forming the series that unite the pheooena in experience, which are seen as either extensive magnitu(axioms of intuition) or intensive magnitudes (anticipations

perception). These syntheses are mathematical; they unite innon-necessary way a multiplicity of homogeneous elements.ulative reason asks whether or not the series formed by thesetheses should be arrested (at a beginning in extension, at the si

94

97CattgoricI11 Examination oftht Suhlimt

•

the first" (KRV B, 1J6, em.; 122). Thus for quality "limitation [Ein­Jr/JiillkllngJ is simply reality combined with negation" (ibid.).

Because a subjective judgment' related only to the faculty of feel­ing pleasure and displeasure is involved here, irs quality is ex­pressed as pleasure when it is real or affirmative, displeasure whenil is negative, or pleasure linked to displeasure when it is limited orinfinite. This last case is that of sublime feeling with regard to itsqualiry: in the sublime pleasure is limited by displeasure, whichmakes this feeling an infinite (indlfini: tr.] subjective judgment.This infinite Iindifinir/) quality is what forces the critique to havert'COUISe to the two syntheses I have discussed. The dynamical syn_thesis accounts for the component ofpleasure, and the mathemat*ical synthesis for the component ofdispleasure. ftu an aesthetic re­A«tive judgment, the co-p~nce of these syntheses is only felt.This co-presence consists entirely in the violent and ambivalentemotion that thinking feels on the occ:asion of the "formless."

Quality, Once Ag>in

remember this when we read the "Analytic of the Sublime." In­deed the problem is displaced, for here it is not a question of de~terminant judgments as in the antinomies, but of an aestheticjudgment, which is reflective and subjective. However, mutatis mil_tnndis, it is conceivable on the one hand that sublime "magnirude"does not completely escape the axioms of intuition and the antic.ipations of perception, or even the most e1emenrary syntheses­those of apprehension and reproduaion of the manifold in an in.tuition-(there is an "object" given in sublime feding) and on theother hand that this same magnitude will be taken .as the (nega­tive) effect in p~ntation of a pure Idea of reason.

Caugorica/ Examination of,ht Sub/imt

What motiV2tes the union of the twO syntheses, mathematicaland dynamical, in the critical analysis of the sublime is the veryquality of feding.as it is observed in empirical reality. There is noneed for a meta-operator to analyze taSte. This is b«ause the na­rure ofdelight is very different in each of the twO aesthetic feelings.Paragraph 2.4 very quickly places the sublime on the side of caste

from the point ofview of their quality: both .are devoid of interest.But the qualification is a negative one. The preceding paT2gT2pb.in which both feelings are compared, is more articulate. But it alsorecaJls their difference, as we have already seen (see Chapter 2, pp.56-67). Qualitatively, sublime feeling seems "contradictory." Weknow that the quality of a subjective judgment consists in delightor displeasure. In this regard the judgment ofsublimity is qualita­tively different from the judgment of beauty because it associafCIIdispleasure with pleasure.

As a category of undersranding. quality requires that a judgmentbe either affirmative, negative, or "infinite" (unmd/ieh: KRV, lOT>

1/0). In the first case, the judgment truly attributes the predicateto the subject, in the second it denies it, in the third it limits it.Whence the three categories of the "class" quality: Rtalitiit, Ntglt­,ion, Limitation (ibid., 113; uS). The third caregory in each dass"always arises from the combination of the second category with

99Tlu Sublim~ tlJ MllIlumati~a/Sy"tbnis

•

btter experiences a failure unknown to it in taste, which is anala­ous 10 the aporia expounded in the first twO antinomies.

g It follows from the faCt that sublime judgment is reAcctive, as is

the judgment upon the beautiful, that what is at stake is not theknowledge of the object, but the subjective sensation aceompany~

ing the presentation of the object. This is true for the aspect ofreflection I have called tautegorical (set Chapter I. pp. 8-15). As for

the heuristic aspect (set Chapter I, pp. 26-32). one could say atfirst glance that what is true for the beautiful is also uue for the

sublime: the rule for the synthesis of (reAective) judgment is nOtgiven by a category or a principle of pure understanding, as is theC25C for an objective determinant judgment. The rule remains to~ found. and it must remain so. Thus "the sublime pleases" (tim£rhabm~gifiiUr: 94; 91) like the beautiful "simply pleases" (bioIt4'i/h: 49; 47)· In both cases the pleasure is due to a subjective fi~

nality. But this finality is altogether different in the sublime fromwhat it was in taste. "The object is grasped [auEmommm] as sub­lime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation[vmnituLrtl of a displeasure" (l09, t.m.; 105). One must look fortEe source of this "happiness" crossed with unhappiness elsewherethan in the affinity of the faculty of prese:nration with the thinkingof concepts. Rather, it is to lx found, paradoxically. in their het~

ttogeneiry. The resolution of the conflict constitutive of sublimejudgment requires a "dynamical" synthesis because of the he=tero­geneity of the imagination and rc=ason. In this conflict. the imagi·nation does not contribute to pleasure through a free productjonof forms and aesthetic Ideas, but in its powerlessness to give formto the object. The rule of the synthesis of judgmc=nt is lacking herenOt for want of profusion but for want of presentation.

In this respect, the situation is similar to that of the antinomiesor the first Critiqu~. The imagination (matched, however, with un~

d~rstanding in order to produce knowledge; this is the differenceWIth imagination's situation in the sublime) was supposed to pre~

St'nt a bl,.'ginning or a limit (3 temporal or spatiaJ 1.ero), the simple(a"tCro in intensity), an absolute in causality or in the existence ofthe world. It was shown that the imagination was incapable of do-

"Comprehension" Is "Measured"

The "drama" that goes by me name of the- sublime cansi"mathematic:illy" (daJ Matlumatisch-Erhabnu), which is normathematical sublime, is undoubtedly similar to the canRiagivd ri~ ro the first two antinomies in the Dialectic of theCritiqu~. This conAia insists on the faCt that the syntheses .

~oked b~ ~th panies in order to come to a d«ision about qmy (beglnnmg or om) or about qualiry (simpliciry or nor) ofworld in its rotality are only mathematical and unite homagenelements-the phenomena in the world. Howc=ver, an ahsollimit. a beginning, a border without ocrerioriry. a simple dethat is nm subject to a possible decomposition into parts, can

be a phenomenon, because it is always supposed to be uneao&:tianed. We will also find this aporia in the "mathematical" analylifof sublime judgment. However, we will find it transposed.

T~ localize the change of scene required by the analysis of thesublime more precisely, one could situate it nO[ only in relation COthe scene of the Antithetic of speculative reason but also in relatioll

to the Analytic of the Beautiful. The judgment upon the sublimeis a reAective judgment, like the judgment upon the beautiful, andnot dctcrminant, like those that enter into conAict in the antino­mies. But in the constitution of sublime feeling, reason is subsri­tuted for undemanding as imagination's parmer; this is why the

98

§ 4 The Sublime as

Mathematical Synthesis

Tht Subfjm~as MathtmaticalSyntJusis

ulting inro form. and form is a limitation. To say that the givensPre shaped logether, zUJIlmmmgtfaSIm, means that their rdations:re arrested by and in the form that results from their shaping.

The aesthetic "estimation" (Schiitumg) of magnitude In a singleintuition is like mat of a visual fidd. It is measured by "compre­hension"' jusl as me visual fidd is measured "by the~" (tIIlch dnnAugmnUljk: 98. [.m.; 95). The visual fidd is limited; the magnirudethai Ihe faculty of presentation can embrace at one lime has amaximum measun:ment. This maximum is "subjectivdy ... deter­mined" (ibid.). The faculty of presc=nration experiences. fec:ls that itis held back by an insurmounrable limit in the extension of its ac­tu2l inruicion. This limit is me absolute. fdt subjectivdy or aes­throcally. ofwhat the faOJ.lty ofp~rationcan grasp in terms ofpresenrable magnirude. It is enough for thought to fed mis mc=a­surt as insurmountable. as subjectivdy absolute. for this aestheticmnimum to convey "the idc=a of me subljme'" (n dir ld« to Er­habmm Ixi ruh ftihrr) and 10 call forth me "emotion" (ditimigtRiHmmg; 99; 95) that char.tcteriz.es mis fec:ling. A mathematicalestimation of very greal magnirudes by means of numerical con~

~ts <98; 9fJ cannor engender this emotion, and~ will see why itcannot.

Kant takes me opportunity provided by the examjnation of thisarsthetic measure [0 make an observ<ltion that anticipates some ofHusserl's analyses. The very notion of magnitude in ~nera1. in­cluding its mathematical sense, is grounded in the measure ofimagination's "comprehension."' Mathematical magnitude cannot~ constitUted malhematically. It can be measured. But the mc=a­SUI"(' is itself a magnirude. It mwt be mc=asured in turn. The math­ematician would say Ihat the unit of measure is chosen arbitrarily.Kant agrees with this (108"""'9; 104-5). But the very notion of mea~~ure does not resuh from this choiCC' of unit. It proceeds from the~esthctic" limitation of the comprehension of the manifold in a

Single presentation. This is the "first or fundamental measure"'(Gnmdmnjt) by which all malhematical measure is made possible:ts numerical determination (98; 95). The "horizon" of compre­hension is the magnitude of the measure that makes [he measure

J

Tb~ Sub'im~ as Matlumatical Symhnis'00

iog SO in all of the above cases, for the: imagination can only p~sem phenomena, and the absolute is not a phenomenon. In theAecrive judgment of taste, the issue is no longer to know the :.jects bUI to ocperience pleasu~ on me occasion ofobjects. For thiIpleasure t? be aesthetic. il must be independent of all interest Uathe m~[en.a1 of the phenomenon; it must be due only [0 obj~

form msoF.tr as the form can affect the "state" of thought. Theimagination is precisdy in charge of these forms. Indeed. tbiIpurting into form is no longer subordinat~ here to the rules aacIprinciples of understanding, for it is nOI a mancr of makingphenomenon knowable. The "schematism" (which is this puinto form: KRV, 180-87; 196-20p loves room for the fr~ produe>­cion of forms whose end is, on the conrrary. to prevent unstanding from placing th~ forms under itS rules and princiHowever. understanding continues itS game in the faCC' ofchallenge. to which it tries to respond. bur to no avail. ThUiunion is established baw«n underst:lllding and the imagina .which is very differc=nt from that rc=quired by knowledge. There'a compttition ofsorts bawec:n the two powers in this unionc=ach fec:ls its foItt. yet is unable to overpower the other. It mustremembc=red that in this free play, howc:ver numerow and prothe forms presc=nted by the imagination may bc=. och of them is cf.feaivdy "presc=nted" or presc=ntable within the limits of the "(.()Oo

prc=hensive" synthesis, which is the affair of the imagination.When rc=a.son is imposed upon imagination as itS partner in sub­

lime fec:ling (when undersranding is no longer itS partner). thi,.change radically. Rc=a.son is also the power of concepts. whose abo­jc=cts (of thought) have no possible presentarion in expc=rienc:e.Thus reason opposes the imagination nOt with categorical rulcland principles. which would be applicable il priori to what theimagination can present. but with Ideas that are inapplicable il pri­ori to any presentation. because the objects of these Idc=as are abo­solute or limidc=ss, wherc=as the "comprehension" (ZUJilmmttifllS·sting) that allows for the presentation of sensations in a unity halwhat one calls "limits." Comprehension has a limit or, rather. islimitation itself before any conceptual rule. for it consists in a

'OJThe Sublime I1S Marhematical Synthesis

. compared; namral magnitudes can also exceed the measure:lga ll1

, • '''d"finlaginalions comprehenSIon spontaneously, 1I1 a ttl e way.o The catastrophe that the imagination experiences in the sub­

'Iime (from a "mathemati~~" point of"view) has not at all to" do. c ,he incommensurabilIty of the fundamental measure of

WlflI. g·,n:ttion's comprehension with the very great measures that un-Ima ' . . .derstanding can conceive of by the recurrent a?dltlon of a umt to

. elf and by the choice of larger and larger umts of measure. The~:~it chosen by undetstanding to measure magnitudes, even ifit is\'ery large (in the series of numbers)-the earth's diameter countedin miles, for example, and then taken as the unit with which to

measure interplanetary distances (102, 105; 98, lOll-would notpose an insurmountable obstacle to the cooperation tha~ imagina­tion gives understanding when the latter wants to obram a deter­minant knowledge of the magnitudes it measures. One could evensay that the extension of knowledge tequites the us~ of larger .andlarger units--or smaller and smallet ones, for there IS also an Infi·nite number of possible units in decteasing ordet to measure themicroscopic, and microscopes give liS as great an "abundance ~fmaterial" as telescopes do in rhis regard (97; 94). The only condl­ti~n, which is that of knowledge, is that the imagination always beable to present by apprehension, unit after unit, the partial mag­nitudes that undetstanding measures and adds to each other. Thefollowing clearly expresses this: "In the successive aggr~tio~ ofunits requisite for the reptesentation of magnitudes the Imagma­tion of itself advances ad infinittim withour let or hindrance-un­derstanding, however, conducting it lleiut sie] by means of con:ccpu of number for which the fotmer must supply the schema

(J01; 98).This cooperation of the imagination and understanding in the

representation, Vorsullullg, of magnitude might appear to be para­doxical if one thinks that rhe imagination contributes with irs~cornprehension" (ZuSilmmenfammg). This is the word one finds inthe German text, but following a correction made by Erdmann.Kant had written Ztlsammem~tzung, "composition." And compo­sition is not comprehension. The former ZttJammtmetzlmg (com-

J

Thl' Sublime as Mathematical Symhesis>02

of magnitudes possible. A great "evaluator," so (Q speak, a rnsuring measure for all measured magnitudes. From the aestheticthe mathematical the word "measure" thus changes meaning. Forrhe imagination, measure is the maximum magniUlde that is Pr&.semable at once. For understanding, there is no maximum nmetical magnitude. Understanding can measure magnitudes withvery small or very large numerical units without encountering an,obstacle.

"Composition" Is Infinite

The sublime drama thus appears TO result from this "funmental" threshold that rhe faculty of presentation itself opposesall aesthetic estimation of magnitude: "When the apprehens'[At4Fasslmgl has reached a point beyond which the represenrariof sensuous intuition in the case of the pans first apprehendedgin to disappear from the imagination as this advances to theprehension of yet others, as much, then, is lost at one end asgained at the mher, and for comprehension [ZusammmftlSSuwe get a maximum that the imagination cannot exceed" (99, t.96). In short the case seems to be rather classical. Docs it notonate with Descartes' chiliadic polygon that can be conceived huenot imagined?

However, a difference separates the Cartesian example from _Kantian description that we have JUSt read. The thousand-sidcclpolygon is a figure conStructed by understanding by means of n....merical concepts. The analysis here, on the other hand, involvetthe confrontation of imagination's comprehension, limited to its"first measure," with "magnimdc" as it is to be found "in rude na­ture" (1m tlLr rohe Nawr: 100; 97). Kam's appeal.ro the example ofthe tiers of an Egyptian pyramid or to the interior volume of theBasilica of St. Peter in Rome should nor be a source of error. It isonly a question of showing that from a "proper" distance (properto sublime emotion) these magnitudes, which are indeed mathe­matically measurable, can nonetheless exceed the measure "by theeye" to which the measure of imagination's comprehension is onet'

'OJTht' 5ublimt' (JJ Mi1tht'matici115ymht'sis

ralion in lime by "gener-ning (zu t'ruugm] ... all its parts one afteranother" (ibid., 198; 218). This successive synthesis is the a prioricondition of "apprehension" even of phenomena, as we have secn.The text insists: only "through successive synthesis of part to panin [the process of) its apprehension (in tkr Apprrhmsion)" can thephenomenon "come to be known" (ibid.). Thus one could say thaiapprehension needs composition, or even that it is composition, atleast in regard to me magnitude of phenomena.

However, a first difficulty must be resolved here if we do notwant {Q misunderstand the "comprehension" evoked in paragraphs16 and 17 of me third Cririq~. Let us try to situate the axiom ofcomposition in apprc:hension in rel.:uion 10 the syntheses discussedin the Preliminary Remark to the Deduction of the categories inthe fir.;t CritiqUL (KRV A, 131; 141). One must be aware: that thesesyntheses are constirutive of the possibility of experience in ~ner­

al, and nor of the possibiliry of the objects ofexperience, as is meaxiom of composition. Thus they are even more fundamental(ibid., 131-32; 144); the axiom itsdf presupposes them. Yet, wimIhis reservation in mind, it Sttms that the "composition in appre-

_ hension" required by the axiom corresponds to the first two syn­theses, that of "Apprehension (Apprt'hmsion] in Intuition" and thatof "Reproduction (Rrprodulttio,,] in Imagination." The third, thatof -Recognition (Rt'ltognition) in a Concept," appears to corre·spond to what the axiom calls the "consciousness of unity" alreadyobtained by composition, because [his consciousness of uniry isnOlhing other than the concept of magnitude.

Let us see how the successive composilion of the apprc:hensionof the phenomenon as extensive magnitude demands syntheses ofapprehension and reproduction. The first consists in containing(~rhaltm) the manifold "in a single moment" (Ilis i" tintm Augm­blick) in such a way that the "run·through" Ipar.roun: tr.] or the"trans-currence" (dm DlIrcbktufrn) is "held together" by a singlelake, so ro speak, the ZUJIlmmt'1I1uJmllmg (ibid., IJI-J2; 143). Ob·viously there is only a Aux, a passage of the manifold, if there isSuccession, and rhe latter requires the simultaneous for irs consti­tution. The current flows only in the "hold" of what docs not flow.

Tht Sublimt as Marhnnatical SymhNis1°4

POf;';O) is defined, I will remind the reader (s~ Chapter 3. p8~6), i.n ~ nOle to the "Systematic Representation of all the S~:thetlc Pnnclples of Pure Understanding," added in the second edi­tion of the first Cririqru (KRV 8, 197--98; 210): it is the "synthesis ofthe manifold where its constituents do not n«marily '"long to 0JIr

11110tMr," "the synthesis of the homogm~us in everything that CUI

bt: mathmliU;CI1U, treated" (ibid., r.m.). The oample given to jJ..

lustrate composition is, I will remind the reader again, the fda.tion bt:rween the rwo triangles that one obtains when one dnwtthe diagonal of a square. Thq arc homogenrous (0 each o~but their combin:uion is nor necessary, for each can be conccivalof without the help of the orner. On the contrary. one cannorthink the' effect withom the cause; their synthesis is n«asary, ...though they an: hetcl"Og('neous in nature (the cause, unlike me J..&cr, is not a phenomenon).

Yet the first principle according to which understanding con&tutes the objects of experience, according to which it constinu.the phenomena as knowable, requires that they be intuited iaspace and time as extensive magnitudes. This principle is c:a1Wthe axiom of intuition. It States mat phenomena -cannot be ap­prehended (i1pprrhouiim), mat is, t2ken up into empirical CQDoo

sciousness, save through that synthesis of the manifold ... that it.through composition (ZU.Ji1mmmst'tzungJ of the homogeneoulmanifold and consciousness of its synthetic unity" (KRV a. 1,­

217). AJ for this consciousness, it is constituted by "me conccprof a magnitude (qUtlntum)" (ibid.). This concept, which is the coo­sciousness of "the unity of the composition of the manifold [and)homogeneous" (ibid., 198, t.m.; 217), is an act of understotndins­But the unity of the ZUSi1mmmSt'tzung itself is the schema that cor­responds to the concept of magnitude, and it is the act of theimagination preparing the manifold for knowledge through un·derstanding by means of the concept of magnitUde (and later ofnumber).

One must see that composition is an operation which consists inthe successive addition of one part {Q another, the parts being ho­mogeneous. One only represents a line to oneself in space or a du-

107The SlIblim~ tlJ Matlumatica/Syntlmis

. s afknowledge according to thtir octtnsivt magnitude. In thisJ:posirion, the imagination is ablt to Itt itsdfbe "guided" by thtCOncept, which is in short th~ "consciousntsS" of tht unity pro­:ced by the imagination's synthesis. Furthtrmore. the magnirudesconceived of by undtrsranding can be Vtry largt (numerically)....1rhout the imagination being prevtnted from supplying the cor·responding "schema" (ibid.). A5largt as it may be. a magnirudt isapprdttnded intuitively by parts. and evt:ry apprehmsion is "main.Qina:l" or "reproduced" (in its abKnce) in the following appre.hension (which is only "following" because th~ p~ng is main·rained). In other words tht ambitus of the Zusammmn~hmung

always remains the 5amt. Tht rttUrrence of th~ p~ngappre­htnsion in the Cllm:nt ont dOtS not at all enlargt its ambitus, nomort than a gtsture is a hundred times larger whtn it is repeatedfor tht hundredth timt. N for the concept. it dtttrmines thenumbtr of "times" (of apprthensions supplied by tht imagina·cion), thus allowing for me recognition of tht magrutude of theobj~.

Thus ont can undtrnand why th~ imagination and undtr­_standing an: in perfro: affinity when procttd.ing by ~nce. Rr­cum:nce is a syndlesis of me homogeneous of which both arc: ca­pable without particular effort. each according to its ordtr (re·spectivdy. schtma and concept). This is why "this procedurtinsofar as it belongs to the logical estimation of magrutud~... isdoubtless somedling objro:ively final according to tht concept ofan end (as all measurement is)" (101. t.m.; 98). "Objro:ively final"~l1St dle combination of tht two faculties is finaliztd upon thederermination of th~ magnitudt of tht object: its measurtmtnr.However, because this finality is subordinated to the "conctpt ofan end," which is this cognitive determination, it is not at all aes­~he[ic; it brings to the thought that proceeds to this rtcurrtnct noImmediate pleasure, "nor anything which for the aesthetic judg­Jnenr is final or pleasing" [G~ft"nuuJl (ibid.).

This negative remark in (he roct of paragraph 26 brings us backto the examinarion of aesthetic feeling. The remark evokes thepleasure of the beaurifuJ. Tht remark following it addresses sub·

T!J~ Sllblim~as Matb~ml1ticnJ S)'lItbrri!106

No movement without rCSt. And vice versa. Composition by suc­cession, ZtlJommmsuzung, requires this more originary "suPPOrt,"the Z"snmmmn~bmung,which provides the composition by SUc­

cession with the un irs to compose.

But composition also requires that these unirs be placed one af.ter the other and that each not disap~r when the other appears.for otherwise there would be no succession to make up the mag­nitude of the phenomenon. This is the synthesis that the imagina_tion performs as "reproduction." "When I seek to dr:a.w a line irathought. or to mink of the time from one noon to another. oreven 10 rep~nr to myselfsome particular number, obviowly thevarious manifold representations mat art involved [which art theparts of the line, of the dUf2tion, or of the numberJ must be ap­pn:hended by me in thought one after the other" (ibid.• 13}; 141).Morrovtr, in ordtr to show dlt ntcmity of rq>roduaion. Kam:adds tht following. which SttffiS to tcho tht tOCt of paragraph 16of tht third CritiqlU ocplaining dlt limit of "aesthttic comprthm­sion" (dlt imagination loses "as much ... at ont tnd as is gaintd.tht othtr": 99; 96): "If I wtrt always to drop OUt of thought theprttMing rq>rest>ntlnions (dlt first pans of th~ lint, tht antttrdenrparts of tht time period. or tht units in tht ordtr rq>rest:ntal),and did not rtproduce thtm whilt advancing to those:: that follow,thtn a compltte rtprest>ntation would nev~r ... arise::" (JCRV A. IJJot.m.; 148). R~produaion allows a unit apprthtndtd earlitr, millaaually abS(;nt, to be kq>r present in thought. This synthesis of~tention is the doing of imagination. And "composition"n~Iy includes ir.

Now we can return to the toct of paragraph 26 of the "Analyticof the Sublimc" cited carlier. The "composition"-tht ZUSIl"'~

m~m~tzllllg, as Kant wrote it, and not the "comprehension," tMZlISammmfamwg, as Erdmann mistakenly COrrCCtS it-"requisitefor the representation of magnitudes" is a synthesis that the imag­ination can advance "irself... ad infinitum" (101; 98). This syn­rhesis is in f.1.Ct nothing other than the apprehension and repro­duction necessary to the constitution of the time of knowledge(and of space secondarily), but applied to th~ constitution of ob-

Jy the ~se ~s ~he. series. in:reases by compositio~) because theimagination IS limned to Its fundamental measure, then me pow.~r of presenration, das DanuJlungwtrmiigm, of the imaginationfinds itself literally overwhelmed. The eye beholding the tiers ofthe pyramid Ot the interior of St. Peter's in Rome can be ovet.whelmed if one is a distance such mat the eye cannot "compte­hend" in a glance what it can "compose:" successively.

TIN Sublim~ as MatIN11U1tical SyntlNsis

The Infinite Is Not "Comprehensible" asa Whole: Fear

This aesthetic comprdlension of the whole (at one time) of aw=ry large or infinite series is what reason demands of the imagi.nation and what provokes the sublime emotion. Thw one of theprotagonists in aesthetic judgment changes. The partners are nolonger imagination and understanding, whose agreement is possi.hie and nece:ssary to make an objective determinant judgment, andwhose subjecrivdy final harmony provides the pleasure of taste inaesthetic reRecrive judgment. Instead we have imagination and rca·

.JOn, or, more precisely, because it is an aesthetic reflective judg­ment, we have the subjective sensation that accompanies the: eRr·rise of the imagination and me subjective sensation that accompa·ni~ the: o:ercise of reason.

One: might ask the: following question. Why are mere twO sen·S3tions when the:re is jwt one f«ling, the: sublime? It is becausethis f«,ling consists of twO contradictory sensations, pleasure anddispbsure. "attraction" and "repulsion." Thinking feels itself ang~·togm and abgmoflm, as we have read in paragraph 2) (91i 88). Ye:tis it nOt, in the end, a pleasure: beause it is an aesthetic judgment?One: might be tempted to say this, but one must concede that it isa "negative pleasure:" (negatiw Lust: ibid.). The faCt remains thatthese observations are still merely descriptive. The properly criticalques,ion asks how this nc=gative: pleasure is possible. Or in mherWords, to put it in the form of a problem: give:n that the:re is a~(Iblime aesthetic feeling, how does one lind the subjective: finalitythat unites the rwo kinds ofsensations condensed by sublime aes--

T/~ Sublime as Mitthandriea/ Synthnu.08

lime feding. In the: ~intentional fina.lity~ (in diner absichtlich."ZuNeJuniifUgkeit) implied by composition, "there is nothing COlao

pelling us to t2X me UtmOSt powers of the imagination, and driyt itas far as ever it can reach [nichm] ... so as to push [tTtibmJ the sa.of the measure, and thus make the single intuition holding themany in onc (the comprehension (ZusammelifilSSung» as great.possible" (ibid.• em.). Composition, even ad infinitum. has no.fea of tension on comprehension and its "first measure," ofP'4ing the limit. Let me aplain the argument following this smt~the Zusammmfilliung, the comprehension of units by the ui....I"!nation. em Ix: "pushed" by undersranding to ten or four; in~ the magnirude will be produced in a successive fashioncording to the decimal or quaternary principle that one hucepted). Magnirudc: will ~ produced by composition, ZmmHt%Ung, and also by apprdlension, AuffaJJung, if the qU4is graspable in a single inruition. The imagination can chooseits unit a magnitude that it can take in "at a glance" (in .Bliclt fasstn) a foot or a rod, for example. The imagination cantake a "German mile" or "the eanh's diameter." Understan •will in bOlh cases ~ "as well served and as satisfied." And yathe second case (the mile, the diameter), the imagination willhave the "apprehension" (AuffaJJung) of the magnitude takeaunit, but not the ZUJIlmmmfaJJung, the (romp"hnuio tmthaiall

it. But this does not prevenl the understanding from havinl(comp"lJnuio Iogica) of the magnitude by means of numerical c;aa.cepts (ibid.). And I would add: this does not in the least pmdlthe imagination from effectuating the "composition" of the mil'niNde, which is the rwin of this logical comprehension-the~position or the recurrence by "reproduction" of the parts of a Get­man mile or of the earth's diameter, for the imagination has ..Auffammg, an apprehension, of each of the partS.

We can dearly see where and when the sublime feeling has I

chance of arising: it is when the imagination is asked to ha~.aDaesthetic comprehension of all the units included by compos~:in the progression. For then, if all the partS composed success- .cannot be comprehended in a single momenl (which is necessart"

110 71u Sllblim~ fli Mathnnoticnl SyntlJ~i.J TJu Sublim~ as MarJumatical Symh~lu

Ihetic feeling in such a way as to make this feeling a negative pLc..su~?

From the mathematical syntheses that have occupied us in thitchapter, where me sublime judgment was considered under tbrreAocive "headings" that correspond [Q the categories of qualie,and quantiry, onC' gets a .sense of rhe di~ion one needs (0 fain order to find a solution to this problem. The imaginationnOI "actually" synthesiu= the magnitudes intO an apprehensionless the: magnitudes do not o:ceed the "first measure" of its ..

prehension." One could caJl this measure subjectively absolThe maximum that the aesthetic "estimate" of magnitude ismined by me imagination can itsdfbe "considered [~mihJ

absolute measure {au abw/uu MajrJ" <9'9; 9n. Thus there is ajecrivc: absolU[e in the presentation of a magnitude. As ~said, me proliferation of forms and aesthetic Ideas in the im .cion of the amateur or the min does not strike a blow to thissure; this measure applies in tum to each form or actual "ldeI.;Furthermore, the quality (the other mathematical ~nthesis) ofthetic judgment is reinforced by th.is measure, and the pleasure •creased. However, at the moment of passing beyond this .l......limit, the comprehensive synthesis of magnitude becomes imsible, and the quality of the state, in which the thought that iines finds itself, is reversed: it is afraid of this ObmchwnJglic~

this transcendent, this movable and confused (schwingm)(iib~r) "like an abyss (AbgnmdJ in which it fears ro lose i(107; /OJ). Beyond its absolute of presentation, thinking encounthe unpresentable, the unthinkable in the here and now, andBurke ca.lls horror takes hold of it. But why does thinking needgo this far?

In this demand to reach the limit we recognize a characteristiccfreason, From the point of view of quantity, reason pursues the"ries of magnitudes conceivable ad infinitum. One might remo....str-tle thar nothing can srop understanding in the composidon rJlarger and larger units by means of numerical concepts. Is thequanritative infinite produced by the unlimited recurrence of otICunit added to itself (which the im.agination can easily follow br

\\':l}' of ~composition") not already the object of a concepl of un­derstanding? But "in comparison with this [the infinite) all else(in the way of magnitudes of the same order) is small." This is\\.hy we say that "Ihe infinite is absolutely (nol merely com para­li\'e1y) greal" (tim Unmdlidu, . , ur schkchthin{nidJt bkJfl kompa­rativ/ grofl: 102; 99)·

The next pan of the argument assertS that the conapl of me in­finite formed by understanding or the horizon of a progression adi"ft"irum is not "of capital importance" (ibid.). But before t<tkingIhe next step necessary for an understanding of what me infinite of~n is aboul and how it affects thought, let w scop for a mo­ment at the infinite of understanding, of progression, insofar as itproduces in mought a kind ofsublime feeling. I am referring hereto the end of paragraph 26 (105; ror).

There are "examples of the mathematica.lly sublime (MQrhmuz-J tiKh-Erhabmml in nature [tin- Narur)." They are providm "in

mere intuition" (in tin- bkJjlLs Anschauung 1i4'""- um), which I taketo mean: in a simple, intuitive way, On the side of intuition, thevery concept of understandjng could conrribute, as wt= will.see, tothis ~ublime feeling. The concept of understanding would be "di­rttt" in rna[ it would nor be mmia[ed by an Idea of reason andwould owe nmhing to the way reason conceives of the infinhe.Thus these examples of the sublime are "mathematical" in whichinmilion can follow undemanding in its progression toward theinfinile. The case may seem unexpected after what has been saidabout Ihe measure of subjective comprehension permittm to the~acultyof presentation. So what are we to make of the following:Our imagination is affordm, not so much a greater numerical

concept as a large unir (groflN Einheit] as measure [au Mafll (forshortening me numerical series)" (105; lOr)? This is nor clear. This~vcn seems to conuadict everything rhat one undersrood ofimag­Ination's "first measure." Does the "large unit" nOt exceed this mea­SUre, can it be presenr ro the imagination otherwise than by com­Position? If the "large unit" exceeds the measure, then the case isthe ~ame as with a conflict with reason. If indeed it is a maner ofth l , relation of the imagination to understanding, as Ihe parenrhe-

, ,)'Stematic division and so is the "conversion" of the estimation!Ins -hch fh'ff agnitudes that accompanies t e ange 0 t e Unit 0 measureo :hich undersmlding proceeds when "shonening" the numbers.~(J\\"t\'er. Kant adds, "strictly speaking" (rigt1ltuch: lOS, t.m_; 101),~'h:1,[ Ihis systematic division of the universe by understanding• r(SCntS" to w when it changes the scale of measure, what ittt'':esents to thought, is "our imagination in all irs boundlessnesslZ ihm' ganun Grmunfq~igk~itl, and with it nature as sinking'ntO insignificance Iwmhwmdtna') before the Ideas of reason onct:heir adequate presentation IDarrt~UuT/gJ is attempted" (ibid.).

What seems to have been decided in favor of the concept ofunderstanding in the production of this sublime feeling is thustaken away In-franchi, also to be understood as rt'~tran(h', decidedagain: tr.] from it in the end. Moreover, this is what happens to thethought that imagines: it is blocked, which is a sign that the situ~

J ation is different from the transcendental situation of the progres~

sion. The imagination can follow understanding in its progressiontoward very large units. It can continue to present magnitudes ofeven a cosmic order: it composes the apprdlension ofa presentablemag£lirude by reproductive synthesis, many times. Thw it cancontinue ro supply the "schema- for large numerical concepcs.

However, a mutation occurs on the pan of concepts. The re~

currence ad infinitum of the "and so on" brings thinking to con~

crive not only the nat "time" bur "the most times" at the sametime, all at once, in a single moment. The infinite maximization ofmagnitudes leads 10 the Idea of an infinite magnitude, always a/­rtruly larger than any measurable magnitude. This magnitude isnOt numerable by recurrent addition of a unit to itself, howeverlarge it may be. It is off~limits for understanding. k we have said,the understanding cannot conceive of the unlimited, or even ofthe limit. These are concepts whose object is not presentable inintuition. However, knowledge requires that in the schema thetoncepi be combined with the presentarion of its object. The infi­nite or magnitude, conceived as the whole (at one t~me),. is .not aPo~~ible object of experience; there is no intuition of n. It IS Simplyan object of thought, the object of a concept that remains unde­termined for want of adequate presentation_ The thought that

"lTht' Sub/imt' flj MatlNmatica/ SynrhaisTIN Sub/im~ flj MatlJmlilhca/ Synthtsis

ses suggest ("shonening the numerical series- is for undemandins[0 change the unit of measure as ir progresses roward great tnagni.tudes), it is difficult [0 se-e how the inSmlct may be sublime: the!imagination foUows the progression of undersmlding by compo.sition withour encountering any obstacles.

By giving aamples meant to shed lighr on this obscure affair.the tat in filet displaces the nonon of this sublime of "mere intu­irion:- Thw in view ofabridging the numerical series while it pr0.­

gresses in magnitudes to be measured. undersmlding changes icIunit of measure. Undersmlding can estimate the magnitude ofantt by the height of a man, thar of mountains in tree units, 01the earth's diameter in "mountains," of the planet2ry system in ter­

restrial diameters. of a galaxy in "planetary systems," of a nebula iagalaxies (105; 101). There is no limit to cross in this progressioThere is nothing that could "hold out" (~rwarun) against theprocess of these substitutions of units (ibid.).

However, the estimation of "an immeasurable whole" (rinn_u1U'171l~jflichmGanun: ibid.) reflexively produces a feeling of.sub.­limity. Indeed. the matter is one of "aestheric" estimation, that iI,of the scate of pleasure or displeasure in which the "object,- the"immeasurable" whole, pUts thought. ls this a thinking of COIl­

ctpts, of undersmlding. or, as was Stated under the name of~intuition, of presentation, of imagination? And is it indeed diethought ofa "large unit"?

Here Kant specifies and corrects himself: the sublime sensu:ioII"does not lie so much in the greatness of the number, as in diefact that in our onward advanct lim FortKhn-ruJ we always am­at proportionately gre-ner unics" (ibid.). Thw it is the thought nocofa "large unit" but of the progression toward the always "grearct'"which is fdt as sublime. k for knowing whether thinking fecb:this feeling in conctiving of the progression, in imagining it, orin intuiting it, the text seems to bring the discussion to a dose:"The systematic division of the cosmos Ida Wt/tgtbiiutUsl co~duces to this result [to this feeling]. For it represents all that iJgreat in nature as constantly [immt'r wi~tkruml becoming little­(lOS, t.m.; 10/). This "systematic division" is the part left to under­standing in the formation of this feeling. The progression is due to

115Th~ Sub'im~ as Mathematical SJnth~sis

The Infinite Is Thinkable as a Whole: Exaltation

The aesthetic reflective judgment is a feeling made up of twO

sensations, as we have said. The moment has come for us to askourselves about the sensation that affects thought when it thinks

herlllore, if a presentation had to be provided, one would need a~co01prehension" (Zusammenfaswng) to provide in a single mo­ment. as a single unit, a standard of measure that would be in a de­t(rmined relation with this infinite, and would even be express~

ible in numbers (ibid.). Something that the "first measure" ofimagination's comprehension precludes.

One must go further still, and this further step proves that thefaculty that conceives of the infinite as a whole cannot be under­standing. The infinite as a whole is [Q the infinite of the sensibleworld what a "noumenal~ object (KRV, 2~7-7~; 287-308), the objectof thought alone, is to a single phenomenon, the object ofknowl~edge. However, if understanding can advance to the infinitethrough the regressive series of the conditions of phenomena inthe world, it is because it is supported by the Idea of the infinite asa whole, which only "a faculty that is itself supersensible" can form(103; 99). The notion of the serial infinite proceeds from the notionof the actual infinite. What this means is that even in "the pure in·tellecrual estimation of magnitude" (in da T~inen inu'kktu~llen

Griifmschiitzung) made by understanding, "the infinite of theworld ofsense," which is at the horizon of this estimation, must be

7. compleuly comprehended under a concept" (unrer ~inon B~ffiganz zttSammeng~fajtt: ibid.). This concept belongs so little to un­derstanding that mathematical estimation never succeeds in think­ing the infinite of the world of sense "by means of numerical con­cepts"-the only ones it has at its disposal (ibid.). The object ofthe concept in question, the infinite as totality actually given inthought, does not belong to the world; it is the "substrate" (SlJb~

StTar: ibid.) underlying it. Moreover, the thought that conceives ofthis object is called reason. Such is the impossible partnet withwhich the imagination is provided (and annihilated) in order toproduce the aesthetic reflective judgment called sublime.

Tiu Sublime as Mathnnatical Synthesis"4

conceives of such an object is thus no longer understanding butreason.

What OUf roa analyzes is, in shon, the change of imagination'partner in the course of the progression ad infinittlm of meas~of magnitude. This change can be recognized by the change of thesubjective "stare" in (he thought that imagines. A kind of dizzi..ness, which is nonetheless euphoric, takes hold of it while it f0l­lows the faculty of concepts in its progression toward very gft!It

measures. This is a kind of "mathematicar sublime due soldythe composition ad infinitum. Why "sublime"? Because thegression shows that every magnitude of nature will appear small •the end, and that every composition of a great magnitude byreproductive imagination can be followed by a superior comrion in which the former magnitude will be but a part of thenitude apprehended in the furore. Thus the progression in aprovides this quasi~sublime feeling. I say "quasi" because itnot yet involve the breaking of imagination's "first measure,"simply its "boundlessness" in the recurrence of the synthesis ofproduction; it only involves the faculty of composition (Zmens~tzutJg).

But when the concept of the large number is transformed inthe Idea of an absolute or actual infinite. the mathematicalthesis by composition is powerless to give a presentation of it.fore this Idea, the dizziness of the thought that presents is tformed into a mortal anguish. The imagination sinks to a zeropresentation, which is the correlate of the absolute infinite.[Ure founders with it, for nothing of it is presentable as an objeccof this Idea.

Here we rerurn to what is "of capital importance." What iscapital importance is not only the progression ad infinitum by at­sociatioll of understanding and imagination, it is "also lauch] daemere ability even to think [nUT denkenJ it [the infinite] as a wholt(102 t.m.; 99). This indicates that the mind (thought) has the po"'"er to "transcend" (iibatriffi) everything that sense can measure(ibid.). It is no longer a question of the infinite as the horizon of.recurrent composition, but of rhe "given infinite" (das g~~bttfI

Unmd1ich~: 103; 99), given actually as an object of thought. Fur-

117Tlu Sublimt I1J MatJumnricai SymJusis

rei the sensation we seek. The rext reads as follows (I have11.~lcn Inc liberty of translating it a lillie more ~freely" than oneI uallv docs; I do this in order to convey the argument more dear­~): ~'i'he feeling, namely, thai our power is nor whal il should belUllJ1l1gnnt'SStnluit] to attain m.an Id,ea that is a law for us-thisf«ling is RESPECT [Achmng, which might be more accurately ren­dc.cd as "regard"). Now the Idea to be comprehended [dit' Idntin ZuwmmtnfassungJ in the intuition of a whole. any phenome­!'IOn whatsoever that may be given us is of this son [sokJNl: it isilTlpod upon us (iluftrkgt in] by a law of reason, which knows nodefinite, universally valid and unchangeable measure except theabsolute whole [das Absolut-Ganzl" (lOS. t.m.; 102). One is tempt·td to conclude that respect is the ~nsation thar we are lookingfor, the sensation which in me sublime results for thought fromthe presence of the Idea of reason. However. when one takes a

J dow look, this is not the case. "Respect" is explicitly (and srrange­Iy) described here as the affect provoked in thought not by grasp­ing the absolute whole; rather. it is provoked by the incommensu·r.l.biliry, the UnllngnnnsmJuir, ofour "power" (Unwr1 Vnmiigmr).ofour faculry to grasp. ZUT £rwiclJung. at this moment (ibid.).

whal is the power or the faculry in question? The text citeddoes nor qualify it, but what follows leaves no room for doubt:-But our imagination. even when taxing itsdf to the uttermostIAmtTmgung] on the score of this required comprehension!Zusnmmm!assu1lg) of a given object in a whole of intuition (andso with a view to me presentation [DaT!It'IIung] of the Idea of rea·son), belrays [bt'Wt'irt] its limits [ih" Schra1lkm) and its inadequa­cy [Unangrmessmhritr (106; 102). Thus it is indeed a question ofIhe power of presentation. and of the distress experienced by thet~ought Ihat imagines when il must "comprehend" an object in a~Inglc intuition, or when it must comprehend the form of an ob­Ject that corresponds to the absolute whole conceived by rcason,Respect can provoke this distress or accompany it, when Ihinking~onlpares its finitude in maners of presentation (or will) with itsInfinilude in matters of concepts (or with freedom). BUI respect inlhe Strict sense could not result from this comparison. Nor can it

TIJ~ Subljm~ as MiZth~matical Synthesis,,6

the infinite as a whole. or, as it is called a linle later, daI Abso'ru.Ga1lr" the whole as absolute, the absolUic whole (lOS; 102). Theanswer to this question does not allow one to determine the quan­

tity ofsub.lime feeling ~ such, in its essential complexity, but onlythe quantIty of one of Its components, the affection produ~ iareasoning thought to which me noumenal object is P~nt. nu.affection is analyzed in paragraph 2] under the mathematical car­egory of quality, and in paragraph 28 in the section devoted to thesublime. the affection is considered dynamically under me cae.gory of rd:uion. ~t me ~mind me reader that the rttIaivc "hea.I..ing" that corresponds ro the: first category is identity/cliffe(KRV, 278-79, 28)-84; 112-I3, 318-19) and that the "heading"corresponds to the ~nd category is that of inner/outer (OY.279'-80. 284-85; )1)-14. JIJr20). Here. just as wim [lISte, weconcerned wim reRective judgment.

The greater part ofparagraph 27, devoted to the qu.aIity oflime judgment, consists in deriving mis quality from me anof quantity using the category of relation. It derives mis qin such a way that me whole ofsublime feding is exposed in its .ner heterogeneity. I therefore reserve this examination for thechapter, which coneerns the synthesis of the heterogeneous affi:o.tions that constitute sublime feeling-a dynamical synthesis. Let.us go to paragraph 28. It first examines the emotion felt by tbllthought that imagines when it is given the object said to be sub­lime: this emotion is fear. It is said that the fearfulness is not ,J.fectively determined by a presentable, formidable object (as it is iaBurke's analysis, to which this discussion is implicitly addressed).We know that the faculty of presentation feels displeasure. andeven anguish, at the thought of having to provide a phenomenoacorresponding to the Idea of the infinite whole through "aesthet:Kcomprehension." This subjective componenr comes from theimagination. Where. then, is the component corresponding to theIdea of the whole that comes from reason?

One is tempted to rerum to the beginning of paragraph 27.which introduces "respect" as being the feeling aroused by the pres-­enee in thought of an Idea of reason. But we will see that this is

"9TJu Sublim~ IJj Matlumnticnl Symh~siJ

ing. Vcr)' simply because the moral feeling, respect. is nOI an aes­

Ihetic feeling (see Chapler 7)·The delight that the Idea of reason provides, the absolute whole

(or rhe absolutely powerful) in the case of sublime feeling, is un­doubtedly more accurately named when in paragraph 2.8, followingthe discussion of the nature of feat and the importance to give it inIhis feeling, Kanl observes that even if fear is nOI real or rea1is­lic-<\·en. that is, if Ihe amateur of the sublime is not really indanger-the "soul·stirring delight" (dinn lNg~iJtmukWoMgifallm:U~: 108) that he feels when he is given the object called subljmeIoses none of its "seriousness" (Ernst: ibid.). &g~iJt~nuk, soul·stir.ring in that it revives the G~iJt, the mind-the life vt:in of thoughl(stt Chapter 2. pp. 60-67). If nattlre an be judged sublime, it isnOI because nature "excites fear, but rather because it appeals[Ilufrufil to a force in us that is our own (one not of nature) ... toregard as small those things ofwhich we are WOnt to be solicitous(worldly goods, health, and life)" (III, em.; 107)·

The description here is made in the language of the dynamical(in Ihe physical sense), as is the entire passage that begins with analmosl mechanical reAection on the notion of "resistance" (Widrr­s;;md: 109; Ion. As if Kant himself were mistaking the sense: of theterm "dynamical." He makes no mistake. We will~ (~Chapter

5) that if the conlradiction in the sublime can be resolved dynam­ically, it is in the same way thai the third antinomy ofspeculativereason could be. First causaliry or freedom is accepted as is theconditioning of phenomena because freedom is ofa noumenal or­der. whereas the conditioning of phenomena rules the phenomenalworld. It is Ihis first causality or freedom in the Idea of the all­POwerful thai allows our weakness, as phenomenon, to resisl thefrenzy of the forces of nature. And once again, because it is a ques­tion here of the Ideas of freedom, (he crilical analysis has passed toan examination of the faculty of desire, which justifies the usc of a

\'ocabular)' of forces.Thus in sublime feeling thought feels sensation as an ·'appeal~

111ade to a "force" in it that is nOt "one of nature." This sensation isa soul-stirring delight, a sharp pleasure. Why is this? Because this

Tlu Sllbljm~ flJ Mothmlluicn/ Sym!J~is,,8

be a d~/igbt immediately provided by this infinitude. ResPttt .barely a feeling; it is a "blank" feeling to which we will return ( •Chapter 7 and Chapter 9. pp. 234-39). Respect is above all seemoral feeling, the 'way in which the Idea of the law affectS thought,The Ihought that feels respect is rhe thought that waou, thethought thar desires, and nor the thought that presc=ms or iines. to which our text seems exclusively to refer. The bcull)' ofsire must 1x added-along with the imagination-to themem or conAia of the faculties necessary to the formation oflime aesthetic judgment, in order that lhe allusion to moralacquire itS full force and thal irs found:nion be properly unsiood. This is done in the "dynamjcal" aamination of thelime in paragraphs 28 and 29. but in a way that still remainswhar implicit (as it is in the preceding parngraphs).

There is a kind of persistenl timidity to gr.lnl moral feeling'place in the sublime; the recurrence of parentheso: whenfeeling is mentioned is a sign of this. Capable of transcen ."every u:mdard of sensibility ... from anothet point of view (practical)": this is said of the thought that finds maHer for·"broadening" in the conflict of the sublime (IOj, t.m.; 99).sublime "temper of mind" is conformable to that temper"the influence ofdefinite (practical) ideas 'would produce uponing" (104; 100). I am speaking of the "mathematical" appEven in Ihe dynamical examination one finds parentheses 10

to moraliry: reason does violence 10 sensibiliry "with a view to a­tending it 10 the requirements of its own realm (the practical)­(115; I1l). The judgment upon the sublime has its foundation in"native capacity for the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e. for moralfeeling" (116; 112).

However, the parentheses are not conSlant, and they also serveto remind the reader of the principle established in the Critique"PTIlcticnl Rmson: reason is pure practical will, and it legislates ovdthe realm of will with an Idea, that of absolute causaliry or frte"'dam, which founds moral law. However, if the reference to rhiIprinciple is not developed further in the "Analytic of the Sublime,"it is because sublime fecling can nO[ be identified wilh moral fed-

lin1(' aesthetic judgment under the category of rdation. For theobj~t that arouses soul-stirring delight, the "rude" magnitude orforce Ihal one thinks one finds in nature, should be predicated, inIhc good logic of determinant judgments, under the rclation ofinherence and subsistence. Moreover, the judgment thar attributesthe predicate of absolute should be declam:!. "categorical" (nv.II}. 107; us. uo). However. sublime judgment is nor determinantin relation to the object. It is reflective with regard to me st:lte ofthought when it thinks the object (tautegorical). It is fitting to ap­ply not the category of relation to it, but rather rhe correspondingreflexive ~heading" of inner/outer (KRV, 276--97; 309-33).

1 will try to elucidate this difficult point. We have already said(see Chapter 2, pp. 60--67) mat the Idea of the absolute is not pre­sent in sublime judgment as such, that is. as a concept of reason.because then the sublime judgmem would be:l determinant judg­ment. Because it is a reflecrive judgment, me Idea of the absolute isonly "present" and this presence is that of the "soul-Stirring de­light" that thinking feels on the occasion of the object it judgessublime. This sensation, and this sensation alone, signals the call ofr~son that the critique makes explicit. Thus for reflective judg­ment it matters less that the object of this Idea is absolute (al­though reflective judgment is led to discover the absolute in itsheuriStic capacity, which is what the critique does, being it5C'lf re­Aective). What matters is that the delight is felt to ~ absolute.The reflective absolute predicates not an object, but a State ofIhought. Moreover, for thought to feel called on or requisitionedby the voice of reason is an absolute delight. because it is the ab­SOlute vocation of thought to think the absolute. The absolute.from the point of view of the cuegory of relation, is indeed pureinherence. rhat is fO say, an "object" judged as having norhing Out­

side of itself. i.e.• having nothing in relation to it. This object is meparalogism of an emiry that, from the point of view of relation. iswilhOlit relation. However, transposed ontO the reflective judg­I1lCIl[ of the sublime, the category of rdation becomes a reflexive"heading." and pure inherence is referred to as a "pure inner." Ifrhe shadow (or the glare) of rhe absolute Idea projected on the

I

111TIN Sublim' as Malhnnaliral SymlK1isTIN Sublim~ as Malhnnatical Symlmisno

ap~1 actualizes the dmination (&!timmung) of our Gristesmiigm, of our spiritual faculry-of the power of thought at .strongest-as it discovers this destination. One hears the Stim~l.the vocation of the &stimmtmg, the destination. This voi~ caI.1&thought in the sublime situation offered by nature. If the apaalts thought it is because it comes from the very "pla~,"

transcendental place tow:ud which it is already turned, towhich (to which?) it "is going and giving it5C'lf"-ok' "'IIi, as~in French.

What is the nature of this voice that calls? The answer is aIgiven in paragraph 26 concerning nOt forces bur magnitudes:ab~r bort das Gmtiit in lieh aufdi, Stimm, tkr Vnmmfi (the m'however, hearkens now to the voice of reason: 10l, t.m.; 98).voice "requires"lfortkn): "for all given magnitudes ... thosecan never be completely apprehended (ganz aufgifafltJ, thoughsensuous represe:nt:uion) estimated as completely given [oneognizes magnitudes obt:lined by compositionJ, [the voice ofsonJ requires totality [TotalitiitfordntJ" (IOl, t.m.; 98-99). 'To~ty,".t~at}s to say, their."comprehension [ZtlJammmji1JSung] inJntuJUon (IOl; 99). ThiS needs to be made clearer still, for thocould be mistaken about the extension of totality demanded ofby the voice. The latter "calls for a pmmtation answering tothe above members of a progressively increasing numerical .and does not exempt even the infinite from this requirement,rather, renders it inevitable for us to regard this infinite (in dIIjudgment ofcommon reason) as eomp/~f(1y givm (i.e., given in illtotality)" (IOl; 99).

This is what the voice says to thought with regard to magni­rude. There is no doubt that it says the same thing with regard 10force. Here, tOO, thought is required, called on to accoroplish iadestination, the absolure whole, the infinite of will. Funhermore.this intransigent, inevitable (unwnn,idlirh) requisition is refleJ:·ively fclt as a soul-stirring delight. Why is this? As we have S3id.thought recognizes in it, in Ihis requisition, its destination. its v0­

cation. Thought is destined for the absolute. It is no accident thacthis "discovery" is made by the critique when it analyzes me sub-

§ 5 The Sublime as

Dynamical Synthesis

"3

Anempt to Resolve the DifferendThrough Ethical Mediation

Rc=ason thus enters "thc= scc=nc=" in the place of understanding. Itchallc=ngc=s the thought that imaginc=s: "make the absolute that.Ironcc=ivc= present with your forms," Yc=t form is limitation. Form dl*vidc=s space and timc= into an "inside," what it "comprc:hends," and:rn "outside," what it PUtS at a distance. It cannot present the ab­solute, Bur there is something marc: serious still. The limitationconstituted by the "comprehc=nsion," the Zusilmmmfassun~, ofgivens in a form is also limited. Presentation cannot grasp an mfi­nite ofgivens at one timc= and in a singlc= form. If it is askc=d ro prc=*sc=m morc:, it comes up against its maximum, its "measurc=," ~hich

is thc= subjc=ctivc= foundation of all magnitude. This measurc= 1~ theabsolute of thc= thought that presems (98; ?n, thc= absolutc= ac=s*thc=tic" magnitude thai is possible. ..

This differend is [0 bc= found at the heart of subhmc= fc=ehng: a[the c=nCounter of thc= tWO "absolutes" c=qually "presem" to thought,the absolute wholc= whc=n it conceives, thc= absolurdy measuredWhen it presents. "Meeting" conveys vc=ry little; ,it is mo~c o~ a con­frornation for in accordance with its destination, whICh IS to beWhole, the' abs~lutc= of concepts demands to be presented, A situa·tion to be qualific=d as tragic if one is attentive fO [he "sc=nsation"

TIN Sublim~ 4J MilllNmillical Synrhau

sratc= of thought, or, r.uher, projc=cted in the srate of thought, pro.vidc=s thought with such delight, it is lxause thought recogniza iathis shadow or in this light the truth ofwhat it is in itself"bef~.

all determination. By itself, I am speaking absolutdy, "before" ir:was opposed by givc=ns that had to be grasped by forms of SC=JlIi,.

bility, assc=mbled in schemas, known by concc=pu, or c=stimated ac:­cording to the good (although in this the critique dc=clarc=s thougbcto be autonomous; but this autonomy is exc=rcised under an ob&­galion that transcc=nds it)-"beforc=" all of this, thinking is thepowc=r to think, G~islawnnQgm, irrelative, "raw," that comc=s froanothing othc=r than itself, and is thus in this sc=nse "innc=r," Limi..tions, forms, .schc=mas, ruJc=s ofcona:pt, iUc=gitimacic=s, illusions m.the critique constantly opposes ro this power make no sense ifoatdoes not first ac«pt the presupposition of Kanrian thought_which is no secret-that ..there is thought," and this is absolThis is what ..thc= voice of rc=ason" says in sublime fc=eling, and thiis what is truly exalting.

. ,Ntm...j conformable 10 [gmtA'!l that which the influence of defi-stt'" " to • •

. (pr.Jc,ial) Ide3.'i would produce upon fedmg, and m commonmtt"accord with [vt'71TA'g/ich) it. (104. l.m.; 100)

\'Qith a slight nuance, the same paralld is to lx: found a little12rthcr on: "For just as ISl/wit] in t~e estimate ~f th~ be~utiful

imagination and untknrondingby their con~rt IElIIk'figlu~t} g~n~

crate subjective finality of the.mental. facul~les, so 1-:']lmagma[l~nd rtllJon do so here by thelt conRlcr [dlfferend] (107; 103), m

~c esrimation of the sublime. The t~t ~so im~~atelyad~ thatin rhc laner case, me finality that thmking subJectJv~lyfeels IS thefinality that destines it to think the absolute of magnitude as Idea,and thus the finality of reason itseLf, the "pret:minence" (VOrtti­lichkrit) which can only be made "intuitively evident" (.1111­

~auli(h) by rhe "inadequacyn (Unr.u!iJng!ichkrir) of the imagina­tion. (One may find surprising the way in which the laner is qual­ified: a "faculty which in the presentation of magnitudes lof objectsof sense] is irsdf unbounded (un~l" (t07; 104]. This bound­kssness can only lx: that of the Zus.ammrngrzung, accorded to un~

derstanding in its progression, but without value for reason.)- By forcing the parallel betwttn the beautiful and the sublime, by

having recourse to the principle of a finality in ~th ~' the con­froRlation of reason and imagination in the subhme. It Sttms, canbe brought back to the measure of a dispute, ~f the gen~e disputebcrween undenranding and imagination that gIVes taste us value ofemulation for thought. The ultimatum put to the faculty of pre­sentation by reason can also be understood as a proposal of al­liance, and the war can be understood as being motivated by theproject of a pact. We have noted that reason's claim t? a presenta~

lion of the absolute is (in the preceding sct-off quotation) lessenedby the introduction of an analogy 10 the unreal: it would beenough for the imagination to present something th.at .could af~

ftx:t thought (provide it a sensation of itself) in a way sl~tlar to theWay thought would be affected if thinking [hought (wlth~ut pre~

I,cnlation) the Idea of practical reason, that is, the law and Its foun­dation, freedom.

This of course can be only an analogy. For when thinking feels

"5Th~ SubJjm~ IlJ Dynamical SymhnuTh~ Sublim~ IZJ DynamicalSymhNi;

that results from it (aestheticaJly) for lhought, or absurd ifwished to characterize it logically. In this laner asp«:t, it is COndicrory that the absolute should be put inro relation with SOthing other than itself, for it is the wilhout-relation. AJI theso if that something is also an absolute. Their being pUt intorion abolishes each of them as absolure. But if each must """'11the absolute it continues to be its own sole te'Course, its COUrtappeal, unaware of the other. This conflict is not an ordinarypute, which a third instance could grasp and pm an end to, but"differend," a Wulnrmir (107; 103).

We have seen (Stt Chapter 3, pp. 89-96) that the function ofdynamical synthesis (linked to the categories of relationmodality) is to place rwo heterogeneous elements in a nunity. The critique here is concerned with elaborating such athesis: we have JUSt Sttn that the elements to be united are inheterogeneous. One could say absolutely heterogeneous, thesolute of the infinite and the absolme of the finite, and theirthesis is necessary apriori as the condition of possibility ofsu •feeling, which is an empirical reality. However, in spite of theture of the conflict, which should not allow for this solutioa.transaction is outlined, here and there, to reconcile rhe rwoof thought-that of presenting forms, and thar of concd •Ideas-according to the model of rhe agreement between uStanding and imagination that the critique elaborates on thejeet of taste.

Here are two passages in which this parallel is suggested,without some reservarion, but in both cases according to theplicir figure of "the same ... , the samen;

Th('r('fore. JUSt as [g/t'ichwir] the aesthetic faculty of judgment in .estimate of the beautiful [in &unri/u"g fin &ho"(1I] ref('tS the inurination in its free play to the undmranding 10 bring out its agreeIJ'ldll[zusammrm:UJtim",,.,,] with the (oncrptJof the lattet in gencl'lIIl (~from their determination): so {so] in its [Ihc faculty of judgmentestimale of a thing as sublime it refers that faculty [rhe imaginaUoal10 muon 10 bring OUI its subjective accord with IdrnJof reason (iode­Icnninatdy indicated), i.e. to induce a temper of mind Itint Gmt'"

Attempt to Resolve the DifferendThrough a "Dialectic"

Is it an "admixture" that makes up sublime feeling, strictlyspeaking? "Strictly speaking" here means (0 speak in the rerms ofthe critique. "Admixture" is nOt a term of the critique. It desig­nates the juxtaposition or the coexistence before the "greatness" of[\\'0 feelings in one and the same "s[a[e" of thought. and i,t bothprCSCnlS and conceives. If such were in fact the case, the feeling re­sulting from [his "subjective" coexistence would have no finality,and could lay no claim to the quality of an aesthetic judgmentlhat is finally affinnative. that is 10 say, a pleasure ("fin:llly" in bothSl:nSes of the word: as result, and as granted [0 an end not can­(tived but subjec[ively perceived). (Instead, one might perhapsCOlllpare this "admixture" with the anguish aroused in the psyche

'27Tb~ SI/b1im~ ilJ DynamiCilISymbnu

, .:tn :tbsolure practical causality is that it wants the presentation of~ Idt'3 in the phenomenal world. Subject (0 this obligation, theI~ u~ht Ihat presents rries to force irself (106; (03) to provide the(l'O ~

ost adequate presenr:uion corresponding to the absolute of rea­mn. The thought that presents rhus advances toward what is im­SO ssible for it. The mountain masses, the pyramids of ice. thePO'erhanging, thrc:ucning rocks, [hunderclouds, oceans rising with~lliouS force. volcanoes (104. 110; lOt, (07), everything "rude" tobe found in nature is sublime in presentation because it is a[ [helimit of what can be gra.spe<l in a single inruition: btinab~ zu groJfis" it is "almost too great" (101; 97). and tOO great even for ourfaculty of apprehension, Auffassungrvmniigm (ibid.). This effort isin filet similar to the effort of the will that aims for virtue. This ef­fort is indeed similar, but with the difference that the imaginationbelongs to the capacity to know, whereas the will is the faculty ofdesire: furthermore. the result of the violence that virtue does to it­self is moral, whereas the result of the violence that the sublimedocs ro itself is aesthetic. The admixture of fear and exaltation thatconstitutes sublime feeling is insoluble. irreducible [0 moral feelingflee Chapter 7)·

TIJ~ Sllblim~ ilJ DynamkillSyntlJNu

moral law subjectively, the feeling that corresponds to this "Stat~" ,called respecl (KPV. 74-110; 84-123). And respect "under the nan..of moral feding is ... producro solely by reason" (ibid.• 79; 1ft.Respect doa nOI "serve" for anything except as "an in~nt"

(r;i~bftdnJ thanks to which me law makes itself a maxim" (ibid..(.~')'. Which mean~ t~at respect is the ~ubjective sensation~thinking feels when It IS gra.sped by pracucallaw. that is, nOt asobjea of possible (or impossible) knowledge bur as an in«:ntivt­act. what is called a maxim. Respecr is the sensarion of rhthar is obliged. thoughr that is purely and immediately obligedpractical rcason. An obligation that is not pfticlHmiiJfig (acco .to duty) but directly aUJ PjliclJt (from duty: ibid., 84; 95). Thistogether "singular" (UWilJ &Jontkm: ibid., 82.; 93) temper hasreference to any objects that could affect thoughr or make thodependent on rhem by the feeling they provide for it. This Ifeeling is called "pathological" (parlJolog;JclJ: ibid.) because thiis subject 10 irs state as if it had come from outside irself Thwspeet cannot be "reckoned either as enjoyment (~'XUiigmJ orpain [ScJunt'TZ)" (ibid.• 83; 94), which are the witnesses ro rholiability. This seems srrange: a feeling thar does nor involve:faculty of pleasure and displeasure-a "blank" feeling. It isan cxtrinsic or secondary effect that this feeling is accompanieddispleasure, and Ihat pure obligation resolutely opposes therachmem of the will [Q its favorite object. the ego (ibid., 81;[he ensuing pain comes from [he faculty of desire's anraction to

preoccupation wilh an object. BUI Ihis objecl is not theThought oriented practically, the thought thai looks to act aoIjudges acrion either good or bad, does not initially feel any ..~sian," It does not suffer in the least. The "soul-stirring deligtn:which is thought's temper or irs "stale" when Ihe "presence" oftblabsolute makes itself felt in the sublime, is perfectly foreign to ir(see Chapter 7),

This is why the analogy of the temper required of thought illsublime reason with the temper in which thought is to be found illpractical reason musl remain merely an analogy. The substirutiollof onc for thc other is not possible. What properly defines reasoII

ITIN Sublime IlJ Dy1lAmica/SJmhnu

lin.,l within bounds. Ncvcnhcless. w~th a vi~ to the c:xtens~on ofill1Jgin:ltion necessary for adequacy w\lh what IS unbounded 111 ourf;Jcult)' of reason, namely. the Idea of the absolute, the anend;J1l[ dis­1c;l5urc. and. in this [m;I/};lI]. the want of finaliry in our faculty of

ffllagination. is slill represented as final for Ideas of reason and Iheiranimation. (109. I.m.: 105)

"In this" does translate milhin a linle excessively. However, thecrux of the argument is the same: the relation between the imagi­nation and reason is not final, and thus unpleasant, or it is at leastneutral, making it final and thus pleasant.

The following lines that conclude the same passage are evenmore explicit on this point: "But in this very way (tbm dadurrh; inthe' want of finality of the imagination for reason] the aestheticjudgment itself is subjectively final for reason as a source ofIdeas ... and the object: is received as sublime with a pleasu~ thatis onlv possible through the mediation of a displeasure Inur 1Jn"­

miru4r d1ltT Un/us!)" (ibid., t.m.). The daa'urrh-thanks to this,in this. by means of this-and the "through the mediation" (wr­m;lUlst) suggest the dialectical reading I have evoked. Even thebeginnings of the "suppression" (of the Aufh~bung [or the n!rtJt:tr.]) by the negative. which would be expected in such a reading,arc not missing: the subjective finality of sublime feeling that re­sults from the want of finality of the imagination for reason is fi­nality (I repeat: of this feeling "itself" as a whole and as result) forreason, for rhe: source: of the Ideas. This suppression can be under­stood "dialectically": the absolute auto-affirmation of thinking asreason overcomes (preserves and supprc.sse:s) its negativity as imag­Ination.

1 his "taking up," this Erhrbm, of r('3SOn (the sublime: is ~r­

habm), which is at the same time the "relieving of." the Aufhrbmof the imagination (the German. like the Latin to/Inr, evokes theaction both of removing and of e1c:vating), seems thus to be a Ie·gitil1late meaning of the procedure described by the texts cited. Asin the dialectical operation, each ~momenr" of thought-presen.tat ion. concept-has its absolute ufor itself." But in relalion 10 theOther. the absolute of imagination is not of equal power. The ab-

TIN Sub/im' iU DynamicJlJ Syn!Mis<28

by the approach of the "rear ofdesire, in o:cess ofall "imagiRarfdemand. But this parallel could not readily be articulated, for J'lei,.ther the field nor the approach of the field is, for Freud or La~of the same order of the fields of the transcendemal critique.)

Sublime feeling is aesthetic because, like taste, it is subject:ivdpfinal without the concept of an end. Thw one mwt find a fi~if not an end, in the very difF"erend that reason has with the irnaeo:ination. What arouses sublime feeling, or is at least the .for it, seems "to comravene the ends Izwt'CKwidrig] ofour powI:r

judgmem" and "to be ill-adapted [lma1lgnllasm] to our faculrypresemation" and an "outrage [gewiiluiitigJ on the imaginati(91; 88), but this outrage is judged all the more sublime andst,ne of thought consequently aU the more final.

One is tempted to conceive of the finalization of this exdiscordance as a dialectical operation. Dialectical in a non-Kan .more Hegelian .sense, but well known in the paradoxes ofunder the name given to it by the first Sophist, the argucalled the 4misrnpholl, or rerortion. Using a response madeGorgias to his student Evathle as a model, I will summarize: thealectical figure in the following way: it is precisely in affirmingthe series of your judgments is finite that you deny it, for indoing you add a new judgmem to this series. It is precisely,reason to the imagination, in showing that you cannot "cohend" more magnitudes in a single intuition than you arethat you show you can, for in order to show the limit, you malso show beyond the limit. Such that the pleasure in infini~

which is mine, is already latent in the unhappiness you feel in~finitude. The process consiSts in displacing the o:amination tljudgment from its (negative) quality to its (assertive) modaliq:you say that ... is not, but you affirm it. The modus of a propoli­tion is in effect independent from its content, the dictum.

Kant's text occasionally lends itself to this "dialectical" readins=

When a magnitude begins 10 tax the utmost streich ofour facuhyoEcomprehension in a single intuition. and still numerical magni·ludes ... call upon the imagination for aesthetic comprehension in agreater uniry, the mind then gets a feding of being aestheticaUy COO"

'3'The Sublime as Dynamical SymlJt'Sis

Dynamical Synthesis of the Causeand {he Conditioned

The texts that allow one to identify the dynamical synthesis andto distinguish it from a "dialectical" synthesis have already beencited (see Chapter 3, pp. 77-81 and 89-96 in panicular). They areessentially the exposition of the axioms of intuition and the re~

lTlark inserted between the solurion of the transcendental mathe~

lTlatical Ideas and the solution of the transcendental dynamicalIdeas (respectively. KRV A and H, 197-201; 2I7-20, and KRV, 461-64;

519--22). I will only recall the crux of the argumem to illustrate itsConsequences for the dynamical symhesis in sublime feeling. TointrOduce the general critical "solurion" (Entscheidullg) of the An~

lilhclic (KRV, 443-49; 496-$°4), Kant dismantles the reasoning thatSUPpOrts both theses and antitheses. The reasoning is the same

\l is not graspable except as this undecidable, affirmative work ofche negative. Which here would be the work of reason. Conse­uendy one would have to say that the imagination is reason ar-

. ~stcd in one of its formations, in one of its acts, and that as a rea­son temporarily limited, jt will not fail [Q pass these limits and [Q

seTtle further on, in another so-called instance or faculty that isless limited, for example, understanding, the "enlarging" of whichwill in rum lead to the autopositioning of the spirit by itself as theonly true absolute in the form of reason.

A dialectical reading of this kind has no access [Q a sublime thatis subjectively felt by thought as differend. One has only to refer to

what concerns the sublime in the Hegelian (and Romantic) aes­thetic in general. It is clear that for critical thought such a readingexpresses the rranscendental illusion of which reason is always thevictim, or it expresses a failing in the "domiciliation" of the acts ofthought. An examination of this shortcoming was made in theAppendix to me first CritiquedevOled to reAection, on the subjectof Leibniz's intellecmalism (KRV, 276-96; 309-33; see Chapter I,

pp. 26-)2). Whether it is in regard to "becoming" or to the "life ofth,: spirit," this refutation holds for the speculative dialectic.

J

The Sublime {IS Dynamical Symht'Sis'30

solu.te of. rea~n is the impossible of imagination; the absolute ofthe Imagmatlon would only be a momem relative to the absolute!of reason. The latter would therefore be, in itself, the only ab­solme. And because what is in question here is felt by the thougtuthinking the absolute, the displeasure that it feels in thinking theimpossible absolute (impossible for the imagination) is effitced (yupreserved) before and in the pleasure that it feels in thinking thepossible absolme (possible for reason).

However, this reading is not the correct one. It is not criticalbut speculative. By this I mean that it makes the two powers illconflict "homogeneous" in order to transform them into momcnaof a finalized process. The dialectic seems heedlessly to relati.the absolme of imagination in relation to the absolme of rthe Wfirst measure" of one compared to me "infinite as whole"the other. This "heedlessness" consists in admitting of a mird •stance between imagination and reason that authorizes the ttion from one to the other. As if the question that directs all ofthird Critique, that of "transition" precisely, were already resolved.and as if the Analytic of the Sublime did not refute the promisean agreement of thought with itself and with the nature thatstitutes the feeling of the beautiful. For the "casualties" of the SOo'i

called dialectic of the sublime are considerable: what is lostwi~being taken up in the sublime is all of nature as the "writing" tlforms, and everything by which thought is attached, finalized widlregard 10 this writing-its very power of forms.

The third instance to which both powers-imagination and rei"

son-are supposed to have recourse in the hypothesis of a dialco­tical reading is "becoming" itself, as in the Science ofLogic, or "thelife of the spirit," as in the PhenonmlOwgy of the Spirit. This in­stance is certainly only memio, the act of the mem (of the spirid.and the contradiction of this act by the mens, the construction ofapresence and its deconstruction, thus pure Wtaking up," which in­sists bm is nor an instance. As jt is. this power, which is always inexcess of irs acts, has no trouble striding across the "abysses" thaEparalyze critical thoughr and no trouble rdativizing the "absolutCS"it believes to have localized. Here lies all of the work of this power·

uendy, the "entire series" is nor "given." The "regression" in the~es of conditions can indeed continue ad infinitum. It is noneSCher than the "'progression" in composition, the ZUJIlmmmutz,­0' g of the e1emenu, expounded in Chapter 4 on the sublime ex­un·

"ned mathematically. Intuition and imagination can follow un-,m ,

deTStanding ad infinitum without encountenng any obstacles. BUIwhat they cannot do is "give" the whole of the series, that is, in theroblematic of the antithetic, "give" the world in irs totality. The~Iemic teg2tding the infinitude or the finitude of the world isthus empty, and both parries are nonsuited.

However, as we know, the dismissal of the double complaint isonly legitimate insofar as one is debating a limit phenomenon onboth sides, which is a pure absurdity, for any phenomenon is giv­en only in the syntheses that associate it with other phenomena, ina cOOlingcnr but homogeneous way. Such is not the case: for cause

J and for the necessity of existence. The synthesis of cause with ef­fea is necessary apriori--one cannot be thought without the oth­er-but it also unites two heterogt:neous elements. Effect is givenas a phenomenon. If one looks for the cause, understanding canonl¥ provide other phenomena as conditions of the effect, thusanswering the question "mathematically'": How does the phenom.enon appear? But to provide irs cause (or the necessity of its being)is to answer the question why?

Kam explains this difference through the aspect of temporality,whilh is of great consequence for sublime feeling. The relation ofa cause and an effect is not that of a before and an after. For thebefore is always, by mathematical synthesis, the after of a morebefore. "Between" cause and effect there is, from the temporalpoim of view, an event that does not belong to the succession.The effect is said to result from the cause. If the cause does not act,the phenomenon can still be given, but it is not the effect of theCluse. We would say that it remains to be explained. The momenrsthat form the temporal context of a moment are given to regres­sion (or to progression) in succession. But the "action" ~f th: ~a~~that "produces" the effect is only a principle of the unlllteJllglblll­ty of the phenomenon. This principle is nOt a phenomenon in the

133TIN Sublim~ as DynamicalSynthniJTIN Sublim~ as DynamiclJlSynthniJ

whatever the stakes of each antinomy may be. For in all cases it ita question of thinking the world as a totality of phenomena.: itmis totality limited or unlimited in spatioremporal extension (ac­cording to quantity), in intensive complexity (according to quafi,.ty), in causality (according to relation), in the necessity to exiat(according to modality)?

What supports the arguments is the following reasoning: "'If cbeconditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is Jiko.wise given; objects of the senses are given as conditioned; th~etc." (KRV, 443; 496). Upon which the critique reasons as follow.it is true that me objectS of me senses are given to us as phenom.na, for they are necessarily filtered through the forms ofsensibililJ,the schemas of me imagination, and the principles of undersWICI­ing. What "'gives" them to us, the thing or the being from whidbthese phenomena reach our apprehension, we know nomu.about. By definition, it is not a phenomenon, but an obj~ ~

thought, a noumenon, a thing-in-itsel[Bur the major premise of this rosoning is incorrect: in the W'Il'f ir

is formulated. From the premise mat every phenomenon is~as conditioned (as an object of the mathematical syntheses •volved in forms, schemas, and principles), it does not follow tbIlthe "entire series" of all iu conditions is given. The entire scricImight be given, Kant continues, if the givens were things-in-them­selves. For then their conditions, which are homogeneous to them.would also be things-in-themselves, and one could say that the JOo

ries of the conditions would in turn be given (as thing-in-itsdf).Bur the given is nor the thing as it is in itself. It is what is appre­hended of the thing. in the btoad .sense, and more precisely whar itgrasped by intuition in an "apprehension" and by imagination in'"comprehension." Moreover, these acts of synthesis, which arcminimal in providing a given, are limited, ifonly in "magnitude:by a "measure" that the faculty of presentation cannot exceed (herewe see how the "mathematical" analysis of the sublime naturally J'C'­

lays the critical argument of the Antithetic). The synthesis of the"entire series" of phenomena exceeds this limit. Thus there is nointuitive apprehension or imaginative comprehension of it. eon·

series; it gives the reason for which the phenomenon appe2n i .It is an Idea. The notion ofcausaliry, which is the Idea ofa ca~~ction t~a( p~od~ces an ~ffecr, is not al all satisfied ifunders~l~g provides l( wllh a series, even a very large series, of the condi.Hons of the phenomenon. There arc many conditions for a bod,[Q fall or ~o igni[e~ th~y do nO( give .the reason for the fall or thefire. In thiS, causality IS not a syntheSIS, the certainty of which CIIbe "intuitive»; irs certainty is "discursive" (KRV, 197; 216).

One easily speaks of a phenomenon as the "cause" of a pbo.no~c~on. ~Ul even so, one has 10 distinguish this "causali~.which 1$ sensible, from the intelligible Clusaliry that is at issue heat."Whatever in an object of the sense is nOI irself phenomc=non I...paranee: tr.], I entitle inuUigibk. If, therefore. thar which in mesensible world must be: regarded as phenomenon has in itself a fao,ul~ w~ich is nOI an objecr of sensible intuirion, but throua'whIch It can be: the cause ofphenomena, rhe cawaliryof mis bciaIcan be: regarded from two points of view. Regarded as the causaloI)' of the ming~in-itSelf, it is illuUigibk in its acrion; regarded.as chicausalil)' ofa phenomcnon in the world ofsense, it is smsible in ill~ff«tl' (KRV, 467; 527).

I pUI forward the "cventn that is the puning into action of theimelligible causaliry and that does not belong ro phenomenal tim&Kant's rcxt does not mcmion this term. But it marks the indepc8'"dentt of the causal "agent" in relation to the time of succcssioa."Now Ihis acting subject Idinn lJall~/"dL SubjLla, the source Jthe acrion thai causes the effect) would nOt, in i[5 intelligible chaP­aCler, st3Jld under any conditions of time [UIIf" krinm ZLi,bttiitIt'u"gm sulJm); time is only a condition of phenomena not 01things-in-themselves. In it (in this "subject'" no acrion would bt'fi1'or mm (wiirtk kr;,,~ Handlullg enrstehen, odLT vergehenJ and itwould nor, therefore, be subordinated [um"woifm] to me law <Ithe determination of all rhat is alterable in time [nlln V"iintUr­lichl!1l], namely, rhat everything thar happens must have irs cause in.rhe ph1!1l0ml'1lI1 thar precede it" (KRV, 468, un.; 528).

The verbal mode remains conditional in order ro mark theproblematic nalUre of what is implied. For, in rrurh, we do naC

'35Tlu SublimL as Dynamical SynthniJ

knOW anything about this "agenr" or abom this "subjecr." This~.1i::cnt or "subject" is the object ofan Idea. Bur ir is precisely be·C2~SCof [his StatuS th:u one can negatively char.lcrerize its mode ofaction in relation to succession. The acrion of the cause cannot becaused by what has already taken place, for the "already" belongs 10

[he lime of succession, and in rhis case the cause would lose itsch:ar;lcter of intelligible cause. Bur as soon as it produces irs effect,Ihis effect is "real"; it is a phenomenon, it is "given" in the ncces·sary (/ priori conditions for phenomena to be given. The intelligi~

ble cause may be said to be lirst, but its authority does not belong10 succession.

Several properties of the agent of causal action are thus derer~

mined ncg<llively: the agent is an entiry rhat is only intelligible(not "presentable"); it does not contribute to the knowledge ofphenomena according to understanding; it is unconditionedi it is

J nor situated in succession. The before and the after that supportthe imagination and understanding in their progression or regres~

sion ad infinitum are unknown to it. This agent exercises or aclU­ali1.e5 irs power, that is, it produces a phenomenon as being irs ef~

fttl.. according to "a rule and order [&g~1und Ordnung] altogeth~

er different from the order of nature" (KRV, 474; 5)6). Thus "allthat lJaS bappm~d [alln was . .. geschehen ist] in the course of na·ture, and in accordance with its empirical grounds, must inevitablyh2ve happened {unausbkiblicb geJt:lJtbm mujltL], ought perhaps "Ot

to lu:t~ bappmrd [sollre virlkidJt . .. nicht geschehen ~inJ" (ibid.,t.m.). Here we see the difference between solkn and miiHm. Whathad to happen, according ro rhe necessity of the laws of under­slanding (miiJJm), perhaps did not have [Q happen according tothe "free" causality of rhe agent (1OIk,,). What must happen per­haps musl not.

The critical meditation on rhe time ofcausa.laaion thus leads toa split in lhe sense of the word "duty." As necessity ("disUfI),"dUty" designates the predictabiliry of successions in nature underthe rille of understanding. As obligalion (sollm), "duty" signiliestllal il is "time" for the agent to exert its aClion ("lime," which inclassical Greek or rhe Greek of the Septuagint or rhe Greek of Paul

TIN Sublime as Dynamh:al SyntksiJ'34

,

i'J7Th~ Sublim~ IlJ Dytl4micalSynthnis

Necessity of the Symhesis of Sensations inSublime Feeling

Considered dynamically, sublime judgment must present thecase of a similar synthesis. This synthesis must necessarily unitetWO heterogeneous elementS. One can foresee that a gi.ven pre·.semed in intuition will be "grasped" in intuition as the Sign ?fanIdea of reason. But because it is a question here ofan aesthetic re­Rective judgment, the synthesis must concern not the ~bject, thephenomenal given taken as a sign of a noumenal causality, bur theSlare of thought, i.e., sensarion. Thus sensarion mus.t be double. orsplit into twO heterogeneous yet indissociable sensations. We are ofcourse referring to terror, which has to do with the presentable,and to exaltation, which refers to the unpresentable.

Let us firsr try to understand why the unity of these ~o ~ensa­

tions or of the rwo faces of sublime feeling is necessary. 1 he Imag~

ination tries with "the greatest effort" (dit griijftt &!ln~ung: 106;

103) to present a "comprehension," rhe absolure f~r whlc~ reasonhas an Idea. If rhe thought rhar imagines (always m Kants .sense:that presents here and now) opposed the thought that conceIves ofthe absolute with a pure and simple refusal, there would be no

Rather, it is like listening to a "sign." This is the n.am~ Kant ~ives

henomenon in which the effect of free causahty IS also per­a ~ _.J". the "sensible sign" of the thing, the "rr.tnscendental causecel"l"U .

fits empiricaJ characrer" (das sinnliclu ZLichm do mznsundm­:tm UrJIlclN: KRV, 472, t.m.; 513). Through such signs on~ can

d·e..... rn that causality by frttdom is active in the natural hIStory,-- I "h "hat is the history of man for as long as men th~mse: ves ear

:he "presence" of frttdom in phenom~na (second."ConRict of~eFaculties"). A "reading" ofor a listening to these SIgns has nothmgto do with a determinarion by concept. This "reading" r;quir:s ="manner" much more than a method (182; 174). But the readingapplies to the same objectS. In the dynamical ~nrhesis, .a phe·nomenon enclosed within an immanent necessity occ:aslonallyserves as a sign ofa transcendental obligation.

T," Sublim~as DynamicalSyntMu

of Tarsus is called Jrairos). The agent decides what this "time'" ..The decision is not motivated; it is not conditioned, because thecausality of the agent is not. The phenomenon does nOI itself Ie.

suit from this "due" (solkn) action, but must "also" be the effect 01this action, and no longer simply the conditioned of the con£,tions that envelop it. The phenomenon remains conditioned 10­

cording to the rule and order of nature; it becomes the effect of.unconditioned cause according to the altogether different ruk ...order of reason (unknown to us).

This cause belongs to reason because it is the object of an 1deI.of a concept of reason. But insofar as it is considered the "'u·'IIcause of production, not of the phenomenon but of the naturetfits effect, this reason is itself considered to be acting. In the ..way that there is no effect without cause, there is no cause wima.effect. This is what the Solkn says: this acrion must be OIeffecrcd.~JOne begins with the spttulative examination of the properties fl.,intelligible causality, and these propenies are negative. But bo""ooithey art speculatively negative, they form the a prioriconditions ttla causality freed from all condition, that is, the conditions of.dom. Without this free causality, there could never be moral judi­memo All wlim would be reducible to a mii.sJm. What is inscribeiin the Sollm is that the agent is only agent if it actS. While it is 6aIthe object ofan Idea ofspeculative reason, free causality reveals it­self to be pracricaJ reason in action. One must not ask reason ..explain" ("Idarm) the origin of the acrions that result from m.causality. One must recognize in reason itSelf, whose Idea thiIcausality is, "the cause capable ofproducing {erlalgen] them" (ov,474;JJ6).

This example ofdynamical synthesis had to be examined dOl&"Iy because it is much more than an example. h underlies a larppart of the critical system. This synthesis makes the union of na­ture and freedom possible for thought despite their absolute hee·erogeneity. The same phenomenon explainable through the seriesof conditions of which it is an element can also be grasped as theeffect ofa free causality. This "grasping" is not the apprehension ofa given or ilS subsumption under a concept of understandins-

f'39Tht Sublimt as Dynamical Symhtril

d\'namically opens on the theme of force and no longer of magni­t~dc, al rhe risk ofcreating the confusion we have discussed above.N;lture has might (force), this might inspires "fear" (Fttrcht) in[hough!. but the latter discovers that it tOO has might, enough "do­minion" (Gtwttlt) to resist that of narure (109-10; 105-6). It is not;l question, as we have already said, of a real or empirical fear,which cannOt give rise to sublime feeling any more than thought·captivated. by inclination and appelite can [play the part of ajudge} of the beautiful" (110; 106). What maners in the formula·tion of sublime feeling is the sensation that there is cause to befearful, a terror mat corresponds 10 "this is frightening," that is, to;l rdleaive judgment in the rautegorical sense.

This specification leads to a first remark pursuant to the way inwhich absolute causality makes a "sign" in sublime f«ling. The"acting subject" demands the presentation ofsublime feeling underthe sign ofan "almost tOO great" or, we can now add, ofan "almosttOO strong." But the acting subject does not require its "being ef·feeted," that is, the inscription in the order of phenomena of anaction that is an effect or a sign of its absolute causality. In other~-ords, the Idea of freedom leads not to moral acrion but to aes­thetic feeling. The Idea of fr«dom is not present to thought as anincentive to make exist what is not, but, rather, what should be(1011m); the Idea offittdom is present to thought as fear and exaI­Ution because what is (the phenomenon) is almost nothing next to

w!tat freedom could and should cause to be. Thus moral law,which is simply the obligation fr«ly to carry out fr« causality, isfell not in the form or according to the "state" of thought, which isirs subjective signal, I mean-respect. The laner (as we have said inChapter I, pp. 36-43) is an empty sentimental temper that showsonly that thought is ready to "carry out" the absolute causality, tofulfill the duty (JOIJm) of realizing it. This respectful temper is im·O'lediare1y determined. by first causality when thjnking thinks it; itis first causality itself as felr, but felt as an incentive to acl. In sub·lime feeling, first causality does not become an incentive for thethOUght that wants, for volition, or, as Kant says, for the faculty ofdesire. Sublime feeling is aesthetic and, as such, only inu:rests.

Tbt Sub/imt as DynamicalSymbnil

sublime feeling. The same would be lrue if reason demandednOlhing, thaI is, if thought were nOt available, "liable," did Dothave the necessary £mpj'iingliclJluit (liS; III) to the Ideas of reasor.for them to "arise" on the occasion of this almost impossible p~sentation. The latter must make a "sign" of transcendence:. The"Savoyard peasant" who sees Saussure exalted by the immensityafmountain glaciers judges him (0 be simply a fool (115; III). This illbecause the peasant is not "cuhured." "tutored" in maners ofIeta.of reason (115-16; III).

In reality these twO cases of insensibility (0 the sublime art_and the same. The imagination can refuse (0 present the "al"­tOO great" juSt as the "almost tOO great" may not signal to th.the "presence" of an Idea of reason. The imagination contents ..self, one might say, with "surveying" the given magnitudes by~gressive composition. The imagination will do this under thedirection of understanding; it can resr assured. that underscan .will nor ask it to grasp "in a glance" all the units that comthese magnitudes. Thought will thus remain confined in thecurrent mathematical symhesis of a series that ca.n be infinite.

If the synthesis ofsensations is necessary in sublime feeling, iI:because the imagination does violence to itself in order to p.....1a magnirude, which is a sign of the subjective absolUle of maPtude (magnirude itself). Moreover, the imagination does violcoatto itself because reason has the strength to demand this of it. SIdis the situation (as we have seen on pp. 131-37) with regard to dieIdea of an absolute "agent" and not merely ofan "absolute whole.­For the first Idea immediately requires its realiution. By "ilTUDt'diately" one musl understand not "right now," for the absol...agent does nOl belong to succession, but, rather, "without media­tion." The synthesis ofsensations in sublime fecling only becotndnecessary with the transformarion of the absolute of magnitUdeinto the absolute ofcausality. The absolute ceases ro be merely throbjecl of a speculative Idea; rhe absolute is the subject acting ab­solutely, and this is why it requires the presentation of the "a!ffiOI'100 great" as a sign of ilselfin aesthetic f«ling. •

This explains why the Analytic of the Sublime as it is considen:d

'.'Th~ Sublim~ as DytUl1nic(/i Synthnis

Heterogeneiry of the Sensations of lime inthe Sublime Synthesis

It is useful to clarify the heterogeneous character of the twO e1e~

ments unified in the sublime feeling by an examination of the as~

peq of temporality. A passage from paragraph 27, devoted to the

infinite as torality is altogether different from the concept of aninfinite series of apprehensions and progressive predications. In~

deed the Idea is me "maximization· of the concept or its passage to

the limit, bU[ it jumps the limh, and this suffices to render its ob­ject unpresenrable and thus to make any :mempt at presentation ina "comprehension" fail. But, once again, this "intelligible" status ofthe infinite does not explain why the imagination is called upon togive the infinite a presenration nonetheless.

Only the Idea of absolute causality can legitimate the dollbkbind in which the imagination is caught and kept prisoner in sub­lime feeling: to present the unpresentlble. For only the Idea ofab­solute causality conwns wimin it, as its very content, the obliga­cion of its realization. We have shown how this "being effected" is001 moral action. However, the Juty to "efftct'" is pte:eisdy what, inthe order of aesthetic feeling, is translated as me necessity for theimagination to present an object that cannot be presented. Bc-~

cause the imagination cannot succttd, its failure will at least havethe sense ofa testimony to the "presence" of this causality. Lackingthe power to present it-there being no possible prese:ntltion-theUnagination will present that there is an unpresentable object, ab­solute causality. Thus the distress of the imagination becomes thesign of the intelligible in the sensible. But, once again. the inte1li~

gible must demand this sign, and only the free '"agency of the sub­ject" has this essential property. Only with this agent, thanks tothis "acting subject" that demands its "incarnation," is the synthe~

sis-of what is heterogeneous in the feeling provided by naturalmagnitudes and forces (which are very large in the order of phe~nomena, signs of an absolute magnitude, in extension or in pa­tential in the order of the noumena)-also a necessary synthesis.The synthesis thus is properly dynamical,

a~ong the powers of thought, the power of feeling pleasUtt ar~Ispleasun=, ~nd not ~e power of knowing or the power ofd_mg (and acting). ThiS difference'is considerable. In the sublirae.,absolute causality is "present" only insofilr as ir pleases ordis~es. In filet absolute causality is present as it pleases and displeasest,he s:me time. If such were not the case, the "Analytic of the s..:­lime would be another chapter in the Critiq~ofPractical&-..BU!. the separation o~ the twO powers of thought, ofdesire andGff~hng pleasure or displeasure, whi~ the tlble of filculties dcadrdISplays at the end of the IntroductIon to the third Critiqw_J6?, prevents mis c:onfusion and safeguards the irreducible specI;:fiaty of the aesthmc, even me sublime aesthetic. The tlble abo.minds us mat the final end is not finality: the concept of "­causality .or ~recdom is given by re:uon as the end to WiUi finalir(paradoxical m the case of the sublime), which is expressed inthetic feeling. is subjectively "judged" (tlutegoricaIly, as sen"uialjrby a power of judgment that operates without the mediationconcept.

A second remark must be made on the subject of the ·'",IIac~

ment" of the "absolute whole" with the "absolute cause,· wtlidlloccurs with the transition from a mathematical examinatioaaesthetic judgment upon the sublime, to its dynamical "".....tion. The Idea of the infinite as a whole, absolutely, cannot sillrise to a necessary synthesis of the heterogeneous, that is, to a"namical synthesis complete with presentation. As the object of.Idea, this absolute infinite is obviously not presentlble, and in dIksense there is indeed heterogeneity of this object of thought wi*any object presentable in intuition. But the synthesis ofone.the other is not necessary, for it is not written in the Idea of the_tual infinite magnitude that it must be presented, only that it c:aJt"not be. This is why the imagination, responsible for this presenll"don, does not succeed in fulfilling it. But what remains unCS­plained, with only the Idea of the absolute whole, is why reasoademands a presentation of the absolute. Reason maintains the 0b­ject it conceives as absolme whole outside of the series of phe­nomena estimable by understanding in magnitude and outside rJwhat the imagination can compose in its wake, for the Idea oftbC

Th~ Sublim~ as Dynamical SymJINis

~reproduction" (KRV A, 131.-3); t45-4~). :h~s we not~ that t~e

. ,gination could follow understandlOg 10 us progressIon ad m~,"'

ftllitllm toward very great unitS of magnitudes (see Chapter 4, pp.102-9)' But what one remarks here is more serious than an obsta­Ie to Ihe Zusammnifassungof important magnitudes. It is the de~

:truction of the temporality proper to ::Ill presentation, of whichthe syntheses examined in the first Critiqu~ constitute the a pn'oriconditions. More specifically. the simultaneous grasp of the suc~

cessive destroys the ait[olg~, the "time series" (KRV A, t32; 145).needed by objective description, especially if the magnitude to bedescribed is great. Bur more serious still. this rime series is nOt onlyindispensable to the presentation of an object in intuition, it is "acondition of the internal sense" (rint &di1tlJmg tin innnrn Sinntr.

ibid.).The transcendental aesthetic of the first Critiqt« showed that

time has no reality in itself but is a formal condition of the intu~

ition ofgivens in genernJ. The form that is proper to this ,?nditionis succession: "Time has only one dimension; different times an:nOI simultaneous but successive" (KRV, 75; 74). Space, on the con-

_ tlOlry. is the a priori condition for givens to be intuited "outsideand alongside one another" (KRV A and 8, 68; 67). But time aloneis the "formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsOeVer"(KRV, 77; 71). For givens. outer and inner alike. are subject to itsform, succession, whereas inner givens are nOt subject (Q me spatialform of juxtaposition (which. tempornJly speaking, si~ni~es coex~

istence). From this it follows that time, as the succession Imposedon "givens" for them to be given, "is nothing but the form of innersense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state"

(ibid., 77; 76-71)·Thus the grasp in "one glance" of what is successive. which rea­

SOn demands of the imagination in the judgment upon the sub­lime. and which must render intuirable the "coexistence" (ZlIgkich­uin) of what can only be given successively, does "violence" nOtonly to the a priori condition of the intuition of any given or suc­cession, but to me eminent and unique condition that such a graspimposes on the "intuition of ourselves and of our state." If the

'4371Jr Sltb!im~ as DynamicaL Symlulis

exposition of the quality of sublime delight, invites the reader IQ

do so. I neglected doing so until now oc-cause the consequenCQ ofthis ex~mination are significant only in relation to the dynam~synthesis. The passage in question begins with the following: Mo­sung ~inN RAums (a/s Auffassung) (measurement of space [as ap­prehensionl: 107; 104). The text insists on the "comra-finar(~kwidrig)character of me "effon" (Besmbung) that is requinl4of the imagination in sublime judgment for its normal functio~(ibid.). Kam meticulously points ro what me reversal of the "modeof representation" (di~ VorsuUungwrt: 108; 104), which conforms.the finality of me imagination. consiSts in. We know theI~tion of the reversal: it is in the transition from apprehension.comprehension (see Chapter 4. pp. 101.--9). The apprehension of,magnitude, even a very great magnitude. always remains p<>1Sib1epan by part; it is relayed by the "composition" of me parts applll­hended one after the other. It allows for the "description"(~ J

ung) of this magnjtude manks to me "objective movement" (..J~ktiw &wq;ung. mat is, movement of successive syntheses of tbeproperties of the object). and this movement is a "progression" ('*Progmsur. 108; 104). Thus the imagination works in a way thar iIconformable to its finality, that is, in a way suitable 10 providios.presentation of the object.

However, when me imagination must comprehend the IJWIi.fold in a unity that is no longer one "of thought" (thus no 10.one of composition), bU( "of intuition," when the imaginarioamust provide a comprehension "at one glance" (in ~int1n Aupblick) of what has been apprehended in successively apprehended.pans, tin SIIRussiv-Aufgqilj?un (ibid.), then the imagination worU"regressively": there is Rrgrmw. Furthermore. this regression srrikela blow at what is the most essential to the imagination, "the timecondition in the progression" (di~ aitb~dingtulg im Pro~ibid.), in its own progression. What rime condition? The very onethat is discussed in the Preliminary Remark to the Deduction ofthe categories, 10 which we have previously referred: what intu­ition has apprehended in a unity al first grasp, the imaginationcomprehends in a unity at second grasp by exercising its faculty of

Tb~ Sublim~ llJ DynamicaL Symbttis

'45TIN Sub/im~ lIS Dynamical SJnlhais

rJulegorical sense of reRection. It was never said that thought as re­Aection. as pure fuculty of judging, presupposes an "I think." OndlC contrary, it is said that "the subjective condition of all judg.nlCIHS is the judging fuculty itself" (14); 137). Moreover, becauseIhis ~power of judgment" (tim \.?mlogrn zu urreikn: ibid.) trulyo;cecds what the "I think" and iu temporal synthesis can do bysuccession, it can find a finality in the threat, a finality with regard10 [he destination or voauion exettding iu sole cognitive voca­lion ~for the whole province of the mind" (fur diL ganu &!tim­mung dn Gmliits) when succession is threatened with disappear­ance (108; 104).

Given Ihe above, let us now return to the question of the her·trogeneity of the sensations felt together in sublime feeling. At thevery moment (I dare say) when the thought that imagines SttffiS

dueuened with annihilation by iu "regression," that is, by workingagainst the current of the succession it usually needs. the (rational)thought of rnson also feels serial time to be annihilated in theIdea of the infinite as absolute whole and, further still, as we haveshown, in the Idea of absolute causality. The power ro engender an-effecl" without being determined to do it by a condition doesnol involve the temporality wherein phenomena are perceived andexplained according to their linkage. It escapes the elementary syn.theses of intuirion, imagination, and understanding. that is. re·spectively, form, schema. and the axiom of time as magnitudeadded to ilself.

Sublime feeling is remarkable in this respect, in the doubleweakening of [he principle of succession: a weakening in a strict~nse due to the "regression" of the imaginarion, a weakening (in aloose sense), an extemporalization due 10 the "presence" of theIdt:2 of reason. One might think that it was the same single depar·lure from inner sense. In reality it is a question of rwo very similarbUt hererogeneous feelings. For the imagination. this "departure" isrnadc regressively, in the fear of losing the minimal power thatlhinking has of synthesizing givens (irs own included) by succes­sion. For reason, on the other hand, the departure is made (and al­Ways already made) in a leap, in the exaltation of recovering rhe

144

imagination wert able to satisfy reason, time as the form ofinQer~nse would be altered, at least for the duration of the Zutkic6(but then how would this be determined?), This would mean thatth~re w~uld ~o long~r be an inner sense to organiz.e our rep~rations In a time series. The "subject" would be deprived of themeans of constituting its subjectivity. For, under the name of the"I thi~k:" the "subj~" is nothing other than the consc.iowneu ofthe ongmary synthetic uniry to which all Tq)restntations art u..~U[ed. Without this impur.uion, called ap~rception. represenc.tlORS would not be mose of a subject. Moreover, this imputatioawould be impossible if the representations were not thcmsdvcs.ready given in the form ofa succession. I remind the: reader, all.briefly, of ~is :nalysis in the second edition of the first CriliIfwunder the ode Tr:mscendenCl1lXd.uetion of the Pure: Conccpa~Understanding" (nv 8, 152-75; J4tJ-9I), only to show how ~-,.

gression" of the imagination in sublime feeling mikes a blow at tbtJvery foundation of the "subject." Taste promised him a beautif'allife; the sublime threatens [Q make him disappear. We will retUIIl

to this (see Chapter 7, pp. 179-81).The regression is thus "contr.l-final" to the temporal synthail,

which is itsdf constitutive of the synthesis ofapperception, thaI: ...it is constitutive for the -I think." But the analysis of the TfIDo'scendental Aesthetic of the first Cririql« only considers thousbrin its power to know. One could say (Stt Chapter I, pp. J5-~that i~ the exercise of its other powers-that of feding pleasw:eand displeasure, of particular interest to us here-the "I think" iInot necessarily required. One could say mat thought is not the"think," and that the subjective is not the subject. Furrhe.rmocc.one could say that the time of aesthetic feeling is not necessaril1the same as the time of cognition. Kant does not Sttm to douMthis. For how~er disastrous it may be for inner sense, the -rrgrcs­sion" demanded of the imagination is nonetheless declared to be"subjecJively" felt and feh as zuxcNwidrig. as conrravening the 6­naliry of the fuculry of presentation (108; 104). AJthough this fed­ing cannot be related to the unity ofan "I think," as can a ~mentin a series of inner represent2tions, it is nonetheless felt, in the

Th~ Sublim~ as Dynamical Symh~is

maximal power that thinking has of beginning a series of g;v"h L" bo d " ...

~lt ~Ut lJCmg un (Q n (nv, 475-79; 536-4/). The first "not1m~ threatens the faculty of knowledge, the second "no time" Q.

tablJshes the faculty of pure desire.

Thus it is very difficult to classify Kantism among philosoph'of the subject, as is sometimes done. tel

§ 6 A Few Signs of

Heterogeneity

Resistance

The most difficult and subtle trait to decipher in sublime feelingis the extreme dissonance berween the powers of mought, which issimultaneously felt as the sublime feeling's supreme consonance....·i1h itself. Larer we will examine the: W<ly in which the text of meAnalytic (and even of the: analytics of the: beautiful and the: sub­~me) "deduces" this consonance on the: basis of a supe:rsensible:

principle:. First we: will try to measure: the: sublime paradox by ex·arnining the terms, certain terms mar are: linked (Q it. "Resistance,"Knegative presentation," "enthusiasm," and "simplicity" are: the: re­curring terms in the Ge:neral Remark with which "Exposition of

Aesthetic Refleaive Judgments" concludes (1I7-30i 113-25).The ctitical concept of "resistance:" (Widrnrand: 118; 114) char­

aaerizes ptecisely the relation of sublime feeling to "the interest ofsense" (tim InumK cUr Sinn~: ibid.). This larter notion refers to thediscussion abour the specific nature of aesthe:tic delight in the"First Moment" of the "Analytic of the Beautiful" under the cate­gory of quality. The quality of tasre is to please. This pleasure is

distinct from the pleasure provided by the delight of an inclina­tion, different also from the pleasure that a good action can pro­duce, i.e., the "delight" of moral law. The criterion of this double

difference is unique: interest. "All interest presupposes a want, orcalls one forth; and, being a ground determining approval, de-

I

149A F~w Signs ofHtttrtJgtn~ity

. Icrcst. As for the sublime, it also "pleases immediately" (1l1IVtr~

l:ittflbar gtfiiUt) but it pleases "by its opposition (resistance] to;he interest ofsense" (dureh ~intn Witkntnnd gegm das Imnmt tin.Sil/f/r: 118; 1t4). "Unwrminrlbar" (withom mediation) but "dure""(through, by means of) a resistance. We find this trait of resistance(the luidn) "against" (the gegm) marked once again a few lines lat­er: the beautiful "prepares us to love [/itbm) something, even na­lure. apan from any interest," the sublime "to cstct;m somethinghighl}' (lJochzusclJiirun) even in opposition to our (sensible) imer~

est"' (1I9; 1t4-). The "in opposition to," the witkr, is an essentialngure ofsublime feding, as is the -through," the dureh. Both signala resistance. The sublime is not unaware of the sensible interest; itopposes it. This intrinsic opposition is expressed in the affectua1 0ask the reader to permit me the use of this word) differe.nd thatconstitutes the sublime fCC'ling: of fear and aah::uion. A differend,....nich, in rum, is the subjective stoue of thought at the mercy ofme differend of its powers to present and to conceive.

The term '"resistance" (Widnrumd), linked to that of "differ­end" (Widnrmit: 107; tOj), deserves further elaboration. Not all~istance presupposes and expresses a differend. In a political or~

der, for example, the opposition ofone party to another may onlybe morivated by a dispute about the legitimacy or the authority ofthe government. On the other hand, one cannot conceive ofa dif­ferend that would not distinguish itself by at least one of me par·ties being in conAict with the other, perhaps even by their recipro­cal opposition. Conciliation, indeed to be hoped for, does not tru­ly erase the differend; it displaces it, and its sign, resistance itself,will reappeat elsewhere. (The model of these displacements is giv­en by the resistance of the unconscious in psychoanalysis.)

Here the resistance, which marks the sublime feeling, bears tes­timony to what the dynamical synthesis is, of which the sublimefeeling is the result. This synthesis involves the incommensurabil­ity of one power of thought with another. If, however, we acceptalong with Kant thaI their dissonance and nOI its resolution at·tem 10 a finality, a supreme consonance of Ihought with itself,then we have to conclude that it is essential for thought to feel re~

J

A F~w Sigm ofHmrogmdty

prives the judgment on the object of its freedom" (49; '41), "P~supposes ... or calls ... forth" a need. "Inclination" (N~igunl'

ibid.) is a delight determined by the need of the senses. Ani~feel it in the same way that men do. The law of reason, which illproper to humans, determines an interest for the objects in whichit is judged capable of realizing itself. Thus interest is placed in I

different relation to determination, depending on whether it bt­longs to the senses or to reason. The interest of the senses presup­poses need; inclination is the delight of this interest. The int~of practical reason, or what determines practical reason to exera.ethe power of its absolute causality (KPV, 12.4; Ij8), "produces •interest ... and this we call moral interest" (KPV, 83; 94), an inta'oest that consists in obedience to the law. But in both cases, ddw.is linked to a determination, whether empirical or transcendenal(and even transcendent).

On the contrary, "favor" (Gunst: 49; 4-1), which is the aesthedcdelight owing to the beautiful, is nOl determined by any int~for the object that occasions it, and it calJs fonh none. This delipris thus the only "fl"«" (ibid.) delight, frCC' from all determinatioa.The beautiful is what simply pleases, was bioig4fillt (ibid.). Sufloprising simplicity: the pleasure of the beautiful comes, occurs ID

thought without the latter feeling any need for it. Nothing moQ.vates it. We are reminded in the "General Remark" closing the ex­position of aesthetic judgmenrs that the beautiful "is what pleatSin the mere estimatc [in tkr bloJfm Broruilung] formed of it (COlt"sequently nOl by intervention ofany feeling ofsense in accordanclwith a concept of the understanding)" (118; 114). Aho nicht~uist, "withom rhe intervention" of a sensation that would be sub­sumed under a concept. The mediation that is lacking is dearlydesignated; it is that of the schema. The Empfindllng dn Shmts, the"feeling of scnse," is sensation insofar as it relares 10 the objeec,that is, the sensation examined in the first Critiqllt and not thesensation as thinking feels it reAexively. The estimate of taste isfree of any cognitivc condition, either of sensibility or of under­standing (i.e., of sensorial sensibility).

In summary, the beautiful pleases in the absencc ofany sensible

, 5'A Frill Sipu ofH~urogf'1l~iry

dictory cconomy of sublime feeling. If there is no fear of a de·(('(".lSI.' in tcnsion-due to an cc1ipsing of what can be presented bythe imagination with regard to the absolute Idea-it is because theimagination, believed ro have been blocked at the limits of its "firstmeasure," has a "feeling of being unbounded" (fiiIJIJ liclJ . .. ufJb~·

Fl1zt: ibid.), thanks to the elimination, the "thrusting aside"(w'tgKlJaffimg: ibid.) of its own barriers. The imagination can evenlost comrol, become "unbridled" (ziig~llor. 128; 123) and can dragthought into the "delirium" (Wahn$inn: ibid.) of enthusiasm.

This is a temporary and remissible delirium, unlike &hwiinn­rrri. In mania me imagination claims "positively to present" meabsolure. Although the imagination gets carried aW3Y in Wahminn,presentation extends beyond its fundamenral measun= but n=mainsnegative. The obligation to which the imagination is subjected byreason docs not only leave the imagination terrified, but gives itme courage to force its barriers and anempt a "present2tion of mein6niten (127; /22). This attempt can never end in "anything moreman a negative presentation" (ibid.). What is this negative presen­mion? It is neither the abscnce of presentation nOt the present2·tion of nothingness. It is negative in the eyes of the scnsible but at

- the same time is still a "mode of presentation" (ein~ Darrt~Uungrart:

ibid.). This mode is withdrawn, in retrea[ (abgrzogen~), and thepresentation it furnishes consists in an Ablonderung, a purringapart and to the side, an "abs-traction" (ibid.). The mode escapes,removes itsclf (abgtzOgm~) from the "first measure" of the imagi~

nation. What is presented according to this mode is separated fromwhat is normaJly presented according to this measure; it is isolated,ab-. in a special St2tuS, lond". Here the imagination has a way ofpresenting that "ex·ceeds" its norm. or, rather, "sc·cedes

nfrom it.

The play of the faculties in sublime judgment is thus far morecomplex than one could have imagined. Their difTerend cannOtconsist in the simple incommensurability of their respective caus·es (in the juridical sense). The difTercnd of the finite and the infi·nitl' can only be felt fully in thought if the finite thought (that ofform) removes itself from its finality in order to try to put itself atthe measure of the othcr party. There is no difTerend withollt this

Rexively its heterogeneity when it brings itself to its own linti'(so~ething it cannQ(.avo~d doin~. It can do one thing and its;'poslte, present an object In a finne way and conceive of an objeaas actually infinite. It can feel this double power, as a pleasure~en in form and as cxalration owing to the Idea. In the sublimethought can feel the nullity of this pleasure in the eyes of this ex­altation. When this happens thought feels itsclfin the truth of..split. This split suspends it above or apart from twO W3ys of un­derstanding this split, both ofwhich are deneg_uion: ordinary em.~iricism that draws from the split a lesson of wisdom in dccep.tlon, and speculative idealism that uses the split as the pretc:xr •authorize a delirium in the absolute. Thus the sublime fetling,_has already been suggested (see Chapter 2, pp. 50-56), is the sub­jective st2te critical thought must fetl in its !x'ing carried to illlimits (therefore beyond them) and its resistance to this impnw,or, conversely, what it must feel in its passion to determine and ill J

its resistance to this passion. One might consider this a philo­sophical n~rosis. Rather, it is a faithfulness par C'Xcellencc= [Q thephilosophical feeling, "brooding melancholy," as Kant sugg.",,1111in his ObHrvatiom 0" tlu h~/ing ofth~ &Illltiftl and tIN Subli-.The absolute is never there, never given in a present2tion, but it itaJW3YS "presem

nas a call to think beyond the "there.n Ungraspablr.

but unforgettable. Never restored, never abandoned.

Negative Presentation

This mode of "presencen of the absolute is the grounds for the"negative presemation

ninvoked in the final Remark (127-jJi

122-27). The vocabulary is one of energy (sec Chapter 1, pp.60-67). Ahhough the senses are opposed in sublime feeling and"nothing ... meets the eye of sense" (117; 122), the feeling provid­ed by the unprcsentable "presence" of the abso[me is not lost, tKf'"

lorm (ibid.); it is not reduced to a "cold and lifeless approbation,"without "any moving force," without "emotion" (ibid.). The re­verse is true, g~rnd~ umg~k"lm (ibid.). There follows an argtf'menCthat may surprise the reader because it seems to allnul the contra·

A r~w Sigm ofHn~rogf'1ldry

A hw SiplJ ofHmrogmeity

lore, the shock of the thought of the absolute for the thinking of~orll1s expresses and sanctions a major shift in th~ s.rakes of"art andliteraturc. This shift does not have the charaetenstlcs of a revolu­.... " Historically, it is a slow, uncertain movement, always threat­

tlO,,·ened by repression, through which the faculty of presentation seeksto rell10ve irself from the uclmiofbeauriful forms. One can traccitS avatars in the West, back to the High Middle Ages. via the dis­ute between the Victorines and the Bernardines, via me baroque

~otif that overtakes and opposes a renewed classicism. the Quarrelof the Ancients and the Moderns, via the appropriation of Longi­nus's treatise and the discussion of the figure of the sublime in theeightcenth century. in which Kant'S Analytic is an important ele­ment. This shift in the finality of art and literature was pursued inRomanticism and the avant~garde and is still being debated. Itsstakes can be formulated simply: is it possible. and how would itbe possible. to testify to the absolute by means of artistic and lit­erary presentations, which are always dependent on forms? What~

ever the case may be, the beautiful ceases to be their "object." orelse the meaning of the word is indeed subverted.

Enthusiasm

Another important motif of the General Remark is that of en­thusiasm. "I must dwell a while on the latter point," Kant writes(124; 119). Enthusiasm is important. The "intellectual" delight insublime feeling proceeds, as his analysis of the dynamical point ofvicw shows, from the relation of thought to the absolute of freecausality that founds moral law. This delight is "negative" "fromthc aesthetic side," "opposed ro the interest" of sensibility (123;118-19). Thus it requires "sacrifices" (Aufopftnmgell: 123; lI8), d~~

privation or "spoliation" (BerattbulIg: 120, 123; 116, 118). We WIllcxamine this question further a little later (see Chapter 7, pp.187-90). Kant dwells on this question in ordcr to dissipate a com~

nlon error by which one confuses enthusiasm with the respect duethe law or what maners to it, in particular God (113-14; J0frJo).

Enthusiasm is. rather, "the Idea of the Good to which affection is

A hw SiplJ ofHmrogmeity

gestu.te..Moreover, because this geSlUre cannot succeed, there Witremain In the order of presentation only a trace, the trace of are.treat, the sign of a "presence" that will never be a presentatioll,"Negative presentation" is the sign of the presence of the abSOlute.and it is or can only make a sign of being absent from the formsthe presentable. Thus the absolute remains unpresentable; no~en is subsumable under its concept. But the imagination can s~itS "presence," an almost insane mirage. in the emptiness it dit.covers beyond its capacity to "comprehend." This gesture m_only be understood reAexively. Only through its sensation canthought that imagines be aware of this "presence" without ptation.

The differend does not signify that the two parties do notdemand each orher. It requires that each know the idiom ofother (form. Idea), although each cannot satisfy the demandthe other by means of its own idiom. This is why the variouslime feelings, whatever their particularities may be. are all of"strenuous" (wilckerer: 125; /20) courageous type. Far from ditSelf off in the "own right" of its proper finality and cenoun .the trial, each party, or one at least, accepts to undergo and to

fer the wtong that the claim of the other forces upon it and triesshow with the means it has at its disposal the inanity of the d ."Negative presentarion" is, in this sense. merely the demonstra .of the inanity of the demand that the absolute be presented.excluding itSelf from its own limits of presentation. the imagina­tion suggestS the presence of what it cannot present. It unbiitself. unleashes itself. but it does this by removing itself from its Ii­nality and titUS annihilating itself according ro this finality. It foI.lows that the said "presence" is nor an object of the imagination; iI:is only felt subjectively by thought. as this gesture of retraction.

Two brief observations to conclude this point. First, we under-­stand how useless it is to imagine that one has refuted the noriOllof a differend by showing that the laner presupposes rhe cornm~nication of opposing causes. It is necessary to their differend forthe parties ro "understand" each other. But neither party sueteeJsin making the demand of the other legitimate for itself. Further-

'ISA F~w SiplS ofHu~rogmdty

"unswerving principles"; a manner of writing, a way of carryingoneself. a garment, a building that conveys this extreme firmnessart' noble as they srrenuously "uphold" principles. These states and(hese noble works provoke "admiration," which is an "astonish­ment"' that persists after the surprise of novelry (ibid.). The quan­(it)' of energy is inscribed in the quantity of time. as the words"strenuously" and "enduring" indicate (ibid.). Given this charac·(eoution by tension alone. we see how f2r the sublime is from theabsolutely neutral feeling of respeer.

Another remark must be added to this one. Affea:ual tension isnecessary to the sublime. but it is not sufficient. There are "im­petuous movements of the mind" (ItUnniK," Gnniitsbnmgungm:126: 121) in religious edification, for example, or in the socialbmtdth of cerrain "ideas" that have nothing of the sublime inthem, for thought does not feel itself imperiously called by theabsolute Idea. The "presence" of the latter must be felt as beingstronger than all possible prc:stntation. The "supersensible" (ibid.)must signal itself as the supreme end of thought. through the signof the intrinsically contradictory "state" of thought. Tumult is onlysublime if it proceeds from resistance. and from the endurance of

- the resistance that the supersensible Idea opposes 10 the resistanceof the presentable. The impetUousness of political masses or sponscrowds is not enthusiasm. "For" (IO,ut) in the absence of the ob­Stinate call of imperuow emotion, [he rapture that thought feelsbeFore me exploit of the competitive or political performance. orreligious eloquence. "belong[sl only to motion," to the movementof gymnastics "which we welcome in the interests ofgood health"(126; 121). The play of affections does in effect stir one. FollowingWhich. one takes pleasure in an "agreeable lassitude," which is thetcslOration of one's vital forces, the same effect that the "Easternvoluptuaries" obtain in massage. but in this case a massage wilhourmasseur (ibid.). The Dmkutlglflrt, the "way of thinking" (ibid.)that involves the struggle of thinking with ilself, is missing fromthis.

Will we conclude from this argument that sublime emotion isContrary to the hygiene of thought? On Ihe subject of the well-

A hw Signs ofHeuroge1l~ity"4

~dded Imil AffilttJ" (124, lorn.; 119). The presence of this affectioQIS enoug~ to deprive enthusiasm of any ethical value: WOn ttu.account It ca.nnor merit any delight on the pan of reason" (u'4ilI9-:o). that IS, se~e ~o C3..rry O~( free causality by obedience to thelaw. E~ery a~ecf1on IS blmd ~lther as to the choice of its end, or.supposmg thiS had been furnIShed by reason, in the way it is 0.reeted" (124. lorn.; U9). The law of practical reason must only beeffected by reason. The law of practical reason cannOt be dfeaetby what it prescribes. for it does not prescribe anything that isrermined or could be determinate as object for me will. It effiby miling itsdfdi~ly the incentive of the will. Such isthe only pure moral f~ling (KI'V. 74-110; 84-11j). This p .transandemally requires a '"holiness" of will (KPV, 84; 96),from any interest other man me interest of the law for its real'tion. This is not the case with enthusiasm. By provoking thetreme tension tha[ is subjea:ively experienco:f as terror beforeloss of presentation and as "ardor" (Schwung: 127; 122) in theof whal exceeds presentation, thai is, absolute causality, enth .relates thought to the law with an affectual "Strength" (mung:120).

In showing how enthusiasm contravenes moral feeling, Kant·led to denounce another kind of confusion. First of all, one mUllnot think that the affecmal "coment," so to speak. determines diesublimity of a feeling. Any emotion, any subjective "state" rIithought can pass over into the sublime: anger. desperation (ibid.).sadness (130; 124), admiration (125; 120). and even "fr~om frotaaffection" (di~ Affikl/QJigkdt) or apathy. a state ofdisaffection (11.41120), can become sublime. The sublime can be distinguished norby these affectual qualities or nuances bur, rather, by the quantil1ofenergy that is expended on the occasion of the object said to besublime. "Faint·hcarted" (lJ~rzngt~). exhausted despair is not sub­lime; only "the rage of forlorn hope, n "indignant" (mtriisUu), rhe:energy of desperation is sublime (125; 120). This energy gives theparticular affectual qualiry its sublime value, makes it "noble"(ibid.). Impassiveness is noble, as is the AffiktlOligluit that·resultswithin a person from the unshakable resolution to follow

Simplicity

'57A Few Sigm ofHmrogen~ity

In Kant this is the "artless finality" of sublime style: without ani­

lice.But let us remember mat this candid "stylc" belongs to morality.

ihus ,here would be an aesthetic of morality, or ar least touchingon morality. In context, it could only be the aesthctic of the sub­lime: "thc intellectual and intrinsically final (moral) Good, esti~

mared aesthetically, instead of being represented as beautiful, must,rather, be represented as sublime" (123; [[9). That is, it muSt berepresented as affecting thought in a way that is double, in fearand in t."Xaltation. We will see that this is not the last word thc cri­tique has to say about the aesdletic of morality (see Chapter 9. pp.134-39). Thus the thesis of simplicity declares that this very com~

plex duality of sensations, which requires nothing less than a dy~

namical synthesis to be correctly determined. is simplicity itself.This duality is simple owing to its occasion, the magnitude or thepower that can arouse this complex feeling. The spontaneity ofthis complex feeling is simple, just as virrue is simple. None ofthis needs embellishment, or even a particular intention; it is wim­OUt design and without art (umzbJichrlich und ohn~ Kumr: 125; I20).

It is what we call natural. Morality itself is like sometbing naturalin tbought, "a second (supersensible) nature." Thinking knows its"laws," without baving an "intuition" of the "superscnsible faculty"within it to legitimate them (128; 123).

This simplicity announces neither the end of art nor rhe begin­ning of ethics. As style, it belongs to the aesthetic. It is the signmade by the absolute in the forms of nature and in human mores,in Sittli(hk~it. The absolute sign in all simplicity. In art, the for~

mularion of the absolute under this sign gives rise to various"schools," suprematism. abstraction, minimal ism, etc., in whichthe absolute can signal itself simply in presentation. Morality, onthe orher hand, considered in irself, bas no style at all. Style is amanner of presentation destined to affect thought. Bur moral lawaffects thought without affecting it and without manner; morallaw occupies thought directly without any presentation by its"presence" alone, which is respect. Respect is the absolute in "neg~

ative presentation" in the sense that presentation is intrinsically

bcing of the body, Kant, in the third "Conflict of thc Facuhi •observes that the body's well~being is never determinable in exea.rience and that one has only an Idea of it. As for thought, itswc1l~being is to be ill with the absolute. Thought is in a "gstate" only when this "state" signals to thought its vocation,is to think the absolute, but with the resistance that the "fun_mental measure" of all presentation opposes to the actuality ofabsolutc. The fceling of its destination and its deception canto a "delirium." But this delirium is good because it is remifirst of all, and abovc all because it makes thc absolute "almost'tuitablc" (gkichJam amchaulich: 106; 102) for a momcnt.

A Few Signs ofH~ruognl~ity

One last term deserves examination, which the Generalseems to introduce in passing: this is "simplicity" (di~ Einfalr.123). The German word evokes not only what is not complaalso what is not subtle: candor, and even foolishness. The word.inserted here without any apparent reason, following the pdevoted to the distinction between delirium and mania. Simp'ty, we read, "is, as it were [gkichJam], thc style adopted by nain the sublimc" (ibid.). It is an "artless finality" (kumrbJJ~

miijf;gk~;r) and as such, that is, as nature without art, it is alsostyle "of morality."

This brusque observation echoes the dispute that swept inlecrual Europe and occupied it ar the time, whcther the sub'style is the "grand style" in the sense of ancient rhetotic or. onCOnttary, the absence of all style. What is at stake in this conversy is, once again, the conflict between an aesthetic of "presenand thc pagan poetics of good form. The treatise of Longinus ."..hesitant. Boileau, its translator, orients himself more clearly in thedirection of the thesis of simplicity as hc multiplies his obserYl"tions on Longinus. Fenelon Opts wirhout hesitation for barenCSloThe phrase of predication is all the more sublime in that it itstripped of ornament, of embellishment, of artifice. a!I if it carnestraight from the mouth of the predicator, from the divine voi4:to

Usage, imerest, benefit. sacrifice: the text of the Critiqlus worksits themes. the true, the Good, the beautiful, with the help ofop­rollOrs (the ones we have JUSt memioned, but there are others-forexample. incitcment, incentive) borro.....ed from me world of ec0­

nomics. Even VmnOgnl makes one think ofa potential financier or_ industrialist. This is because mere is an economy of the faculties.

We caught a glim~ of it when we discussed animation (see Chap­tcr 2, pp. 60-67). It always intervenes on two occasions: when thecooperation of the faculties must be elaborated and when it is amatter of understanding how "the facultary" in general. which isonly a power. comes to be actualized in empirical reality. It imer­"encs when it is a marter of knowing how the capital of the think­ing powers is invested, "realized" in aas.

By pointing to interest in sublime feeling......e touch on a nerveCCnter of me "organism" or Aow chan of the faculties. The analy·sis of the beautiful allows one ro hope for the advem ofa subject asunity of the facultics, and for a legitimation of the agreement oft(,;\1 objects with the authentic destination of this subject, in theIdea of naturc. A meteor dropped into the work devoted to thist.....ofold projt."CI, lhe Analytic of the Sublime, a "mere appendage"(9j; 90: see Chapter l, pp. 50-56), seems to put an end to thcse

'59

§ 7 Aesthetics and Ethics in the

Beautiful and the Sublime

Delight

A Fnu Signs ofHmTognl~ity

•

ab~m in. respect. Respect is such a strange feeling that no object.even .an Immoder:ue or formless one, CUl provoke it, so stJ"an1ethat II escapes the values of pleasure and displeasure. But for thiavcry reason it is the absolute model of the simple feeling that sub­lime an (vainly) ancmpts to arouse. This an would have to be"foolish," the way nature is in its magnitude or its "rude" forer:.

AmImia and Ethics in th~ &alltifitl and th~ Sublim~ 161

object can "grarify" (wrgnugm). it can simply "please" (gifalkn), itcan be "esteemed. approved" (gachiirzt. g~biUigt wmun: 49; 47).The object is then called agreeable, beautiful, or good. respective·Iy. The incentive that corresponds to this object for thought is. re·speerively, inclination, favor, or respect. Favor alone, thus accordedthe beautiful, is a "disinterested and ,fr«delighr," writes Kant, "theani)' free liking" (49; 47). The taSte of the senses presupposes in·dination, and wants gratification in the stria sense; me taSte of mesenses is interested in me agreeable. The taste of reflection presup­poses favor. "Pleasure" (&ftlkn) is its lot. And the beauciful is me~object" that is allotted. The German word G¢zllm is indicative ofhow the beautiful befalls it. f.tIls from the sky, is not expected. Oneis neither ready nor prepared for it. To speak of this ingenuousnessof delight (in generaJ), French has the expression: "a happiness"(un bonhrur) which is not happiness see Chapter 2., pp. 60--67).Disinteres[ is the condition for "happinesses" (llVoir tin bonhrul1).But nOl a guarantee. "Genius" is the "happy n=lation" between thepowers of knowledge (lmuht . .. in dnn gliicldichm VmHilmim:179; 172); i[ cannOl be taught and cannot be learned. Genius is to[he creation of forms what taSte is to their estimation.

- Two funher n=marks on the subject of this distinction. Whenaesthetic judgment is applied empirically, it may be that "what hasalready pleased of itself and without regard to any interest wharso­~er" thereafter arouses an interest for its existence, for the exis­tence of this something (I55; [47-41). Thus. for example, the in­dination to live in society can take over from pure aesthetic plea­Sure: sociability finds it can realize itself through taste. for tasteinvolves the demand to be communicable [0 all (155; t48-49). Nev­ertheless, one muSt separ:ue this latter demand, which is inscribeda priori in the transcendental analysis of aesthetic feeling. from allelTIpirical inclination to communicate this feeling. In short, onelllUSt recognize that the promise of a universal communication oftaste, which is analytically attached to raste. is not due to any in­terCSt for a determinable community (156; 149). Pure "favor" can­nOt be an inclination. or else [he beautiful would be agreeable andthere would be no aesthetic pleasure.

160 Amlmicsand Ethics in tlu &alltifidand th~ Sl4blim~

hopes. Yet what is of interest in sublime feeling is precisely whatdetonates this disappointment.

The feeling of the bt=auriful is a reflective judgment, singula,with claims to the universal: immediate. disinterested. It only in­volves a faculty of the soul, that of pleasure and displeasure.takes place on the occasion ofa form. On this point its fine as •interested pleasure is played our. For ifit proceeded from theest attachment to the matter of the given, to a color, to a tone.would regress to an "agreeableness," to the kind of pleasure thacsuIts from a gratified "inclination." The object would have exon the mind a "chaem" through its existence here and now (656,-U).

Chatm is a case: of interest-the empirical. "pathological"The will's maxim, what we would call the finality ofdesire. istated by the "enjoyment" (Gmi4fm: 45; 41) of the object. Th'ing feels an interest in the existence of the object (43-46; 41...,Thinking feels an interest for an empirical object. an interest·serfdom. and a pleasure in dependence.

One mighl think it sufficient to discriminate between pureand impure taSte to emancipate aesthetic pleasute from the en'ment of the object. One might think it sufficient to distinguishflaiomg~hmadr (the taSte of reRection) from Sinnmgach(the taSte of the senses: 54; 12). ReRection in generaJ, especiallythis exemplary "turn" of the immediate judgment in the beau .i.e.• feeling, excludes all interest defined by a submission ofwill to a determined object. ReRection in general consists in jing without the determination of a criterion. without catego .rules of judgment. and thus without being able to anticipatekind of object or the unique object that could providc·pleasure.

However, in distinguishing between tastes according to theulties of knowledge (determinant judgment belongs to under­standing, reRective judgment to the faculty of judgment), 0_overlooks another distinction made by the "mental faculties" ()9136) according to whether they are pure or empirically applied.Kant opposes three kinds of delight (in the broad set'Jse), threekinds of relations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. A1J.

162 Amlmics alld Ethics ill th~ &autifillolld tb~ Sublim~ AmImia and EtlJ;a ill tbe Beautiful and tbe Sublinu 163

This argument emerges from the dislinction betw~n the tran­scendenral and the empirical. Bur it also calls forth, and this is thesecond observation, the differences betwttn the "menral faculties..Delight in the strict sense gratifies an indination. It involves aaeconomy, which is one of desire. Delight implies that there was.lack and a time awaiting its suppression, satiation, the "enough..the g~mlg that can be heard in Vngniigullg. However, taste did notwait for anything in order to rake place. If it obeys a finality,a transcendental analysis could not produce the determined~cept of its end, of the object that would satisfy it. Taste is nOttermined. This does not mean it is infinite. But the delight'which rasre consists is independent ofany leaning. There is no de­sire for the beautifUJ. It is either one or rhe other, desire or bea.~That is ro say: it is either the faculty of desire or the facultypleasure and displeasu~. Moreover, it is no easy rask for us Wierners, haunted as we are by the passion of the will, to thinkthis liking or this grace, this Gunst, is not sought after. A pi"first" rakes place, which does not come to satisfy anythingwhich cannot disappoint anything. Its occurrence is not rela .to anything. It is an incentive, a "favor," thar nothing prompts.

I rerurn to the three delights. The third, "esteemed" and ..proved," has for its incentive respecr and for its object theThe relations of the aesthetic and the ethical are already in play'the pleasure of esteem as compared with the happiness of tas&With this localization, the point of intersection of the subliwith transcendental sentimentality can already ~ determined. 'Theobject, the Good, is made equivalent to that ofan empirical need.at least with regard to the constraint it imposes. Favor alone pro­vides a "free liking." Respect, as we have seen, is itself a 'fr~ affco.rion. But the law and irs prescriprion, be ir only a form of the ac­rions to accomplish, impose on rhe will interest for certain ob­jects. As we are in the practical realm, under the law "of action,·these objects arc actions or, rather, because the law is a formal one.maxims of action. And prescription makes rhem of great interest,"For where moral law dicrates, there is, objectively, no room leftfor free choice as 10 what onc has to do" (50; 47). There is a retUrn

f [he constraint imposed by the object, even if subjectively and;l1lpirically the "good maxims," that is, good objects, remain tobe determined according to the case.

There is constraint because there is a return of the faculty ofde­._ ~Esteem," in this rl"1'r.lrd, is subject to the same fate as "satia-Sl>... -b-

tion" (Vngniigung), which is the fate proper to the faculty of de­sire: 10 attain what "is good" (46; 41-44). In what it is reasonableto judge good, one does indeed distinguish the wozu gut and theall rich gut, the "good for" and the "good in itself," but both pre­suppose the "concept of an end." One must still pUt aside what isuseful (the "good for"), the agreeable in which reason has no part

(KP\', 59"-65; 68-74)· At the twO extremes ofdelight, the agreeableand the good-passing through the useful-however differentthey may be with regard to reason, have a common trait that dis~

tinguishes them from aesthetic pleasure: inrerest, "an interest intheir object" (48; 46). Even pure moral Good does not differ fromthe others acept in the quality of the interest that it arouses: puremoral Good calls forth "the highest interest" (ibid.). Moreover,this resemblance resides in the will, which sets aesthetic pleasurearatt from the rest. For where there is will, there is interest: "Towill something and to rake delight in its existence, i.e., to take aninterest in it, are identical" (ibid.).

The Beautiful, Symbol of the Good

The disjunction betwttn the aesthetic and the ethical seems fi­nal. This disjunction responds to the heterogeneity of the twO"mental faculties" that are in play, [he feeling of pleasure and dis­pleasure and the faculty ofdesire, respectively. Yet in the third Cri­rique the object is to bridge the power of knowledge and the pow­er of will, and the feeling in question, the aesthetic feeling, is to

serve as [he central pillar upon which to build a double~arched

bridge between these powers. It would seem here that the first archhad failed to materialize, the one that was supposed to open theWay from will to feeling. What prcvents onc from building it is in­teres!. At the same lime all hope of unifying thoughl in a "sub-

bc3utiful, with tane, one preaches the"individ~al UhOI?r ~e co~­

rnunity politikon. The way toward an aesthetic educatlon, whichlost for a momem, is reopened without taking any account of

"~ I .h explicit reservation Kam incessantly opposes to a cone uSlve

t e ." h ruse of analogy. As when he wntes, for example: In t e case 0

tWO dissimilar things we may adminedly form some conuption ofe of them by an anAlogy which it bears to the orner, and to do so

• • h·('\'en on the point on which they are dissimilar; but rrom t at III

which they are dissimilar we cannot draw any infrrma from one[Q the other on the Strength of the analogy" ([Part II] 136--37;337-38). One can in shoft say that "as the beautiful, $I} the good,"but nor "ifthe beautiful, thm the good" (or the rnerse). An aes·theric ethics and politics are in advana: unaumoriud, according tothis reservation. They are exactly what Kant calls a ttan5a'ndentaI"illusion" or "appearance.- .

I would add conversely that one should not confuse: the aspi­ration, the call by which thought is affected, the debt that it .ac­cq>ts to contract when it engages in the realization of the beaU~I~

work-in what we would call writing, in a literary and artlstlcsense maintained at least under the demand of the beautiful-

- one should not confuse: this obediena: with listening to the morallaw, with the feeling of the duty to act according to the principle ofuniversalization that it involves as prescriptive reason or as sole ra­tional dictate (see Chapter 5, pp. 123-27). To make the work di­rectlya testament to the law, one occults the aesthetic differe.nce;one obscures a territory, that of beautiful forms, and what IS atstake in them the pure pleasure that they provide, both of whichneed to be P:OtCCted from any interference. In this sense "writ·ing," making the beautiful our of words, is not a manner, ~or evena hopeless one, of settling with the law. Even as a "negative pre­sentation" (see Chapter 6, pp. 150-53), 3 "sublime" writing wouldnOt be equivalem to an action. In other words, the "aminomy ofreason ... for rJu fuling ofpkasun and diIpl~nJunn should not, b~confused with the "aminomy of reason .. . for tlu ftctdty ofdmnb.14; 204). The "aesthetic use of judgmem" is not the "practicalemployment of self-legislative reason" (ibid.).

The principle of the heterogeneity of the faculties prevents one

Amlxtics and EIhics in tlx &autifuland th~ S1tblim~ 165164 Aesth~tics and Ethics in th~ &autiJUl and tlu Sub/im~

JCCt," of unifying its manifold powers, disappears. There will at..ways be a differend between "to taste" and "[0 desire." And mUllnot one but twO heteronomous subjccts, the one that is constllnc­ly born to itself (see pp. 181-87 below) wimout being imerestellin doing so, without wanting it, in the pure pleasure of the beau..tifuJ, and me one mat is alW2YS held to act in me imerest of the re­alization of me law.

This divorce cannol be concluded without much debate.critical judge multiplies me conciliation procedures, in pattiin paragraphs 4.2 and 59, which have been read as if they diKant'S "thesis" on the problem. The feeling of the beautifuJ.seems, conettls an interest in the end, an "imellectual inc(§42, 157; 149), to be understood non-empirically. The feelingthe beautiful concoJs an interest precisely in realizing whatlaw prescribes, an "intelleaual" inrerest because it is attachedthe "object" that practical reason prescribes to the will for it toaliz.e the Good (158--61; IJ!-5). Moreover, in paragraph 59 thissis is reaffirmed in greater detail, and it seems possible tothe missing arch of me bridge by means of a particular constion of great service in critical strateg)'. The consrructionone to span the "abysses" created by the heteronomy of theties. It is called hyporyposis, Iubj«tio ad aspmum, a 5ubm·to sight, i.e., the operation that consists in putting in viewthing that (analogically) corresponds to an invisible object (221-25; 2//-15)· Which is the cast of the object of an Idea ofson, unpresencable in intuition, but of which one can presentimuitive analogue, which is then a "symbol." Beauty can thus"the symbol of the morally good" (223; 2t).

The way being thus opened, more than one thinker, hastily c::oD"

c1uding the Good from the beautiful, has rushed forward and SUO"

ceeded in crossing the bridge (despite the many warningsof~in order to reimplanc the metaphysical bridgehead on critical soiLin order to reaffirm the archaic argument, archaic for WesterGthought, according to which the outcome, having moved from thebeautiful to the Good, is the Good and that in fuling the Good.one will do good. Furthermore, in making the beautiful felr. onewill make others do good. In shaping me given according to rht

166 Amh~tics alld Ethics ill tlJ~ &alltijill and tlu Sftblim~

from confusing the beamiful with the good. h dispels the illusionthar subordinates the feeling of pleasure and displeasure to the Fac­ulry of knowledge. It also dispels the illusion "that the judgment oftaste is in fuct a disguised judgment of reason on the perfea:iodiscovered in a thing" (ibid.), that is, the difference between u:;two judgments being reduced to the "distinction" berw«n them(70 ; 6t): taste is a "confused ... concept" (wrworrm~r&griff) 01an object, the perfection of which is "clearly defined" (tkutlichw&griff: ibid.) in principle. This is a LLibniuan thesis against whichthe whole of the third Critiqlt~argues according to a general strat.egy thar autonomizes space~time in relation to understanding andautonomizes reflection in relation to determinarion, a nrategy aI.ready begun in the first Critiqu~ (.sec Chapter I, pp. 31-35).

The initial confusion of the good and the beautiful thar the cri­tique dispels should also discourage all "philosophy of the wiJr~inni~g wi~ the "will to power,· which reduces ethics and p0l­itiCS to values and thus authorizes itself to tteat them as equal to"forms.· "Affirmation" in NietzSChe is to be: understood as forma­tion, as artistic cteation. The good and secondarily the true ate

supported only by their "beauty." This is an extreme expressiOil~f the obsession to shape, no more authorized, following the cri­tlque, than that of a preestablished harmony. This always fOralthe unity of being.

Let us return to our bridge. The analogical construction is fatfrom being the basis ofa true bridge. We have JUSt evoked some ofthe perils that a thought tOO quickJy engaged along this fragile pas­sage is sure to encounter. Kant tries to consolidate the passage be-­cause the unification for which he aims, that of the system, has agrC;lt need for ir (see Chapter I, pp. 1-8). I will examine the strat·egy of this consolidation. We will be bener able to gauge irs scopewhen we situate sublime feeling in relation to ethics.

The Analogy of the Beauriful with the Good asIt Is Logically Argued

There are two setS ofarguments, of two different sortS. The firstset of arguments calls attention ro the rranscendental properties

ANt/mics and Ethics in th~ &autijid and th~ Sublime 167

comll1on to aesthetic and moral judgment, to the similar aspects ofthe ('YO that permit such an analogy to be made. I will call these;J.rglllllems /qgit'al because they limit themselves to comparing thetWO judgments according to what transcendental logic alone per­mitS. The other SCt of arguments, on the contrary, appeals to rheregulative Idea of;J. nature finalized according to the model of art.fhe arguments use the "guiding thread" that the teleological cri~

tique draws from the concrete texture of the existences that makeup the world. We will call them uko/ogicalwith the reservation re­quired by the usc of this term in lunt's work, and in the thirdCritiqu~ in panieular. They follow, or at least accompany, the elab­oration of the Idea of nature in the latter Cririqu~, whereas thefirst kind ofargument is foreign to ir and one might say prior to it.

The distinction between these twO kinds ofargument is made inparagraph III of the Introduction to our Critiq'I'. The fucuhy ofjudging, it is written, must make a transition, an Obrrgang. be:~

tween the realm of nature and the realm offreedom "just as kbm~IOwohl aif) in its logical employment lim /QgUchm Gtbmuch] itmakes possible the transition from underst2nding to reason" (17;15). The first transirion requires a teleological principle, the sec­ond the simple, logical extension of the concept beyond experi­ence. Nonetheless, ir is a maner of unifying the true and the good,and nOt, as we have here, the beauriful and the good, that is, thefaculty of judging with practical reason.

Logically, the beautiful and the good have a family resemblance.They please immediately, withom or before any interest, accordingto a free relation of the faculties to which they respectively belong;they are judged according to a mode of necessity, as universallycommunicable (124-15; 214-15). These similarities, a little forced,require correction, according to Kant. These corrections are suchIhat the difference between the good and the beautiful is asrnarked as before. The concept of the law is what inspires moralfeeling withom mediation; it is an inconceivable form of the imag­ination, at least for a moment, which is rhe occasion for taste.(One is indeed "forced" b,[ort knowing whar it is Olle is forced to.

although the law that forces is conceivable.) The will is free inmorality, in rhat it is subordinate to a prescription of rational form

168 A~thetics and Ethics in tIN &autifuland tilt Sublime

(the "typic" of legality: KPY. 70-74; 7H4); whereas in taste theimagination is free. The imagination produces new forms way "be­yond" what is "conformable [0 the concept" mat limits the schema(179; Ill), to such an orent that it creares "as it were. a secondnatUre out of the mareriaJ supplied to it by actual natUre" (176;168). This freedom incites or excites the understanding to COm­pete in conception with the creativiry of the imagination. Froaamis results a "pla( between me faculties that is iuc=lf"free: a "'fur..therance... a &fiirdnung(l43; 137). The claim ofsingular taSte tOIuniversal communicuion is not supported by the authority ofaarconcept. whereas the universalization of the maxim is anaJytic:aD,requiml. in the very definition of me concept of the law. The beau.tiful concedes nothing [0 interest, which I distinguish here as tbefinaJ term in the comparison: "it pleases apan from liD inrnm,­whereas me "moraJly good is ... necessarily bound up with an in­terest" (21.4; 214).

The opposition is nm. however, as r.adical as I have made it oatto be. even in the logical argument. The good is bound to an iJa.terest, but this interest does not precede moraJ judgment, but ,.suIts from it (ibid.). This specifiC2tion is repeated: prlletical judttment is not "founded" on any interest, "though ht-n it proa..one" (lj9; 112)· This reversal of the position of interest is essentillto the critique of moraJity. The law does not mult from the infCl'o'est of the will in the good, it diroues·it. This is the "par.adoxmethod": .. TIN conetpt ofgood and tvil is not tkfintd priOT to ,.mOTal law, to which, it would sum, tiNfonntr would haw to JUIJ1t.foundation; ratlNT, the concept ofgood and tvil mwt be tkfined aft1'and by means oftIN law" (KPV, 6j; 74). If in morality the will aimedfor the good as itS object "before" the good was prescribed to 11.the will would be subordinated to this good object, JUSt as it is to

an empirical. desirable, agreeable, or useful object. There wouldthen be no transcendental difference betwecn pathos and puretthos. Only a difference ofobject. In both cases, one would have animperative on condition, which is the condition of the object, thus"interested," hypothetical. If you want this (the good or choco­late), do that.

Amhttics and Ethia in the &autifuland tht Sublime 169

10 escape this ruinous consequence, that is, "heteronomy" (KPV,

67; 76), which is ruinous for ethical difference and leads to skep­ticism or cynicism (some like the good, others like chocolate), theorder of determination must be revers«!. The law "immediately"

rasps the will by obligation, without regard to any object. Thus it~nly prescribes prescription iuelf to the will. The law's dictum (itsconrent) is reduced to the commandment. without object. Ac­cording to iu modw (the modaJity of the prescription), it mustnecessarily prescribe the prescription. The law is posed as beingunable not to be posed. Consequently it must be the law for everymoral "subject," for aJl the you's. It is universally imposed.

The same can be said for the judgment of taSte. All must judgewhat I judge beautiful to be beautiful. "The judgment of taSte ex­aCtS agreement from everyone; and a pe.rson who describes some­thing as beautiful insists that everyone ought (solie] to give the ob­ject in question his approval and follow suit in ~escribin~ it :asbeautiful" (81.; 79). Kant underlines the analogy: The feeling In

the judgment of taSte comes to be exacted [ugtmutn} from every­one as a SOrt of duty [gkichJllm aLs Pflicht)'" (154; 147). The analo­gy goes so far as to assimilate an imp~mant pro~rty of aestheticinterest to one of moral interest: the Interest, which the thoughtthat judges me beautiful has in iu object, is "immediate~ (unmit~

ulbnm Int~), "jUSt the same" (gkichmiif{ig~ . .. JOWlt) as theinterest it takes in iu object when it judges the good (161; 153)·

The analogy must, however, stOp here. The "interests" in play inaesthetic judgmenr and in moral judgment are similarly immed~­

ate, aJthough aesthetic judgment is "free" and moral judgment IS

~founded on objective laws" (160; 153). One could say that morallaw does not prescribe what is good, but, on the contrary, leavesjudgment free (responsible) to decide on the object that dese~es t~

be esteemed good. This is why the interest moral law has In thiSobject is immediate, not determined by a prior conc~ept of th~

good. But this same immediate interest results from the presence,in the thought [hat wants or desires, of the Idea.of absolute cau~al­

ity. This "presence" is respect. It is what determines, not thc objectof morality, but the will to realize morality. Thus in ethics interest

•

The erve of the Teleological Argument

Does the argument that I have called "kologiclJi bener aue5t to

the kinship of the beautiful with the good? The reasoning as fol­lows:

I. The mind has no interest in the law. But the law commandsit to do good. and interests it in "actS" that are capable of acrualiz~iog me good. (This demand to actualize is exercised. funhermore.o\'er all of me faculties. which. of memselves. are bur "optional"possibilities.)

1. The mind has no inrerest in the beautiful. But the beautifulocrurs, and this gives pure reflective (disinterested) judgmenr meopportUniry to be exercised, to be realized, as the sensation of purepleasure. What furnishes this opportUniry seenu to be an. whichproduces the beautiful. Bur on me condition that an itself solicitno interest, and thus that ir obey no interest.

3. Moreover, the model for disinterested actualization of thebeautiful is furnished by "nature." It expects no gain, mat we knowof. from the landscapes, the harmonies it offers to the mind. Ithas no concept of me end it aims at producing me beautiful. Art ispure only if it produces works the way "nature" does. itself theparadigm of pure art.

4. "Nature" as artist and/or work of art in providing occasionsfor pure aesthetic pleasure (of taste) for the mind thus attests thata disinterested judgment or activiry that is merely possible can beactualized. Thus it shows itself favorable to the demand to actual~

Amh~tier and Ethier in tiN &aulifuL and Ih~ Sub/im~ 171

One would need for "it to go over" into the Good from me beau~

dful. But according to strict transcendental logic "it goes over"rather badly. There is no interest at all, but. rather, sentimentalimmediacy, in taste. In ethics there is interest. which is undoubt­~)' secondary but stOOndary because, precisely. it is deduced fromthe concept of the law; in emics there is interest that is "media*tized"-an implicit interest. Interest is what resulrs in ethics. Dis~

interest is what initiates in aesthetics.

is "founded," merely founded, on a concept of reason, that offree­dom, which the law transcribes by prescribing Ihm this frttdom bemade real. This Idea is absolmdy universal, because its object, firstcausaliry, is an absolure. The law can thus specify not what must bedone for it to be realized bUi that. whatever one does. it mUSt bedone "in such a way that" any will will also want to do it in orderto realize freroom. The prescription to universalize me maxim­according to which the will decides on an object that it judgagood (an action to accomplish)-is inherent in the law becaUltthe law is moral, mat is to say. because it is absolUie causaliry as.is exercised on and in me thoughr that desires.

If the good is interesting, it is because freedom must be~ized, and this is what the law says. But me beautiful is only "inter.esting" insofar as reflective thought has no interest in it. "No m­terest, whether of sense or reason. extorts approval" (49; 47).Taste's demand to be communicable to all would not be a Soidentical to mat of moral dury except if this universalization~"of itself" (an nch) to"carry wim it an interest for us" (Khon nn J."mJr flir um bri Jich fUhrrn miiJg: 154; 147). However, only theuniversalization of the moral maxim has in and of itself the pawetro carry an interest for thought. We have JUSt .ittn how and why. Iris because it proceeds from an Idea, from me Idea of reason tharcontains the demand for irs reaJiza.tion by me will. Irs power ~l':nhcr, the necessiry is such mat "we are not entitled ro draw fir] •a conclusion IKh/i4fm] from the character [aUi drr &schaffrnhrit)of a merely reflective judgment fblojf "JkJuinmdm] " (ibid.). Wearc not entitled to draw it as a conclusion from a power of thoughrthat is not supported by a universal concept of judging the beauti­ful-and certainly not by rhe concept of absolute causaliry tbarcarries the dictate ro realize its object. We are not entitled ro drawit as a conclusion from a power of thought thar thinks complerelyotherwise and does not have at irs disposal the force ro oblige"everyone" (j~d~rmann), either in or of itself, or for us.

If there is a cousinship between the twO judgments, it must be"tt la mode de Bretagne," constructed upon an improbable analogy.

170 Amlmier and Elhier in Ih~ &altlifill and Ih~ Sltblim~

"Faculrary" Interest and Primacy of the Practical

One must begin again wim the faculty's demand to actualize.This demand extends to all the powers. all the faculties of themind. They are only possibilities. How do mey become menwactS? How is it mat on a certain occasion (at me -right moment").understmding or, rather, taste or perhaps the will is exercised?How is the divide between posse and~ crossed? It is crossed pre·cisely by "interest."

In me second Critiq~. Kant seeks to establish the primacy ofpure practical reason over pure speculative reason (KPV. 124-26;

US-40). This primacy, he explains. cannot be intrinsic. One can­not say that the practical usage of reason affords funher insightthan its meorerical usage. Further in itself. One feels like 5"lying: a"bener'" ontological grasp.

Formulated critically. this primacy is not metaphysical. or eventranSCtndenw. They are me condidons according to which a pow­er of mought can. It would be absurd to claim mat some condi­tions are more "radical" than omen. On the orner hand, when it isa matter ofeffecting any one of mese powers, it is permined, and itis even inevitable, to ask why on a panicular occasion the -exer­cise" of a given faculty rakes place and why a particular power,rather than another, finds -employment." The term "employ·mem," frequently repeated along with "'interest" and "incentive"throughout the Critiques, should be examined. The employment~f a faculty is like me transformation of its transcendental -value"Into mental acts such as production and consumption. The facul·ty is what the rules of the game permit, and its use is the shot one~akes, to speak like Wjttgensrein. This transformation, this real·~1.;}tion which is similar to that of the transformation of currencyInto goods. is dictated by an interest. Interest is the "principle matContains the condition under which alone its leach of the "mentalpowers"] exercise is advanced" (KPV, 124; IJ8). Interest does nOl

Anrhttia and Ethia in the &auti/uland th~ Sub/im~ J73

consequences will be treated here. We will only point to the secondset concerning the subject.

172 Amh~riaand Ethia in the &alltifuland tht Sublim~

i~ the possible in general, the ~f.tcuhary" or the optional. In Pu­ocular to the demand to actualize the faculty of acting in a disi....terested way. i.e., rational will.

5. Thus practical reason discovers an interest in the disint~ed pleasure aroused by "natural" beauty (157-61; 14JrJ2; and ICPV:124-26; 138-40). •

Such is the thrust of the "tdeological" argument by whichcal thought supports the affinity of the beamiful with theOn~ mi~t be tempted to give it a dialectically logical tum: ..(elhlcal) Interest for (aesthetic) disinterest. But this dialecticnot be critical. The critique is held to explaining the conditionthe so-calJed dialectic, and this condition is not "conceptual" inHegdian ~n~; it is the regulative Idea ofa nature finalized (asart can be) upon the acrua1ization of the menw powers. Farauthorizing a logic of negation that would in its own way hoenize the "'yes" and the "no," that is. interest and disinrerestin a movement of "supercession" (set: Chapter 5. pp. 127-31),Idea must on the COntrary, according to the critique, est2bli.sb .legitimacy (be "deduced" in the Kantian ~n~: KRV. 11.0; 126).

deduction reveals the exerci~ of a third faculty, that of reAjudgment, which, to be in play in knowledge and morality.poses of its own Bodm, its own territOry of legislation (15; IJ).and nature, where it is "purely" exercised in a way that is "aPl""'!1priate to it," This does indeed complicate the maner of unition, which is consequently in suspension because of the .ia­demonstrable" Idea (210-12; 201-2) of a natural teleology ofand which is required to include a supplementary faculty insynthesis of the first two. Thus it is critically that one must e:xaD'

ine the play of interest and disinterest that allows one in principltto bring together or pair (to "bridge") aesthetic favor and ethic:llrespect. An examination that is all the more "useful," for it revedthe exact point at which sublime feeling scrambles the play brbreaking the fragile alliance between the twO "delights." The coO­sequences that the localization of this fracture may have both 011the Idea of "nature" and on the general project ofconstituting lhemind as a subjective unity are easy to establish, Only the first set rJ

non.Practial reason is interested in irs actualization not merely as a

f.tculry, like=: all the orner faculties beginning with undersranding. Itis interested in irs actualization because it is practical. that is, it

_ carries in irs inuinsic condition of possibility, in the imperaciveform of the law. the obligoltion to be realized. "Act": this is whatpractial reason prescribes to pr.lctical thought (to empirial will)and this means nothing orner than-actualize me. But in order toobtain this effect, there mwt be an incentive in the will capable ofovercoming the inte=:rnal obstacles, i.e.• the prustablished incen­tives, that is, the will's attachment to the empirical ego.

The interest of practical reason can only be understood if prac­tical reason creates in the ego an "interest" relieved of its choice=: ob­JCCI, the ego itself. But "w relieve" not only implies changing theobject of interest and reorienting the interest in the ego to the law,it also implies transforming the nature of the interest. For whatrational law requires is ilS interest and not the illterest of the ego.Mon.-over, this inrerest induces, from the empirical point of view, aparadoxical incentive. a "disillterest." It does not offer the ego anew object of cathexis, in whose appropriation it might havesol1lclhing [0 gain. The law itself cannot be this object. It doesnOt offer the ego any "content" that would allow for the ego's

In thc passage I am discussing, Kant analyzes the incentive andthe interest of, for, and in rational morality; he analyzes the in­centive that incites one ro do good and the imerest that this in­citement (the maxim) can have for thought. The obsClcle is eas), ro

discern: what has ro be set apart in and by the actualizacion ofpractical reason, in and by the "'employment of moral law, is thepleasure taken by the empirial q;o in irself, irs preferencr for itself,itS conceit. "'The rep~nt2tion of moral law deprives self-love [tkr&'bstli~bl"] of irs inAuence and self-conceit [dnn EignuJiink~/] ofitS delusion [tim WaJmr (KPV. 78, t.m.; 89). Kant does not havethe words to explain what thinking mwt "sacrifice" to realizemoral law. However. one would be wrong in emphasiz.ing the cal·eulation of the sacrifices to be made in view ofaaualizing the goodprescribed by the law. One would be confusing respect with en·thusiasm, ethics with sublime aesthetics. This is the whole quo--

therefore consist in me "'mere agreement [of reason] with itse=lf" ac.cording to each of irs faculties (that the status of irs "It priori COil­

ditions" fixes), but "'only [in) irs extension [Erwt'ill'rungr (ibid.).The interest in the employment of a facuhy is an interest with re­gard to the facuhy itself: in employing it, thought carries OUt itapotential, "realizes" its credit, as much as possible. Thw it "Q.

tends, enlarges" me scope of the facuhy by manifesting its power itactu. The faculty is like a bank of possible judgments; it is in nabest interest that an entrepreneur dig imo the resources of thebank to make use of memo

But the entrepreneur needs an "incentive." In experience tbitincentive is the Aip side of faCUIClry interest. The entrepreneurneeds a kind of incitement to invest in me faculwy power. The'terest of me bank to "'realize" must be matched by an interest of ...a1ity to invest in a faculr:ary power, an interest ofempirial thougbrto register the mark of one of its powers in experience. This in~est is not a pn'orr, it mwt be calculated. It mwt be a1culated be­cause empirial thought, when it actualizes one of irs powers...ways takes a risk, the risk of a loss. An interest "can never be •tributed to a being which lacks reason; it indicates an incentivethe will so far as it is presented by reason" (KPV, 82.; 91). A =s....able calculation mwt be made because the acrualization ofaer of thought is not without risk for empirial thought. The riskbankruptcy. of a dead loss. a deficit. The debit balance threatcM.the acrualization of a rational potential, becawe obst2c1es oppallthe acrualization. "'All three concepts---of incentive. interest. andmaxim (which would be the strategy of the entrepreneur in themetaphorj-ean. however, be applied only to finite beings. Forwithout exception they presuppose a limitation of the nature t:ibeing ... that being must be impelled [/mgl"/ril"bt''lJ1 in some rna&'ner to action (this is the incitement to investl. since an internal ob-­stacie stands against it" (KPV, 82; 93). When thought is interestedby the actualization of one of its faculties, it is interested in it: theactualization becomes thought's rational incentive and thought hasto sacrifice any other interest that is not reasonable, that is ratio­nally impure. This is why rational interest must be negotiated.The entrepreneur is not a saint.

AN/Julies and Ethics in the &i1tltij111 and the Sublime 177

og)" ~Nor could we reverse the order (of the subordinadon ofspec·ulative reason to practical reason) and o:pect practical reason to

submit to speculative reason, because every interest is ultimatelypt:lctical" (KPV, 126; 140).

Every imerest is practical. On the one hand, transa=ndental in­terest attests to a SOrt of "need" [0 actualize the faculty. a pressureon the possible to be realized. which is pure prtlluin. We mightsay: a kind of facuhary "will to be" (which would require furthero:amination). And on the othel hand. on the side of the empirical.this facuhary "will" cannot be effected unless it can make itselfheard by a thought immersed in the world of empirical interests.conditions. and charms. This thought must "pay anemion"(ArhlUng. respect). have regard for me facultary "pressure" (what­ever it may be), be "mobilized" by th.is pressure. Such is p~isely

the condition of actualizing the f2cu1rary power. consideml fromthe point of view of a reasonable, practical. and finite being: thebeing must be moved by this power.

Thus even the interest ofspeculative reason is "only conditional"(KPV. 126; 140). This does not mean that sclena: passes into theservice of morality. But what actualizes knowled~. what prompts

-scientific tesearch (according to its own rules, of course, and notaccording to moral law). what extends its I'C21m. this very thing isdependent on a transcendental interest right at first. on a "will toeffect" the potencial of understanding; it is dependent on a will to"use." on an impatience to perform cognitive feats. in order to es­tablish in me world a knowledge about it. In the empirical. therealization of knowledge requires the other "intercst" that corre·sponds or responds to a speculative interest of reason, an "incen­live," the "subjective determining ground of a will" (KPV, 74; 84),which is not immediately omniscient (benevolent when it is a mat­ter of actualizing the Good), and whose theoretical (or practical)rational spontaneity is hindered and must be "incited." The will ofa being that has constitutively to do with ignorance (or wirhmeanness). (And perhaps, as it involves the interest of the reAectivef.,cuhy, with ugliness. with what is disguSting. with the insipid?)

In morality. the obstacles to be overcome are the likings that in·

176 Anlhities And EthiC! in tlu &Ilulifu/ And llu Sublim~

own i~u=test to ove~determine(including by "sublimation" in theFreudian ~n~) the Interest of me law. It must not permit me I

bO0 0 th L~ ....

am 19u1ty In e olKUience it requires. In listening to the law, the~ cannot hope. for ~y advanug~ in happiness, in pride. and thehke. It must fall In Wlm the la.w WithOut any (empirical) sub' .o Th 0 j~mterest. us It must produce in itself a disinterested ina:n .

°th • th "°th calcu1 0 ...WI ~Ut pa. os. WI out anon. Such is me interest ofpracucal ranonal f2culty: it must actualize itself without am .an empirical interest for it (KPV, 78-79; 88-89).

Ina:ntive and interest are less clearly circumscrilxd withto the theom:~c:al power of reason in the first en'Ii'l1« and Ileave them aside bere (nv. 422-}0; 470-80). What is a:rtaiathat they are different from the incentive and interest thatpractical reason to be: "exercisaf." This is why thett is a problemto the Vn-bin4ung (KPV. 124; 138) of interests. their connectionone anomer. Th~ problem is not dramatic according to Kant •the sense ofone Interest having to "give prc:cmena:" to theIt might be: if theoretical interest and practical interest "condict(ed)'" each other (ibid.), which is not necessarily the case.question is only one of hierarchy or "primacy": Which iJ"highest" interest, to extend knowledge or to extend morality?. We ~ow the answer: without undermining the inner fun .mg ~d Interest of knowledge. the primacy of interest belongspractical ~n. But the argument backing this primacy dsome attennon. The hegemony of me practical is not due. or~Iely. as we are in the habit of saying. to ethics being what '-~.

gJv~ to thought a necessary access-by obligation, that is. by indomanon of moral law-to the supersensible, i.e., freedom (the ab­solure of causality). Knowledge does not lead to the supersensiblt(the absolute of the world) except by a "maximization" of its co~c~~ts (nv. 44~H; 504-10), which is inevitable but without COS"nmve use: the precept to advance toward completeness by an ~cent to ever.higher conditions" (Vorschrift, sich ... der V~standigltdl dme/ben zu nahern: KRV. }07. em.; 346) is also wild~~rns ~e concepts into Ideas that cannot be determined by intu'"mono Indemonstrable" (210; 201). No, hegemony is first a t3utoJ..

A~thetics and Ethics in tiN &autiftl and tb~ Sublim~ 179

cal"; it is a "singular" (sontkrbar) feeling, "ofsuch a peculiar kind"(so ~igmriimli(h~r Art: ibid.). The law clears a space for its "pres~

ence~ in the dense texture of the conditioned. Being uncondition~

aI. "C:!tegorical," it acquires simplicity and levity. The space it dearsdoes not consist in anything. One recogniz.es the "sign" of the lawbecause regard always stems from duty, whatever the circum~

srance--even "a humble plain" one (KPV, 79; 90). Regard is an in~

«ntive at rest, a sentimenw state il priori, an a-pathetic pathos.~The negative effect on feding ... is irself feding" (KPV, 75; 8f}.We must recall that apathy, ilpatlNill, Affilttlosigkril. is to be count~

ed among the sublime f~lings. with the advantage over enthusi~

urn that it has "the delight of pure reason on irs side" (US; 120),which enthusiasm does not, for it contains tOO much fNZthos.. The~is a great range of disinterested f~lings, a range that goes frompure aesthetic favor to pure ethical regard. And the intermediary"tones" are all sublime.

There are not one but many sublime f~lings, as we have seen(see Chapter 6. pp. 15}-S6): theR' is an entire family, or, rather, anentire generation. Let me embellish for a moment the Story of thisgmos. On the family tr~ of the "mental faculties" the ~male par~

ent is a "sensation" U9; 36), a state of the faculty of pleasure anddispleasure. the same as the male parent. But the father is contentand the mother is miserable. The sublime child will be sentimen~

tally impaired, contradictory: pain and delight. This is because inthe genealogy of the faculties said to be "of knowledge" (in thebroad sense, as the powers of thought relate [Q objects), the parentscome from twO different families. She is "judgmem" and he is"reason." She is an artist and he a moralist. She "reflects" and he"derermines." The (paternal) moral law determines itself and de­tcrmines thought [Q act. Reason wants good children, requires thatJUSt moral maxims be engendered. But the mother, the free, re~

flectivc imagination, knows only how to deploy forms without pri~

Or rules and without a known or knowable end.

The Family Story of the Sublime

178 Amlmics and Ethics in tht &autiftland th~ Sl4blim~

hibit ~e exercise ofgood will. Empirical will is always already in_vested In and fixa~ed ~n "ch~rms." It is preoccupied. The purdy~ea~o~able, practical mcentlv~ can ~nly arise accompanied byp~m (KPV, 75; 85), by ~ournm~ objectS tIm are captivating, by~osmg fixed cathexes. This mournmg must affect the "object" thai:IS an obstacle to the good incentive, the obstacle ro respect par Q_

ceIlen~: "the self" (du &lJnt: KPV, n; 87), which nevenhelea.accordmg to Freud, Stays on, and suppons itself with the loss ofcaptivating objca::s. This dark side of respect is the "humiliation· of"pretensions,· of the empirical ego's "conceit,· of the overestilQlo.tion of the self by the self (ibid.). Narcissism must be thrown oftovercome. The ego feds bound only by duty, affected by respectfor the law, and prepared to realize it, insofar as it feds itself lID­

bound and its "pathological" dependence broken. Dis-occupied.It nn'er completely accomplishes this. This mourning remains •melancholy. Dark ride, finitude. The will is not holy, and the ill ill

..radical. Hown'er, this is but the obverse of respect, and not illcondition.

Seen in its more favorable light, respect is "an incentive" (KPV.82.; 93)· It is the empirical listening to pure practical reason. It illthe law itsdf Listened roo It is interesting because "from the conceptof an incentive there comes that of an intnnt" (ibid.). This is aaintetest independent of empitical interests, "the mere interest iaobedience to the law" (ibid.). This interest is without interest, illthat it does not result from a calculation of enjoyment. "Thus re­spect for the law is not the incentive to morality [nicht TriebftMrzur Sittlichk~it]; it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as an ill-'centive" (di~ Sittlichk~il ulbJt, Jubj~ktill als Tri~bftd" b~trachtd:

KPV, 78; 89)· JUSt like listening to the order to do good, it is thewhole condition of ethics. This is what the German Achtlmgsays.Thus the law makes itself an incentive, in its more favorable lighLAs regard.

Achtung is closer [Q regard. a regatd for something that is notthere, that is not an object and does not give rise to passionate in­trigue or to a passion for knowledge or to a passion [Q desite andlove. It is barely a feeling, which would necessarily be "parhologi.

AmJmia and Ethier in tht &autiful and t"~ Stlblim~

Teleology in the Beautiful and the Sublime

The reader will pc=rhaps smile ar this puerile scenario. Yet it is a"manner" (Mani") ofaposition (181; lJ4) permitted in matters ofaesthetics. Let us return to the modw IogUus. which here is uko­Ibg;cus. Kant is well aware that the cousinship between the goodand the sublime is closer than that between the beautiful and thesublime. "lntdleaual ... (moral) good. cstimated acsthetically, in­slead of being representc=d as beautiful. musr ramer be reprcscnted

- as sublime (nichl J(Jwohl JChon a/s lJitlm~hr nlwbm w'ltU~llt)" (113;119). This is me thesis. The effect of this kinship on the Starns ofnature in the sublime aesthetic can be Sttn as follows: "The con·cept of the sublime in nature is rat less imponant and rich in con­sequences (bti uwium nicht S(J wichtig und nn Folg~rungnt rtich­haltigl than that of its beauty. It gives on the whole no indicationof anything final in nature itself, but only in the possible ffllP~

mtm ofour intuirions of it in inducing a feeling in our own selvesof a finality quite independent of nature [um tin~ fl()n d~r Naturgm,z lIf1abhiingigt ZwtckmilJUgkdt in tt1lS selbstfUhlbnr zu machm]":(92-93, Lm.; 89-90),

The word "employment" (GrbraucIJ) is emphasi7.ed in the text.[n order ro undcrstand its scope, one must return to the teleolog­ical argument and 10 rhe parallel in the paradox of intcresrs rhalappears in it bel"Ncen aesthetic ravor and ethical regard. I have said[hat the interest of practical reason is to have icselflinened 10 wirh-

\\.ill is not holy. Yet it is not nc=<:essary for the self to cry our. It is a6cI of finitude. Respect cannot be measured in sacrifices. The lawdoes nOI wish anyonc= any pain; it does not wish anything. Thesublime, on the contrary, requires one to suffc=r. It must cause dis­pleasure. It is "coOlt3-final" (r.W«kwidrig), "ill-adapted," This justmakes it more sublime "on that account" (dennoclJ nur 14m drsr(J tr­

hnbmrr zu Kin gnmnk wird: 91, l.m.; 88). It needs "presentation."which is the funaion of the imagination, its mother. and "oon­cei["-me native illness of servilc= will-in order to manifcst meirnullity before the greatness of the law,

180 Amh~tierand Ethier in th~ &autifuland th~ Sublime

In hc=r relationship with understanding, "before" encounterinsreason, it so happened that this freedom of "forms" was ablc= tounite with the power to rc=gulatc= and that from this enCOUnter all

exc=mplary "happiness" was born (Stt pp. 159-63 abovc=). But inany case no children. Beauty is not the fruit ofa comract; rather, itis the flower of love. and, likc= anything not conceived OUt of in­terest, it passes.

The sublimc= is the child of an unhappy encoumer, that of theIdea with form. Unhappy beca~ this Idea is unable to make COlt­

cessions. The law (the father) is so authoritarian, so unconditioe­aI. and the regard the law mtuires so exclusive that hc=. the fawill do nothing to obtain con~m, even through a ddicious .ry with the imagination. He mtuires the imagination's "retr.KoorJ'(Stt Chapter 6. pp. 147-53). He pushes forms asidc=, or, fa

forms pan bdQre his presence. tcar themsdves apan. atend me..selves to inordinate proponions. He fenilizes the virgin whodevO[ro herself to forms. without rc=g:ud for her favor. Hemandt regard only for himsdf. for the law and its realization.has no need for a beautiful nature. Hc= desperately nttds an iination that is violatro, aceeded, exhaustc=d. She will die in gi .binh to the subljme. Shc= will think she is dying (Stt Chaptetpp. 102--9).

Thus thc= sublime inhc=rits an air of respect from reason. irsther. Howevc=r. the Erhabffl~ is nO[ ErJJtb,mg (KPV, 83; 94). isthe pure elation, Erhabenhtit. which the law inspires (ibid.•102). Violence and courage (125; 120) are necessary to thc= sublilllllit tears at itself, undoes itself Whc=reas respttt simply arises and ..dresses. Violc=nce must be done to the imagination becawe it illthrough its pain. through the mc=diation of irs violation, that thejoy of seeing or of almost seeing thc= law is obtained. Thc= sublime"renders almost intuitable [gkichsam n!lSdJaulich] the suprc=macy riour cognitive faculties on the rational sidc= over the greatest facull1of sensibility" (106, t.m.; 102). Moreover. this "pleasure ... is onlypossiblc= through the mediation of a displeasure" (109. Lm.; 105).

Thc= mourning involved in the respect for thc= law is thc= datksidc= of respect, bur not its means. The self cries Out because iet

Aestlmics and Ethics in tb~ &'ltItifid and til( Sltblim~ 183

lastc. but one that works backward, from the objcctive toward thesubj~'Ctive. The landscape alludes to the destination of thought.111C favor with which it is welcomed induces a timid, suspendedMgcsture," a gesture of respc<:t. But the allusion to the law goes nofun her than this oblique glance. One has to elaborate the condi­tions of "objective" teleology in order to legitimate this gesture(161; '53). arum finality is only made up of a netwOrk of "guidingthread Is!" (UitfdLk1J: (part III 36, 40; 250, 251)· The gesture of aes­thetic subreption takes hold ofone of these threads.

Bur the sublime CUtS the thread, interruptS the allusion, aggra­vates the subreption. "It gives on the whole no indication of any­

thing final in nature itself, but only in the possible employment ofour intuitions of it" (93; po). It is ignorant of nature, for naturemust remain unrrkliirliclJ (nol able to be ducidated, explained, or

proclaimed: (pan II] 48; 260) for the AuJltliirtT. This protectS theenigma of the sublime against metaphysical delirium (uibniz.,

Hegel). The sublime cares nothing about the move toward ethicsthat the aesthetic of nature enables and that the law seems to re­

quire for its realiz.ation.In the sublime, nature does nOt give thought a sign, an indirect

- sign of itS destination. Rather, thought makes "usc" of nature. Theobject "wanting in form or figure" (fonnloJ odeT Imgtsla/t), "form­less and in conAict with ends" (fonnloJ und unr.w«kmiifUg), is "PUtto a subjectively final we IgebrauchtJ, but is not estimated as sub.­jectively final on iu own accoum and because of its form. (It is, as it

were, a Ip~cit1 jina/is acup'", flOIl Mtll.)" (1]4; 128-2p). Indeed, wesee a reversal of the relation ro the object, bUt above all a reversal ofinterestS, and thus a pUlling imo question of imeresting disinter­ests. Natural ami-finality, or, to be brief, anti.nature, can be said 10

have a possible usc:. We have seen what "ami· nature," a term that isnot Kamian, might mean in [he economy of thought consideredin its subjective nature. The word dcsignates "rude naturc" (see

Chaptcr 3, pp. 77-81) insofar as the laner inclines thought 10 ne·glect itS beautiful forms: it may be "that the object, when we per·ccive it, has nothing for our rcflection tllat [would} be purposivefor a[ny] dctermination of itS form" (1'1, 439). This does not refer

IBl A(!1thedcs and Ethics in the &autifi" and the Sublime

om illlerest. ~his. is the res~t for the law. The interest of the fac­ul.ry of r~Accllve Ju?gmcllI IS to offer the mind occasions 10 judge

~'th~m m~erest,.wnhout pathological inclination, without cogni­uve Incenuve, wtt~Out even the intention of doing good: such itfavor for the beaullfuJ. The employmem of the two faculties, whidiare heterogeneous in Ihe a priori condil'ions of their respecti~

functioning, requires the same lUnd ofparadoxical illcmtiw: a w..interested interest. Favor is less suspect the more beaury----of whichit is the occasion-belongs to nature; the law is interested in ~ture as what spontaneously arouses a disilllerested delighl (.stt pp.t71-73 above).

~at the releological argument adds to the strialy analogical.logical argument of the affinity of the beautiful with the good is.gesture. The mind gestures when it enjoys a landsape. Let us calnatural beauties landKa~ whatever they may be. and stripped,.Kant requires, of their material charms (64-68; 6t-66). Thq"speak" to us or through them narure "speaks to us figurativdf(jigiirlich zu uns Ipricht: 160. em.; 15J), as a coded writing, a -~pher" (ChiJfreschrifi: ibid.). The code of this writing remains UDo

known. It is impossible to decode the landscapes. to "give [their)exponents" kxponinm: 212; 2(2) conceprually. They are a .

ble only by feding, by taste. This only in itself suggests a retreat,'sidelong look, at the "in our Own selves" (in uns y/bIl: 93; po). Themi.nd :eds a quasi finality. a quasi intentionality, and a quasi rtgU"

lanry In the mute messages, mar is, the landscapes. However, -.we never meet with such an end outside ourselves. we naturallylook for ir in ourselves. and, in faCt, in that which conStitutes theultimate end ofour c:xistence--the moral side of our being" (160­r.m.; lJ3).

This gesturing back is surreptirious. In Ihe sublime we spoke of"subreption" (Subreption: 106; t02) and of a "substitution of a re.­speet for the objcct in place of one for the idea of humanity inOllt own self-thc subject" (ibid.). Ir is this projection, this objcc·tification that the Analytic of the Sublime critiques; there are no

sublime objects but only sublime feelings (103-5. tOo-tO'~ see alsoChaptcr 2, pp. 67-73). There is already an implicit subrcption in

Amlmics and Ethics in tlu &autifitl and th~ Sublim~ 185

respect of the form, or even formlessness, ofobjects" (33, em.; 29)·Hl."re we have a reversal if not a conAict of the finalilies. Through,he beautiful lhe "subject" is made 10 listen to nature, as well as toitS own "subject" nature. In the sublime. nature is put in drasliccontrast to mis other thought requimi by the law, a thought that isonly ~SUbjecl" because it is absolutely subject to obligation. For[he &iJusg1Uh1is nOl a stranger to "respect for moral Ideas" (2.02.;

193). And, as il should be, the "delight" that affects this thought isnOl a pleasure, a Vngnugm. but a &lbslKhiJtzung, a self-esteem(49,2.02.; 47, 19]; Stt Chapret 9, pp. 2.2.6-}I).

In pursuing the reversal offinaliries, one might wonder whetherlhe very "spiritual" feeling, which expects and learns nothing ofits object. but instead st'1WJ as its occasion-a given more "cap­tured." than "given": "rude" nature, forms at the limit of the pre­senrable-still deserves to be ClIled aesthetic. "Yet" it must be,Kant writes, "beeaust it tOO expresses a subjective purposivenessthat does not rest on a concept of the object" (FI, 440). Like taste,the sublime is a reAective judgment "wimout concepu of the ob­ject, bur [a reflective judgment] merely in regard to subjective pur­posiveness" (ibid.). Thus the sublime can be classified as aesmetic

- because aiJthisis, sensation, here means not "the represe:nrat.ion of athing (through sense as a receptivity ~rt:lining to the faculty ofknowledge)," but"'a modification of the feeling of pleasure or dis­pbsure." a teprese:nt.nion that refers "solely [kdig1ichl to the sub­ject and is not available for any cognition, not even for that bywhich the subject cognizn itself" (45, t.m.; 42-43). What judges(itself) by the stare of thought, by itS internal "sensation," is aes­thetic. This sensation is not information about the object, whetherit be internal or external (see Chapter I, pp. 8-(5). What is infor·mative, on the contrary. is the sensation furnished by rhe senses. Itis even an indispensable component in judgmentS of knowledge.The sensation refers to logic (71; 68; and KRV, 66-67; 64-65)· Asfor the "spiritual feeling," it belongs to the aesthelic despite its in­difference to sensible forms, for, like laste, it is a non-cognitivejudgment that thinking makes that concerns not an object, bUlthe occasion of an object. The sensation concerns the occasion of

184 Amlutics and Ethics in th~ &autifill a'id th~ Sublim~

to the "~onst~us" (100; 97), as we have read (see Chapu=r 4, Pp.102.-9) .. Form simply. ceases to be relevant in matters of aesthetic:~rceptlon. The. sublJf~e d~ n~t ~eive the object according 10Its form, according to Its subJectlve, Inner finality. Form does notcause the soul to ring with "happiness."

What "use" does thought make of natu~ or of ami-nature •the sublime? The First Introduction says a "contingent uu" (...439)· "A purposivmm ofnlJlurt concerning the subject" ceases •induce "in" thought its own proper "natural" finality, felt asagreement of its manifold po.....ers. On the contrary, me "purpo­siveness lying IJ priori in me subject," "an a priori principle (this principle is only subjective)," makes "a possible pUrpo$iw1m... of certain sensible intuitions." This ust is contingentcaust it does not requi~ that one "presuppose a special technicnaturt" (FI, 439). Natural an, of which taste was me repercuss'the "inner" harmonic in thought, is silent.

On the COntrary, thought imposes its own finality on what ,.mains of nature when natural form is no longer "given" (dAta) aswork ofan, but only "rece:ived," "taken" (acuptlJ), diverted. Mote-'over, (ethical) destination, me sublime ofwhich is tOO strenuous I

feeling, is not suggested to thought by the work of nature, Ibe"landscape," even indirect.ly, as with taste; rather, thought aroia»­ily actualizes iu destination in a "contingent" way with regard •the object, and in an autonomous way with regard to itseJf, bygrasping the occasion furnished not by the landscape but by diequasi lmorphousness of a "rude" magnitude (100; 97).

The part played by the imagination (or sensibility) in sublimejudgment must consequently be reduced, "retracted"; the conteD!of forms is weak in sublime presentation (Stt Chapter 6, pp. 150­53)· This is why, for Kant, the sublime is said to be an "intell~

al feeling" (G~iJmgifuhl), as opposed to taste. Irs true force con~

sisu in a destination proper to thought, which is indifferent to thefinality of forms. What arouses and sustains sublime feeling is not'only "a finality on the part of objects in their relation to the re­Aective judgment in the subject" but "also, conversely, a finalit)'on the pari of the subject, answering to the concepr of freedom, in

, "intuitablc" (106; 102) to thought the Idea of its true dcsti.",0'

nation. which is to be moral.

Amh~tics mid Ethics in the &atttifill and th~ Sublime 187

The Sublime Sacri6ce

\Ylere we to raise the question of the interest or disinterest feh byempirical thought affected by subl~me e~otion, and ~er~ we to

U[ aside the "disinterested interest that It feels when It dISCOvers;he moral law within itself, we would see that the indifference itshows the object's forms involves, more than a disinterest or inter­est, a simple unin/nne. The forms of the imagination seem irrele­vant to the arousal of"spirirual feeling."

Ho.....ever, a closer examination ~eaLS that this "thrusting aside"(AbJond~rung: 127; 122) of forms is not without interest f~r

thought in the discovery of its true destination. Their .ind~:c: LS

a means toward this discovery, and the pain that the ImpossIbilityof presentation gives to thought, is a "mediation" authorizing ex·alted pleasure to discover the true (ethical) destination of thought,thus evoking respect. This is because the "forgetting" of for~s­ho.....ever "contra-final" it may appear to taste and to the finality of

_ nature-is nevertheless finalized, or finalizable, upon the Idea ofthis ultimate destination. The "displeasure" that insists on showingJUSt how "contr.l-final" reason is to the imagination "is still repre­sented as final" (109; 105). There is something like a logic of the"worst possible" or at least an aesthetic of the worst that "plays" notthe ugly but the amorphous. The more an anti-landscaJX; exceedsall putting into form, the more (he power of pure ~pracncal) ~­

SOn finds itself "extended" or actualized, the more us greatness IS

revealed. It CountS on favor's misery to bring out the elevation ofits law. We have already seen this (sec Chapter s. pp. 12j-27). Un­like what takes place in rcspect, which only arouses displeasuresecondarily, in an cxtrinsic way, the sublime "mediatiz~s" ("dy~

namicaJly" speaking) thc light with the dark. A dear space IS drawnupon a dark COntrast.

This biascd perhaps pervcrse intercst, this profit dcrived fron~

the quasi "insignificance [of naturc] bcfore thc Ideas of reason

an object according only ro the subjective state in which thinkinsfinds itself on this occasion.

The occasion of this judging sensation simply does not have thesame status when it feels the beautiful and when it feels the s~lime, and thought is not in the same state. This aherity deptnds 011the occasion and affects the order of respective imerests that art illplay. The object said to be sublime is no longer the occasion sivea.to a form to uansform itself immediately into a "happiness" of thesoul by a transitiveness of the finalities, in the way the naturll"code" convens itself to an affectual disposition. It is through iraabsence of form, or, rather, considered "withom" its forms, be­yond or outside them, that the object-in spite of itself, so ..speak-furnishes praaica.I reason the opportunity to reinforce illhold on thought and to extend its power according to its F.aculEaryinterest. And ofcourse, thought, thus constrained by the law, tu1W

to the law or exposes itself to the law without being pushed by.interest, thus by the singular incentive of ethics, that is, regard,Achrung (see Chapter 9, pp. 226--31). But an the same be said forthe dark side of the sublime-a dark side darker than that of re­spect, beca~ here it is constitucive of the feeling and not merdyits verso? And will it be said thar sublime indifference to form itstill the sign of a "disinterest"?

In terms of the transcendental interest that leads the facuhiclto actualize themselves, the debacle of forms, or the "retreat" rIthe imagination (see Chapter 6, pp. Iso-53) that the sublime jm..

plies, results in a reshuffling of the interfacuhary hierarchies. Un­derstanding (or thought in its cognitive usage) must relinquish illpower, whereas in taste, as we recall (see Chapter 2, pp. 60-67).forms, in defying, in exciting the understanding, appeal [Q its ac;.

tualiz.ation as a power. The perspectives of knowledge that thebeautiful leaves accessible, albeit aparetically (206-9; 197-2(0), arcat once barred by the sublime. Reason, on the other hand, the fite·uhy of purc Ideas, and first that of absolute causality, seems tohave a great intcrest in the disorganization of the given and thedcfeat of the understanding and the imagination. In the space thU$created by "negative presentation," reason can in effect render aJ·

186 Amlmics and Ethics in th~ &autifill and the Sllblime

AmImia and Ethia in thL" Beautiful and thL" Sub/imL" 189

ing a first gift, which muSt itselfbc infinitely precious. The naturesacrificed is sacred. Sublime interest evokes such a sacrilege. One istempted to say: an onrologica1 sacrilege. In any case, here, a facul~

rary sacrilege. The law of practical reason, the law of the law,\\'eighs with all itS weight on the law of productive imagination. huses it. It subordinates it as far as itS a priori conditions of possi­biliry, its own autonomy, which is also itS heterogeneity with re­sl}t'ct to the conditions of morality. However, me servitude of theimagination is "voluntary," violently interested. The faculty of freeforms ~depriv[csl itself of its freedom" (no; II6), and it does thisin order [Q induce "a feeling" for a law that is nOt irs own (93; po).By sacrificing itself, the imagination sacrifices nature, which is aes~

thetically sacred, in order to exalt holy law.As in any sacrificial rite, there is in the sacrifice of the imagina­

tion a calculation of interest, a reckoning offeeling. Give up favor,and you will find regard. It seems easy to back this calculation upwith the calculation supporting a "dialectic" (for example, the~master-slave": renounce pleasure and one wiJI have recognitionand spirit). This would be me case if Kant let himself be Hegel (seeChapter 5, pp. 127-3t). Ifhe thought me law were negotiable at theex.pense of the beautiful in me gifr-for-a-gift logic that dictates di­alecticallogic and guarantees its profit, irs final RL"Sultat, even if al­ways deferred.

On the contrary, this economy of the bad, of plus through mi­nus, this interested frenzy in denaturation that Kant calls enthusi~

asm (but it has siblings) is denounced as a blindness owing to the~choice" of itS end or "in the way it is effected" (124; IIp). As an~affection of a strenuous type," a violence of feeling, the sublime"cannot merit any delight on the pan of reason" ('24i 11~2(Jj seeChapter 6, pp. 153-56). This "use" thus remains useless, withoutethical result. The law will not allow itself to yield to the con­Sumption of forms. For, quite simply, the law requires regardalone, a pure, disinterested obedience. It will have nothing to doWith demonsrrations of heroism. Respect cannot be obtained by~eJns of monification. It is an immediate and a priori reverence.[hat this veneration should have for its L"fficl, as I have said, the

Amimia and ElhiCJ in th~ &alttifitll1nd /h~ Subiim~,88

(105; lQr, see Chapter 4. pp. 102-9), is what motivates or accorn,.panies the "use"-rhe "contingent" use-that thought ml1k~s

nature (of ami-namre) in the sublime. Let us reread this pasS3gt:"The concept of the sublime ... gives on the whole no indicariOilof anything final in nature itself, but only in the possible ~mp

mmt of our intuitions of it in inducing a feeling (fuMbar] inown selves of a finality quite independent of nature" (93; 90). 0­the side of actual thought this "in order ro induce a feeling" be­trays a powerful interesr. The collapse of forms is interesting. asthe subordination of the imagination [Q a finality that is inpatible with irs own finality, that is, the free production of fo"The imagination by its own act depriv[esJ itselfof itS freedomreceiving a final determination in accordance with a law otherthat of its empirical employmem" (llOi 1I6). What profit canexpected from the 8t'rallbung, the "spoliation," [Q which itsems (ibid.)? The profit one would expect from a sacrifice. Whothe beneficiary? Nature is sacrificed on the altar of the law. "Inway lrhe imagination] gains an extension [Erwdurung] andmight greater than that which it sacrifices [allftpftrr]. Butground of this is concealed from it, and in its place it ftL"Lr therifice or deprivation, as wetl as irs cause, to which it is subj(ibid., em.).

The "contingent use" of nature thus proceeds from a sacrifi •cronomy of the facuhary powers. The kind of regard the sub'has for the law is acquired and signaled by using narural forms inway that was nOt their intended use for thought, by misus'them. This constitutes a conversion (or perversion) in destina .which perhaps still connotes the institution of the sacred. Theter requires the destruction or consumption of the given, ofpresent "wealth," the Stoffof free natural form (180i 171-7T. setChapter 2, pp. 60-67), in order [Q obtain in return rhe countd'"gift of the unpresenred. "It is only through sacrifices that rhiImight [of moral law] makes itSelf known [Q us aesthetically" (I%JiliB). Aesthetically. When one lights the beautiful on fire, the sigllof the good arises from its cinders. Any sacrifice involves this S2C"

rilege. A pardon can only be obtained by abandoning, by banish-

§ 8 The Communication

ofTaste

'9'

Demand for a Universal Communication

Taste and sublime feeling must be described by the critique asfttlings devoid of all interest, in order to be disrins,uished frominclinations presupposing neros, or from a moral feelmg that pro­duces a need for the good (48-50; 46-48). This condition of pos~sibility ofaesthetic feeling was established in the name of its qual~

ity. But we have seen that another aspect also djstinguishes taSte,-and also the sublime, from the other fedings, and this aspect isno less important-far from it. Taste is a sensation that immedi­ately demands to be communicated. It demands this immediately.This exigency or expectation is inscribed in the sensation, withoutany extrinsic mediation. One could say that taSle immediately de~

mands 10 be communicated immediately. This does not mean inIhe same instant, but, rathet, without the mediation of any argu~

ment, as ifby a direct transitiveness. Immediacy of a demand to beCommunicated without mediation. We have seen (see Chapter J,pp. 81-89) how the critical analysis of this double immedialion ismade doubly, both in the name of quality and in the na".'e ~f

modality. Moreover, the importance of quality and modality IS

Such that they alone are responsible for the legitimation of taste asa judgment necess.ary fl prior;" they arc responsible for its critical"deduction": "The solution [AIij/osu1/gJ of these logical peculiari­lies," i,e., universality and necessity, "will itSelf suffice for a deduc-

190 Amhe/iCJ and £thiCJ in tile &au/iji,1 and tbe Sublime

humiliation of self-love, is one thing. But it is another altogetherfor the sacrifice of the ego, or that of the imagination's forms, to bethe cor/dition of respect. Respect takes place without condition;.,is, let me repeat, "morality itSelf, regarded ... as an incentive" U.empirical will (KPV, 78; 89). Respect cannot be acquired, even lone were to offer the price of all of nature. Like the law, respcqcannot be the object of a trade, even one that is expiatory.

This is especialJy true of a transcendental trade. By this I meaa:especially when the trade implies thai one power of thought "g;.way" to another-for example, the Faculty of presenting forms •the one ofbeing obligated by the law. This is especially true wbeaone Faculty concedes not only primacy in extension, but gives..,011 the very conditions of possibility, 0" its autonomy-in this~on the freedom ofpresentation and itS disinterestedness. This ....render overwhelms not only the specific functioning of the iJTllli­nation. This surrender also disorganizes the very principle oftical reason, which is precisely the unconditioned of the lawthe regard owed to it. Thus the general economy of the faculties·affected by this crisis.

The second Cririqueuses the word fuw/(KPV. 126; 140) to10 this radical concession, to this subordination of one Facultyanother, which also en rails the disorganization of the other (incase. the constant threat of the subordination of practical reasonspeculative reason. and the overturning of an order). It sign'an outrage to piety, a sacrilege. There is pllelhaft in the subliIn other words, respect, in its pure ideal, that is, the Fair Face oflaw, cannot enter into account, be counted in an economy ofrifice. It involves an an-economy, which would be of the order rJholiness. Its dark Face and the loss that ensues result from empifi..cal will being nOt holy, but finite. Furthermore, sacrifice ca.nnol

use this finitude to buy holiness. (Practical) reason could not be"satisfied" with such folly, which masks a "frivolous" wager.

tion judges without the mediation of a determinate concepL Un­derstanding is at work in taste only as the power, V~rmogm, ofconcepts, but it does not determine the object through a conceptof beauty by means of a rule of attribution. If there is a rule, thesensation or the pleasure of the beautiful "waitS (muaTur) for con­firmation (Bt:s-ratigungJ" (ibid.), for approval through homology.It looks for confirmation "not from conceptS" (nicht von &griffin),but Mfrom the concurrence of others" (von andnn- &itrin: ibid.),from their "access" to the same st:nsation. The rule of taste that is-imputed" in singular pleasure would thus be induced on the basisof equally singular pleasures felt by "others," on the basis of theirproliferation, which would be so many instances confirming therule.

This is a common reading and one the text seems [0 authorize.Thus: "To say: this Aower is beautiful, is tlUltalnount [ebtnsovitl]to repeating itS own proper claim [ihnon rigmm Anspruch] to thedelight of everyone" (t}6, Lm.; IJ/). One must remember that inthe Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point ofVino (§+4) the fa.cultyof"finding [auszufindm] the panicular [daJ Bno~] for the gen~

eral (the rule) (zum AUgnn~in (tkr RLg~l)r is called Urttiultrafi,_ judgment. Conversely. "the fa.culty of discovering [ausdmltm] the

general for the panicular" is spirit, tkr Win (ingmium). Indeedthe Anthropology is only an anthropology and should not be in~

voh'ed in the affairs ofa critique. Nevertheless, one can draw fromthis distinction the following question, When the st:nsation of tasteis said to "look for" the concurrence of others. is it in the way theWin prepares to think the general on the basis of particular in­stances or is it in the way the Uruiukra/t inquires after instancesthat may fall under a rule it already has? EVidently what taste"waits for" or "promises itSelf" (57; 54) is neither. It cannot be amatrer of applying a rule of taste already determined [0 the "in­Stances" of aesthetic judgments, because the latter judge withoutrules. Nor can one find this rule on the basis of the judgments ofothers, however numerous they may be in their consensus, for twO

reasons. The first is aU[Olllatic: empirical induction is not legiti­mation in the eyes of the critique. The synthesis implied in the

Th~ Communication of7iuu

tion of this strange faculty [di~m Jond~rbarm

IJO-31)·According £0 the category of quantity, the demand to be

municated in the judgment upon the beautiful calls directly foruniversality that is iudf immediate. According to modality,demand to be communicated spontlUloously requires iu nto be accepted without discussion. (To simplify maners, andlowing Kant's own example, I am using the designations ofcategories of pure understanding inStead of the "headings" ofSection, which would be idemity/differenet and determinaciontterminable, respectively, and which, in principle, are the onlypropriate designations fot the subjective judgments of purethetic feelings. The first "heading" suggests by comparison thatthar is beautiful gives pleasure. and the second suggests thatbeautiful is unable not £0 give pleasuR:.)

We have also seen (see Chapter 1, pp. 60--67) how theof the demand for universality and the demand for necessity(Ogether in the nouon of a possible communication of taste...sible communication" is one word, Mifuilbarlttil, communiity. This notion is the topic of par:;agr:;aph }9: "Von der Mibarkeit einer Empfindung" (Whether a st:nsation is communi148, t.m.; f42). Thus the quantitative analysis of the claim toversality, [0 AUgntltinhrit. leads the critique to the Idea of anmtin~ Stimm~, a "universal voice" (56; 54). What doa thissay? II says there is "a possibility" (Miiglichk~if) of an aesjudgment-this very sensation-being considered "valid forone" (al.rfiiTj~dnmann giilfig) "at the same time" {%Uglrich: ib'The judgmenr of taste does not "postulate" an Eimtimmung,agreement" (the choruJ) of everyone; it only "imputes [a sinnt ••an] this agreement £0 everyone" (ibid.).

The judgment of taste imputes the agreement "as an instadCIof the rule" (au tin Fall tin Rtgtl: ibid.). Every "agreement," evdfpure plcasuR: felt before the same form, is an instance and, as sudl.remains a singular judgment. By calling it an instance, one notlC"the1ess refers it to a general rule ofaesthetic judgment, of which itwould be the particular instance. This rule is not given, for sensa-

Tht Communication ojTmtt 193

'9'Thl' Communication o/Time

[0 be beautiful "applies" to the totality of the state of thoughtca1k-d pure pleasure: this is the reflective analogue to universality indctermination. Third of all, this "applicuion," or attribution, isneither an application nor an attribution, because tne beautiful isnot an objective predicate, and pleasure is not a concept, the pos­sible "subject" of a judgment. One must not fall victim to thepredicative form that we give to our taste by "subreption" when weS3.y, for example, "This form is beautiful." Formulated correcrly,raste S3.ys: "Given this form, thought feels a pure pleasure (that isimmotiV3.ted and whole)."

However, this formulation conceals something equivocal: whatis "the thought" that feels this pleasure? Is it the instantaneousthought that "apprehends" and '"reproduces," that "comprehends"the said form, the thought "cont2ined in a single moment," the~absolute unity" (KRV A, t)l; 143) where: the manifold is first syn~

thesized and then actually reproduced in order to present itself asform (ibid., 1)2-)); '45-46)-as a frtt form in taste, but none­theless alw:lYS presentable within the limits of the "fim measure" ofthe imagination (98; 95; see also Chapter I, pp. 8-15, and Chapter4, pp. 98-102). Or are we speaking of "thought- in general, of all

-thought as it thinks this form, thought thus seen as a permanentobject, identical to itself through the successive and/or coexistentproliferation of thoughts that take hold of it? Is ..thought" thoughtas an immediate whole, as occurrence, or else thought in totality,all thought, as capacity? The definite article is equivocal (int=rench, but also in German). It designates the universal: man[I1Jomme: tr.1 is mortal (all men are); or the singular: the man isblond (the man of whom I speak). The same is [fue of "the(hought" in our formulation.

For thc;re to be taste, singular thought in its actual occurrencemUSt be affected as a whole by a pure pleasure on the occasion ofthe presentation of the form judged to be bcatltifu1. This is its def­inition with regard to quality. But this quality maintains the quan­(ity of the judgment in its singularity, in :t unique and exclusiveuniversality. This indeed suffices to distinguish i[ from tht' "de­light" afforded by the "agreeable" (49; 46-47) or the positivc "es-

rh~ Communication o/Taste'94

judgment of taste must be transcendentally "deduced" as the a Pri­ori condition of this judgment; the unanimity observed in fact (rrit existS) is not a valid legitimation. The' other reason applia to

aesthetic judgment proper: once again, aesthetic judgment is notaware of a conaprual rule. It does nO( presuppose: it, nor is therule its aim as it may be for reRection in iu cognitive usa~. It iaraUlegorial. but not heuristic.

Thus the "universal voice" should nor be confused with thea~menr that everyone em in effect give:: to the singular sensatioQof pu~ pleasu~ inspired by a form. Nevenhdess, me "universal ca­paciry for being communicated incident to the mental state in thegiven rep~ntation [dio" aUgnnnn... Mittrilungrfdhiglui/ tin~zwtllndn in d...r g~...b...nm V&nuUung] ... must be fundamentalIzum Gruntk Ii~ffl mujrJ" in a judgment of WIC: (57; JJ). Thecharacu:r of communicability is indeed distincrive_ But the legili.macy of this stran~ demand still remains to ~ deduad. This iIwh.:n is done explicitly by the deducrion in paragraph 30 and illsubsequent paragraphs (11l-14; u8-z9). But the materials for thededucrion are already to be found in the Analytic of the Beautiful

Let us first examine what relates to quantity. We have alreadyobserved that a slippage occurs, by which the universal claim madeby a judgment upon the beautiful is treated as a claim toward Ufti..versal communication, the latter understood in turn--2t least ap­parently-as the communication of this judgment to "everyone­(sec Chapter ), pp. 81-89). It is difficult to see why the logical UJli.versality of a judgment would be guaranteed or even signaled bythe unanimity of the individuals judging. The fact that this juds­ment is reflective and not determinant does not make matters anyeasier. The reflexive "heading" of unity replaces the determinantc:uegory "universality," but this does not make it any dearer why itmust have the agreement of others to be valid.

I will briefly recall what appears to be the structure of the rea­soning behind this "slippage." First ofall, as we have JUSt indicated.universality must be thought of as a reflexive "heading," becausethe judgment upon the beautiful is a reflective judgment. Second,this "heading," unity, indicates thar the whole of the form judged

teem" giv~n to th~ "good" (ibid.), but it is not ~nough to confa­upon it any univ~rsality proper. Wh~n~ it follows from dt~ slip­pag~ w~ hav~ signaled that "communicability" would~ to ~ atranscendenlaJ aspect of taste.

How se.riow would this be? Docs "disint~rest" not suffi~ in au­m~nricating pleasure as pure aesth~tic? In authenticating it, cer_tainly, for its quality is enough to distinguish it, though not to Ie­gitimat~ it. Without this univ~rsality ofcommunication, evm as asimple demand, the aesth~tic cannot be founded. To found thejudgm~nt of tast~ means, in critical t~rms, to deduce: its possibili­ty a priori, and not simply to describe its diS(inctiv~ characteriscia.For th~ critical project, these. serve only to establish the necessary.prion' conditions for these charact~riS[ics to be what they are. AInecessary a priori, these conditions are universal, that is, true forany singular aesth~tic judgment. Thw one must be abl~ to d~mon­

strate that this judgment, in its empirical and conting~nt singular_ity, presupposes certain conditions without which it could not in .I

fact present itself, as it presents itself, as singular and contingcDLThese conditions said to be transcendental ar~ univ~rsal and ner;­essary for all judgments of this nature. Thw it is n~ither the sin­gularity nor the contingency of aesth~ticjudgm~nt that leads thecritiqu~ to these conditions. No more than does its quality of"di.interest," which is perfectly compatibl~ with its singularity and illcontingency. It is only this--oft~n forgonen-aspeet, the denuodto be: communicated universally and necessarily. This is why a pot­sible communication of th~ m~ntal srat~ is "fundamental" to thejudgment of taste (57; 5)), with pleasure as "its consequent" (1#Folg,: ibid.). Aesthetic pleasur~ has irs "determining ground·(Grund: 58; 55) in judgment, and, finally, the "universality of thesubjective conditions of estimating objects forms th~ sol~ founda­tion [a/kin . .. grUlItUtJ of this universal subjectiv~ validity of theddight that we connect with representation of the object" (59; 56).On~ could oppose the above text to that of paragraph I where,

on the contrary, it seems that "the feeling of pleasure and displea­sure ... forms the basis [griindtt] of a quite separate faculty of dis-­criminating and estimating" (42; 40). Th~ order of foundation

'97Thr Communication ofTllJu

seems rev~rsed in favor of pleasure, thus of the singular, to thedetriment of th~ faculty of judging and its a priori conditions. Butthis is because th~ object of this last passage is quite different. Theparagraph aims at distinguishing a faculty "that contributes noth­ing to knowledge" of th~ object (42; 40) from "one's cognitive fac­ulties, be th~ mode of representation clear or confused" (ibid.).(The "confused" mode refers on~ again to Leibni£s intellectual­ism.) What "forms th~ basis" of the feeling is the capacity ofthought to relat~ a thought (a representation) not to the objectthought, but to thinking itself according to its "state," a strictly"subjective" and ~en tautegorical capacity to think. What the to:tdoes, in short, is to translate from the "m~ntal faculty" (VrrmOgt1ltin Grmiits) of th~ feeling of pleasure and displeasure to the "cog­nitive faculty" (ErlunnmisIJtmlOgt1l) of pure judgment without re­sorting to und~rstanding (39; 36). "To form the basis" her~ meansto institute this correspondence.

Let us return to "communicability." This demand is much more[han a remarkable aspect of taste. It serves as the basis for its uni~

versa! validity. Th~ hypothesis ofan aesthetic sense, common to allthought, the stnSUJ communis (83-85; 8~2), will be formed onthe basis on this d~mand. With this demand and through th~ hy*pothesis of a stnSUJ communis, me critiqu~ will discover me princi­ple of a su~rse:nsible substrate that finalizes all thought (207~;

198). This d~mand is what will pennit th~ antinomy of th~ cn*tique of rast~ to be debated: the antinomy states that there can beno "dispute" and "decision," disputi""' and tTltJchritkn, abouttast~, but mat there can always be ·contention" (srrriIm) about it(205-6, t.m.; 196-97); this ofcourse has to do with the statuS of itsuniversality and necessity. Thw it must be und~rstood that in ourformulation-"given this form, thought feels a pure: pleasure"­the term "thought" signifies both the whole of a given thoughtthat actually occurs, and all thought thinking th~ same form. Itsignifies singular thought and the universal condition of thought,at the same time. This paradoxical coexistence is precisely what ismarked analytically by the double immediacy mentioned earlier: assingular, thought is immediately affected by pleasure on the occa-

The Commlmicarion ofTllJu

TIJ~ Commun;catioll ofTasu TIJ~ Commlwkl1tion ofJiuu '99

sion ofa given form; as universal, it immediately calls for the OOrn~

nmnication of irs affeclion.

Demand tor a Nece.£sary Communication

AJ it examines the judgment of ta5fe through the category ofmodality (or the corresponding reflexive "heading" determina_tion/dctcrminable: KRV, 280-81; Jl4-IJ), the critique explores thequestion ofpossible cOmmunication. And it offers a solution. This"Founh Moment" of the "Analyric of the Beautiful" first deter.mines me modality of the judgment of taste by elimination. Thelogical category of modality commands the synthesis that unitesthe terms involved in a judgment when the laner posa: the syn­thesis in terms of "possibility," "existena:," or "necessity" (nv, II);

lIB). In the case of an aesthetic reflectivc judgment, ttn: ml"C'C val­ues of moda.lity would be as follows: it can happen that a fonnprovides pleasure for thought; or it is a faCt that it gives thoughtpleasure; or it is impossible for it not to give pleasure. The firstjudgment would be "problematic" (nv, 107i lID); the second,which posits the form as '"actually" (w;'}dkh: 81; 78) giving plea.sure, would be "assertoric." In the third, a form declared beautifulis thus judged to provide pleasure, and the synthesis of form anddelight is posed as necessary, making the judgment "apodicric."

This would indeed be the case if me judgment in question~a dcterminant judgment and attributed a property to the concqnof the object that belonged (Q it necessarily. But such is not thecase in a judgment of taste, for the beautiful is not an objectiveprediote bur thc name of a subjective state of thought projectedonto an object. It is nonetheless true that the union of the object'sform with the state of thought is necessary. In calling the formbeautiful, we mean that all thought should be in the Slate whereour thought finds itself in the presence of this form. But it~shouJd" merely. We may evoke or invoke this necessity withoutbeing able to give "its exponenrs" (expon;mm: 212i 202). To give itsexponents is to reduce "a represcntation of the imagination to con·cepts [l1ttf&griffi bdllgml" (ibid.). However, rhe judgmcnt made

by our feeling regarding a form operates withour a concept. If itexpfCSSCS a necessary link betwccn scnsation and the occasion ofsens:Hion, it does so only insofar as "we tolerate no one else beingof a different opinion" (vmtl1tUII w;r k~;,,~m, 111ld~"r Mdmmg zu$(;'1: 84; 81). This purs the critique back on the path of ~commu­niability."

This mental experience, so to speak, or this "imaginary varia­tion" by which we rry to fed what others should fed on the sameoccasion, endows our judgment with a special necessity, one that isnot logical but whar Kant calls "exemplary" (annpltInuiJ: 81; 78):"a necessity of the assent ofall to a judgment" kjn~ No~nd;gkrit

tkr Bmtimmung I1Iln zu dllnn Un~;[: ibid.). The shift is plain tosee: the judgment is not necessary, but the agr~ment of allthoughr on the subject of Ihis judgment is. A legitimate shift, forthe thought that judges the judgment is me same thought which,as (logical) "subject" of this judgment, is supposed to judge meform to which the judgment refers. From this simple evocacion,rhus, the judgment of taste pr~nrs itself as "exemplifying k;n&ispMl a universal rule inopable of formulation" (ibid.). As withthe claim ro universality previously, the demand for necessity

-evokes the phantom of a cona:prual rule. But this rule cannot beformulated (by understanding, whose function it is); therefore thedemand for necessity remains unfounded conceptually. Lackingthis rule, the critique must find some reflexive "principle" (82-8);79-80) authorizing sensation ro claim irs communication as neces-­sary. This principle must determine "by means of feeling only andnor through conceprs" what pleases and yet has "universal validity"(ibid.). The necessity called for by the judgment of taste will be ex·cmplary only if it is legitimared by this principle.

In what does this principle consist? It can be oiled G~m~;'IS;,m,

"common sense" (ibid.). It is not "good sense," which is rhe ordi­nary faculty of reasoning attributed to every thinking being, bur adisposition to "feel," which would be communicable lO all (15<>-51;

(44-45). Irs function would be (thc entire dcscriplion is in thcconditional, as this principle remains problematic at this stage ofthc deduction) to authorize the universal cxcmplarity of rhe ne-

cessity feh singularly in taSte: "I put forward my judgment of tasteas an aample [Empit'/1 of the judgment ofcommon SC=~, and at.tribute to it on that account ccnnplary lexemplarische] valjdi~

(84. Lm.; 81). This principle of common sense would mus ful6Ume function of the missing rule.

Given this, can it be said that one is justified in presupposingthis principle? The argument 3Ulhorizing this presupposirion. OUt_

lined in the Introduction UI-33; 28-29), is givtn in par2gl'3.ph 21. Itcan be daborated in the following way:

I. Cognitions and judgments must (m~n: 83; 80) be uni~_

sally communicated, "together with their anendant conviction[Obauugungj"' (ibid.). Why must they be? Ikca~ without thisuniversal communication, there would only be individual opin.ions, incapable of showing the agreement (Ob~instimmung)ofthese cognitions and judgments with their object. Moreover. theskepticism that would result from this incapacity is untenable, uthe first Cn'tiqu~ shows.

2. The possibility of universal communication, required ofknowledge. must also be required of the "mental state" (Gnniits­zwtana: ibid.) accompanying knowledge. For all thought 0ccu­

pied with knowing an object is at me same time affected by its act

of knowing and thus finds itself in a certain "state'": for exampLe"conviction," which is a delight due to knowledge. By reversingthe order, one couJd even say mat this subjective "condition," thisStimmung, i.e., the state in which thought finds itself when itknows, is also a "subjective condition of... knowing" (di~ JUbj~1t­

nw &dingung tks Erlunnnu: ibid., t.m.), a condition, this time, inme sense of a condition of possibility. If there were not a disposi.rion of thought about which it was immediately informed and wasfavorable to its act of knowing, the laner would not exist formought and thought would not know. The subjective here, that is,the reRective, overrides the objective or the determinant. (Thiscould only surprise a hasty reader of the Critiq/l~s and of the Ap­pendix ro the first Critiqlu in parricular, which is devoted to the"conceprs" of reRection.) Ofcourse subjective sensation is the "ef~

fecr" (dit WirNung) of facilitating the play between understanding

20'TIN Communication olTast~

and the imagination, the bculties of objective knowledge (60; 57);bUi conversely "knowledge, as effect" (tim ErNmnmis als Wirku1Ig:83: 80) could not arise without the Stimmu1Ig. the "disposition" ofthought that allows for the agreement of the two faculties. This re­\'ersal is of great importance: the rank of a condition of knowl­edge, a &dingung, is conferred upon the Slimmung. Moreover, as,his condition must be universal for the condition connected tocognition and determinant judgment to be communicable, as it isin effect, the Slimmung must itself be universally communicable.

3. There is a disposition of thought particularly "suited," par­Iiculatly "due" (I am trying to convey the I«kJu Jich . .. gtbiihrt[ibid.]), to the representation of an object from which cognitionwill result. It corresponds to a "proportion" (tint Proportion: ibid.)of the twO powers-imagination and understanding-the one inrelation to the other. The disposition of thought, estimated ac­cording to pleasure and displeasure (the mental faculty), can thusbe translated in terms of the faculties of knowledge. An object isgiven by sensibility, and the imagination sets to work arranging,Zwammtmttzu1lg (8); So), the given manifold in a schema; theimagination pUts the understanding to work so that it "recognizes"

- the object through concepts. We recognize the "ratio" required ofthe famlties of knowledge for the knowledge of the object to be ef·fective. This ratio was described in me first CritiqUL.

4. Is this ratio felt by mought to be "good," to be a pleuure?One cannot be cemin. Many ratios are possible. The ratio of thefaculties al work in obtaining a cognition generally depends uponthe object to be known (Ilul Erkmntnis [gtg~btntr GtgmJt4ntUiibtrhllupt)). In critial terms "cognition ... generally"' includesknowledge that determines an object of experience in the strictsense, but it also includes me repre:se.nration ofa pl'3ctical action to

be accomplished, or the representation of a free form to be pre­sented for pure pleasure, or the representation of a "transcendent"object, the Idea ofwhich reason has and upon which it speculates,or finally the representation of an object of which pure under­standing tries to determine [he "notion," withour considering ex­perience, etc. It is dear that in each of these cases, the proportion

Th~ Communiciltion ofTasu200

203Th, CommulI;canon ofTaste

that should be given to a SmfUS communis. "Psychological observa­tions" (84; 81) are certainly not what can determine this starns. It islranscendemal, but where should it be "housed"? The question is areRective one. This consideration is for the "transcendental top­ic"; it requires this additional determination.

The question is addressed in paragraph 21 in the form of an al­ternative. However, in order to grasp the stakes of the a1rernative,one must clearly circumscribe its object. Its object is not the semuscommunis itself. It is the "ideal norm" (d;e ;tkak Norm: 84; 81), "amere ideal" that the pleasure in the beautiful seems to involve assoon as it claims a universaliution of itS singular judgment. If I de­mand that you find beautiful what I find beautiful, is it not be­cause my taSte obeys a norm? "Imputes," "waits for," "promises it­self" assent: all of these terms give themselves a "duty," a So/kn. Aswe have already read, "a person who describes something as beau­tiful insistS that everyone ought to give the object in question hisapproval and follow suit in describing it as beautiful" (82; 79"> seeChapter 7, pp. ,61-71). But we also saw that the So/un cannotclaim the status of a moral duty: "The ought in aesthetic judg­mentS, therefore, despite an accordance with all the requisite datafor passing judgment, is still only pronounced conditionally" (82;

79). The aesthetic "ought" obliges ani on conditio .mem invo Vlll It e IIlstance a a rinci Ie sumvers y v I , ecause this judgment which is subjective, sin­

gul'ir, and Without concept has no authority to obligate. A§.J~uPPosing further that this principle could be demonstratM, onewould always need to be "assured" Ummer Jicher) that "the case"

(der Fall), that is, a given judgment of taste in its singular occur­rence, was indeed subsumed "under that ground" (ibid.), and did

nOt oblige for other motives than this pure principle. Aestheticobligation would then have a validity similar to that of an "objec­tive principle" (g/e;ch dnem objekdve: 85; 81). But the condition isrepeated: provided one were assured that the subsumption of thesingular judgment of taste under the principle was "correct" (ibid.).

The term "subsumption,» which is used twice to designate thecondition of validity of aesthetic obligation, leads one to think of

Tlu Commltl1icmion ofTiuu202

Hesitation About the Demand

of imagination and understanding "invested" in the act of rhinkingis not the same.

5- "However [given the above], there must be (gltichwoh/ ab~muff u: ibid.) one ratio among all those possible that is "bestadapted" (die zlItriiglichste; ibid.) to the rdation between the tWopowers (of presentation and concepts): a kind of optimal ratio.Optimal for what, adapted for what? For the "mental powers"(Gnniitskriifie: ibid.) in view of knowledge in general.

6. This ratio can be recognized, for it is felt immediately bythought. Thus one returns from the analysis of the powers ofknowing to the examination of the reAective disposition ofthought as the power of feeling pleasure and displeasure. And nei.rher the "good" proportion nor the "happy" disposition, which isits sign (both the cause and the effect), is determinable "throughconcepts." They are only determinable "through feeling." Here werecognize the absolutely tautegorical property of reflective thought:itS "state" is the sign of itself. Paragraph 9 shows that it cannot bc J

determined conceptually. If it could be, thought would be in­formed and made "conscious" of its pleasure in an "intellectual"

way, as in the cognition of an object by means of an "objectivrschematism" (59; 57-58). But this is impossible. For thought has noknowledge in the strict sense (by schema and concept) of its sub­jective states; it has a sensation of them, and the sensation is itSstate.

7· In conclusion, the knowledge of an object must be commu­nicable and the subjective disposition suited to it must be com­municable. The proper disposition (pleasure) must also be com­municable. Thus it is permitted to presuppose a "common sense,"that is, a common aptitude for feeling the good proportion of thefaculties of knowledge. Moreover, this is not only permitted but isas necessary as the "communicability" of knowledge.

Despite its rigor, this demonstration does not fully satisfy thecritique. It leaves open the question of the transcendental statuS

Localization of the Principle Behind me Demand

Where must one house [he principle upon which the demandfor communicability, inherent in a judgment of taSte, is based? Towhich faculty does it belong? To which power of though[? In para·

In other words: when thinking judges a form to be beautiful, doesit requi" all thought to feel the form to be beautiful, or does itoblig~ all thought to feel this form to be beautiful? Our text in­vokes the necessity of aesthetic judgment. But the necessity, stricto$(1/$11, is the impossibility of an opposing judgment. Is this the casewith raste? Not at aiL To each his own, as they say. When onejudges a body to be weighty, the opposite judgment is excluded.Form is not beautiful in the same way that a body is weighty. Thusthe necessity is not "apodictic." It is exemplary (81; 78), but howdoes one house an "exemplary necessity" in a transcendental topic?Ex~mplarisch is not of the same tOpOl as &ispi~l So/len, obligation,is not miillm. necessity.

Yer the critique seems to have some difficulty in separating themin irs description of aesthetic obligation. The following passage isevidence of this: "The 'ought' [da! So/1m], i.e., the objective ne­cessity [di~ obj~ktiv~ Notwmdigk~itJ of the coincidence of the feel­ing of all [Zusammmfli~flm] with the particular feeling of each,only betoken[s] the possibility of artiving at some son of unanim­ity [~intTachtjgJ in these matters, and the judgment of taste onlyadducers] an example kin &ispi~/] of the application of this prin·ciple" (85, t.m.; 82). The exemplary is a simple example of appli­cation, and the Sollnt is an objective necessity: here we return tothe cognitive hypothesis. It thus becomes urgent to localize theprinciple authorizing communicability. If this principle is requiredlike a rule, it belongs w the realm of understanding, which is im­possible. If the principle is obligawry like a norm, it depends onpractical reason, which is equally impossible (see Chapter 7, pp.159-73). This al[ernative is displaced by another, more subtle onedescribed in paragraph 22. The solution w the latter is deferredand given only in paragraphs 57 and 59.

'osTiu Communication ofTasuTh~ Communication ofTast~

the principle-to which this obligation refers-as a rule of undO'_standing. Just as a judgment of experience acquires its cognitivevalidity and the right to universalization from the synthesis it J>tt­forms upon the givens being subsumed under a rule of under.smnding, so it stands for a judgment upon the beautiful. Irs valid.ity is subject to a similar condition, that of the subsumption of illsynthesis under a principle. One could "rightly convert ... into I

rule for everyone" (furj~tknnann mit Ruht zur R~~/machm: 8.t;8I) a singular judgment, an "instance" of taste, if it satisfied thiIcondition of qubsumption.

However, this interpretation of the principle as a cognitive rulemust be abandoned for three reasons: the hrst is that the judg­ment of taste is subjective, even if it requires universality and ne­cessity, and cannot fall under a rule of understanding. The secondis that in a judgment of taSte the imagination does not wotk ao­cording to schemas. And finally such a rule is not binding, strictlyspeaking. It requires that the instance be subsumed to it for it (0

known, that is, determined by a concept. However, a s~nsus CtnM­

munis is felt as an "ideal nOtm" that everyone in [Urn "should" 0b­serve when judging the form judged to be beautifuL What obli­gates, what is felt by thought as a So/len, as a "you must," is callednot a rule but a norm. Moral law is a norm. It prescribes impera­tively and without condition. Moreover, unlike a rule of under.standing, the law does not determine what it is one must do, me:instance, but that something must be done, given the instance, forthe law to be realized. When the principle of universalization.which legitimates the singular aesthetic judgment to demand iacommunication, works as an "ideal norm," it acts more like amoral law. And its norm, like that of moral law, would have to I'e""

main "indeterminate" (unb~!timmu: 85; 82).In summary, by requiring communication, taste would exem~

plifY a norm. This norm would remain indeterminare (aestheticjudgment musr remain free); it would be founded on an uncondi­tional and universal principle.

But before accepting the deduction of the said principle, oncmust still confront the difficulty of localizing the facuhary realm.

graph 22., the question is formulated in a new way: "Is taste ... anatural and original faculty lei" urspriingliclm mId natllr/Mus."VmnogmJ. or is it only the Idea of one that is artificial and to beacquired by us?" (od« nur die Idu /JOn einem lIoch zu mJ.Wbmdn,und kumllichm Vtrmiigt,r.: 85, £om.; 82). Thrtt oppositions arc tobe understood: either tasle is a power already given, or it only ft.

quires the Idea of a power; either thought is originally endowedwith this power, or it must take hold of it; either this power be­longs to the nature of thought. or it is the fruit orits arl.

The question might be surprising on me whole. Had it nOt al­ready 1>«0 esrablished that the capacity for thought to be and fedgood on the OCC2Si~nof the perception ofa form was sponcmeGUloconstitutive? Had the "subjective" nOl been precisdy conceived.this affectiviry or immediate affecrua1ity of though I in irs objeculCould it ~ that thought has to deploy its artful resources, that iIhas 10 deploy an an-to become an anist, even deceitful, hi"./ich~in order to ~ capable of feeling the beautiful? J

This is in effect surprising. Furthermore, il is not taste as pure.disinterested sensation that is put into question in this way, but illdemand to ~ universally and necessarily communicated. The~ginning of the passage leaves no room for doubt: the question is 10

know whether "a common sense Idoes) in f2a c:xist lob n in MrTill . .. gt'l¥] as a conStitutive principle of the possibility ofexperi-­ence, or (whether it is) formed for us as a regulative principle by aStill higher (,,«11 l1iilm-n] principle of reason, that for higher endsfirst [n/lnrml seeks to beget in US Ii" um JNrIJOTZubringm) a co~mon sense" (85. I.m.; $2). The first hypothesis is dearly mat of aprinciple working as a rule of understanding for a knowledge of

experience. One must remember that this hypothesis was aumO"ri7.cd by the deduction procedure ofa smsus communis, supportedentirely by a reference to the subjective condition of all knowledgestricto UIIStI. According to the second hypothesis. on the otherhand. that of a "higher principle of reason," the critique must ac·knowledge that a smms communis is not itself the principle behindan aesthetic norm. Smms communis is subordinated to this otherprinciple; it is regulated. Tegllidtiv, by it and this other principle

'"Solution to the Antinomy ofTaste

Let us look now at paragraphs 57 and 59 where the hypothesiswe have JUSt oudine<! is argued. These paragraphs belong to the"Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment." They follow the "Solution ofthe Antinomy ofTaste" (206-15; 197-2°5). I will remind the read­er of the latter's content.

Above all else, one must keep in mind that the antinomy is notthe antinomy of taste itself but that of the "critique of taSte" (204;

195). On the subject of taste, the critique should and must sup­port two apparently contradictory propositions; taste is a singular,subjective judgment that does not make use ofany concept; taste isa judgment that lays claim to universality and necessity, which arecalcgories of the understanding, i.e., the f.'lculty of concepts. Thethesis of the antinomy (which proceeds by refutation, as in theAntithetic of the first Critiqut') follows from the firsl proposition: if

207TIN COmnllm;(Iltion of1itstt'

~bt.-ger[sl" (hn-vorbr;ngm) in us a common sense. The said "com­OlOll sense" is reclassified as a trace, a sign which, in the order ofdle aesthetic, reca.lls an Idea that regulates thought from af2r asthought rakes pleasure in lhe beautiful and demands its commu­nication. Thus we understand how, according to this hypothesis,aesthetic thought (the feeling of the beautiful, taste) belongs toanother power, that this higher power is nOt yel at thought's dis­posal. and that thought will need plenty of an to attain it. For~·t=n in its demand for communication, taSte is only (nlkm-sr) apremise and has no uhimate finality.

This is the enigma, which begins to sound a little intellectualist:I:aste would merely be the still confused actualization of a purelyr.l.lional power of thought-to come-which is not limited tomaking experience "possible." This is the correa hypothesis none­theless, as we will see. However, the communicability demandedby taste cannot be supported solely by demonstrating irs involve­ment in all acts of theoretical knowled~. For a very simple reason:this demand acts not as a rule of underst2nding, but as a nonn ofreason. Norm implies a finality, whereas rule does not.

The Communicntion ofTtzsu206

one judged the beautiful according to a concept, one couJd makedecisi?n about what was beautiful ~by means of proofs."Ho~such IS not the~ (206; 197). The antithesis follows from thesecond hypothesIS: If one were to judge the beautiful without an,concept, onc could make no claim as "to the necessary agrttme..of ?thers :-ith this )udgment" (ibid., t.m.). and discussion would.~ Impossible. Again, this is not me ~.. In ~rd.er to resolve this-its-aporia, the: critique ~ns by~

tmgulshmg between two kinds of argumentative imerlocutiODl""To dispute" (disputinYn) is an exchange of argumenu that obe,ame rul~ ofconcep\uallogic and objecrive knowl~gc: with a viewto reachmg an agreement of the interlocutors upon the object ofthe dispUt4tio. It involves the giving ofproofs: during the course of~~ dispute phenome~a are put forw:ud (0 prove mat a given eat­pmcal concept does In faa have iu object preK:nt in aperienm(Wi 201). And if the concepts in question are used by the jude­menu a priori, the:n one: puts forward the: sche:mas the:rnsdwI J

(2.2.2-23; 2I2). Thq ascertain that me: objc=a of the: judgmc=ncs itp~n~ble: 11 priori in o:pc=rie:ncc=. In both casc=s-me: simply c=mo­plncal Judgme:nt or the 4 priori judgment-the dispulIltio has ,.courK to a Dllnu/kn, to prc=Kntation (210; 201), to a "dirJDar:uUung(2.2.3; 212), and has the powe:r to convincc=. The: imap..natJ~n, the faculty of prc=Kntation, and me: undetst2nding thaifurnl~hes the: concc=pts thus coopc=rate in giving ptoof of the: argo­me:nts truth and allow one: to come to a "decision" (mtsdNiJnc2.05; 196) about the argument and its opposition.

We: hav~ ~rady seen that when the: object of the dispute: iItaste, a deciSIon cannot be roch~ betwc=en judgme:nts on the: sub­jeer: of the lxautiful. Lacking concepts, devoid of rules, indifferenrto knowable o:pc=rience, judgments of taste are incapable of fur·nishing logical arguments and proofs of their aesthetic validitYthrough presentation. If, however. they provide matter for inter~

locution, for "discussion," the laner cannot be a dispuratiu; it is~in Smiun, a subject of "contention" (205, t.m.; 196), one might~y~ a battle. One fights. Each parry tries to supply arguments forItS Judgment on the beautiful in order to rach an agrc=ement with

Th~ Communication ofTastt

Jlle other. But the "hope" (dit Hoffilung: ibid.) of reaching thisagreement will be forever disappoint~. A consensus will never becsrablished on the: basis of communicable reasons and proofs that".ould e:nable one to declare the dispute resolv~. Thus, unable [Q

be resolvc=d, the de:oore about the beautiful lives on. And the debate:lives on not, or not only, because it cannot be StOPped. After all,rhe adversaries could, as in the first twO antinomies of me firstCritiqld, be dismissc=d (see Chapter I, pp. 36-43), and the debatewould come to a halt for lack of debaters. No, me: debate livc=s onbc=c:;luse a "higher" finality, of which neither of me: inte:rlocutors isaware, "inhabits," so [Q speak, the object of the debate and hauntsthe debate itself. He:re: I ~ke the e:nigmatic instamz, which, fromabove and beyond, ceasc:lessly caus for the communication of aes­thetic feeling and consequendy for the discussion of this feeling.

The interminable de:bate guides the: critical solution of the an­tinomy_ For the debare: is, in itself, me: sign of the: way in which toproceed in unifying what is heterogeneous, and ofunifying it in anecessary way. The solution can only be sought on the side of adynamical synthc=sis (see Chapter 3. pp. 60-6]). The text rec:aIIswhat is essential in this I1l2.ner: the principle of this synthesis is

~ "the possibility of twO :iIIpparendy conAicting propositions (denSch~in~ nach] not being in fact (in tkr Tar] contradictory, butrather being capable of consisting together [n~bmt'inandn-)" (2.08,t.m.; 199). The unfolding of this solution, its Gang. is similar to me:procc=dure involv~ in me resolution of me: last twO antinomies ofpure theoretical reason (ibid.).

One: should and one must give reason to the thc=sis stating thatthere arc: no concc=pts in taste that allow it to be disputed, and alsoto the antithesis that says there must be concepts to at least pushone to de:bate it, for debate is an argument. For there is indeed nodeterminable concept at work in the judgment of taste. However,(his judgment nevertheless obeys, in a regulative way, an "undeter­mined" and "indeterminable" concept (206; 197). There: is no con­cept here that is "provable" (mut'is/ich: ibid.) on the basis of anintuition, as the dispute demands. But there is nevertheless a con­cept, or else we could never unde:rstand the demand for commu-

Tht CommunicAtion ofT4SU'08

TIN Communication ofTtlJU

nication in taste that motivates the debate and the hope ofcomingto. an ag~eement. This demand and this hope are the sea.I, the signWith whIch the power of concepts marks pure reAection, i.e., thefeding of the bautiful. Because of this seal. aesthetic judgment isrem~ved from the I~mited paniculariry of a Pn'vaturt~il(207; 198),ofa Judgment devoid ofall communication, incommunicable likta judgment of the senses. Aesthetic judgment judges without rules.bm not without a regulative Idea. The call to communicate p~ceeds from this regulation.

An ind~terminable concept, the object ofwhich remains unpre-­sentable, IS called an Idea (nv, 308--26; 34]-68). Thinlcing in thestria sense knows nothing about the object of this Idea. In thedemand t:> be communicated, which is constitutive of the plea­sure provided by the beautiful, the critique discovers the sign ofanIdea. This Idea makes caste possible according to its very distinvtive delight. which is this demand irself. In estimating the beauti-ful, thought knows nothing of this Idea; it is affected by it, it hean J

its v?ice. a voice evoking the concen ofvoices, a voice promising,loolcing toward, and pracribing the "universal voice" (s6; 54). Suchis the indetermination of the concept (of reason) "underly[ing)·the conditions ofaesthetic judgment.

Limit-Ideas

. T~is concept of reason is called tim Obminnlich. the "supersen~

Sible (s6; 54). It refers to what lies above the sensible, without anyfurther determination than its localization in relation to the sensi·ble. The voice that calls for the communication ofsensation is notthe voice ofsensation. The sensation related to the state of thoughtis traversed by "another sensation" that thinlcing feels as a ClllJ

lodged in its pleasure. For the supersensible affects thought simplyby making a "sign" to it of a regulative norm, and this is whattransforms the singular feeling intO an "example" to be followednecessarily and universally.

It is not difficult to localize this voice in the transcendental tOp­ic. The dynamical resolurion of the antinomy suggests it is an Idea

TIJ~ Communication ofTasu

of reason, for taste gives rise to argumentation, and reason cannotsupply any proofs in the form of presentations-<mly a conceptwitham corresponding imuition. Like any Idea, this Idea is "in­demonstrable" (indnno,utraw/: 210; 20/). lnmomtrirrrn is "oslro­tUrf, txhibm," to present the object of a concept in intuition (211;

10/-2). For example, the Idea at the foundation of morality, the~concept of transcendental frttdom" (211; 202), is indemonstrable,as the Critiql« ofPracticlII &ason makes dear. The Idea of the su­persensible is nOt only a "transcendental rational concept" kintrJInsznuImulk Vtrnunftbtgriff: 207; 197), it is a "transcendent con­cept" (rin rransurulmrn &griff: 210; 200), according to the dis­tinaion made by the first Critiqt« in the "Concluding Note on theWhole Antinomy of Pure Reason" (nv. 48)-84; 546-47). What isconceived in the transcendent concept exceeds aU sensible intu­ition and escapes all means of proof.

So long as an Idea regulates the legitimate usc of a faculry in itsrealm or territory, it is transcendental. It is transcendent when itmakes for ir.sclf"objcas for which experience supplies no material"(nv, 483; 547). either in the realm or the territory. It is not deter­minable by the means that govern judgment in this fidd; "it is amere thought emiry" (~i" blojfn G~dttnkmding; ibid., 484; 547)·The "thought emiry" was defined in the table of Nothing as an"empty concept without object. tnS rlltionu· (ibid., 295-96;jj2-jj). It is the "blank" concept for an object for which intuitionhas nothing to show. But in ir.sclf or as an object of thought, thisempry concepl is no less certain; its transcendence is certain. Theconcept of the superstnsible is transcendent, but certain. Its cer­tainry is "immediate"; it cannot be obtained by giving proofs,which are impossible (:2.10-11; 201-2). It is transcendental in that itis required by critical reAection in the judgment of raste when re­Aection looks to legitimate the demand for the communication oftaste. It is transcendent in that its object remains unknown. Inother words, this demand to be communicated is not equivalent to

the presentation of the object of the supersensible. The demand isbur the "presence" or the sign of this object that is absolutely ab­sent, insensible, in the strictesr sense of the word "knowledge."

One might say, and Kant himself writes, that these propertiesare: also those of the Idea of freedom: the Idea of freedom is tran.scendemal, for it makes morality possible and governs the realm ofpractica.l reason; it is transcendent beca.use: itS "presence" is sig_naled only by the fe:ding of respect, which also implies the obliga.tion to bc= universally communica.terl. This is not to say that bothIdeas, the one governing the: aesthetic and the one governing theethica.l, arc the same. Thc=y arc not idemica.l but arc in a relation of"analogy" (222; 212). More precisely. the ~utiful is to the goodwhat an indirect presentation is to an unprese:ntable concept(ibid.). This "hypotyposis" is ca.lled "symbolic" (ibid.). We have

already a2lIlined the fourfold relSOn for this analogy, expoundedin paragJ'2ph 59 (see Chapter 7. pp. 166-]1).\ In faa, although the: text e:ncourages such a reading-for the

critique: of aesthetic judgment c=nds with the analogy of the: beau­tiful and the good--the U'3.J1SCCnde:nt concept of the: supersc=nsibleuncove:m:l. by the a2lIlination of this judgmem unOI the object of J

the comparison of the: ~utifuJ with the good. What is comparedto the Idea of practical relSOn, transcendental frttdom, is the Ideaproper to the F.tcuIty ofaesthetic judgment, the aesthetic Idea. Thislaner expression, introduced in "technical" terms in the First R,e..

mark of paragraph 57. is repea.rc=d. as we: have already seen (secChapter 2, pp. 60-67) from the analysis of genius (175-81.;16'-74). The e:xpression designates a mode of prese:ntation offorms by the imagination in which no determinc=d concept couldbc= adc=quate to the presentation, nor could it be rende:rc=d by anyintelligible: language (1]5-76; 16H8). One is temptc=d to say that ifin fact the:re is an Idea of the faculty of aesthetic judgment analo--gous to that of practica.l reason, it is transcendental freedom onceagain-but the transcendental freedom of the imagination and notof the will. Thus the Idea of aesthetic judgmem is the "counter·part" to the Idea of reason (1]6; 168): presentation without ade--quate concept, concept without adequate prese:mation.

In the Dialectic this symmetry motivates the opposition of the:<'inexponible" Unncponib~l) and the "indemonStrable" (imkmon·umbel: 210; 201). To give exponents is to pm a representation of

the imagination into concepts; thus the aesthetic Ide:a, which doesnot permit this, is inexponible. The Idea of reason is indemon~

m-able because the opposite is true: the concept does not find ad~

equate intuition. This opposition is enough to prevent any confu­sion, and even any continuity, between the: e:thical and the aes­thetic. Their relation must be maintained by the: critique in the

form of an analogy. The aesthetic inexponibility can be no morc:than a symbol of indemonstr.tbility. Although taSte is linked (Q agood proportion of the farolnes of knowledge (but only seen as the

subjective condition of me possibility ofexperience, the sntIUl com~

munu), there is in both the aesthetic and the ethical a kind of 0;.

cess in the play of one farolty with me Other: tOO much imagina·

rive presentation, too much rational obligation.The: final analogy, discussed in paragr.tph 59. thus esClblishes a

paralld between the Idea of the beautiful and the Idea of the good,a "de:monstration" and an "exposition" (one must be wary of thesewords). The analogy is not at all about the indeterminate concept

of the supe:rsensible. The supersensible is ofeven higher rank. Forwhat the: supe:rsensible must esClblish is the: agreement or the affin~

ity of the farolties themselves with each other. despite: the ex~me:_ differe:nces between Ideas (we: have touchc=d on those concerning

the ethical and the: aesthe:tic) encounte:m:l. by these faculties at thevery limit of the:ir power when thc=y seek to discover the suprc:mecondition of the spttific conditions of possibility of their respectivete:rritories or realms. The: faculty ofdesire culminates in the Idea ofa transcendental freedom for the: ethical realm, and the nrolty of

presentation rolminates in the Idea of a transcendental freedomfor the: territory of the aesthetic. But tnc=y are not alone. Under~

standing also cannot avoid maximiz.ing its concepts (that conditionthe possibility of a knowlc=dge of experience) to the Ideas of "ab­solute completeness" (absoillte Vollsliindiglui/) that form the tableof cosmological concepts: "composition" (Zusammensetzung), "di­vision,n "origination" (Enrsu/Jlwg). and the "dependence of exis­

tenCen(KRV, 390, t.m.; 444). The antinomies resulting ftom these

concepts, when the:y are maximized to the absolute, show onceagain that understanding, otherwise master of rules in the territo-

71Je Communicntion ofTasuTb~ Communication ofTasu

The Communicl1Iion ofTaste

ry of the knowl.ed~e of nature, contradicts itself when it attemptsto know these limn-Ideas. They belong to theoretical reason in itstranscendental freedom to conceive.

When each of the faculties of knowledge (in the broad sense)~ches its point of breathlessness, its hubris, it is seized by itS in~

trinsic weakness. The antinomy is the logical (transcendental)mark of the contradiction. i.e., the limit. Beousc= there are "thrttfaculties ofcognition," there are three antinomies: "fOr I," rogniriwjiuulry an antinomy of reason in respect of the theoretica.l employ.menr of understanding carried to the point of the unconditioned"·"fOr lluf«ling ofpkilJUrr and dispkmurr an antinomy of reason i~respect of the aesthetic employment ofjudgment"-and hert onemight add: to the point of the universality necessary to taSte; "/01rlu faculty oftUsirr an antinomy in respect of the praetica.l employ.ment ofse1f.legislative reason: or to the point of the autonomy ofdesire in the law (21.4, t.m.; 204).

The "to the point of the unconditioned," which is indicative ofthe limit &om which the antinomy atises, and which I will allowmyself to specify for the two following antinomies, indicates that itis indeed a question of the unthinkable horizon that each po~r ofthought approaches in its passion to legitim:ue itself. h is a ques­tion of horizons becausc= the unconditioned of the conditions ofthought in each of its capacities is always deferred, and its searchhas no end. In the name of"reason" one is entitled to hear the in·terminable heuristic act of critical reflection itself. With the meansreflection has at its disposal in each of the realms or territoriesmentioned, reAection cannot determine the absolutes upon whichthese means depend. The unconditioned of knowledge cannot beknown. The absolute law of the faculty of desire cannot be de·sired. The supersensible principle that founds the demand for theuniversal communication of taste is not the object of an acstheticpleasure. However, the horizon is "present" everywhere. What weare calling "presence" in contradistinction to presentation is theeffect of this transcendence, its sign, on theoretical, pr:lctical, andaesthetic thought. If "reason" is truly reflection when it arrives atthese border regions, at these borders, one can see the advantage

J

T!Je ConmllwicOlion ofTmle

rhe reflective faculty of judgment has in aesthetic judgment whenit approaches the absolute.

The Supersensible Substrate

The Idea of the superscnsible was discussed under the name ofthe "intelligible" in the first Crilique (KRV, 467-69.; 527-29) in theresolution of the third cosmological antinomy with the dynamicalsynthesis of condition and causc= (see Chapter 5, pp. 131-37). Thissame Idea appears under the name of the "supersensible" in theCritiqur ofPractical !«mon (KPV, 56-59; 6,~7): it is the "theorerj·cally empty" concept, but one that conditions tht: very possibilityof morality. of an "empirically unconditioned causality" (ibid., 58;66). The Idea of the supersensible is not, howevet, one of the limit­Ideas ofa realm or terrirory, or, rather, it is all of these Ideas. Ltt ussay that these Ideas, listed as we have read in the exposition of thethree antinomies (214; 2°4), are in effect horizons speci6ed ac­cording to tht: faculry, but that the supersensible is the horizon ofthese horizons, the notion the critique needs to unify them. Thesupersensible guarant~ that these profoundly heterogeneous ca­pacities of thinking-theoretica.l, practica.l, and aesthetic-nont:­thdess share an affinity with each other. This affinity is mrealed byway of the similarity of their respective inconsistencies. Each f.tc­ulty is seized with the impossibility of thinking its limit with themeans it has at its disposal, but that it must try to think this limitis the sign of the superscnsible. This sign is transitive in relation rothe heterogeneity of the faculties.

But this sign does not pUt an end to their hett:rogeneity. On thecontrary, the supersensible must signal itself (iich uigm: 215, Lm.;20,) in each of the three faculrary orders. It is the "substrate" thatmakes one nature oU[ of tht: rorality of phenomena (Subitrol derNotl/r: ibid.). But it is also the principle of affinity of this naturewith our powet of knowing envisaged subjectively as the pleasureof taste (Prit/zip der subjeckliven ZwtCkmdjtigkeit der MUllr furumer Erkf!lJlIl1liswrmogm: ibid.). The superscnsible is also the prin­ciple according to which transccndcnral freedom poses its ends

Tiu CommuniclJtion ofTasu

and the principle that accords these ends with morality, "Prinzi;dno ZuNckt tUr Frtihtir und Prinzi; tUr Obmmtimmung d~/~mir jm" in Sil/lichtn" (ibid.). These three different functions areassured by the Idea of the supersensible. In the final analysis theyare nor only what accords each fuculty with the exercise of irs pow_er; they are brought together by the common sign of their incom_petence to think this exercise to its conclusion, to exercise theirpower in thinking this power itsel(

Thus the supersensible--the unique name for this "bounded_ness" or this "unboundedness"-is what makes all manners ofthinking "compossible" insofar as they all think excessively. Onemust think excessively, until one reaches a discordance, in order tohear the voia= ofconcordance.

Moreover this voice is the one that CUl be heard in the presup­position of a snuus communis for the aesthetic faculty. The truededuction of the demand for oommuniciltion is thus the following:(I) The feeling, altogether singular, of the beautiful immediatelyJinvolves the demand to be universally and necessarily communi­cated. (1) In order to found this oomradictory demand, a JnIJUS

communis muSt be presupposed. (j) This presupposition, itselfparadoxical, is only permitted if in turn a principle can assurethought of irs consistency with regard to all of its "objecu" (in­cluding itself) when this consistency appears impossible. Thisprinciple of harmonious acoord must serve as nature in all acts ofthought, all judgmentS, however heterogenrous they may be. This"natural" principle is called "the supersensible substrate of all thesubject's faculties" (211; 20;), of all the faculties of the "subject,"that is, of thought. It is "that which forms the point of referena=for the harmonious accord [zusnmmfflJtimmmdj of all our facul­ties of cognition-the production of which accord is the ultimateend set by the intelligible basis of our nature" (ibid.• t.m.).

The antinomy of taste (indisputable/disputable) is finally re­solved by having recourse (Q this indeterminable "nature." This"natUre" also works when thinking is blocked as it reaches its lim­its. With this substrate the dead ends can be commuted to pas­sageways. The dynamical synthesis provides the general model for

Tlu Communication ofTasu

this mutation. Aesthetic feeling. as I have said, has the advantagein [hat it gives virtually ditect access to the Idea of this substrate.\'i/e have seen (see Chapter 7. pp. 171-73) that there is an "aesthet­ic and unconditioned finality in ... art" (112; 20;) unconditionedbecause it is not subject to a causality by concept: the artist doesnot know what he does, the amateur does not know whal il is hetastes. Neither consults "rule or precept" (R~gt/ othr Vorschrifi:ibid.) when estimating form. Their judgment is guided by a "sub­jective standard" (subj~ktilJt' RichtmaJft) that works as "mere na­

ture in the subject" (ibid.).Funhermore. what setS this standard, what may "serve" (ibid.) as

a purely reRecrive measure for aesthetic finality, is the principle ofthe supersensible subsrt'2te. Why is this? Simply because the su­persensible guarantees, prior to all schemas, prior to all rules andnorms, that the synthesis of the manifold, of even the most het­erogeneous manifold, is always possible. Even the synth:sis of themanifold faculties themselves--imagination, understanding, theo­retical reason, desire. and feeling-is possible. The action. theWirkungofitS action, is reassuring, liberating. and generous, and isexperienced immediately in the: aesthetic paradox ofa singular feel­ing claiming universal validity. Once it is kno~n tha~ the "aesthet­ic and unconditioned finality" to be found In art has to Isol/]make a warranted claim to being bound to please everyone lJ'ttkr­mann gtfizlkn zu mumn) (ibid.), the claim can only be fully legit­imated by the principle: according to which the nature of thoughtis to feel pleasure on the occasion oHorms. or by th~ p~nciple.ac­cording to which it is in the: nature of forms to prOVide Immediate

pleasure for thought. . . .. .Thus when taste demands its possible commUnication, It signi­

fies that reRective thought, in its most subjective relation to itselfand its most immediate relation to the object (form), is naturallyin accord with itself and with its givens in general. This. I think, iswhat allows one to understand the "digression" of paragraph 40(150-54; 145-47) where the critical analysis appears su~~enly to

stray from the description of the aesthetic s~nmJ communu LO orderto list the "maxims of common human understanding" appur-

218 The Commun;cation ofTtlSUThe Communication ofTasu 21 9

tenant to the ways ?f thinking in general. The line of argumentseems [0 have ~n lm~rrup~ed. However, in saying that thinking~US( always.think for Itself, In accord with aU other thought. andIn accord With itself, the said maxims simply attest, in the lan­guage of popular wisdom, [0 me certainty of always being ablethin~: this is what thinking concludes from the principle of h~~mO~IOW a~rd. I have said (see Chapter I, pp. 36-43) that these:~axl~S all ~nvolved reRection. J will add that if reRection can riskItself In trymg to understand something it does not understllnd(h~risti~), using to guide itself only the subjective feeling (caure­goncaJ), It owes this ability to the:: assurance of the accord given itby the su~rsensiblc=. One must not forget that it is reRectivethought i~lf that discovers me principle of this guaranree: in the~u~rsenslble substrate. Hence "the subjective condition of allJudgme.nts is the judging facu.lry itself, or judgment [das Vmniignrzu ururkn «lbIt. odn- di~ UruiIJltraftl" (143, t.m.; IJ7).

The Procedure of Communication

Thw it is easy to show how the presupposition of a JnlSUS com­mu.,nu owes nothi~g to. ex~rience. Consequently a "psychologi­cal but also a SOCiological l.nrerpretuion (84; aI) of the aestheticcommuniry is to be rejeered. An interpretation of this order inter­feres with the critical procedure. which cannm be inductive andmwt ~in with the given in order to establish the conditions ofits ~ibiliry; the critical procedure returns to the given in order to

legmmate or delegitimate that for which it "gives" itself. The de-­mand for. po~ible communication as it is given in the feding oft~~ beaut~ful ~nduces ~ sn/sus communis as its condition of possi.bility. whlc.h. In turn, IS founded upon the supersensible principleof harmOniOus accord. It goes without saying that the mere em­pirical fact of unanimity, Ot even a simple majority opinion. fa­vorable to a singular judgment that declares a form to be beautiful,can do nothin~ to legitimate the intrinsic claim of this judgmentto be commUnicable to all. The "universal voice" is nOt the resultof a Vote. Communicability is a transcendental characteristic of

(:\Ste, and it in turn requires a transcendental supplement, i.e., the

Idea of the supersensible.Howevet, a number of passages in the "Analytic of the Beautiful"

seem to call for both a sociologiz.ing and "egologiz.ing" reading, so10 speak, or at least an anthropological one. To begin with the de­finition of «nsus rommunu given in paragraph 40 (151; 144), I willquote the passage directly in a translation I f«1 is respectful to theletler of the text but no more caught up in the anthropologicalbias than is necessary, in order that the reader bear witness to whatI say and in order to shorten the discussion: "By the name smsuscommunis is to be understood the Ida. of a communal sense[gmuinsdtitfi/ichm Sinnnl, that is, a critical f.tculry, which in itsreRective aCt takes into consider:illtion, in thought (it priori) [inCddtznltm (it priori)), the mode of represent2tion ofany other Ifrtksandnm], in order, as it 1«Tt, to weigh irs judgment with the col­lective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the iUwion arisingfrom subjective and personal conditions which could readily betaken for objecrive, and might exm a prejudicial inRuence upon itsjudgment" (151, em.; 1«). The ~nd of the passage is tranSlated a bitfreely in order to makt: the sentence a litcle easier going than it is.- The crucial point is thej~dn andnrn. It is generally understoodto mean "everyone else." It .seems to me that the expression echoesanother, r.lthet strange formulation: ~inn lkuruilungwomiigffl, "itpower of estimation," lakes into account (Rucltsicht nimmt) an·other (itlldntn) power of estimation whatever it may be, j~tks. Inthe same way, gkichsam, "as it were," is italiciz.ed in the text, whichindicates that the comparison (we are in the middle of reRection)of a judgment with oth~r judgments is made "almost as if" think­ing sought, by the comparison, to "attach" the judgment to humanreason in general. It does this consequently in the mode of the alsob. In the same way, the "communal" (gemd1Jschllfi/ich) nature ofthe sensus communis (and there is no reason to translate it by "com­mon to a"") seeks to compare "in thought" (in Gultmkm) (andnor "in thinking") and to compare a priori (and nOI in experience)a singular aesthetic estimation with another estimation, whalcver itmay be. The aesthetic "community" is nor primarily constituted by

the convergence ofopinions given by individuals. It is "deployed,.so (0 s~ak. by a work of ~riation thar "[hou~tu," and thOUght

alone (m Guinnkm) effects In order (Q remove !(Sdr from iu "pri.vate" condition, deprived as it is of the Other by the singularity ofiu act ofestimation. One could say that reRection reduces the es..timarions of the form that it judges beautiful in order 10 ensu~

that iu estimation, immediate and singular, is reasonably unive:r_saliza.ble. In this~ it hardJy maners whether the empirical indi­vidual in charge of this memal variation is the same as the onewhose estimation it was in the first place. Wert he to find himsdf"on an uninhabited island" (43; -'It), the demand and the: procedun!of this communicuion would ~ no less necessary to ensure thai:his estimation. like the disinu:rar of this estimation, was a p~aathetic judgment.

Thus the only remaining amhropological resonance in the telt

is the ~ocation of the "collecrive rt:aSOn of mankind." Althoughwhat follows sounds very similar: "This is what happt:ns by weigh­ing ont:'s judgmt:nt [.srin UlUi/l, not so much with aauaJ, as r:UMwith the merdy possible, with the judgments ofothers [an anb~r . .. Uruik hiJlt} and by putting oursdvt:$ in the position of~ne dSt: [in di~ St~1kj~dn antkml), as the result ofa mere ab­straction from the limitations which contingently affect our ownestimate (ummorrigt7lffl &un~i'ungr (151. t.m.; 144-45). Here itSttffiS difficult to support the purdy transcendental thesis of themt:a.ning of "communal." "One" has one's own estimate, one putsoneself (vas~lZ/) in the place ofanother to escape the contingencyof one's own singular judgment: does this nor refer to human in·dividua.ls who practice these gymnastics? It is true that these gym·nastics belong more to the order of the possible than to the rea.!.Yet are they not the inevitable condition of human "sympathy:given that the ego can be in the place of the "you" only in an imag­inary transference?

I do not deny that the conception of UlIJltJ commul/is still bears(faces of what the critique itself calls its "empirical realism." Thedi~mg~JclJi~ht mm dndurch. the "this is what happens," of the lastpassage cited shows obvious signs of this realism. The laner is an

TJx Communication ofTaJU

c:ssential factor of the critical procedure along with transcendentalidt.-alism. Yet in order that this feeling be properly aesthetic, it isimponant not to confuse the twO movements, for it is not the faCtof the call for a Jt7lJUJ communis present in aesthetic feeling thatneeds to be established, but, rather, the legitimacy of this fact thatis its necessity a priori. And on this subject, the to:t does nOt allowfor any hesitation. It Ceast:S to be anthropological and bt:comesIruly critical when it comes time to daborate the proet:dure bywhich aesthetic thought seeks to emancipate itself from the con~

tingent particularities that might weigh on irs estimation. Onereaches this "absU2oion- "by so far as possible letting go the de­ment of the matta, i.e., ~nsation {Empftndungl •. .. and confininganention to the formal peculiarities of our representation or gen~

era! state of representative activity" (151; /45)·However one interprers it, the "communal- operation thus al~

ways demands a kind of purifioation of the representation of theobject judged beauriful or of the ·subjective state" that responds inthought to this representation. There is a kind of skimming off ofeverything mat might be ·maner" in the representation or the sub­. tive state it produces. One can prom~ oneself the ·agreementof everyone" only for "the delight remaining- once consciousnesshas separated out "~erythingbelonging to the agrttable and the

good" ('7; U)· .The "matter" of sensation must be eliminated from aesthetic

pleasure because it aercises a "charm" over thought. When mink~

ing is subjected to this charm, its judgment is a "judgment ofsense" (65; 62). also called a "material aesthetic judgment": such ajudgment only apresses the "agreeableness or disagreeableness"(ibid.) of the object. Thus the marter of representation creates aninterest. A delight owing to matter is an emotion. There is nothingaesthetic in all of this, at least from the point of view of taste (thesublime is an emotion, but not owing to matter; it is due to theabsence of form, which is not the same thing: see Chapter 2, pp.

,6-67)'The matter of representation is called Empftndung, "sensation,"

in the sense of the first Critiqlu. In agreeableness, "sensation alone"

TJu Communication ofTasuno

(/edig/ieh Empfinduug: 66, t.m.; 63) suffices to provide pleasure.The state of thought is euphoric. but it cannot lay claim ro a uni­versal and necessary communication. This agreeable Stafe can itselfbe called "the matter ofdelight" (65; 62) because it is a delight ow.ing to matter. It does not result from the good proportion of rhefaculties of knowledge in play in pure aesthetic judgment.

The faculties of knowledge can only be in accord. even for juSt amoment-the moment taste arises-if each lends iuelf to the playof the mher, to the "rules of the game" of the other. Thus theycan only be in accord insofar as understanding moderates its ap­petite for concepts and gives up "invesriguing" (gt:scIJiifiig . ..durchzUJpiihm: KRV A, 147; (85) appearances in order to ascribesome rule to them. But they can also only be in accord insofar asthe imagination concentrates on pure forms. free of concepts andalso free of maner: fanciful constructions of relations in which un.dersranding will believe itSelf able to give free rein to itS rules. Thus J

the imagination gives understanding "the wealth of material"(Sroff) which overwhelms it. and which is not the matter of sen·sation, but the proliferation of forms (see Chapter 2, pp. 60-67).Only then does agreeableness give way to "favor," which is the

subjective state of thought, the delight corresponding to the esti·mate of forms.

This purge is the way aesthetic thought succeeds in putting itselfin the place of the other and in laying claim to the communicationo,~itS judgmellt. From this we conclude that judgment can only layclaim to irs communication when it has been purged of materialcharms. The argument here proceeds from a critical (transcenden·ral) purification to a possible empirical communication. However,there is an argument that works in the opposite direction. For ex·ample, one finds the following lines at the end of paragraph 40, af·ter the passage we have JUSt examined: "We might even define tasreas the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given rep­resentation universally communicable without mediation of a con·cepr" (153; 147). From which one would conclude instead thatcommuniGlbility is what ensures the purity of the judgment oftaste.

There is no need to "choose" between these twO versions of the

procedure of communication. Transcendentally, the critique pr~­

ceeds from the purity of taste (itS quantity of disinterest) to ltScommunicability (itS universal quantity and necessary modality),

passing through its finality (that is, its relation; see Chap~ers 2 and3)' The disinterest of delight is always pur forward to umoducethe paradox of a universality withom concept. Bur empirically, rhe

purity of rhe judgment of taste is estimated according to t~e p~~­sibility of its communication. One could say that commumcabdl­ry is in faCt the ratio cog;noscmdi of the purity of taste, the way inwhich taste is recognizable when it occurs, but that this same pu­rity is the ratio essendi of the possible communication, which

would be impossible without if.All of this, Kant concludes, may seem kii1lStlich, "artificial." And

yet "nothing is mote natural" than purging aesthetic pleasure ofcharm and emotion if it is to have an exemplary and universal val­

ue (152; 145). This is because the nature of taSte is artistic. and art isnature. Even the supersensible principle is like a "nature" inthought that oversees its harmonious accord (212-13; 202--j). Thisdoes not prevent the Idea of this principle from being the fruit of

an art of thinking that is kiimtlich (85; 82).

llJThe Communication ofTasu7JJe Commllniauion ofTasu'l2

§ 9 The Communication

of Sublime Feeling

A Mediarized Communication

?ne must ask onesdfwhtth~sublime feding also demands to beun~versally com.municared. like rasre, and whether it is justified in J

dOing so according to the same principle of snuus rommunis with itssupreme fina1~ty in the.5upersmsible. This question is raisat in para­graph 39. which aanunes the communicability of a sensation (tinMhtnlbarJtril nun- Empfindung: 148-50; 142-44). The examinationof the commu.nic:abil~ryof the sublime takes up very liule spaa.

The text distinguishes four kinds of sensation. according [0

~hether the: sensation is due to the senses, 10 morality, to the su~hme, or to me beautiful. This repeats the division made at the be­ginning of the "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the name of the qualj..t)' of taste (42-50j 4(}-4$). The pleasure in the beautiful, "favor"(GII1JSt), is the only delight "free" ofall imeresr. The pleasure in thesenses is "conditioned" by the interesl the senses lake in the exis-­ten~ of ~he obi,ea, ~n its "material" presence. As for the delight tak·en m dOI~g.or Judgl~g what is good, what is "'esteemed, approved"(49; 47), It IS determmed by the interest that results from the obli·g,ltion of the empirical will to realize moral law, Moral obligation,the Gebol, the commandment, does not result from an interest andin this it is altogether different from the necessity experienced b~ thesenses; however moral obligation creates an interesl in the reali7.3tionof the good (54-57, 112, 159-60; 46-48, 1/8, 1$2).

214

The Communication ofSublime Fuling 225

In me "First Moment" of the "'Analytic of the Beautiful," thecritique distinguishes three kinds of delighl (.s« Chapter 7. pp.15?-63). In paragraph 39, a fourth delight is added, the delightprovided by "the sublime in nature" (die Lusl am Erhabmm derNatur: 149; 142). Furthermore, the category or the reAoctive spaceoverseeing the examination is no longer the quality of the delight,but irs possible communicalion, irs Mjueilbarlttit, which has amodal character. Thus the entire elaboration of communicabilityin wte is to be reconsidered here in relation 10 the sublime. Bythis I mean that the quality of sublime feeling. disinterested likeIhe feeling of the beautiful (they please "on their own account":90; 87), but in whjch pleasure and displeasure combine "dynami~

cally" (.s« Chapter 5). is not enough to determine irs commun.ica~

bility. As with the beautiful, one must proceed with the examina·tion of sublime judgment according to its quantity and modality.The question is to know whether a singular sublime judgment im·mediatdy requires one to obtain. as t2Stt does, a universal and nec·essary agreement. and whether a sublime judgment requires thisimmediately, that is, whether its very occurrence carries with il

_ this demand, prior to all concepts, as the simple sign of the sub-­

jective universality necessary in all thought.To this question, the texl clearly says "no," We must remember,

however, that me feelings of the beautiful and the sublime wereeasily assimilated to one another with regard to their universaliz.a.·lion: "The judgments: 'That man is beautiful' and 'He is tall' donOt purport to speak only for the judging subjecl, but, like th~retical judgments, they demand the assent of everyone" (95; 92).

Our text, on the contrary, asserrs thai sublime feeling "lays claimalso 10 universal participation" (machl zwar tlucb aufallgemeint"l~jln(bmtmgAnspruch: '49; 143), bur this cnllcannot be immediatein the same way as it is in taste. The demand for universality thatis proper to the sublime passes Uthrough lvermituhr] the morallaw Ides mora/iseben Geutw]" (ibid.), The pleasure in the sublimeis said to be a pleasure "of rationalizing contemplation" (als Lustder venzunfu/ndm Konumplnljo'I), the pleasure that we have in

contemplating while reasoning (149; 142-43).

•

The Other Feeling

This "other feeling" is not named in the passage. Yet what ismentioned about it suffices to identify it. It is a very obscure feel~

ing; it has a moral foundation; it signals the supersensible sphere of

We have seen (see Chapter 4. pp. 115-22) that, as pleasure, thecontradictory feeling of the sublime holds exclusively to the "soul~

stirring delight" provided by the Idea of the absolute (as wholeand as cause) and that only rationalizing thought, reason, can rep­TeSent this unpresemable object, which is, properly speaking. anIdea. This pleasure is the "anractive" component of the sublimeemotion (or "shock"). This component corresponds to the obser.vation of an object that is a being of reason. The "repulsion" thattakes hold of thought and preventS it from pursuing the contem_plation of the object comes from its powerlessness to present itthrough a synthesis of the imagination.

Thus the communicabiliry of sublime feeling as delight wouldonly belong [Q reason as a universal capaciry, and irs universalitywould in faCt be that of moral law. The [ext suggesrs this so S[fong-Iy that it almost breaks the precarious uniry of the paradoxical feeJ­

ing and almoSt destroys the dynamical synrhesis that constitutes it. J

However, the very notion of a pleasure tied to the exercise of ra·tional thought, even if only contemplative (and not directly ethi·cal), is nOt a simple one. For if the demand for universal commu~

nication is mediatized in sublime feeling by the representation of"moral law," we also know that the concept of this law translates oris experienced subjectively as a feeling, respect, whose specific qual~

iry is that it is neither pleasure nor pain (KPV, 78-92; 8~I04). Vetthe text we are discussing seems to escape this objection. It suggesrsthat pleasure as a component of sublime feeling only claims [0 becommunicated because "it already [scbon] indeed {docb] presup~

poses another feeling [ein and~m Gefiibl], that, namely, of irs su~

persensible sphere" (149, Lm.; 143). (I emphasize the dod?, the s~in-

er of" its . .. sphere" relates the sphere to thought.) Vet this "otherfeeling," howevet "obscure" (dunkel) it may indeed also (auch) be,still has "a moral foundation" (tin momliscbe Gnmdlagt: ibid.).

227The Communication o/Sublime Fuling

thought. We recognize respect, the Achtungor regard thai the sec~

and Critique carefully isolates as the only moral feeling. "And thecapacity [Fiihigkeit} of taking such an inrerest in the law (or ofhaving respect for the moral law itself) is really moral feeling"(KPV, 83; 94). The "interest" in question is free of all motive. Re­spect does not satisfy the need thinking has to obey the law. On

the contrary, as we have seen, listening [Q the law may simply pr~­

duce in thought an interest in doing good (ibid.). This reversal ISthe central motif of the second Cn'tiqltt and a recurrent one in the

third Critique. The regard thought feels for the law is nOt interest~

cd (in the sense of motivation). However the categorical impera~

tive, without content (without "matter"), that is, the command­ment issued from the mere form of the moral law, determines the

interest thought has in certain objects-good actions that havebeen done and remain to do (49, 122-24, 159; 47, u8-19, 112)·

The law must not prescribe what is good, for then the will would

be affected "pathologically" (KPV, 83; 94) and could not claim to be

freely determined. Because it is not "pathologicaL" beca~s: ~e­spectful thought is not subject to any heteronomy, respect IS Slll­gular" (sotlturbar) and unlike any other feeling. Its manner is norlike any other but is, father, of a "peculiar kind" (eigentiim/icherArt: ibid., 79; 89). It is obscure because it is "blank" in relation to

pleasure and pain. It is not a pleasure. One only "reluctantly givesway to it as regards a man." One even makes an effor~ to defendoneself against the respect due the law. Nor, however, IS respeCt a

displeasure (ibid., 80-81; 9D--91). One cannot "ever satisfy oneself{nichr SIlftSehm} in comemplating the majesty of the law" (ibid., 81,

Lm.; 91).These strange properties converge in the following property: re~

spect is wthe only case wherein we can determine from n prioriconcepts the relation of a cognition (here a cogni~ion of pu:e .pr.ac~tical reason) to the feeling of a pleasure or a displeasure (Ibid.,

75; 85). Respect is produced "by an intellectual cause," which isthe law, and as such it is the only feeling "that we can know com­

pletely n prion''' (ibid., 76; 86). To say that it is pr~tlC"e~ b.y thelaw is going too far. It "is nor the incentive to morabry ; It IS the"presence" of the law regarded sllbjectively, its "sign," "morality it-

Tht Communication ofSlIblimt Feeling226

self regarded subjectively as an incentive" (ibid., 78; 89). Because ofits n priori StatuS it does nOf wait for the occasion with which an

object might provide it in order [Q appear; re>pcct is "there" as thesignaJ in thought of its disposition to desire the Good. It is thesubjective: 11 priori of moral thought. In this sense respect does notbelong to the faculty of pleasure and displeasure. Respect is in­clem the disposition and the sign of the disposition of thought,but only insofar as it wanrs or "desires," and nOt iosof-a as it suf­fers.

Thus it is "another feeling" altogether from the sublime feeling.The sublime feeling is an emorion, a violent emotion, cl~ to un­rcas<>n, which forces thought [0 me extremes of pleasure and dis­~Ieasun=. from joyous exaltuion to terror; the sublime fec:ling is asughtly scrung between ultraviolet and infrarro as resp«t is white.This does not pmrc=nt sublime: pathos from "presupposing" an "ap­athe:tic· resp«t. For if thought did not have: the: powc=r of con~

C(:pts in the: form of an Ida, if it did not have: the: absolute: (fm=)causal.iry that founds the: law for which and from which it feels re­sp«t, it would have: no chancc= of feeling me: magnitude: and forcc=of "raw" natUrl: so intc=nS(:!y as signs nc=gativdy indicative: of the:"presc=ncc=" of this Ida. Sublime feeling is not moral f«ling, but itu:quires the: "capaciry" of taking a pUrl: inte:rest in the: law. On the:basis of this presupposition it is arguc=d that sublime: f«ling cannotbe r(:Cognittd as having a "communicabiliry" analogous to that oftaste. The:rc= is no sublime: smsus communis bc=cause the: sublimcneeds the: mc=diation of moral feeling, and the: latter is a concept ofreason (freedom as absolUlc causaliry) that is fdt subj«tively (1 pri.ori. Because: it is felt subj«tively by thought, this concept does in.deed translate as a feeling (although an altogether different one).But as a concept that is felt, this feeling proceeds (1 priori from afaculry of knowing, i.e., reason in its practical usagc=.

This is the movemcnt invoked by the text of the Deduction to

explain why sublime feeling has no need for a dc=duction in the:critical sense. The affiniry (or finality) of the form of an objectwith the faculry of feeling pleasure: or displasure:. or taste. even asit is expounded in detail according to thc four "hadings" of re.

229Tht Communic(1tion ofSublimt Fuling

Aective: judgment, still requires a "deduction." The: critique mustreveal what is presupposc:d as an (1 priori condition for such anaffinity (which is ral, for raste aim) to be possible:. This condi­tion is the: smsus communis, and bqond it the: supc=rsensible sub.strate:. Such is not the: ca.sc= with the sublime:. Its critical "exposi­tion" is "at the samc= time:" (zugkich) its deduction (1}4; 12p).Through the simple analysis ofsublime: feeling, this aposition dis­cove:rs in it directly "a final relation of the cognitive: faculties," aparadoxical relation: final for pUrl: practical reason, "contra-final"for the imagination. But iliis paradoxical relation attests by iliisvery fact mat it is (1 priori "at the basis of the: faculty of ends (thc=will)" (dnn Vmniignt ekr Zw«ltt (dmr WiIJm] a priori tum GruntiLgt/tgt wmlm muff: ibid.). This is lxcau.sc= the sublime contains the:concq>t ofabsolute: causality, or frtt will. or practical reason whichis the: concept of a causaHty of the e:nd. This end is mc= univc=rsa1·iurion of practical freedom. This is why sublime: feding is Ic=giti­matc in demanding its unive:rsa.liution, without needing its owndeduction (ibid.). It owes this privil~ to its dO$(: cousinship withmoral feeling: frtt will is a universaJ Ida. and resp«t. which is

_ this Ida felt subjectively. is also unive:rsaJ.This must be aplained furthe:r still. Thc= concqJt of freedom as

absolute causality is not d(:te:rminant. Its object. freedom. remainsinde:te:rminate (in the: 5(:n5(: de:manded by undc=rsranding), -in·compre:he:nsible:" (unbtgrtif/ich for the unde:rstanding). "in­scrutable:" (unnfimchlich: KPV, 7. 48. 49; 8. 56, 57)· But as suchthis object of the: pure: Ida of reason is indispc=nsablc= (KPV. 7; 8) t~the: realm of morality; it is its foundation. its condition of poSSI­bility. For this indetermination makes the: determination of whatfreedom is impossible: and kc=eps the law from having a content. Itprescribes that one: must judge: the good and. the: bad, whenthought so desires. But the: d(:Cision about what IS good and ~adbelongs to the thought that desires. Thus the: thoug~t th~[ d(:$l~escan desire: freely, that is, morally. The: law only prOVides It a gUId-

ing thread with which to help it in thi~ decisio~. .Furrhermore:, this thre:ad or rc=gulauve Idea IS preCisely that of

the possible universal communication of the ~maxim" supponing

J

The Communication ofSublime Fuling,,8

~hough~ in irs decision. "So act thar" (Handk so, daJf: KI>V, }O; 36),Act as If' (Hnndk ok ob: Foundntion oflb~ M~liIphYJiCJ ofMorals,

Akad, 4, 421): these clauses modalize the rule of universalization(thar is, the quantity of the imperative) in order to allow this ruleiu merely regulative character. Bur the coment of the rule, thusmodalized, is clearly me demand for a universal communication:"that the maxim of your will will always hold at the same: time as aprinciple establishing universal law" (KPV, )0; J6). Thus we Stt

how the communication required by morality is mediarjzed. h ismediari7Ld by the law. More precisely still, it is required by thevery form of the law. In F.tcr it is the whole of the fann. This formis borrowed from the form of a conceptual, cognitive rule andrransposro analogically into the practical realm. The law is nO[ arule, but is formulated according to me "type" ofa rule of knowI·

edge, retaining from mis rule only me principle of its universalvalidity. This is what the typic of the second Criliqu, explains J

(KPV. 70-74; 79-84).Universality. which is thus transposed from knowledge to the

practical, loses through the analogy its determined character andassumes its function as "guiding thread"-as indicated by the ilUDb and the so, daft Meanwhile the concept of understanding istransformed into an Idea of reason, and the phenomenon. on theside of the object. is henceforth grasped as a sign. All voluntary ac­tion given in experience gives way to knowledge according to theseries of conditions of which it is the conditioned. Bur the sameaction, subjected cognitively to the syntheses of intuition. of theimaginatio~and understanding, can also be judged mOr:Illy, as the

effect (~he Slg~) o~ a free causality. Thus the criterion for evaluatingthe action resIdes In the clause ofa possible universalization. How­ever, in spite of the profound tr:Insformation of the nature of uni.

ve.rsal~ty as it passes from knowledge to morality, universality re­taIns Irs conceptual foundation. The concept belongs henceforthto reason and no longer to understanding, yet as Idea it remainswhat legitimates the demand for universalization made of themOr:I1 maxim. Moreover, because this demand is the only demandheard in sublime feeling (and suffices to authorize or "deduce" it in

23'TIJ, Commlmicnfion ofSllblime Fuling

itS claim for possibl..: communication), one must say that the latter

is in fact "mediatiz.ed" by the concept of reason.In conclusion we see that the demand to be communicated is of

an altogether different nature in the sublime than it was in thebeautiful. Twice different. First. the demand in sublime feelingdoes nm properly belong to sublime feeling. The demand comesto sublime feeling from me demand to be communicated inscribedin the form of the moral law. and this laner demand is authorizedby the simple fact that the law rests on the the Idea of freedom.The demand is authorized by the faculty of concepts and the fac·ulty of desire. Far from being "immediate" like the demand oftaste, far from being a universality "apart from a concept" (60; 58).

the universality in question in sublime fee:ling passes through theconcept of practical reason. If one does not have the Idea of free­dom and of its law, one cannOt experience sublime feeling. Fur­

mermore. me sublime differs from rane in the quality of the feel­ing. Violent. divided agajnst itself, it is simultaneously fascination,horror. and elevation. Thissplirting can also be expressed in termsof a possible communication. For what authorizes sublime feding

to demand its communication is that part of itself, mat compo­nent. which is the aesthetic analogue of respect. This alone. con·sequently, lays claim to the concept. The communication of thebeautiful does not refer to any concept; this is why the critiquemUst deduce it. Taste is immediately a thought that feels itself. the

thought mat does not think the object but feels itselfon the ~ca­sion of the form of an object. The sublime is a thought that IS felton the occasion ofan absence of the object's form. But this absence

is only due to rhe thought of another object by means of a con­cept, the Idea of absolute causality and magnitude. Sublimethought is a "rationalizing" conremp!:uion. It is in this name thatsublime thought demands to be communicated. Thus it onlymakes its demand under [he direction of a concept. This is what

gives the sublime its violence. It is an aesthetic. feeling. and notmerely any delight, because it demands to be ulllversally commu­nicated. But what demands this communication in this aesthetic

feeling is not the aesrhetic. but, rather, reason itself.

Th~ Communication ()fSllblim~ Fulfllg'30

The Other Object

I will brieRy point out a remarkable effect of the U2[US given tothe communicability of the sublime by the critique. The analyticof this feeling insists at various points that the sublime is only inthought (91--92, 91--93. 114. 134; 8S-S9, 8HO, no, I29). and matmert is no sublime object suiccly speaking. The critique also insistson calling the sublime a Grisusgifli.h/(r.« Chapu:r 7. pp. 181-87) inorder to show the extent to which narurc, which in the beaUtifuladdresses itself to thought through the "cipher· of its forms, is dis­crttlit~ in sublime feding. As if thought wert turning away fromany given object only to ~ cuhed by its power (0 think an ·ob-­ject" that it gives itself.

Things are not quite so simple. For ifit were only a question ofthinking the absolute. one would lx f2e«l. with a case of specula­tive reason, which would not belong to the aesthetic at all. Whe:K­as he:rc= we: do ind«d ha~ an ao:thetic ddight, and this implidi the:prc=2ntation of an obja:t or at least the: prc=2ntation of the: form ofan obja:t by the: imagination, c=ve:n if the: prc=Kntation is nc=gativeand the: objc=a formless. Thus the:rc= is an objc=ct: that giVdi risc= tothe sublime, if not a sublime object:. Par:tgr2.ph 39 rc=fers to "thepleasurc= in the sublime in naturc=" (149; 142). Morro~r, the: argu­ment that rc=lUses sublime: fe:eling its universal communication alsoinvokdi the formless character of the object that may give risc= tosublime feeling. "Therc= is simply [schkchthin] no authority for mypresupposing that other men will pay attention to this object andtake delight in contemplating the uncouth dimensions of naturc=/in &trnchtullg tkr rauhm GrOJl~]" (149, t.m.; 143).

This argument against the hypothesis of a sublime Imsus com­munis, which proceeds by way of the strangeness of the: "sublimeobject," no doubt suppons the argument we have: just analyzedthat appeals to the "orher feeling" hidden in sublime feeling. Butinstead of exploring the subjective state of thought seittd. by thesublime, the argument contents itself with remarking the unce:rtainstatus of the object that occasions this state. The object is indeed aphenomenon (pyramid of icc, ocean, volcano, etc.) and as suchfalls under the general rule of knowledge, the schematism. The

2)' Tht Communication ofSublimt Fuling

"Savoyard peasant" perceives and conceives the phenomenon,whereas Herr von Saussure, who hnds in the: same object occasionfor a sublime e:morion, seems unquditionably foolish (115; 1lJ). Thehrst has good sc=nsc=, understanding; he: is wrstiindig. The: secondfeels in the object the: "prc=Knce" of some:thing that transce:nds the:object. The mountain peak is a phe:nomenon that indicates that itis also some:thing morc= than a phenomenon. It indicatdi this prc=­cisc=ly in that it "almost" exceeds the capacity of the: imagination'scomprc=hension and forces the laner to beat a rc=treat. Space andtime, which it must give: up synthdiiung (which an= thus no longc=rspace and time as forms of intuition), signal the unpr~ntable

·presence" of an object: of thought mat is not an objc=ct: of experi­ence, but which cannot bc= sc=ntimentally deciphemi anywherc= ex­cept upon me object ofexperie:nce. The analogy with morality im­poses itsdf once again by way of this phenomenist or para-phe­nome:nist means of access. For the virtuous act, if it exists, is aphenome:non, but if it is virtuous it pointS to the Other of phe­nomenality, absolute causality and itS law.

One: could say mat the: object's Other is not an object and that_me sign is what de-objectihdi the: object. This is only true if one:identihdi the: object with the: phenomenon. However, in the: vo­cabulary of the critique:, this should not bc= done. An object is whatoffers itself to thought. The: Ideas of reason have objectS, thosc=limits ofunde:rstanding constituted by the: absolute whole:, the ab­solute cause, and the like:. Although one cannot hnd a corre:­spending intuition for the:m, one: can still think them, and thustake them as objects. These are the objects thai Kant calls "intelli­gible" (KRV, 467, 483-84; $27, 547). Whe:n .thought grasps a phe­nomenon as a sign, it thinks it in twO different ways at once: as agiven and conditioned object of experience, and as the effc=ct of atransce:ndent causaliry. The:se tWO manners of thinking are: tran­sce:ndenrally "Iocalizc=d" in twO different facultary rcalms. They areheterogeneous and characterize the same object in a heterogeneousway. The object [hat is presented to rcason in the phenomenon isnever "big" enough with respect to the object of its Idea. and forthe imagination the lane:r is always [00 "big" to be presenrable.

The differend cannot be resolved. But it can be feh as such, as dif­ferend. This is the sublime feeling. This feeling makes the rawmagnitude of nature a sign of reason while remaining a phenome­non of experience. The sublime feeling does this with the help ofthe dynamical sylllhesis. Still one must have the "sense," theFiihigkeit of the heterogeneous and of the necessiry that forces theheterogeneous ways of thinking to meet, without, however, reduc­ing their differend in the least.

'35The Communication ofSub/ime Fee/ing

interest is signaled by a feeling that should be the sensation we aretrying to isolate: the state in which thought, discovering the puri­ty of a maxim, finds itself and recognizes the "sign" of the morallaw's "presence" in the maxim. This "sign" signifies not only thatthe will obeys an imerested motivation, including the one thatmay push it to accord itself with moral law, bur that pure practicalreason, the free (absolutely first) causality, is implicated in the de­termination of the will. This sensation is a kind of liking: "We ul­timately rake a liking [wir gewinnm endlich ... lieb] to that theobservation of which makes us feel that our powers of knowledgeare extended" (ibid.). Our powers of knowledge are "extended"(~iurte). because pure practical reason emers into the picture inthe maxim of an empirical desire. It is this feeling of "liking" thatthought feels when it discerns (recognizes) true morality, beyondmere factual rectitude.

Thus mere is a kind of subjective happiness in the observationof a pure practical judgment or ofa strictly moral maxim-a hap­piness projected as a liking for me latter. This happiness can becritically analyzed as the harmonious accord of the "faculties ofknowledge," i.e., the powers of thought insofar as they are direct­ed at the object. This happy sensation stems from the way "reason,with its faculty of determining according to'a priori principleswhat ought to occur [was geschehen soli]. can find satisfaction[a/kin gut fintkn kann]" (ibid., t.m.). Rational thought can thus"find satisfaction" because irs power of determining a priori "theends of freedom" is in "accord" (Obereimtimmung) with freedom"in the moral sphere" (im Sittlichro: 215; 205). This is the definitiongiven in the third Critique of the third supersensible Idea, the onewhich precisely authorizes the accord. the Obereimtimmung, of thea priori law of freedom and the maxim of moral desire. The "ex~

tension" of the faculties of knowledge is thus considerable; it iseven maximal, for it requires that the supersensible principle guar­antee pure a priori desire irs actualization in a concrete maxim (but

always and only as a sign).Moreover, with this accord. this harmony. and this happiness

one cannot help thinking, by analogy. of the state that character-

The Communication ofSublime he/ing'34

The Aesthetic Feeling Inspired by Moral Judgment

The following point remains ro be examined: the "soul-stirringdeligh( fclt by "mionaliz.ing" (1Ier11unfulnd: 149; 143) thought inthe sublime is not respecr for the moral law irsel( Rather. this de­light is an echo of respect in the order of the aesthetic, thar is, inthe order of contemplation and not of practice. Should one mere~

fore see this exaltation as the sensation mat must subjectively ac~

company moral judgment or the "maxim" of moral will in general?Kant examines this sensation at the end of the "Methodology of

Pure Practical Reason" (KI'V, 163-65; 182~85). The question ofmethod in morality concerns the learning of moral correctness.There are twO dispositions [Q acquire. One must first learn "to

make judging according fO moral laws" into something of a"habit," that is, to acquire and/or have acquired a competence thatallows one to distinguish between "essential duties" and "non­essential duties" (ibid., 163; 182). The next step is to learn and/orteach how fO judge whether an act is done not only in accordancewith the moral law but "for the sake of the moral law" (ibid., 163;18J). For in the first case, the action or, rather, its maxim offersonly a rightness of deed; it has a moral value only in the secondcase.

What is of interest to our discussion here is that this exercise ofmoral discernment in which reflection is formed in the practicalrealm-the reflection whose responsibility it is to "decide" what isgood-must "gradually produce a certain interest even in its [rea­son'sl own law {Ie/bsl am Cemu dme/bmJ" (ibid., 164; 18J). This

'36 Th~ Communication ofSub/;m~ Fuling Th~ Communication ofSub/im~ Fu/ing '37

ires the thought judging the beautifuL Accord, harmony. and hap-.piness are guaranteed to thought by the second Idea of the super­sensible, according to which, I will remind the reader, there is a"subjective finality of narure for our cognitive faculties" (ibid.).The analogy is inevitable because the text concerns practicalmethodology and the (subjective) feeling wim which a moral judg­ment provides thought, and nm the practical acrualiz.ation of thelaw by the maxim. Kant does in fact make the analogy. This exer~

eise of moral judgment "only enables one [Q entertain himself withsuch judging and gives virtue or a turn of mind based on morallaws a form of beauty [eine Form tin- Schiinheir] which is admired[bt'Wundtrt] but not yet sought" (KPV, 164; IS]). Ikwuntkrt, mxhnichtg~ucht: one admires virtue. It is an aesthetic feeling, but onedoes not yet seek it; it is not an ethical obligation. Thinking en~

tertains itSelf, is entertained by its accord on the occasion ofvirtuetaken as an object. It does not, however, engage itself to practicevirtue. The good ratio in which the faculties of knowing findthemselves with each other, the power to prescribe absolutely andthe power to realize the prescription, is so pleasant that thinking"dwells" in its subjective state, "lingers," marks a pause, a ~TUMi/~

tUig (64; 61), and thus defers the putting into action of virtue.The subjective state occasioned by the observation of moral rec­

titude should be compared to the feeling of the beamiful. "Theexistence of the object remains indifferent to us, as it is seen onlyas the occasion [dh' Vtoranlassung] for our becoming aware of thestore of talents [Taknu} within us [in urn iml~ zu Wt'rdm] that el­evate us krhabenm] above the mere animal level" (KPV, ,64, t.m.;183). "Talent" belongs to the terminology of the beautiful, theirelevation, uhahmm, to that of the sublime. It is less importantfor the moral maxim (the "object") to "manifest" a transcendenceof free will in relation to all other motivation ("anima!''' "patho­logical"); it is more important for the object to be grasped as theoccasion of a pleasure, which is the case with taste. We have theproof in what follows: "It is the same with everything whose con­templation produces subjectively a consciousness of the harmonyof our powers of representation by which we feel our entire cogni-

tive faculty (understanding and imagination) strengthened\gtstiirktl" (ibid.). The formulation leads directly to the Analytic ofthe Beautiful, in partirular to what goes by the name ofanimation(see Chapter 2, pp. 60-67).

One must not forget the determination of the "satisfaction" thusdescribed in the relative clause attached to it and with which theGerman sentence ends: "produces a satisfaction that can be com­municated to others [tUn sich auch autUIYn mituikn liijftl" (KPV,,64; 18J). This specification rerurns us to the question of commu­nication. The aesthetic feeling provided by moral judgment de­mands, "it tOO," to be communicated. We recognize the obliga­tion to be communicated, the So/kn, inherent in taSte. But letthere be no mistake: that my taste should be communicable doesnot entail that duty should be. Taste is subjective, and duty is ob­jective. In the Methodology of Practical Reason the first "youmust" is "still" in a relation of analogy with the second, and theaesthetic feeling produced by virtue is only a means of instillingthe habit of recognizing and practicing virtue. As the means tosomething other than itself, this feeling cannot be identified withpure taste. Furthermore, as something aesthetic, taSte cannot beconfused with moral feeling-strictly speaking, respect-nor can itbe confused with the obligation of putting the law into action.There is even some danger in this kind of learning: the pleasure inadmiring virtue may deter thought from the desire to practice it.

Thus the term to compare, in the order of the aesthetic, withthe feeling provided by the ethical maxim is not sublime feelingbut the feeling of the beautiful. Sublime feeling is in no way ahappy disposition of thought. The powers of thought in sublimefeeling in no way relate to one another according to a good pro­portion; they "disproportion" themselves violently. The object thatoccasions the sublime is assuredly a "sign," the sign of a supersen­sible sphere, bm it disarms the presentation and goes so far as todiscredit the phenomenality of the phenomenon. The analogy(that one might suppose possible) between the "raw" magnitude orforce of nature and virtue, insofar as they both inspire a sublimefeeling, finds its limit here. To judge a maxim to be morally es-

timable leads thought to feel it as beauriful. 10 judge the ocean"too big" for presemation leads one to experience it as sublime.Duty can and must be called sublime: "Dury! Thou sublime andmighty name that clost embrace nmhing charming It/jehu B~­

li~bUJr (KPV, 89; 10I). However, dury differs from the sublime inthe mief sense in that it does nm move dlOUght "by threateningaught that would arouse natural aversion and terror" (ibid.), andmal [he law it prescribes "itself finds emrancc imo the mind" (rinGnnu . .. ~kha von g/bJI im Gmlut~£jngal/gfintkl: ibid.). Thusin me: description of the sublimity ofduty one finds characteristicsthat make the ft~lingof duty. respect. nor in faCt a sublime feeling.If virtue were itself sublime. the sign of the law of freedom in itwould nor be graspable by subjective thought excepl by "sub·merging" the phenomenality of the virtuous act, which would be100 big or tOO strong to be presentable. This act would nOI be anact: the pure and free desire of which il would be a sign would J

prevent empirical will from actualizing it, JUSt as the absolule ofreason preventS the presentation of the phenomenon by the imag­matlon.

All that can be conceded to sublime feeling in the consider2­tion of morality is resistance (see Chapter 6, pp. 147-50), the re­sistance of virtue to passions, to "fear," "superstition," "the frailtyof human nature," and itS "shortcomings" (112-14; [08-[0). Thecourage of a soldier, or of a people at \Var, the submission of onewho believes to God can be experienced by thought as somethingsublime, on condition that the maxim orientating the will of thesoldier, of the people, of the one who believes, be virtuous. Butcven then it is not morality itself that is fell ro be sublime, it is itSresistance to temptations, its triumph over them, reducing them to

naught. The sublime and aesthedc effect results from the dispro·portion of pure will ro empirical desire. However, virtue consists inthe simple "presence" of the former in the latter according to their"natural" accord, without resistance, and this is why virtlle evokesbeauty.

Morality thus intrinsically demands to be univers.1l1y colllllluni·cated, and it is analogous in this respect 10 the feeling of the beau·

tiful. But it is analogous only, for this demand is legitimated by anIdea immediately or unconditionally present, always present, andpresent a priori to the thought that desires: the concept of free­dom. Whereas the demand to be immediately communicated intaSte must be deduced from a principle of JnIJUS communis. that, inrum, is legitimated by a "supe~nsible" Idea that is hidden andaccording to which the forms in nature are in affinity with theSlates of Ihought. AJ for the sublime. it escapes both demands foruniversal communication. In the bce of the r2W magnitudes andforces of nature (or the resistance of virtue) "there is simply noauthority for my presupposing that other men will pay arrention 10

it [daraufRikltsicht "~hmtn]" (149, t.m.; [41). The Idea of the ab­solute is nOl present to thought here in the necessary form of re­spect. The Idea of the finality wilhout concept of a form of purepleasure cannot be suggested by the violent cofllr2-finality of theobject. The sublime feeling is neither moral universality nor aes·thetic universalization, bUI is. r.!ther, Ihe destruaion ofone by theothet in the violence of their differend. This differend cannot de­mand, even subjectively, to be communicated to all thought.

lJ9Th~ Commuuicntion ofSublime FtelingTb~ Communication ofS/lblim~ P«linglJ8

Index

L

J

Index

In this indo: an "r after a number india.te$;II SCFr.m: mcrenIX on me IlCXt

page. and an "fr indicates scpar.ltC: rmrenocs on the next rwo pages. A con­tinUoU5 discussion O\~r (Yo'() or morc~ is indicated by a span of pagenumbas, e.g., ·S7-19." Passim is used for a dustCf of mcrmas in close butnot consecutive sequence. [nllics arc alphabetized Imer by letter, ignoringword breaks, hyphens. and accents.

Absolute, 14. 39. 56. 70, 75, 8of.9}f, 98-101, 110, 118, 137-41,lSI-57, 170-71, 214-15. 1}2-}4.

".Absolutdy, 79. 81, 111, 119, 112., 12.4.".Absolutes. 100, 12.4. 'jZ. 215Acsthetic Ida, 64-67. 68, 73-74.

99, 110, 1I1-lj. 239Amphiboly (of the concepts of reo

Atclion), 17. 29-31, 44-49passim. IJI-}1" IOI

Analogy, 46-47. 6S-67, 88, us.[66-67, llj, ljO, lj7-j8

Anamnesis, jl-35, 46-47AnimatiOn, In LifeAminomy, 47, 60, 165, 197, 107-11 ,

21j-[6. &r auo DialectieAntithetic, j9, 98, [}2-jj, 107-8·

Sn ow Dialectic

Appn.rancc (traJUCCndcntal), 26,19-30, }9. ~I, 76. IJI-j2., 165

Apprehension, 11-1}. 60. 74, 79·81, 9}. 96. 101, 104-14. 12.7. 1}1,

1}6, 141. S« illsD Syntheses, ele­mcnt.try

Axioms (ofintuilion). 79. 90. 92 ,

94,96-97. I}l

Burke, Edmund, 24, 60-61, 66-68,82, 110, 116

Categories, 16-17, j6-49 pllIIim, 78.89-90, [24, 141, 191, 107

CauS31iry, 2[, 15, j6-41, 95, 99, 117,141,145, 170, [76, 186, 115,118-j[,ljj

Coded (writing of N:Ilure). 51. 69,181, Srr auo Cypher

Common sense (~'&"$/# rommu-

143

'45

T:l.utegoric:ll, 4--6. Ij-tS. 1S· jl-}S.41,81, 99, Ill. Ij9, 145. 194. 218

Time:. 9-10. 18-2]. 64. 90, 104. II},Ilj. 1}4-}6. 146. ISS. 161. 191,

'HTopic. 17. 26-19•.p, 1O}, 110

Schema. 14. II. lo}f. 107. IIj. 14S,

148. t68. 101Sensation, 8-IS. 19. 1j. }4. 4}. 79.

81.99. 111, 117. I2.S. 1}7-40. lSI,ISS, t92, 102. 110. 111-12, ll4.

1J4-jSSign, Ij7-41, IS2, ISS. IS? 18j, 186.

t88. 101. 110, liS. 11S. lB-}4.1j7-}8. Stt /tUo ·Prc::scnce"

Sub~ivdsubjea, 4-8. 1j.}}.}6-j7. 4S, 53. 79, 81-8S, 96, 109."4,117. 1}9, 144. ISO, 181-86.197. 10j-4, ltj. 2.17, 11S, 1jS

Subreplion, 70. 181. 19SSubstrllie. I}, liS. 197, lIS-18. 119SupefSCnsible. Ij. 42. 87. liS. 147.

ISS-S7. 176. 197. 110-18 pmsim,1jS-j7

Syntheses, deme:nl2ry", 21-1j.

jo-jl. JS. 60. 74. 90-91, 96, lOS,14S, ljO. S« Ill» Apprehension;Recognition: Reproduction

Rc:lalion, }4. j9. 46. 64. 67. 81. 84.87.116, Ill. t1.4

Reproduclion. 11-21, 60. 67. 74.96. lOS, 142-4j. Stt IlUo Symhe­sc:s, dememary

Rcsisl2ntt. j8. 46. 77. 1t9. 147-So.

'i'Respect. IS. 41. 68. 116-18, 126,

IS}-SS. J7S, 171. 181-86. 190,217-19, lB--J4. Ij8-j9

["de<

Re:cognition. 11-11. 60. 74. 107· Sitalso Syntheses. eleme:nlary

Rcflcction, 1-8, 14, 18-jl, J4-JS.4j-47, 49. 78. 8S· 14S. 160. 194.

11l.114Refl.e:xive space:. Stt Topic

Qu.ality.}4. }9. Sl-S4, 61, n. 91,96.110.116, 141. 147, 196. 12S

Quamiry. 16-17. 21, j4-j9. S}. S7.n-86. 89. 98. 1l0. t91, 194

Nature. 4S-SS, 66. 69, 71-79. 90·101. III, "9, Ij9. lS6-S8. t68.171-71. 18}, 18S, 188, 114-17. 21j,118, 1jl, Ij9

No:cssiry. t6-19. +4, 47-49, 71, 8j,In-37. 167, 197-100. 104-S. 111,

'i4

Orienl2oon. 7-8, }8. 40

Play, 4. 11. 19. 6j. 67. 7S, 88. 100.lSI, t68

PrlIcticaI. j6--4}. u8, 148, IS4'164-68. 173. 186. 190, 219,1}4-j6

"Presence." S}. 71-73, 94, 1}7-}8,

ISo-Sl. ISS-S8. t69. 179. 111-11.114,217-18. Ijj-jS

Presenl2lion. Sl, S6--60, 6S-70, 88.91-9j,96, 114. 117, II}. 117, 119·

141. t4}. 147, ISO, 108Proponion. 18. 14. 101-1, Ilj, 121.

m

Mc::I.liure (fundamemaj or firsl).

80-81. 9j, 101-1. loS-IS. I1j.

I}O, 151, IS6, 19SMethod. Stt Manner/methodModality, 16, j4, 44, 47-48, 67-7},

81-84.89.118,169.191,198

J

MagnilUde. SI-S}, 70, n-8l. 91.

96, 101. lOS, liS, IS7-S8, 184. 118.

'i'Magnitudo. 80. &t also MagnirudeManner/method. 6-8. 16--18.

4 1-46 pnrsim, 49, 79. Ij7. 181Marcrial, 61, 6S, 77, 86, 100, 168.

181, 194, 111. 111. 114MathcmariCiI. Itt

Dynamical/m:l.rhematical

law. JU RcspeclLife. 61. 67--68, 74, 119

Geniw, 4S-49, 61--6j. 67--69. 74ff.161, 112

Form, 48-49, S4, 7}. 76, 87. 88-89,99-101, Uj. 14j, 18j-?o. 194-99passim, 104, u8, 1}1

Freud, Sigmund. 14. n, 60, 118.

",

Idea of TC:2SOn, S9. 6S. 94. 96, III,

117-19. Ij7-j8. 14S, 164. 170,210-11, 2.12-lj. 119-jO

Immediate. 4S-SI. 61. So. 87.91--9j, 107, 160, 169. 189, 191--9S,106. :H1, 110, 11S. 2jl. Str Ill»Tautegorical

Innnile. 9j--97. 101. 109. 114£. lSIImdlecuw feeling, SJ-S6. 184-8SImerest.}4. S7. n-78, 86. 96. too.

147-49. IS4, IS9--64 passim.l68-n, 178. 187, 224. 117

oHete~nC'Ouslhom~ncous,

11-26,89, 9j, 9S, 104. 116, 124.IB, Ij7. 140-46, 182, IIS-17.

2B-J4Hnuuril;, 2-4. 26-j2, 40. 4j,

46-47,81.99.121.194, 114

["de<'44

niO. 11. '7-19. 43. 84, 199-106palJim

Communication (offrding), 48.62--6}. 151. 161, 168, 191-91, 196­

"'0Composilion. 104-9. 114. 120. 'H.

I}S, II}

Comprc:hc:ruion. 21., 98, 101-11 JHlS­sim. l}l-j}, 137. '41_ IH

Cypher. ,82, 1.)1.

Dclighl. 11. 2.4. 44. 49-10. 57. 60,6:.,67--68,71, 7J. n. 84-85, 96.118-19.116.141,147. IU--6,. 179.181, 18S. '95, 198, l.IO. 2.21-26.l}l-p.

Deslinalion. 18, IS. 120, I1j, ''IS.156.159. 18j-84. 187. SuIlIstJ Fi­nality

Dialmic. j~}I. 47. 59. 72, 98. 10].

:uz.. Snalu Aminomy. Amithet­i,

-Di2kc:IK:: 117-29. Ijl, 189

Difrc:n::nd. 39. 11)-}I, 149. '51, 164.IJ4.139

Out)' (Sollrn), 116, In-}6. IJ9"-41.165.169-70,178, to}. Ill-jS

Dynamical/mathematical. 24.39-40, 78, 89-97 passim, 116,11j-24. Ij6-40, '49. 157. 209ff.116, 2M

Finality, j-14. 44. 49. 51, 6j-71. 81,86--89,99. US. 141. lSI, IS6, 181.2°7-9, Uj, 118. 2j6. lj9

Employment. Sl-jJ. 66, 8.. [65--67.17J-74. 175. ,81-8j. 188. II..

Enthusiasm, 147. IS!, 15}-j6. '79.

'"Exemplary, 16.44,49,71, 160, 180,199, lOS. 11}. &t also Necessity

Voice, 18, 84, 120-12., 156, 192, 194.210. 216, 218

82-86,192,195-98, 20j-7, 214,123, 126, 2jo-jl, 239

/ndn:

\Vhol~, 109, 112-17 jHUJi"" l29-jO.138, 126,23j

J

MERIDIAN

Crossing Aesthetics

Jean-Fra.n~ois Lymard, On lIN Analylir oflIN Sublim~

Peter Fenves. "ChalU''': 1.Angwzg~ a"d History in KinluglJilrd

Jean-Luc ancy, TM Expnima ofFrudom

Jean~Joseph Cow:, O~dipUl. Philosoph"

Haun Saussy. Tht Probkm ofa Chin~ AmlNlie

Jean-Luc Nancy, Th~ Binh /0 !Wma

l.ibn.ry of CongtnSCUOlklging-in-Publicldon Daa

Lym:rnl., Jean-F~is[~ons.MIr I'AsWytiquc du wblimc. English!L..asoru on the AsWytic of the Sublime: Kam'$ Critique ofJudgmenl, [~ions11j-19 J Jean-Franl,"Ois L)'OQI&lranslated by E1iubclh Roltcnbcrg.p. em. - (Maldian)Includcs index.ISIIN ~7-1141-1 (cloth)lSIIN 0-10..7-1141-0 (paper)I. Kanl, ImmOlnuel, 1714-1804. Krilik dCT Uncilskraft. 1.Sublime, The-HisIOry-lltrh amury. j. Judgmem (Logic)". Ac:sthetiC$. s. Teleology. I. Title. II. Serics :Meridian (Slanford. Calif.)1I171t..·L96"lj 1994Ill-dClO9j-I06ltj

c'"

@ This book is primed on acid-free paper.It was typeSCI on a Macintosh lidat Stanford University Press.

J